3 I - 1 GB

Canadian National Report for the
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Seventh Report
August 2016
Executive Summary
Canadian National Report

for the Convention on Nuclear Safety –
Seventh Report
In conformance with article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety
________________________________________________________________________
Executive Summary
This seventh Canadian report demonstrates how Canada continued to meet its obligations under
the terms of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) during the reporting period from April
2013 to March 2016. During this period, Canada effectively maintained and, in many cases,
enhanced its measures to meet its obligations under the CNS. Enabled by a modern and robust
legislative framework, these measures – which focus on the health and safety of persons and the
protection of the environment – are implemented by Canada’s nuclear regulator, licensees of
nuclear power plants (NPPs), and other government institutions and industry stakeholders.
Canada remains fully committed to the principles and implementation of the CNS by
undertaking continuous improvements to maintain the highest level of safety of nuclear power
reactors in Canada and around the world.
Nineteen Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors were operating in Canada during the
reporting period and three reactors were in safe storage.
Nuclear-related activities at NPPs in Canada are governed by robust, modern legislation, with
appropriate and well-defined powers to ensure the NPPs remain safe. The most important
legislation is the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), which is complemented by regulations
and other regulatory instruments. Canada’s nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC), is mature and well established. A system of licensing is in place to control
activity related to NPPs and to protect the health and safety of persons, the environment, and
national security. To further enhance this system, the CNSC continued its licence reform project
and during the reporting period, all existing NPPs had streamlined operating licences and
accompanying licence condition handbooks (LCHs) that clarify the regulatory requirements and
expectations and facilitate increased regulatory effectiveness and efficiency.
With the 2015 publication of CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety
Reviews, and its implementation to the licensing basis of Canadian NPPs, licensees will begin to
perform periodic safety reviews (PSRs) for future licence renewals. This closes the one
remaining open recommendation from the 2009 Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
mission to Canada.
The CNSC has a comprehensive program to assure compliance with the regulatory framework
and monitor the safety performance of the NPPs. The CNSC continued to enhance the
compliance program for operating NPPs during the reporting period.
A comprehensive set of graduated enforcement tools are available to the CNSC to address non-
compliances. One of the tools introduced during the previous reporting period, administrative
monetary penalties (AMPs), was further developed during the reporting period with the
publication of the Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety
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Executive Summary
Commission) and CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.5.2, Administrative Monetary

Penalties, Version 2. This tool has been used to enhance the CNSC’s effectiveness and flexibility
in enforcement.
The CNSC’s regulatory framework and processes feature a high degree of openness and
transparency. The CNSC continued to foster openness and transparency during the reporting
period – for example, through its Participant Funding Program, which facilitates the participation
of eligible intervenors in the decision-making process and by issuing discussion papers and
soliciting early public feedback on potential regulatory changes.
The Canadian regulatory framework, which is largely non-prescriptive, is continuously updated
and aligned with international standards. Renewals of operating licences for NPPs are used to
introduce new standards and requirements that the licensees actively implement.
Canada’s nuclear industry has an excellent safety record. During the reporting period, NPP
licensees fulfilled the basic responsibilities for safety as required by the NSCA, regulations, and
the NPP operating licences. The licensees also addressed any safety issues that arose to keep the
risk at reasonable levels – and continued to give safety a high priority at every level of their
organizations.
None of the safety-significant events that occurred at Canadian NPPs during the reporting period
posed a significant threat to persons or the environment. For example, there were no serious
process failures at any NPP during the reporting period. The licensees’ efforts to address
operational events were effective in correcting any deficiencies and preventing recurrence.
During the reporting period, all Canadian NPPs operated with acceptable safety margins and
acceptable levels of defence in depth. The maximum annual worker doses at NPPs were below
annual dose limits, and all radiological releases from NPPs were very low – below 1 percent of
derived release limits. The CNSC’s ratings of NPP safety performance confirmed that regulatory
requirements and performance expectations in all 14 of its safety and control areas were met or
exceeded at all NPPs during the reporting period.
The 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) was adopted by Contracting Parties to
the CNS. The declaration provides principles for the implementation of the objective of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety to prevent accidents and mitigate radiological consequences.
Canada has demonstrated its fulfillment of the VDNS principles through the activities of the
CNSC and its licensees in all aspects of operating NPP facilities. Specifically, the principles of
the VDNS have been achieved through the following means:
 The national regulatory framework for siting, design, and construction of NPPs aligns
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, which themselves
have been demonstrated to fulfill the principles of the VDNS.
 The designs of Canada’s NPPs include features that prevent accidents and mitigate
impacts should an accident occur. In addition, actions by the CNSC and licensees have
strengthened defence in depth and enhanced emergency response.
 Licensees have implemented updated safety analyses and safety analysis reports that
align with the requirements in revised CNSC regulatory documents. Also, licensees are
meeting the safety goals associated with probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs).
 Integrated safety reviews for the refurbishment of specific NPPs have been completed.
The introduction of PSRs for 10-year operating licences will enhance the systematic
adoption of safety improvements at existing NPPs.
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Executive Summary
During the reporting period, the CNSC and Canadian nuclear industry addressed the six specific
CNS challenges that were identified for Canada at the Sixth Review Meeting:
Challenge C-1 Complete the implementation of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan in
response to the Fukushima accident
Challenge C-2 Enhance probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to consider multi-units and
to consider irradiated fuel bays (spent fuel bays)
Challenge C-3 Establish guidelines for the return of evacuees post-accident and to confirm
public acceptability of it
Challenge C-4 Invite an IAEA emergency preparedness review (EPREV) mission
Challenge C-5 Update emergency operational interventional guidelines and protective
measures for the public during and following major and radiological events
Challenge C-6 Transition to decommissioning approach
The following steps were taken to address the six challenges.
Canadian NPP licensees completed the Fukushima action items (FAIs) by December 31, 2015,
as specified in the CNSC Action Plan. The FAIs address safety improvements aimed at
strengthening defence in depth, and enhancing onsite emergency response. The CNSC completed
enhancements to its regulatory documents and is amending its regulations to address lessons
learned from Fukushima.
The CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, in May 2014, which introduced new requirements related to
multi-units, irradiated fuel bays, and re-evaluation of site-specific external initiating events.
REGDOC-2.4.2 will be included in the licensing basis for NPP licensees as their operating
licences are renewed. All licensees are expected to be fully compliant by 2020. Full-scope PSAs
are either completed or the licensees are making acceptable progress towards completion. The
licensees are developing a safety goal framework and pilot application of a whole-site PSA
methodology.
With respect to guidelines for the post-accident return of evacuees, the CNSC is collaborating
with Health Canada to develop a discussion paper on a proposed regulatory document that will
address this topic. The discussion paper is targeted for publication in the fall of 2016 and the goal
is to publish the regulatory document during the next reporting period.
Health Canada continues to work with stakeholders to implement the lessons learned from the
2014 Exercise Unified Response, with a planned completion date of mid-2016 for federal-level
actions. Health Canada and the CNSC have initiated planning for a future EPREV mission and
an invitation for an EPREV mission is expected during the next reporting period.
Health Canada is updating the draft Canadian Guidelines for Protective Actions during a
Nuclear Emergency. It will be released by mid-2016 for final consultation with federal,
provincial, municipal and non-governmental organizations.
The CNSC established a licensing strategy for decommissioning NPPs in the context of the 2016
licence renewal for Gentilly-2. The licence application from Hydro-Québec is to replace the
current licence with a 10-year power reactor decommissioning licence. Hydro-Québec is
expected to continue activities related to the preparation for the decommissioning of Gentilly-2
and CNSC is providing oversight, adapting its compliance program to the decommissioning
phase.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i
Acronyms, Abbreviations and Specific Expressions................................................................ vii
Chapter I – Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter II – Summary ............................................................................................................... 13
Chapter III – Compliance with Articles of the Convention .................................................... 19
Part A General Provisions.......................................................................................................... 19
Article 6 – Existing nuclear power plants ................................................................................. 20

6 (a) List of existing nuclear power plants .......................................................................... 20
6 (b) Justification of continued operation of Canadian NPPs ............................................. 20
Part B Legislation and Regulation ............................................................................................ 23
Article 7 – Legislative and regulatory framework ................................................................... 24

7.1 Establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework ....................... 24
7.2 Provisions of the legislative and regulatory framework ............................................. 28
7.2 (i) National safety requirements and regulations ............................................................. 28
7.2 (ii) System of licensing ..................................................................................................... 35
7.2 (iii) System of regulatory inspection and assessment ........................................................ 48
7.2 (iv) Enforcement ................................................................................................................ 52
Article 8 – Regulatory body ....................................................................................................... 56

8.1 Establishment of the regulatory body ......................................................................... 58
8.2 Status of the regulatory body ...................................................................................... 74
Article 9 – Responsibility of the licence holder ........................................................................ 76
Part C General Safety Considerations ...................................................................................... 81
Article 10 – Priority to safety ..................................................................................................... 82
Article 11 – Financial and human resources ............................................................................ 89

11.1 Adequacy of financial resources ................................................................................. 89
11.2 Adequacy of human resources .................................................................................... 92
Article 12 – Human factors ...................................................................................................... 100
Article 13 – Quality assurance ................................................................................................. 107
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Article 14 – Assessment and verification of safety ................................................................. 111

14 (i) Assessment of safety ................................................................................................. 111
14 (ii) Verification of safety ................................................................................................ 126
Article 15 – Radiation protection ............................................................................................ 130
Article 16 – Emergency preparedness..................................................................................... 138

16.1 Emergency plans and programs ................................................................................ 138
16.2 Information to the public and neighbouring states ................................................... 151
16.3 Emergency preparedness for Contracting Parties without nuclear installations ....... 152
Part D Safety of Installations ................................................................................................... 153
Article 17 – Siting ...................................................................................................................... 154

17 (i) Evaluation of site-related factors .............................................................................. 157
17 (ii) Impact of the installation on individuals, society and environment ......................... 158
17 (iii) Re-evaluation of site-related factors ......................................................................... 160
17 (iv) Consultation with other contracting parties likely to be affected by the
installation ................................................................................................................. 161
Article 18 – Design and construction ...................................................................................... 163

18 (i) Implementation of defence in depth in design and construction .............................. 166
18 (ii) Incorporation of proven technologies ....................................................................... 167
18 (iii) Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation .............................................. 168
Article 19 – Operation .............................................................................................................. 170

19 (ii) Operational limits and conditions ............................................................................. 172
19 (iii) Procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing ................................ 173
19 (iv) Procedures for responding to operational occurrences and accidents ...................... 175
19 (v) Engineering and technical support ............................................................................ 178
19 (vi) Reporting incidents significant to safety................................................................... 179
19 (vii) Operational experience feedback .............................................................................. 180
19 (viii) Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste onsite .......................................... 181
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................... 183
Appendix A Relevant Websites................................................................................................ 184
Appendix B List and Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Canada ........................................ 186
Appendix C Examples of Descriptions and Plans Required to Support an Application to

Renew a Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licence .......................................... 187
Appendix D Significant Events During Reporting Period .................................................... 188
Appendix E Nuclear Research in Canada Related to Nuclear Power Plants ...................... 193
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Appendix F Description and Results of the CNSC’s Assessment and Rating System for
Nuclear Power Plants ............................................................................................ 198
ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................. 205
vi
Acronyms, Abbreviations and Specific Expressions
ACR Advanced CANDU Reactor

action level a specific dose of radiation or other parameter that, if reached, may
indicate a loss of control of part of a licensee’s radiation protection
program and triggers a requirement for specific action to be taken
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
AMP administrative monetary penalty
AOO anticipated operating occurrence
BDBA beyond-design-basis accident
Canadian report the [nth] Canadian report refers to the [nth] Canadian National
Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety, submitted on behalf
of Canada for the [nth] Review Meeting of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety
CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium
CCP commissioning control point
CEAA Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,2012
CIIT CANDU Industry Integration Team
CMD Commission member document (prepared for Commission
hearings and meetings by CNSC staff, proponents and intervenors)
CNL Canadian Nuclear Laboratories
CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety
CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CNSC Action Plan CNSC Integrated Action Plan on the Lessons Learned from the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
COG CANDU Owners Group (Inc.)
ConvEx Convention Exercise (operated under the framework of the IAEA
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident)
Commission the tribunal component of the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission
COP continued operations plan
CSA Canadian Standards Association (now called “CSA Group”)
CSI CANDU safety issue
CSS Commission on Safety Standards
CVC compliance verification criteria
desktop review all verification activities limited to the review of documents and
reports submitted by licensees (including quarterly technical
reports, annual compliance reports, special reports and
documentation related to design, safety analysis, programs and
procedures)
DG-IAEA Report The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director General
DLA dynamic learning activity
DRL derived release limit
EA environmental assessment
vii
EC6 Enhanced CANDU 6

EFPH equivalent full-power hours
EIR event initial report
EIS environmental impact statement
EME emergency mitigating equipment
EMEG emergency mitigating equipment guideline
EPREV Emergency Preparedness Review
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ERA environmental risk assessment
event review all verification activities related to reviewing, assessing and
trending of licensees’ event reports
FAI Fukushima action item
FERP Federal Emergency Response Plan
FNEP Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan
focused inspection a special Type I or Type II inspection that is performed as a
regulatory follow-up in response to an event, inspection findings or
a licensee’s performance
G7 Group of seven nations (Canada, United States of America, France,
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan and representatives of the
European Union)
GoCo government-owned, contractor-operated
Harmonized Plan the CNSC’s corporate improvement plan that integrates and aligns
all cross-functional improvement initiatives into a single,
prioritized plan with clear deliverables
HFE human factors engineering
HOP human and organizational performance
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection
IEMP independent environmental monitoring program
IFB irradiated fuel bay
INES International Nuclear Event Scale
INFCIRC Information Circular (IAEA publication)
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
INSAG International Nuclear Safety Group
IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRS Incident Reporting System
IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISR integrated safety review
KI potassium iodide
LBLOCA large-break loss-of-coolant accident
LCH licence conditions handbook
LRF large release frequency
MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation Programme
METER medical emergency treatment for exposure to radiation
MOL Ministry of Labour
viii
mSv millisievert
MW megawatt
MWe megawatt (electrical)
NAYGN North American Young Generation in Nuclear
NBEMO New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)
NEWS Nuclear Event Web-based System (IAEA)
NPP nuclear power plant
NRCan Natural Resources Canada
NSCA Nuclear Safety and Control Act
NSCMP Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
NSRB Nuclear Safety Review Board
OAG Office of the Auditor General of Canada
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OP&P operating policies and principles
OPEX operating experience
OPG Ontario Power Generation (Inc.)
OSART Operational Safety Review Team
OSCQ Organisation de la sécurité civile du Québec
PAR passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiner
person-Sv person-sievert
PMUNE Plan des mesures d’urgence nucléaire externe
PNERP Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan
PSA probabilistic safety assessment (same as probabilistic risk
assessment)
PSR periodic safety review
R&D research and development
RANET Response and Assistance Network
REGDOC regulatory document (CNSC publication)
reporting period April 2013 to March 2016
RN-Med-Prep Radiological/Nuclear Medical Emergency Preparedness and
Response
RPD Regulatory Program Division
SAM severe accident management
SAMG severe accident management guideline
SCA safety and control area
SCDF severe core damage frequency
SMR small modular reactor
SOE safe operating envelope
SOP sustainable operations plan
SSCs structures, systems and components
TBq terabecquerel
TBq-MeV terabecquerel-million electron volts
TECDOC Technical Document (IAEA publication)
Type I inspection all verification activities related to onsite audits and evaluations of
licensee programs, processes and practices
ix
Type II inspection all verification activities related to routine (item-by-item) checks

and rounds
UNENE University Network of Excellence in Nuclear Engineering
UOIT University of Ontario Institute of Technology
USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
VDNS Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators
WiN Women in Nuclear
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Chapter I Introduction
Chapter I – Introduction
A. General
Canada was one of the first signatories of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS, also referred
to as the Convention), which came into force on October 24, 1996. Canada has endeavoured to
fulfill its obligations as a Contracting Party to the Convention, as demonstrated in the Canadian
reports presented at the review meetings of the Convention. Canada remains fully committed to
the principles and implementation of the Convention by undertaking continuous improvements
to maintain the highest level of safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Canada and around the
world.
This seventh Canadian report, which is for the Seventh Review Meeting, was produced on behalf
of the Government of Canada by a team led by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
(CNSC). Contributions to the report were made by representatives from Bruce Power, NB
Power, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Canadian
Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), SNC-Lavalin Nuclear, the CANDU Owners Group (COG), Natural
Resources Canada (NRCan), Health Canada, Public Safety Canada and the emergency response
organizations of the provinces of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec.
A.1 Scope
As required by article 5 of the Convention, this seventh Canadian report demonstrates how
Canada fulfilled its obligations under articles 6 to 19 of the Convention during the reporting
period, which extended from April 2013 through March 2016. The report closely follows the
form and structure established by the Contracting Parties to the Convention, pursuant to article
22 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document INFCIRC/572/Rev.5,
Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was
revised in January 2015. This seventh Canadian report describes the basic provisions that Canada
has made to fulfill its obligations of the Convention and provides details on the changes that have
taken place since the publication of the sixth Canadian report. A particular focus is placed on the
challenges identified for Canada at the Sixth Review Meeting.
The nuclear installations referred to in the articles of the Convention are taken to specifically
mean NPPs. The Canadian report does not cover nuclear research reactors.
In addition, this report does not cover nuclear security and safeguards, nor does it cover spent
fuel and radioactive waste, except for the discussion in subarticle 19(viii). Spent fuel and
radioactive waste are addressed thoroughly in the fifth Canadian National Report for the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, published in October 2014.
A.2 Contents
Chapter I provides important context for the rest of the report. Section A provides a general
introduction to the report while section B summarizes the outcomes of the Sixth Review Meeting
for Canada, including the specific good practices and challenges that were identified for Canada.
Section C describes aspects of nuclear power policy and nuclear-related activity in Canada.
Section D provides a high-level description of the nuclear power industry in Canada and recent
major developments (life extensions and new-build projects). Although these sections do not
Canadian National Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Seventh Report 1
directly apply to any particular article of the Convention, they represent the context within which
the articles are met. Section E describes the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) and
the parts of this report that address it.
Chapter II provides an overview of the report’s conclusions, including a summary statement of
Canada’s fulfillment of the articles of the Convention. It also summarizes:
 progress on addressing the challenges identified for Canada at the Sixth Review Meeting
 progress on other important issues not covered by the challenges identified for Canada
 measures that addressed the VDNS
 planned future activities to improve safety
Chapter III includes detailed material that demonstrates how Canada implemented its obligations
under articles 6 to 19 of the Convention during the reporting period. Chapter III is subdivided
into four parts that correspond to the subdivision of the Convention articles:
 Part A – General Provisions (article 6)
 Part B – Legislation and Regulation (articles 7 to 9)
 Part C – General Safety Considerations (articles 10 to 16)
 Part D – Safety of Installations (articles 17 to 19)
The sections in each chapter begin with a grey box that contains the text of the relevant article of
the Convention. The term “Contracting Party” in an article refers to each signatory to the
Convention. For each article, the description of Canada’s provisions to fulfill the relevant
obligations is organized in subarticles that follow the structure and numbering of the obligations
as presented in the article itself. Where a breakdown into finer subsections is used, lowercase
letters have been appended to the article or subarticle numbering, for reference purposes (e.g.,
subsection 8.1(a)).
The challenges identified for Canada at the Sixth Review Meeting are highlighted in boxes near
the beginning of the relevant discussion.
There are two bodies of supplementary information at the end of the report: appendices and
annexes. The appendices (identified by letters A through F) provide detailed information that is
relevant to more than one article. The annexes, on the other hand, provide supplementary,
specific information that is directly relevant to the manner in which Canada fulfills a particular
article. Each annex’s number corresponds to the number of the article, subarticle, or subsection
to which the annex is relevant.
The full text of previous Canadian reports, the Canadian report to the Second Extraordinary
Meeting and related documents can be found on the websites of the CNSC and the IAEA. A list
of websites of relevant organizations mentioned throughout this report is included in appendix A.
This seventh Canadian report will be available on the IAEA website upon submission in August
2016 and will be posted to the CNSC website in late 2016 or early 2017, in both of Canada’s
official languages (English and French). The annual CNSC staff reports on the regulatory
oversight of Canadian NPPs, as well as the annual reports of the CNSC, can also be found on the
CNSC website.
B. Outcome of the Sixth Review Meeting

At the Sixth Review Meeting of the Convention, held in Vienna in March 2014, Canada was part
of Country Group 6 (CG6), which also included Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Norway, Senegal, Uruguay, Bangladesh, Denmark, Indonesia and Libya. Canada
presented its report at the Sixth Review Meeting to an audience of 35 attendees, not including
Canadian delegation members and the CG6 officers. Canada responded to 26 comments and
questions from numerous country delegations. These comments and questions pertained to topics
such as Canada’s expectations for its new enforcement tool (administrative monetary penalties),
the criteria for deciding who receives money under the CNSC Participant Funding Program,
budgets allocated for nuclear safety research in Canada, integrated safety reviews, periodic safety
reviews, reviews of operating experience, aging of reactors, radiation protection, public
disclosure, and others. The discussion related to the Fukushima nuclear accident focused on
Canada’s work in areas such as severe events, multiple-unit events, utilization of probabilistic
safety assessments and emergency response.
The following table lists the challenges identified for Canada at the Sixth Review Meeting.
Cross-references to the relevant subsections of this seventh Canadian report are also provided.
CNS Challenges for Canada from the Sixth Review Meeting

Number Text of challenge Relevant article
(or subsection)
C-1 Complete the implementation of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan in 8
C-2 Enhance probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to consider multi-units 14(i)(d)
and to consider irradiated fuel bays (spent fuel bays)
C-3 Establish guidelines for the return of evacuees post-accident and to 16.1(a)
confirm public acceptability of it
C-4 Invite an IAEA emergency preparedness review (EPREV) mission 16.1(a)
C-5 Update emergency operational interventional guidelines and protective 16.1(a)
measures for the public during and following major and radiological
events
C-6 Transition to decommissioning approach 7.2(ii)(e)
C. National nuclear framework and policy

C.1 General framework
In Canada, the development and implementation of nuclear energy policy fall within federal
jurisdiction. The Government of Canada has funded nuclear research and supported the
development and use of nuclear energy and related applications for many decades. The first NPP
in Canada began operation in 1962. Today, the Government of Canada provides $76 million
annually for nuclear research and development (R&D) activities primarily through the Federal
Nuclear Science and Technology Work Plan. The nuclear industry provides, via the COG R&D
program (described in subsection D.1), approximately $40 million annually for research that
supports operating NPPs. Other joint programs that are arranged through COG contribute
another $15 to $20 million annually to R&D supporting NPPs in Canada. The national nuclear
research program is summarized in appendix E.
Although the Government of Canada has important responsibilities related to nuclear energy, the
decision to invest in electricity generation rests with each province. It is up to each province, in
concert with the relevant provincial energy organizations and power utilities, to determine
whether or not new NPPs should be built.
Nuclear energy is an emissions-free energy source that is recognized as a reliable and cost-
competitive contributor to Canada’s 80 percent decarbonized electricity mix, supporting climate
change mitigation. The Canadian nuclear energy sector is a very important component of
Canada’s economy.
The following is an overview of nuclear activity in Canada:
 In 2014, nuclear energy supplied about 16 percent of Canada’s electricity.
 In the province of Ontario, approximately 60 percent of electricity production comes
from NPPs.
 In the province of New Brunswick, approximately 33 percent of electricity production
comes from the province’s NPP.
 Canada’s nuclear technology sector has enabled healthcare providers to improve cancer
therapy and diagnostic techniques, as Canada is a major supplier to the world market for
medical isotopes.
 Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors have been built and operated in several
countries besides Canada, including four in operation in South Korea, two in China, two
in Romania and one in Argentina. In November 2015, Argentina announced it had signed
an agreement for the construction of a new Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) reactor.
Pressurized heavy water reactors based on early CANDU technology are also in
operation globally, including two in India and one in Pakistan.
 Canada’s entire nuclear industry, including power generation, contributes more than six
billion dollars a year to the gross domestic product, directly employing more than 30,000
highly skilled workers.
 Canada is the world’s second-largest producer and exporter of uranium, with about
20 percent of total world production (13,353 tonnes of uranium metal) in 2015. More
than 85 percent of this production is exported, containing energy equivalent to
approximately one billion barrels of oil, comparable to Canada’s oil exports in 2015.
C.2 National nuclear policy

Under Canada’s constitution, responsibility for nuclear energy falls within the jurisdiction of the
federal government. Its role encompasses R&D, as well as the regulation of all nuclear materials
and activities in Canada. The Government of Canada places high priority on health, safety,
national security and the environment in relation to nuclear activities in Canada along with the
implementation of Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The Government of Canada has established a comprehensive and robust regulatory regime
implemented by Canada’s independent nuclear regulator: the CNSC.
Other major federal government departments involved in the Canadian nuclear sector include:
 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), which:
o establishes policies, priorities and programs for energy science and technology
o administers the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act
(together with the CNSC) and the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act
o has overall responsibility for managing historic nuclear wastes
o is responsible for the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), which is administered
by the CNSC
 Public Safety Canada, which is the lead authority for the all-hazards Federal Emergency
Response Plan
 Health Canada, which:
o establishes radiological protection guidelines and assessments
o monitors environmental radiation as well as occupational radiological exposures
o is responsible for the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan, an event-specific annex to the
Federal Emergency Response Plan
 Transport Canada, which develops and administers policies and regulations for the
Canadian transportation system, including the transportation of dangerous goods
 Environment and Climate Change Canada, which:
o contributes to sustainable development through pollution prevention in order to
protect people and the environment from the risks associated with toxic substances
o is responsible for administering the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and the
recently updated Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA), which
delegates responsibility for conducting environmental assessments of proposed
nuclear projects under the NSCA to the CNSC
 Global Affairs Canada, which is responsible for Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation
policy
Various memoranda of understanding exist between the CNSC and other organizations involved
in the nuclear industry, such as those organizations in the above list.
The NSCA, the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act and the Nuclear Liability Act,
(which will be replaced by the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act) are the centrepieces of
Canada’s legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear matters. The NSCA is the key piece
of legislation for ensuring the safety of the nuclear industry in Canada. These acts are
complemented by other legislation that provides emergency management, environmental
protection and worker protection, such as the Emergency Management Act, the CEAA, the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 and the Canada Labour Code.
Canada’s nuclear policy framework includes the following general elements: a nuclear non-
proliferation policy, transparent and independent regulation, a radioactive waste policy
framework, a uranium ownership and control policy, support for nuclear science and technology,
and cooperation with provincial governments and municipal jurisdictions.
AECL is a Crown corporation of the Government of Canada that reports to Parliament through
the Minister of Natural Resources. Its mandate is to enable nuclear science and technology for
the benefit of Canadians and industry, and to fulfill Canada’s radioactive waste and
decommissioning responsibilities.
Under a restructuring plan for AECL, a government-owned, contractor-operated (GoCo) model
was implemented in 2015 for AECL’s nuclear laboratories. This new model is similar to the one
used in the United States and the United Kingdom. Under the GoCo model, a private-sector
company, CNL, is now the organization responsible for the management and operation of the
nuclear laboratories and it is under the ownership of Canadian National Energy Alliance, a
consortium of waste management, engineering, and science and technology companies. AECL
continues to function as a federal Crown corporation and continues to have the same mandate but
delivers it through contractual arrangements with CNL to provide science and technology (S&T)
to meet core federal needs through the Federal S&T Work Plan (see appendix E.3 for details),
and to support the nuclear industry through access to S&T facilities and expertise on a
commercial basis. In addition, AECL also retains ownership of the nuclear laboratories’ physical
and intellectual property assets and its liabilities. AECL’s infrastructure and the expertise
brought by CNL are strategic elements of Canada’s science and technology capabilities, bringing
unique abilities that benefit Canadians and the nuclear sector.
Internationally, Canada is actively involved in IAEA-sponsored activities (such as the IAEA
Nuclear Safety Action Plan) and fully supports IAEA peer review missions, including those
conducted by the International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) and International Physical
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). In October 2015, an IPPAS mission reviewed Canada’s
nuclear security regime, concluding that Canada has established and maintains a strong and
comprehensive nuclear security infrastructure.
Canada is actively involved with a number of other international organizations, including the
International Nuclear Regulators Association, the CANDU Senior Regulators Group, the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the G7’s Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Involvement in these groups allows
Canada to influence and enhance nuclear safety from an international regulatory perspective and
to exchange information and experience among regulatory organizations. For example, by
chairing the CANDU Senior Regulators’ Meeting, the CNSC is able to share regulatory
information that is specifically relevant to CANDU NPPs, such as, its report on Category 3
CANDU safety issues (see subsection 14(i)(g)). Canada is also a participant in the International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme
(MDEP; see article 18) and the Generation IV International Forum, which led to the
establishment of its own national Generation IV program (see appendix E).
Canada has signed and ratified five other multilateral, nuclear-related conventions, including the:
 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management
 International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (see subsection 16.2(b))
 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
(see subsection 16.2(b))
In addition, Canada signed the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage in December 2013.
Canada also continued to enhance its international cooperation and assistance to improve nuclear
safety worldwide, through cooperation with international partners in environmental protection
and emergency preparedness and response, and by participating in international technical
working groups.
D. Nuclear power industry and recent major activities

D.1 Nuclear power industry in Canada
The locations of NPPs within Canada are shown in the partial map below. Of the 22 nuclear
power reactor units in Canada, 19 are currently producing power. In addition, two units at
Pickering and the one unit at Gentilly-2 are in a safe storage state. The Gentilly-2 unit has started
the process toward decommissioning (see description below). The operation of these reactors is
governed by five operating licences issued by the CNSC.
The Canadian NPPs are operated by four licensees:
 Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG), a commercial company wholly owned by the
province of Ontario
 Bruce Power Inc. (Bruce Power), a private corporation
 Hydro-Québec, a Crown corporation of the province of Quebec
 NB Power, a Crown corporation of the province of New Brunswick
Partial Map of Canada Showing the Locations of NPPs
The licensees and number of reactors at each licensed site (and their status) are summarized in
the following table.
Licensed NPP site Province Licensee Number of Operating status of
reactors reactors
Bruce A and B Ontario Bruce Power 8 All operating
Darlington Ontario OPG 4 All operating
Gentilly-2 Quebec Hydro-Québec 1 Safe storage state
Pickering Ontario OPG 8 6 operating,
2 safe storage state
Point Lepreau New Brunswick NB Power 1 Operating
Appendix B provides basic information on all NPP units in Canada.

The NPPs in Canada use pressurized heavy water reactors of the CANDU design (originally
developed through a partnership between AECL, Ontario Hydro and GE Canada). Besides
Canada, there are six other countries with CANDU reactors in operation. A full description of
CANDU reactors was provided in the first and second Canadian reports.
As previously discussed in subsection C.2, the Government of Canada has taken steps to
strengthen Canada’s nuclear industry by restructuring AECL. In October 2011, the Government
completed the sale of AECL’s CANDU reactor division’s assets to Candu Energy Inc., which is
a wholly owned subsidiary of SNC-Lavalin Inc. In 2015, Candu Energy Inc. and SNC-Lavalin
Nuclear Inc. were integrated into SNC-Lavalin Nuclear, which is a full-service provider of
nuclear technology for nuclear power reactors and nuclear products and services to customers
worldwide. Candu Energy acts as the original designer and vendor of the CANDU technology.
Candu Energy has four reactor designs:
 CANDU 6: Heavy-water moderated reactor utilizing natural uranium fuel and on-power
refuelling
 Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6): Generation III, 700 MWe heavy-water moderated and
cooled reactor based on the successful CANDU 6 model
 Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR-1000): Generation III+, 1,200 MWe heavy-water
reactor
 Advanced Fuel CANDU Reactor: Designed to use alternative fuel sources such as
recovered uranium from the reprocessing of used light-water reactor fuel, low-enriched
uranium and plutonium-mixed oxide and thorium, in addition to the conventional natural
uranium (Candu Energy is currently working with China to further develop thorium as an
alternative fuel source)
All CANDU operators in the world (including Canadian NPP licensees) and CNL are members
of COG: a not-for-profit organization that provides programs for cooperation, mutual assistance
and exchange of information for the successful support, development, operation, maintenance
and economics of CANDU technology. While membership is restricted to organizations owning
or operating a CANDU reactor, suppliers and engineering organizations involved in the design,
construction and operation of CANDU reactors are eligible for participation in specific
programs. COG also operates a Supplier Participant program that is open to all suppliers of
goods and services to the Canadian nuclear industry. COG is described further in subarticle 9(c).
D.2 Life extension of existing NPPs

Several existing CANDU NPPs have undergone major life-extension projects. Currently, life
extension is being pursued or considered for many of the reactor units at the Canadian NPPs and
abroad. Life extension includes R&D, engineering, analysis and other fitness for service
activities to support extended operation of structures, systems and components beyond their
assumed design life, as well as to refurbish components. CANDU refurbishment typically
involves replacement of major reactor components (e.g., fuel channels), along with replacing or
upgrading other safety-significant systems. Depending on the circumstances and CNSC
approval, a refurbished reactor with replaced fuel channels could operate for approximately 30 or
more years. The status of each current life-extension project is briefly described below (see
subsection 14(i)(f) for more details).
Bruce A and B refurbishment

In December 2015, the Government of Ontario announced that Bruce Power and the Independent
Electricity System Operator entered into an amended, long-term agreement to secure
6,300 megawatts of electricity from Bruce A and B through a multi-year investment program.
The amended agreement will allow Bruce Power to immediately invest in life-extension
activities for Units 3–8, optimizing the operational life of the site (Units 1 and 2 were previously
refurbished, returning to service in October 2012.)
Since the refurbishment of Units 3–8 was not considered during the 2015 licence renewal
hearing process, Bruce Power will need to submit an application for refurbishment to be
considered by the Commission in a public hearing. The life extension will entail outages to
replace major critical life-limiting components (fuel channels, feeders and steam generators) and
perform associated enabling work. Refurbishment will begin in 2020, starting with Unit 6.
Darlington refurbishment
OPG is proceeding with the refurbishment of the four reactors at the Darlington site to extend the
life of the NPP for an additional 30 years.
By the end of the reporting period, OPG had completed all of the necessary assessments for life
extension of all four units. The first refurbishment outage is scheduled to commence in October
2016 and all four units will be completed by 2026.
In preparation for refurbishment, OPG has constructed a full-scale mock-up of a Darlington

reactor. The mock-up is being used to train staff prior to performing work in the field, to develop
workplans and to test and commission specialized tooling required for refurbishment work. A
detailed description of this refurbishment training facility, referred to as the Darlington Energy
Complex, can be found in annex 11.2(a).
Pickering extended operation

Pickering Units 1–4, formerly known as Pickering A, came into service in 1971. Following
refurbishment activities, Units 1 and 4 were returned to service in 2005 and 2003, respectively.
In 2005, OPG decided not to return Units 2 and 3 to service, based on an economic evaluation. In
2010, Units 2 and 3 were each placed in a safe storage condition, which involved removing the
fuel and heavy water from the reactors, isolating these units from the operational part of the
station (i.e., containment) and placing the units in a state that prevents start-up. Some Unit 2 and
3 systems remain operational, providing common system support to the operation of Units 1 and
4. Units 2 and 3 will be maintained in safe storage states until the entire NPP is shut down for
eventual decommissioning.
Pickering Units 5–8, formerly known as Pickering B, came into service in 1983. An extensive
integrated safety review (ISR) was completed in 2010 to assess the options for its ongoing
service. In 2010, OPG decided that incremental life extension, rather than the options of
shutdown or refurbishment, was the best option. The decision to not refurbish was based on
economic factors, such as the capacity of the units, rather than on safety concerns.
In 2010, OPG developed a continued operations plan (COP) to document the technical basis
actions required to support the incremental life extension of the Pickering Units 5–8 to the end of
2020. The COP is updated annually. In 2011, OPG developed a sustainable operations plan
(SOP) for Pickering that contains strategic plans recognizing the unique challenges associated
with the approach to the end of commercial operation. The SOP, which is also updated annually,
describes the arrangements and activities required to demonstrate that Pickering’s safe and
reliable operation will be maintained and sustained for the period of operation until each unit is
permanently shut down.
Since 2013, OPG has been conducting operation of the Pickering reactors under the COP. The
incremental life extension option chosen by OPG was supported by previous work done for
Pickering Units 5–8 ISR complemented by other activities linked to the end of life of the facility,
such as annual updates of the COP, the start of the SOP and preparations for longer-term plans
(e.g., transition to safe storage prior to decommissioning).
For the current Pickering licence to operate (granted in 2013 and expiring in August 2018), the
Commission approved the operation of the Pickering Units 5–8 reactors beyond the assumed
pressure tubes design life (210,000 equivalent full-power hours), based on continued
demonstration of fitness for service and up to a maximum of 247,000 equivalent full-power
hours.
During the reporting period, preliminary studies, including technical and economic assessments,
suggest there is value in pursuing further studies to support extending the operation of the
Pickering units. In 2015, the business case supporting extended operation was approved to
continue operating Pickering to 2024 and subsequently in January 2016, the province of Ontario
announced its support for OPG's plans to operate Pickering to 2024, subject to completion of the
necessary assessments and regulatory approval. Decisions on which reactors will operate to 2024
(and which may be shutdown a year or two earlier) have not yet been made. To support this
decision, CNSC required OPG to conduct a periodic safety review (PSR) update for the next
licence renewal in 2018, which will cover the proposed operating period. The results of the PSR
and its conclusions in the integrated implementation plan to operate until 2024 will be presented
to the Commission at the next licence renewal hearing in 2018.
D.3 Transition to a safe storage state

During the reporting period, stabilization operations and activities were conducted to transition
Gentilly-2 to the safe storage state. This work was completed by December 2014. All spent fuel
has been placed in the irradiated fuel bay and all main NPP systems no longer in service have
been drained, dried and placed in a safe layup state. Hydro-Québec foresees having all fuel in dry
storage by 2020 and dismantling the NPP between 2059 and 2064, with restoration of the site
being completed by 2066.
D.4 New-build projects

