1.

MINUCHER VS CA

FACTS:
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a
“buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his
official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States
Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING
YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state. The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed
facts in the case.

* The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the

two countries
* Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy
* Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust
operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent,
to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during
the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties.

2. MANANQUIL VS. CA
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina Manananquil went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City, where her husband was working as a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline
Station at Taft Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a coffee bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day, because the latter had burned her
clothing, was maintaining a mistress, and had been taking all the food from their
house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at his wife and
castigated her, saying “PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON”
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and
poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame
Defense’s version
o Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station
and bought ten centavos’ worth of gasoline, intending to use the same to clean
her shoes, which she needed for church the next day
o Then she remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she
dropped by his place of work
o She saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by the window
o She entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but when he
saw his wife he shouted at her.
o She told him that she had brought him fluid for his lighter, but Elias, who was
drunk, cursed her “PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON.” This shouting
continued despite her telling him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that
he wanted
o She trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that
she was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband’s face.
o She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she remembered
her grandson who was alone in the house so she went home, leaving her husband
who was walking to and fro and not paying attention to her
o She went to bed but could not sleep. She returned to NAWASA to apologize to
her husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police officers were present
o An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she was Elias’s wife
o When she said yes, officer accused her of setting her husband on fire—an
accusation she denied
o The police took her to the headquarters, prepared a written statement which she
was made to sign upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it
ISSUES/HELD

WON appellant’s extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given – YES

WON burns sustained by victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of
the victim’s death – YES

RATIONALE
Court found “appellant’s aforesaid assertions a mere pretense to flimsy to be accepted as
true,” “no error in the trial court’s pronouncement that the appellant’s sworn statement
was voluntarily given by her”
Contrary to her claim, she knew and understood Tagalog even though she was not a
“Tagala” as she had stayed in Manila continuously for 14 years
her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that had befallen
the victim supports the theory that she “has murder in her heart and meant to do harm” to
her husband
Mananquil claimed that victim’s pneumonia, from which he died, was caused by the
alcohol which he was drunk on that night. But as testified by a doctor, taking alcohol
cannot cause pneumonia
Pneumonia was complication of the burns sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court held on to state
that this could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second-degree burns

3. MAGNO VS CA

Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair
shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment
needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
 As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and
the rest had no sufficient fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled
out the equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found
guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:
No

Ratio:
• To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as
it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay
an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.

4. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a
Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.

The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity
from legal processes, dismissed the criminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig
City annulled and set aside the MeTC s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for
review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and
staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity.
Hence, the present MR.

Issue: WON Liang is immune from suit Held: No.

Ratio:

The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision. The slander of a person, by any
stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to
ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether or not Liang s utterances constituted
oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine
Concurring:

Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a

political question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is
conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter
and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. it is designed to safeguard the autonomy
and independence of international organizations against interference from any authon‘ty
external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge their
entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an
implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The
exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.

"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise
theirjurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such
cases the judicra’l department of the governmentfollows the action of the political branch
and will not embarrass the latterby assumir'g an antagonistic jun'sdiction."

Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his
immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jun‘sdiction of the receiving State for all acts,
whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for
any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of intemational organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only
those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of
its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement
explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with
respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives
immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the
jun‘sdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a
waiver of immunity.

Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal
process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is
absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official
acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks
against his secretary. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only
to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual
determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in
relation to his official functions as a senior economist.
5. De Guzman, Jr. vs People
FACTS:

At about 10 o’clock in the evening of December 1997, Alexander Flojo (Alexander) was fetching
water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay St., Old aniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly
Alfredo De Guzman (Alfredo), the brother of his land lady, Lucia Bautista (Lucila), hit him on
the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to
Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to just go up. Alexander
obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to
12:15 AM, Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and
chest. Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, he accidentally hit
Alexander’s back, causing the latter to thro invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a
fistfight ensued between them. Alfredo adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the
fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should only be held
liable only for serious physical injuries. Crime Charged: (Silent) RTC: Frustrated Homicide CA:
Frustrated Homicide

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alfredo had intent to kill Alexander.

