Ancient Greek Dialectic as Expression of Freedom of Thought and Speech

Author(s): Enrico Berti

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1978), pp. 347-370
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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ANCIENT GREEK DIALECTIC AS EXPRESSION OF FREEDOM
OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH*

BY ENRICO BERTI

1. Freedom of speech and philosophy in Athenian democracy.-

After Hegel it has become a commonplace to assert that philosophy
was born in Greece, because in Greece for the first time we find realized
that very freedom of thought which is the necessary condition of philoso-
phy itself.' However, the assertion is still very general if we do not
precisely understand what he means by freedom of thought and to what
period or aspect of Greek philosophy he refers. Hegel undoubtedly,
when he speaks of freedom, has also in mind its practical aspect, that is,
its political side; in fact, he asserts that free philosophical thought has
an immediate connection with practical freedom for the reason that
philosophy appears in history only where and to the extent that free
constitutions are formed.2 Furthermore,he is well aware of the particular
mode of political freedom that was realized in Greece, because he claims
that it was a matter of limited freedom on account of the existence of
slavery, and to this proposition he adds the famous declaration accord-
ing to which in the Orient only one is free, which is to say no one, in
Greece only some are free, and in the Christian-Germanicworld all are
free.3 However, it cannot be forgotten, and he repeats it himself, that

* This article is a new and revised version of a communication

presented by
me to the Fourth Conference of The International Society for the History of Ideas,
held in Venice (Fondazione Cini), Sept. 28-Oct. 3, 1975 on the theme "Freedom
of Thought and Expression in the History of Ideas." The first version was published
in Italian in the journal Verifiche, 5 (1976), 339-57. The present version differs
notably from the preceding one insofar as it is addressed not exclusively to scholars
of the history of the idea of freedom but to those of ancient thought in general.
Since, however, some parts of the two versions coincide, I thank the editors of
Verifiche for having permitted me to reproduce them in English and thank the
editors of this Journal for having accepted this revised version.
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen iber die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung
B3.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. On the existence of
slavery, Marxist oriented historiography insists
especially, as is well known, on denying any genuine freedom in the ancient
Greek world. However, concerning this question cf. M. I. Finley, Democracy
Ancient and Modern (Cambridge, 1972; Italian translation, Bari, 1973), 16-17,
observing that the existence of slaves did not prevent a good part of the population
(demos)-peasants, shopworkers, artisans-from being admitted and participating
in the political community as members with full rights, which constitutes an amaz-

347
348 ENRICO BERTI

freedom for Hegel means essentially self-consciousness, thought about

thought, autonomy of the spirit confronted by nature,4 which ends by
conferring a very general and almost tautological meaning on the rela-
tion between philosophy's birth and the existence of freedom.
A more specific form of such a relation is assumed instead, and this
is the thesis I propose to illustrate, if by freedom we understand that
particular form of freedom realized in a democratic constitution, and
more precisely, the form realized in the Athenian democracy of the fifth
century B.C.; and by philosophy we understandthat particular philoso-
phy developed by the Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratics, including
among the latter Plato and Aristotle, that is, a philosophy of a type not
naturalistic nor religious, but dialectical. That which agrees, in my
opinion, with the establishing of a determinate relationship between
political freedom and philosophy, in the sense indicated, is precisely
that aspect of political freedom which is the freedom of thought and
expression, that is, what the Athenians called the equal right of speech
in the public assembly (isegoria) and which had as its growth or, accord-
ing to other opinions, its degeneration, in the faculty of saying anything
whatsoever (parresia).
That freedom of speech was an essential aspect of Athenian democ-
racy is amply attested above all by its supporters, e.g., Herodotus who
claimed that the equal right of speech is the principal element of equality
of all citizens before the law (isonomia), which is the essence of the
democratic regime.5 But it is also attested by its critics, e.g., Isocrates
who condemned this freedom by saying that equal rights had degenerated
into verbal license (parresia),6 and by Plato, according to whom Athens
was the city in which free speech (exousia tou legein) was greater than
in all Greece, to the extent that Athens could be called the city "in love
with speech" (philologos) or the city "of many speeches" (polylogos).7
Now, exactly the possibility of using this free speech, guaranteed by
the democratic regime, the possibility of influencing the government of
the city by holding debates in the assembly and persuading other citizens
to approve or reject specific proposed laws, created in fifth-century
Athens that extraordinarydemand for teachers in the arts of effective
speech, that is, in rhetoric, from which the Sophist movement came to

ing change that has had scarcely any applications later on, even in modern democ-
racies themselves exempt from slavery.
4
Hegel, op cit. and Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte,
III, 527.
5 Herodotus V 78.
6 Isocrates, Areopagiticos 20.
7 Plato, Gorgias
461e; Laws 1 641e. On freedom in Greece, cf. also M. Pohlenz,
Griechische Freiheit (Heidelberg, 1955); D. Nestle, Eleutheria (Tiibingen, 1967),
and M. van Straaten, "What did the Greeks mean by liberty?", Theta-Pi, 1 (1972),
105-27.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 349

life.8 In this sense there exists a precise connection between freedom

of speech and that certain type of philosophy known as Sophistical. Such
a connection holds not only for the Sophists, but also runs into, thanks
to the particular technique of discussions elaborated by the Sophists
and transmitted exactly with the name of dialectic, to philosophers
such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, viz., the major figures of Greek
philosophy.
Naturally I do not intend to maintain that a philosophical and
cultural movement as complex as that of the Sophists, or also a succes-
sion of philosophies as profound as those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
should be derived entirely from the freedom of speech allowed by
Athenian democracy. It is well known that the major Sophists had their
own particular conception of arete or human excellence. (It consisted,
for example, for Protagoras in political virtue, that is, in the art of being
a good citizen, for Gorgias in rhetoric, that is, in the art of knowing
how to talk persuasively on any topic; for others in other virtues.) All
these conceptions were associated with the idea that such a virtue was
teachable; hence the Sophists qualified themselves as essentially teachers
of virtue, or of wisdom, and this idea was the chief motive that deter-
mined the rise and expansion of their movement.9 All the more reason
why the same should hold for Socrates, for Plato, and for Aristotle.
To limit ourselves only to the first, the only one of the three who was
the contemporary of the first and most important generation of Sophists;
we know that Socrates' philosophy arose from aspiring to a type of arete
which, though also teachable, for him as it was for the Sophists, had
nothing to do with rhetoric or with freedom of speech and democracy,
to certain aspects of which he was directly opposed.10
Nevertheless it seems to me undeniable that the freedom of speech
assured by Athenian democracy was one of the causes which contributed
to the rise of such philosophies. This holds true in both a negative and
positive sense. Freedom, in fact, insofar as it consists in the absence
of impediments or of external limitations, cannot by itself be the positive
cause, that is, the sufficient cause determining an act. It is only a neces-
8Suffice to cite the classical work of H. Gomperz, Sophistic und Rhetoric
(Leipzig, 1912).
9 For an
adequate illustration of the conception of arete among the Sophists,
cf. W. Jaeger, Paideia (2nd ed., Oxford, New York, 1945), vol. I, Bk. II, ch.
III. For a recent reconstruction of the cultural background of the origins of the
Sophist movement, cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cam-
bridge, 1969), vol. III, which considers H. Gomperz' thesis exaggerated when it
claims that the whole teaching of the Sophists is resumed in the art of rhetoric,
though he recognizes nevertheless that this was a fundamental aspect of their
teaching (20, 24).
10 Also for the Socratic conception of arete and for its analogies and differences
with respect to that of the Sophists, see also Jaeger, Paideia (New York, 1943),
vol. II, Bk. III, Ch. II.
350 ENRICO BERTI