As described in previous Canadian reports, in 2006 OPG submitted an application for a licence
to prepare a site for future construction of NPPs within the existing boundary of the Darlington
site. The project aims to create a site for up to four new nuclear reactors, with a maximum of
4,800 megawatts of electrical output, directly east of the existing Darlington NPP. An
environmental assessment (EA) concluded in May 2010 that the project was not likely to cause
significant adverse environmental effects. In August 2012, the joint review panel for the EA (as a
panel of the Commission) granted OPG a licence to prepare the site.
Following issuance of the licence, the EA and the licence to prepare the site were challenged
through an application for judicial review before the Federal Court of Canada. In May 2014, the
Federal Court allowed the application in part, ordering that the licence be quashed and the matter
be returned to the joint review panel (or a duly constituted panel) for further consideration and
determination of the specific issues set out in the Court’s decisions and reasons. The decision by
the Federal Court was appealed by OPG, the Attorney General of Canada and the CNSC.
Arguments before the Federal Court of Appeal were held in June 2015.
In September 2015, the Federal Court of Appeal granted the appeal, upholding the EA approval
and restoring the licence to prepare the site.
In November 2015, an application for leave to appeal was filed with the Supreme Court of
Canada by the parties that brought the judicial review. OPG, the other respondents and the
parties that brought the initial judicial review filed their submissions in December 2015. The
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for leave to appeal in April 2016.
During the reporting period, OPG continued to pursue several work activities related to the joint
review panel’s recommendations, including:
 bank swallow monitoring and mitigation
 intake and diffuser structures siting
 support for CNSC activities to engage stakeholders in developing policy for land use
around NPPs
OPG site-preparation activities will occur following selection of a reactor vendor by the province
of Ontario.
Specific measures taken by CNSC and NPP licensees with respect to new-build projects are
given in subsection 7.2(i)(c) and subarticle 17(ii). Other measures taken in preparation for
potential new-build NPPs in Canada are described in the sixth Canadian report.
E. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) was adopted by Contracting Parties to the
CNS at a Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna on February 9, 2015. The declaration provides
the following three principles for implementing the objective of the CNS (to prevent accidents
and mitigate radiological consequences):
 Principle (1): New NPPs are to be designed, sited and constructed, consistent with the
objective of preventing accidents in commissioning and operation and, should an accident
occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides causing long-term offsite
contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or radioactive releases large
enough to require long-term protective measures and actions.
 Principle (2): Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are to be carried out
periodically and regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime in order to
identify safety improvements that are oriented to meet the above objective. Reasonably
practicable or achievable safety improvements are to be implemented in a timely manner.
 Principle (3): National requirements and regulations for addressing this objective
throughout the lifetime of NPPs are to take into account the relevant IAEA safety
standards and, as appropriate, other good practices as identified inter alia in the Review
Meetings of the CNS.
Details of how Canada fulfilled the VDNS can be found in the following articles or subsections
of this report:
 subsection 7.2(i)(d): Legislative and regulatory framework – Principle (3)
 subsection 14(i)(h): Assessment and verification of safety – Principle (2)
 article 17: Siting – Principle (1)
 article 18: Design and construction – Principle (1)
Chapter II Summary
Chapter II – Summary
Statement of compliance with articles of the Convention
Article 5 of the Convention requires each Contracting Party to submit a report on measures it has
taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. This report demonstrates the
measures that Canada has taken to implement its obligations under articles 6 to 19 of the
Convention. Obligations under the other articles of the Convention are implemented through
administrative activities and participation in relevant fora.
The measures that Canada has taken to meet the obligations of the Convention were effectively
maintained and, in many cases, enhanced during the reporting period. These measures, as
implemented by regulatory and industry stakeholders who focus on nuclear safety, the health and
safety of persons, and the protection of the environment.
General conclusions
There are 19 operating nuclear power reactors and three reactors in safe storage state in Canada;
all are of the CANDU design. They are situated at five sites, each with its own operating licence
issued by the CNSC. Gentilly-2 is shutdown; Hydro-Québec completed the transition to safe
storage during the reporting period and will be proceeding to decommissioning the NPP. OPG
plans to proceed with refurbishing Darlington starting in 2016 and intends to extend operation
for Pickering beyond 2020. Bruce Power plans to refurbish six reactors commencing in 2020.
Nuclear-related activities at NPPs in Canada are governed by robust, modern legislation, with
appropriate and well-defined powers to ensure that the NPPs remain safe. The legislation is
complemented by regulations and other elements of the regulatory framework that are developed
in consultation with stakeholders. Canada’s nuclear regulator, the CNSC, is mature and well
established. A system of licensing is in place to control activity related to NPPs and to maintain
the associated risks to the health and safety of persons, the environment and national security at
reasonable levels. The CNSC uses a comprehensive compliance program to assure the
compliance of the licensees against the regulatory framework and monitor the safety
performances of their NPPs. The Canadian NPP licensees fulfill their responsibilities to safety,
giving it the highest priority at all levels of their organizations. Many provisions are in place that
contribute to the safe operation of NPPs in Canada. Both the CNSC and the licensees make a
strong commitment to nuclear safety on an ongoing basis, striving for continuous improvement.
Overall safety performance

Canada’s nuclear industry has an excellent safety record spanning several decades. Any safety
issues that arise are addressed by licensees, in order to keep risk at their NPPs at reasonable
levels. Canadian NPP licensees also collaborate on many projects to address safety issues and
share information. For example, they collaborated with the technical suppliers through COG to
align severe accident management assessments and methodology for implementing actions in
response to the Fukushima accident.
None of the safety-significant operational events that occurred at Canadian NPPs during the
reporting period posed a significant threat to persons or the environment. For example, there
were no serious process failures at any NPP during the reporting period. Furthermore, the
Chapter II Summary
licensees’ efforts to address these operational events were effective in correcting any deficiencies
and preventing recurrence.
During the reporting period, all NPP licensees fulfilled their basic responsibilities for safety and
their regulatory obligations. At all NPPs, the maximum annual worker doses were well below
annual dose limits. In addition, the radiological releases from Canadian NPPs were very low, less
than 1 percent of the derived release limits. The licensees’ safety analyses, as described in the
safety analysis reports, demonstrated adequate safety margins for all Canadian NPPs. The level
of defence in depth also remained adequate during the reporting period for all operating NPPs.
Regulatory framework and improvements

During the reporting period, the CNSC continued its progress in enhancing the regulatory
framework – which included various regulatory documents relevant to both existing NPPs and
new-build projects – and aligning the regulatory framework with international standards (as a
minimum). These changes have been introduced into the regulatory framework in a risk-
informed way. Renewals of operating licences for NPPs (which occur approximately every five
years) have been used to introduce new standards and requirements, with provisions for
implementation of the new requirements over predefined time periods.
With the publication in 2015 of CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety
Reviews, and its implementation to the licensing basis of Canadian NPPs, licensees will begin to
perform PSRs for future licence renewals. This closes the one remaining open recommendation
from the 2009 IRRS mission to Canada.
As a result of the licence reform project that began in 2008, NPP operating licences have been
streamlined to contain relatively general requirements that are common to all NPPs. These
streamlined licences have led to enhanced consistency and regulatory efficiency. All NPP
licensees also have licence conditions handbooks (LCHs), which state the verification criteria
that CNSC staff will use to judge regulatory compliance and provide additional guidance on how
to achieve compliance with the licence conditions. During the reporting period, upon renewal of
NPP operating licences, the CNSC began removing references to regulatory documents and
industry standards from the operating licences and including them in the LCHs.
The CNSC has a comprehensive program to assure compliance with the regulatory framework
and monitor the safety performance of the NPPs. The CNSC has continued to enhance the
compliance program for operating NPPs. This includes developing and updating inspection
guides and establishing the compliance program elements for overseeing the various new-build
licensing stages. The CNSC is optimizing its employment levels and identifying organizational
and staffing requirements to support the compliance program. During the reporting period, the
CNSC completed the development of the Inspector Training and Qualification Program.
A comprehensive set of graduated enforcement tools are available to the CNSC to address non-
compliances. During the reporting period, the CNSC further developed a new tool that was
introduced during the previous reporting period: administrative monetary penalties. This
involved publishing the Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission) and regulatory document REGDOC-3.5.2, Administrative Monetary
Penalties, Version 2. This tool has been used to enhance the CNSC’s effectiveness and flexibility
in enforcement.
Chapter II Summary
Assessments and peer reviews

Canada hosted its initial Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in 2009 and a
follow-up review in 2011. The results and findings of these two reviews were described in the
fifth and sixth Canadian reports, respectively. The follow-up mission concluded that 13 of 14
recommendations and 17 of 18 suggestions made during the initial IRRS mission had been
effectively addressed and therefore could be considered closed. The one recommendation from
2009 that remained open – to implement PSRs – has been systematically addressed by the
CNSC. The one suggestion from 2009 that remained open was not directly relevant to NPPs.
The Fukushima accident component of the assessment of the 2011 follow-up IRRS mission
identified two recommendations and one suggestion for follow-up. One of the recommendations
pertained to the review and assessment of the offsite emergency plans for NPPs. It has been
addressed through workshops that were hosted by CNSC, Health Canada, and Public Safety
Canada. These workshops, which included all levels of government and industry, helped ensure
that offsite emergency plans are comprehensive and that the participating organizations are
capable of fulfilling their respective duties.
The second recommendation pertained to conducting, on a periodic basis, full-scale exercises of
offsite emergency plans. It has been addressed through two exercises. Exercise United Response
was a major joint nuclear emergency exercise held at Darlington in May 2014. It included OPG,
as well as more than 50 offsite agencies, including the CNSC. The exercise lasted three days and
allowed emergency response organizations the opportunity to test their response capability.
Exercise Intrepid, held at Point Lepreau in November 2015, simulated an event that progressed
into a severe accident with offsite implications. It was the first full-scale exercise for this NPP
that used emergency mitigating equipment and other Fukushima-related modifications.
The one suggestion form the IRRS follow-up was for Canada to consider inviting an
international peer review mission for emergency preparedness and review. This is being
addressed through CNS Challenge C-4 and an update is given below.
The CNSC’s ratings of NPP safety performance confirmed that CNSC’s requirements and
expectations in all 14 of its safety and control areas were met or exceeded at the NPPs for the
reporting period. The integrated plant ratings were either “fully satisfactory” or “satisfactory” for
all NPPs in 2013, 2014 and 2015.
Addressing the challenges for Canada from the Sixth Review Meeting
Six specific challenges for Canada were identified at the Sixth Review Meeting. The following
describes the highlights of activities undertaken during the reporting period to address those
challenges.
CNS Challenge C-1: Complete the implementation of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan in
The Fukushima action items (FAIs), as specified in the CNSC Action Plan and implemented by
NPP licensees, address safety improvements aimed at strengthening defence in depth and
enhancing onsite emergency response. The NPP licensees addressed the implementation of the
36 FAIs at their stations under aggressive timelines, with all actions completed by December 31,
2015. Verification of implementation is integrated into licensing and compliance processes.
Chapter II Summary
The CNSC Action Plan also included enhancements to the CNSC’s nuclear regulatory
framework. Updates to regulatory documents were completed during the reporting period. Work
is ongoing to amend the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Radiation Protection
Regulations.
Both the CNSC and the nuclear power industry are continuing to consider potential lessons
learned from operating experience in order to make further improvements.
Canada reviewed the IAEA’s The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director General,
against the status of the actions taken in Canada to address the lessons learned. The review
demonstrated that the Canadian nuclear industry and the CNSC and other relevant authorities
have made significant progress in augmenting nuclear safety through a continuous improvement
process. Canadian activities in response to the Fukushima accident aligned with and addressed
the lessons learned reported in the IAEA’s report.
CNS Challenge C-2: Enhance probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to consider multi-units
and to consider irradiated fuel bays (spent fuel pools)
The CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, in May 2014. This document introduced new requirements in
light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident related to multi-units, irradiated fuel
bays, and re-evaluation of site-specific external initiating events (e.g., seismic, flooding, and high
wind). REGDOC-2.4.2 will be included in the licensing basis for NPP licensees as their
operating licences are renewed. All licensees are expected to be fully compliant by 2020. Full-
scope PSAs are either completed or the licensees are making acceptable progress towards
completion. The licensees are developing a safety goal framework and pilot application of a
whole-site PSA methodology.
CNS Challenge C-3: Establish guidelines for the return of evacuees post-accident and to
confirm public acceptability of it
During the reporting period, the CNSC was involved in a number of post-accident recovery
phase initiatives, including participation in the IAEA’s Modelling and Data for Radiological
Impact Assessments Programme.
Further, the CNSC has carried out benchmarking on recovery and, in collaboration with Health
Canada, is developing a discussion paper on a proposed regulatory document that will address
this matter. The main purpose of the paper is to elicit early feedback and engagement with
stakeholders, including federal and provincial governments, on plans for the regulatory
document to describe roles and responsibilities for recovery, as well as important considerations
to be addressed before and during the recovery phase. The discussion paper is targeted for
publication in the fall of 2016 and the goal is to subsequently publish the regulatory document
during the next reporting period. Both the discussion paper and regulatory document will
undergo an external consultation process prior to publication.
CNS Challenge C-4: Invite an IAEA emergency preparedness review (EPREV) mission
Health Canada has completed the current series of exercises to validate the Federal Nuclear
Emergency Plan and worked with stakeholders to implement the lessons learned from the 2014
Exercise Unified Response. In addition, Health Canada and the CNSC continue their planning
Chapter II Summary
for a future EPREV mission, which includes participating in external EPREV missions to
observe best practices for hosting a peer review. An invitation for an EPREV mission is expected
during the next reporting period.
CNS Challenge C-5: Update emergency operational interventional guidelines and

protective measures for the public during and following major and radiological events
Health Canada is finalizing, following consultation, an update to the Canadian Guidelines for
Protective Actions During a Nuclear Emergency, which address protective measures for the
public, including evacuation, sheltering and iodine thyroid blocking, and include operational
intervention levels and well as guidelines for water and food consumption. The guidelines were
released in 2014 for public consultation, followed by a second round of consultation in June
2016. After consideration of the feedback and possible revisions, the guidelines will be finalized
and published by the end of 2017.
CNS Challenge C-6: Transition to decommissioning approach

The CNSC has established a licensing strategy for decommissioning NPPs in the context of the
2016 licence renewal for Gentilly-2. Hydro-Québec applied in 2015 to replace its current licence
with a 10-year power reactor decommissioning licence, subject to renewal. The activities to
complete the transition of the reactor to the safe storage state have been completed. Transfer of
irradiated fuel to dry storage modules is continuing in accordance with the existing regulatory
requirements. CNSC continues to provide oversight, adapting its compliance program to the
decommissioning phase.
Summary of measures that address the Vienna Declaration on

Nuclear Safety
The 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) was adopted by the Contracting Parties
to the CNS. It provides principles for the implementation of the objective of the CNS to prevent
accidents and mitigate radiological consequences.
Canada has demonstrated its fulfillment of the principles of the VDNS through the activities of
the CNSC and licensees in all aspects of NPP operation. Specifically, the principles of the VDNS
have been achieved through the following means:
 The Canadian regulatory framework has been aligned with the IAEA safety standards,
which themselves have been demonstrated to fulfill the principles of the VDNS.
Revisions have been made to the Canadian regulations, regulatory documents and
standards in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima and other operating
experience.
 The designs of existing Canadian NPPs, which are all CANDU reactors, include features
that prevent accidents and mitigate impacts should an accident occur. In addition, actions
by the CNSC and licensees have strengthened defence in depth and enhanced emergency
response. New reactors would meet the latest requirements for siting, design, and
construction.
 Licensees have implemented updated safety analyses and safety analysis reports that
align with the requirements in revised CNSC regulatory documents. Also, licensees are
meeting the safety goals associated with PSAs. Through verification of analysis,
surveillance, testing and inspection, Canadian NPPs have been shown to meet design and
Chapter II Summary
safety requirements as well as the operational limits and conditions necessary for meeting
the VDNS principles. Finally, considering the aging of Canada’s fleet of reactors, NPP
licensees have established and implemented rigorous aging programs with the objectives
of preventing accidents and should one occur, mitigating possible releases of
radionuclides.
 Integrated safety reviews for the refurbishment of specific NPPs have been completed.
The CNSC has introduced PSRs for 10-year operating licences, which will enhance the
systematic adoption of safety-related improvements of NPPs as requirements evolve.
Summary of other safety improvements during the reporting period

In addition to addressing the six challenges from the Sixth Review Meeting, numerous other
safety improvements were made at the Canadian NPPs during the reporting period, including:
 verification of pressure tube fitness-for-service beyond the assumed design life of
210,000 equivalent full-power hours of operation at Darlington, Pickering, Bruce A and
Bruce B
 emergency preparedness improvements following from full-scale, national emergency
exercises at NPPs involving all levels of government and other institutions (Exercise
Unified Response 2014, Exercise Intrepid 2015)
 distribution of potassium iodide pills to all residences, businesses and institutions within
the primary zone (typically 8 to 16 km from the NPP)
 completion of the transition to safe storage for Gentilly-2
 completion of environmental assessment and integrated safety review for Darlington
Summary of planned activities to improve safety

The CNSC and NPP licensees plan to continue the initiatives and safety improvements described
above and to undertake other activities to further enhance safety. The planned improvements
during the next reporting period include:
 refurbishment of Darlington
 PSR update for Pickering’s extended operation
 completion of PSR for Bruce A and B
 preparation of PSR basis document for next licence renewal of Darlington
 resolution of CANDU safety issues, supported by analysis and testing
 ongoing improvements to deterministic safety analysis
 completion of full-scope PSAs at all operating NPPs and methodology development for
whole-site PSA
 preparations for the decommissioning of Gentilly-2
 completion of regulatory framework documents
Chapter III Part A Compliance with Articles of the Convention
Chapter III – Compliance with Articles of the Convention
Part A
General Provisions
Part A of chapter III consists of article 6 – Existing nuclear power plants.
Article 6 Compliance with Articles of the Convention
Article 6 – Existing nuclear power plants
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting
Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention,
the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made
as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading
cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as
soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the
whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and
economic impact.
6 (a) List of existing nuclear power plants

There are 19 operating nuclear power reactors in Canada as well as three reactors in a safe
storage state; all are of the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) design and all were in
operation when the CNS came into force in Canada. They are situated at five sites, each with its
own operating licence issued by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). Appendix B
provides basic information on all the units at the Canadian nuclear power plants (NPPs).
6 (b) Justification of continued operation of Canadian nuclear power plants
General safety framework and overall description of safety evaluations

Activities related to NPPs in Canada are governed by robust, modern legislation, with
appropriate and well-defined powers to ensure the NPPs remain safe. The key legislation is the
Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), which is complemented by a system of regulations and
other elements of the regulatory framework. The CNSC continues to update its regulatory
framework and align it with international standards. The transparency of the regulatory process
in Canada (see article 7) helps to keep the focus of regulatory decisions on the health and safety
of persons and the protection of the environment. Public participation in the development of the
regulatory framework and the licensing process help, to maintain this focus and keep
stakeholders informed and engaged. The regulatory compliance program provides
comprehensive assessments of the operating NPPs’ safety performance against the regulatory
framework and helps ensure all reasonable provisions are made to maintain the risk of existing
NPPs at a reasonable level.
Canada’s nuclear regulator, the CNSC, is mature and well established, as described in article 8.
Articles 9 and 10 describe how the NPP licensees fulfill their responsibilities to safety, giving it
high priority at all levels of their organizations.
The remaining articles in this report describe the many provisions that contribute to the safe
operation of NPPs in Canada. Both the CNSC and the licensees make a strong commitment to
nuclear safety and strive to continuously improve it. This is evidenced by a willingness to engage
in third-party evaluations, such as those done by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) and the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The involvement of
third-party expertise and CNSC’s participation in international fora and activities, such as the
development of IAEA standards, strengthen these provisions.
Safety evaluations and improvements

The safety of all existing NPPs in Canada was fully reviewed during their initial licensing. Both
the licensees and the CNSC have continued to conduct broad and updated assessments since
then, including updates to their safety analysis reports, probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs)
and licence renewal assessments. The licensees’ safety analyses, as described in the safety
analysis reports, demonstrate acceptable safety margins for all Canadian NPPs. Safety
assessments have been conducted in response to significant events and national and international
operating experience. The licensees have reassessed the safety cases of their NPPs through
regular safety analysis report updates but also as part of environmental assessment follow-ups or
as reviews of lessons learned in the context of special circumstances (e.g., the Fukushima
accident).
As explained in subsections 14(i)(c) and 14(i)(d), licensees are also updating analyses and
implementing new requirements for both deterministic safety analyses and PSAs.
The licensees and the CNSC have also conducted many detailed verification activities in support
of ongoing operations. The licensees limit the life of critical components (such as CANDU fuel
channels) and implement aging management plans to help ensure ongoing safe operation. The
licensees also perform thousands of tests of safety and safety-related systems each year to
confirm their functionality and availability to meet the safety requirements. (See
subarticles 14(ii) and 19(iii) for more information on programs that verify safety and manage
aging mechanisms on a continual basis.)
The CNSC renews operating licences for NPPs on a continuous basis and, therefore, the
Commission oversees licensees on a regular basis throughout the lifecycle of a facility. During
the reporting period, the licences for three NPPs were renewed. The CNSC has used operating
licence renewals to introduce new requirements for NPPs – for example, the new requirements
for deterministic safety analysis and PSA mentioned above (see subsection 7.2(ii)(d), “Licence
renewals and updating the licensing basis”).
Licensees implemented safety upgrades on a continual basis to maintain safety margins and
incrementally enhanced safety at their sites (see annex 18(i) for examples). Further, NPP
licensees have conducted integrated safety reviews (ISRs), which are similar in scope to periodic
safety reviews (PSRs), as part of the planning for potential refurbishment projects. (ISRs are
described in subsection 14(i)(f).) These exercises have included comprehensive and systematic
plant condition assessments and the identification of safety improvements that are reflected in
integrated implementation plans – all robust mechanisms for safely extending the operating lives
of NPPs. These activities have helped enhance the level of safety of refurbished NPPs as
compared to their pre-refurbished conditions. With the publication in 2015 of CNSC regulatory
document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews, and its implementation in the licensing
basis of Canadian NPPs, licensees will begin to perform PSRs for future licence renewals (see
subsection 7.2(ii)(d), “Periodic safety review within the licensing framework”).
Canada has committed to fulfilling the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS),
which provides principles for implementing the Convention’s objective: to prevent accidents and
mitigate radiological consequences. Details of the VDNS’s principles are provided in section E
of chapter I.
Principle (2) of the VDNS requires comprehensive and systematic safety assessments to be
carried out periodically and regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime in order
to identify safety improvements that are oriented to meet the objective of the VDNS. Reasonably
practicable or achievable safety improvements are to be implemented in a timely manner.
The measures described above illustrate that comprehensive and systematic assessments of the
existing NPPs have been carried out and will continue to be carried out periodically in Canada.
These have resulted in numerous safety improvements that helped meet the objective in
principle (2) of the VDNS. See subsection 14(i)(h) for further discussion.
Operational safety record

Canada has a mature nuclear industry with an excellent safety record spanning several decades.
None of the operational events that occurred at Canadian NPPs during the reporting period posed
a significant threat to the health and safety of persons or to the environment. There were no
serious process failures at any NPP during the reporting period. (A serious process failure is
defined as a failure that leads to systematic fuel failure or a significant release from an NPP, or
could lead to a systematic fuel failure or a significant release in the absence of action by any
special safety system.) Furthermore, the licensees’ efforts to address operational events were
effective in correcting any deficiencies and preventing their recurrence.
During the reporting period, the CNSC did not need to engage in formal enforcement actions,
including, orders, administrative monetary penalties or prosecution (all of which are options for
resolving nuclear safety-related issues at Canadian NPPs, as described in subarticle 7.2(iv)).
Conclusion
Based on the many provisions described above and its overall strong safety record, Canada is
confident in the ongoing safety of the NPPs currently licensed to operate across the country.
Chapter III Part B Compliance with Articles of the Convention

(continued)
Part B
Legislation and Regulation
Part B of chapter III consists of three articles:
Article 7 – Legislative and regulatory framework
Article 8 – Regulatory body
Article 9 – Responsibility of licensees
Article 7 – Legislative and regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory
framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;
(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of
the operation of a nuclear installation without a licence;
(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to
ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licences;
(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences,
including suspension, modification and revocation.
A general description of Canada’s nuclear policy is provided in subsection C.2 of chapter I.
7.1 Establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) operates within a modern and robust
legislative and regulatory framework. This framework consists of laws (acts) passed by the
Parliament of Canada that govern the regulation of Canada’s nuclear industry, as well as
regulatory instruments such as regulations, licences, orders and documents that the CNSC uses to
regulate the industry.
The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) is the enabling legislation for the regulatory
framework. Regulatory instruments set out and provide guidance on requirements. Requirements
are legally binding and mandatory elements that include the regulations made under the NSCA,
licences and orders. CNSC regulatory documents, as well as other standards, also become legally
binding requirements if they are part of the licensing basis (as defined in subsection 7.2(ii)(a)).
The NSCA, regulations, regulatory documents, licences and orders are described in more detail
in the subsections below.
The Canadian nuclear legislative and regulatory framework was reviewed by the CNSC
Fukushima Task Force (2011) as well as by the follow-up Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) review (2011) and the Fukushima External Advisory Committee (2012). Details on these
reviews can be found in Article 8 of the sixth Canadian report. Much work to update the
regulatory framework following these reviews has been completed and is ongoing.
During the reporting period, the CNSC continued to modernize its regulatory framework and
library of regulatory documents, taking into consideration opportunities to improve the
cataloguing and clarity of the regulatory framework. All activities were carried out with a
continued focus on communicating and engaging with stakeholders, including the continued use
of discussion papers, which play an important role in the selection of regulatory approaches and
the development of the regulatory framework and regulatory program.
In keeping with federal policies on public consultation and regulatory fairness, the legislative and
regulatory framework for nuclear regulation is open and transparent. The processes in place for
the development of regulations and supporting documents, along with the issuing of licences,
provide for the involvement of interested parties and timely communications to stakeholders.
(See subsection 8.1(f) for additional information on the CNSC’s communications and
commitment to openness and transparency.)
7.1 (a) The Nuclear Safety and Control Act

The original legislation in Canada governing nuclear safety was the Atomic Energy Control Act
of 1946. As regulatory practices evolved to keep pace with the subsequent growth in Canada’s
nuclear industry and nuclear technology – and to focus more on health, safety, national security,
environmental protection and fulfilling Canada’s international obligations – updated legislation
was required for more explicit and effective nuclear regulation. Thus, the Canadian Parliament
passed the NSCA in 1997 and the new law came into force on May 31, 2000.
The NSCA provided a distinct identity to a new regulatory agency, the CNSC, replacing the
Atomic Energy Control Board. The CNSC comprises two components: a tribunal component
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission) and a staff organization.
The Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial administrative tribunal that establishes
regulatory policy on matters relating to health, safety, security and the environment. (The
independence of the Commission is described in subsection 8.2(a)). It also makes independent
licensing decisions and legally binding regulations subject to the approval of the Governor in
Council (Cabinet). It is a court of record with powers to hear witnesses, receive evidence and
control its proceedings, while maintaining the flexibility to hold informal hearings.
The Commission consists of up to seven members appointed by the Governor in Council for
renewable terms of up to five years. Members must have a significant scientific, engineering or
business background. They are not necessarily nuclear specialists but bring strong reputations
and transferrable skills to Commission proceedings.
Section 9 of the NSCA sets out the CNSC’s objects (or mandate) as follows:
 to regulate the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production,
possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed
information in order to:
o prevent unreasonable risk to the environment and to the health and safety of
persons associated with that development, production, possession or use
o prevent unreasonable risk to national security associated with that development,
production, possession or use
o achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which
Canada has agreed
 to disseminate objective, scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public
concerning the activities of the Commission and the effects, on the environment and
on the health and safety of persons, of the development, production, possession and use
of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information
The CNSC regulates all nuclear facilities and nuclear activities in Canada, including:
 the site preparation, design, construction, operation, decommissioning and
abandonment of:
o nuclear power plants
o non-power reactors
o nuclear research and test facilities
o uranium mines and mills

o uranium refining and conversion facilities
o nuclear fuel fabrication facilities
o waste management facilities
o high-power particle accelerators
o heavy-water plants
 the certification and use of prescribed equipment and nuclear substances used in:
o nuclear medicine (e.g., teletherapy machines and brachytherapy used in cancer
treatment and diagnostic medicine)
o industry (e.g., industrial radiography, oil and gas well logging, density gauges)
o research
 the certification of persons requiring certain qualifications to carry out duties under the
NSCA
The NSCA enables the regulation of facilities (such as NPPs) by establishing a system of
licensing and certification and by assigning to the CNSC the power to set regulations that
govern those facilities and to issue, amend, suspend and revoke licences that set out specific
requirements that control licensed activities.
In addition, the NSCA provides the CNSC with other powers appropriate for a modern
regulatory agency, including:
 clearly defined powers for inspectors, with powers in line with legislative practices
 a system of penalties and enforcement options for non-compliance, including the
authority to issue administrative monetary penalties (AMPs)
 clear appeal provisions for orders of inspectors and officers designated by the
Commission
 provision for the Commission to re-determine decisions in light of new information
 the authority to order remedial actions in hazardous situations and to require responsible
parties to bear the costs of decontamination and other remedial measures
 the authority to include licence conditions (including the power to demand financial
guarantees for operation, decommissioning and waste management, as a licence
condition)
 recovery of the costs of regulation from entities licensed under the NSCA
 operation of the Participant Funding Program which gives the public, Aboriginal groups
and other stakeholders the opportunity to request funding from the CNSC to participate in
its regulatory process
The CNSC is also responsible for administering and implementing Canada’s international
obligations pursuant to existing bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation agreements,
conventions and undertakings, including nuclear safeguards and the import and export of
controlled nuclear equipment, material and information. The CNSC administers and implements
the above obligations in collaboration with other government departments, the most important
being Global Affairs Canada.
7.1 (b) Other legislation, conventions or legal instruments

Nuclear regulation is under federal jurisdiction. Subsection C.2 of chapter I describes all
federal organizations in addition to the CNSC that are involved in regulating the Canadian
nuclear industry.
The following legislation enacted by Parliament also applies to the nuclear industry in Canada:
 Nuclear Energy Act
 Nuclear Liability Act and the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act
 Nuclear Fuel Waste Act
 Radiation Emitting Devices Act
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA)
 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999
 Canada Labour Code
 Fisheries Act
 Species at Risk Act
 Migratory Bird Convention Act, 1994
 Canada Water Act
 Navigation Protection Act
 Transport of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992
 Explosives Act
 Emergencies Act
 Emergency Management Act
Canada signed the IAEA’s Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in
December 2013. In 2015, the Canadian Parliament passed the Nuclear Liability and
Compensation Act to replace the Nuclear Liability Act. The regulations under the Nuclear
Liability and Compensation Act were published in Canada Gazette II on May 18, 2016. When
this Act comes into force on January 1, 2017, it will increase the amount of compensation
available to address civil nuclear damage from $75 million to $1 billion, broaden the number
of categories for which compensation may be sought, and improve the procedures for
delivering compensation.
Under the Canadian constitution, provincial laws may also apply to nuclear facilities and
activities in areas that do not relate directly to nuclear regulation and that do not conflict with
federal law. Where both federal and provincial laws may apply, the CNSC tries to avoid
duplicate effort by seeking cooperative arrangements with federal and provincial bodies that
have regulatory responsibilities or expertise in these areas. Such arrangements are authorized
by the NSCA, in order to avoid regulatory overlap.
For example, conventional health and safety is overseen at the federal and provincial levels. In
Quebec and New Brunswick, the CNSC shares the regulation of conventional health and safety
for NPPs with Employment and Social Development Canada, in accordance with Part II of the
Canada Labour Code. In Ontario, under an exclusion to the Canada Labour Code, provincial
legislation is substituted for federal legislation to protect workers at designated nuclear facilities.
A memorandum of understanding exists between the CNSC and the Ontario Ministry of Labour
to enable cooperation and the exchange of information/data and technical expertise related to the
exercise of their respective areas of jurisdiction at designated Ontario NPPs.
As another example, environmental protection for NPPs is regulated through the CNSC,
Environment Canada and at the provincial level. That is, provincial environmental legislation
applies to nuclear facilities and the CNSC also shares the federal regulation of environmental
protection with Environment Canada, in accordance with the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999.
7.2 Provisions of the legislative and regulatory framework
7.2 (i) National safety requirements and regulations

The NSCA allows for a range of supporting and complementary regulatory instruments,
including regulations, licences, regulatory documents and standards. The most recent update to
the CNSC’s long-term regulatory framework plan covers the period from 2016 to 2021 and
outlines the regulations and regulatory documents the CNSC will be developing or amending
during that time. This plan allows for more effective long-term planning of resources and better
scheduling of projects within the regulatory framework.
The CNSC makes quarterly updates to the long-term regulatory framework plan to take into
account new projects or changes in project plans. All updates are posted to the CNSC’s external
website.
7.2 (i) (a) Regulations under the NSCA

Under the NSCA, the CNSC has implemented regulations and by-laws with the approval of the
Governor in Council. Regulations set information requirements for all types of licence
applications and provide for exemptions from licensing. By-laws are in place to govern the
management and conduct of the CNSC’s affairs.
The following regulations and by-laws are issued under the NSCA:
 General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations
 Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission)
 Radiation Protection Regulations
 Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations
 Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment Regulations
 Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations
 Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015
 Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations
 Nuclear Security Regulations
 Nuclear Non-proliferation Import and Export Control Regulations
 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees Regulations
 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure
 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission By-laws
Generally, these regulations give licensees flexibility in how to comply with legislative
requirements. With some exceptions – such as the transport packaging and licence exemption
criteria for certain devices – the regulations do not specify detailed criteria used in assessing
licence applications or judging compliance.
The CNSC’s regulatory regime defines NPPs as Class IA nuclear facilities; the regulatory
requirements for these facilities are found in the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations. Class I
facilities also include research reactors (Class IA facilities) and fuel-fabrication facilities (Class
IB facilities).
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure do not impose requirements for
health, safety and the protection of the environment. Instead, they set out rules of procedure for
public hearings held by the Commission and for certain proceedings conducted by officers
designated by the Commission.
The AMP program was implemented when the Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations
(Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) came into force on July 3, 2013. The regulations set out
the schedule of violations that are subject to AMPs under the NSCA as well as the method by
which penalty amounts are determined and notices of violation are served. See subarticle 7.2(iv)
for a more detailed description of AMPs.
The CNSC’s regulation-making process

When making or amending regulations, the CNSC abides by the Government of Canada’s
Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management and follows the federal regulation process. This
ensures that the potential impacts of any proposed regulations on health, safety, security, the
environment and the socio-economic well-being of Canadians, as well as the costs or savings to
government or business and the level of support of the proposed regulations, are systematically
considered before they are created.
The CNSC’s regulation-making process includes extensive consultation with both internal and
external stakeholders. In developing its consultation plan, the CNSC recognizes the multiplicity
of stakeholders with different levels of interest, points of view and expectations concerning the
nature and content of a proposed regulatory regime. Interested parties are consulted early through
discussion papers, workshops or other means to seek feedback before starting to draft the
regulation. The regulation-making process is described in more detail in annex 7.2(i)(a).
Response to Fukushima – Amendments to CNSC regulations

Following the Fukushima accident, the CNSC Fukushima Task Force reviewed the regulations
and found that, overall, the regulations are sound. No changes to the General Nuclear Safety and
Control Regulations were identified as a result of the review. However, the task force
recommended changes to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Radiation
Protection Regulations (and the Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations) to further enhance the
safety of nuclear facilities.
It is anticipated that the amendments to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations to address
lessons learned from Fukushima will be published in 2017. See subsections 7.2(ii)(d), 12(a),
13(a) and 16.1(a) for details.
It is anticipated that the amendments to the Radiation Protection Regulations to address lessons
learned from Fukushima will be published in 2017. See subsection 16.1(a) for details. Other
changes to the Radiation Protection Regulations, unrelated to Fukushima, are also expected to be
made in 2017. See article 15 for details.
7.2 (i) (b) Regulatory framework documents
General description of CNSC regulatory documents

The CNSC uses regulatory documents to support its regulatory framework by expanding on the
requirements set out in the NSCA, its regulations and legal instruments such as licences and
orders. These documents provide instruction, assistance and information to the licensees.
Typically, the Canadian approach to setting requirements in regulations and regulatory
documents is non-prescriptive; that is, the CNSC sets general, objective, performance-based
regulatory requirements and NPP licensees develop specific provisions to meet the requirements.
Specific requirements can be established where necessary.
During the reporting period, the CNSC published a number of regulatory documents that clarify
requirements in the areas of accident management, aging management, security, and compliance
and enforcement. The CNSC also continued to modernize its approach to documenting its
requirements and expectations, moving to a single document type (referred to as a regulatory
document (REGDOC)) that includes both regulatory requirements and guidance in the same
document for ease of understanding and cross-referencing. The CNSC is working towards a
target date of introducing all new REGDOCs and completing the revisions to current REGDOCs
by 2018.
The CNSC REGDOC-development process includes significant consultation with external
stakeholders. See annex 7.2(i)(b) for an outline of this process.
To organize the CNSC’s library of REGDOCs in a clear and logical manner and to facilitate
stakeholder access to relevant content, REGDOCs are grouped into three categories:
 Regulated facilities and activities: REGDOCs in this category provide guidance to
applicants on the information required for licence applications and to licensees on the
requirements for conducting the licensed activity. They also point to relevant
expectations in the 14 safety and control areas used by the CNSC to assess, review, verify
and report on performance and regulatory compliance across all regulated facilities and
activities, where appropriate. They are organized according to the type of regulated
facility or activity.
 Safety and control areas: This category covers the 14 safety and control areas in detail.
 Other regulatory areas: This category covers topics such as reporting requirements,
public and Aboriginal engagement, financial guarantees for licensed activities,
Commission proceedings and information dissemination.
The CNSC safety and control areas, which are described in detail in appendix F, are as follows:
 management system
 human performance management
 operating performance
 safety analysis
 physical design
 fitness for service
 radiation protection
 conventional health and safety
 environmental protection
 emergency management and fire protection

 waste management
 security
 safeguards and non-proliferation
 packaging and transport
The CNSC’s frequency of document revision is every five years or sooner, should the need to
move more quickly be identified. Documents are reviewed to determine which ones should be
withdrawn and archived, retained as is for continued use or scheduled for revision. This process
ensures that the CNSC’s full regulatory framework continues to be current and reflects the latest
developments in domestic and international operating experience and guidance.
A table listing the key CNSC documents that apply to NPP licensees is provided in
annex 7.2(i)(b).
Use of other standards in the development of CNSC REGDOCs