HELD:

Yes, there was intent to kill. The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the
intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind,
is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered
the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have
also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the
time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that
intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the
wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the
result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on
Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds,
specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s
attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his
submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about
the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention. With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed
all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded
to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide
6. Rogelio Roque vs. People

FACTS:
In November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were in the house
of Bella in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted dela Cruzand shouted to him to join them. At
that instant, Roque and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that
Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former.
Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but Roque was unyielding. Before
leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if
they continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Chairman Tayao to ask for assistance in settling
the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was
fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no
longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to Rouqers house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo
who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again
apologized to Roque but the latter did not reply. Instead, then, he entered the house and
when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo
who was hit in his right ear. Roque then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being
hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, Roque kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo
pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get
involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for
emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three weeks.
Roque claimed that Reynaldo went to their house then hurled invective words and
challenged him to a duel/ Roque interposed self-defense.

CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated homicide RTC RULING: Frustrated homicide

CA RULING: Frustrated homicide

ISSUE: Is there intent to kill?

RULING: Yes. Intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the
parts of the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds
inflicted. It is worth highlighting that the Reynaldo received two gunshot wounds in the
head. Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready
indications that the accused-Roque’s objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a
supposed aggressor. Verily, had Roque been slightly better with his aim, any of the two
bullets surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited
by the fact that the Roque even prevented barangay officials from intervening and
helping the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously
able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the
crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries.
After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the
gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled
the trigger

7. PEOPLE vs BAYONA

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision ofJudge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of first Instance of
Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a Violation of section 416 of the Election Law and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment forthirty days and to pay a fine of P50, wrth
subsrdiary Imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The defendant, who was a special agent ofthe Philippine Constabulary, contends that he
stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of
delivering to Malor Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one
Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor, that he did not know there was a polling
place near where he parked his motor car; that he was called by his fn'end, Jose D.
Benliro and aligned his automobile, he did not leave the revolver because there were
many people in the road and he might lose it; that he was sixty-three meters from the
electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Secretary of the Interior.

ISSUE: W/N the defendant is liable even without criminal intent.

HELD: Yes. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory prowsion, and the intent
with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not
intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way. The act prohibited
by the Election Law was complete.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala
prohibita it is sufficient ifthe prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be
exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. ...“ IU.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

8. US vs Go Chico

Facts: On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of
the windows and one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a
number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon which were printed the
miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used during the late
insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection
against the United States. On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant
had purchased the said medallion sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of
the city of Manila. On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods
for the purpose of displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the
medallions in his showcase and on one of the windows of his store. The appellant was
ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and had consequently no
corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two propositions
for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the
part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the
prohibition of law is directed against the use of identical banners, devices or emblems
actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the
United States.

Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.

Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
The words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or
identify those in armed rebellion against the United States” mean not only the identical
flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description
refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute
may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.

9. MANUEL vs PP

FACTS:
July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again
January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial student,
in Dagupan City while she looked for a friend during her 2 days stay
Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a motel together and he proposed marriage and
introduced her to his parents who assures that he is single
April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to build a home after
1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina
would ask for money, he would slap her
January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and left and stopped giving financial support
August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
and was embarrassed and humiliated to learn that Eduardo was previously married
Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina
RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as minimum, to 10 years, as
maximum and P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit
Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-
year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy
Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent whereas under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice
for one to be criminally liable for a felony
CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating that Article 41 of the Family Code should
apply that there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as
the absent spouse and modified minimum to 2 years and four months

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent
not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and
(b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved.
§ The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent
Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury
When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent.
§ Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
·GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
·EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
·burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married he was of the well-
grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for
more than 20 years since 1975
o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial declaration as proof
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on presumptive death on Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code which states that before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
·moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code for being against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society

10. LONEY vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s
end which caused the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the
Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines
(PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single
act.

ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand.

HELD:
No. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply
means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110). There is
duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense.

The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against two
or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same
offense." Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.

On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984,
and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence
(culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

11. Garcia v. People

FACTS:
On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatorial elections, Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators,
willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to
1921 votes.
Pimentel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was
acquitted due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime
defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was
no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of
an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified
under mala in se.
(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD:
(1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.

(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error
on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of
Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year
instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

12. ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO,
ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS
JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO, respondents.
FACTS:
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have been
initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites started
when the neophytes were met by some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby
of the Ateneo Law School. They were consequently brought to a house and briefed on
what will be happening during the days when they will be initiated. They were informed
that there will be physical beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want.
They were brought to another house to commence their initiation.
The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van. Members of
the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several
initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and
rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of the fraternity and were hit
everytime they made a mistake.
Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation rites
(Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes to paddling
and additional hours of physical pain. After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa
could not walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was
brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according
to individual participation. 19 of the accused were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were
found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and
Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the grounds that the
CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second, conviction absent
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March
2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are criminally liable.
HELD:
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime,
the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act
under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused,
the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code
also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article
3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack
of foresight, or lack of skill.

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply
enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the
nature of hazing — unique as against typical crimes — cast a cloud of doubt on whether
society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time.

Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the
Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have
all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua(life
imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died,
we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death.

ARTICLE 4
1. PEOPLE v. QUIANZON
FACTS:
Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres Aribuabo applied a firebrand on his
abdomen. He died after 10 days. Three witnesses corroborated to facts and Quianzon also
owned up to his act. The trial court charged Quianzon of homicide. His counsel argued
that it should only be convicted serious physical injuries as Aribuabo died because of his
carelessness and his disobedience to his doctors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Quianzon committed homicide.

HELD:
The Supreme Court said that Quianzon’s contention was without merit. The doctor even
said that it was difficult if the victim would survive or not. His act was the direct cause of
the victim’s death. The SC held that Quianzon was guilty of murder with additional
mitigating circumstance because of his admission to the crime.

2. People vs. Noel T. Sales

FACTS:
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively,
left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission
of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales
(Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay.
Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother
prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a furious appellant confronted
them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his
kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree,
appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one,
who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the
unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there
was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar
is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of
the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital
more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15
minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.
HELD:

Yes. Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended
to discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.

All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant
killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and
Junior. As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.
As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut
tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a
physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.

3. Intod vs. CA
Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

FACTS:
Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went
to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them,
Mandaya was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his
family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner raised the case to CA but the same
affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for an
impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.
ISSUE:
WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

HELD:
YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to
perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4)
the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown
to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The
case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite
apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of
attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime
could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to
be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted
Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

4. Jacinto vs. People

Doctrine: The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be
an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3)
that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual

FACTS:
Petitioner Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check
amounting to Php 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam.
However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her account. The
check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that the petitioner
was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari to SC.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual.

Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is

found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

5. People vs. Domasian

FACTS:
•March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate,
along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by Pablito
Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical
certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan,
where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico
became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man
told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at
Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed
him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a
tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying and being firmly held, Alexander
Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship
with the boy who told him they were brothers. Their physical differences and the wide
gap between their ages made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods
went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being
pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way
home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital
ambulance and already looking for him.
• At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of
Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting
in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination
• March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note
demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the handwriting in
the note was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for examination and it turned out to be
Dr. Samson Tan’s signature.
• Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a
friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his
eyeglasses
o Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
• Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
• RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
• Appealed

ISSUE:
W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention

HELD:
YES. Appealed decision is AFFIRMED
• Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only in placing a
person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty
• Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom
note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
• Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies
to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
• Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible
crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note would
have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of
Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
• On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether
they act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively.
These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the
common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for
Enrico's life.
• The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan
approached him 6 days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him,
angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.