CASE DIGESTS

1. HILARIO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148 SCRA 517

FACTS:

On January 13, 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch VI at Baliuag, Bulacan alleging that since January, 1955 he had been in
continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of about 2 hectares
situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which was previously owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas;
that on or about December 27, 1980, and thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him
to desist from entering and cultivating a portion of the aforesaid land with an area of 4,000 square
meters and otherwise committed acts in violation of his security of tenure; that the Hilarios were
contemplating the putting up of a fence around the said portion of 4,000 square meters and that
unless restrained by the court, they would continue to do so to his great irreparable injury.

claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the latter's two-hectare
landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of a "Kasunduan" executed
between them on January 8, 1979, He states that he erected his house and planted "halaman,"
the produce of which was divided at 70-30 and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro
P. Vda. de Balagtas, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter
Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December, 1980 that he came to know that a portion of the 2
hectares or 4,000 square meters is already owned by the Hilarios.

On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,00
0 square meters from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been foreclosed by virtue of
a deed of sale executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The former owner Corazon
Pengzon testified that she owned only two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841 square meters and
Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square meters with a total area of 1,740 square meters. The other
2 lots were owned by Ruben Ocampo and Juan Mendoza. She further testified that in 1964 at the
time of the partition of the property, she declared the property for classification purposes as
"bakuran" located in the Poblacion and had no knowledge that there were other things planted in
it except bananas and pomelos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Salvador Baltazar is a tenant.
RULING:

The evidence presented by the petitioners is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that
private respondent Salvador Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding in question.

Salvador Baltazar claims: that he is working on the land in question pursuant to a "kasunduan"
executed between him and Socorro Balagtas. The contract covers a two-hectare parcel of land.
The disputed landholding is only 4,000 square meters more or less, although Baltazar claims that
this area is a portion of the two hectares in the contract. He testified that sometime in 1965, he
relinquished 1.5 hectares of the two hectares subject of the "kasunduan" to Nemesio Ocampo,
Juan Mendoza, Miguel Ocampo and Miguel Viola and what remained under his cultivation was 1/2
hectare owned by Corazon Pengson. He stated that when Socorro Balagtas died, no new contract
was executed. However, he insists that the old contract was continued between Corazon Pengson
and himself.

This claim is controverted by the testimony of Corazon Pengson herself. Corazon Pengson further
explained that she did not receive any share from the produce of the land from 1964 up to the
filing of the case and she would not have accepted any share from the produce of the land because
she knew pretty well that she was no longer the owner of the lot since 1974 when it was foreclosed
by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios.

2. DAEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 325 SCRA 856

FACTS:

Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio
Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land
was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
278 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to
private respondents as beneficiaries.

However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating
that they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Armed with such document, Eudosia Daez
applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as
well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.

In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership
over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14)
hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064
hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare
landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.

On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daez's
application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474,
petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.

On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for
reconsideration of Undersecretary Medina's order. But on January 16, 1992 Secretary Leong
affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject
land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents' May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been
executed under duress because he found that Eudosia's son, Adriano, who was then the
incumbent Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan, pressured private respondents into signing the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings,
despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become
final and executory

RULING:

First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.

P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice
or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-
tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If
either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need
not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
Exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it
is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed
twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at
least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist
of "other agricultural lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT
and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention, are
different.
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one
and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application
filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her
appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject
4.1685 riceland.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the
legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights
of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is
land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing the
government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process.

Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the government's agrarian reform program are subject to
the exercise by a landowner, who is so qualified, of his right of retention.

The issuance of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby.
Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land
covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.

The CLTs (Certificate of Land Transfer) of private respondents over the subject 4.1685-hectare
riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what to
retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis of those
CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain the said
4.1685 hectares of riceland.