sary condition, that is, without it no such action would be possible. Now
if, as we shall soon see, dialectic - and hence the philosophy of the
Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to the extent that they are
dialectical - presupposes the confrontation of opposing opinions, and
if such confrontation is possible only where opposing opinions are freely
expressed, we may then say that freedom of expression is the necessary
condition for the rise of dialectic and of all those philosophies that have
a non-intuitive character, that is, a character neither revealed nor
inspired, but argumentative and hence dialectical.
Moreover, freedom of speech was the cause if not of the rise, at least
of the spread of rhetoric, of dialectic, and of the philosophy connected
with the latter in a positive sense too. It is generally recognized in fact
that democracy in Athens created the need for citizens to learn the art
of argumentation in order to win in the political discussions which took
place in the Assembly. Now the Sophists at first, and the other philoso-
phers later, came exactly to satisfy this need, and it is in this sense that
we may say that democracy and the freedom of speech connected with
it encouraged the development of rhetoric and dialectic."
However, before going into illustrations of this connection, it is
necessary to clear the ground of an objection that comes spontaneously
concerning the good relations between Athenian democracy and philoso-
phy. In fact, Athens, and particularly democratic Athens, was the only
city of ancient Greece that persecuted philosophers, putting them on
trial in a series of cases for impiety, culminating sometimes in sentences
of death or exile, in which cases the right to profess and express their
opinions freely was denied. The most famous victims of such trials were
(1) Anaxagoras - who was tried according to some, about 432 B.C.,
according to others, two or three years later,12that is, during or immedi-

1 Sharing this opinion, Guthrie has also declared (op. cit., 19, 179): "The
Sophists were not the pioneers of rhetoric, but they were certainly ready to step
in and supply the demand for it which accompanied the development of personal
freedom all over Greece." Furthermore, as is noted by the same author (179, n.
1), the only ones who have been indicated as the inventors of rhetoric-namely,
the Sicilian Corax (according to Aristotle) and his pupil Tisias (according to
Plato)--are said by Aristotle to have written the first treatises on this art after
the expulsion of tyrants from Sicily, that is, after the instauration of democracy
and free speech (Aristotle, apud Cicero, Brutus xii, 46).
12 The date 432 B.C. is indicated-on the basis of Diodorus, xii, 38ff. and
Plutarch, Pericles 82, who placed in this year the decree against impiety submitted
by the soothsayer Diopitus-by E. Derenne, Les proces d'impiete intentes aux
philosophes a Athenes au Vme et au I Vme sicles avant J. C. (Liege & Paris, 1930),
13-41. On the other hand, E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley
& Los Angeles, 1951; Italian transl. [Florence, 1959], 230) tends to place thai
decree and hence the trial of Anaxagoras in 430, considering the trial as a result
of the emotions experienced in Athens during the pestilence, taken to be a sign of
divine anger.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 351

ately after the rule of his friend Pericles - for having asserted that
the sun was an incandescent stone larger than the Peloponnesus, and
that the moon was an earth; he was condemned to exile from Athens or
perhaps directly given the death penalty; (2) Protagoras, who was tried
(according to some between 416 and 415 B.C., according to others,
earlier13)for having declared that it is impossible to know whether or
no the gods exist, and he too was probably condemned to exile or to
death14;(3)Diagoras who was tried afterwards for having denied the
existence of the gods and for having performed deeds against their
worship, was forced also to leave Athens; (4) Socrates, tried on the
charge of having corrupted the youth and for having introduced new
gods, was condemned to death in 399; (5) Aristotle, tried in 323, on the
charge of having deified Hermias, and compelled to leave Athens; and
finally, others like Theophrastus, Stilpo, the Megarian, Theodorus of
Cyrene. Athens' persecution of philosophy may be said to have reached
its culmination in 306 with the famous edict, an act that was submitted
by a certain Sophocles, which prohibited philosophers in general from
keeping a school within the confines of the city.
However, before declaring that Athens denied philosophers freedom
of thought and expression, we need to understand the reasons for the
so-called persecutions and consider their actual extension. According
to traditional opinion, professed by many who have always believed
in freedom of thought and speech guaranteed by Athenian democracy
to intellectuals, the laws which condemned impiety were voted because
impiety, due to the particular character of the ancient Greek religion,
was considered harmful for the state and therefore for democracy itself.
Greek religion, in fact, being free from dogmas and priests, was essen-
tially a product of a cult which considered itself as obligated to the gods
in exchange for their protection of the State. Consequently, whoever
attacked religion or acted against the cult was regarded as if he had
attacked the country, that is, he was a sort of traitor. We need to
consider, furthermore, that, on the whole, trials for impiety were some-
what rare on account of the particular legislation which did not provide
a public inquisition but only an accusation initiated by private persons
(a propos of such persons, it is necessary besides to observe that they
often acted for political or personal ends rather than religious ones).
Moreover, people in effect were punished not for impious or atheistic
13The date 416-415 B.C. is indicated by Derenne, op. cit., 51-52, but is
incompatible with the presumed death of Protagoras in 420, cf. Guthrie, op, cit.,
262.
14 Cf. Derenne, op. cit., 52-55 and Guthrie, op. cit., 263, who refer to the fact,
on the basis of ancient testimony, that Protagoras probably died as a result of the
sinking of the ship on which he left Athens, following his condemnation. Guthrie,
however, like J. Burnet before him (Greek Philosophy, 1: Thales to Plato
[London, 1914], 111 f.) considers this story dubious.
352 ENRICO BERTI

opinions but for their propaganda. For this reason, the atheists who
were actually persecuted were very few in proportion to the great
numbers of atheists who were in Athens at that time. It may be said,
therefore, that, in fact, in Athens there existed a noteworthy freedom
of thought, in any case very superior to what existed in all the other
Greek cities; and if Athens were the only city that condemned philoso-
phers for impiety, this happened because it was the only city in which
there existed philosophers free to speak. In Sparta, in fact, and in other
cities, philosophers were not even admitted.15
According to a more recent view, however, trials for offenses to
religion, which were in Athens notoriously charged against intellectuals,
struck not only at acts contrary to worship but actually at opinions them-
selves, and were manifestations of a reaction against the so-called
"enlightenmentof the fifth century B.C." The reaction emerged during
the last decade of that century through the influence of the soothsayer
priests who felt their prestige diminished, or more probably through the
psychosis caused by the Peloponnesian war tending to overstate the
solidarity of the polis with its gods, or finally through the degeneration
of the enlightenment itself which in some disciples of the great Sophists
had led to justifying any arbitrary opinion whatsover.'6
In any case, even if this second explanation is accepted, which
however holds exclusively for trials occurring at the end of the fifth
century, it must be admitted that the frequency of repressive inter-
ventions reveals a constant tendency of the philosophers to take positions
counter to the most widespread views, which would not be possible
without a certain customary attitude to free speech that should be
guaranteed by the particular form of Athenian government, at least in
the beginning. Moreover, the fact that the philosophers were the victims
and not the advocates of such interventions aimed at limiting free speech
confirmsthe connection existing between the type of philosophy professed
by them and freedom of speech.
2. The birth of dialectic: Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, and Socrates.-
In order to illustrate the connection of philosophy with free speech,
practised in democratic Athens, it is necessary to examine the particular
activity of "dialectic" associated with philosophy or included in it or
identical with it. The term, that is, the adjective "dialectic" by means
of which a determinate activity or art or person practising it is described,
is mentioned for the first time by Plato, but what we indicate as "dialectic"
was previously born surely in the fifth century B.C.17 The same Plato,
Derenne, 247 67; Finley, 29 85ff.
15
16Cf. Dodds, 229-34. Guthrie (32-40) also maintains for such reasons as the
Sophists' foreign origin and easy economic fortune why the Athenian people looked
upon them unfavorably.
17 On the
history of the term "dialectic" see L. Sichirollo, Dialegesthai-Dialektik.
Von Homer bis Aristoteles (Hildesheim, 1966), 18-33.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 353