The CNSC sets requirements by adopting (or adapting) appropriate industry, national,
international or other standards. The CNSC is committed to using other standards, as appropriate,
in the effective implementation of its regulatory mandate. This is in line with the Government of
Canada Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management and is consistent with the CNSC’s vision
of regulatory excellence.
IAEA standards continue to serve as references and benchmarks for the Canadian approach to
nuclear safety, as they have for many years. During the reporting period, the Canadian regulatory
framework related to NPPs continued to move toward better alignment with international
standards. The Canadian approach recognizes that international standards may only represent
minimum requirements, which may need to be augmented to suit Canadian technology, practices
and regulatory approach. Annex 7.2(i)(b) provides numerous examples of where IAEA standards
have been used to develop CNSC documents.
The CNSC actively contributes to the development of the IAEA’s safety standards, as well as the
supporting technical documents that provide more specific technical requirements and best
practices for NPP siting, design, construction, operation and decommissioning. Several CNSC
staff members participate in the working groups to draft these standards. CNSC representatives
also sit on the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and the five supporting safety standards
committees.
Response to Fukushima – CNSC regulatory documents

A review of the CNSC’s regulatory documents following the Fukushima accident found that the
documents were acceptable for their purposes. However, the CNSC Fukushima Task Force did
find that certain regulatory documents required updating. To address this finding, certain CNSC
REGDOCs were published during the reporting period to replace older regulatory documents, as
shown in the table below.
CNSC Superseded regulatory Notes regarding new REGDOC

REGDOC document
REGDOC-2.3.2, G-306, Severe Accident Includes requirements and guidance for the
Accident Management Programs development, implementation and validation
Management for Nuclear Reactors of integrated accident management for reactor
facilities.
REGDOC-2.4.1, RD-308, Deterministic Includes requirements and guidance for the
Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small preparation and presentation of a safety
Safety Analysis Reactors analysis that demonstrates the safety of a
nuclear facility.
RD-310, Safety Analysis
for Nuclear Power Plants
GD-310, Guidance on
Safety Analysis for
Nuclear Power Plants
REGDOC-2.4.2, S-294, Probabilistic Provided new requirements, in light of
Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Fukushima lessons learned, related to
Safety Nuclear Power Plants probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for
Assessment multi-units and irradiated fuel bays, and re-
evaluation of site-specific external initiating
events, such as seismic, flooding, and high
winds.
REGDOC-2.9.1, S-296, Environmental Added guidance on station boundary
Environmental Protection Polices, monitoring.
Protection Programs and Procedures
Policies, at Class I Nuclear
Programs and Facilities and Uranium
Procedures Mines and Mills
G-296, Developing
Environmental Protection
Polices, Programs and
Procedures at Class I
Nuclear Facilities and
Uranium Mines and Mills
REGDOC-2.5.2, RD-337, Design of Addressed key lessons learned identified in
Design of Nuclear Power Plants the CNSC Fukushima Task Force
Reactor recommendations. Revised the description of
Facilities: plant states by adding design extension
Nuclear Power conditions for beyond-design-basis accidents
Plants to be addressed in design.
REGDOC- Not applicable Consolidated requirements and guidance for
2.10.1, Nuclear licensees’ management of emergency
Emergency preparedness in conjunction with multiple
CNSC Superseded regulatory Notes regarding new REGDOC

REGDOC document
Preparedness multi-jurisdictional governmental authorities.
and Response, Includes the requirement for the pre-
Version 2 distribution of iodine thyroid-blocking agents
(such as potassium iodide (KI) pills).
Discussion papers
Discussion papers are used to solicit early public feedback on CNSC policies or approaches,
which the CNSC then analyzes and considers so that it can determine the type and nature of
requirements and guidance to issue. The use of discussion papers early in the regulatory process
underlines the CNSC’s commitment to a transparent consultation process, giving stakeholders an
early opportunity to present their positions on regulatory initiatives. The four key stages for the
development of discussion papers are:
 analyze the issue
 develop the discussion paper
 consult with stakeholders
 decide on a regulatory approach
The following discussion papers were published during the reporting period:
 DIS-13-01, Proposals to Amend the Radiation Protection Regulations
 DIS-13-02, Proposed Amendments Made to Regulations under the Canadian Nuclear
Safety and Control Act
 DIS-14-01, Design Extension Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants
 DIS-14-02, Modernizing the CNSC’s Regulations
 DIS-15-01, Proposal to Amend the Nuclear Non-proliferation Import and Export Control
Regulation
 DIS-15-02, Review of CNSC Documentation on the Security of Nuclear Material
CSA Group standards

The CSA Group (formerly the Canadian Standards Association), Canada’s largest, member-
based standards development organization, sets voluntary consensus standards developed by
national stakeholders and public interests related to NPPs and other nuclear facilities and
activities. As many CSA standards are related to NPP design, and operation, they complement
the regulatory documents published by the CNSC.
During the reporting period, the nuclear industry, the CNSC and the CSA Group continued to
collaborate to strengthen Canada’s program for nuclear standards. A representative of CNSC
senior management is a member of the CSA Nuclear Strategic Steering Committee and its
Executive Committee, which are responsible for developing the suite of nuclear standards.
Additionally, CNSC managers and technical staff contribute to the technical committees,
subcommittees and working groups developing the CSA standards. As shown in the table in
annex 7.2(i)(b), several new standards relevant to NPPs were issued during the reporting period
and many others were updated or reaffirmed.
The CSA Group continued to integrate the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident into its
workplan, which include proposals for new CSA standards along with revisions to several
existing ones. In May 2014, the CSA Group published a new standard on emergency
management – N1600, General requirements for emergency management for nuclear facilities –
to address lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and to align with CNSC regulatory
document REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response. A new edition has
subsequently been developed and was published in March 2016. Examples of other new CSA
standards include:
 N290.12, Human factors in design for nuclear power plants (published in 2014)
 N290.7, Cyber-security for NPPs and small reactor facilities (published in 2014)
 N290.16, Requirements for beyond design-basis accidents (published in 2016)
7.2 (i) (c) Regulatory framework for new NPPs

During the reporting period, the CNSC continued to update its regulatory framework for new
NPPs. The revised framework draws upon international standards and best practices, including
the IAEA’s safety standards, to the extent practicable. The IAEA standards set out high-level
safety goals and requirements that apply to all reactor designs; that is, they are technology-
neutral.
The CNSC regulatory documents that are an important part of the suite of documents required
for the licensing of new-build projects can be found in table 1 of annex 7.2 (i)(b). Additional
specific information on the new-build regulatory framework and documents under development
is provided in article 12 (for human and organizational factors), article 17 (for siting) and
article 18 (for design and construction).
Several stakeholders have expressed interest in the possible construction of new, small reactors,
including small modular reactors. A small reactor is defined as a fission reactor with a thermal
power of less than 200 megawatts. Small reactors include reactors capable of producing
radioactive isotopes, research reactors, steam production units and small-scale electrical power
production units. The following CNSC regulatory documents related to small reactors have been
published:
 RD-367, Design of Small Reactor Facilities
 RD-308, Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactor Facilities
 REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis
The Canadian regulatory approach to licensing small reactors is built on a long-established
foundation of risk-informed regulation. Regulatory tools and decision-making processes are
structured to enable a licence applicant for a reactor facility to propose alternative ways to meet
regulatory objectives. Proposals must demonstrate, with suitable information, that they are
equivalent to or exceed regulatory requirements.
Requirements and guidance for reactor facilities are generally articulated to be technology-
neutral and, where possible, permit the use of the graded approach. The graded approach enables
applicants to propose the stringency of design measures, safety analyses and provisions for
conduct of their activities commensurate with the level of risk posed by the reactor facility. The
factors to be considered in the graded approach are as follows:
 reactor power
 source term
 amount and enrichment of fissile and fissionable material
 spent fuel, high-pressure systems, heating systems and the storage of flammables, all of
which may affect the safety of the reactor
 type of fuel elements
 type and the mass of moderator, reflector and coolant
 amount of reactivity that can be introduced (and its rate of introduction), reactivity
control, and inherent and additional features
 quality of the confinement structure or other means of confinement
 utilization of the reactor
 siting, which includes proximity to population groups or extent of isolation from
emergency responders
Regulatory framework activities with respect to small modular reactors are discussed in more
detail in annex 7.2(i)(c).
7.2 (i) (d) Fulfilling principle (3) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
Principle (3) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) states that national
requirements and regulations for addressing the objective of preventing accidents and mitigating
their radiological consequences throughout the lifetime of the NPP are to take into account the
relevant IAEA safety standards and other good practices identified in the review meetings of the
CNS. (See section E of chapter I for further details on the VDNS.)
The table in annex 7.2(i)(b) shows how IAEA safety standards continue to serve as guiding
principles for the Canadian regulatory framework, for both existing NPPs and new-build. The
table also shows that CNSC regulatory documents and CSA standards incorporate the content of
a significant number of IAEA publications as references. The referenced IAEA publications are
given in annex 7.2(i)(b) but also additional IAEA publications were considered in the
development of the CNSC regulatory documents and CSA standards. Further, the revisions made
to the CNSC’s regulations and regulatory documents and CSA standards in response to the
Fukushima accident have further aligned the national regulatory framework with the IAEA
safety standards.
7.2 (ii) System of licensing

Section 26 of the NSCA prohibits any person from preparing a site, constructing, operating,
decommissioning or abandoning a nuclear facility without a licence granted by the Commission.
Subsection 24(4) of the NSCA states the following:
No licence may be issued, renewed, amended or replaced – and no authorization to
transfer one given – unless, in the opinion of the Commission, the applicant or, in the case
of an application for an authorization to transfer the licence, the transferee
a) is qualified to carry on the activity that the licence will authorize the licensee to carry
on; and
b) will, in carrying on that activity, make adequate provision for the protection of the
environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national
security and measures required to implement international obligations to which
Canada has agreed.
Subsection 24(5) of the NSCA gives the Commission the authority to include in licences any term
or condition that it deems necessary for the purposes of the NSCA.
The CNSC’s licensing system is administered in cooperation with federal and provincial/territorial
government departments and agencies in such areas as health, environment, Aboriginal
consultation, transportation and labour. Before the CNSC issues a licence, the concerns and
responsibilities of these departments and agencies are taken into account, to ensure that no
conflicts exist with the provisions of the NSCA and its regulations.
The CNSC is obligated to comply with any federal legislation and therefore may make its
licensing decisions in consultation with any department or agency government bodies at the
federal level having independent but related responsibilities with the CNSC.
The CNSC’s regulatory regime defines NPPs as Class IA nuclear facilities and the regulatory
requirements for these facilities are found in the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations. These
regulations require separate licences for each of the five phases in the lifecycle of a Class IA
nuclear facility:
 licence to prepare a site
 licence to construct
 licence to operate
 licence to decommission
 licence to abandon
The NSCA does not have provisions for combined licences for site preparation, construction, or
operation. However, applications for licences to prepare a site for, construct and operate a new
nuclear facility can be assessed in parallel provided the applicant submits supporting information
and evidence.
The Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations
establish a 24-month timeline for projects requiring the CNSC’s regulatory review and decision
on new applications for a licence to prepare a site for a Class I nuclear facility and a licence to
prepare a site and construct a uranium mine and mill. This timeline does not include the time
required by proponents to respond to information requests.
7.2 (ii) (a) Licences and licensing process

CNSC REGDOC-3.5.1, Licensing Process for Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines
and Mills, was published in 2015 and replaced the CNSC information document INFO-0756,
Rev. 1, Licensing Process for New Nuclear Power Plants in Canada. This document outlines the
current licensing process in the context of the NSCA. The CNSC licensing process is one of the
core processes in the CNSC management system, which is described in subsection 8.1(d).
Figure 7.2 depicts the CNSC licensing process and the key activities to be carried out by the
licence applicant, CNSC staff and the Commission.
Figure 7.2 The Process for Obtaining an NPP Licence under the Nuclear Safety and Control
Act
Public
Intervene/
Provide
Feedback
START END
Applicant
Provide Input as Provide Input as Licence Package/

Application under S 24 Necessary Necessary Notification
(2) of the NSCA (submit CMD) (submit CMD)
Commission
Part 1 Part 2
Public Hearing Document
Public Hearing
Process Decision
Process
END
CNSC Staff
Prepare Prepare &

Log Receipt, Establish and Prepare and
Supplementary Distribute Licence
Conduct Execute Submit
CMD Package/
Financial Review Review Plan CMD
(if necessary) Notification
The licensing process is initiated when the proponent sends an application to the CNSC. A
licence application must contain sufficient information to meet regulatory requirements and to
demonstrate that the applicant is qualified to conduct the licensed activity.
The regulations under the NSCA provide licence applicants with general performance criteria
and details about the information and programs they must prepare and submit to the CNSC as
part of the application process. The following table highlights some of the more important
information requirements identified in the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations and
the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations.
Licence type General regulations Class I regulations
Licence to prepare a site Section 3 Sections 3 and 4
Licence to construct Section 3 Sections 3 and 5
Licence to operate Section 3 Sections 3 and 6
To enhance clarity, the CNSC is preparing a supporting application guide (a REGDOC) for each
licence type that provides additional details and criteria (such as references to CNSC regulatory
documents, national codes and standards, or the IAEA safety standards) so applicants clearly
understand what is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the applicable regulations under the
NSCA. The licence application guide RD/GD-369, Licence to Construct a Nuclear Power Plant,
was published in 2011. Application guides for the licence to prepare a site and a licence to
operate an NPP are under development.
For new NPPs, information on decommissioning plans and financial guarantees is required early
in the licensing process. The Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations require an applicant to
provide information on its proposed plan for decommissioning a nuclear facility or site, while the
General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations require information on financial guarantees to
accompany a licence application. Financial guarantees are used to ensure sufficient funds are
available so that the facility does not pose any unnecessary risk in the event that the licensee can
no longer operate the facility. To date, these have mostly been used for decommissioning an NPP
at the end of its operating life and for the long-term management of spent nuclear fuel.
Information on proposed financial guarantees should include any obligations for funding the
decommissioning and long-term management of nuclear fuel waste, pursuant to the Nuclear Fuel
Waste Act. Financial guarantees for decommissioning are discussed in subsection 11.1(b).
Per CEAA, before any federal authority issues a permit or licence, grants an approval, or takes
any other action for the purpose of enabling a project to be carried out in whole or in part, an
environmental assessment (EA) must be carried out for certain designated physical activities to
identify whether the project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. For all
new NPPs, the EA is performed before the first licence – namely, the licence to prepare a site –
is issued. An EA addresses all the phases of the project lifecycle, from site preparation through to
abandonment. EAs are described in more detail in subsection 17(ii)(a).
CNSC licensing staff assessment and process documentation

The CNSC employs a risk-informed approach to define the scope of the assessments in its
licensing process.
In addition to the REGDOC completion project described in subarticle 7.2(i)(b), the CNSC is
implementing a comprehensive plan for the preparation of licensing process documentation,
application guides and forms as part of the projects under the CNSC’s Harmonized Plan for
Improvement Initiatives (referred to herein as the Harmonized Plan, see subsection 8.1(e)). This
plan includes the integration of knowledge gained from international licensing experience
through organizations such as the IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the Multinational
Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) and other nuclear regulators.
Both the EA reviews and the licensing reviews are executed by CNSC staff using a project-
specific assessment plan that triggers specific reviews within a project management framework
per the process in figure 7.2. Public information meetings and the discussions that follow also
assist in judging the acceptability of the site.
The CNSC has assessment plans and topical staff work instructions (see subsection 8.1(d)) for
the following projects:
 applications for a licence to prepare a site
 application for a licence to construct
 environmental impact statements (EISs, see Article 17)
 integrated safety reviews for life extension (see subsection 14(i)(f))
Licensing recommendations, decisions and related approvals

The CNSC staff assessment of an applicant’s supporting information is augmented by input from
federal and provincial government departments and agencies responsible for regulating health
and safety, environmental protection, emergency preparedness and the transportation of
dangerous goods in relation to nuclear-related projects. The CNSC maintains memoranda of
understanding with these departments and agencies. The NSCA also requires that members of
the public be invited to participate in licensing hearings of Class I facilities (NPPs, conversion
facilities, research reactors) and uranium mines and mills.
CNSC staff members document the conclusions and recommendations from their reviews in
Commission member documents (CMDs), submitting them to the Commission for a public
hearing held in one or two parts. In the more conventional two-part hearings, the Commission
considers the initial conclusions and recommendations at the Part One public hearing (refer to
figure 7.2 shown previously), along with information provided by the licence applicant. At the
Part Two public hearing, the Commission, in accordance with the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission Rules of Procedure, invites interventions by other interested parties (e.g., members
of the public, non-government organizations, labour unions, municipalities, other government
departments, industry) who are then given the opportunity to present information that they feel is
relevant to the licensing decision at hand.
For the licensing of NPPs, intervenors are typically allotted significant periods of time at the Part
Two hearing to present their information and engage the Commission. (This usually involves a
10-minute oral presentation to summarize the key points of the written submission, followed by
question period for which no time limit is ascribed.) CNSC staff and applicants may also present
supplementary or revised information at the Part Two hearing as follow-up to discussion at Part
One. The hearings are webcast and the video is available online for a minimum of three months
following the hearing.
During and after public hearings, the Commission deliberates upon the information provided and
makes the final decision on the granting of the licence. The CNSC issues news releases to inform
the public of the decisions made. The records of proceedings from the hearings, along with the
reasons for the Commission’s decisions, are posted on the CNSC website and sent to all
participants.
Content of licences - General

The licensing basis is defined as the set of requirements and documents comprising:
(i) the regulatory requirements set out in the applicable laws and regulations
(ii) the conditions and safety and control measures described in the facility’s or activity’s
licence and the documents directly referenced in that licence
(iii) the safety and control measures described in the licence application and the documents
needed to support that licence application
The documents needed to support the licence application are those that demonstrate that the
applicant is qualified to carry out the licensed activity and appropriate provisions are in place to
protect worker and public health and safety, protect the environment, maintain national security
and implement the international obligations to which Canada has agreed.
The licensing basis sets the boundary conditions for acceptable performance at a nuclear facility.
As such, it establishes the basis for the CNSC’s compliance program (see subarticle 7.2(iii)),
which is designed to ensure licensees continue to meet requirements and conduct the licensed
activity within the licensing basis.
CNSC licences for NPPs contain a general requirement to conduct the licensed activities in
accordance with the licensing basis. The licensee can improve its provisions, operations or
facility design during the licence period as long as the improvements are within the licensing
basis and executed according to the licensee’s management system. The licensee must obtain the
written approval of the Commission if it wants to make a change outside the licensing basis.
These licences also contain a general condition requiring the licensee to notify the CNSC in
writing when it changes its safety and control measures. This allows CNSC staff to confirm that
operations remain in accordance with the licensing basis.
If the Commission grants a licence, the information and commitments submitted with a licence
application become a legal requirement for the licensee (specifically, part iii of the licensing
basis). Licences may also contain other terms and conditions, including references to regulatory
documents or industry standards that licensees must meet.
NPP licences may include control provisions that require approval or consent to proceed for
situations or changes where the licensee could be:
 not compliant with regulatory requirements set out in applicable laws, regulations or
licence conditions
 outside the licensing basis
NPP licences may also indicate if the Commission has the option of delegating the authority to
grant the approval to CNSC staff (a process known as “CNSC staff consent”).
A common type of approval included in an NPP licensee is a “hold point” – a specific milestone
that is established in a licence to separate critical phases of a workplan and allows for regulatory
review before the licensee is authorized to proceed. The licensee seeks approval of the
Commission or consent of a person authorized by the Commission prior to the removal of a hold
point.
Examples of Commission approval and CNSC staff consent for a hold point were included in the
licence to operate Pickering issued in 2013. That licence included a hold point regarding the
authorization for OPG to operate Pickering beyond the nominal fuel channel design life assumed
in the original design (technical details are provided in subsection 14(ii)(b)). This hold point was
exercised during the reporting period.
Licence amendments
The NSCA gives the Commission the authority to issue and amend licences (to modify existing
licence conditions or to add new licensing requirements, for example). Licence amendments can
be initiated by the Commission or at the request of the licensee, and can be executed relatively
quickly if necessary. This ability enables the CNSC to effectively address safety-related and
other issues at the licensing level.
Licence conditions handbooks

As a result of the licence reform project that began in 2008 (see the sixth Canadian report for
details), NPP licences contain relatively general requirements that are common to all NPPs in
Canada. This greatly reduces the detail in the licence and the need for the Commission to amend
the licence during the licence period. However, each NPP site with a licence to operate has an
associated licence conditions handbook (LCH), the contents of which are under the responsibility
of CNSC staff.
Intended to inform both the licensee and CNSC staff, the LCH gathers in a single document all
the regulatory details, explanations, expectations and associated processes for definitions,
interpretations and administrative control of the licence conditions. The LCH is read in
conjunction with the licence. The LCH associates each licence condition with compliance
verification criteria (CVC) that are used by CNSC staff to confirm the licensee’s compliance
with the licence condition. The CVC are aligned with the licensing basis and document the
implementation plans, action items and transition dates required to meet specific licence
conditions. They provide the latest revisions and effective dates of the CNSC regulatory
documents and industry standards that form part of the licensing basis. (During the reporting
period, the CNSC began removing references to regulatory documents and industry standards
from renewed NPP operating licences, including this information in the LCHs instead.) The
CVC also provide information on obtaining Commission approval or CNSC staff consent of
specified changes (e.g., hold points).
In addition, the LCH provides recommendations and guidance for each licence condition, which
include non-mandatory suggestions or advice on how the licensee can comply with the licence
condition. It also provides for the management of records and documents, including the process
by which the licensee notifies the CNSC of changes to its documentation comprising part iii of
the licensing basis.
An NPP LCH may be revised in accordance with a CNSC process. All revisions are approved by
the Director General of the Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation.
7.2 (ii) (b) Licence to prepare a site

The selection of a site for the long-term development of a new NPP is not, in itself, a regulated
activity in Canada (although the activities of site characterization and evaluation, which support
site selection, are regulated). The choice of site is largely a matter between the project proponent
and the municipalities and provinces/territories involved. The only exception to this practice is
when the Government of Canada, under Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), assumes the role of
proponent if it directly sponsors a federal (i.e., government-run) NPP project. In either event, the
CNSC is not involved in the site-selection process.
When applying for a licence to prepare a site, it is the applicant’s responsibility to demonstrate to
the CNSC that the proposed site is suitable for future development and that the activities
encompassed by the licence will not pose unreasonable risks to health, safety, security and the
environment for the site and its surrounding region. In addition to addressing the activities
pertaining to site evaluation and site preparation, submissions for selected topics for the licence
to prepare a site are expected to consider the entire lifecycle of the proposed facility. The
applicant must also demonstrate that the proposed licensed activity meets all applicable
regulatory requirements.
The CNSC regulatory document RD-346, Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power Plants,
describes the general process for evaluating an NPP site in Canada. Specifically, it:
 provides site evaluation criteria (e.g., to address the impact of the site on the
environment, emergency planning and natural and human-induced external hazards)
 sets expectations for collecting site-related data
 sets expectations for quality assurance as well as public and Aboriginal consultation
Additional information on the site evaluation criteria in RD-346 and the level of certainty and
detail required for the design, is provided in the preamble of article 17.
Regulatory efficiencies can be maximized if the applicant thoroughly evaluates the proposed site
for the project and fully documents the site selection case before initiating the licensing and EA
processes. The information needed to complete such an evaluation has been compiled in a draft
regulatory document, which will update RD-346 and is expected to be released for consultation
during the next reporting period. The document will include criteria for the level of facility
design information needed to support the site selection case. This document is intended to
supplement the related application requirements contained in the regulations under the NSCA.
The draft regulatory document codifies experiences from recent assessments for potential new
NPPs and addresses lessons learned.
As part of the site evaluation process, the CNSC expects the applicant to publicly announce its
intention to construct the facility and initiate a robust public communication program that will
continue for the life of the project. This includes public meetings, held by the applicant, where
the public can express its views and question the applicant.
7.2 (ii) (c) Licence to construct

When applying for a licence to construct a new NPP, it is the applicant’s responsibility to
demonstrate to the CNSC that the proposed NPP design conforms to regulatory requirements and
will provide for safe operation on the designated site over the proposed plant life. The
information required in support of the application to construct an NPP is referred to as the
“safety case” and includes, for example, the following:
 a description of the proposed design for the new NPP, taking into consideration physical
and environmental characteristics of the site
 environmental baseline data on the site and surrounding area
 a preliminary safety analysis report demonstrating the adequacy of the design
 measures to mitigate the effects on the environment and health and safety of persons that
may arise from the construction, operation or decommissioning of the facility
 information on the potential releases of nuclear substances and hazardous materials and
proposed measures to control them
 programs and schedules for recruiting and training staff for the construction,
commissioning and operation phases of the project
 programs and activities that will be undertaken by the applicant to perform the oversight
of design, procurement, construction, commissioning and operation activities, in order to
provide assurance that the plant will conform to regulatory requirements and the design
and safety analysis, as presented in the application
During the reporting period, the CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.1, Conduct
of Licensed Activities: Construction and Commissioning Programs, to provide assurance to the
applicant and the regulator that facilities are constructed per design and the reactor facility meets
its safety requirements and will operate safety. CNSC staff will use this REGDOC to assess new
applications for licences to construct reactor facilities.
In order for the applicant to demonstrate that the reactor facility can operate safely in the modes
for which it has been designed, it is necessary for the design of the facility and the safety analysis
to be well advanced and supported by appropriate and adequate research, including experimental
tests and analysis.
The CNSC’s review of an application for a licence to construct is designed to obtain reasonable
assurance that the facility design meets all regulatory requirements and can be constructed,
commissioned and operated safely as designed and that no new safety issues will be identified
prior to reactor operation. Upon receipt of the application, the CNSC performs a comprehensive
assessment of the design documentation, preliminary safety analysis report, the construction
program and all other information required by the regulations. The evaluation involves rigorous
engineering and scientific analysis, as well as engineering judgment, taking into consideration
the CNSC’s experience and knowledge of best practices in NPP design and operation gained
from existing NPPs in Canada and around the world.
The scope of a licence to construct covers all facility construction and Phase A commissioning as
described in REGDOC-2.3.1 (i.e., the commissioning of all structures, systems and components
(SSCs) done without fuel loaded). The licensee must also build a significant portion of the
operating organization such that facility operations, processes and procedures will be in place in
anticipation of the licence to operate. This approach is part of an overall philosophy to facilitate
the transition from construction to commissioning to commercial operation. In addition, the
approach may increase regulatory certainty for an operating licence if the licensee demonstrates
good regulatory performance regarding facility construction.
During the construction stage, the CNSC carries out compliance activities to verify licensee
compliance with the NSCA, associated regulations and its licence. Compliance activities focus
on confirming that the NPP construction is consistent with the design and the licensee is
demonstrating adequate project oversight and meeting quality assurance requirements.
Regulatory oversight activities include, but are not limited to:
 inspections, surveillance, reviews, witnessing of commissioning tests and evaluations of
commissioning test results
 inspections at manufacturing facilities
 assessment of the effectiveness of applicant’s oversight of construction and
commissioning activities
 granting of Commission approval or CNSC staff consent pertaining to commissioning
hold points
Toward the latter part of construction, regulatory attention turns toward the Phase A
commissioning program and its associated activities. The purpose is to verify, to the extent
practicable (without fuel loaded), that all SSCs have been installed correctly and are performing
according to the design intent (which includes their response to abnormal conditions, as credited
in the safety analysis). Details on commissioning activities are provided in subarticle 19(i).
In addition, the licensee’s progress on its organizational development is considered in
preparation for the anticipated application for a licence to operate.
7.2 (ii) (d) Licence to operate

When applying for a licence to operate, it is the applicant’s responsibility to demonstrate to the
CNSC that it has established appropriate safety management systems, plans and programs for
safe and secure operation. This includes a demonstration that all Phase A commissioning has
been successfully completed and all the systems important to safety are ready for the reactor core
to accept first fuel.
The specific information required for an application for a licence to operate an NPP is found in
sections 3 and 6 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations. The following list outlines some
of the information required in support of a licence to operate a new NPP in accordance with
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.5.1, Licensing Process for Class I Nuclear Facilities
and Uranium Mines and Mills:
 a description of the SSCs, including their design and operating conditions
 the final safety analysis report
 proposed measures, programs, policies, methods and procedures for:
o Phase B, C and D commissioning (i.e., the commissioning of all SSCs with first
fuel in the core)
o operating and maintaining the NPP
o handling nuclear substances and hazardous materials
o controlling releases of nuclear substances and hazardous materials into the
environment
o preventing and mitigating the effects on the environment and health and safety of
persons resulting from plant operation and decommissioning
o assisting offsite authorities in emergency preparedness activities, including
procedures to deal with an accidental, offsite release
o developing and maintaining nuclear security
 public information and disclosure program to keep the public and target audiences
informed of the anticipated effects of the NPP’s operation on their health and safety and
on the environment
 updated preliminary decommissioning plan
 proposed financial guarantee for the activities to be licensed
The information needed by the applicant to submit a successful application for a licence to
operate will be further articulated in a CNSC regulatory document currently under development.
For a licence to operate a new NPP, in addition to assessing the information included in the
initial application, the CNSC verifies that any outstanding issues from the construction licensing
stage have been resolved.
The initial operating licence will enable the operator to load nuclear fuel and begin fuel-in
commissioning (i.e., Phases B, C and D). These activities complete the overall commissioning
program of SSCs to confirm that:
 The key operational safety characteristics match those used in the safety analyses
 The NPP has been constructed in accordance with the design
 The SSCs important to safety are functioning reliably
Commissioning is discussed in more detail in subarticle 19(i).
Licence period
The CNSC uses flexible licence periods that enable it to regulate NPPs in a more risk-informed
manner (in particular, through the adjustment of the licence period according to the licensee’s
previous performance and the findings resulting from its compliance verification activities). The
licensee may also request a specific licence period to match its planned activities or anticipated
change in status (such as the beginning or end of refurbishment).
CNSC Commission member document CMD 02-M12, New Staff Approach to Recommending
Licence Periods, compiles the factors CNSC staff members need to consider when making
recommendations to the Commission regarding licence periods. These factors include:
 facility-related hazards
 presence and effective implementation of the licensee’s quality management programs
 implementation of an effective compliance program from both the licensee and the CNSC
 extent of licensee experience
 demonstrated acceptable rating of licensee performance under the CNSC safety and
control areas
 requirements of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees
Regulations
 the facility’s planning cycle
The imposition of a relatively short licence period by the Commission is an option where overall
licensee performance is unsatisfactory or because of other considerations.
Licence renewal and updating the licensing basis

For the renewal of a licence to operate, the licensee must indicate any changes in information
submitted in the previous application. Appendix C provides a summary of information required
to accompany an application to renew an NPP operating licence. This type of information
becomes part of the licensing basis of the NPP once a licence to operate is granted, as described
in subarticle 7.2(ii). The CNSC plans and conducts a balanced assessment of the licensee
programs and activities, which provides the Commission with a comprehensive review of the
facility and of the licensee’s activities and performance. It also supports staff recommendations
for any licensing decision and guides ongoing regulatory activities. See subsection 14(i)(b) for
a description of this assessment.
Licence renewal is a mechanism to implement new requirements from recently published
REGDOCs or standards, thus contributing to the continuous safety improvement of NPPs.
Before implementation, the CNSC consults with licensees on the need for a transition period or
implementation plan to achieve full compliance. The implementation of CNSC REGDOCs or
standards frequently involves a series of consultations, such as CNSC–industry workshops and
CNSC staff visits to NPPs. The Commission may provide direction on the planned
implementation of new REGDOCs and standards during the licence renewal process. Following
the licence renewal, the implementation details of these REGDOCs and standards are recorded in
the LCH. For example, the LCH contains the anticipated implementation date of the new
REGDOC or standard, which may be projected to be after the start of the licence period.
During the reporting period, the licences to operate Pickering, Bruce A and B and Darlington
were all renewed. The operating licences for Pickering A and Pickering B were combined into a
single site licence in 2013 for a period of five years. The operating licences for Bruce A and
Bruce B were similarly combined as a single site operating licence in 2015 for a period of five
years. The Commission renewed the licence for Darlington in 2016 for a period of approximately
10 years. (This licence period includes the Darlington refurbishment period, which is discussed
further below). All of these renewals involved the implementation of several new REGDOCs and
standards, along with revised versions of existing regulatory documents and standards. The
licence to operate Gentilly-2 will expire shortly after the reporting period (see subsection
7.2(ii)(e)).
As part of continuous improvement during their licence periods, NPP licensees also implement
new regulatory documents and standards (and new versions thereof) that were not considered at
the time of the renewal of their licences to operate. This is done on a risk informed-basis, which
considers the most effective and efficient time to adjust programs to meet evolving requirements.
The LCH is used to document, on an ongoing basis, the implementation status of new regulatory
documents and standards. CNSC staff informs the Commission on an annual basis of changes to
the LCH, including information on progress in implementing new regulatory documents and
standards. This annual reporting is described in appendix F.
Integrated safety review within the licensing framework

The CANDU reactors in Canada have a typical design life of about 30 years, after which a re-
assessment is required to justify further operation. Refurbishment activities, designed to extend
the life of the reactor, take years to execute. Given that the typical duration of a licence to
operate in Canada has been five years, activities associated with life extension were governed in
part, by the conditions in the licence to operate that are in effect before life extension, during life
extension and during return to service following life extension.
In the past, CNSC regulatory requirements for life-extension projects were detailed in the
regulatory document RD-360, Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants. It specified the
requirements for an integrated safety review (ISR), which is a one-time application of a periodic
safety review (PSR). RD-360 was based on IAEA guidance for PSRs. For more information on
RD-360 and recent life-extension projects, see the sixth Canadian report.
The Darlington refurbishment project, to begin in the next reporting period, was also planned
using RD-360 as the base requirement. See subsection 14(i)(f) for details on the Darlington ISR
and life extension. The related licence renewal of Darlington is also discussed in the next sub-
section in the context of PSR.
Periodic safety review within the licensing framework

In April 2015, the CNSC published REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews, which superseded
RD-360. REGDOC-2.3.3 is consistent with the IAEA’s Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-25,
Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants.
Like an ISR, a PSR involves an assessment of the current state of the NPP and its performance to
determine the extent to which it conforms to applicable modern codes, standards and practices,
and to identify any factors that would limit its safe, long-term operation. A PSR is a rigorous
safety assessment that is complementary to – and does not replace – routine and non-routine
regulatory reviews, inspections, event reporting and investigations, or other CNSC compliance
and verification activities. It takes into account evolving international safety requirements,
worldwide operating experience and, in particular, the assessment of the combined effects of
plant aging on safety.
PSRs are complementary to the CNSC’s existing assessments within its process to renew a
licence to operate an NPP. The safety and control areas that provide the framework for the
licence renewal safety assessment (and ISR/PSR) cover the IAEA PSR safety factors. The
implementation of PSR at the CNSC is relatively straightforward in that it simply assigns a
regular frequency to regulatory activities that have been previously conducted in the “one-off”
occasions of life-extension projects. As explained above, the imposition of requirements in new
REGDOCs and standards has already been well-established in the CNSC’s licence renewal
process, prior to the adoption of PSR.
Per REGDOC-2.3.3, the documentation to be submitted to the CNSC for a PSR includes:
 PSR basis document
 reports on the review of each safety factor (safety factor reports)
 global assessment report
 integrated implementation plan
The integrated implementation plan identifies corrective actions and safety improvements that
address all gaps found in the PSR.
In the transition to a PSR-based regulatory regime, CNSC staff members have begun
recommending 10-year operating licences for NPPs with a PSR performed every 10 years to
coincide with licence renewal. During the transition to REGDOC-2.3.3, for situations where the
licensee performed an ISR for life extension in accordance with RD-360, the ISR will be
considered to be equivalent to the first PSR. This was the case for the recent renewal of the
licence to operate Darlington. The Commission granted a 10-year licence for Darlington, which
included a licence condition requiring OPG to submit a PSR basis document, along with the
subsequent licence renewal application, no later than one year prior to the expiry of the new
licence.
In support of the next renewal of the licence to operate Bruce A and B, the Bruce A safety factor
reports were submitted to the CNSC in August 2015. CNSC staff concluded that Bruce Power
has properly identified the strength and gaps presented in these reports. Bruce Power also
submitted the Bruce B PSR basis document in January 2016.
The introduction of PSRs for NPPs is the lead activity in a broader CNSC initiative to consider
implementing PSRs for all Class I facilities in Canada. The implementation of REGDOC-2.3.3
fulfills the 2009 IRRS recommendation R5 regarding the introduction of PSRs (see the sixth
Canadian report for details). This initiative is being further supported by a proposed amendment
to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations that would require all Class I facilities to conduct a
PSR at an interval as specified in their operating licence. The amended regulations are
anticipated to be published in 2017.
7.2 (ii) (e) Licence to decommission
CNS Challenge C-6 for Canada from the Sixth Review Meeting
“Transition to decommissioning approach”
The CNSC has established a licensing strategy for decommissioning NPPs in the context of the
licence renewal for Gentilly-2. Hydro-Québec submitted a licence application in 2015, as its
current operating licence will expire on June 30, 2016. The application is to replace the current
licence with a 10-year power reactor decommissioning licence, subject to renewal. The activities
to complete the transition of the reactor to the safe storage state have been completed and the
transfer of irradiated fuel to dry storage modules is continuing in accordance with the existing
regulatory requirements. CNSC continues to provide oversight, adapting its compliance program
to the decommissioning phase. In addition, during the next licensing period, Hydro-Québec is
expected to continue activities related to the preparation for the decommissioning of Gentilly-2.
The overall project timeline shows that dismantling of the facility will be completed by 2064 and
the licensee plans to apply for a licence to abandon the site in 2066.
7.2 (iii) System of regulatory inspection and assessment