3. KAPISANAN V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 106 PHIL. 607

FACTS:
On 7 March 1955 the Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company filed a petition
in the Court of Industrial Relations under section 12, Republic Act No. 875, alleging that it is one
of the eight labor organizations with which the employees and workers of the Manila Railroad
Company are affiliated
On 18 March 1955 the Manila Railroad Labor Federation filed an answer claiming that it is the only
labor organization or the appropriate union, and not any of the eight labor organizations named
by the petitioner union, that can legally act for all or for the members of the union concerned as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees and laborers working in the
Company; that there is no urgent need for holding a certification election because there are no
pending demands from the employees and workers; that the petitioner union is represented by
one who is ineligible to become a member of the union because of the supervisory nature of the
position he holds in the Company
On 23 March 1955 the Manila Railroad Company filed an answer claiming that a large number of
its employees and workers are "supervisors" within the meaning of section 2 (k), Republic Act No.
875, who are ineligible for membership in a labor organization of employees like the petitioner
union and the others existing in the Company and cannot participle and vote at such election,
pursuant to section 3 of the same Act; that Vicente K. Olazo, president of the petitioner union,
who subscribed the petition or certification, is assistant chief, signal and electrical division of the
Company, a supervision, and for that reason he is ineligible for membership in the petitioner union
After hearing, on 29 September 1956 the Court held that Vicente K. Olazo who is holding the
position of assistant electrical and signal superintendent in the Company, is a supervisor ineligible
for membership in the petitioner union

ISSUE:
Whether or not Vicente K. Olazo is a supervisor ineligible for membership in the petitioner union

RULING:
Vicente K. Olazo is ineligible.

Section 2, clause (k), defines the terms "supervisor" as —

... any person having authority in the interest of an employer, to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign, recommend, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
to direct them, and to a just their grievances, or effectively to recommend such act if, in
connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routinary
or clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment.

A person who occupies the position of assistant electrical and signal superintendent in the Manila
railroad Company; has around sixty men under his supervision; can recommend the promotion
and the disciplining of his subordinates, assign and direct their work; and acts as Superintendent
in the absence of the latter, is a supervisor within the meaning of section 2, clause (k) of Republic
Act No. 875. As such he is ineligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under
his supervision.

4. CUNANAN V. HON. ANDRES C. AGUILAR, G.R. NO. L-31963, AUGUST 31, 1978
FACTS:
On August 28, 1958, private respondent, Ciriaco Rivera, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch II, then presided by Judge L. Pasicolan Civil Case No. 1477, entitled "Ciriaco
Rivera, plaintiff vs. Pragmacio Paule, Severa Sicat and Anastacio Saddi," as tenant of Pragmacio
Paule, for recovery of possession and damages over a parcel of agricultural land of about one (1)
hectare, more or less, situated at Sta. Rita, Lubao Pampanga. Plaintiff Rivera, — whose heirs are
private respondents herein — then alleged that he was in open, continuous and peaceful
possession of the said parcel until December, 1950 when defendants helping one another and
aided by armed persons masquerading as special policemen (civilian guards,) wrested from him
possession and cultivation of the holding and appropriated its harvests.
On December 8,1964, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants (1)
Pragmacio Paule, (2) Severa Sicat and (3) Anastacio Saddi to vacate the property and surrender
the same to plaintiffs and to pay damages.
On August 19,1969, the judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued and by virtue thereof the heirs of the late Ciriaco Rivera were placed in possession of the
land in October, 1969.

On January 26, 1970, petitioner herein initiated an action before the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) in San Fernando, Pampanga, presided by Judge Isidro L. Tayag thru a "Complaint with Urgent
Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of an Interlocutory Order," docketed as CAR Case No. 1038-P'70
against Pragmacio Paule. He alleged, that since 1965 he was the agricultural tenant of defendant
Paule and that Paule threatened to eject him from his landholding. 14

On February 2, 1970, Judge Tayag of the CAR issued the interlocutory order prayed for, directing
the Chief of Police of Lubao Pampanga to enforce its order prohibiting the defendant Paule and/or
any person acting in his behalf from molesting and disturbing the plaintiff (petitioner herein), in
his peaceful possession and cultivation of the landholding in question. 15

On February 7, 1970, Pragmacio Paule — defendant and one of the losing parties, in Civil Case No.
1477-CFI Pampanga and also defendant in CAR Case No. 1038-P'70 Med his answer in CAR Case
No. 1038-P'70. In said answer, he ... admitted all the material averments in the Complaint and
alleged merely as a defense, that the contract between him and the petitioner had already been
terminated and that he is returning the land to the new landowner ..." 16