in his Parmenides, implicitly attributed the discovery of dialectic, at

least as a method of argumentation,to Zeno of Elea. Plato in fact affirms
that Zeno applied to sensory reality the same procedure which, if applied
to intelligible reality, constituted dialectic in the Platonic sense of the
term.18 The procedure consists in establishing a thesis - in the case of
Zeno the Parmenidean thesis that all things reduce to only One Being -
by means of refuting the contradictory thesis, always in Zeno's case the
thesis according to which things are Many. The refutation of a thesis,
in its turn, consists in showing that the thesis in question leads to
intrinsically contradictory consequences; in Zeno's case the consequence
of considering things as Many would be that things would be both
similar and dissimilar at the same time. Zeno's method presupposes,
therefore, the validity of the principle of non-contradiction and is based
entirely on it.
It should be observed, though, that Zenonian dialectic, just by con-
fronting opposing theses and hence presupposingthe existence of a multi-
plicity of opinions, does not also grant to each of them an equal right
to be considered valid, but identifies a priori only one of the opinions,
viz., the Parmenidean one, with the truth by demonstrating that the
opinions opposed to it have no validity. In short, for Zeno dialectic is
entirely at the service of the truth, of science; truth denies any value
whatsover to opinion as such, and therefore it has nothing to do with
freedom of thought and speech.19 For that reason some scholars do not
consider Zeno to be the inventor of dialectic, but accredit it to the
Sophists and more particularly, to Protagoras.20
We recall, in fact, that Protagoras had said that on any subject two
opposing statements could be made, and that he himself had applied
such opposing positions in dialogue form.21 Now, discussing arguments
in favor of opposing theses, that is, to assume as hypothesis a certain
thesis and to deduce from it all the consequences which are derivable
from it in order to see whether the thesis holds up or not, and then to
do the same with the opposite thesis is precisely what Plato indicates in
the Parmenides as the essence of dialectic, and what. even outside of a
true and proper dialogue, Zeno had already done. Moreover, in Prota-

18 Cf.
Plato, Parmenides 127d-128e, 135c-136c. The attribution of the dis-
covery of dialectic to Zeno is confirmed by Aristotle in his lost dialogue The
Sophist, presumably a youthful writing under the influence of Plato (Diogenes
Laertius, VIII, 2, 57).
19It is difficult to judge, in relation to freedom of speech and thought, the
relevance of the fact that Zeno died in an attempt to overthrow a tyranny that
was established in Elea (cf. Diels-Kranz, 29 A 1).
20 On
Protagoras' place as the true inventor of dialectic, cf. above all, G. Ryle,
"Dialectic in the Academy," New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough
(London, 1965), 39-65, esp. 44-45.
21
Diels-Kranz, 80 A 1.
354 ENRICO BERTI

goras' time, others practised this same method within the sphere of the
dialogue form, for example, Thucydides, the Sophist Antiphon, and as
we shall see, Socrates. It is even probable that such a procedure refers
again to those whom Plato and Aristotle considered the founders of
rhetoric, namely, the rhetoricians Tisias and Corax.22
Undoubtedly dialectic arose in close association with rhetoric, which
Protagoras taught as an instrumentfor acquiring skill in the government
of the city, that is, in the political art, evidently successful in persuading
citizens in the assembly.23 The difference between rhetoric and dialectic
is perhaps indicated by the distinction between "long argument" (macro-
logia) and "short argument" (micrologia), in both of which Protagoras
was said to have been skillful24;the "short argument" in fact consists
in interrogating and responding in a clenched dialogue.25 But it seems
that Protagoras insisted in a particular way on the opposition between
the theses confronting each other in the dialogue. In fact, one of his
most famous works was entitled Antilogies, that is, exactly opposing
arguments; whence the beginning of a literary tradition out of which
came the work Dissoi logoi, i.e., "double statements" in the sense of
opposites.26 Now the opposition of arguments presupposes the existence
of conflicting opinions, and the possibility as well as necessity that they
be expressed, which assumes exactly freedom of thought and expression.
For this reason Protagoras' position is characterized in a quite dis-
tinctive manner with respect to the position held by other Sophists,
contemporary with him, and by other philosophers subsequent to him.
In fact, Protagoras had a very high esteem of opinion (doxa) to which
he always attributed a positive value. His well-known declaration that
"all opinions are true"27is a direct consequence of the other still more
famous affirmation according to which "man is the measure of all
things."28 This doctrine has a meaning which today we would call
profoundly democratic insofar as it acknowledges in all humans a certain
degree of wisdom, in particular political wisdom, that is, the capacity
to judge about mattersof common interest.29Protagorashimself bestowed

22 Cf. Guthrie, 179-82.

Plato, Protagoras 318c-319a. The political aspect of Greek dialectic has
23

been well-emphasized by E. Weil, "Pensee dialectique et politique," Revue de

Metaphysique et de Morale, 60(1955), 1-25.
24
Plato, Protagoras, 335b-e.
25
Ibid., 329b.
26
Ryle, 44-55; Sichirollo, 34-60.
27 Cf.
Plato, Theaetetus 166d ff.
28
Diels-Kranz, 80 B 1.
29
Protagoras' position here coincides with that of Pericles who in his famous
speech, reported by Thucydides, stated that only a few are able to govern but all
are able to judge how they are governed. Cf. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society
and Its Enemies (5th ed., London, 1969), I, 186.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 355

an explicitly political dimension, in a precisely democratic sense, on his

affirmation, maintaining - if what Plato refers to him is true - that
"whatever seems just and beautiful to each city is such for that city so
long as it deems it so."30
We ought not believe that this position was generally held by all
Sophists, because Protagoras was probably the only Sophist oriented
politically in a democratic direction.31 And if it might be said in general
that Athenian democracy, assuring freedom of speech, made possible
the emergence of dialectic as a practical activity on a large scale and
was adopted by Sophists in their theorizing; we should add that in Prota-
goras not only did dialectic presuppose the possibility of free speech but
his democratic conception of dialectic amounts to constituting the best
justification of this very freedom of speech. Since, in fact, all have the
capacity to judge political matters, it is right to extend to all the right to
speak.32 The condemnation of that right, therefore, that is, the prohibi-
tion of freedom of speech imposed by democratic Athens on the philoso-
pher, is all the more paradoxical insofar as he more than any other
defended democracy and freedom of speech.
Nevertheless Protagoras' democratic idea of opposing opinions en-
tailed a serious inconvenience for his dialectic: if, in fact, all opinions
are true, then also opinions that contradict each other will be equally
true. Actually, according to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle,
Protagoras had denied the principle of noncontradiction.33But, if that
principle is denied, it is no longer possible to refute any thesis, since
refutingmeans showing the opposite thesis is false insofar as it is a contra-
dictory one, i.e., it is in conflict with the principle of non-contradiction;
thus the peculiar characteristic of dialectic, since the time of Zeno, of
being a method of refutation, is lost. It should follow, therefore, that if
Protagoras discovered the value of opinions for dialectic and hence for
freedom of speech, a thing neglected by Zeno, then Protagoras in his
turn neglected the value for dialectic of the principle of non-contradiction
and hence of refutation.
Socrates was the one who knew how to bring together the two require-
ments of dialectic, namely, the value of opinions and of the principle
of non-contradiction. As he appears in the early Platonic dialogues and
in the testimony of Xenophon and Aristotle, Socrates practised the
method of discussion by questions and answers.34 In this respect, as we
have noticed several times, Socrates was bound to appear in the eyes
30
Plato, Theaetetus 167a. 31 Cf. Finley, op. cit., 28.
32 Ibid.
33Plato, Euthymedus, 236b-c; Artistotle, Metaphysics IV 4, 1007b 18-23.
34That dialectic was also practised by the historical Socrates, and not solely
by the Socrates described by Plato, is established by the exact testimony of
Aristotle; he attributes to Socrates not only the use of inductive arguments (Meta-
physics XIII 4, 1078b27-28) as a type of dialectical argument (cf. Topics I 12,
356 ENRICO BERTI