Section 30 of the NSCA authorizes CNSC inspectors to carry out inspections to verify licensee
compliance with regulatory requirements, including any licence conditions. Per paragraph
24(4)(b) of the NSCA, these inspections are intended to confirm that the licensee has adequate
provisions to adequately protect the environment and the health and safety of persons, maintain
national security and implement Canada’s international obligations. These provisions cover
the areas listed in appendix C.
The CNSC and licensees take necessary and reasonable measures to maximize the level of
compliance with regulatory requirements of persons or organizations regulated by the CNSC.
The CNSC designs and executes a compliance program that:
 is informed by risk (to health, safety, environment and national security)
 considers the effective implementation of international agreements to which Canada
has agreed
 accounts for the compliance record of the regulated person or organization
The CNSC implements a corporate-wide compliance process (one of the core processes in
the CNSC management system; see subsection 8.1(d)) that integrates the following elements:
 promotion to encourage compliance
 verification activities to confirm licensees are complying with requirements and
expectations
 reactive control measures to enforce compliance (see subarticle 7.2(iv))
The compliance process provides input to the initial issuance of licences and the operating
licence renewal process described in subarticle 7.2(ii).
7.2 (iii) (a) Promotion of compliance

Promotion of compliance refers to all activities related to fostering conformity with legal
requirements. The goal is to maximize compliance, by strengthening those factors that encourage
it and by mitigating those that hinder it. Compliance promotion can take the form of
consultation, acknowledgement of good performance, collaboration with other regulatory bodies,
and dissemination of information to the regulated community about regulatory
requirements/standards and the rationale behind them. Specific compliance promotion activities
include, but may not be limited to, training, seminars, workshops and conferences.
7.2 (iii) (b) Verification of compliance
General
Verification includes all the activities related to determining and documenting whether a
licensee’s programs and performance comply with legal requirements and conform to acceptance
criteria. Verification activities include:
 Type I inspections, which consist of audits of licensee programs or processes and their
implementation
 Type II inspections, which focus on the performance or output of the programs or
processes, as well as walkdowns or rounds and routine system inspections
 desktop reviews, which are reviews of documentation submitted to the CNSC by
licensees (or applicants)
 surveillance and monitoring, which includes the review of NPP records; and attendance
at meetings related to production, return to service and outage planning
Desktop reviews include reviewing licensee documents, such as the safety analysis reports,
quarterly reports and event reports, against relevant requirements. Some specific forms of
desktop review are supported by CNSC staff work instructions to ensure consistency of approach
and to optimize regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. See annex 7.2(iii)(b) for a listing of
systems and areas of verification activities through inspections at NPPs.
Desktop reviews are also conducted when licensees propose certain changes to their operations,
documentation, etc. As indicated in subsection 7.2(ii)(a), licences require the licensees to notify
the CNSC of such changes. CNSC staff members perform desktop reviews to confirm that the
change, if it were to proceed, would remain in accordance with the licensing basis for the
facility.
In general, acceptance criteria that can be used to assess compliance during desktop reviews or
inspections may be derived from compliance verification criteria in the LCH, licensees’
documents, CNSC regulatory documents and standards, and criteria that are not in the LCH such
as the following:
 CNSC documents not listed in the LCH that clarify how the Commission intends to apply
the legal requirements
 additional information supplied by licensees defining how they intend to meet legal
requirements in performing the licensed activity
 CNSC staff’s expert judgment, including knowledge of industry best practices
Important inspection improvements during the reporting period included the modernization of
the CNSC laboratory, its information management system, and implementation of mobile
inspection kits to enhance CNSC’s capability to verify licensee compliance programs.
Inspections
Inspections typically include interviews with responsible licensee staff; reviews of
documentation, data, logs and event reports; and field component line-up checks.
Some inspections monitor licensee activities as they unfold (e.g., exercises, outages). Other
surveillance and monitoring activities collect real-time information about licensee performance
and possible emerging issues.
The CNSC has in place a comprehensive process for conducting inspections that applies to
all service lines, including NPPs. This process has been responsible for the development of
procedures, templates and guides used by CNSC staff to improve the consistency and
efficiency of inspections for all regulated facilities and activities. A feedback mechanism is
also in place for CNSC staff to recommend revisions to inspection documents.
CNSC staff members who conduct the inspection are chosen based on the area being assessed
and typically include specialists from the head office and inspectors from the site office. The
site office inspectors are designated per section 29 of the NSCA and have various powers and
limitations described in sections 30 to 35 of the NSCA (see subsection 8.1(b) for further
details). A site office inspector generally leads the inspection team, with support from the
technical specialist staff. The licensee is notified in advance of the inspection and its subject
area. Entrance meetings, daily briefings of results and exit meetings are included in the
inspection plans. The results are recorded in a CNSC report to the licensee and follow-up
actions are documented and assigned target completion dates.
Type I inspections are used to evaluate licensee programs that address the topics listed in
appendix C, and may be conducted after programmatic changes. As Canadian NPP licensees
are well-established, Type I inspections are rarely conducted. Type I inspections are planned to
a high degree of detail, with acceptance criteria spelled out in advance. The results from Type I
inspections are transmitted by letter to licensees.
To help achieve regulatory effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and clarity, the CNSC
compliance program uses a planned set of baseline inspections. It represents the minimum set of
compliance activities required to verify licensee compliance with regulatory requirements. The
baseline set was established by identifying a group of Type II inspections (and desktop reviews),
as well as promotion activities for typical NPP operation (e.g., for those programs that address
the areas listed in appendix C and for the systems and areas listed in table 1 in annex 7.2(iii)(b)).
Inspections were then assigned to the CNSC safety and control areas. The baseline set was
subsequently refined to represent a reasonable set of inspections for a licensee having acceptable
CNSC ratings in the safety and control areas during the preceding period.
A suite of CNSC Type II inspection guides was updated during the reporting period and
additional guides were developed. The guides are continuously improved to reflect the current
state of the CNSC compliance program and changes to the licensing basis. The results of Type
II inspections are transmitted by letter to licensees.
The baseline regulatory activities take place over a schedule of five years. For safety and control
areas where the CNSC rating of licensee performance is below expectations, risk management
principles are used to identify focused activities that CNSC staff will undertake in the next
period to supplement the baseline inspections. Monitoring includes the quarterly review of
results of all verification activities.
While most inspections are planned and scheduled with licensees, inspectors have and do use the
power to conduct unscheduled inspections, in reaction to events or other findings. For example,
immediately after the Fukushima accident, CNSC site staff performed walkdowns at Canadian
NPPs to verify the licensees’ emergency preparedness for external hazards and severe accidents.
See Canada’s report for the Second Extraordinary Meeting for more details.
Another CNSC program that has also helped enhance the coherency and consistency of
inspections is the inspector training and qualification program (see subsection 8.1(c) for details).
Results of the CNSC’s compliance activities, and assessments of licensees’ safety performance
are provided to the Commission and stakeholders annually in the Regulatory Oversight Report
for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants (see appendix F for details).
Licensee reporting, follow-up, recording and tracking

The CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear
Power Plants, in May 2014. It consolidates and expands upon almost all legislated reporting
requirements contained in the NSCA and its associated regulations that apply to NPPs.
REGDOC-3.1.1 replaced CNSC regulatory standard S-99, Reporting Requirements for
Operating Nuclear Power Plants, as the document that sets out the timing and information that
NPP licensees are required to report to the CNSC. It has been incorporated in the operating
licences of all NPPs. NPP licensees began reporting in accordance with the new regulatory
document in 2015.
REGDOC-3.1.1 includes requirements for scheduled (periodic) and unscheduled (e.g., event)
reports. REGDOC-3.1.1 has helped improved clarity by focusing on more significant
information.
Preliminary reports for the most safety-significant situations or events (as defined in the
regulatory document) must be provided to the CNSC immediately. Other preliminary reports
must be provided on or before the first business day after the day that the licensee determines
that the situation or event is reportable. The least significant reportable events are required to be
reported quarterly or annually, primarily for trending and analysis of long-term safety and
regulatory issues.
CNSC staff members assess the significance of events or situations that are outside the normal
operations described in the licensing basis. Significance is determined using operational
procedures or expert judgment. The urgency with which follow-up to the event should be
conducted is also evaluated. The CNSC reviews do not aim to duplicate the assessments already
performed by licensees; their purpose is to ensure licensees have adequate processes in place to
take necessary corrective actions and incorporate the lessons learned from past events into their
day-to-day operations. CNSC staff will only carry out detailed reviews of those events
considered particularly significant to safety. CNSC staff may also investigate events of higher
safety significance to independently confirm the event causes and required corrective actions.
CNSC staff members use the Central Event Reporting and Tracking System database to record
the details of reported events; to code, trend and sort events using various criteria; and to track
licensee and CNSC follow-up.
Situations deemed to be of noteworthy significance with respect to the protection of health,
safety and the environment, the maintenance of national security, and compliance with
international obligations are reported to the Commission in an event initial report (EIR), thus
making the information available to all stakeholders. CNSC Commission member document
CMD 03-M68, Criteria for Preparing Significant Development Reports (SDR), includes guiding
criteria to be used by CNSC staff when selecting the situations and issues to include in an EIR.
(Note, the CNSC replaced significant development reports with EIRs in 2013.)
REGDOC-3.1.1 requires the NPP licensees to report data for a set of 25 safety performance
indicators on a quarterly basis. CNSC staff members use these safety performance indicators to:
 benchmark acceptable levels of operational safety
 allow tracking of operational trends important to safety and, in some cases, performance
comparisons across NPPs
 assess, summarize and report on the performance of licensees with respect to safety
in the licence renewal process, in annual/quarterly reviews of NPP performance and in
the Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants
The safety performance indicators are divided among seven categories:
 radiation and contamination
 environment, waste, and health and safety
 international benchmarking
 maintenance
 emergency response
 operations
 chemistry
REGDOC-3.1.1 also provides the CNSC’s requirements for self-reporting of compliance
monitoring for operating NPPs. The scheduled compliance reports are based on the 14 CNSC
safety and control areas. These reports include information about the least significant reportable
events discussed above that the CNSC uses for trending and analysis. The quarterly compliance
reports, which include safety performance indicators, are designed to highlight areas of potential
non-compliance with regulations and licence conditions. Annual reports provide information on
program status and performance.
7.2 (iv) Enforcement

Enforcement includes all activities to compel a licensee into compliance and to deter non-
compliance with legal requirements. The choice of enforcement tool is governed by the CNSC
process to select and apply enforcement tools, which is based on a graduated approach. The
process provides details on the effective application of the enforcement tools described below
and outlines the responsibilities of CNSC staff and the Commission in their execution. If the
initial enforcement action does not result in timely compliance, increasingly severe enforcement
actions may need to be used. In the graduated approach, the severity of the enforcement measure
depends on the safety significance of the non-compliance and other related factors, such as:
 the risk significance of the non-compliance with respect to health, safety, national
security, the environment and Canada’s international obligations
 the circumstances that lead to the non-compliance (including acts of willfulness)
 the licensee’s previous compliance record
 operational and legal constraints
 industry-specific strategies, efforts and ability to return to compliance and/or rectify the
situation
During the reporting period, graduated enforcement tools available to the CNSC included:
 written notices
 increased regulatory scrutiny
 request from the Commission for information
 orders
 licensing actions
 prosecution
 AMPs
The first two types of enforcement in this list – written notices and increased regulatory scrutiny
– are less formal and do not require the involvement of the Commission (as they are typically
handled by CNSC staff).
Written notices are the most common enforcement tools used for NPPs. There are three types of
written notices: recommendations, action notices and directives.
A recommendation is a written suggestion to effect an improvement based on good industry
practice. It is, technically speaking, not an enforcement tool in that it is used when the licensee is
still in compliance with regulatory requirements.
An action notice is a written request that the licensee take action to correct a non-compliance that
is not a direct contravention of the NSCA, the applicable regulations, or a licence condition, but
that can compromise safety, the environment or national security and may lead to a direct non-
compliance if not corrected. Such non-compliances include:
 a failure to satisfy acceptance criteria not directly referenced in the applicable regulations
or licence conditions
 a significant, but non-systemic failure to comply with the licensee’s own policies,
procedures or instructions that have been established to meet licensing requirements
(including programs and internal processes submitted in support of a licence application)
A directive is a written request that the licensee or a person subject to enforcement action take
action to correct:
 a non-compliance with the NSCA, the applicable regulations, or licence conditions
 a general or sustained failure to adhere to the documents, policies, procedures,
instructions, programs or processes established by the licensee to meet licensing
requirements
Increased regulatory scrutiny includes the focused verification activities referred to in
subsection 7.2(iii)(b).
The Commission (or an authorized person) can make a formal request for more information, as
stipulated in subsection 12(2) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations. These
types of formal requests are infrequent. The licensee can be asked to explain how it plans to
address a concern raised by the Commission or the authorized person. For example, such
requests were issued to NPP licensees to provide information related to potential safety issues
raised following the Fukushima accident in 2011.
The NSCA gives the Commission, inspectors and designated officers of the Commission the
authority to issue an order without prior notice, where necessary to do so in the interests of
health, safety, the environment, national security or Canada’s international obligations. The NSCA
includes provisions for the review of orders by the Commission, which includes an opportunity for
the affected licensee to be heard. Orders to NPP licensees are rare – there were none issued during
the reporting period. In fact, no orders related to safety have been issued to NPP licensees in the
history of previous Canadian reports.
Licensing action can be taken in the context of a licensing matter initiated by the
licensee/applicant. The Commission could grant a licence for a shorter term – for example, so that it
can reconsider a specific compliance issue in the relatively near future. Alternatively, the
Commission could also grant a licence renewal for a shorter licence term to allow the licensee
sufficient time to make certain improvements or provide clarifications before the licence is
considered for renewal.
Examples of licensing actions initiated by the CNSC include:
 Licence amendment: CNSC staff may recommend a licence amendment to the
Commission. Licence amendments cover a wide range of possibilities and are decided on a
case-by-case basis. Examples of licence amendments include the following:
o limitations to on-power operation
o a requirement to obtain Commission approval before reactor start-up
o a requirement to appear before the Commission on a regular basis, to provide status
reports on progress in improvements to operation and maintenance programs
 Decertification of persons
 Refusal to certify or renew certification
 Licence suspension or revocation: CNSC staff may recommend to the Commission to
suspend or revoke a licence. This course of action can be taken in any of the following
circumstances:
o the licensee is in serious non-compliance
o the licensee has been successfully prosecuted
o the licensee has a history of non-compliance
o the CNSC has lost confidence in the licensee’s ability to comply with the
regulatory requirements
Notwithstanding what has been given previously regarding licensing actions initiated by CNSC,
and per the NSCA, the Commission may, on its own motion, renew, suspend in whole or in part,
amend, revoke or replace a licence under the prescribed conditions.
A licensee that is subject to enforcement action that involves an order or amendment, suspension
or revocation of its licence, is entitled to appeal to the Commission to contest the action. For a
licence amendment, suspension, or revocation, the licensee would normally receive advance
notice and have an opportunity to be heard by the Commission.
Where warranted, prosecution is also an enforcement option available to the CNSC. Specific
instances of non-compliance that might lead to prosecution include:
 exposures to the public or workers in excess of the dose or exposure limits
 failure to take all reasonable measures to comply with an inspector’s order
During the reporting period, the CNSC introduced a new enforcement tool – administrative
monetary penalties (AMPs). An AMP is a financial penalty imposed by the CNSC, without court
involvement, in response to a violation of a regulatory requirement. It can be applied to any
person or corporation subject to the NSCA. AMPs enhance the robustness and effectiveness of
the CNSC’s enforcement regime and serve as a credible deterrent, thereby achieving higher
levels of compliance.
The NSCA sets the maximum AMPs for individuals and persons other than an individual (i.e., a
corporation or other institution) at $25,000 and $100,000, respectively and addresses the rules
surrounding violations and designates who can issue AMPs and review them. The review
framework is based on the current CNSC appeal process; reviews are conducted by the
Commission, during which time payment is pending. The Administrative Monetary Penalties
Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) set out the schedule of violations that are
subject to AMPs under the NSCA, as well as the method by which the penalty amounts are
determined and the way notices of violation are served.
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.5.2, Administrative Monetary Penalties, Version 2,
provides information about the AMP program. It describes how and where AMPs fit into the
CNSC’s approach to compliance, and provides an overview of how they are administered.
REGDOC-3.5.2 was originally published in March 2014 and was revised in August 2015.
The CNSC issued a total of 20 AMPs during the reporting period. Only one AMP was issued to
an NPP licensee during the reporting period, and it was related to prescribed information which
is outside the scope of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Specifically, this AMP was issued to
promote compliance with conditions of the licence and to deter reoccurrence and was not nuclear
safety-related.
The CNSC process to select and apply enforcement tools does not include follow-up and
tracking of responses to enforcement action. CNSC staff members utilize an action tracking tool
in order to track the follow-up to non-compliances and help ensure appropriate and timely
responses.
Significant enforcement actions against NPP licensees are summarized for the Commission and
stakeholders in the annual Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants (see
appendix F).
Article 8 – Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the
implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, and
provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its
assigned responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization
concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.
Canada’s nuclear regulatory body, the CNSC, strives for regulatory excellence. Its vision, as
stated in its Management System Manual (see subsection 8.1(d)), is “to be the best nuclear
regulator in the world”. This vision is supported by a commitment to self-assessment, peer
review and continual improvement. The CNSC strives to adjust to changing circumstances and
learn from situations and events.
Overall CNSC response to the Fukushima accident

The CNSC’s response to the Fukushima accident included:
 Issuing a regulatory request, under subsection 12(2) of the General Nuclear Safety and
Control Regulations, to all licensees of nuclear facilities in Canada to review the lessons
learned from the event, re-examine their safety cases and report on their implementation
plans to address significant gaps
 forming the CNSC Task Force to examine the response of NPPs to external events of
higher magnitude than had previously been considered in the approved design bases; and
to examine the licensees’ capacity to respond to external events that may cause a
prolonged loss of electrical power, resulting in operators being unable to continue cooling
the reactors
 publishing the CNSC Integrated Action Plan on the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Accident (CNSC Action Plan), which included
o 36 Fukushima actions items (FAIs) applicable to Canadian NPP licensees and
prescribing well-defined deliverables and timeline for their completion
o actions for CNSC to enhance elements of the regulatory framework
The CNSC was the subject of two, distinct, independent assessments of its response to
Fukushima: the 2011 follow-up IRRS mission to Canada and the review by an external advisory
committee in 2012.
Details on the CNSC response to Fukushima and the independent assessments can be found in
the sixth Canadian report.
“Complete the implementation of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan in response to the
Fukushima accident”
Canadian NPP licensees completed all FAIs resulting from the CNSC Action Plan by December
31, 2015 and details are found throughout this report. To follow through on the closure of the
FAIs, station-specific action items were raised where necessary. CNSC staff members continue
to monitor the implementation of planned measures at the NPPs through the station-specific
action items as part of its ongoing compliance verification program. These activities include
desktop reviews or inspections of the design improvements to enhance defence in depth, and
field verifications of additional emergency mitigating equipment procured (including its
availability and deployment guidelines). These station-specific action items are tracked through
closure under established compliance verification criteria.
The CNSC also enhanced various elements of the regulatory framework, which included
regulatory documents and the regulations. The updates for regulatory documents were completed
during the reporting period. See subsection 7.2(i)(b) for details. Work is ongoing to amend two
regulations to address lessons learned from Fukushima: Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations
and the Radiation Protection Regulations. Details can be found in subsection 7.2(i)(a).
For more details on the CNSC’s response to the Fukushima accident, see annex 8 of the sixth
Canadian report, which provides a detailed comparison of Canada’s efforts against the IAEA
Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.
In 2015, the IAEA published The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director General
(the DG-IAEA Report), which contained 45 observations and lessons learned from the accident.
CNSC staff played key leadership roles in preparing this report. In consultation with Health Canada
and Public Safety Canada, the CNSC reviewed the lessons learned and assessed them against the
status of the actions taken in Canada to address the lessons learned. The findings of this review
were tabulated in CNSC Assessment of the IAEA Director General Report on the Fukushima
Daiichi Accident, which was posted on the CNSC website in 2016 and can be found in annex 8
of this report.
The review demonstrated that the Canadian nuclear industry, the CNSC and other relevant
authorities (including Health Canada and Public Safety Canada) have made significant progress
in augmenting nuclear safety through a continuous improvement process. Canadian activities in
response to the Fukushima accident were in line with and addressed the lessons identified in the
DG-IAEA Report, and no new gaps were identified. Additional activities continue, including the
drafting of post-accident recovery guidelines that will address related elements in the DG-IAEA
Report (see subsection 16.1(a) for details).
The CNSC continues to consider potential lessons learned from operational experience, both
from within the nuclear industry and from other safety-conscious industries.
Preparation for new-build project

The CNSC has put in place all the necessary tools and capacity to undertake new major facility
licensing and compliance activities, including conducting pre-licensing vendor design reviews.
8.1 Establishment of the regulatory body

As established by the NSCA, the CNSC is the nuclear regulatory body in Canada. The
fulfillment of its mandate (see subsection 7.1(a)) is accomplished by the work of the
Commission, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal comprising a maximum of seven members.
Commission members are chosen on the basis of their credentials and are independent of all
political, governmental, special interest group or industry influences. Members are appointed by
the Governor in Council for terms not exceeding five years and may be reappointed. One member
of the Commission is designated as both the President and Chief Executive Officer of the CNSC
as an organization.
Subsection 16(1) of the NSCA stipulates that the Commission can employ staff to meet the
purposes of the NSCA (see subsection 8.1(b) for a detailed description of CNSC staff).
The Commission conducts its business in an open and transparent manner. The public hearings
and meetings of the Commission represent the public’s primary opportunity to participate in the
regulatory process. For more information on openness and transparency, as well as the CNSC’s
efforts to engage stakeholders, see subsection 8.1(f).
Hearings and meetings are held to discuss, among other things, NPP status, licensees
performance, overall industry performance, and the findings resulting from licensing and
compliance activities. CNSC staff members regularly attend these public hearings and meetings
to advise, report and make recommendations to the Commission.
Subsection 17(1) of the NSCA stipulates that the Commission can also retain the services of
external persons having technical or specialized expertise to advise it, independently of CNSC
staff. This provision is used as needed, and would be the foundation for establishing ad hoc
or permanent committees to support the Commission.
For some technical issues, the CNSC has also jointly sponsored, with the NPP industry,
independent technical panels to review certain aspects of a particular issue (such as the analysis
of effects associated with the issue or the proposed methodology to address it). An example of
this kind of technical panel is provided in appendix G, section G.3 of the fifth Canadian report,
which describes how an independent technical panel reviewed a new neutron overpower analysis
methodology. This independent panel continued its advisory work during this reporting period.
The CNSC research program provides access to independent advice, expertise, experience,
information and other resources via contracts and contributions placed in the private sector
and with academic institutions and other agencies/organizations across Canada and around the
world. The research program helps CNSC meet its regulatory mission and is independent of the
extensive R&D program conducted by the industry. Appendix E describes the research
objectives of the CNSC (and the Canadian nuclear industry) during the reporting period.
8.1 (a) Position and funding of the CNSC within the government structure
Position of the CNSC in the government structure

The CNSC is independent of government and reports to the Parliament of Canada through a
Minister, designated by the Governor in Council. Currently, this designate is the Minister of
Natural Resources. The CNSC makes independent, fair and unbiased decisions to regulate the
nuclear industry.
The Commission is accountable in the following ways:
 Accountability to Parliament: The Commission submits to Parliament its annual report as
well as its Report on Plans and Priorities and a Departmental Performance Report. The
President of the CNSC, as the head of the Commission, appears before parliamentary
committees to elaborate on matters related to the administration of the regulatory regime.
 Legal Accountability: Regulatory decisions by the Commission can be reviewed only by
the Federal Court. As a federal agency, the CNSC is subject to various laws (e.g., the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Official Languages Act, the Privacy Act,
the Access to Information Act and the Financial Administration Act).
The Commission requires the involvement and support of the Minister of Natural Resources to
make or amend regulations and on matters of administration. Ministerial approval is required for
regulation proposals submitted to the Governor in Council for approval. In addition, the
Commission requires the involvement and support of the Minister for requests for funding of
activities not funded under the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees
Regulations. For example, when its workload increases for activities that have no direct benefit
to individual licensees, the CNSC, with the support of its Minister, seeks incremental funding
through the Government of Canada’s annual budget process. While the CNSC always seeks to
increase the efficiency of its operations, it can also address workload pressures associated with
fee-paying licensees through an increase of its regulatory fees.
Although the CNSC is the clear regulatory authority with respect to nuclear safety in Canada,
various other national organizations play important, complementary roles. Legislation is
established to set the relevant requirements for other areas of jurisdiction that are also applicable
to nuclear-related activities. Memoranda of understanding and working relationships are
established between these organizations and the CNSC to ensure nuclear regulation is effective
and consistent, safety is not compromised, all responsibilities are borne by the appropriate body
and no ambiguity or overlap exists. Examples of such areas of jurisdiction are emergency
preparedness, the transportation of dangerous goods, environmental protection, and conventional
health and safety (see subsection 7.1(b)).
In particular, CNSC staff members communicate with management and staff of Natural Resources
Canada (NRCan) in areas of mutual interest. NRCan formulates the Government of Canada’s
policy regarding nuclear energy and natural resources. It is also a licensee for the cleanup of
certain low-level radioactive wastes on behalf of the Government of Canada and, consequently,
is subject to the CNSC’s licensing and regulatory oversight. Another close partner is Global
Affairs Canada, with which the CNSC frequently works to ensure the fulfillment of Canada’s
international commitments pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties, conventions and
understandings.
Under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA; see subsection 7.2(ii)(a))
the CNSC is identified as a responsible authority for the purpose of conducting
environmental assessments. The CNSC has responsibility for both the process and decision-
making under the CEAA.
In addition to federal government entities, the CNSC works with several provincial and
municipal organizations, as appropriate, in fulfilling its mandate.
The CNSC issues nuclear power reactor operating licences for the nuclear operations of
provincially owned electrical utilities OPG, Hydro-Québec and NB Power (as well as to Bruce
Power, which is a private-sector organization). The following publicly owned institutions or agents
of the federal and provincial governments also hold other types of CNSC licences:
 NRCan
 Canadian universities
 hospitals and research institutions
 federal and provincial government departments
As part of its assessment of the lessons learned from Fukushima, the post-Fukushima review
evaluated the roles and responsibilities of the various federal/provincial organizations (including
the CNSC) that play significant roles in nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness. For
more details, see the sixth Canadian report. See subsection 16.1(a) for information about the
specific follow-up issues related to emergency preparedness that involve other national
organizations.
Funding
The CNSC is a departmental corporation, listed in schedules II and V of the Financial
Administration Act.
In the past, CNSC regulatory activities were fully funded through the appropriations from
Parliament. In the 2013 federal budget, the CNSC received statutory authority – pursuant to
subsection 21(3) of the NSCA – to spend during a fiscal year any revenues that it receives in the
current or previous fiscal year through the conduct of its operations. The revenues received from
regulatory fees for licences and applications are charged in accordance with the Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission Cost Recovery Fees Regulations. This authority to spend revenues
provides a sustainable and timely funding regime to address the rapid changes in the regulatory
oversight workload associated with the Canadian nuclear industry.
Revenue recovered from fee-paying applicants and licensees accounts for almost 70 percent of
the CNSC’s funding. CNSC activities that are not recovered through cost recovery fees are
funded through annual appropriations from Parliament. This accounts for the remaining
30 percent of the CNSC’s funding.
Certain organizations are exempt from cost recovery and are not charged licence fees. These
include not-for-profit institutions such as schools, medical facilities and emergency services, as
well as government departments or agencies that hold a licence for an abandoned, contaminated
site (assuming the licensee did not create the contamination). In addition to the exempt
organizations, the types of activities funded through the annual appropriations are activities that
the CNSC is obliged to conduct and that have no direct benefit for individual licensees (e.g.,
activities related to non-proliferation, emergency preparedness, public information programs and
the maintenance of the NSCA and its associated regulations). For fluctuations associated with
these licensees or activities, the CNSC can request additional funding from the Government of
Canada (as given in the previous subsection).
8.1 (b) Organization of CNSC staff

The CNSC consists of a President, the federally appointed members of the Commission and
approximately 829 staff members, as of the end of the reporting period. Subsection 12(1) of the
NSCA states that the President “has supervision over and direction of the work of the members
and officers and employees of the Commission,” including professional, scientific, technical and
other officers employed for the purpose of carrying on the work of the Commission.
The CNSC’s current organizational structure is described in Figure 8.1 (b) below:
Figure 8.1 (b) Organization of the CNSC
Commission President CNSC Audit

Commission Members Chief Executive Officer Committee
Legal Services Commission Secretariat

Senior General Counsel Commission Secretary
Office of Audit & Ethics

Director
Regulatory
Operations Branch Technical Support Regulatory Affairs Corporate Services
Executive Vice-
Branch Branch Branch
President & Chief Vice-President & Chief
Regulatory Operations Vice-President Vice-President
Financial Officer
Officer
To satisfy the internal audit policy of the Government of Canada, the CNSC has an Audit
Committee of five members composed of three external members, the CNSC President and the
Commission Secretary. The Audit Committee provides the President with independent and
objective advice and assurance on how well the CNSC’s internal audit and accountability
processes are working. Its oversight also extends to areas and processes that include values and
ethics, risk management, management control and accountability reporting.
The Commission Secretariat consists of the Commission Secretary and supporting staff. It
organizes all Commission hearings and meetings and provides the Commission with
administrative and technical support.
The Office of Audit and Ethics, which is part of the Secretariat but whose work is also overseen
and assessed by the CNSC Audit Committee, helps the CNSC achieve its objectives efficiently
and in a way that demonstrates informed, ethical and accountable decision making. It is
responsible for independently and objectively assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of CNSC
operations and for providing advice to CNSC management on related improvement initiatives.
The Office of Audit and Ethics also administers the CNSC programs for values and ethics,
internal disclosure, external complaints, political activities, conflict of interest and post-
employment. (See subsection 8.2(b) for additional description of the activities of the Office of
Audit and Ethics.)
Legal Services acts as counsel to the Commission in its statutory roles and provides legal
representation in litigation and prosecution cases. It also provides advice and legal opinions to
CNSC staff members.
The CNSC as an organization consists of four branches: Regulatory Operations, Technical
Support, Regulatory Affairs and Corporate Services.
Regulatory Operations Branch

The Regulatory Operations Branch is responsible for managing regulatory activities, including
those related to licensing, compliance verification and enforcement. The relevant regulatory
decisions may be made by designated officers, where the Commission formally assigns specific
authorities to those officers in accordance with the provisions set out in the NSCA and its
regulations. It is headed by the CNSC Executive Vice-President and Chief Regulatory
Operations Officer and comprises the following directorates:
 Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation
 Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation
 Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation
 Directorate of Regulatory Improvement and Major Projects Management
The Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation regulates the development and operation of
NPPs in Canada, in accordance with the requirements of the NSCA and its associated
regulations. The directorate currently consists of the following five divisions:
 four regulatory program divisions (RPDs)
o Pickering
o Darlington
o Gentilly-2/Point Lepreau
o Bruce
 Power Reactor Licensing and Compliance Integration Division
The four RPDs are accountable for the planning, management and implementation of the power
reactor regulatory program at their respective sites. Each RPD also acts as a single point of
contact for internal stakeholders and licensees regarding most issues associated with the site. A
correspondence protocol is in place to govern both official communications (usually at the level
of RPD Director) and unofficial communications between CNSC staff and the licensees.
In each RPD, there are permanently situated CNSC staff members who work at each NPP to lead
and assist in the conduct of the CNSC compliance program activities (described in
subsection 7.2(iii)(b)). Led by a site supervisor, these site inspectors inspect the premises,
monitor activities and ensure compliance with the licensing basis. The inspectors are designated
as such per section 29 of the NSCA.
In addition to the site inspectors at the NPP, technical staff at the CNSC’s head office are also
assigned to each RPD.
In 2014, given the shutdown state of the reactor at Gentilly-2 and the progress being made
toward the safe storage state, the site office at Gentilly-2 was closed and the resident CNSC
inspectors were re-assigned to different positions within the organization. Inspections of the
Gentilly-2 site are now coordinated and conducted by CNSC staff from the head office.
The Power Reactor Licensing and Compliance Integration Division is accountable for
discharging the CNSC’s international obligations with respect to the NEA/IAEA Incident
Reporting System (see subarticle 19(vi)) and the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). It
also ensures consistency in licensing and compliance activities across NPP sites, assists in the
development of LCHs and preparations for the renewal of NPP operating licences, identifies
trends in compliance information, manages performance indicator data and conducts event
investigations as needed. During the reporting period, the Power Reactor Licensing and
Compliance Integration Division continued to lead the development of inspection guides and
corresponding performance objectives and criteria and developed various reports related to
NPPs. This division also leads the management of CANDU safety issues (described in
subsection 14(i)(g)).
The consistency of the implementation of the regulatory programs across the NPPs is fostered by
a common approach to training (see subsection 8.1(c)). Meetings are also held regularly to foster
common understanding and consistent approaches among directorate staff. This includes weekly
teleconferences, divisional meetings, bi-monthly site supervisor meetings, quarterly review
meetings and annual staff meetings.
The Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation and the Directorate of Nuclear
Substance Regulation contribute to the regulatory program for NPPs. The Directorate of
Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation is responsible for, among other things, the various
facilities associated with NPPs, such as uranium mines and refineries, conversion and fuel-
fabrication facilities, and facilities for spent fuel storage and management of low- and
intermediate-level radioactive waste. The Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation is
responsible for some licences related to NPPs that fall outside the scope of the operating licence
(e.g., licences for nuclear substances and radiation devices, transport).
The Directorate of Regulatory Improvement and Major Projects Management consists of
three divisions:
 Internal Quality Management Division
 Regulatory Operations Coordination Division
 New Major Facilities Licensing Division
The responsibilities of the Internal Quality Management Division include strengthening the
CNSC’s management system, promoting a healthy safety culture, conducting and coordinating
the CNSC’s Harmonized Plan for improvement initiatives, and implementing self-assessments of
key regulatory processes.
The responsibilities of the Regulatory Operations Coordination Division include the coordination
of the annual operations planning, monitoring and reporting process, as well as the maintenance
and central coordination of support activities and programs across regulatory programs. These
topics are described in subsection 8.1(d).
The New Major Facilities Licensing Division is mandated to provide regulatory oversight
through licensing, compliance, and other activities for potential new NPPs to be built in Canada;
ensure a state of readiness for licensing any emerging technologies (such as small modular
reactors); and manage new major projects and their related regulatory framework improvement
projects. This division manages the CNSC’s pre-project vendor design reviews, which provide
vendors with regulatory guidance in regards to their NPP designs. It also participates in
international activities that have a bearing on new-build projects, including those of the
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP). See the preamble to article 18 for more
details on pre-project vendor design reviews and MDEP.
Technical Support Branch

The Technical Support Branch consists of a large number of employees with particular
knowledge and skills who provide technical support to the activities of the Regulatory
Operations Branch (including the Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation) and the Regulatory
Affairs Branch. This is accomplished by providing specialist advice for regulatory programs,
reviewing NPP licensee submissions, participating in inspections and helping to develop
regulatory framework documents. Collaborations frequently include contributions involving
several disciplines from across the Technical Support Branch and the Regulatory Operations
Branch, requiring an integrated approach to resolving issues. The staff of the Technical Support
Branch also share scientific and technical information and experience with stakeholders in
Canada and other countries and undertake special projects within their expertise and mandate.
The Technical Support Branch comprises four directorates:
 Directorate of Assessment and Analysis
 Directorate of Safety Management
 Directorate of Environmental and Radiation Protection and Assessment
 Directorate of Security and Safeguards
The Directorate of Assessment and Analysis has expertise in the areas of chemistry, nuclear
fuel, reactor physics, engineering (electrical, materials, mechanical, metallurgical, nuclear,
civil/structural, and systems), design, aging management, maintenance, and equipment
qualification, as well as fire protection, robustness, vulnerability design engineering and safety
analysis, including deterministic safety analysis, probabilistic safety assessment and hazards
analysis. The Directorate of Assessment and Analysis consists of eight divisions:
 Engineering Design Assessment Division
 Operational Engineering Assessment Division
 Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Reliability Division
 Systems Engineering Division
 Physics and Fuel Division

 Reactor Behaviour Division
 Reactor Themalhydraulics Division
 Assessment Integration Division
The Directorate of Safety Management has expertise in the areas of human and organizational
safety management, human factors, safety culture, management systems, examination,
certification and training. It consists of four divisions:
 Management Systems Division
 Personnel Certification Division
 Human and Organizational Performance Division
 Training Program Evaluation Division
The Directorate of Environmental and Radiation Protection and Assessment has expertise in
the areas of environmental assessment (EA), environmental risk assessment, environmental
monitoring and environmental management systems, as well as radiation protection, dosimetry
and health sciences. It consists of five divisions:
 Environmental Risk Assessment Division
 Environmental Assessment Division
 Environmental Compliance and Laboratory Services Division
 Radiation Protection Division
 Radiation and Health Sciences Division
The Directorate of Security and Safeguards has expertise in the area of emergency
management and response. It is responsible for the CNSC’s Nuclear Emergency Management
Program, including its implementation and the planning of activities with other federal/provincial
agencies and international organizations (see article 16). It also has expertise in nuclear security;
import and export of nuclear substances, equipment and devices; safeguards; and non-
proliferation. It consists of four divisions:
 Nuclear Security Division
 Emergency Management Programs Division
 Non-proliferation and Export Control Division
 International Safeguards Division
Regulatory Affairs Branch

