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REGALIAN DOCTRINE

RULING:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA
LAO, respondent. Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that:
FACTS:  he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
 On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier;
Tagaytay City, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land under  the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
As to requirement #1:
 Respondent Lao alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo
Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina.The latter, in Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in
turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the
Perido by transfer. concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

 In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of There is merit in the petition.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her
and her predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it
possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim.

 Witnesses and evidence presented by the respondent: Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of
o Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of
in 1932; the required period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the
o Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the property from property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On
Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on Edilbertos ownership of the land
o Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later
registration. on admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of
o The Deed of Absolute Sale[3] dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and the property.
Victoria in her favor
o The survey plan and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer
in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest. of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela.She likewise
did not show the relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and
TRIAL COURT DECISION the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa.
o The applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Hence, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At
Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her most, respondents possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, claimed possession of the property.
adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for
more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land
purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent
involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
o Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same
property, as well as technical description and other documents presented, that the As to requirement #2:
land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public
domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is
appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
years.
o This Court hereby approves this application for registration. Under the REGALIAN DOCTRINE which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
COURT OF APPEALS domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands
o Affirmed the judgment of the trial court. not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
ISSUE/S: remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
1. Whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she
met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an There is no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation
owner, of the subject parcel of land; and reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely
submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information
2. Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and regarding the classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the
alienable land of the public domain. presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the
property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that
the land being registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption
that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.

The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.

Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State
cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.

It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the
government. It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.

The petition is GRANTED.


DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP o Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal
Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and o The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents. property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a
right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989 possession. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986.
ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
ISSUE/S:
FACTS:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of
 Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer.
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal. 2. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

 The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of RULING:
Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent.
The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. The
 On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property into a residential petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties,
subdivision. the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that
petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of
 Upon obtaining a Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, due process.
they found out that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
 Petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were
 Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging the following: subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact
o that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; destroying their crops.
o that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years
prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
o that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a
of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
o that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying
the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine
coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in
respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case
MTC may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing,
o Dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry. must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

RTC The Court resolved to DENY the instant petition.


o Sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court

COURT OF APPEALS

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