of Athenians as not very different from the Sophists, and the proof is
seen in the caricature of him drawn by Aristophanes' Clouds. The only
appreciable external difference consisted in the fact that the Sophists
had themselves been paid for their teaching, but not Socrates. For the
rest he practiced the same method as that of the Sophists.35 On the other
hand, in the version of it given by Plato, the dialectical method practiced
by Socrates achieves its technical perfection, shaping itself as putting
to work a whole series of logical procedures, among which the most
important is exactly the refutation (elenchos) or demonstration of the
indefensibility of a specific opinion through the deduction from it of
consequences contradicting itself or other opinions also professed by
the interlocutor.36
The original contribution brought by Socrates to Greek dialectic
consists in the different attitude he assumed towards Protagoras with
respect to opinion. For Protagoras in fact, as we have seen, all opinions
are true and it is the task of dialectic to make one or the other of them
prevail, performing a work of positive persuasion analogous to what is
properly rhetoric. For Socrates, on the contrary, all opinions are as
such false, or better, may be true as well as false, that is to say, they lack
the character of necessary truth that belongs only to science (episteme)
and consequently also, if by chance opinions are true, they are equally
inadequate.37 The task of dialectic, however, is not to serve an opinion
by persuading an interlocutor of its truth, but on the contrary to serve
knowledge by showing the interlocutor the inadequacy of the opinions
he professes, refuting them, or better, refuting their apparent certainty,
their pretension of validity as knowledge, and thus bringing out the
requirement of genuine knowledge.38 In this fashion Socratic dialectic
emancipates itself definitively from rhetoric and assumes an essentially

105 a 10-19), but also confirms the character of true dialectic as questioning with-
out presumptuousness, by recalling the fact that Socrates questioned and declared
his ignorance (Sophistici Elenchi, 34, 183 b 1-8).
35 Cf. Plato,
Apology 19 a-d, recalling "the very old charge" against Socrates
of inquiring into things below the earth and in the sky, "trying to make the
weaker argument appear the stronger, and teaching all this to others."
36 The best illustration of the Socratic dialectical
procedure has been furnished
by R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953). For a philosophical
evaluation of this procedure in Socrates, cf. B. Weldenfels, Das Sokratische Fragen
(Meisenheim a.G., 1961), and F. Chiereghin, Storiciti e originarieta nell'idea
platonica (Padua, 1963).
37 In this
regard, cf. Plato's entire Theaetetus. On account of its negative con-
clusion, it has all the air of expounding Socrates' thought rather than Plato's,
also because Plato's thought is expounded in the dialogues that follow, namely the
Sophist and the Statesman, to which the Theaetetus serves as an introduction.
From this point of view the encounter between Socrates and Protagoras is also
significant.
38 Cf.
Chiereghin, op. cit., 41-92.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 357

critical character, or as Aristotle was to call it, exetastic or peirastic,

consisting in the attitude of examining, valuating, refuting.39
In Socrates, then, dialectic arises also, in accordance with its nature,
in the domain of opinion, and though it regards opinion as its essential
object, it is oriented towards knowledge. However, as has already been
noted several times, Socratic dialectic does not lead yet to knowledge,
that is, the criticism of opinions does not yet approach the conquest of
true and appropriateknowledge. In this respect, the inconclusive nature
of the "Socratic" dialogues of Plato is also characteristic, that is, they
reveal the incapacity to obtain positively the various definitions sought
in relation to which the opinions have been judged inadequate; as is
also characteristic the declaration, often repeated by Socrates, that his
knowledge consists only of "knowledge of his ignorance."40This critical
position of Socrates, which is not a skeptical one, because he does not
deny the existence of truth, but on the contrary, requires it, and is not
dogmatic because he does not claim to possess positively the truth, was
developed in the negative direction by the Cynics and given a positive
direction by Plato and Aristotle. It may be said, however, that in
Socrates, dialectic is detached from rhetoric in order to put itself in
relation to knowledge without, however, being itself converted into
knowledge.
Closely connected with his new conception of dialectic is the attitude
assumed by Socrates towards democracy. While Protagoras, through
his positive valuation of opinions, is a supporter of democracy, Socrates
through his critical valuation of opinions, is essentially a critic of democ-
racy. Unlike Protagoras he does not believe that all persons are able
to judge competently, because in his judgment politics is a science; it is
moreover the science par excellence, and therefore cannot be based
simply on opinions but requires, like all other sciences, a special kind
of competence superior to what opinion offers.41However, since Socrates
does not claim to possess any knowledge, his criticism of democracy
carries no commitment to antidemocraticregimes such as those supported
in Athens by the oligarchical or philo-Spartanparty; this is proved by the
fact that during his lifetime he clearly disassociated himself from the
oligarchs among whom he also counted some friends when they took
power (at the time of the Thirty Tyrants),42and he never rebelled against
the democratic laws, even when these laws inculpated him personally in
a way that he claimed was unjust.43 However, we may say of Socrates,
39 Cf. Ryle, art. cit.; Sichirollo, op. cit., 55ff.
40
Cf. e.g., Plato, Apology 21 b-e, 22e-23c.
41 The contrast between Socrates and Protagoras on this point is expressed by
Plato's dialogue Protagoras 319b-320c.
42 Cf.
Plato, Apology 32a-e.
43 The Crito
exemplary in this respect with the famous speech by the "Laws"
of Athens.
358 ENRICO BERTI

to use Popper's phrase, that though Socrates was a critic of democracy,

he expressed his criticism in a way that we would today define as "demo-
cratic," that is, by accepting the fundamental rules of democracy itself,
namely, the free confrontation of opinions and hence the free exercise
of thought and speech. Of freedom of expression, we should rather say
that Socrates was not only a supporter but a downright martyr, because
he testified with his life for the right of every person to profess his thought
freely, even when it led him to oppose authority and the constituted
power.44
3. Dialectic as science in Plato. - With Plato we are in the presence
of the positive development of the Socratic conception of dialectic which
leads to the complete identificationof dialectic with knowledge (episteme).
Such an identification is in the beginning only asserted, and in a manner
first implicit and then explicit, while in the sequel it is given a founda-
tion, and is finally actualized. In order to illustrate the Platonic
conception of dialectic, as we would any other aspect of Plato's thought,
it is necessary obviously to refer not to his early dialogues, which accord-
ing to the most accredited interpretation express Socrates' position and
are therefore called "Socratic,"but rather go to the dialogues of Plato's
riper, later years.45
So far as dialectic is concerned, it takes on a central importance in
the Republic. A first hint of it is to be had actually in the Meno, in which
Plato declares that "answeringin a dialectical manner" consists not only
in answeringwith truth but also, and above all, in formulating the proper
reply by using terms to which the questioner admits he agrees.46 But
here Plato is still tied to the Socratic model, in which dialectic has a
relation with knowledge insofar as it must tell the truth, but what counts
more is agreement (homologia) with the interlocutor reached through
the dialogue. In the Republic, on the other hand, dialectic appears essen-
tially characterized by its coincidence with knowledge, that is, it is
directly identified with the fourth segment of the line which represents
the different grades of knowing, that is, with the only true science,
namely, intellectual understanding(noesis), which, in differentiationfrom
such pseudo-sciences as mathematics, is not confined to hypotheses, but
rises above them by means of ideas to a non-hypothetical principle, the
idea of the Good, for the purpose of explaining the preceding hypotheses,