On February 10, 1970, the CAR again issued an order, upon motion of plaintiff, dated February 9,
1970, directing the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary San Fernando,
Pampanga, to enforce its Order prohibiting defendants (1) Pragmacio Paule, (2) Eduardo
Manalansan, (3) Jose Manalansan, Jr., (4) Anastacio (also Eustaquio) Rivera, (5) Ciriaco Lugto, (6)
Pepito Lugto and Rudy and/or any other persons acting for and in behalf of said defendant from
molesting and disturbing the plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation of his landholding
in question. 17

On February 15, 1970, Eustaquio (also Anastacio) Rivera, one of the persons restrained in the
preceeding order of February 10, in CAR Case No. 1038-P'70, filed a motion in said case to
reconsider and to set aside the order of February 10, 1970 on the ground that Pragmacio Paule,
whose former tenant is Anastacio Saddi have been ordered by the Court of First Instance in Civil
Case 1477 to surrender possession of the land to him as one of the heirs of Ciriaco Rivera, and that
plaintiff Angel Cunanan cannot, therefore, invoke security of tenure, citing Lastimosa vs. Blanco,
L-14697, January 28, 1961. The CAR thru Judge Isidro Tayag denied the motion on March 11, 1970
on the ground that movant Eustaquio (also Anastacio) Rivera has no standing or personality before
his Court.

Meanwhile — and on the same date, i.e. February 15, 1970, — plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1477,
filed a "Motion for Contempt" alleging that on February 12, 1970, Angel Cunanan, petitioner
herein, entered the premises and destroyed the growing palay planting thereon by harrowing the
said land, without their knowledge and consent.
On April 11, 1970, respondent Judge Andres C. Aguilar, CFI, Pampanga in turn issued the order,
now in question, resolving the motion for contempt against petitioner.
Assailing this Order of respondent Judge, petitioner now contends in this petition that, as adverted
to above, the same was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion on two
grounds, i.e. (1) that he was not a party in Civil Case No. 1477 and, therefore, the Court of First
Instance, not having acquired jurisdiction over his person, cannot enforce the decision in said case
against him (citing Sumulong v. Imperial, 51 Phil. 251); and (2) that he has been duly declared in
CAR Case No. 1038-P'70 as the lawful agricultural tenant lessee of the landholding belonging to
private respondents, and as such he is entitled to security to tenure under Sections 7 and 36 of RA
3844.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, Angel Cunanan, who is in possession of the disputed holding and who claims
to be the agricultural tenant lessee thereof as held by the CAR in CAR Case No. 1038-P'70, may be
ordered, under pain of contempt, to surrender the holding to private respondents, heirs of Ciriaco
Rivera, pursuant to an order issued by the CFI on April 11, 1970 in Civil Case No. 1477, Branch II,
San Fernando Pampanga.

RULING:
YES.

Petitioner's first contention that the order of April 11, 1970 issued by respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 1477-CFI-Pampanga, cannot enforced against him, on the
ground that he is not a party to the case, is without merit. For although petitioner is not a party
defendant in said case, he was — by his own admission and as the records clearly show instituted
as tenant on the holding by Pragmacio Paule who was — as one of the principal defendants in Civil
Case No. 1477 and who, per the judgment in said case rendered on December 8, 1964, which has
become final and executory — ordered to vacate the property and surrender the same to the
plaintiffs therein, now private respondents. The decision in said case and the writ for its execution
are, therefore, clearly enforceable and may be executed as against petitioner. For petitioner
derives his alleged right to hold the holding from one who has no right to the same. To hold
otherwise is to permit a situation where Paule can defeat the judgment, by the mere device of
appointing petitioner as alleged tenant over the holding from which he (Paule) had been ejected
by final and executory judgment.

Petitioner's second claim that, as an agricultural tenant, recognized as such in the decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 1038-P'70, he is entitled to security of tenure, is also
without merit.

There was no tenure relation because the alleged landholder, Paule, has precisely been ordered
to surrender the holding to its rightful owner by final and executory judgment at the time he
constituted petitioner as tenant, the declaration by the CAR to that effect — in a judgment which
it was misled to make by the very misrepresentations of Paule — must of necessity be null and
void and of no legal effect. Otherwise stated, the CAR cannot create or recognize a tenure relation
between persons, where none exists, because the alleged landholder is not the owner, lessee or
possessor or usufructuary of the holding.