The Regulatory Affairs Branch plays a central role in managing the regulatory framework in
addition to communications and stakeholder relations. It encompasses the Regulatory Policy
Directorate, the Strategic Planning Directorate and the Strategic Communications Directorate.
The Regulatory Policy Directorate is charged with managing the regulatory framework, which
includes reviewing the adequacy of regulatory instruments, managing their revision, and
producing new instruments (including new regulatory documents). The Strategic Planning
Directorate is responsible for planning and reporting at the organizational level (e.g., reporting to
Parliament), and for evaluating the CNSC’s effectiveness and efficiency in relation to its
regulatory mandate. The Strategic Communications Directorate is responsible for both internal
and external communications and hence contributes to measures related to openness and
transparency.
Corporate Services Branch

The Corporate Services Branch manages organizational-wide services, activities and resources
that are administered to support the needs of programs and other corporate obligations of the
organization. These include management and oversight, human resources management, financial
management, information and technology management, acquisition services, and other
administrative services. It provides services and resources that apply across the organization.
8.1 (c) Maintaining competent staff
Workforce management
Maintaining a competent, agile and engaged workforce is critical to the CNSC’s success and its
goal of being “an employer of choice.” As a result of uncertainty in the nuclear industry and
anticipated attrition of the CNSC’s workforce, an initiative to significantly increase the rigour of
workforce planning was launched during this reporting period. Its aim was to strengthen CNSC’s
capacity for continuous forecasting of industry trends, including their workforce implications, so
that proactive measures could be taken to build and protect the organizational capabilities needed
to deliver on its mandate. The CNSC also focused on employee retention and fostering high
levels of employee engagement.
Increasing the rigour of workforce planning included:
 development of a framework to catalogue the CNSC’s current capabilities and associated
workforce competencies
 segmentation of positions into categories to support the development of targeted
recruitment strategies
 establishment of forecasts of future workforce requirements using scenario planning
 review of the anticipated supply of labour (internal and external to the CNSC) and the
analysis of anticipated gaps
 development of a framework to engage all managers across directorates in the
examination of workforce requirements and potential risk areas
 development and implementation of workforce strategies to address anticipated gaps and
risks
The development and implementation of strategies to address workforce needs was supported by
an organizational review to understand the degree to which CNSC’s organizational structure
supported on-the-job growth and development and the effective progression of employees from
junior to senior roles. Consequentially, CNSC launched a significant New Graduate Recruitment
Initiative that resulted in the hiring of 61 new employees – representing almost 8 percent of the
CNSC’s overall workforce. This was supported by redistribution, as necessary, of some senior
roles (upon retirement) to create entry-level job opportunities or mid-level positions that support
progression to senior levels.
Professional development
Each CNSC staff member has an individual learning plan that contributes to the CNSC’s strong
learning culture by ensuring immediate and future learning needs are identified and by helping
the CNSC meet its evolving business priorities and objectives. The CNSC offers a variety of
technical and non-technical training to its staff directly in support of its mandate.
The CNSC’s Management Excellence Initiative supports leadership capacity building at all
levels. During the reporting period, several learning activities were provided to CNSC leaders
including courses on topics such as, leadership fundamentals, emotional intelligence, influence
and persuasion (without authority), and critical thinking. A new initiative on exploring leadership
was also offered to employees during the reporting period, providing them the opportunity to do
a series of assessments to identify their leadership strengths and areas for development.
During the reporting period, the development of the Inspector Training and Qualification
Program (ITQP) was completed. This program, which is composed of a combination of core
training, service-line specific training and on-the-job training, establishes a consistent approach
to train, assess and qualify CNSC inspectors-in-training across all service lines.
As part of the ITQP, the Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation uses a systematic approach for
NPP-related knowledge and on-the-job-training for NPP site inspectors. This program includes a
training plan that identifies the common inspector and specific training required by NPP site
inspectors, on-the-job training and evaluation manuals and a training qualification record that
documents the inspector’s progress. Each inspector is required to take courses related to the
regulatory process, CANDU design, non-technical topics (such as technical writing and effective
interviewing), radiation protection and conventional health and safety. An inspector certificate is
issued only when the site supervisor at the NPP determines that the inspector-in-training has
achieved all the training requirements. From the time a new inspector enters into the program, it
takes approximately 18 months to obtain an inspector’s certificate.
To support senior inspectors who are coaching inspectors-in-training, a course on effective
knowledge transfer was developed and delivered during the reporting period. The CNSC also
began developing a Regulatory Operations Training Program for all regulatory operations staff
and their supervisors to promote consistent application of CNSC licensing, certification and
compliance processes.
The CNSC has a well-established 15-month co-op student rotation program with the University
of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT), McMaster University and the University of
Saskatchewan, and is actively looking to expand this program to other universities.
8.1 (d) Management system

The management system links the people, processes and resources within the CNSC’s
overarching regulatory framework. It reflects an integrated, fit-for-purpose approach to
managing the performance of mandated functions, allowing for differences in implementation
across CNSC programs and sub-programs. The CNSC management system is based on
principles and requirements found within international quality standards and internationally
recognized frameworks for organizational excellence. It also aligns to the IAEA safety standard
GS-R-3, The Management System for Facilities and Activities, and other related safety standards.
Additional CNSC-specific elements, such as its regulatory philosophy, internal safety culture,
strategic priorities, its goal to become “an employer of choice” and its vision of being “the best
nuclear regulator in the world,” are all incorporated into the management system to ensure it
meets the needs of the CNSC.
The CNSC management system was the subject of extensive review during the IRRS missions in
2009 and 2011 and during the reporting period the CNSC continued to build upon the feedback
received. Ongoing development and strengthening of the management system has focused on
continuing to move the organization from an expert-based system to a more process-based

system.
Management System Manual

The CNSC Management System Manual is the top-level document in the management system’s
document hierarchy. It applies to all CNSC staff. While it applies to the relationship and process
interfaces with the Commission, the tenets of the manual do not apply to the Commission itself.
The manual was last updated in December 2014 and is scheduled to be reviewed in 2016 in
accordance with its two-year review cycle.
The purpose of the Management System Manual is to describe for CNSC employees and
contractors how the management system integrates people, processes and resources within the
CNSC’s overarching regulatory framework to manage all work across the organization and
ensure consistent, high-quality results. The manual identifies the high-level policies, principles
and processes and mechanisms by which the CNSC achieves its goals and objectives. The
manual is supported at lower levels by process documentation, detailed work instructions and
other tools developed as needed that guide staff and collectively provide direction on how work
is to be conducted at the CNSC.
The Management System Manual identifies the CNSC’s key processes as follows:
 management processes
 core processes (manage the regulatory framework, manage licensing and certification and
assure compliance)
 enabling processes
The Management System Manual also identifies the CNSC governance structure and describes
the role of process owners who are responsible for the development, implementation and
maintenance of the key processes. Each key process has a single process owner, appointed by
senior CNSC management.
The CNSC staff work instructions are also found in the Management System Manual under
processes. These important process-related documents provide more detailed guidance to staff.
Planning process for regulatory activities

The overall plan for the CNSC is summarized in its annual Report on Plans and Priorities,
which is presented to Parliament.
At the working level, integral with its annual planning exercise, the CNSC organizes its
inspections, reviews and other regulatory activities for NPPs by creating, implementing,
monitoring and adjusting regulatory workplans for each NPP. Workplans are reviewed to ensure
they cover specific goals, are risk-informed, and are consistent among NPPs. Activities in each
NPP workplan are also consolidated into a summary – the Regulatory Activity Plan – which is
costed to establish an estimate of the annual licence fee for each NPP (see subsection 8.1(a)).
The Regulatory Activity Plan, along with a notification containing the licence fee estimate, is
sent to each licensee at the beginning of each fiscal year.
During the reporting period, the CNSC formally documented its operations planning process
within the management system.
8.1 (e) Assessment and improvement mechanisms
Follow-up IRRS mission to Canada

Canada hosted its initial IRRS mission in 2009. The results, findings and the CNSC’s planned
follow-up were described in the fifth Canadian report.
Canada hosted a follow-up IRRS mission in 2011 to review the measures taken to address the
recommendations and suggestions from the initial mission and to review two new review areas –
the Fukushima accident and the regulation of the transport of radioactive material. The results,
findings and follow-up were described in the sixth Canadian report.
The follow-up mission concluded that 13 of 14 recommendations and 17 of 18 suggestions made
during the initial IRRS mission had been effectively addressed and therefore could be considered
closed. The one IRRS recommendation from 2009 that remained open – to implement PSR – has
been systematically addressed by the CNSC (see subsection 7.2(ii)(d)). The one IRRS suggestion
from 2009 that remained open was not directly relevant to NPPs.
The responses to findings from the follow-up IRRS mission that resulted from the Fukushima
review were related to emergency preparedness and are described in article 16. The findings
from the follow-up IRRS mission that resulted from the transport review are outside the scope of
the CNS.
Harmonized Plan for Improvement Initiatives

Many of the improvement initiatives needed to address employee suggestions, the findings of
peer reviews, and audits and evaluations of the CNSC are addressed through the CNSC’s
Harmonized Plan for Improvement Initiatives: a continuous improvement mechanism that
develops and strengthens the CNSC’s management system through the integration and alignment
of all corporate-wide improvement initiatives into a single prioritized plan. The Harmonized Plan
leverages commonalities between the different improvement initiatives and helps to streamline
business processes, prioritize work and distribute resources to maximize horizontal collaboration
and coordination for greater effectiveness and efficiency. It makes planning easier and helps
CNSC managers work together to reduce duplication and redundancy. The Harmonized Plan is
refreshed regularly to ensure it remains aligned with corporate priorities. The executive authority
for the Harmonized Plan is the CNSC’s Executive Vice-President and Chief Regulatory
Operations Officer (see subsection 8.1(b)).
Many Harmonized Plan initiatives have helped improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
regulatory oversight of NPPs and the overall NPP regulatory program by:
 establishing levels of regulatory activities that are founded on formal, well-articulated
risk-informed approaches
 developing, establishing and implementing documented processes and procedures that
define how the many contributors work together in a coordinated and well-managed
manner
 improving information management in support of the regulatory program
 ensuring a consistent regulatory approach is applied for all licensees in a graded manner
CNSC assessments
CNSC self-assessments are championed by the manager responsible for the process or program
being assessed.
Internal audits and program evaluations are conducted per the schedules approved by senior
management and in accordance with established Government of Canada policies and procedures.
Final reports are posted on the internal website for staff review and are shared with the public on
the CNSC website. Each assessment and/or review of elements of the CNSC management
system results in action plans that are approved and then monitored by senior management.
During the reporting period, formal audits were conducted on the following:
 CNSC Action Plan
 the process for the certification of personnel working at NPPs
 the import-export licensing program
 the CNSC’s oversight of emergency measures at Class I nuclear facilities and uranium
mines and mills
 the CNSC Participant Funding Program
 the CNSC travel, hospitality, conference and event expenditures
In addition, formal program evaluations were conducted on the CNSC Nuclear Emergency
Management Program, the compliance verification program for the Directorate of Nuclear
Substance Regulation, the CNSC grants and contributions program, and CNSC contributions to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
An evaluation of the CNSC Harmonized Plan is scheduled for the next reporting period. The
goal of the evaluation will be to ensure that the Harmonized Plan remains as effective as
possible.
In August 2015, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development of the
Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) began a performance audit of the CNSC’s
oversight of the nuclear sector for the period 2013–2015. An OAG performance audit is an
independent, objective and systematic assessment of how well the Government of Canada is
managing its activities, responsibilities and resources. The audit of the CNSC is examining
management practices, controls, and reporting systems. The objective of the audit is to determine
whether the CNSC adequately oversees the management of NPPs so that the health, safety, and
security of Canadians and of the environment are protected. The audit is focusing on the CNSC’s
processes for planning and completing compliance inspections at NPPs, allocating resources to
support the inspection program, and applying enforcement measures to correct and deter non-
compliance.
The OAG audit is expected to be tabled in Parliament in October 2016.
During the reporting period, the CNSC hosted its first IAEA International Physical Protection
Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission, an international peer review of Canada’s nuclear security
regime and its effectiveness in protecting against the unauthorized removal of nuclear material
and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and material. Following 12 months of preparation,
including a comprehensive self-assessment, the mission was conducted in October 2015. The
IPPAS mission concluded that Canada has established and maintains a strong and comprehensive
nuclear security infrastructure. As with other assessments of elements of the CNSC management
system, an action plan was developed alongside a commitment to track, through to

implementation, improvement opportunities identified during the mission.
CNSC staff members also actively participate in international conferences, workshops and peer
reviews to gain useful insights and lessons learned that can be leveraged to strengthen the CNSC
management system. CNSC attendees/participants are required to complete trip reports that are
shared within the organization and where relevant, are asked to participate in CNSC
improvements stemming from the insights gained. Interactions with IAEA Member States and
other Government of Canada agencies take place on many technical and non-technical topics on
a regular basis.
8.1 (f) Openness and transparency
Dissemination of information – General

Disseminating objective scientific, technical and regulatory information is a part of the CNSC’s
mandate (see subsection 7.1(a)). The CNSC is taking advantage of new means of communicating
to maximize the dissemination of information and engagement with stakeholders, which benefits
both stakeholders and the CNSC.
During this reporting period, the CNSC approved a new approach for outreach and engagement.
The CNSC identified many outreach opportunities focusing on youth, municipal governments in
the areas where major facilities are located, medical communities, professional associations and
non-governmental organizations. To reach target audiences, the CNSC uses many tools such as
its website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, webinars, interactive online modules, email updates to
subscribers and attendance at third-party events and conferences. CNSC staff members also host
information sessions to explain to stakeholders how the nuclear industry is regulated and how to
participate in the regulatory process.
The CNSC is equally committed to helping licensees and the nuclear industry to understand and
comply with its regulatory framework. It has undertaken a variety of engagement activities,
including the following:
 offering information sessions on draft regulatory documents
 participating in the Certification and Training Advisory group (co-chaired by CNSC and
the industry), involving policy-level discussions about the training and certification of
NPP personnel
 participating in COG Nuclear Safety Committee meetings, as well as meetings of the
Chief Nuclear Officer/CNSC Executive Forum (see subsection 8.1(g)) to promote
common understanding of generic safety and licensing issues
Response to Fukushima – Dissemination of information

The CNSC includes a section on its response to the Fukushima accident in its annual Regulatory
Oversight Report of Canadian Nuclear Power Plants, which is described in appendix F. The
public has the opportunity to provide written comments on that report’s content and these are
addressed when the report is presented to the Commission in a public meeting.
During this reporting period, the CNSC published the Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical
Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation Measure. Written in plain language, it
assesses the consequences and possible preventative mitigation of a hypothetical severe nuclear
accident in Canada. It addresses concerns raised during public hearings in 2012 on the EA for the
Darlington refurbishment project and in response to the Fukushima accident.
In June 2014, the draft study was released for public consultation and presented to the
Commission. The CNSC addressed and incorporated Commission feedback and comments from
more than 500 submissions from the public, government and other organizations. Certain study
assumptions and language were clarified, and information was added on a number of topics such
as reactor behaviour, emergency response decisions, risk acceptability, and comparisons to
effects from the Fukushima accident. In some cases, dose and risk results were updated, using a
statistical approach more consistent with how dose modelling would be done in an actual
emergency. These changes did not alter the conclusions of the report.
A subsequent update was presented to the Commission and published on the CNSC website in
September 2015. See subsection 15(b) for details.
In 2015, a new interactive online module was launched on the CNSC website highlighting the
most significant post-Fukushima safety improvements in Canada.
Open and transparent processes

In keeping with federal policies on public consultation and regulatory fairness, the legislative and
regulatory framework for nuclear regulation is open and transparent. The CNSC is fully
committed to maximizing the openness and transparency of its affairs and the undertakings of the
Commission.
The CNSC takes all stakeholder feedback into account when finalizing its regulatory approach.
In cases where diverse viewpoints are presented to the CNSC, additional consultations or
meetings may be used to explore the issue. However, in all cases, the CNSC sets requirements in
accordance with the best available science and other information, to deliver on its mandate.
Before the Commission makes decisions about whether to license nuclear-related activities, it
considers applicants’ proposals, recommendations from CNSC staff and stakeholder views. Each
decision to license is based on information demonstrating that the activity or the operation of a
given facility can be carried out safely and that the environment will be protected. To promote
openness and transparency, the Commission conducts its business where possible in public
hearings and meetings and, where appropriate, in the communities where activities arise.
Members of the public can participate in hearings via written submissions and oral presentations.
Commission hearings and meetings can also be viewed online as webcasts on the CNSC website,
and transcripts of public hearings and meetings are also made available.
During the reporting period, public hearings associated with the licence renewal of the Pickering,
Darlington and Bruce A and B NPPs were held in the respective host communities. Public
participation for these hearings was promoted through advertising in local community
newspapers, notices sent to CNSC email subscribers, and through the CNSC’s Facebook, Twitter
and YouTube channels. CNSC information sessions were also held in the communities well in
advance of the hearings. The Commission considered more than 560 public submissions during
these hearings.
In anticipation of refurbishment at Bruce A and B and Darlington, the CNSC launched two
communications products in early 2015 to help explain how it regulates during these significant
undertakings. One was a new online interactive module on refurbishing a virtual NPP; the other
was a video giving an explanation of the role of the regulator in the refurbishment of NPPs in
Canada.
The CNSC’s commitment to effective and well-managed Aboriginal consultation processes is
guided by Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation – Updated Guidelines for Federal
Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult – March 2011. The CNSC’s Codification of Current
Practice: CNSC Commitment to Aboriginal Consultation outlines the organization’s approach to
fulfilling its legal obligations as an agent of the Government of Canada and as a regulatory body
for Aboriginal consultation on CNSC-regulated projects.
In February 2016, the CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-3.2.2, Aboriginal
Engagement, which sets out requirements and guidance for licensees whose proposed projects
may raise the Crown’s duty to consult Aboriginal peoples. The implementation of
REGDOC-3.2.2 is expected to lead to more effective and efficient Aboriginal engagement
practices, strengthen relationships with Aboriginal communities, assist the CNSC in meeting its
duty to consult obligations, and reduce the risk of delays in the regulatory review processes.
To assist in its decision-making process, the CNSC offers a Participant Funding Program to give
members of the public, Aboriginal groups and other stakeholders the opportunity to request
funding to support their participation in and submissions to the CNSC’s regulatory decision-
making process. This allows eligible stakeholders to participate in aspects of EAs and licensing
actions for major nuclear facilities. Funding may also be made available for other CNSC
proceedings that are of significant interest to the public or to Aboriginal peoples. An independent
Funding Review Committee, composed of three external members, reviews all funding
applications and makes recommendations to the CNSC on potential funding recipients,
individual amounts and deliverables. The CNSC approves the overall fund release. For the
above-mentioned licence renewal hearings for Pickering, Darlington and Bruce A and B,
$198,000 in funding was provided to 23 recipients.
The CNSC also has significant opportunities for public involvement in its regulation making
process (see subsection 7.2(i)(a)) and its regulatory document writing process (see
subsection 7.2(i)(b)). The use of CNSC discussion papers and the analysis and publication of the
feedback they generate have also enhanced the degree and interactive nature of engagement
possible.
The CNSC takes every opportunity to encourage other national nuclear regulators and
international organizations involved in nuclear safety to share information with the public.
8.1 (g) Collaborative approach to the resolution of safety issues

The Chief Nuclear Officers/CNSC Executive Forum provides an effective channel of high-level
communication between the NPP licensees and the CNSC. The participants discuss strategic
issues that involve both the licensees and the CNSC, thereby promoting a mutual understanding
of and helping to focus action on various safety issues related to NPPs. It is used to identify
strategic challenges and opportunities that may influence the Canadian nuclear power industry
and the CNSC. The forum continued to evolve and help focus efforts to address various safety
issues during the reporting period. Although the forum is not a mechanism for decision making,
it has facilitated dialogue on the following:
 existing and emerging issues pertaining to the CNSC’s mandate for health, safety,
security and the environment
 new industry developments, major projects and planned (emergency) exercises

 respective focus areas and strategic plans and priorities where practical and appropriate
 IAEA missions and other third-party audits planned at Canadian NPPs, such as those
conducted by the IPPAS, Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), etc., and their
outcomes
The CNSC and the nuclear power industry created a strategic forum called the CANDU Industry
Integration Team (CIIT) during the previous reporting period to discuss, on a quarterly basis, the
progress in completing the CNSC Action Plan. During this reporting period, the CIIT
transitioned to a working group where updates or further discussions on the status of actions
derived from the CNSC Action Plan would be accomplished, as necessary.
The CNSC also participates, with industry members, in the standard-setting work of the CSA
Group, as described in subsection 7.2(i)(b).
8.2 Status of the regulatory body
8.2 (a) Separation of the CNSC and organizations that promote and utilize nuclear
energy
The passage of the NSCA created distinct, enabling legislation for the regulation of nuclear
activities and the separation of functions of the regulatory body from organizations that promote
or use nuclear energy. The mandate of the CNSC (see subsection 7.1(a)) focuses clearly on the
health, safety and security of persons, the preservation of national security and the protection of
the environment, and the implementation of Canada’s international obligations. The mandate
does not extend to economic matters (such as the promotion of nuclear power).
The Commission (described in subsection 7.1(a)) is defined as a court of record in the NSCA,
which allows it to conduct its matters in an independent manner. Commission members are
subject to guidelines on conflict of interest and ethics that assure separation between them and
the various stakeholders. Commission members hold office “during good behaviour” rather than
being appointed “at pleasure.” This means they can only be removed for cause (such as fraud).
No member of the Commission has ever been removed for cause.
The Commission’s decisions are not subject to review by any minister or other parts of the
government executive. The NSCA provides that only the Governor in Council may issue
directives to the Commission and these must be broad and not directed at any particular licensee.
In addition, such an order would be published in the Canada Gazette and laid before each House
of Parliament. An example is the Directive to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Regarding the Health of Canadians, which is described in subsection 8.2(b).
To safeguard the integrity of the Commission’s role as an independent decision maker, contact
between the Commission and CNSC staff occurs through the Secretariat. With the exception of
the Secretariat and the President, CNSC staff members have limited interaction with the
Commission.
The CNSC, as an organization, is also independent of other organizations in the government, as
described in subsection 8.1(a). As stated there, the CNSC does not report to a minister, but rather
to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources.
8.2 (b) Other mechanisms that facilitate regulatory independence

The CNSC fosters open interaction and communication with its stakeholders, thereby
continuously gathering input from all parties with an interest in Canada’s nuclear industry.
Transparent regulatory processes make the consideration of that input more systematic and fair
(see subsection 8.1(f) for more information). These provisions help prevent undue influence from
any one party or concern. Other mechanisms that help maintain the independence of the CNSC
include a risk-informed framework for decision making as well as a strong framework for ethical
and responsible action.
Guidance and structure for decision making

Nuclear regulatory independence is facilitated by a strong framework for decision making that is
aligned with the CNSC’s mandate and based on a rational, balanced consideration of risk.
For important decisions involving different types of risks, general guidance was provided to the
CNSC in 2007 through the Directive to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regarding the
Health of Canadians, which states the following:
In regulating the production, possession and use of nuclear substances in order to prevent
unreasonable risk to the health of persons, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission shall
take into account the health of Canadians who, for medical purposes, depend on nuclear
substances produced by nuclear reactors.
The explanatory notes of the directive indicated that it is necessary to protect the health of
Canadians if a serious shortage of medical isotopes in Canada and around the world puts the
health of Canadians at risk.
The CNSC also has a formalized process in which risk is considered systematically. The use of
risk-informed decision making was described in detail in the sixth Canadian report.
Office of Audit and Ethics

The Office of Audit and Ethics administers three ethics-related programs. The Values and Ethics
Program provides employees with guidance and techniques for strengthening relationships in the
workplace and with stakeholders, as well as practical tools for ethical decision-making. The
Internal Disclosure Program is designed to help employees safely and constructively disclose
wrongdoing and to protect them from reprisal. The Conflict of Interest and Post-employment
Program gives CNSC employees tools to prevent and avoid situations that could create the
appearance of conflicts of interest or result in potential or actual conflict of interest.
In 2014, the CNSC conducted a benchmarking exercise to compare the implementation of these
programs with similar programs found in 17 other federal departments and agencies. The CNSC
has implemented the recommendations coming out of the post-exercise report.
In addition, beginning in 2016, the Office of Audit and Ethics will manage complaints made by
external entities to the CNSC to ensure a neutral body is overseeing the investigation and
resolution processes.
Article 9 – Responsibility of the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate
steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.
9 (a) Legislation assigning responsibility to the licence holder

Paragraph 26(e) of the NSCA prohibits any person from preparing a site, constructing, operating,
modifying, decommissioning or abandoning a nuclear facility without a licence granted by the
Commission. As stated in subarticle 7.2(ii), the Commission can only issue licences only to
applicants that are qualified to operate the NPP and that will adequately provide for the health
and safety of persons and the protection of the environment.
Subsection 12(1) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations assigns various
responsibilities to the licensees related to nuclear safety. Paragraph 12(1)(c) requires the
licensee to take all reasonable precautions to protect the environment and the health and safety of
persons and to maintain the security of nuclear facilities and of nuclear substances. Other
paragraphs assign responsibility to the licensee to:
 provide and adequately train a sufficient number of qualified workers
 provide and maintain the required devices
 require that all people on site properly use equipment, devices, clothing and procedures
 take all reasonable precautions to control the release of nuclear or hazardous substances
to the environment
 take measures to instruct its staff on security provisions and to alert itself in the event of
illegal activities or sabotage
9 (b) Means by which licence holders discharge safety responsibility

For the most part, Canada has a relatively non-prescriptive nuclear regulatory regime for NPPs that
sets general requirements and performance standards, thereby allowing the licensees some
flexibility to meet them in a manner that best meets their needs. The licensees are responsible for
addressing the requirements in their systems, programs, processes and designs. Descriptions of
these provisions are submitted to the CNSC at the time of licence application (see
appendix C). If accepted by the CNSC, these provisions become part of the licensing basis for
the NPP (defined in subsection 7.2(ii)(a)) and dictate future regulatory activities.
Licensees must demonstrate that NPP operations satisfy performance standards and that the
NPP continues to meet applicable criteria throughout its licence period and the designated
operating life.
During operations, licensees fulfill their responsibilities through the following activities that are
described elsewhere in this report:
 complying with the regulatory requirements set out in applicable laws and regulations
 operating in accordance with the licensing basis (see article 19)
 defining and following operating policies and principles (OP&Ps; see “Specific
organizational provisions” below)
 defining safe operating limits and working within them (see subarticle 19(ii))
 developing safety policies and an organizational culture committed to ensuring safe NPP
operation (see article 10)
 monitoring both employee and facility performance to ensure expectations are met (see
subsection 14(ii)(a) and subarticle 19(vii))
 ensuring adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of each NPP
throughout its life (see subarticle 11.1)
 ensuring adequate qualified resources are always available to respond to planned activities
and contingencies (see subsection 11.2(b))
 implementing managed systems to control risks associated with NPP operations to
govern the above activities (see article 13)
As explained in subsection 13(a), all licensees implement and maintain a management system.
An NPP management system is expected to establish safety as the paramount objective, foster
the safe operation of the NPP during all phases of its life-cycle, and implement practices that
contribute to excellence in worker performance. Licensees have various provisions that help
ensure safe operation, such as ensuring worker competence, sharing and using operating
experience, verifying the correctness of work, identifying and resolving problems and controlling
changes. The licensees’ processes also require independent assessments to confirm the
effectiveness of the management systems in achieving the expected results. These measures help
ensure that the licensees’ responsibility to safety is fulfilled.
Each licensee structures its organization so that the safety of the nuclear facilities under its
responsibility is optimized. Each licensee has appointed a key management leader who is
responsible for the operation and safety of the NPP. These nuclear executives or nuclear officers
participate in the Chief Nuclear Officers Forum (see subsection 9(c)).
Specific organizational provisions

Many of the specific provisions used by each licensee to discharge its responsibility for safety
are described in its OP&P document. This document is submitted in support of a licence
application and is enforceable as part of the licensing basis of the NPP. The OP&P document
provides direction for operating the NPP safely and reflects the safety analysis submitted to the
CNSC as part of the licence application. For each NPP, the OP&P document explains, at a high
level, how licensees operate, maintain and modify systems to maximize nuclear safety and keep
consequential public risk acceptably low. (More detailed information on this area is contained
within the management system documentation of the NPP.) Each licensee is required to define
the bounds and limits for safe operation that are derived from the safety analysis that is also part
of the facility’s licensing basis. Operation in states not considered in or bounded by the safety
analysis is not permitted.
9 (c) Other mechanisms that facilitate the licence holder’s execution of

responsibility
Peer and other reviews

The licensees host independent reviews that help confirm that their responsibilities for safety are
being met. For example, the NPP licensees are members of the World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) and host WANO reviews on a regular basis (see subsection 14(i)(e)). As
another example, Bruce Power, OPG and NB Power initiate regular, independent, external
nuclear safety assessments through a Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) to provide assurance
that the requirements of their respective nuclear safety policies and nuclear management systems
are being fulfilled. The NSRB is a team of external industry experts that performs annual
assessments (typically one week in duration) of NPP activities that might affect nuclear safety
and performance. It reports directly to the Chief Nuclear Officer.
An IAEA OSART mission was conducted at the Bruce B facility during 2015 (see
subsection 14(i)(e)). Canada has invited the IAEA to conduct OSART missions at several
Canadian facilities over the next few years.
Collective measures
Although the regulatory framework and licensee governance are in place to ensure each licensee
fulfills its responsibility to safety, the licensees in Canada also act collectively to help fulfill that
responsibility. The purpose of this collective effort is to pool understanding and expertise (when
appropriate), coordinate and prioritize the resolution of issues and improvement initiatives and
enhance overall adherence to regulatory requirements.
In addition to membership in WANO and the CSA Group, all NPP licensees in Canada and
Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) are members of the CANDU Owners Group (COG): a
not-for-profit organization dedicated to providing programs for cooperation, mutual assistance
and exchange of information for the successful support, development, operation, maintenance
and economics of CANDU technology. COG has provided the mechanism for many projects to
improve the safety of CANDU reactors, several of which are described throughout this report. In
addition to its R&D program (described in appendix E.2), COG facilitates the execution of
licensee responsibility by:
 sharing operating experience and providing support to resolve technical and operating
problems for all COG members
 initiating and managing jointly funded projects and services
 adopting common strategies and plans for the resolution of regulatory issues related to
nuclear safety
 sharing best practices, delivering jointly developed training programs and developing
knowledge-retention tools such as the CANDU textbook (described in
subsection 11.2(b))
In addition to ongoing COG programs, the members form working groups to address specific
issues that arise.
The Chief Nuclear Officers Forum, which includes senior representatives from all licensees and
CNL, facilitates a coordinated approach to resolving significant technical and regulatory issues.
It provides high-level direction to, and oversight of, the work done by functional groups to better
understand and resolve safety issues. The benefits include consistency of licensing positions,
alignment of strategic directions and pooling of resources. COG facilitates the meetings of the
Chief Nuclear Officers Forum, which helps ensure the alignment of the high-level direction with
ongoing COG programs and projects.
The chief nuclear officers also engage in high-level communications with CNSC executives (see
subsection 8.1(g)).
In addition, Chief Executive Officers from more than 30 companies in the Canadian nuclear
industry created in 2012 the Nuclear Leadership Forum, which examines the strengths,
challenges and prospects in Canada for the complete nuclear cycle (e.g., uranium mining and
milling, fuel fabrication, nuclear power, nuclear medicine, suppliers).
Proactive disclosure and public communications

CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-99.3, Public Information and Disclosure, requires all major
licensees, including NPPs, to maintain active public information and disclosure programs.
Programs must be supported by robust disclosure protocols regarding events and developments
involving their facilities or activities. Program requirements are derived from the objectives of
the Commission in the NSCA and paragraph 3(j) of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations,
which requires licensees “to inform persons living in the vicinity of the site of the general nature
and characteristics of the anticipated effects on the environment and the health and safety of
persons that may result from the activity to be licensed.”
The public disclosure protocols must describe the type of information or reports to be made
public, the criteria for determining when such information and reports are to be published and the
medium of disclosure. To define what information and reports are of interest to the different
audiences, the licensees and applicants must consult with stakeholders and interest groups. The
protocols must be posted on the Internet and any revisions sent to the CNSC.
The elements of the licensees’ public information and disclosure program, along with specific
examples of NPP licensee outreach activities conducted during the reporting period are, provided
in annex 9(c).
9 (d) CNSC verification and oversight of licensees’ responsibilities

To assure compliance of the licensees with the various regulatory requirements, the CNSC:
 sets and documents clear requirements using a process that includes consultation
 cooperates with other organizations and jurisdictions to foster the development of
consistent regulatory requirements
 indicates acceptable ways to meet regulatory requirements, but allows licensees to
propose alternative methods that take into account risk and cost-benefit
 promotes compliance with regulatory expectations
 verifies that processes and programs satisfy regulatory requirements
 enforces requirements using an escalating, consistent regulatory approach based on the
level of risk
 uses appropriate industry, national, international or other standards
These regulatory activities are described in more detail in subarticle 7.2, covering all operational
states, including accidents.
The licensing basis for each NPP is established through the process to renew each licence to
operate, reaffirming the responsibility of the licensees. Licensees implement new regulatory
documents and standards, on a regular basis, both at licence renewal and during the licence
period.
The licensing basis dictates CNSC regulatory activities during the licence period, such as
inspections and change approvals. Between licence renewals, the CNSC compliance program
ensures that licensees meet their defined responsibilities. The CNSC maintains trained,
experienced inspectors at all NPP sites with operating reactors on a permanent basis. They
provide a high degree of day-to-day interaction with the licensees and scrutiny of their activities
(see subsection 8.1(b) for more details).
Reporting requirements are an important aspect of the CNSC’s assurance that licensees continue
to meet their responsibilities. Operating licences refer to CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, which establishes reporting
requirements for safety-significant developments and non-compliances with legal requirements
(see subsection 7.2(iii)(b)).
The transparency of the Canadian nuclear regulatory framework and the licensing process
also helps ensure that the licensees’ execution of their responsibility to safety is apparent to
all stakeholders.
9 (e) Summary of fulfillment of safety responsibilities during reporting period

During the reporting period, NPP licensees fulfilled the fundamental responsibilities for safety as
required by the NSCA and its regulations. The licensees’ fulfillment of this responsibility was
manifested by the strong safety record of the Canadian NPPs during the reporting period, as
described throughout this report. The use of regulatory enforcement action such as orders,
licensing action or prosecution (as described in subarticle 7.2(iv)) by the CNSC was not required
to resolve safety-related issues at Canadian NPPs. The CNSC’s regulatory activities involving
promotion and verification of compliance were sufficient to address and resolve safety-related
issues and the regulatory tools were adequate to maximize conformance with regulatory
requirements by all NPP licensees.
Immediately after the Fukushima accident, each NPP licensee commenced a thorough review of
the lessons learned and, during the reporting period, completed the improvements to address
these lessons learned.
The licensees further fulfilled their responsibility to safety during the reporting period by
executing numerous improvements to safety. Since original construction, the NPP licensees in
Canada have made many safety improvements based on CNSC requirements, industry research,
national and international operational experience, and heightened public expectations.
Chapter III Part C Compliance with Articles of the Convention

(continued)
Part C
General Safety Considerations
Part C of chapter III consists of seven articles:
Article 10 – Priority to safety
Article 11 – Financial and human resources
Article 12 – Human factors
Article 13 – Quality assurance
Article 14 – Assessment and verification of safety
Article 15 – Radiation protection
Article 16 – Emergency preparedness
Article 10 – Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations
engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that
give due priority to nuclear safety.
The collective priority to safety by organizations engaged in activities related to nuclear facilities
is, in part, demonstrated by the commitment to peer review and continuous improvement. For
example, the Canadian NPP licensees regularly participate in World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) assessments (see subsection 14(i)(e)). The licensees also demonstrate an
ongoing commitment to safety through their sponsorship of, and involvement in, safety-related
research and development activities (see appendix E for details). The CNSC has demonstrated a
commitment to peer review and improvement, including the hosting of Integrated Regulatory
Review Service (IRRS) missions (see the sixth Canadian report). In addition, the CNSC has an
active research program that focuses on regulatory issues (see subarticle 8.1).
10 (a) Establishment of policies and supporting processes for NPPs that give due
priority to safety
To make safety an overriding priority, the executive and management of an organization must
state and demonstrate safety as a core value. Its management system must consistently uphold
and restate this priority at all levels of the management structure. The management system (see
article 13) provides assurance that policies, principles and high-level safety requirements are
adequately carried through to licensee activities.
All NPP licensees have established policies that give due priority to nuclear safety. All licensees
have also embedded in their management systems the principle that “safety is the paramount
consideration, guiding decisions and actions”. The implementation of the principles found in
these policies differs by licensee, as described in annex 10(a).
NPP licensees’ management system processes ensure that conditions adverse to safety are
systematically evaluated and resolved. Corrective action programs are formalized to ensure
issues affecting safety are addressed properly and promptly. These processes continue to mature
each time they are used and the lessons learned are shared with the other licensees.
Operability evaluations are completed when the ability of systems and components to carry out
their safety-related function is uncertain. Decision-making processes are used to resolve
significant problems that require prompt, coordinated response to indeterminate or known
degraded conditions that affect safety. Other practices, such as management presence in the field
and oversight committees, also help maintain the priority on safety.
CSA standard N286-12, Management System Requirements for Nuclear Facilities, has been
implemented, or is being implemented by the NPP licensees (see subsection 13(a) for details).
This standard builds upon the principal that safety is the paramount consideration guiding
decisions and actions by including a requirement on safety culture that states:
Management shall use the management system to understand and promote a safety
culture by:
(a) issuing a statement committing workers to adhere to the management system;
(b) defining and implementing practices that contribute to excellence in worker
performance;
(c) providing the means by which the business supports workers in carrying out their
tasks safely and successfully, by taking into account the interactions between
individuals, technology, and the organization; and
(d) monitoring to understand and improve the culture.
10 (b) Safety culture at NPPs
General approach
The safety culture at Canadian NPPs is based on a collective belief among all employees and
management that safety is the first priority when making decisions and performing work. This is
accomplished by considering risks and maintaining adequate safety margins, maintaining respect
and a sense of responsibility for the reactor core and reactor safety and confirming that a task can
be performed safely before executing it. The foundation of safety culture is further established by
constantly examining nuclear safety, cultivating a “what if?” approach to safety planning and
preparation, embracing organizational learning, and promoting a “just culture” that aims to learn
as much as possible from events or near misses without removing the possibility of holding
persons responsible for their actions.
Clear lines of authority and communication are established, so that individuals throughout the
organization are aware of their responsibilities toward nuclear safety. Senior management is
ultimately responsible for the safety of the NPP and is, therefore, expected to develop processes
to encourage and track the effectiveness of safety programs and to demonstrate through action
that safety is of overriding concern. Supervisors’ behaviour must also show that they expect their
workers to follow safety processes while, at the same time, encouraging a questioning attitude.
At the individual level, the emphasis is on personal dedication and accountability for each individual
engaged in an activity that affects the safety of the NPP. All employees are expected to be aware of
and adhere to all procedures. This assures that rules, policies and regulations related to reactor
safety, radiation safety, environmental protection, industrial safety, security, fire protection and
other relevant areas addressed in the procedures are followed. These expectations are promoted
through training and leading by example; monitored through field observations, oversight
committees and self-assessments; and assured by means of coaching and mechanisms to
encourage problem identification and effective corrective action.
Safety culture self-assessments