44Popper, 194, 306-13. On Socrates' political position, cf. the excellent

status quaestionis produced by Guthrie, 410-15.
45 A thorough picture of the results of researches on the
chronological order
of the Platonic dialogues is given by W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford,
1951), 1-10. The result is that the following dialogues may be considered with
certainty to belong to the maturity and late years of Plato: Symposium, Phaedo,
Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias,
Philebus, Laws, and also Epistle VII.
46
Plato, Meno 75d.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 359

and after having attained this principle, descends from it to all the other
ideas, of which it is exactly the first principle.47 However, in the Republic
Plato does not make clear how the ascent from hypotheses to a first
principle occurs and, above all, how dialectic succeeds in assuring one's
having attained an actual principle, or something not hypothetical, prob-
ably because the theme of the dialogue is not dialectic but the State.48
Some indication concerning the procedure with which one rises to
the first principle is contained in the Phaedo where we find the treatment
to which dialectic subjects hypotheses. Here Plato declares that to
ground any proposition whatsoever, it is necessary before all to formulate
an hypothesis, that amounts to saying a universal proposition of which
the former is a particular case, and he identified such an hypothesis with
the Idea.49 It is next necessary to ascertain the validity of the hypothesis
subjected to dialectic and this can be done in two ways: first, by examin-
ing the consequences derivable from it, in order to see whether there is
agreementbetween them or not; secondly, leading back the first hypothesis
to one that is higher, i.e., more universal, until we reach something that
is self-sufficient (hikanon), that is to say, no longer reducible to higher
hypotheses. All this, obviously, occurs always in the course of a discus-
sion composed of questions and answers.50
Let us observe that in this way Plato clarifies the features of the ascent
to the first principle as mentioned in the Republic, and shows precisely
how the first requisite that a hypothesis should have in order to be
considered true is internal coherence (i.e., non-contradictoriness) and
external consistency (i.e., with respect to other propositions which are
assumed)51; but that is scarcely sufficient to guarantee the truth of the

47 Plato, Republic VI, 509d-51 le. The explicit assertion that dialectic positively

attains the principle (51lb: hapsamenos) clarifies the meaning of previous state-
ments that the idea of the Good is never known adequately (hikanos), cf. 505a-e;
it is in fact a question of positive but partial knowledge, which is, however, more
than simply "knowledge of one's ignorance."
48 Some scholars have understood the ascent from hypotheses to first prin-

ciples as a process of progressive generalization, i.e., the subsumption of particular

concepts under more universal ones (Zeller, Maier, Rodier); others have under-
stood it as a process of axiomatization of geometric type, i.e., the resolution
of more particular and complex propositions into more universal and simple ones
(Milhaud, Stenzel, Cornford). The two interpretations are not incompatible, and
in any case do not explain how dialectic can be sure to attain a non-hypothetical
principle, one that is truly primary and not reducible to anything else.
49Plato, Phaedo lOOa,b.
50Ibid., 100 d, e. The hypothetical method has been illustrated by various
interpreters, in substantial agreement, such as Ross, 93-179; A. C. Crombie, An
Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1963), II, 517-61; K. M. Sayre,
Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago, 1969), 3-40.
51In order to explain the ascent described in the Republic, recourse to the
Phaedo is recommended, rightly in my opinion, by Robinson, 169-72, and Sayre,
360 ENRICO BERTI

obtained result, which is not assured simply by coherence since this

might also belong to a false proposition. A hint of the true way to
guarantee this truth is perhaps contained again in the Republic where
Plato asserts that dialectic reaches the first principle by passing through
refutations of all kinds (did pdnton elenchon diexion) and by striving
to argue not according to opinion but according to reality (me katd
doxan alla kat' ousian).52 This leads us to suppose that the proposition
assumed as the principal one, in distinction from all others, is the one
which resists refutation, and in order to discover which it is, needs exactly
to submit all others to continual refutation.
But the clear explanation and definitive acquisition of the procedure
constituting dialectic, with which to attain the non-hypothetical principle,
can be found, in my opinion, in the dialogue Parmenides; it is, there-
fore, far from being merely a game or logical exercise as some have
maintained, and comes to be the most important of Plato's dialectical
dialogues. In it the dialectical procedure is no longer identified with the
method of Socrates but with that of Zeno of Elea, or better still, with a
synthesis of both, consisting of the application to intelligible realities,
i.e., to universals discovered by Socrates, of the method of disproof
discovered by Zeno and applied by him only to sensory reality or par-
ticulars. This revival of the Zenonian idea of refutation which is distin-
guished from the Sophistic one by virtue of the sharp demarcation be-
tween knowledge and opinion, explains the "scientific"or logical charac-
ter of Platonic dialectic and its thorough devaluation of opinion: it will
also entail, as we shall soon see, a rather hostile position taken against
freedom of speech. Plato's method consists in not limiting itself to
submitting a single hypothesis to refutation by deducing from it all the
consequences and examining whether they are self-contradictory or
inconsistent with other assumed propositions, but - and this is the
decisive turn - in submitting to refutation also the hypothesis opposite
to the one assumed.53 If in fact the two opposed hypotheses are really
mutually contradictory, and one denies what the other affirms,the refuta-
tion of one necessarily implies the truth of the other, a truth which is
not simply one of internal coherence or non-contradictoriness,but is an
incontrovertible or irrefutable truth, obtained precisely by means of
refutation. In this manner dialectic leads to results rigorously scientific,

41-56, who, however, with equally good reason do not maintain that the positive
attainment of the non-hypothetical first principle is sufficiently explained.
52 Plato,
Republic VII, 534 b, c. This passage renders totally inacceptable the
suppositions of many like Robinson, 172-77, who maintain that the guarantee
of the actual knowledge of the first principle is given, according to Plato, by a
sort of intuition; Robinson's interpretation has been subjected to a convincing
criticism by Sayre, 51-54.
53
Plato, Parmenides, 135e-136e.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 361

that is to say, coinciding fully with knowledge; rather knowledge itself

is characterized by its dialectical nature, i.e., by the incontrovertible
result obtained by refutation.54
This same conception of dialectic, which is in profound continuity
with the Socratic method of refutation and constitutes its perfection, so
to speak, is also found in the Sophist in which dialogue "Sophistic" is
identified in the last analysis with the art of refuting, with the clear
explanation that this art is, however, a "noble Sophistic," which is exactly
dialectic.55 But in this dialogue there is also present another conception
of dialectic, showing itself already in the Phaedrus, namely, its identifica-
ton with the putting together (synagoge) of many particular cases in
a single universal case (the Idea) and the division (diairesis) of this
universalinto other universals, less extensive and more specific, contained
in it.56 In fact, in the Sophist also, dialectic is identified with the art of
uniting and dividing ideas (genera and species) in the most correct way,
viz., one which corresponds with reality.57 Whoever knows how to do
it, evidently, possesses the knowledge of all things; this conception of
dialectic, therefore, is the consequence of its identification with knowl-
edge, already affirmed in the Republic. The ultimate perfection of this
view of dialectic is achieved by Plato in the Philebus, in which it is made
clear that dialectic should bring together and divide, and determine
exactly the number of ideas (genera and species) contained in a more
universal idea.58

-4 This characteristic of the

methodology in the Parmenides has not hitherto
been adequately emphasized; on this matter, however, see my article "Struttura e
significato del Parmenide di Platone," Giornale di Metafisica, 26(1971), 487-527
(reprinted in Studi aristotelici [L'Aquila, 1975], 297-327). It must be said, how-
ever, that though the theory of the dialectical procedure in the Parmenides is very
clearly presented, the results obtained by its application are anything but clear
and undisputed, which explains the variety of interpretations the dialogue has
received. They range from the neoplatonic type of versions which accept
the validity of all the hypotheses formulated on the One-cf. J. Wahl, Etude sur
le Parmenide de Platon (Paris, 1926); M. Wundt, Plato Parmenides (Stuttgart,
1935); W. F. Lynch, An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the
Parmenides (Georgetown University Press, 1959)-to those maintaining, on the
contrary, that the hypotheses are all invalid, and therefore tend to consider the
dialogue as an empty exercise of mental gymnastics or simply as a game-cf. A. E.
Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work (London, 1924); Ross, op. cit., 82-99;
Robinson, op. cit., 223-80. The most convincing interpretation, which distinguishes
the valid from the self-contradictory invalid hypotheses, seems to me to be by
F. M. Cornford, Parmenides Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides (London, 1939).
55 Plato, Sophist 229e-231a. Of particular interest in this passage is the manner
in which Plato formulates the contradiction to which the adversary's position is
reduced (230b), which is the same formulation that Aristotle was to give in his
Metaphysics, Bk. IV, in discussing the principle of non-contradiction.
56
Plato, Phaedrus 265d-266d.
57 Plato, Sophist 253d, e. 58 Plato, Philebus 16c-6.
362 ENRICO BERTI