Prescinding from the foregoing absence of tenure relations and the consequent lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the CAR to declare that one exists, petitioner's claim to security of tenure in the
holding must fail. For it is settled that "...Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure
and not by those who are not true and lawful tenants but who became so only through the acts
of a supposed landholder who had no right to the landholdings. Tenancy relation can only be
created with the consent of the true landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or
legal possessor of the land." Further, ... Where the alleged landholder was a squatter who was
ejected from the landholding by virtue of a writ of execution in a forcible entry case, the legal
possessors of the landholding cannot be compelled to retain the tenants of the said squatter. 30 It
follows then that petitioner is not entitled to security of tenure extended to de jure agricultural
tenants for reasons of public policy. He may thus be lawfully ordered by respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 1477-CFI- Pampanga, to surrender the lawful possession of the holding to private
respondents, heirs of Ciriaco Rivera, at the pain of being held in contempt of court.

5. TAPANG V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 72 PHIL. 79

The validity of Section 19 of Act No. 4054 (Sec. 19 provides that landlord may not dismiss tenant
except for good pause) and of Commonwealth Act No. 461 was questioned on the ground that
they violate the constitutional guarantee against impairment of contracts. Overruling this
argument, the Supreme Court said:

El arguments de que la Ley No. 461 del Commonwealth es contraria a la Constitution

porque altera obligaciones contractuales, no tiene ningua fuerza, porque, ... la misma
Constitution manda que se debe "promoter la justicia social a fin de asegurara el
bienestar y la estabilidad economica de todo el pueblo," y que se debe protegee al
mismo tiempo "a todos los trabajadores, especialmente a las mujeres"; y no hay duda de
que las dos mencionadas leves tienden a licho fina, protegiendo al aparcero y al
propietario por igual y estableciendo reglas que han de determinar las relaciones que
deben existing entre los dos para su propio beneficio. (Per Pablo, J., Tapang v. CIR, supra)

The argument that the tenancy relationship had ceased after the expiration of the agricultural
year was declared by the Court to be without any validity because Section 26 of Act No. 4054,
the basis of said argument, must be understood to have been annulled or at least subject to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 461 (ante) Said this Court:

"No obstante todo contrato o disposicion en contrario de cualquier ley vigente en todos los casos
en que un terreno es ocupado bajo un sistema cualquiera de aparceria no se ha de desposeer
alaparo del terreno cultivado porel mismo, in la aprobacion de un representante del Departmento
de Justicia debidamiente authorizado al efecto y como no sea por alguna de las causes expresadas
en al articulo diecinueva de la Ley Numero Cuatro mil cincuenta y cuatro o por alguno otro motivo
justificada."

6. CUAÑO V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In 1958, Andres Cruz took in private respondents to work on his land. They were assigned specific
areas to work on and cultivate. They planted more mango trees and cared for them, cultivating
the fruit-bearing tress, fertilizing, smudging and spraying them with insecticides and flower-
inducing chemicals. After deducting twenty-five percent (25%) of the gross proceeds as
reimbursement to Andres Cruz who purchased the fertilizers, insecticides and chemicals used in
the operations of the farm, the balance of the proceeds of each portion or area of the farm was
shared equally between the private respondents assigned to such area and Andres Cruz.

Andres Cruz died in 1976 and the ownership of the land passed on to his two (2) daughters, Cecilia
Cruz-Mendiola and Carmen Cruz-Dolor. Private respondents, however, continued to work on the
land and the net proceeds of the farm operations continued to be divided between Andres Cruz's
daughters and private respondents.

On 8 November 1980, the two (2) daughters, without previous notification to private respondents,
executed a contract to sell the land to the Cuaño spouses, petitioners herein.

On 6 November 1981, private respondents commenced suit against the Cuaño spouses claiming
that, as tenants or agricultural leases, they were entitled to redeem the land pursuant to Section
12 of R.A. No. 3844 (known as The Agricultural Land Reform Code) as amended by R.A. No. 6389

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were tenants of the late Andres Cruz and accordingly eligible
to exercise a right of redemption in respect of the land they were working on which was sold to
petitioner Cuaño spouses

RULING:

It is apparent from R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No. 3844 that a "share tenant" and an "agricultural
lessee" are defined in very similar terms and that a share tenancy and an agricultural lease
relationship have the following common requisite elements:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;

(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. 5
In respect of the element of consent, petitioner Cuaño spouses contend that the element was
absent in the case at bar because private respondents, alleged tenants or agricultural lessees, had
merely been hired by an overseer, one Evaristo Erilla, without the authority of Andres Cruz or his
successors-in-interest, his two (2) daughters Carmen and Cecilia.