NPP licensees conduct safety culture self-assessments, conduct follow-ups to assess safety
culture issues, develop appropriate corrective actions and complete post-assessments.
The benefits of a safety culture assessment are the learning and improvement opportunities
created. However, in a safety culture self-assessment there is the potential for licensees to
overlook key topics or circumstances due to complacency and over-familiarity with internal
ways of conducting business. As such, the industry has taken several approaches to try to
overcome the potential for “organizational blindness,” including:
 the development of common safety culture assessment guidance and information
exchange among Canadian NPP licensees through the COG Human Performance
Working Group
 the implementation of safety culture monitoring processes between safety culture
assessments to identify possible, subtle changes in safety culture
 the inclusion of safety culture as part of regular, third-party assessments by other industry
organizations
The licensees use guidance from WANO, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and
the Nuclear Energy Institute as their primary source of self-assessment requirements.
The nuclear safety culture monitoring panel (NSCMP) process discussed in the sixth Canadian
report is now fully established for all NPP licensees. The panels monitor process inputs that are
indicative of the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture (internal events, trends, and
organizational changes), and identify areas of strengths and potential concern that merit
additional attention by the organization. They also monitor the actions from safety culture
assessments on a periodic basis. Executive management considers the insights produced by the
NSCMP process.
The results of safety culture self-assessments and other safety culture activities during the
reporting period are summarized here for Canadian NPP licensees.
Ontario Power Generation

OPG conducts a comprehensive nuclear safety culture self-assessment once every three years at
each of its NPPs. The assessment has two phases: a detailed safety culture survey that is sent to
all employees and resident contractors; and an onsite assessment by an assessment team
involving interviews, focus groups, document review and observations. The assessment focuses
on perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of the organization.
The assessment process continues to be refined based on the lessons learned from each preceding
assessment. Enhancements to both the staff survey tool and the onsite assessment process have
been made to facilitate the collection and consistency of assessment inputs, and to allow OPG to
benchmark its results with other utilities that use the INPO safety culture survey.
OPG completed nuclear safety culture assessments at both Darlington and Pickering in 2015.
Overall, the assessments determined that each NPP has a healthy nuclear safety culture and
respect for nuclear safety and that nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities.
Personnel feel they can challenge any decision if needed without fear of professional or personal
implications. OPG also identified a strength in the way both NPPs foster an environment in
which employees feel comfortable raising safety concerns.
At Pickering, one focus area was noted in reducing maintenance backlogs and addressing some
equipment issues. Both these issues are receiving focus as part of the NPP and fleet improvement
programs.
At Darlington, one focus area has been to continue to strengthen the interface between the staff
of the NPP, projects and contract partners. As the NPP is beginning a large-scale refurbishment
project, the organization has recognized the need to foster strong relationships and a healthy
nuclear safety culture with all organizations involved. To this end, OPG carried out in April 2016
(after the reporting period) a first-of-a-kind comprehensive nuclear safety culture assessment
within the nuclear projects area and involving all of its major contract partners.
Hydro-Québec
The most recent self-assessment at Gentilly-2 was an evaluation by peers in 2012. See the sixth
Canadian report for details.
Bruce Power
A nuclear safety culture self-assessment was performed at Bruce Power in 2013, covering
Bruce A, Bruce B and the licensee’s corporate functions. An electronic survey was delivered to
all staff and interviews and focus groups were held.
The purpose of the self-assessment was to gather a wide input of people’s perceptions about
safety. This type of assessment cannot rate safety performance in absolute terms, but instead is
designed to provide an overview of people’s concerns, behaviour patterns and other insights to
help management improve the safety culture.
Some of the assessment areas that received the most positive ratings were:
 employees’ comfort in raising concerns and ability to recognize unusual conditions and
stop in the face of uncertainty
 employees’ strong sense of ownership of their work
 how training reinforces safe behaviours and establishes high expectations
 senior leadership’s frequent communications on the importance of nuclear safety
 the respect given to the roles of the regulators
Among the most frequently raised issues were:
 employees concerns about equipment reliability (although employees have faith that
nuclear safety is not being jeopardized)
 the lack of awareness of the value of the corrective action program, including
effectiveness, trends and actions taken on issues raised
 management communications to staff
 the need to ensure nuclear knowledge and experience is maintained
After evaluating the results of the nuclear safety culture self-assessment, Bruce Power decided to
concentrate on three main new focus areas to address the findings related to:
 management communications to staff
 the lack of awareness of the value of the corrective action plan
 the employees’ concern about equipment reliability
NB Power
NB Power conducted a comprehensive nuclear safety culture self-assessment in November 2014.
The assessment was carried out in two parts: a survey of NB Power employees; and an interview
process to validate the survey responses and gain additional insights. The assessment is required
at a minimum every three years per the licensee’s process documentation; however, a two-year
cycle is currently being used with a brief employee “pulse” survey being deployed in the years
between full assessments.
The 2014 assessment revealed there is a healthy nuclear safety culture that values nuclear safety
over other competing priorities such as production. NB Power utilizes 10 nuclear safety culture
“action statements” derived from the INPO document, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety
Culture. The action statements provide information on what the traits mean to all employees at
NB Power.
The 2014 assessment results showed significant improvements in all 10 action statements in
comparison to the 2011 assessment. Although nuclear safety culture cannot be measured by
statistical data alone, the assessment noted, an overall 10 percent improvement in the action
statements. The improvement was driven by:
 the strong level of support for the direction set out in the Navigating for Excellence Plan,
which identifies the goals, objectives and strategies for the NPP
 employees’ level of pride in moving forward toward industry excellence
 a sense of togetherness (as indicated by the phrase: “One Team, One Plan”)
 the performance metrics in place to track progress and motivate the workforce
Some of the assessment areas that were identified as focus areas included:
 equipment reliability
 leadership commitment to deliver key messages face to face
 investing in developing NPP licensee staff
Actions taken by NB Power to address the focus areas include:
 scheduling WANO technical support missions for the areas of leadership and equipment
reliability
 scheduling an equipment reliability process implementation strategy
 producing a plan for developing staff through training and seminars, formalizing a
leadership training and development program, and enhancing the performance
management programs
NB Power completed a pulse survey in December 2015 and plans to conduct another safety
culture assessment in 2016.
SNC-Lavalin Nuclear
SNC-Lavalin Nuclear has made safety both in the workplace and within technical activities a key
commitment at all levels of the organization. In 2015, the two organizations comprising SNC-
Lavalin Nuclear (Candu Energy Inc. and SNC-Lavalin Nuclear Inc.) joined INPO as supplier
members. This membership enables SNC-Lavalin Nuclear to incorporate many of the INPO
principles, including the Principles for Excellence in Nuclear Supplier performance, in its
business approach. These INPO principles are important elements of the SNC-Lavalin Nuclear
safety culture.
10 (c) CNSC framework for assessing safety culture at NPPs

As stated in CNSC discussion paper DIS-12-07, Safety Culture for Nuclear Licensees, the CNSC
defines safety culture as:
the characteristics of the work environment, such as the values, rules and common
understandings that influence employees’ perceptions and attitudes about the importance
that the organization places on safety.
This definition includes the degree to which a critical, questioning attitude exists that is directed
toward facility improvement. The CNSC maintains regulatory oversight of the organizational
processes (such as roles and responsibilities, communications and training) that influence safety
performance at Canadian nuclear facilities in order to determine whether the licensees possess
the characteristics of safety culture that support the safe conduct of nuclear activities. (See
article 12 for more discussion on human factors technical review areas.) The CNSC evaluates the
NPP licensees according to the following characteristics:
 Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization.
 Accountability for safety in the organization is clear.
 Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization.
 A safety leadership process exists in the organization.
 Safety culture is learning-driven in the organization.
Safety performance can be influenced by the ways in which responsibilities are assigned within
the organization, from the senior management team to the personnel in the field where
operational activities are carried out. It can also be influenced by the ways in which
organizational changes are made and communicated to staff, and by the effectiveness of its
training programs.
When reviewing NPP management systems, the CNSC pays particular attention to the way
nuclear, radiological and conventional safety; environmental protection; and the security of the
facility are all managed and integrated within the general management system. Canadian
management system requirements introduce the promotion of safety culture (as discussed in
subsection 10(a)) and include several measures related to organizational changes.
CNSC staff members use an organization and management review method to evaluate
organizational influences on licensees’ safety performance. The review method is a long-
established, objective and systematic approach that has been used extensively to conduct
baseline assessments of all operating NPPs in Canada. The review method uses a multi-trait,
multi-method approach to determine the presence or absence of the organizational processes (or
behaviours) that are important to safety. There are 17 behaviours that can be measured. Multiple
data collection methods are used (e.g., surveys, interviews, work task observations) to measure
each process. The results are then used to determine whether the licensee’s organization
possesses the characteristics of a culture where safety is its most important focus.
CNSC staff members review events related to personnel safety and security against expected
organizational behaviours to observe emerging trends in the licensee’s safety culture.
CNSC staff members also check for other indicators of a healthy safety culture at NPPs, such as
whether:
 documentation exists that describes the importance and role of safety in the operation of
organization, such as a safety management program
 good housekeeping, material condition and working conditions are maintained

 the use of continuous self-assessment is evident
Organizational performance is monitored and assessed through a number of activities, such as
desktop reviews, regulatory inspections and the review of licensee self-assessments.
CNSC staff members examine the self-assessment approach proposed by each licensee and
review licensees’ plans to conduct specific assessments. They also provide licensees with
feedback on planned corrective actions that may arise from licensees’ self-assessments, and
examine how licensees evaluate security culture in the context of safety culture.
Safety culture draft regulatory document

The CNSC is developing a regulatory document on safety culture, based on the feedback
received from its 2012 discussion paper DIS-12-07, Safety Culture for Nuclear Licensees. The
regulatory document is anticipated to:
 formalize the CNSC’s commitment to promoting a healthy safety culture in the nuclear
industry by providing a clear definition and describing the characteristics of a healthy
safety culture, ensuring a shared understanding of these concepts between the CNSC and
its stakeholders
 formalize requirements and expectations for licensees regarding safety culture at NPPs
 clarify and implement the CNSC’s oversight role and strategy to verify that NPP
licensees are conducting and implementing appropriate safety culture self-assessments
and that corrective actions arising from these assessments are effectively implemented
10 (d) Priority to safety at the CNSC

The CNSC makes nuclear safety the priority in all of its activities. The CNSC Management
System Manual (see subsection 8.2(d)) has clear statements on the consideration of safety in
every decision made by the CNSC and on the expectation of a strong culture of safety where
organizational and individual behaviour continuously demonstrate this consideration. In support
of this, all regulatory processes within the CNSC management system are developed respecting
the CNSC’s focus on the safety of staff (both its own and the licensees’), the environment and
the Canadian public.
The regulatory independence of the CNSC (as described in subarticle 8.2) helps CNSC staff
members maintain their focus on nuclear safety while addressing all organizational priorities.
During the reporting period, an internal safety culture working group facilitated a series of town
hall sessions within the CNSC to showcase the mechanisms and commitments being used to
address recent survey results and the attributes of being a world-class regulator.
Article 11 – Financial and human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate
financial resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation
throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient
numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are
available for all safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout
its life.
11.1 Adequacy of financial resources

Each NPP licensee in Canada has the prime responsibility for the safety of its facility per
article 9 of the CNS. This responsibility includes providing adequate financial resources to
support the safety of each NPP throughout its life.
Paragraph 3(1)(l) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations requires all licence
applicants to provide a description of any proposed financial guarantee relating to the activity to
be licensed. In addition, NPP licensees in Canada are required by licence conditions, imposed
pursuant to a specific reference in subsection 24(5) of the NSCA, to provide financial guarantees
acceptable to the CNSC for the costs of decommissioning NPPs.
11.1 (a) Financing of operations and safety improvements made to nuclear power
plants during their operating life
Canadian NPP licensees maintain budgets for operation, maintenance and capital improvements.
For large-scale improvements, an item is costed for financing over the estimated remaining
effective lifetime of the NPP. Expenditures are dictated by the licensee’s financial position,
current and planned performance, service obligations (electrical load forecast) and financial and
business strategies. These inputs are used to develop the envelopes for ongoing operating
expenditures and capital investments.
Canadian NPP licensees place a high priority on safety-related programs and projects. This
ensures adequate financial resources will be applied to safety improvement programs and
projects throughout the life of each NPP.
11.1 (b) Financial resources for decommissioning

Canada’s four NPP licensees have opted for different methods of supplying decommissioning
financial guarantees, as allowed by CNSC regulatory guide G-206, Financial Guarantees for the
Decommissioning of Licensed Activities. In each case, the financial guarantee arrangements
include legal agreements that grant the CNSC access to the guaranteed funds in the event of
default by the licensee. The licensees maintain preliminary decommissioning plans, cost
estimates and financial guarantees and report periodically to the CNSC that the estimates and
plans remain valid, in effect and sufficient to meet the decommissioning needs. The preliminary
decommissioning plans and financial guarantees are kept up to date in response to events such as
changes to NPP operating plans, changes in financial conditions and the development of plans
for the long-term management of spent fuel under the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act. The financial
guarantees encompass not only the operation of the NPP but also the safe storage of nuclear
waste and spent fuel produced by the plant. Therefore, the financial guarantees are significant.
NPP licensees submit to the Commission annual reports on the status of their financial
guarantees and CNSC staff members review the financial guarantees plan for each NPP licensee
every five years.
Acceptable financial guarantees include cash, letters of credit, surety bonds, insurance and
legally binding commitments from a government (either federal or provincial). The acceptability
of the guarantees is assessed by the CNSC according to the following general criteria:
 Liquidity: The proposed funding measures should be such that the financial vehicle can
be drawn upon only with the approval of the CNSC and that payout for decommissioning
purposes is not prevented, unduly delayed or compromised for any reason.
 Certainty of value: Licensees should select funding, security instruments and
arrangements that provide full assurance of their value.
 Adequacy of value: Funding measures should be sufficient, at all or predetermined
points in time, to fund the decommissioning plans for which they are intended.
 Continuity: The required funding measures for decommissioning should be maintained
on a continuing basis. This may require periodic renewals, revisions and replacements of
securities provided or issued for fixed terms. For example, during a licence renewal the
preliminary decommissioning plan may be revised and the financial guarantee updated
accordingly. Where necessary and in order to ensure that there is continuity of coverage,
funding measures should include provisions for advance notice of termination or intent
not to renew.
The decommissioning financial guarantees required from Hydro-Québec, NB Power and OPG
cover the full breadth of decommissioning, including the initial steps to place the facilities in a
safe storage state. Under the lease conditions of the Bruce site to Bruce Power, the owner (OPG)
maintains the decommissioning financial guarantees for the Bruce reactors.
All licensees issue a preliminary decommissioning plan every five years. The preliminary
decommissioning plan provides the long-term vision for the storage and surveillance period
(approximately 30 years) prior to demolition and site restoration. In the preliminary
decommissioning plan, the estimated costs associated with decommissioning are presented that
support the decommissioning financial guarantees.
Further details on financial guarantees and decommissioning can be found in Canada’s National
Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management.
In addition to financial guarantees for decommissioning, the CNSC may also require financial
guarantees for other costs where it considers that financial and safety risks warrant such a
requirement.
Financing of the Pickering safe storage project
The financing of the placement of Pickering Units 2 and 3 into safe storage and the isolation of
interfaces to the operating NPP was provided primarily from OPG’s Nuclear Decommissioning
Fund.
The project scope and cost estimate for the placement of Pickering Units 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 into
safe storage at the end of their operating lives are in development. OPG is working on plans to
transition the NPP into safe storage beginning in early 2023 with completion by approximately
late 2027. Under these plans, partial shutdown would begin at the end of 2022, followed by full
NPP shutdown at the end of 2024. Some preliminary plans for the activities associated with the
transition of Pickering into safe storage were provided in the stabilization activity plan which
was submitted to the CNSC in December 2015.
11.1 (c) Requirements under the Nuclear Liability Act and Nuclear Liability and
Compensation Act
Canada’s nuclear liability regime is currently under revision. In 2015, the Canadian Parliament
passed the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act. This new legislation will come into force on
January 1, 2017, once the key regulations and financial security mechanisms are in place. It is
intended to replace the current Nuclear Liability Act, providing a stronger legislative
framework that will better address liability and compensation after a nuclear incident.
The civil liability regime provided by the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act – like the
current Nuclear Liability Act – establishes the absolute, exclusive and limited liability of the
operator for civil damages. It is designed to provide certainty on the treatment of legal liability
for nuclear damage resulting from a nuclear incident (including losses resulting from a
preventive measure) and to provide prompt compensation with minimal litigation.
The Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act will include the following changes from the
existing legislation:
 It increases the absolute liability limit of an NPP operator to $1 billion from the
$75 million specified in the current legislation. The $1 billion limit will apply in the
fourth year, progressively increasing from $650 million when the new legislation comes
into force. Operators of nuclear installations other than NPPs will have lower liability
limits, commensurate with their risk, as established in regulations.
 It expands the definition of compensable damage to include, in addition to bodily injury
and property damage under the current legislation, some forms of psychological trauma,
economic loss, losses resulting from preventive measures and environmental damage.
 It introduces a longer limitation period – 30 years from the current 10 years – for
submitting compensation claims for bodily injury and loss of life. Through an indemnity
agreement with operators, the Government of Canada will provide coverage for claims
occurring between 10 and 30 years. The limitation period for other forms of damage will
remain at 10 years as in the current legislation.
 Operators will be required to maintain financial security to cover their full liability limit.
This financial security must be in the form of insurance obtained from an insurer
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources. Subject to the approval of the Minister,
operators will be permitted to cover up to 50 percent of their liability with alternate forms
of financial security such as provincial government guarantees or letters of credit.
 It establishes a quasi-judicial claims tribunal to replace the courts if necessary, to
accelerate claims payments and provide an efficient and equitable forum.
Once the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act comes into force, Canada will be able to ratify
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which it signed in 2013.
11.2 Adequacy of human resources

Paragraph 12(1)(a) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations require licensees to
“ensure the presence of a sufficient number of qualified workers to carry on the licensed activity
safely and in accordance with the Act, the regulations made under the Act and the licence.”
Adequate human resources means the employment of enough qualified staff to carry out all
normal activities and to respond to the most resource-intensive conditions under all operating
states, including normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, design-basis accidents,
and emergencies.
As described in the following subsections, the licensees have extensive and effective programs
related to training, staffing, examination, workforce capacity evaluation, hiring, knowledge
retention and research and development (R&D). These programs, in conjunction with the above
developments, have contributed to the effective management of human resources, in general,
across the industry.
11.2 (a) Requirements and measures related to staffing levels, qualifications, training
and certification of workers
Licensees are responsible for the safe operation of their respective NPPs. As such they are held
fully responsible for both training and testing their workers to ensure they are fully qualified to
perform the duties of their positions.
Licensee training programs

In August 2014, the CNSC published regulatory document REGDOC-2.2.2, Personnel Training,
which sets out the requirements and guidance for the analysis, design, development,
implementation, evaluation, documentation and management of training at nuclear facilities,
including the principles and elements essential to an effective training system. NPP licensees are
in the process of implementing the requirements of REGDOC-2.2.2.
Licensee training programs are established in accordance with the principles of the systematic
approach to training, which ensures licensee staff members receive training pertinent to their
positions. Departmental programs are routinely reviewed and training needs analytically
identified to allow training courses to be revised or developed as necessary to guarantee that the
training replicates the procedures and equipment used in the NPPs. Furthermore, training
program evaluation processes and procedures are regularly applied to assess the effectiveness of
the training programs. Licensees use objectives and criteria for accreditation of training
programs (such as those developed by INPO). All key training performance areas are evaluated
and assessed against these objectives quarterly. OPG, for example, uses them as the basis for a
number of training performance indicators.
All NPP licensees have internal training programs that focus on training in CANDU technology
and on the development of soft skills (such as behaviour competencies). Operations and
maintenance training is provided to create and maintain job performance capability. This training
normally includes classroom instruction, workshops, full-scope simulator exercises, on-the-job
instruction, supervisory coaching and informal briefings. The majority of staff members are also
trained to a radiation protection level that qualifies them to be responsible for their own
protection and able to sponsor supplemental staff and provide radiation protection oversight. In
addition, SNC-Lavalin Nuclear provides internal training in CANDU technology as well as

training in other nuclear technologies that support its products and services for NPPs.
A number of enhancements have been made to the training programs at Canadian NPPs during
the reporting period. (OPG, for example, built a reactor mock-up at Darlington for training in
preparation for refurbishment.) Annex 11.2(a) provides examples from Bruce Power, OPG and
NB Power.
The CNSC regularly evaluates licensees’ training programs for certified and non-certified staff.
It also verifies that all workers, including temporary staff and contractors, are qualified and
competent to perform the tasks assigned to them. Regulatory activities include the assessment of
processes and procedures in the context of the systematic approach to training, review of training
programs and onsite evaluation and inspections of the training program’s products and material.
The number of staff working in the regulatory field is too small for a single Canadian NPP
licensee to maintain and deliver an in-house training program on regulatory affairs. Therefore, an
industry working group coordinates a joint regulatory affairs training program. It includes
courses on the following topics, developed by individual licensees, the CNSC and CNL:
 NPP operating licences
 REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Plants
 the NSCA and its regulations
 introduction to safety analysis
 regulatory issues management
 regulatory communications and technical writing
 International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) training
The use of supplemental staff is important to licensees’ performance of critical work on safety
and safety-related systems during maintenance outages. While supplemental workers are
typically recruited to augment outages, they can also be involved in engineering or design work.
Training programs consider the requirements for supplemental personnel (e.g., electrical,
hoisting and rigging, pressure boundary) as well as personnel performing a contract management
role. The training programs consider previous training and experience through the use of
standard task evaluations based on Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) methodology or
apprentice-related certificates of qualification. The training and qualification of supplemental
workers ensures familiarity with nuclear-related practices such as human performance tools and
corrective action programs. Specialized training is provided in areas such as environmental
qualification, foreign material exclusion, respiratory protection, human performance and
radiation protection, all of which include industry-related operating experience. The programs to
assess the competencies of the supplemental staff include the evaluation of the knowledge and
skills necessary to conduct specific work at the NPPs.
Qualification and numbers of workers

The CNSC defines and establishes regulatory requirements and criteria for the qualification,
examination, and numbers of licensee personnel, including certified staff at NPPs.
Annex 11.2(a) provides specific details on the hierarchy of these requirements and guidance.
Some of the more pertinent documents are discussed in detail in the following.
CNSC regulatory document RD-204, Certification of Persons Working at Nuclear Power Plants,
sets the requirements for persons in certified positions at NPPs (the actual positions are described
in annex 11.2 (a)). It also sets requirements for processes by which the licensees train and
examine their candidates for certified positions. The NPP licensees independently administer the
examinations of their candidates for certified positions. The CNSC provides oversight of the
training and examination programs.
Minimum shift complement refers to the minimum number of workers with specific
qualifications that must be present at the NPP at all times to carry out the licensed activity safely
and in accordance with the NSCA, the regulations and the licence. It is specific to each nuclear
facility due to factors such as plant design, organizational structure and procedures. It must be
adequate to respond to the most resource-intensive conditions under all design-basis operating
states, including normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, design-basis accidents,
and emergencies.
The CNSC guidance document G-323, Ensuring the Presence of Sufficient Qualified Staff at
Class I Nuclear Facilities – Minimum Staff Complement, describes CNSC staff’s expectations as
they relate to the key factors that must be considered for ensuring the presence of a sufficient
number of qualified staff at Class I nuclear facilities. G-323 also describes the expectation to
ensure that at any given time, the minimum shift complement is present at the nuclear facility.
Considerations include shift turn over, scheduling vacation and training and short term absences
due to sick leave.
Licensees conduct a systematic analysis to determine the specific numbers and qualifications of
staff required in the minimum shift complement. This analysis considers all work groups
essential to ensuring the safe operation of the nuclear facility and adequate emergency response
capability, such as certified and non-certified staff, maintenance, emergency response, and fuel
handling. It also considers the response necessary to mitigate the consequence of all design-basis
events including common mode events and multi-unit facilities. The adequacy of the minimum
shift complement is demonstrated by an integrated validation exercise that is observed by CNSC
staff. During the reporting period, OPG completed the document analysis and validation of
minimum shift complement for its operating units at Pickering and Darlington. The remaining
NPP licensees continued the systematic analysis and validation of the minimum shift
complement requirements. This work is expected to be completed during the next reporting
period.
As noted above, the minimum shift complement is in place to ensure safe operation during any
design-basis condition. As part of the CNSC Action Plan, NPPs were required to evaluate
existing emergency plans and take steps to enhance their emergency response capability to
various conditions that extend beyond the previously postulated design-basis accidents (e.g., an
extended loss of all AC power). Among other things, licensees were required to evaluate the
roles and functions of staff that would be required beyond minimum shift complement. These
roles and functions were tested in various emergency exercises which were also observed by
CNSC staff.
The FAIs pertaining to the evaluation of plans and measures to enhance the emergency response
capability were closed for all NPP licensees during the previous reporting period.
11.2 (b) Capability maintenance at NPP sites

The nuclear industry in Canada has robust workforce-development and worker-replacement
programs in place to meet future needs. Changes in workforce demographics and anticipation of
increasing industry human resources requirements (e.g., due to refurbishments and possible new
construction that may compete for resources with other large energy-related projects) have led to
initiatives in four related areas:
 workforce capability analyses
 hiring programs
 external training programs
 knowledge-retention programs
Workforce capability analyses

NPP licensees regularly conduct detailed workforce capability analyses to predict gaps between
forecasted supply and planned resource levels in operator, maintenance and engineering job-
families. These analyses focus on assessing critical gaps in skills that need to be retained,
replaced and resourced. Training requirements are also identified. Annex 11.2(b) provides, as an
example, a detailed description of the workforce planning process used by Bruce Power.
Succession-planning processes are also in place at the NPPs to predict, plan and prepare for the
replacement of senior-level personnel. Leadership positions down to the level of department
manager are identified and assessments of employee readiness to assume a position (from “ready
now” to “ready in one to two years” to “ready in three to five years”) are conducted.
Development plans prepare potential candidates to assume critical positions as employees retire.
To address anticipated readiness gaps at senior levels, OPG initiated a program to accelerate the
development of high-potential engineers through focused development and targeted learning
events.
SNC-Lavalin Nuclear addresses this issue through a comprehensive resource-management
system that focuses on the delivery of engineering products and services to nuclear facilities
around the world, the refurbishment of existing reactors and the construction of new reactors.
This functionally managed system covers various groups in SNC-Lavalin Nuclear and takes an
optimal approach to dealing with volatility of business, balancing customer needs and ensuring a
consistent approach, while complying with its collective agreements and using best practices.
System elements are grouped on the basis of supply, demand, resource planning, development of
resources and performance management. Skills of individual technical staff are identified and
maintained with succession plans established to meet commercial demands. The attrition risks of
these employees are actively managed by a dedicated functional resource management team that
continually assesses worker skills, knowledge and qualification to identify gaps and utilize a
combination of targeted and on-the-job commercial training opportunities to close the gaps.
Hiring programs
NPP licensees continued to replenish their workforces through hiring programs to recruit
workers into the operator, maintenance and engineering job-families. Recruitment of mechanical
and control maintenance workers and operators is largely conducted through community
colleges; the NPP licensees have established partnerships with colleges in their regions, often
advising on curriculum and career opportunities. Recruitment of engineers includes both
experienced workers and new graduates from Canadian universities, some of which offer nuclear
engineering programs.
To further promote the industry and increase the pool of potential applicants, the NPP licensees
are active in programs such as campus outreach and robotics competitions, as well as in
organizations such as Women in Nuclear (WiN) and North American Young Generation in
Nuclear (NAYGN).
WiN-Canada emphasizes and supports the role of women in addressing the general public’s
concerns about nuclear energy and applying radiation and nuclear technology. WiN-Canada also
works to provide an opportunity for women to succeed in the industry through initiatives such as
mentoring, networking and personal development opportunities. The industry has collaborated
on a number of joint initiatives in partnership with WiN, including the production of a video to
encourage young women in high school to pursue a career in the nuclear industry and an
initiative to provide the human resources community with recommendations for developing more
robust strategies to have women pursue trades careers in the electricity sector.
A number of new graduate engineering trainees in the licensee organizations are part of the
NAYGN. This organization provides opportunities for a young generation of nuclear enthusiasts
to develop leadership and professional skills, create life-long connections and engage and inform
the public.
At SNC-Lavalin Nuclear, the supply of personnel in the needed skills is maintained by internal
postings and external hiring, including that of experienced personnel on contract (such as retirees
from Candu Energy or the licensee organizations). Further, recruitment by SNC-Lavalin Nuclear
utilizes social media and innovative partnerships with Canadian universities and Mitacs (a non-
profit organization that manages and funds research and training programs).
External training programs

In addition to the partnerships mentioned above, there are a number of specific programs in
Canada to develop new workers for the nuclear industry.
The University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) has shaped a nuclear engineering
program specifically to meet industry needs. Its Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science
offers undergraduate (bachelor’s), post-graduate (master’s) and doctorate (PhD) degrees,
graduate courses and diploma programs that focus on nuclear engineering, radiation science and
related areas to support continuing-education needs.
More than 450 undergraduate students, over 90 master’s students and four PhD students have
graduated from the degree programs offered by the Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear
Science since 2007. A close interface with industry members, the CSA Group and the CNSC is
used to formulate advice on the curriculum and make available thesis and research topics at the
university. UOIT is strongly committed to promoting educational and career opportunities for
women in science and engineering. The nuclear programs focus on reactor kinetics, reactor
design, plant design and simulation, radiation detection and measurement, radiation biophysics
and dosimetry, radiation protection, environmental radioactivity, nuclear security, production
and utilization of radioisotopes, waste management, fuel cycle, radiation chemistry and material
analysis with radiation techniques.
The University Network of Excellence in Nuclear Engineering (UNENE) is an alliance of

Canadian universities (including UOIT and others) and NPP licensees, with support from
research and regulatory agencies. UNENE was created to provide a sustainable supply of
qualified nuclear engineers and scientists to meet the current and future needs of the Canadian
nuclear industry through university-based training. Through UNENE, nuclear professorships in
participating universities have been sustained. The five universities currently participating in
UNENE offer a common course-based master’s of engineering (M.Eng.) program aimed at
professionals already working in the nuclear industry. To date, 106 students have graduated from
the UNENE M.Eng. program. A new, shorter diploma program was introduced by UNENE in
April 2015 to enable young industry professionals to acquire focussed knowledge in their current
areas of responsibility. UNENE also supports M.Sc. and Ph.D. research; currently there are 120
students participating.
Mitacs is a not-for-profit, government-supported training organization to connect highly skilled
graduate students and postdoctoral fellow interns (and their supervising professors) with
CANDU technology projects aimed at addressing a clearly identified industry knowledge gap.
CANTEACH is a web-based knowledge repository that provides high-quality technical
documentation relating to the CANDU nuclear energy system. The CANTEACH program was
established by AECL, OPG, COG, Bruce Power, McMaster University, l’École Polytechnique de
Montréal and the Canadian Nuclear Society. Its aim is to develop and maintain a comprehensive
set of web-accessible documents for use in various aspects of education, training, design and
operation. The CANTEACH program continues to accumulate information contributed by the
Canadian nuclear industry, universities and the CNSC.
In 2015, UNENE announced the publication of a CANDU textbook titled “The Essential
CANDU”, which meets the long-standing need for a peer-reviewed textbook on CANDU
technology, suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate students, educators, trainers and
working professionals. It enables those new to CANDU technology to learn about the overall
system and pursue specialized topics in depth. As such, it prepares undergraduates for a career in
the nuclear industry, facilitates the technical training of new employees, and supports knowledge
enhancement of experienced employees. It also supports university level nuclear education
curricula. It is available at the UNENE website and is intended to be a living document.
Knowledge-retention programs
Knowledge management and retention continue to be important focus areas for the NPP
licensees. Various knowledge management and mitigations plans exist for critical and “at-risk”
roles due to the departure of a significant portion of the nuclear industry’s knowledge workers.
For example, OPG uses both internal and external approaches to knowledge management. The
internal approach uses internal tools and resources to assess the risk of knowledge loss by
determining a total attrition factor that includes a rating based on the estimated time until
retirement or departure and the position criticality. This information is then utilized in
developing an approach to manage the key issues. The external approach involves engaging a
vendor to capture knowledge through specialized knowledge mapping software. Both approaches
are integrated into OPG’s succession-planning cycle when critical and “at-risk” roles are
reviewed and identified, with specific focus placed on critical positions where knowledge loss is
the greatest threat.
Managers periodically review knowledge-retention plans to assess the overall criticality of the
roles and the availability of knowledge to the organization. OPG’s leadership team fully supports
the program and regularly reviews the knowledge risk areas through the succession-planning
process.
Some of the initiatives implemented by NPP licensees in Canada to mitigate knowledge retention
risks include:
 knowledge repositories that use common documentation
 a high-potential development program for emerging leaders and middle managers that
accelerate the development of high-potential employees for future leadership roles
 a recruitment and resourcing strategy to achieve a mix of new graduates, experienced
hires, on-the-job developmental opportunities and rotations, and contract staff
 partnerships with selected external service providers to provide a new means of
implementing projects
 ongoing mentoring and coaching of employees
 on-the-job and classroom-based training communities for sharing best practices and
discussing solutions to common issues and challenges
 centres of excellences, which establish a critical mass of expertise and a consistent
enterprise-wide approach in key areas important to the business
To support the knowledge management and retention initiatives of CANDU NPPs, SNC-Lavalin
Nuclear provides the following engineering support services:
 attachment of experienced SNC-Lavalin Nuclear staff to CANDU NPPs
 provision of common nuclear products and services to multiple CANDU 6 NPPs
Maintaining research and development capability

In addition to the human resource challenges noted above, there has been some concern that
available funds for nuclear power R&D may be insufficient to sustain the core R&D elements of
people and facilities. Canada recognizes that it is important to retain adequate core R&D
capability, preserve expert knowledge and train future experts.
Every three years, COG produces a report on the R&D capability of the Canadian nuclear
industry. This report examines and documents Canadian R&D capability in order to ensure
adequate financial resources for R&D, with the view of supporting continued safe and reliable
operation of NPPs. The 2015 report assessed the R&D funding stream during the previous three
years (2012–14) and the resources anticipated for the following three years (2015–17). The 2015
report noted that sustained R&D funding in recent years has allowed the industry to adequately
maintain the infrastructure (both facilities and expert staff) needed to support safe and efficient
operation of nuclear facilities as they age. Initiatives such as knowledge retention through the
production of state-of-the-art reports, software quality assurance documentation, consolidated
databases and operational guidelines, along with higher-level initiatives related to the
management of knowledge retention and the elimination of singleton expertise, are expected to
produce positive results in the short and medium terms.
During the reporting period, COG funded a formal capability maintenance program aimed at
supporting the R&D facilities and resources located at CNL during the period of AECL’s
restructuring. This program focused on several facilities that were potentially at risk during the
transition period. With the formation of the government-owned, contractor-operated (GoCo)
model and the restructuring and operation of CNL, the formal program came to an end in March
2016.
The CNSC monitors both the capability of the Canadian nuclear industry to sustain R&D and the
results of the R&D programs themselves. The licensees are required to report to the CNSC
significant findings generated by R&D that reveals a hazard different than previously represented
to the CNSC according to CNSC REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants.
Appendix E describes the R&D programs for Canadian NPPs during the reporting period.
Article 12 – Human factors
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and
limitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear
installation.
“Human factors” are those that influence human performance and thereby influence the safety of
a nuclear facility or activity during any (or all) phases, including specification, design,
construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. These factors may
include the characteristics of the person, the task, the equipment or tools used, the organizations
to which he/she belongs, the work environment and the training received. The application of
human-factors knowledge and methods, in areas such as interface design, procedures, training
and organization and job design, improves the reliability of humans performing tasks under
various conditions.
The CNSC regulatory approach is to consider human factors during its licensing, compliance and
standards-development activities. During licensing, the CNSC evaluates the extent to which the
applicant has considered human factors and applied that knowledge in its proposed programs.
The CNSC has issued several regulatory documents and guides to assist licensees and licence
applicants in the planning and implementation of human factors activities. In addition, a number
of CNSC regulatory documents include specific requirements for the consideration of human
factors during new-build and life-extension projects. Relevant documents include:
 G-276, Human Factors Engineering Program Plans
 G-278, Human Factors Verification and Validation Plans
 G-323, Ensuring the Presence of Sufficient Qualified Staff at Class I Nuclear Facilities –
Minimum Staff Complement
 RD/GD-210, Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
 REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident Management, Version 2
 REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews
 REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants
 REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants
 REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, Version 2
Also, CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-369, Licence Application Guide: Licence to Construct
a Nuclear Power Plant, addresses human and organizational factors throughout its guidance. It
stresses the necessity for the applicant to demonstrate the knowledge, skills and abilities of its
workers and those of the major contractors and their subcontractors, as well as an overall
commitment to fostering a healthy safety culture.
Additionally, the CSA Group has published the following standards relevant to human factors
activities:
 N286-12, Management system requirements for nuclear facilities
 N290.6, Requirements for monitoring and display of nuclear power plant safety functions
in the event of an accident
 N290.12, Human factors in design for nuclear power plants