The two conceptions of dialectic that Plato thus seems to profess,

i.e., dialectic as refutation and dialectic as classification of ideas, are
not mutually exclusive; nor does one follow after the other, as some have
believed.59 They imply one another reciprocally, as is proved besides
by the presence of both in the Sophist,60 also from the fact that the
second appears already in the Phaedrus, a dialogue certainly prior to the
Parmenides in which the first at times dominates. Refutation as well as
classification, in fact, aim at the identification of a certain idea, an
identification that is attained by means of division of the most universal
idea to which inquiry has led, into more particular ideas and by means
of exclusion of some of these ideas; now exclusion is precisely a form
of refutation.
Obviously, a similar conception of dialectic as knowledge or science
implies, in Plato, a radical depreciation of opinion, and not only a sharp
contrast between dialectic and rhetoric but one also between dialectic
and sophistic (or eristic).61 "Refutation according to opinion" practised
by Protagoras is for Plato no longer dialectic because dialectic should
"refute according to reality."62 Hence, there is no other dialectic than
philosophy, a philosophy understood as science. A consequence of this
position is the complete condemnation of democracy contained in the
well-known description of it given in the Republic63 and includes the
condemnation of freedom of thought and expression, viewed as essential
features of democracy.64 It is true, of course, that the perfect State
envisioned by Plato is not an oligarchy based on force or on wealth,
or on any other imposed form, but is based only on reason, that is to
say, on explaining to others what is done, and thus on dialectic. But it
is also true that this explaining can take place only among the philoso-
phers charged with ruling the State; thus it is limited to a restricted circle
of persons, and presumably such a circle had its historical embodiment
in Plato's Academy itself. It is significant in this respect to recall the

59A chronological succession between the two methods was affirmed for the
first time by J. Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von
Sokrates zu Aristoteles (Breslau, 1917; English translation by D. J. Allan,
Plato's Method of Dialectic [New York, 1947]), 2-3 and 45-54, and is shared
today, for example, by Sayre, op. cit., x.
60 The simultaneous
presence of both conceptions of dialect has been vigorously
emphasized by Chiereghin, op. cit., 68-70.
61 On the
opposition of dialectic to rhetoric, cf. Plato, Gorgias 471d, 487e
(it is mitigated in the Phaedrus on the ground that rhetoric is based on dialectic);
on the opposition of dialectic to sophistic, cf. Philebus 16e.
62
Plato, Republic VII, 534 b, c.
63
Ibid., VIII, 562a-563e.
64
Ibid., 557 a. In the Laws Plato forecasts a series of punitive laws for the
crime of impiety committed not only by actions but also by speech (X, 907c-e),
and in general is against freedom of speech (parresia) concerning the gods, reach-
ing in some cases to the death penalty (907d-909d; cf. also 885b).
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 363

famous statement in the Seventh Epistle, which if not by Plato surely

reflects a Platonic thought, according to which only after living together
for some time can a few friends, engaged in continuous discussions,
discover and know the truth.65
In conclusion, however, it can be stated, that Plato in one respect
offers us an unprecedented valuation of dialectic, because he arrives
at its identification with the supreme science itself, namely, philosophy;
but, on the other hand, he does restrict its exercise to philosophers alone,
detaching it from and even setting it against freedom of expression, that
aspect of democracy without which dialectic itself could not even arise.
Freedom of expression, primarilythe obligation to take a stand, to oppose
and to refute, are in effect essential for the philosopher; the latter actually,
insofar as he is a dialectician, in order to arrive at truth, needs to come
to account with an adversary,with opposition, with refutation. Under this
aspect the Platonic valuation of dialectic may also be considered as a
valuation only within a limited circle of contrast and confrontation
between opposing views.
4. Scientific and non-scientific dialectic in Aristotle. - With Aris-
totle, Plato's pupil and ultimate representative of classical Greek
philosophy, which ended its cycle contemporaneously with freedom,
that is, with the political independence and internal democracy of the
Greek city-state, dialectic also arrives at its most complete development
which is at the time a recapitulation of the most important of the
preceding stages.
In fact, Aristotle resumes above all the conception of dialectic that
had been inaugurated by Protagoras and which placed the dialectical
activity essentially in the domain of opinions. In the treatise devoted
to this argument, generally constituting the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi,
which Aristotle vaunted as the first works of their kind ever to have been
written,66he declared he was furnishing a method with which to argue
about any problem whatsoever - hence not exclusively philosophical
problems-taking up "noteworthy opinions" (endoxa) either for the
purpose of refuting a thesis unfolded by discussing the side taken by a
questioner, or to defend the side displayed by the respondent.67 The
taking up of noteworthy opinions is what exactly distinguishes dialectical
argumentationwhether of the scientific kind, properly called demonstra-
tion, or of the eristic or sophistic kind; and "noteworthy opinions" were
meant to be opinions held by all, either by the majority of people or by
the learned; and among the latter either by all or by the majority or
by the most well known and esteemed. Scientific demonstration, on the
other hand, does not start from opinions, but from true and appropriate

65 Plato, Epistle VII, 341d-342a.

66 Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi 34, 183b 16-184b7.
67
Aristotle, Topics I 1, 100al-20; cf. also Sophistici Elenchi 34, 183a37-b15.
364 ENRICO BERTI

principles, that is, from statements that should be true and self-evident,
whereas eristic argumentation starts from premises that are only in
appearance noteworthy, but in reality are not.68
With that Aristotle firmly established dialectic in the field of human
opinions, that is, in genuine opinion that is not science and not even an
altogether arbitrary and subjective point of view, but is a position that
must be taken into consideration because and only because it is actually
professed by a certain number of persons.69 It is the same conception
that we have met in Protagoras with the sole difference that in Aristotle
dialectic is removed from forms of degeneration in the eristic sense
(with the aim of prevailing in discussions by unfair means) which after
Protagoras it has experienced in the works of minor Sophists. On the
basis of this conception not only those who know and even those who
only desire to know, but all men can be dialecticians. In fact, "even one
who does not know a scientific subject is capable of putting to the test
another person, . . . thus everybody, including a person lacking compe-
tence can exercise in some way dialectic and the art of putting a thesis
to the test." The only difference between the common man and the true
and genuine dialectician rests on the fact that the former employs without
method the same activity that the latter exercises with argumentative
ability.70
Accompanying this revaluation of common opinion, which for Aris-
totle is not opposed to science, but is ratherthe place from which knowl-
edge draws its material,7' is a natural revaluation of rhetoric derived
by Aristotle from the positions of Protagoras. In fact, for Aristotle
rhetoric is the "counterpart"(antistrophos) of dialectic since both deal
with matters which in a certain way it is appropriate for all to know,
and do not belong to any special science, all participating in both
in a certain way, because all persons strive to put to the test or to
support a particular thesis, or to defend themselves and to accuse
others.72 And, as in Protagoras, also in Aristotle, dialectic and rhetoric
find their most natural terrain of application in political life, where
democracy accepts the free confrontation of opinions: rhetoric in fact,
says Aristotle, is like an offshoot of dialectic and of the treatment con-
cerning peoples' customs which is rightly called politics.73

68 Aristotle, Topics I 1, 100a27-O1 al.

69 On this distinctive character of Aristotelian dialectic Sichirollo's "Giusti-
ficazioni della dialletica in Aristotele," Studi Urbinati, 37 (1963), 65-114 and
279-313, has rightly insisted.
70
Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi XI, 172a23-36.
71 On the value of opinion in Aristotle, see L. M. Regis, L'opinion selon
Aristotle (Paris & Ottawa, 1935).
72 Aristotle, Rhetoric I 1, 1354al-6. On the revaluation of rhetoric in Aristotle,

cf. C. A. Viano, "Aristotele e la redenzione della retorica," Rivista di filosofia, 58