The overseer Evaristo Erilla had hired or retained private respondents as tenants and later as
agricultural lessees with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landholder(s). We consider that
this knowledge and acquiescence on the part of the landholders validated the relationship created
(hypothetically) by the overseer and private respondents. For this reason, Evaristo Erilla is properly
considered as an agent of the landowner(s) who acted as such with at least implied or apparent
authority and whose principal(s) were accordingly bound to private respondents.

In other words, Erilla, as an agent of the landowner(s) was not an independent personality who
could provide insulation for the landowners from the legal obligations to private respondents as
tenants or agricultural lessees. To hold that the landowner(s) did not give their consent because
private respondents had been hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the
landowner(s) with too easy an escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple
expedient of hiring an employee or overseer to stand between the landowner(s) and the tenants
or agricultural lessees. To sustain this particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the
force and effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, well-nigh to the vanishing point.

Petitioners also contend that the elements of "personal cultivation" on the part of private
respondents was absent. It is asserted that private respondents did not "cultivate" the portions of
the landholding which had been assigned to them, that private respondents had been hired simply
to carry out particular jobs such as the "smudging" or "smoking" of the mango trees. The Court of
Appeals, however, found that private respondents had carried out all phases of farm operations
leading to the production of mangoes, from the first stage of clearing the land and there planting
the mango seedling and then tending the trees, weeding and watering them, fertilizing the ground,
etc., until they bore fruit, including other tasks essential to induce the trees to bring forth more
bountiful harvest such as smudging or smoking the trees and applying fertilizers and chemical
flower-inducers. 8 It is useful to note in this connection that the concept of "cultivation" is not
limited to the plowing or harrowing of the soil in rice and corn fields. Cultivation includes all
activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and husbanding the
earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more products or fruits. Such is the gist of our
case law in respect of coconut plantations, 9 case law that we consider equally applicable to mango
plantations.

Petitioner spouses also aver that such cultivation as was done by private respondent tenants or
lessees was not "personal" in character, considering that private respondents had availed
themselves of the services of farm laborers hired by the overseer. Under the statutory definition
of an agricultural lessee quoted earlier, an agricultural lessee is a person "who by himself, or with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household" cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another. 10 The fact, however, that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may have been
assisted by farm laborers, on an occasional or temporary basis, hired by the landowners, does not
preclude the element of "personal cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold
relationship. In De Guzman v. Santos, 11 the mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work
himself but temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the services of other to assist him, was
not taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement imposed by the statute.
We do not consider that the statute prohibits the tenant or agricultural lessee who generally works
the land himself or with the aid of member of his immediate household, from availing occasionally
or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.

In view of our conclusion that private respondents were share tenants and later agricultural
lessees of the owner(s) of that land, it follows that private respondents were entitled to redeem
the land upon the alienation thereof by the two (2) daughters of Andres Cruz in favor of petitioner
Cuaño spouses. This right of redemption is statutory in character, that is to say, it is created by and
rests upon the provisions of a particular law.

All the above-noted elements of a share tenancy and an agricultural lease relationship existed
between the landowner(s) and private respondents and that accordingly, private respondents
were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of Andres Cruz, and later of his two (2) daughters
and ultimately of petitioners Cuaño spouses.

7. CARAG V. CA, 151 SCRA 44

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land situated at Finulu-Cabaritan Solana,
Cagayan Identified as Lot 8137-C of the Solana Cadastre with an area of 25 hectares, more or less,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5727

Sometime in 1955, Tomas Carag, the father of Plaintiff herein andq at the same time his overseer
on the above-described land, entered into a verbal contract of lease whereby he leased to the
defendant-lessee, Leocadio Ibay the western portion of said land covering 11 hectares with the
condition that there would be no rental on the land for the first 3 years of the lease and that after
the third year, the rental would be at 70-30 share basis.