In the next reporting period, CNSC staff will continue its work developing and improving the
regulatory framework in support of human factors. Such work includes initiatives on human
performance, fitness for duty (including fatigue management), safety culture and minimum shift
complement. These improvements will reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.
The CNSC Action Plan identified a number of specific actions that have implications for human
and organizational performance. In short, licensees were required to evaluate the habitability of
emergency control facilities, the roles and functions of staffing requirements beyond minimum
shift complement (see subsection 11.2(a)), and the emergency procedures and equipment that
would be used to mitigate any beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA). Given the nature of the
potential enhancements, human performance was considered in the assessment of the response to
BDBA. In the reporting period, CNSC staff reviewed the licensees’ plan to address FAIs for the
use of human and organizational tools, including task analysis, verification and validation,
usability requirements, procedure development, operating experience and lessons learned,
habitability, severe accident management guideline (SAMG) development and validation,
training needs analysis, and more. CNSC conducted a series of Fukushima-related inspections at
the NPPs focussing on human and organizational factors. Specifically, these verified that the
licensees are adequately developing and modifying procedures, and taking human factors in
design into account, as they relate to Fukushima lessons learned. CNSC also witnessed the
testing of various human and organizational factors during emergency exercises. The FAIs for all
NPPs were closed by the end of the reporting period but improvements related to human and
organizational factors, and CNSC’s monitoring thereof, are continuing.
The CNSC subdivides its assessment of human factors into the following technical review areas
as shown in the table below. The subarticle/subsection number in the table indicates where the
factor is described.
Technical review area Subarticle/Subsection
Reporting and trending 7.2(iii), 19(vii)
Safety culture 10(b)
Minimum shift complement 11.2(a)
Human performance program 12(a)
Fitness for duty 12(b)
Procedures 12(c)
Human actions in safety analysis 12(d)
Human factors engineering (Human factors in design) 12(e)
Organizational performance 12(f)
Work organization and job design 12(g)
Accident management and recovery 19(iv)
12 (a) Human performance programs

Human performance is the outcome of human behaviours, functions and actions in a specified
environment, reflecting the ability of workers and management to meet the system’s defined
performance requirements under the conditions in which the system is employed. Human
performance programs aim to minimize the potential for human error by addressing the range of
factors that affect human performance. An effective human performance program integrates the
full range of human factors considerations – not just the people but also the tools, equipment,
tasks and environments in which they work – to ensure people are fully supported in carrying out
their work safely. The desired human performance is supported by hardware and software design
that considers the users, high-quality procedures, good procedural adherence, effective work
organization and careful job design. It is also necessary to ensure workers are fit for duty and are
supported by appropriate organizational mechanisms, continuous monitoring and an
organizational commitment to improvement. (These review areas are discussed in subsequent
subsections.)
The requirement for a licensee to have a documented human performance program is a licence
condition in NPP operating licences. An NPP licensee’s human performance program should be
developed, reviewed for effectiveness and updated continually (or at frequent intervals) and at all
phases of the plant lifecycle, from design through to decommissioning. CNSC staff members are
drafting a discussion paper that considers the approach to human performance at an
organizational level, to develop stronger links between the human performance program and the
range of human factors topics, leading to a strong, integrated consideration of human
performance.
CNSC has also proposed an amendment to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations that would
require all Class I facilities to have a human performance program for the activity to be licensed,
including measures in place to ensure workers’ fitness for duty (discussed further below). The
amended regulations are anticipated to be published in 2017.
All Canadian NPPs have implemented human performance programs that emphasize detection
and correction of human error with a focus on monitoring individuals’ behaviours. Licensees’
human performance improvement programs encourage assessment of internal and external
events and operating experience as opportunities to address problems before errors occur. All
licensees conduct detailed reviews of operational conditions, activities, incidents and events
(e.g., review of station condition records), as well as apparent-cause evaluation or root-cause
analyses to facilitate the detection and correction of human performance and other human
factors-related issues. Licensees have developed coding schemes to effectively identify and track
the causes of adverse conditions (see subarticle 19(vii) for more information).
In this learning environment, licensees strive to operate in a blame-free environment, which
increases the willingness of staff to identify errors in their work.
The mechanisms by which NPP licensees assign responsibilities and accountabilities for human
performance are described in annex 12(a).
More recently, some licensees have broadened the focus of their human performance programs
to consider managing defences against human error and supporting workers to achieve the
desired safety performance. Defence methods, which are identified through risk assessment,
include elimination, engineering controls, administrative controls and personal protective
equipment. The CNSC recognizes the benefit of licensees encouraging employees to get more
involved in devising methods to improve the quality, reliability and safety of their work, and
more fully appreciating their roles in nuclear safety. An example of this is the Human
Performance Advocates Network implemented by Bruce Power.
CNSC staff’s review of human performance programs assesses the organization’s ability to
create, integrate and implement defences that prevent or mitigate the consequences of human
error in work activities, and to support its workers to achieve the desired human performance.
This includes a review of programs for performance monitoring that detect latent organizational
conditions and weaknesses, the consideration of human and organizational factors in
organizational processes, strategies for improvement and the licensee’s overall commitment to
fostering a healthy safety culture.
The CNSC review of performance monitoring and improvement focuses on ensuring that there is
a systematic, objective and comprehensive process for monitoring and improving safety. The
CNSC event reviews ensure that corrective action plans are systematically developed,
comprehensive and effective for addressing the causes of an event.
12 (b) Fitness for duty

Fitness for duty is a broad topic that touches on occupational health, physical and mental ability,
the use of potentially physio- and psycho-active substances and occupational fitness. It is defined
as a condition in which workers are physically, physiologically and psychologically capable of
competently and safely performing their tasks.
CNSC regulatory document RD-204, Certification of Persons Working at Nuclear Power Plants,
requires licensees to have a documented fitness-for-duty program for certified workers. In
addition, CNSC regulatory document RD-363, Nuclear Security Officer Medical, Physical and
Psychological Fitness, sets out the fitness-for-duty requirements for nuclear security officers.
During the reporting period CNSC issued draft regulatory document REGDOC-2.2.4, Fitness for
Duty, for public consultation. This document will be applicable to all workers who could pose a
risk to nuclear safety or security at high-security sites and has been developed considering the
full breadth of fitness for duty requirements, including alcohol and drug testing. REGDOC-2.2.4
will amalgamate requirements from RD-363.
As part of the process to ensure workers possess the minimum qualifications to perform their
jobs safely and to minimize the risks to NPP safety, the environment, and themselves or others,
NPP licensees conduct various fitness-for-duty assessments across various workgroups.
Depending on the risks associated with a position, these may include medical evaluations,
alcohol and drug testing, and occupational or physical fitness. These evaluations are conducted
in various circumstances, including pre-placement, periodic and return-to-work, or are based on
referral from the employee health assistance program or the outcome of behavioural observation.
With respect to fatigue-related fitness for duty, the CNSC has expectations for limits on hours of
work and mandatory rest periods between blocks of 12-hour shifts. These expectations are
currently implemented by NPPs with some exceptions (e.g., application to casual construction
trades and contractors, outages). The CNSC monitors hours-of-work violations, which are
reported quarterly by the licensees. During the reporting period the CNSC issued draft regulatory
document REGDOC-2.2.4, Managing Worker Fatigue, for public consultation. This regulatory
document will provide requirements and guidance with respect to managing worker fatigue at
high-security sites.
12 (c) Procedures
NPP licensees have processes for producing and maintaining procedures used for testing,
maintenance and operations (both normal and abnormal). In addition, most licensees have a
guide that addresses relevant human factors.
CNSC staff’s review of procedures focuses on ensuring there is an adequate process for the
development, validation, implementation, modification and use of procedures that account for
human performance. CNSC staff members also focus on ensuring that the process is
implemented effectively and there are demonstrated mechanisms for managing procedural
adherence.
12 (d) Human actions in safety analysis

Human actions are considered in probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses to examine the
possible contribution of human error and human reliability to hazards and risks.
Human reliability analysis is an integral component of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in
situations where humans are involved in system performance. (More information on PSA is
provided in subsection 14(i)(d).) It is a method for estimating the probability that a system-
required human action, task or job necessary for safety will not be completed successfully within
the required time period. It can also consider the probability that extraneous tasks or actions
detrimental to system reliability or availability will be performed. Other safety analyses that
consider human actions include hazard and operability studies, failure modes and effects
analyses and hazard analyses.
Licensees use industry-accepted human reliability assessment methods within their PSAs to
incorporate the probability of human errors in risk-important sequences. While the CNSC does
not require its licensees to use any particular method for human reliability analysis, it verifies
that the method chosen meets industry good practices and is carried out in a systematic way. One
commonly used method is the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction.
The CNSC is conducting research into the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk – Human Reliability
Analysis method with regard to adapting the factors that shape human performance. This could
eventually assist licensees with developing their Level 2 PSAs, including consideration of the
use of emergency mitigating equipment and severe accident management guides.
CNSC staff’s review of human actions focuses on the execution of components of emergency
operating procedures in the control room and field.
12 (e) Human factors engineering (human factors in design)

The consideration of human factors engineering (HFE) (also referred to as human factors in
design) applies to the design of new facilities and to the modification and decommissioning of
existing facilities. The concept of HFE is concerned with ensuring that the design or
modification of facilities, systems and equipment integrates information about human
characteristics, performance and limitations so as to ensure safe and reliable task and system
performance and to minimize the potential for human error. The concept considers the cognitive,
physical and sensory characteristics of people who operate, maintain or support the system,
ensuring that the system and equipment are designed to support human performance.
HFE effort increases with higher levels of interface complexity or criticality; greater HFE effort
is typically required for reactor operator tasks.
The CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Physical Design – Design of Reactor
Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants, includes requirements for addressing human factors in the
design of new NPPs (see subarticle 18 (iii) for details). In addition, CNSC regulatory document
RD/GD-210, Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants includes requirements for
addressing human factors in maintenance.
The CSA standard N290.12-14, Human factors in design for nuclear power plants, was
published in December 2014. NPP licensees are currently implementing this standard.
As part of an integrated safety review (ISR) for a life-extension project, licensees must determine
the extent to which the current NPP and plant performance conform to modern standards and
practices and identify any gaps between those standards and actual performance (see subsection
14(i)(f) for details). The CNSC expects that modern HFE principles and standards using best
practices will be consulted when plant modifications are being considered, although it is
recognized that the existing technologies, space limitations and control room practices may limit
their application to older NPPs. CNSC staff members continue to work with licensees
undergoing life-extension projects to ensure the reviews against modern standards address
expectations related to human factors that could limit safe long-term operation. In addition,
modifications in response to the Fukushima accident have included human factors in design
considerations.
A description of how the Canadian nuclear industry considers human factors through its
application of HFE is provided in annex 12(e).
CNSC staff’s review of HFE assures that there is a systematic process for effectively
incorporating human factors considerations into system requirements, definition, analysis, design
and verification and validation activities. CNSC staff members also focus on ensuring that the
process of incorporating HFE is implemented effectively by suitably trained, qualified and
competent human-factors specialists.
12 (f) Organizational performance

CNSC staff members review the management processes related to organizational performance
(e.g., business planning, the establishment of the organization, change management of roles and
responsibilities, communications, resourcing) and consider the influence of such processes on
safety performance at Canadian nuclear facilities. For example, safety performance at NPPs can
be influenced by the ways in which organizational changes are made and communicated, how
contractors are managed, how the organization conveys its vision and mission, and how
responsibilities are assigned within the organization ─ from the senior management team to the
field where the work is carried out. All of these processes are established in the licensees’
management systems according to the requirements of CSA standard N286-12, Management
system requirements for nuclear facilities, and are regularly assessed by both the licensees and
CNSC for their effectiveness.
The CNSC’s review of licensees’ organizational processes and performance is described further
in subsection 10(c).
12 (g) Work organization and job design
Work organization and job design relate to the organization and provision of a sufficient number
of qualified staff and the organization and allocation of work assigned to staff to ensure that
work-related goals are achieved in a safe manner. They include, but may not be limited to,
staffing levels and minimum shift complement, which are discussed in more detail in
subsection 11.2(a).
Article 13 – Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance
programs are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that
specified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied
throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
13 (a) General management system requirements

Safe and reliable operation requires a commitment and adherence to a set of management system
principles and, consistent with those principles, the establishment and implementation of a
planned and systematic pattern of actions that achieve the expected results.
Currently, the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations require licence applicants to propose
quality assurance programs for the following activities to be licensed:
 site preparation
 construction
 operation
 decommissioning
The Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and the Uranium Mines and Mills Regulations will be
amended to require licence applicants to propose a management system for the activities listed
above, including measures to promote and support safety culture. The amended regulations are
expected to be published in 2017. This represents a significant step for the CNSC in evolving the
regulatory framework for management systems. CNSC licensing requirements refer to
“management systems” and specify CSA standard N286 as the principal safety management
requirement.
The current CSA N286 standard, N286-12, Management system requirements for nuclear
facilities, is being cited as the management system requirement for all new licence applications
and licence renewals. This standard promotes the integration of management systems and
requires that safety be the paramount consideration guiding decisions and actions. It follows and
builds on the model provided in the IAEA general safety requirements document GS-R-3, The
Management System for Facilities and Activities.
NPP licensees have implemented (or are in the process of implementing) CSA standard
N286-12. For a description of the existing management systems that are currently implementing
N286-12, see the sixth Canadian report (annex 13(a) of that report provides an example of an
existing management system for one NPP licensee). For licensees who are in the process of
implementing N286-12, their existing management system is in accordance with CSA standard
N286-05, Management system requirements for nuclear power plants.
The N286 standard applies to the top management with overall accountability for the facility,
through its life cycle including design, supply chain, construction, commissioning, operation and
decommissioning and integrates the management system requirements for health, safety,
environment, security, economics and quality. N286 applies to all 14 CNSC safety and control
areas.
Management systems based on N286-12 include processes to define, plan and control the
licensed activities by identifying relevant requirements to be met; establishing objectives that
achieve the requirements; identifying and controlling risks; establishing plans, measures and
targets, monitoring that results are achieved and taking appropriate corrective measures if they
are not. As part of the management system, these processes are subject to regular monitoring and
reporting to assess effectiveness and identify opportunities for improvement. See subsection 9(b)
for additional details of management systems in this context.
Specifically, N286-12 is based on the following 12 principles for management system:
 Safety is the paramount consideration, guiding decisions and actions.
 The business is defined, planned and controlled.
 The organization is defined and understood.
 Resources are managed.
 Communication is effective.
 Information is managed.
 Work is managed.
 Problems are identified and resolved.
 Changes are controlled.
 Assessments are performed.
 Experience is sought, shared and used.
 The management system is continually improved.
These principles are supported by the following generic requirements for management systems
as outlined in N286-12:
 Safety culture: The management system is used to understand and promote a safety
culture.
 Business planning: Requirements are identified, risks to objectives are identified and
controlled, and results are monitored to ensure planned results are achieved.
 Organization: The organizational structure, authorities, accountabilities, responsibilities,
and decision-making process are defined.
 Resources: Resources required to carry out the business plan with a focus on competent
human resources, and the means to achieve this requirement, are identified.
 Communication: Processes exist to ensure effective communications and to make
workers aware of the relevance and significance of their work.
 Information management: The management system is documented, information is
provided to those who need it in a timely manner, and document control and records are
managed.
 Work management: Work is planned, controlled and independently verified.
 Problem identification and resolution: Problems are identified, evaluated, documented,
and resolved, and the effectiveness of the resolution confirmed.
 Change: Required changes are identified, justified, reviewed, approved, implemented
and assessed.
 Assessment: Self-assessments and independent assessments are conducted.
 Use of experience: Experience gained within the industry and from other industries is
reviewed for relevance and used to initiate improvement.
 Continual improvement: Management continually improves the management system

and periodically assesses its effectiveness to achieve planned results.
The CNSC expects licensees’ management systems and performance to demonstrate adherence
to these principles by implementing processes, aligned with the generic requirements, that apply
to all of their licensed activities.
It is of particular importance that licensees conduct self- and independent assessments of their
core processes and programs to evaluate the effectiveness of the management system in ensuring
requirements are met. Licensees routinely conduct self-assessments, sometimes referred to as
functional area self-assessments, on their core processes to provide objective information to
senior management for their overall management review activity. This is supplemented with
information from independent assessments and other important metrics and indicators.
CNSC staff members routinely review the licensees’ assessment information to ensure the
processes are properly implemented and that licensees’ senior management are receiving
objective feedback on the organization’s performance.
The following quality assurance/management system standards are also relevant to NPP
operations:
 CSA standard N286.7-16, Quality Assurance of Analytical, Scientific and Design
Computer Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) document 14001-2004,
Environmental management systems – Requirements with guidance for use
Applicants for site preparation and construction licences also require the proposed quality
assurance program for the design of the nuclear facility. Applicants are required to provide
descriptions of measures, policies, methods and procedures for worker health and safety
protection, environmental protection, and for operating and maintaining the nuclear facility.
13 (b) Addressing the issue of suspect material

Incidents involving the purchase and use of valves, which may have had suspect material used in
their manufacture, was discovered by NPP licensees during the reporting period. Canadian
licensees had purchased and installed valves containing suspect material at Bruce A and B,
Darlington, Pickering and Point Lepreau. This issue had no impact on safety at Gentilly-2.
The potential non-conforming material in the suspect valves was supplied by a third party
supplier. These valves had been received as early as 2001 and some had been installed since that
time. In March 2015, Canadian NPP licensees were notified by a valve supplier that materials
contained in valve assemblies and components may not conform to accepted standards,
specifications or technical requirements. Licensees immediately notified the CNSC about this
event, per the requirements of the regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements
for Nuclear Power Plants.
The affected NPP licensees determined the extent of condition and submitted related reports to
the CNSC. Licensees determined that there were no operability or safety concerns with the
supplied valves and components and that none of the safety-related components in service has
had a pressure boundary failure. Moreover, they quarantined all suspect components in storage to
prevent installation and identified affected system(s).
Licensees performed a root-cause analysis and identified the root cause and have taken
corrective actions to prevent re-occurrence of a similar event.
The CNSC staff concluded that the engineering assessments and reviews conducted by licensees,
suppliers and authorized inspection agencies have been performed thoroughly and in a robust
manner. The CNSC also concluded that the licensees implemented appropriate corrective
actions.
The discovery and reporting of these incidents demonstrated the effectiveness of the NPP
licensees’ supply chain management and procurement quality assurance program for discovering
and mitigating the intrusion of counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items (CFSIs) into their
operations as well as the overall robustness of their supply chain processes. To further improve
the effectiveness of their programs, the licensees implemented a variety of enhancements to
increase surveillance of sub-suppliers’ quality programs and to enhance awareness and training
of supply chain staff with respect to CFSI issues.
CSA standard N299, Quality assurance program requirements for the supply of items and
services for nuclear power plants, is an update to the former Z299 series of standards into which
requirements for measures to address CFSIs has been introduced. It is expected to be published
in 2016 and NPP licensees are planning to implement it.
For further details, see appendix D.
Article 14 – Assessment and verification of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the
construction and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life.
Such assessments shall be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of
operating experience and significant new safety information, and reviewed under
the authority of the regulatory body;
(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure
that the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in
accordance with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational
limits and conditions.
14 (i) Assessment of safety
14 (i) (a) General safety assessment in response to the Fukushima accident

As reported in the sixth Canadian report, Canada’s post-Fukushima safety assessment confirmed
that operating procedures and equipment are in place at all CANDU reactors to ensure key safety
functions are carried out for extended durations and to bring a reactor to a safe, stable state
following an accident.
The post-Fukushima safety review also found that the licensees’ assessments of the progression
of beyond-design-basis accidents (BDBA) were adequate. The assessment also confirmed the
general adequacy of the licensees’ safety cases for external events.
The CNSC Action Plan assigned an action to licensees to complete the review of the basis of
each external event to which the NPP may be susceptible using modern, state-of-the-art
practices. Most of this work was described in the sixth Canadian report.
The licensees’ remaining work to address this action is described in the following
subarticles/subsections:
 reviews of the bases of external events – subarticle 17(iii)
 updates to PSAs – subsection 14(i)(d)
 deterministic analyses for representative severe core damage accidents to confirm that
consequences of events triggered by external hazards are within applicable limits -
subsection 14(i)(c)
14 (i) (b) Assessment of licence applications

CNSC staff members perform detailed assessments of safety in relation to NPP licence
applications. Subarticle 7.2(ii) describes the general CNSC licensing process for both new-build
projects and currently operating NPPs and provides specific information related to CNSC
licences to prepare the site for, construct and operate an NPP. The CNSC’s assessment of safety
for a licence application is conducted against the application requirements set out in the General
Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations, the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, and other
relevant regulations. Licence application guides have been written (or are in production) to
supplement the regulations. They are written in the context of the 14 CNSC safety and control
areas as well as the other matters of regulatory interest described in appendix F. CNSC staff
members use assessment plans, along with staff work instructions, to coordinate the assessment
of licence applications related to NPPs. During the reporting period, the CNSC continued to
develop a comprehensive set of technical assessment criteria to aid these assessments. See
subarticle 7.2(ii) for more details on these topics.
The rest of this subsection describes the CNSC’s assessment of an application to renew a licence
to operate an NPP. These assessments have typically recurred every five years for currently
operating NPPs in Canada, corresponding to the typical duration of licences to operate that were
in effect during the reporting period. In 2015, an NPP operating licence for a period greater than
five years was issued to OPG for the operation of Darlington (see below).
In accordance with the regulations and CNSC guidance, an application to renew a licence to
operate an NPP typically addresses the programs and plans listed in appendix C, which are
aligned with the CNSC safety and control areas. The CNSC conducts a balanced assessment of
the licensee’s programs and activities, with priority placed on certain areas based on
performance history, risk and expert judgment. In their assessments, CNSC staff members focus
on:
 the performance of the licensee and the NPP over the previous licence period
 the licensee’s plans for operation and safety improvement over the next licence period
 significant activities envisaged by the licensee for an extensive period beyond the next
licence period
To help summarize the overall assessment of an application to renew a licence to operate, CNSC
staff members assess and rate the applicant’s performance under the CNSC safety and control
areas, as described in appendix F.1
As explained in subsection 7.2(ii)(d), the periodic safety review (PSR) process is being
integrated into the overall CNSC licence renewal process. This is illustrated in the following
description of the recent Darlington licence to operate, where the integrated safety review for
refurbishment will serve as the initial PSR.
OPG was issued an operating licence in 2015 for Darlington for a licence period from January 1,
2016 until November 30, 2025. The assessment of the application to renew this licence to
operate produced the following major results:
 The assessments for the refurbishment and life extension of Darlington met the
requirements of CNSC regulatory document RD-360, Life Extension of Nuclear Power
Plants. RD-360 was used because the project started prior to publication of the CNSC
regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews.
 The safety and control areas for Darlington were all rated as “satisfactory” or “fully
satisfactory” during the licensing period.
 The PSA results showed that the safety goal limits were met.
1
These ratings are, in fact, produced for all licensees and all safety and control areas on an annual basis, as
described in appendix F.
 CNSC staff verified that OPG has demonstrated pressure tube (which contain the fuel)
fitness for service beyond 210,000 equivalent full-power hours (EFPH), up to the planned
pre-refurbishment service life of 235,000 EFPH. (See subsection 14(ii)(b) for details.)
 The distribution and pre-stocking of potassium iodide (KI) pills was completed in
accordance with regulatory requirements. (This is discussed further in
subsection 16.1(d).)
 All CNSC Fukushima action items (FAIs) were closed.
 OPG was required to complete the refurbishment integrated implementation plan (IIP).
 OPG was required to submit the PSR basis document, along with the subsequent licence
renewal application, no later than one year prior to the expiry of the new licence.
14 (i) (c) Deterministic safety analysis
Response to Fukushima – Deterministic safety analysis

The licensees and CNSC post-Fukushima review of the deterministic safety analyses for each
NPP confirmed that the safety analysis of each NPP adequately considered design-basis
accidents and meets or exceeds the original design intent. The safety report of each NPP shows
that the predicted consequences, with conservative safety analysis assumptions, met the CNSC’s
prescribed acceptance criteria. The review found that the licensees’ assessment of beyond-
design-basis events were adequate. Further details were provided in the sixth Canadian report.
General requirements and approach

General requirements for safety analysis are found in the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations.
In particular, paragraph 5(f) requires an applicant for a construction licence to submit a
preliminary safety analysis report. The regulations also specify supporting design information
that must be submitted in an application for a licence to construct a Class I nuclear facility. This
includes:
 a description of the proposed design of the nuclear facility, including the manner in which
the physical and environmental characteristics of the site are taken into account in the
design (paragraph 5(a))
 a description of the environmental baseline characteristics of the site and the surrounding
area (paragraph 5(b))
 a description of the structures proposed to be built as part of the nuclear facility, including
their design and their design characteristics (paragraph 5(d))
 a description of the systems and equipment proposed to be installed at the nuclear facility,
including their design and their design operating conditions (paragraph 5(e))
 the proposed quality assurance program for the design of the nuclear facility
(paragraph 5(g))
For new-build projects, CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor
Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants, published in May 2014 and replacing CNSC regulatory
document RD-337, Design of New Nuclear Power Plants, stipulates that the preliminary safety
analysis report shall assist in the establishment of the design-basis requirements for items
important to safety and demonstrate whether the NPP design meets applicable requirements. The
Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations also stipulate requirements for an application to operate a
Class I nuclear facility. Per paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b), an application for a licence to operate shall
contain descriptions of the systems, structures and equipment of the facility, including their
design and design operating conditions. Paragraph 6(c) further requires the application to contain
a final safety analysis report demonstrating the adequacy of the design of the facility. Details on
the content of a typical safety analysis report for a currently operating NPP are provided in
annex 14(i)(c).
REDGDOC-2.5.2 further states that the final safety analysis report shall:
 reflect the as-built NPP
 account for postulated aging effects on structures, systems and components important to
safety
 demonstrate that the design can withstand and effectively respond to identified postulated
initiating events
 demonstrate the effectiveness of the safety systems and safety support systems
 derive the operational limits and conditions for the plant, including:
o operational limits and set points important to safety
o allowable operating configurations, and constraints for operational procedures
 establish requirements for emergency response and accident management
 determine post-accident environmental conditions, including radiation fields and worker
doses, to confirm that operators are able to carry out the actions credited in the analysis
 demonstrate that the design incorporates sufficient safety margins
 confirm that the dose and derived acceptance criteria are met for all anticipated
operational occurrences and design-basis accidents
 demonstrate that all safety goals have been met
The licensees use integral mechanistic models in sophisticated computer codes to simulate
accident progression and consequences. The tools and methodologies used in licensees’ safety
analysis reports are supported by national and international experience and are validated against
relevant test data and benchmark solutions. In addition to the quality assurance requirements for
safety analysis specified in paragraph 5(g) of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations noted
above, the licensees follow CSA standard N286.7, Quality assurance of analytical, scientific and
design computer programs for nuclear power plants, which is part of the licensing basis for all
operating NPPs. The NPP licensees have established specific validation programs in accordance
with N286.7 for industry standard tool (safety analysis) codes to provide the necessary
confidence in the analytical results. During the reporting period, the industry continued to extend
the validation of these codes to align with expanded applications.
In accordance with CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants, the NPP licensees, within five years of the date of the last submission of
their NPP description and final safety analysis report (or when requested by the CNSC), must
submit an updated NPP description and an updated final safety analysis providing:
 a description of the changes made to the site and the NPP’s structures, systems and
components (SSCs), including any changes to the design and design operating conditions
of the SSCs
 safety analyses that have been appropriately reviewed and revised and that take into
account the most up-to-date and relevant information and methods, including the
experience gained and lessons learned from the situations, events, problems or other
information reported pursuant to REGDOC-3.1.1
Updates to safety analysis reports for existing NPPs are ongoing continuously to include the
effects of aging of the primary heat transport system. See annex 14(i)(c) for details.
During the reporting period, CNSC staff reviews of the safety analysis reports confirmed that the
safety margins for all Canadian NPPs remained acceptable.
In addition to the analysis of design-basis accidents, licensees perform analyses of design
extension conditions accidents (a subset of BDBAs), including severe accidents. In this context,
a design extension conditions accident is a BDBA that is not included in the NPP design basis
but is nevertheless considered in the design.
An example of a design extension conditions accident resulting in fuel damage but maintaining
intact core geometry is a large-break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) coincident with a loss
of emergency core cooling where the moderator serves as an ultimate heat sink. This event was
formerly considered as a design-basis accident and its analysis continues to (typically) be
included as part of safety reports. Other BDBAs, such as a prolonged station blackout, are
analyzed using PSA, which is discussed in subsection 14(i)(d).
If the safety consequences of an event are significant (e.g., severe core and fuel damage and the
potential to exceed the regulatory dose limits), it is referred to as a severe accident. To address
lessons learned from Fukushima, the NPP licensees are continuing to perform further
deterministic analyses for representative severe core damage accidents. Such safety analysis has
already been conducted as part of the integrated safety reviews (ISRs) to help decide on the
scope of refurbishment activity for NPPs undergoing life extension. The licensees are also
evaluating the existing models for BDBA analyses to specifically address multi-unit events.
Further, NPP licensees use deterministic severe accident analyses to:
 develop computational aids, guidelines and procedures
 identify potential strategies for mitigating severe accident consequences
 assess instrumentation and equipment survivability and facilities habitability in severe
accidents
 train staff and conduct validation exercises
Updating safety analysis requirements, methods and acceptance criteria

A set of siting criteria for assessing the acceptability of NPPs was developed in the mid-1960s.
The criteria specify offsite dose limits to be used in safety analyses of any serious process failure
(i.e., a single failure) and any combination of a serious process failure and failure of a special
safety system (i.e., a dual failure).
These criteria continue to be used as part of the licensing basis for all Canadian NPPs, except for
Darlington. For the initial licensing of Darlington, the CNSC consultative regulatory document
C-006, Requirements for the Safety Analysis of CANDU Nuclear Power Plants, was used on a
trial basis. This document addressed deficiencies in the basic single/dual-failure safety analysis
requirements, reflecting Canadian experience in applying the single/dual-failure analysis
approach. The safety report for Darlington continues to reflect the requirements of C-006.
Details on the above criteria can be found in subsection 14(i)(c) of the sixth Canadian report.
During the reporting period, the CNSC continued to update the regulatory framework for NPPs,
as described in subsections 7.2(i)(b) and 7.2(i)(c). CNSC regulatory documents that contain
updated requirements related to safety analysis include:
 RD-346, Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power Plants (see article 17)
 REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews
The implementation of these and other documents will enable the CNSC and stakeholders to take
into account:
 modern practices in safety analysis
 aging of equipment
 refurbishment and PSR
 evolving requirements for new-build projects and their adaptation to existing NPPs
The licensees’ work to update their safety analyses and safety analysis reports (such that they
will be aligned with the new documents) is ongoing. The implementation of modern
requirements for operating NPPs consists of a gap assessment with subsequent prioritization of
analysis activities to address any identified gaps and shortcomings. The most significant issues
are addressed on a priority basis. In the longer term, compliance with these documents, to the
extent practicable, will be achieved as part of PSRs. CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews, requires the safety analysis update to be completed
according to modern standards.
The key new document related to safety analysis is REGDOC-2.4.1, which was published in
2014 and supersedes RD-310, Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Aligned with the IAEA
standards on safety analysis, its purpose is to modernize and improve transparency and
consistency of safety analysis activities supporting the safe operation of Canadian NPPs.
REGDOC-2.4.1 identifies high-level regulatory requirements for an NPP licence applicant’s
preparation and presentation of deterministic safety analysis in the evaluation of event
consequences. REGDOC-2.4.1 prescribes a systematic process for event identification and
classification of the events into categories based on event frequency. It requires BDBAs to be
addressed.
All future new-build projects will be expected to be fully compliant with REGDOC-2.4.1.
Although it is recognized that the existing safety cases are not in question, Canadian NPP
licensees will update certain analyses through the implementation of REGDOC-2.4.1, which will
continue into the next reporting period. Assessments of the gaps between the requirements of
REGDOC-2.4.1 and the existing safety reports are being used to prioritize the safety report
updates. The safety margins and degree of conservatism in the analyses will continue to be re-
assessed in light of operating experience and new knowledge. To facilitate this, the NPP industry
and the CNSC participate in a working group to address specific safety analysis shortcomings
identified by the CNSC as well as other safety analysis issues important to the industry.
To better coordinate safety report updates across the industry, the NPP licensees established a
safety analysis improvement program through COG. One of the purposes of the COG safety
analysis improvement program is to facilitate the implementation of REGDOC-2.4.1. Specific
areas of focus for the program include assessing the impact of aging on the heat transport system
and evaluating the conservatism of, and correcting inconsistencies in, the safety analyses. The
main activities of the program have included:
 performance of pilot studies for specific analyses
 production of a guideline for application of derived acceptance criteria to safety analysis
 performance of pilot studies of Darlington loss-of-reactivity control, Bruce A loss of flow
and Point Lepreau safety report dose assessment
 gap assessments for the set of analyses in the safety analysis report, followed by the
necessary actions to address such gaps
 overall improvement of the safety analysis report
The lessons learned from the pilot studies are being used to update a COG document that
provides guidance for deterministic safety analysis and, in particular, for the
implementation of REGDOC-2.4.1.
The activities undertaken as part of the safety analysis improvement program are chosen,
in part, to address the CANDU safety issues described in subsection 14(i)(g). For
example, the pilot study of the Darlington loss-of-reactivity control addressed one of the
Category 3 CANDU safety issues related to non-large-break loss-of-coolant accident
(non-LBLOCA). In that work, OPG integrated modern and validated coupled thermal
hydraulic and reactor physics tools and classified events into the categories of anticipated
operational occurrences, design-basis accidents and BDBAs.
Details on the work each licensee is undertaking to implement REGDOC-2.4.1 are
provided in annex 14(i)(c).
Fire safety assessment

Each facility has revised its fire safety assessment (which involves a fire hazard
assessment and fire safe shutdown analysis) in accordance with the CSA standard
N293-07, Fire Protection for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants, which is part of the
licensing basis for all NPPs. CNSC staff members have reviewed and accepted the
revised fire safety assessments. NPP licensees have implemented modifications or
provided corrective action plans to address recommendations arising from the revised
assessments. The recommendations identified in the fire safety assessments are not
considered to be risk significant. The implemented and proposed modifications will
enhance fire protection at Canada’s NPPs.
The CSA Group issued a new edition of the standard N293 standard during the reporting
period. The updated standard, N293-12, Fire Protection for CANDU Nuclear Power
Plants, provides clarifications to content and additional guidance on achieving
compliance in the case of performance-based designs. It does not include any new
requirements that would negate or requires revisions to the approved fire safety
assessments.
14 (i) (d) Probabilistic safety assessments

A PSA is a comprehensive and integrated assessment of the safety of an NPP that
considers the probability, progression and consequences of equipment failures or
transient conditions to derive numerical estimates that provide a consistent measure of
safety. There are three levels of PSAs:
 A Level 1 PSA identifies and quantifies the sequences of events that may lead to
the loss of core structural integrity and massive fuel failures.
 A Level 2 PSA starts from the Level 1 results and analyzes the containment
behaviour, evaluates the radionuclides released from the failed fuel and quantifies
the releases to the environment.
 A Level 3 PSA starts from the Level 2 results and analyzes the distribution of
radionuclides in the environment, evaluating the resulting effect on public health.
The main objectives of the PSA are to:
 provide a systematic analysis that gives confidence that the design will comply
with the fundamental safety objectives
 demonstrate that a balanced design has been achieved
 provide confidence that small changes of conditions that may lead to a
catastrophic increase in the severity of consequences (i.e., cliff-edge effects) will
be prevented
 assess the probabilities of occurrence for severe core damage states and the risks
of major radioactive releases to the environment
 assess the probabilities of occurrence and the consequences of site-specific
external hazards
 identify NPP vulnerabilities and systems for which design improvements or
modifications to operational procedures could reduce the probabilities of severe
accidents or mitigate their consequences
 assess the adequacy of emergency procedures
 provide insights into the severe accident management (SAM) program
The post-Fukushima safety assessment reviewed PSA results from Canadian NPP licensees as
part of the assessment of the provisions for using existing plant capabilities, complementary
design features and emergency mitigating equipment (EME) in SAM and recovery. Severe
accident assessments have been extended to consider further design improvements that have
either been implemented or are being planned.
Requirements for probabilistic safety assessment

The CNSC published REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear
Power Plants, in May 2014. This document sets out the requirements for the PSA and it
supersedes CNSC regulatory standard S-294, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for
Nuclear Power Plants. REGDOC-2.4.2 would also be applied to the construction phase
for new-build projects. One of the key requirements is CNSC acceptance of the
methodology and the computer codes used for the PSA.
The PSA update interval in REGDOC-2.4.2 is five years – or sooner, if major changes
occur in the facility. The updates are subject to regulatory review.
REGDOC-2.4.2 refers to the IAEA safety series to provide general guidance on PSA
methodology. In general, the methodologies developed by the licensees are based on the
guidance available in documents issued by internationally recognized organizations such
as the IAEA and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as good
practices.
The PSA assessments of the probabilities of occurrences for severe core damage states,
along with the assessments of the risks of major radioactive releases into the
environment, are compared with safety goals. The safety goals for new NPPs, which are
established in CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities:
Nuclear Power Plants, are summarized in the table below. These safety goals are
consistent with those in International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) document
INSAG-12, Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants.
CNSC safety goals for new NPPs
Safety goal Rationale Numerical objective