73Aristotle, Rhetoric I 2, 1356a25-26.
(1967), 371-425.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 365

But this is not the only use of dialectic considered by Aristotle; in

the passage in which he enumerates the aims in the light of which the
exercise of this art is rendered useful, after having mentioned the dis-
cussions (enteuxis) that are intended to deal with men in the most varied
arguments, to which dialectic is of service because it is conducive to
taking into account "the opinions of the many" (ton pollon do6ai) and
to discuss with them on their own grounds, he states that dialectic is
also useful for the "philosophicalsciences."74 By this expression Aristotle
alludes not to philosophy in the true and primary sense, i.e., to what he
calls "first philosophy," but to each of the particular sciences cultivated
by specialists. Dialectic is useful to these sciences for two reasons:
because by providing the ability to raise objections on both sides of
issues, it helps discover more easily what is true and false in each alter-
native, and because "being the art of critical examination, it shows the
path that leads to the principles of all scientific inquiries."75
This second use of dialectic, referringexplicitly to science, but wholly
extrinsic and preliminary with respect to the true and primary science,
which for Aristotle consists exclusively of rigorous demonstration, recalls
directly the conception of dialectic Socrates had.76 Dialectic in fact does
not constitute knowledge but the path on which to approach knowledge,
either by means of inquiry (exetasis) or by proof (peira) or by means
of induction (epag6ge), whereas true and primary knowledge takes the
lead only of intellectual intuition (nous) which comes after dialectic
and furnishes the principles from which science proceeds.77
The applications of this second use of dialectic in Aristotle are the
most frequent ones in Aristotle, as frequent as is their conceptualization.
It suffices to cite, with respect to the former, the numerous discussions
with which he underscores the non-philosophical or pre-philosophical
positions (widespread opinions, myths, proverbs, traditional beliefs) for
the purpose of drawing from them suggestions useful for the philosophical
sciences78; for example, the discussions he undertakes with previous
philosophers at the beginning of numerous treatises concerning special
sciences (Physics, On Generation and Corruption, On the Soul, Meta-
physics). As regards his conceptualization of such a procedure, we may
rememberthe famous statementsof his Metaphysics concerning the value
of discussing the opinions of previous philosophers,79and in general the
value of discussing any problem with opposing opinions, exactly as is
74Aristotle, Topics I 2, 101a25-34.
7 Ibid., 101a34-b4.
76 The
recalling of Socrates is moreover explicit in Aristotle's Sophistic Elenchi
34, 183b7-8.
77Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, 19.
7 Cf. G. Verbeke, "Philosophie et conceptions pre-philosophiques chez
Aristote," Revue philosophique de Louvain, 59 (1961), 405-30.
79 Aristotle, Metaphysics II 1, 993bl 1-19; also I 3, 983b4.
366 ENRICO BERTI

done in judicial controversies80;or those statements in De Caelo about

the necessity of passing in review the opinions of others, because the
demonstration of a thesis is equivalent to the refutation of the opposite
thesis.81
This second use of dialectic in Aristotle has long been misunderstood
by interpreters on account of the presupposition that the only logic
admitted by Aristotle was the narrowly demonstrative one theoretically
expounded in the Posterior Analytics, and therefore that any non-
demonstrative argument would be automatically irrelevant to scientific
knowledge.82 Only recently has it been seen that in Aristotle there exists
also a dialectic which is useful for science inasmuch as it is capable
of "preparing the road" for the discovery of the principles of scientific
knowledge, that is, a dialectic, shall we be permitted to say, of Socratic
type.83
Finally, in Aristotle there exists also a third use of dialectic which
is not explicitly conceptualized, but is often practised; it has like the
preceding one a reference to science, in particular to that science sui
generis which is First Philosophy, the science of being qua being. How-
ever, it deals with a more intrinsic matter in the sense that here dialectic
does not function any longer as a preliminary introduction, or pro-
paedeutic, to true and primary knowledge, but constitutes its effective
method, its logical structure. This most well-known and most typical
use of dialectic is the defense of the principle of non-contradiction,
contained in the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In it a true and
genuine demonstration is actually worked out, and therefore moves
effectively into the domain of knowledge; but the procedure employed
is dialectic, because the demonstration consists in the refutation of the
denial of the principle of non-contradiction, i.e., of a thesis expressed
by an absolutely indispensable questioner who is asked to take a stand
and in confronting it the inquiry is conducted exactly as in dialectical
discussion.84 This form of argument, different from what occurred in the

"OIbid., III 1, 995a24-b4.

81 DeCaelo I, 10, 179a6-12.
82
Sharing this opinion were, e.g., E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II,
2 (Leipzig, 19234), 242-45; H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, II, I
(Tiibingen, 1900), 29; 0. Hamelin, Le systeme d'Aristote (Paris, 1920), 229; L.
Robin, Aristote (Paris, 1944), 41-44.
83Cf. J. M. Le Blond, Logique et methode chez Aristote (Paris, 1939); E.
Weil, "La place de la logique dans la pensee aristotelicienne," Revue de me'ta-
physique et de morale, 56 (1951), 283-315; P. Wilpert, "Aristoteles und die
Dialektik," Kant-Studien, 48 (1956-1957), 247-57; L. Lugarini, "Dialettica e
filosofia in Aristotele," II pensiero, 4 (1959), 48-69; W. Wieland, "Das Problem
der Prinzipienforschung und die aristotelische Physik," Kant-Studien, 52 (1960-
1961), 206-19; G.L.E. Owen, 4"4Lo-vat r& OatvrLEva," Aristote et les problemes de
methode (Louvain-Paris, 1961), 83-103.
84
Metaphysics IV 4, 1006all-26.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 367

preceding use of dialectic, does not precede that intuition of the principle
but follows it: all actually intuit the principle of non-contradiction, to
that extent it is true that all use it, but only the first philosopher, the
one who investigates being as being, is able to discuss whether it is true
or false, and only this discussion furnishes the "scientific"demonstration
of the principle.85 Other examples of this use of dialectic could be
displayed by the defense of philosophy contained in the Protrepticus,86
or by the demonstration of the necessity of an unmoved mover in the
twelfth book of the Metaphysics, in which Aristotle also establishes a
thesis through the refutation of the contrary thesis.87
This third use of dialectic resumes in every respect the process
conceptualized and realized by Plato in the Parmenides and may be
considered, therefore, among the Aristotelian acquisitions of dialectic
derived from Plato. It is evidently not within the reach of everyone but
only of the philosopher in the narrow sense, that is, the philosopher who
by virtue of his inquiring into being as such, has to question any certitude
whatever and adopts an integral and purely problematic attitude.
Another aspect of this third use of dialectic, also found in Plato,
but understanding dialectic as classification of ideas rather than as
refutation, is the treatment that Aristotle achieves in various places of
his Metaphysics and to which it may be said, this whole work is dedi-
cated, viz., the nature of being qua being, and of its meanings - that is
to say, the categories - of its attributes per se and of their opposites
(one-many, identity-diversity), and of their many meanings (equal-
unequal, similar-dissimilar), and other such questions.88 According to
Aristotle, the specific task of the "first philosopher" is to treat the ques-
tions with which the "dialecticians" were previously occupied, namely,
Plato and the other members of the Academy. The only difference, he
emphasizes, between the method practised by the Platonists and the
method adopted by the "first philosopher," that is by himself, is the
connection, established by the latter, between those concepts and sub-
stances, namely, the consideration of them not as an independent reality