In 1961 there was yet another verbal contract of lease between the same parties with the
following conditions: (1) Lessee, the herein defendant, would pay the rental to the lessor 15 cavans
of palay per hectare for the main crop and (2) 10 cavans of palay per hectare for the second crop
on the 11 hectares of land leased.

All rentals on the land leased were fully paid except the rentals corresponding to the crop year
1970-71 which was paid in part, the plaintiff having received 130 cavans of palay from defendant,
leaving a balance of 35 cavans unpaid rentals from the main crop.
Respondent Ibay refused to surrender possession of the land leased to petitioner Carag despite
repeated demands from the latter. Hence, on April 2, 1971, the petitioner as plaintiff filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer with damages before the above-mentioned municipal court
against herein respondent as defendant.

The defendant denied the amount of rentals and set up as defense that he would not vacate the
land unless reimbursed for P20,000.00 worth of improvements he had introduced. In his counter-
claim Ibay claimed reimbursement for the P20,000.00. There was absolutely no mention of the
fact that he was supposed to be a mere tenant

While jurisdiction was not raised and was never in issue, the trial court ruled that there was no
agricultural leasehold relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in order to determine the
applicable law. Hence, it ruled that the provisions of the Civil Code on civil lease applied in the case
at bar. It then proceeded to rule against respondent Ibay ordering him, inter alia, to vacate the
land in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties

RULING:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.

From the definition of a tenant and the admission made by respondent, it is clear that absent the
important factor of cultivation, no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties.

There may have been sharing of harvests but such is not a positive indication of the existence of
tenancy relations per se as it must be taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy.
(Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra). The fact that the respondent never raised the issue of
tenancy when he filed the answer to the ejectment complaint is significant. To a genuine tenant,
that would have been the first thing to come to mind. He thought of raising the issue of tenancy
only when the decision was being executed and he countered with the complaint to annul the
municipal court's decision. The total area leased to Mr. Ibay in 1955 by the petitioner and one
Florencio Cuntapay and Angel Carag was 40 hectares. (Decision of Municipal Court of Solana, p. 3;
Record of Exhibits, p. 16; T.S.N., July 14, 1972, pp. 30 and 38). The area alone is indicative of a civil
lease. There are other circumstances of this case showing that there is no agricultural landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties but the above are sufficient.
 8. GRAZA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 163 SCRA 39

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against the private respondent docketed as CAR
Case No. 1950 with the agrarian court abovementioned. The complaint alleged, among others:
that petitioner Rosina C. Graza is the owner of a parcel of land planted to palay and located at
Barrio Pooc, Santa Rosa, Laguna, designated as Lot No. 1623 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision;
that said land is under the management of petitioner Felizardo Graza, Rosina's husband, with
petitioner Jose Barraquio as bona fide agricultural tenant until 1957; that in 1957 Barraquio due
to his failing eyesight took in respondent Sayao as sub-tenant for his own account without the
previous knowledge and consent of the petitioner spouses; that in March 1968, Barraquio
dismissed Sayao as his sub-tenant notifying him accordingly; and that on July 27, 1968, Sayao,
through intimidation stealth and strategy, entered the subject riceland, claimed to be the tenant
thereof, and planted palay thereon once or twice a year up to the time the ejectment case was
filed due to his refusal to leave the land in question despite the landowners' repeated demands
for him to vacate it.

On July 17, 1973, the agrarian court ordered that the proceedings before it be suspended pending
the preliminary determination by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the relationship
between the parties pursuant to the prevailing agrarian laws.

On November 24, 1975, the Secretary of DAR, through the regional director, certified that the
instant case is not proper for trial in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, San Pablo City on
the following grounds:

"'1. That there exists tenancy relationship between defendant Antonio Sayao and plaintiffs
— spouses Rosina C. Graza and Felizardo Graza;

"'2. That the landholding involved in this case is primarily devoted to palay; and

"'3. That the instant action is one of ejectment of the defendant-tenant farmer."'

On May 17, 1976, CAR Case No. 1950 was ordered archived as a result of the DAR's certification.

On July 13, 1976, the private respondent filed with the agrarian court a motion to withdraw the
cash deposits with the clerk of court representing 20% of the net harvests from September 1970
to November 1975.

