Elcano vs Hill
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).
Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted
for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action
against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his
son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a
parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under
Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar
the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article
2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the
time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should
be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co
(MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that
he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at
about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full
stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still
slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons
which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him
to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by
the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few
meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling
the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco
was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from
the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without
suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was
yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were
there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of
employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract
[of carriage]:
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable
for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount
to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon
a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve
him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under
such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an
extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics
are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of
the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were
tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first
class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok,
he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat
because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso
protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other
Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to
the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines,
he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered
during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s
pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that
he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court
eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers
that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an
assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth
and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony
regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never
presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what
basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note
which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa- of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when
contractual and on culpa aquiliana. the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact
of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
Culpa Contractual
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of
There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule.
there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso It forms part of the res gestae.
to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the
issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he
will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between
Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa
aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s
action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on
res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription
 lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered
in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully
paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus,
a Deed of Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of
Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not
registered with the LTO.
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of,
388 SCRA 445 (2002)
because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the
accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made
Facts:
of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed
as the public and third persons are concerned.
into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion
of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could
charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.
the negligence of the driver.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known
PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his
against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable
pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith
Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine
to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
and that the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared
the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not
to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the
of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
Issue:
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
delict for the negligent acts.
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says
that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
Held:
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side
stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter into a finance
of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to
the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed
in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability
Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages
YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as
a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor
to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case
we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed
in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the
law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario
Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a
“kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s
parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right
to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate
civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights
in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and
this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment
Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it
was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already
before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing.
Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo
would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being
sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence)
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base.
The jeep he was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided
with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight
at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the
next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and
burns.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the
evidence, concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to
speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach
the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation.
The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court,
satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this
appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages
reaching the sum of P282,065.40.
ISSUE: WON the lower court’s decision is erroneous
HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is
affirmed.
NO. The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of
correctness. It is entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling
reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial judge why
had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their
demeanor on the witness stand.”
But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil
Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the
damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that
MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The
crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v.
Juanillo and United States v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted
with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: “Judge
Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to
be:
“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.”
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”
“Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a
relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and
the action of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are,
compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC
had not arisen.
Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided
in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves.
There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation
demands.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RAMIREZ, defendant-appellant.
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, for the crime of homicide, to the penalty of fourteen years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of
the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs.
On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro
Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and
Agustin Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of
Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three last named proceeded to
hunt, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer
from the place where the act complained of took place. Upon the
hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who
was carrying the shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern,
happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there
and watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus
Victoriano Ranga and Agusto Menor were waiting when suddenly the
report of the shotgun was heard hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and
the right temple, who thereafter died on that night as a result of the
wounds.
It does not appear that the matter was judicially investigated until the
month of October, 1924, when the complaint was filed which initiated
this proceedings.
The only witness who could testify upon the act complained of is
naturally Agustin Menor who was near the deceased when the latter
was shot. According to Agustin Menor, the defendant, after having
gotten the first prey, told his companions to stay there, while he (Pedro
Ramirez) was leaving them to go on hunting , and "when he was far
away, he fired the shotgun," hitting the deceased Victoriano Ranga. It
must be noted that the witness Agustin Menor changed his first
testimony that "when he was far away, he fired the shotgun," by saying
afterwards, "When Pedro Ramirez was a little away, he turned toward
us and fired." And to make it more specific, the defense moved that the
translation of the testimony of the witness be corrected and the
interpreter of the court caused it to be stated in the record that the true
testimony of the witness was as follows: "Pedro Ramirez caused me and
Victoriano Ranga to stay in the mount , telling us: 'Brothers, you stay
here and I am going up to hunt with the lamp' and then after he has While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered
gone ways, he (Pedro Ramirez) turned toward us and fired." to the mother of the deceased a carabao and a horse by way of
indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the
On the other hand the defendant, testifying as witness in his behalf, commission of the crime, on the other it shows that he performed that
admits being the author of the shot which caused the death of act without criminal intent and only through a real imprudence.
Victoriano Ranga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told
his companions to stay there, watching over the prey, while he was The defense alleges that the trial court must have solved the reasonable
going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it doubt in favor of the defendant. After considering carefully the
would have been hard for them to find the prey, if no one would have evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion
been left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to and so hold that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide
have seen with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1
meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on of article 568 of the Penal Code.
approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion
Victoriano Ranga. The same witness says that he did not expect to find Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correccional,
his companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but with the accessories prescribed by the law, must be imposed upon him,
they left, the place.lawph!1.net and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of the accused
from them when he fired the gun for the second time is contradictory.
On the other hand, there is not in the record any circumstances as to
whether or not the deceased and the witness Agustin Menor were in
the same place where they were left by the defendant, when the latter
fired. The night being dark like that when the event took place, the
hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get confused as
to his relative situation; and after walking around, he may think having
gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the point of departure. and
so, judging the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and
Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and taking into account that there
existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant
against the offended party, we are compelled to conclude that the act
complained of constitutes homicide through reckless imprudence. The
defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid
of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have
exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable
accident, such as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of
Victoriano Ranga.
Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.

Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met
his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a
wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate,
Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the
deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the
defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to
render it liable for damages.

Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for
damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence.
Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public.
But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have
a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have
been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of
the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to
a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of
one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged
and defectively insulated wire.
David Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
Element – Quasi Delicts
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at
sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical
engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was
a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well
beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of
Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps
which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor
experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the
caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the
company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that
said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor
is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion
of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts,
tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion
and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he
had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well
knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing
himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents
of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous.
CULION ICE V. PHILIPPINE MOTORS (G.R. NO. L-32611)
Facts:
Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an
Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s
running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in machinery blame.
engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest came
to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the course of
the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the
gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern
was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped
and upon being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly
spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members safely
escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the
recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial court
ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not
due to the fault of Quest.
Issue:
Whether or not Quest was negligent.
Ruling: YES.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if
he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest
had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of
similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did
not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of
fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we
think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances
(risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions
against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing
gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of
Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and
this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said

Fernando V. CA (1992)
FACTS:
 November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao
Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property
of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank
in Agdao wherein Bascon won
 November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
 The bodies were removed by a fireman.
 The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo
Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.
 The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they
entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master.
 Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
 Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died
from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body
and intake of toxic gas
 November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
 RTC: Dismissed the case
 CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and
the needy, the ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate
cause therefore can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
 test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case:
 Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence
 standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law
 Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences
 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case
 Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist
 Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
 Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover
 Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
 Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in
Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning
signs for the protection of the public
 While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost
compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up
of warning signs is not one of those requirements
 accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely
to happen unless one removes its covers
 Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily
prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an
old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.
 proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due
to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot
demand damages from the public respondent.