85Ibid., 3, 1005a19-b27. On the dialectical nature of this

reasoning, see my
essay, L'unita del sapere in Aristotele (Padova, 1965), and the article, "II principio
di non contraddizione come criterio supremo di significanza nella Metafisica
aristotelica," Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti della classe di scienze
morali, storiche e filologiche, serie VIII, 21 (1966), 224-52 (reprinted in Studi
aristotelici, 61-88).
86Aristotle, Protrepticus, fr. 2 Ross. Cf. E. Berti, Aristotele. Esortazione alla
filosofia (Padova, 1967), 45-47.
87
Metaphysics XII 6, Cf. E. Berti, "La struttura logica della dimostrazione
dell'atto puro in Aristotele," Scritti in onore di Carlo Giacon (Padova, 1972). 41-
62 (reprinted in Studi aristotelici, 143-57).
88 See
esp. Books IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and X of the Metaphysics.
368 ENRICO BERTI

hypostatized and reified in the mode of Platonic ideas, but rather as

predicates or attributes of substance.89
None of the scholars of Aristotle's writings, so far as I know, has
until now paid enough attention to this "metaphysical"use of dialectic
in Aristotle. If anyone, indeed, has affirmed the dialectic character of
Aristotle's Metaphysics, he has still understood that character in a
negative sense, as an expression of a lack of a scientific standard and
hence lack of truth, as a failure, a checkmate.9 On the contrary, for
Aristotle the dialectical character of first philosophy is the expression
of a type of science which is differentfrom that of the particular sciences,
but no less rigorous on that account, and even more rigorous from a cer-
tain viewpoint insofar as it is free from undemonstratedpresuppositions.
After all, one might also bring under the third use of dialectic the
classification of animals by genera and species, so frequently practised
by Aristotle in his biological treatises. That the biologist should be in
possession of a particular form of development (paideia), which consists
precisely in dialectic, is stated in the famous prologue to De partibus
animalium.91 Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the classificatory
method practised by Aristotle in his biological writings, chiefly in his
Historia animalium, is of Platonic origin,92 though in the De partibus
animalium he explicitly criticizes and proposes to modify Plato's criterion
of classification.93
In general, therefore, it may be said that Aristotle revises either the
pre-Platonic conception of dialectic as distinct from knowledge or the
Platonic conception of dialectic as knowledge. For Aristotle, however,
only the first is the true and proper "dialectic" whereas the second
re-enters in the "uses" of dialectic as a function of a particular science
or of first philosophy. It might be said, therefore, that in his conception
of dialectic Aristotle is connected above all to Protagoras and to Socrates
although he differs from Protagoras by affirming the principle of non-
89Metaphysics IV, 2, 1004a31-b26. Cf. my article, "La riduzione dei contrari
in Aristotele," Zetesis. Bijdragen . . . aangeboden aan Prof. Dr. Emile de Strijcker
(Antwerpen-Utrecht, 1973), 122-46 (reprinted in Studi aristotelici, 209-31).
90Cf. P. Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote (Paris, 1962). I
criticized Aubenque's thesis in my article, "La dialettica in Aristotele," L'atlualita
della problematica aristotelica. Atti del convegno franco-italiano su Aristotele
(Padova, 5-8aprile 1967) (Padova, 1972), 33-80 (reprinled in Studi aristotelici,
109-33); but cf. the article, "Dimostrazione e metafisica in Aristotele," Studi
aristotelici (1962), 41-45.
91On the Parts of Animals I, 1, 639al-12, on which see P. Aubenque, "Science,
culture et dialectique chez Aristote," Association G. Bude, Actes du Congres de
Lyon (Paris, 1960).
92 Cf. H. J. Kraemer,
"Grundbegriffe Akademischer Dialektik in den biolo-
gischen Schriften von Aristoteles und Theophrast," Rheinisches Museum, 111
(1968), 293-333.
93 On the Parts of Animals I, 2-3.
 GREEK DIALECTIC AND FREE SPEECH 369

contradiction, and hence by distinguishing between true and false

opinions; he differs from Socrates by affirmingthe autonomy of dialectic
distinct from science.94 Indeed, this last character confers on dialectic,
according to Aristotle, a dignity which it did not have so long as it was
confounded with Sophistics or with science. Aristotle accordingly pro-
fesses a conception of political life much more favorable than the Platonic
one with respect to what we today would call "democracy" and which
he calls simply a form of "constitutional government" (politeia), char-
acterized by the equal right of any citizen to participate in the governing
power and by the abolition of excessive economic inequality.95 Conse-
quently, Aristotle is more favorable than Plato to freedom of expression,
the prohibiting of which he considers peculiar to tyranny.96 However,
it would be erroneous to make of Aristotle a democrat and defender of
freedom of expression in the manner of Protagoras; whereas, in fact,
Protagoras, as we have seen, admits no other value than opinion - and
Plato opposed him by not admitting any value other than knowledge -
Aristotle admits at times the value of opinion in the field of controversial
political life, and at times the value of knowledge in the field of the
knowable which is that of philosophy. In politics, therefore, Aristotle
affirms the necessity of a dialectic of opinion that is not philosophical
and is, so to speak, democratic, whereas in philosophy he practises a
dialectic of truth about which it makes no sense to talk of democracy or
anti-democracy.
The common characterof these conceptions of freedom of expression
in relation to dialectic is the fact that such freedom is, yes, amply justified,
no longer, however, as the right of a private individual in the full realiza-
tion of his or her personality, but as the contribution of the individual
to the realization of the common good of a political or scientific nature.
Such is the reason why Hegel, having indeed recognized the Greeks'
discovery of freedom, affirmedthat for the Greeks only some men were
free, whereas in the Christian-Germanicworld it was understood for the
first time that all men are free as such97; however, by the term "Christian-
Germanic" Hegel means to refer essentially to modern philosophy,
actually to his own philosophy.
The reference to Hegel, and more particularly the fact that he con-
sidered his own philosophy as the most thoroughexpression of the freedom

94 Cf. Metaphysics XIII, 4, 1078b23-30, where Aristotle asserts that dialectic

in Socrates was not yet "strong" enough not to need the awareness of essence, that
is, of knowledge.
95 Cf. the definition of citizen in Aristotle's Politics, III, 1, 1275a22-23, and

III, 13, 1283b42-1284al; the description of politeia in Politics IV, chaps. 7-9 and
11 and his characterization of a "mode-rate constitution", i.e., with moderate pos-
session of wealth (ibid., IV, 11).
96 Aristotle, Politics V, 11, 1313a39-b16.

97 Cf. footnote 1, above.

370 ENRICO BERTI

of spirit, and at the same time conceived his philosophy as dialectical,

may suggest a final consideration about the difference between the rela-
tionship of dialectic to freedom established in ancient Greek philosophy
to that established in modern philosophy, in particular the Hegelian. The
Hegelian conception of dialectic may be considered in fact still alive,
given that it has been resumed by Marx and in general by contemporary
Marxism. The difference is all the more sharply defined: whereas indeed,
as we have seen, ancient dialectic consists in a confrontation of opposing
opinions to be resolved by means of free discussion, and presupposes as
a necessary condition freedom of thought and speech, modern dialectics,
whether Hegelian or Marxian, consists in an opposition not of opinions
freely expressed but of "moments"of reality, spiritual and material, pre-
destined to be resolved by means of a necessary process of unification.
In Hegel, actually, the terms of dialectical opposition are, for example,
the family and civil society whose points of view and rights are neces-
sarily absorbed in and superseded by the State.98 In Marx, the terms of
opposition are capital and labor, whose points of view are equally
predestined to unification and resolution in the classless society.99 The
point of view or "opinion" of the family and of civil society in Hegel,
like the viewpoints of capital and labor in Marx, have no right to be
expressed through a free and honest discussion but in the name of
dialectics must be necessarily superseded and suppressed. For this reason
modem Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, instead of presupposing and
guaranteeing freedom of thought and expression, leads rather to the
destruction of that freedom.
University of Padua. (Translated by Philip P. Wiener.)

98
G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, ? 157.
99K. Marx, Das Kapital, Book 1. ch. 24 (at the end).