On August 25, 1976 and September 6, 1976 the agrarian court issued the assailed orders in relation
to the above motion. While the appeal to the public respondent was pending, the private
respondent withdrew from the clerk of court the aforestated cash deposits.
On May 16, 1978, the public respondent dismissed the petitioners' appeal and upheld the issuance
of the assailed orders on two main grounds, namely: that by virtue of the DAR certification that
CAR Case No. 1950 is not proper for trial, all the proceedings held thereon were null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction, hence, the agrarian court had to order the return of the
cash so deposited with the court to return things to status quo ante; and that the finding by DAR
of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties is binding upon the
agrarian court considering that under Presidential Decree No. 946, section 12, the DAR is vested
with the exclusive authority to determine the issue of relationship between the parties involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certificate as to the
supposed tenancy relationship between the contending parties are not binding on the lower court

RULING:

The findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certificate as to the supposed tenancy
relationship between the contending parties are not binding on the lower court pursuant to
section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 316 and section 12, sub-paragraph (r) of Presidential Decree
No. 946. The Secretary's determination of the relationship between the parties is only preliminary.
The same cannot be final and conclusive on the lower court.

The last paragraph. of section 12 of P.D. No. 946 supplements section 2 of P.D. No. 316 and
sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 583. P.D. No. 946 provides that when a case involving an agricultural
land is certified as a proper case for trial, the preliminary determination of the relationship
between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not bind the court
assuming jurisdiction over said case. It is evidently with more reason that when the Secretary
certifies that an agrarian case is not proper for trial, the court before which an appeal is ventilated
regarding the effect of said certification must look into the bases of the Secretary's preliminary
determination. Otherwise, the party adversely affected by the DAR's certification is left without
any judicial recourse. Definitely, such an unjust and absurd result could not have been the intent
of P.D. No. 946.

In the case at bar, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his certification made a finding that a
tenancy relationship existed between the petitioner spouses and the private respondent. Is the
finding supported by substantial evidence? Nowhere in the records is there a showing that the
administrative finding is supported by evidence substantial enough to establish the presence of
tenancy relations between the petitioners and the private respondent. In Bicol Federation of Labor
v. Cuyugan (65 SCRA 195), we held that:
 "Although the Code (of Agrarian Reforms) nowhere expressly defines the metes and bounds
of the term 'agrarian' relations, there can be no doubt, considering the policy, objectives,
spirit and purposes of that far-reaching legislation, that as used therein, the term embraces
every situation where an individual provides his personal labor over a parcel of agricultural
land belonging to another for the purpose principally of agricultural production, and where
the former, for his labor input and other sundry contributions, is compensated either in
wages or a share in the produce, or is obligated to pay lease rentals to the landowner."

Likewise, in the case of Carag v. Court of Appeals (151 SCRA 44) citing Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals (130 SCRA 482) and Guerrero v. Court of Appeals (142 SCRA 136), we stated that the
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties are the landholder
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.

Whether or not a person is a tenant is an issue of fact reviewable on appeal or petition for review
when the conclusion arrived at by the court below has no support in the evidence on record. The
respondent court, in adjudging the private respondent as the bona fide tenant of the petitioner
spouses, relied completely on the DAR's certification. There is no reference to any reliable
investigative report or other supporting papers justifying the finding that there was a tenancy
relationship between the landowners, and the alleged tenant. In fact, there was a failure to
appreciate the following testimony in open court of the alleged tenant before the Court of
Agrarian Relations

The respondent admitted in open court that any agreements with regard to his work on the
landholding in question were made only with petitioner Barraquio, the recognized tenant of the
petitioner spouses. Tenancy relationship can be created only with the consent of the true and
lawful landowner. In this case the supposed tenant did not even know the landowner. The
respondent court in affirming the orders of the agrarian court recognized a tenancy relationship
between the petitioner spouses and the private respondent where none was present by the
respondent's own admission. It has been our consistent ruling that in agrarian cases all that is
required is "substantial evidence." Under the third paragraph of section 18 of Presidential Decree
No. 946, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence in agrarian cases is
concerned, is to determine whether the decision, order or portions thereof appealed from is
supported by substantial evidence (See Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226). Said quantum
of evidence is wanting in this case.