Core damage frequency Related to accident Sum of frequencies of all event
prevention sequences that can lead to core
degradation is less than 10-5 per reactor-
year
Small release frequency Release that would Sum of frequencies of all event
trigger evacuation sequences that can lead to a release of
more than 1015 Bq of I-131 is less than
10-5 per reactor-year
Large release frequency Release that would Sum of frequencies of all event
trigger long-term sequences that can lead to a release to
relocation the environment of more than 1014 Bq of
Cesium-137 (corresponds to 1% of the
Chernobyl accident radioactive release)
is less than 10-6 per reactor-year
Although there are no explicit requirements for safety goals at the existing NPPs, the
CNSC does expect the licensees of operating NPPs to establish safety goals that are
aligned with international practices. Consistent with INSAG-12 and/or IAEA specific
safety guide SSG-3, Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants, the NPP licensees have established and meet, the
following safety goals for the existing NPPs:
- severe core damage frequency (SCDF) of less than 10-4 per reactor-year
- large release frequency (LRF) of less than 10-5 per reactor-year
Consistent with international practice, small release frequency is generally not included
in the safety goals of existing Canadian NPPs.
Development of probabilistic safety assessment and implementation of REGDOC-2.4.2

At the time of writing the sixth Canadian report, NPP licensees had developed PSAs in
accordance with CNSC regulatory document S-294, which required a Level 2 PSA that includes
both internal and external events.
“Enhance probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) to consider multi-units and to consider
irradiated fuel bays (spent fuel pools)”
The new REGDOC-2.4.2 requires Level 1 and Level 2 PSAs that include all potential,
site-specific initiating events and potential hazards:
 internal initiating events and internal hazards
 external hazards, both natural and human-induced, but non-malevolent
The new REGDOC-2.4.2 includes amendments regarding lessons learned from
Fukushima. The revised requirements consider all sources of radioactivity – not just the
reactor core. It introduced new requirements related to multi-units, irradiated fuel bays,
and low-power operational states. It identifies specific external initiating events, such as
seismic, flooding, and high wind. It also requires licensees to consider potential
combinations of external hazards.
Consequential events (e.g., external consequential events, such as a tsunami caused by an
earthquake) are also considered in the PSAs. A PSA is required for the full-power and
shutdown states of the NPP as well as any state where the reactor is expected to operate
for extended periods of time.
NPP licensees have either completed or are in the process of completing Level l and
Level 2 PSAs that address, among other things, re-evaluation of site-specific external
initiating events. These include:
 Level 1 and 2 at-power internal events
 Level 1 outage
 Level 1 internal flood
 Level 1 and 2 fire
 Level 1 and 2 seismic
 Level 1 and 2 high wind
The application of PSA in the assessment of external events is further discussed in
subarticle 17(iii).
During the reporting period, the NPP licensees performed gap analyses against the
revised requirements of REGDOC-2.4.2 and submitted their transition plans to CNSC.
NPP licensees have started to transition towards compliance with REGDOC-2.4.2
requirements and all licensees are expected to be fully compliant by 2020. Full-scope
PSAs are either completed or the licensees are making acceptable progress towards
completion.
The new requirements for the irradiated fuel bay PSA may be dealt with through
alternative methods to PSA (as allowed by REGDOC-2.4.2), for which guidance is
currently being developed by industry. Licensees plan to complete this work in the next
reporting period.
Recent PSA updates (now submitted every five years) have included estimates of the
multi-unit PSA results (severe core damage frequency and large release frequency).
Further, OPG is collaborating with other members of the industry in the development of a
whole-site PSA methodology. A concept-level, whole-site PSA methodology has been
issued as a COG document representing the common preliminary perspective of the
industry. Industry, through COG, is developing a safety goal framework and a pilot
application of the whole-site PSA methodology. This methodology is expected to be

completed by 2017.
Use of probabilistic safety assessment

Licensees are at various stages of utilizing the results from their PSAs. Typical
applications include the use of PSA results in conjunction with deterministic analytical
results to refine programs for reliability and maintenance. For example, PSA results are
used to support the identification of the systems important to safety for the reliability
program (see section 19(iii)). Recent developments at NPPs indicate a growing use of
PSAs for risk monitoring. The most recent revisions of the PSAs for Darlington and
Pickering were used to develop computerized tools for routine risk monitoring, using
severe core damage frequency, for both outages and full-power operation. The PSAs have
also been used to reduce risk at the NPPs by making changes to operating procedures that
improve preparedness for an event. The PSAs will continue to be used to enhance
operational risk monitoring programs, and will also provide input to NPP refurbishment
decisions. For example, OPG investigated the implementation of possible cost-effective
measures to meet its target core damage frequency for existing NPPs as part of the
overall operational plan to the end of life for Pickering.
Design changes to improve safety have been identified through the use of PSA. Some examples
are provided in annex 18(i).
Status of PSAs at each NPP

CNSC staff accepted in 2015 the results of the updated PSAs for Bruce A and B, which
incorporate Fukushima enhancements. The PSA reports are consistent with the accepted
methodologies, as well as applicable quality assurance requirements. The results show that the
Fukushima enhancements improve safety in terms of providing mitigating capabilities as an
additional layer of defence in depth for very rare events. The SCDF and the LRF limits were met
for both Bruce A and Bruce B. The PSA results are posted on Bruce Power’s website.
CNSC staff accepted in 2015 the Darlington PSA update, which evaluates the contribution of
both the safety improvement opportunities and EME. CNSC staff accepted in 2014 the results of
the updated Pickering PSA, which incorporated Fukushima enhancements. OPG is currently in
the process of updating the Pickering PSA to incorporate the contribution of both the risk
improvement plan and EME. The PSA reports are consistent with the accepted methodologies, as
well as applicable quality assurance requirements. The Darlington and Pickering PSA update
results show that the contributions described above and other Fukushima enhancements
improved safety in terms of providing mitigating capabilities as an additional layer of defence in
depth for very rare events. The SCDF and the LRF limits were met for both Darlington and
Pickering. The results for both NPPs were posted on OPG’s website.
NB Power is in the process of completing the first periodic update of its PSA reports that were
originally submitted to and accepted by the CNSC in 2008. This update will include NB Power’s
responses to the CNSC Action Plan. The existing PSA reports are consistent with the accepted
methodologies, as well as applicable quality assurance requirements. The results of the PSA
updates submitted to-date have shown that the Fukushima enhancements improved safety in
terms of providing mitigating capabilities as an additional layer of defence in depth for very rare
events. The assessments have demonstrated that the risk for severe core damage or large release
frequency has been reduced significantly.
14 (i) (e) Reviews by the World Association of Nuclear Operators and IAEA
The NPP licensees and CNL are members of WANO, an organization dedicated to helping its
members achieve the highest levels of operational safety and performance. WANO conducts
periodic evaluations to promote excellence in the operation, maintenance and support of
operating NPPs, with a focus on safety and reliability. These evaluations are not required by law
or regulation but are requested on a voluntary basis by WANO members. Details of the WANO
peer-review process are provided in the sixth Canadian report.
The following WANO peer reviews were conducted in Canada during the reporting period.
 Bruce A and B (corporate) September 2013
 Bruce A February 2014
 Bruce B June 2014
 OPG (corporate) November 2015
 Darlington March 2014
 Pickering June 2013, June 2015
 NB Power (corporate) December 2013
 Point Lepreau October 2013, October 2015
 Gentilly-2 No peer reviews conducted
The feedback, insights and learning from the WANO peer-review process are highly valuable.
The process drives major improvements and helps to continually raise the standard of
performance and practice across the industry. In support of general improvement, WANO shares
good practices identified during reviews with all members.
The following WANO peer reviews are planned in Canada during the next reporting period:
 Bruce A and B (corporate) 2017
 Bruce A September 2016
 Bruce B May 2017
 Darlington May 2016
 Pickering October 2017
 Point Lepreau Fall 2017
 Gentilly-2 No peer reviews scheduled
An OSART mission was conducted at the Bruce B facility from November 30 to December 17,
2015. The OSART team identified 10 good practices, five recommendations, 12 suggestions and
25 good performances. Good practices were identified in planning for refurbishment and asset
management, new tooling, safety, training, communications and emergency preparedness. The
final report was posted on the Bruce Power and CNSC websites.
Canada has invited the IAEA to conduct OSART missions at several Canadian facilities over the
next few years and one is scheduled for Pickering during the fall of 2016.
14 (i) (f) Integrated safety review for life extension

The following describes the work executed and announcements made related to ISR and life
extension for NPPs during the reporting period. The incorporation of ISR in the licensing process
is described in subsection 7(ii)(d).
Darlington refurbishment
The four reactors at Darlington came into service from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. During
the reporting period, OPG completed an ISR and environmental assessment (EA) for Darlington
refurbishment and continued operation. In March 2013, the Commission announced its positive
decision on the EA, concluding that the proposed project is not likely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects, taking into account mitigation measures identified in the assessment.
At the end of the reporting period, OPG had completed all of the necessary assessments for the
refurbishment of all four Darlington units. As the Darlington refurbishment project started before
the publication of CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews, the
assessments were performed per its predecessor regulatory document RD-360, Life Extension of
Nuclear Power Plants instead. Specifically, in addition to the EA and an ISR in support of
Darlington refurbishment, a global assessment report (GAR) and an integrated implementation
plan (IIP) were completed, as required by RD-360. The ISR addressed all IAEA safety factors
and CNSC safety and control areas and demonstrated a high level of compliance with modern
codes, standards and practices. The ISR identified safety improvements to continue to enhance
the current strong performance and allow for the safe long-term operation over the proposed
extended plant life.
Darlington’s new training facility for the refurbishment is described in annex 11.2(a).
Pickering extended operation

As mentioned in the sixth Canadian report, OPG conducted an extensive ISR in 2010 leading to
its decision to incrementally extend the life of Pickering Units 5–8 (formerly known as
Pickering B). The assessment covered not only various technical areas such as design and
operation but also organizational and programmatic issues. The incremental life extension option
was complemented by other activities linked to the end of life of the facility, such as annual
updates of the continued operations plan (COP), the start of the sustainable operations plan
(SOP) and preparations of longer term plans such as transition to safe storage prior to
decommissioning.
The COP integrates the improvements necessary to close issues identified in the EA (2007) and
ISR (2010) for Pickering Units 5–8. OPG has completed most of the activities identified in the
Pickering Units 5–8 COP, with the remaining actions scheduled for completion prior to entering
into the incremental life-extension time frame. Many of these improvements were related to
lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and were described in the sixth Canadian report.
The SOP documents strategies, direction and actions to address the unique challenges,
constraints and risks associated with the approach to the end of commercial operation. It
describes the arrangements and activities required to demonstrate that safe and reliable operation
of Pickering will be maintained and sustained, for each of the 14 CNSC safety and control areas,
for the period of operation up to and until each reactor unit’s permanent shutdown. From a
program perspective, no changes were required. The plans dealt primarily with people issues and
with business issues pertaining to the life expectancy of the plant. The SOP also contains some
preliminary information about the first stages of the transition to safe storage.
The assessment of remaining pressure tube life at Pickering Units 5–8 is described later in
subsection 14(ii)(b).
In conjunction with the pending decision to extend the life of Pickering Units 5–8 to 2024 (see
details in subsection D.2 of chapter I), a PSR update is required. It will build on the review basis
of earlier PSR work and other associated assessments, specifically the ISR for Pickering
Units 5-8, the integrated safety assessments for Pickering Units 1–4 (formerly known as
Pickering A) and the ISR for Darlington.
Additional details on Canada’s introduction of PSRs for licence renewals can be found in
subsection 7.2(ii)(d).
14 (i) (g) Assessment and resolution of CANDU safety issues

Comprehensive provisions for the assessment and verification of safety for Canadian NPPs have
confirmed the ongoing safety of operating NPPs in Canada. As part of this process, these
provisions have led to the identification and resolution of safety issues, some of which have been
described in previous Canadian reports. In recent years, it was recognized that a more systematic
approach to identifying, prioritizing and resolving safety issues would optimize the
improvements to safety that would be realized by these efforts.
In 2009, the CNSC and industry collaborated on a project to survey generic safety issues related
to CANDU NPPs, rank them and evaluate strategies for addressing them in a risk-informed
manner. The CANDU safety issues (CSIs) were distributed into three broad categories according
to the adequacy and effectiveness of the control measures implemented by the licensees to
maintain safety margins.
 Category 1 represents issues that have been satisfactorily addressed in Canada.
 Category 2 represents issues that are a concern in Canada, but appropriate measures are
in place to maintain safety margins.
 Category 3 issues are a concern in Canada and measures are in place to maintain safety
margins, but the adequacy of these measures needs to be confirmed.
The continued operation of an NPP in the presence of these issues is judged to be permissible –
none of the Category 3 issues involves a level of incremental risk that requires immediate
corrective action. Issues with confirmed and immediate safety significance are addressed by
other means on a priority basis (see subarticles 7.2(iii) and (iv)).
A risk-informed decision making process (as described in the sixth Canadian report) was applied
to the Category 3 CSIs to identify, estimate and evaluate the risks associated with each issue and
to recommend risk control measures. In accordance with defence-in-depth principles, the risk
assessment covered all possible combinations of events that could potentially lead to fuel
damage, adverse effects to people or the environment, or any combination thereof.
To address the Category 3 CSIs effectively, they have been logically separated into two groups –
those associated with LBLOCAs and those that are not (referred to as non-LBLOCA issues).
The CNSC maintains regulatory control of the resolution of the CSIs by monitoring the path
forward, established through a mutual agreement with the NPP licensees. During the reporting
period, no new Category 3 CSIs were opened and seven of the CSIs were downgraded from
Category 3 to Category 2 for all NPPs:
 computer code and plant model validation
 fuel-channel integrity and effect on core internals
 impact of ageing on safe plant operation
 analysis methodology for neutron overpower protection/regional overpower protection
 steam line breaks in balance of plant
 aging of equipment and structures
 fuel bundle/element behaviour under post dryout conditions
Some of the other issues were downgraded from Category 3 to Category 2 for some (but not all)
of the NPPs.
The remaining Category 3 CSIs divided by category, are as follows:
 Category 3 LBLOCA CSIs:
o Analysis for void reactivity coefficient
o Fuel behaviour in high temperature transients
o Fuel behaviour in fuel pulse transients
 Category 3 non-LBLOCA CSI:
o Systematic assessment of high energy line break effects
For the LBLOCA CSIs, the CNSC has developed an interim regulatory position, which
established a set of interim action level limits for safety margin parameters and design-basis
accident acceptance criteria for all NPPs. This position is consistent with the risk control
measures for CSIs and will remain in effect until the recommendations of the industry LBLOCA
working group are accepted by the CNSC and are fully implemented by the industry. The non-
LBLOCA CSI requires further experimental and/or analytical studies to resolve it; this work is
ongoing. It is expected that the work to address the remaining four Category 3 CSIs will be
completed in the next reporting period.
The CNSC annual Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants, which
describes the Category 3 issues and the required risk control measures, is publicly available.
14 (i) (h) Fulfilling principle (2) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety
Principle (2) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration of Nuclear Safety (VDNS) requires comprehensive
and systematic safety assessments to be carried out periodically and regularly for existing
installations throughout their lifetime to identify safety improvements that are oriented to meet
the objective of principle (1) of the VDNS (chapter I). As described in section E of chapter I, the
objective in principle (1) is that new NPPs are designed, sited and constructed, consistent with
the objective of preventing accidents in the commissioning and operation and, should an accident
occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides causing long-term off site contamination and
avoiding early radioactive releases or radioactive releases large enough to require long-term
protective measures and actions. Principle (2) of the VDNS also requires reasonably practicable
or achievable safety improvements, in support of that objective, to be implemented in a timely
manner.
Canada fulfils principle (2) through both global and specific assessments that are described in
detail in this article. Licensees have completed ISRs for the refurbishment of specific NPPs,
which included comparisons with the latest CNSC regulatory documents and other modern
standards. ISRs have been completed for Bruce A, Units 1 and 2 (2007), Point Lepreau (2008),
Pickering 5-8 (2010), and Darlington (2015). Reasonably practicable safety improvements were
made as a result; see the sixth Canadian report for details. Furthermore, CNSC is introducing
PSRs into the licensing process (see subsection 7.2(ii)(d)). Some licensees have already begun
preparation of PSRs in anticipation of the next renewal of their licences to operate the NPPs.
These PSRs are being conducted using the most recent regulatory documents which, as explained
in subsection 7.2(i)(b), satisfy the objective in principle (1) of the VDNS. The PSR process will
include IIPs to systematically execute safety improvements that address gaps found during the
PSR.
Other assessments and verifications (which are also conducted using updated regulatory
documents and standards) include:
 updated safety analyses and safety analysis reports
 PSAs (and ongoing work to enhance them)
 surveillance, testing and inspection activities that confirm that the NPPs meet the
appropriate detailed design and safety requirements as well as operational limits and
conditions
 rigorous aging management programs
These assessments and verifications, also described in this article, have led to safety
improvements aligned with the updated regulatory documents and standards.
In summary, comprehensive and systematic assessments of the existing NPPs have been carried
out and will continue to be carried out, periodically. These have resulted in numerous safety
improvements that helped meet the objective stated in principle (2) of the VDNS.
14 (ii) Verification of safety

This subsection describes the activities to verify – by analysis, surveillance, testing or inspection
– that an NPP meets the appropriate design and safety requirements as well as its operational
limits and conditions. While these activities are carried out primarily by the licensee, the CNSC
also conducts various verifications of safety (as described in other articles of this report). For
example, the CNSC maintains permanent staff members at each NPP (see subsection 8.1(b)) who
monitor operations, verify safety in certain circumstances and conduct a wide range of
inspections with the assistance from specialists from CNSC headquarters in Ottawa.
CNSC staff members also review details in reports submitted by NPP licensees per CNSC
regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1. These include event reports and quarterly/annual reports
on matters such as safety performance indicators, fuel monitoring and inspection, pressure
boundaries, radiation protection, environmental protection, and risk and reliability. The most
safety-significant situations are pursued by special reviews or focused inspections, which are
often followed up through specific action items at individual NPPs. CNSC staff members also
review the safety analysis reports and safety system reliability studies that are submitted per
REGDOC-3.1.1.
Furthermore, CNSC staff members also review and approve certain operational changes or other
changes to items in the licensing basis (see subsection 7.2(ii)(d)). CNSC staff members verify
that proposed changes are within the licensing basis (e.g., by confirming that they do not
significantly erode the margin of safety for the NPP that was agreed upon at the time of
licensing).
CNSC licences to operate the existing NPPs contain conditions governing the licensee’s
verification of safety through various fitness-for-service programs. The licensees’ programs
include testing (see subsection 14(ii)(a)) and various aging management programs to address
specific critical systems and aging mechanisms (see subsection 14(ii)(b)).
14 (ii) (a) Testing - General

CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-98, Reliability Programs for Nuclear Power Plants, which
is part of the licensing basis for NPPs – includes general requirements for the reliability program
for systems important to safety. RD/GD-98 addresses the roles of inspection, testing, modelling
and monitoring in the identification of systems important to safety, their failure modes and their
appropriate reliability targets, as well as confirmation that the targets are met (see
subarticle 19(iii) for more information). The licensing basis also includes other standards that
include extensive requirements for testing safety-related components and systems. For example,
requirements for testing and acceptance criteria are found in the following CSA standards:
 N285.4, Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power plant components
 N285.5, Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power plant containment components
 N287.7, In-service examination and testing requirements for concrete containment
structures for CANDU nuclear power plants
As described in the following section, the licensees execute periodic inspection programs for
critical components and systems. The various testing requirements are addressed in the
management systems, policies and operational programs and procedures at the NPPs.
Thousands of safety-related tests are conducted annually at each NPP. These tests typically have a
pass rate on the order of 99.9 percent. Testing to confirm the availability and functionality of safety
and safety-related systems is also described in subarticle 19(iii).
14 (ii) (b) Aging management

All NPPs experience materials degradation. Their SSCs are subjected to a variety of chemical,
mechanical and physical influences during operation. In time, stressors such as corrosion, load
variations, flow conditions, temperature and neutron irradiation cause degradation of materials
and equipment. This time-dependent degradation is referred to as aging. Aging management is
the set of engineering, operational, inspection and maintenance actions that control, within
acceptable limits, the effects of physical aging and obsolescence on an NPP’s SSCs.
Experience with several significant material degradation mechanisms during the life of currently
operating NPPs in Canada has led to the development, formalization and documentation of a
number of aging management programs. These programs provide for materials and component
inspection and assessment techniques and intervals to ensure that all safety-significant SSCs are
maintained within the safe operating limits allowed by relevant codes and standards. Aging
management programs are based on comprehensive methodologies involving surveillance, the
production and monitoring of system health reports, inspections by qualified inspection
personnel and preventive maintenance. They are regularly reviewed and updated, as required, to
incorporate and allow for new information and findings. CNSC staff members regularly review
the results of activities covered by the aging management programs.
In 2015, the CNSC issued the regulatory document REGDOC-2.6.3, Aging Management, to
provide regulatory requirements and guidance for aging management. REGDOC-2.6.3
supersedes CNSC regulatory document RD-334, Aging Management of Nuclear Power Plants.
The requirements and guidance set out in REGDOC-2.6.3 are consistent with the guidance in the
IAEA safety guide NS-G-2.12, Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants and the IAEA
safety report series No. 82, International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned. REGDOC-2.6.3
emphasizes the need for early and proactive consideration of aging management for all stages of
an NPP’s lifecycle: design, fabrication, construction, commissioning, operation, life extension,
and decommissioning. It also provides requirements for the establishment, implementation and
improvement of integrated aging management programs, through the application of a systematic
and integrated approach. The approach includes organizational arrangements, data management,
SSC selection, aging evaluation and condition-assessment processes, documentation and
interfaces with other supporting program areas (such as the review and improvement of the
program).
During the reporting period, the NPP licensees began to adapt their aging management programs,
as necessary, to meet the requirements of REGDOC-2.6.3.
The main areas of focus under aging management include feeder pipes, fuel channels, flow-
accelerated corrosion, steam generators, containment and general component replacement. The
basic aging management programs for these areas are described in annex 14(ii)(b). The fuel
channel lifecycle management project is particularly important in that its results help confirm the
safety of ongoing operation of the NPPs as they approach their anticipated end of life, since the
pressure tubes in the fuel channels are typically the major life-limiting component in the
CANDU design.
The current assumed pressure tube design life is based on 30 years of operation at 80 percent
capacity factor (which correspond to 210,000 EFPH per reactor from the date of first criticality).
For Pickering Units 5–8, the assumed design life for the lead reactor would have been reached in
late 2014. When the Pickering operating licence was renewed in 2013, it included a regulatory
hold point requiring the licensee to obtain permission from the Commission to continue
operation prior to the lead reactor unit reaching 210,000 EFPH.
Through a joint fuel channel lifecycle management project, industry developed refined
engineering methodologies and models of degradation mechanisms in materials used for pressure
tubes (including delayed hydride cracking as a result of deuterium uptake). These methodologies
and models were used to conservatively assess the fitness for service of the pressure tubes.
Additionally, industry developed inspection and maintenance programs to ensure continued
validation of the engineering assessments.
CNSC staff assessed and accepted the methodologies and models submitted by OPG along with
the results that showed safe operation of Pickering beyond 210,000 EFPH. Based on the
evidence provided for safe operation of pressure tubes, the Commission removed the regulatory
hold point in 2014 and approved operation of Pickering up to 247,000 EFPH. In its decision, the
Commission required increased monitoring, inspection and reporting by OPG and CNSC staff on
the operation of Pickering.
During the licence renewal hearings held in 2015, both Bruce Power and OPG requested
operation of the Bruce A and B and Darlington facilities, respectively, beyond 210,000 EFPH.
The Commission approved the operation of Bruce A and B up to 247,000 EFPH and the
operation of Darlington up to 235,000 EFPH.
The CNSC has also established a licence condition requiring licensees to develop inspection
programs to monitor the conditions of safety-significant, balance-of-plant pressure boundary
components and structures (containment structures are addressed by separate licence
requirements). Industry and the CNSC developed the new CSA standard N285.7, Periodic
inspection of CANDU nuclear power plant balance of plant systems and components that
provides minimum periodic inspection requirements for balance of plant systems and
components. The first edition of N285.7 was published in 2015. Portions of this standard have
been developed using the methodologies and definitions for risk-informed in-service inspection
from EPRI and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers publications.
Article 15 – Radiation protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational
states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear
installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be
exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose limits.
Canada sponsors significant R&D in the field of nuclear safety, as described in appendix E. A
significant portion of the activity addresses the areas of radiation protection, radiation
monitoring, environmental protection, environmental management and other related topics.
In Canada, high-level requirements related to controlling radiation exposure of nuclear energy
workers2 and members of the public are found in the General Nuclear Safety and Control
Regulations. Paragraph 12(1)(c) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations requires
every licensee to take all reasonable precautions to protect, among other things, the health and
safety of persons. Key requirements are also found in the Radiation Protection Regulations. The
CNSC recently recognized the need to review the Radiation Protection Regulations in light of
developments since their introduction in the year 2000, including:
 Changes to international benchmarks
In 2007, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) published a
revised set of recommendations for its system of radiological protection. These
recommendations were published in ICRP Publication 103 (ICRP 103), which
incorporates updates based on more recent scientific information as well as new guidance
on controlling radiation exposure. The current Radiation Protection Regulations are
largely based on ICRP 60, which was published in 1990. Additionally, in 2006, the IAEA
undertook a review and initiated a revision of the 1996 edition of its International Basic
Safety Standards, in cooperation with other organizations. The IAEA published the
revised standards in 2014, incorporating the ICRP 103 recommendations and other
safety-related improvements.
 The Fukushima accident
The CNSC’s review of the regulatory framework following the Fukushima accident
found, specifically, that the Radiation Protection Regulations needed to be updated and
aligned with the above international benchmarks in order to ensure that the prescribed
dose limits for emergency workers are consistent with the actions that workers are
required to take during the control of an emergency.
 Other lessons learned
Since the Radiation Protection Regulations came into force in May 2000, the CNSC has
identified opportunities to address specific gaps and provide additional clarity.
2
Nuclear energy worker is a person who is required, in the course of the person’s business or occupation in
connection with a nuclear substance or nuclear facility, to perform duties in such circumstances that there is a
reasonable probability that the person may receive a dose of radiation that is greater than the prescribed limit for the
general public.
The CNSC published a discussion paper describing the proposals to amend the Radiation
Protection Regulations in August 2013 and posted it on the CNSC website for 120 days.
Following this, in January 2014, the CNSC posted on its website the comments it had received,
and issued an invitation for stakeholders to provide their feedback on the comments. The CNSC
received 42 submissions, totalling more than 400 comments from stakeholders, over the course
of the two comment periods. CNSC staff subsequently published a report in 2015 detailing the
feedback received from stakeholders and the next steps for the project to amend the Radiation
Protection Regulations. The CNSC is drafting the amended regulation. It is anticipated that the
amended Radiation Protection Regulations will be published in 2017.
To verify compliance with licence conditions and regulations, CNSC staff members review
documentation and operational reports submitted by applicants and licensees and evaluate the
implementation of licensees’ radiation protection and environmental protection programs
through desktop reviews and onsite inspections. CNSC staff members also:
 monitor and evaluate the radiological and environmental impacts of licensed activities
 conduct onsite evaluations of licensed dosimetry service providers
Events related to potential and actual exposure to radiation or hazardous substances, releases to
the environment of nuclear and hazardous substances (e.g., reaching an action level for radiation
protection or environmental protection, see below) are reported to the CNSC in accordance with
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants.
CNSC staff members review the event reports and the reporting, analysis, and corrective
processes of licensees, to verify their compliance with regulatory requirements and their
effectiveness in correcting weaknesses. CNSC staff members also investigate significant events
related to radiation protection.
Paragraph 3(1)(f) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations requires that an
application for a licence contain any proposed action levels. An action level is defined in
subsection 6(1) of the Radiation Protection Regulations as a specific dose of radiation or other
parameter that, if reached, may indicate a loss of control of part of a licensee’s radiation
protection program and triggers a requirement for specific action to be taken. When an action
level, whether radiation protection or environmental protection, is reached, the licensee must
notify the CNSC, conduct an investigation to establish the cause for reaching the action level,
and identify and (if appropriate) take action to restore the effectiveness of the radiation or
environmental protection program. REGDOC-3.1.1 requires that when a licensee becomes aware
that an action level has been reached they must submit a report to the Commission within the
time period specified in the licence, which is currently set at seven days. These reports must
describe the results of the investigation, identify the actions taken to restore the effectiveness of
the program, identify any missing information, and further describe how and when the remaining
information will be provided to the CNSC. If any required information was missing from the
initial report, the licensee must file the missing material within 60 days of the original report.
15 (a) Radiation protection for workers and application of the ALARA principle
General requirements and activities for radiation protection of workers

In addition to the requirements in the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations
mentioned above, paragraph 12(1)(e) requires all persons at the site of a licensed activity to use
equipment, devices, clothing and procedures in accordance with the NSCA, the regulations and
the licence.
Paragraph 4(a) of the Radiation Protection Regulations requires that every licensee implement a
radiation protection program and, as part of that program, keep the amount of exposure to radon
progeny and the effective dose and equivalent dose received by and committed to persons as low
as is reasonably achievable (ALARA), social and economic factors being taken into account.
In addition, section 13 of the Radiation Protection Regulations requires that every licensee
ensure the following effective dose limits are not exceeded:
 50 mSv in a one-year dosimetry period and 100 mSv over a five-year dosimetry period
for a nuclear energy worker
 4 mSv for a pregnant nuclear energy worker for the balance of pregnancy
 1 mSv per calendar year for a person who is not a nuclear energy worker
Additional information on the Radiation Protection Regulations, dosimetry requirements, and
guidance related to the ALARA principle and the setting of radiation protection action levels is
provided in annex 15(a).
To fulfill the related regulatory requirements, NPP licensees establish, maintain and document
programs to effectively manage and control radiological risk to workers, as well as the public.
An objective of these programs is to ensure that workers are only exposed to radiological risks that
are low, understood and voluntarily accepted. To ensure that the exposures to workers are
ALARA, the licensees implement processes for:
 management control over work practices
 personnel qualification and training
 control of occupational and public exposure to radiation
 planning for unusual situations
Examples of three specific licensee strategies to minimize the dose to workers are described
below.
Increased use of technology is a key component of the ALARA program. Some licensees have
installed remote monitoring equipment to improve radioactive work planning and reduce dose to
workers. Remote monitoring for radiological hazards has reduced dose by not requiring staff to
enter certain areas to perform routine radiation surveys, and have enabled workers to select
protective equipment appropriate to the current and anticipated hazard conditions, as well as
respond to changing conditions. Robotics have been used by some licensees to inspect and
remove hot spots of elevated contamination, thereby minimizing worker dose. Remotely
operated cameras have been used to perform visual inspections and monitoring of inaccessible
areas. Radiography services at NPPs are implementing pulsed x-ray technology instead of
gamma sources to reduce the dose that workers would normally receive from handling the
sources. One licensee has designed and implemented a new reactor inspection maintenance tool
to reduce worker time in high dose rate areas.
Source term control measures are in place to reduce doses to workers from exposure to various
hazards. The measures include more frequent replacement of desiccant in dryer units and
improvement of the material condition of dryer systems; some licensees also de-tritiate their
heavy-water inventory. Several licensees have implemented shielding canopies and reactor face
shielding tiles to reduce gamma dose to workers. Licensees are also working to reduce the
recurrence of hot spots through initiatives involving either reduction of the filter pore size or an
increase in the flow rate of the heat transport purification system. Filter pore size reduction is
being addressed through new technology such as new-generation nano-fibre media to improve
efficiency at removing colloidal matter from the primary heat transport system. Finally, by
applying operational experience, all licensees have enhanced their contamination control
programs to better manage and control risks from alpha hazards.
Training is also essential to keeping doses ALARA. Some licensees provide mock-up training
for jobs with elevated radiological risk. In preparation for refurbishment, full-scale mock-ups for
tool testing and worker familiarization have been built. The use of mock-ups enables
optimization of procedures that reduce time spent in the radiation field. One licensee has actively
pursued the use of dynamic learning activities, wherein an activity or task being taught includes,
as is best possible, the actual conditions encountered and tools required; real world situations are
simulated and the activity is enhanced with role playing by other participants. To further limit
tritium exposure, some licensees reinforce the need to plug in plastic suits at every opportunity to
refill them with fresh air (thereby limiting unplugged periods to less than 60 seconds).
Each year, licensees establish challenging radiation dose performance targets based upon the
planned activities and outages for the year. They are analogous to the constraints recommended
in the IAEA safety guide NS-G-2.7, Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management
in the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. CNSC staff members verify that the NPP licensees
monitor their performance against internal radiation dose performance targets and that this
information is used to improve radiation protection performance.
Doses to workers
Health Canada maintains the National Dose Registry, which contains the radiation monitoring
records of all occupationally exposed workers in Canada.
Doses to workers were below regulatory limits during the reporting period (see annex 15(a),
which charts and discusses doses to workers at Canadian NPPs). During the reporting period, the
total collective dose at Canadian NPPs varied due to a number of factors such as:
 the dose rates associated with the type of work being performed
 the number of outages each year
 the scope and duration of outage work
 the number of people involved in outage work
15 (b) Environmental protection and radiological surveillance
Requirements for protection of the environment

The requirements related to protecting people and the environment by controlling the release of
nuclear and hazardous substances are found in the General Nuclear Safety and Control
Regulations. Paragraph 12(1)(c) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations requires
every licensee to take all reasonable precautions to protect, among others, the health and safety
of persons and the environment. Paragraph 12(1)(f) requires every licensee to take all reasonable
precautions to control the release of radioactive nuclear substances or hazardous substances
within the site of the licensed activity and into the environment as a result of the licensed
activity.
As mentioned in subsection 15(a), section 13 of the Radiation Protection Regulations requires

that every licensee ensure that doses to non-nuclear energy workers do not exceed 1 mSv per
calendar year.
The CNSC regulatory policy P-223, Protection of the Environment, describes the principles and
factors that guide the CNSC in regulating the development, production and use of nuclear
energy, and the production, possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment
and prescribed information. This policy describes how the CNSC assures that the
environment is protected in a manner consistent with Canadian environmental policies, acts and
regulations and consistent with Canada’s international obligations. Pollution prevention is
incorporated into this policy by applying the ALARA principle to all releases to the
environment.
The CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.9.1, Environmental Protection: Policies, Programs
and Procedures, which was published in September 2013, superseded regulatory document
S-296, Environmental Protection, Policies, Programs and Procedures at Class I Nuclear
Facilities and Uranium Mills and Mines. NPP licensees have implemented, or are in the process
of implementing REGDOC-2.9.1. The REGDOC provides direction and guidance to the licensee
towards developing and implementing an integrated set of documented activities (an
environmental management system) as the means to adequately provide for the protection of the
environment at Class I nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills.
Programs to control and monitor radioactive releases

As part of environmental management systems, Canadian NPPs have established programs to
control and monitor the effect of operations (both nuclear and hazardous) on human health and
the environment. These programs include an objective to maintain a low level of public risk
compared to other normal public risks that arise from industrial activity. Typical elements include
management of releases and waste, worker training and informing the public.
In support of these programs, NPP licensees conduct environmental risk assessments (ERAs),
which are evaluations or analyses of risks associated with contaminants and disturbances in the
environment relevant to a facility. Details regarding ERAs are provided in CSA standard N288.6,
Environmental risk assessment at class I nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills, which
is being implemented by the NPP licensees. ERAs are also used in developing environmental
assessments (EA; see article 17) and are regularly updated, per the requirements of REGDOC-
3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants.
Other important measures include the monitoring of releases, the establishment of environmental
release limits and action levels, and environmental monitoring, which are discussed below.
Although radioactive material released into the environment through gaseous emissions and
liquid effluents from NPPs can result in radiation doses to members of the public through
environmental exposure pathways, the doses received by the public from routine releases from
NPPs are too low to measure directly. Therefore, to ensure that the public dose limit is not
exceeded, the CNSC restricts the amount of radioactive material that licensees may release.
These gaseous and effluent limits are derived from the public annual dose limit of 1 mSv, and are
called derived release limits (DRLs). A DRL for a given radionuclide/radionuclide group is a
specific release limit for a route of release (exposure pathway) from an NPP. If the total of the
measured releases for each gaseous or waterborne effluent, expressed as percentages of their
respective DRLs, exceeds 100 percent, members of the public with the greatest exposure may
exceed the public dose limit over the calendar year. The phrase “members of the public with the
greatest exposure” refers to individuals who receive the highest doses from a particular source
due to factors such as proximity to the release, dietary and behavioural habits, age and
metabolism, and variations in the environment.
The calculation of DRLs is based on methodology in the CSA standard N288.1, Guidelines for
Calculating Derived Release Limits for Radioactive Material in Airborne and Liquid Effluents
for Normal Operation of Nuclear Facilities. DRLs are also based on other developments in
radiation protection (e.g., ICRP dose conversion factors). DRLs are unique to each facility, vary
in values, and depend on several factors (assumptions, representative person characteristics, site-
specific data, etc.). The calculation of DRLs can vary from simple to exceedingly complex. As a
result, DRLs are reviewed and, if necessary, updated approximately every five years.
For environmental protection, licensees set environmental action levels well below the DRLs.
These action levels provide a warning, when exceeded, of a possible loss of control in the
emissions management systems and allows for prompt corrective action. This enables licensees to
keep liquid effluent and gaseous emission releases well below their respective DRLs.
NPP licensees monitor airborne emissions for tritium, iodine, noble gases, carbon-14 and
particulates, as well as waterborne emissions for tritium, carbon-14 and gross beta-gamma
radioactivity. Releases of gaseous emissions and liquid effluents from Canadian NPPs from 2013
to 2015 are tabulated in annex 15(b), along with the corresponding DRLs. During the reporting
period, all releases from Canadian NPPs were very low: less than 1 percent of the DRLs. From
2013 to 2015, there were no reported cases of environmental action levels being exceeded.
In addition to tracking radiological emissions from the NPP, licensees have radiological
environmental monitoring programs to monitor radioactivity and other interactions with the
environment around the facilities in the air, water and food chain products. These environmental
monitoring programs are designed with the goal of protecting the environment and the health of
persons. The environmental monitoring programs aim to:
 assess the level of risk on human health and safety, and the potential biological effects in
the environment of the contaminants and physical stressors of concern arising from the
facility
 demonstrate compliance with limits on the concentration and/or intensity of contaminants
and physical stressors in the environment or their effect on the environment
 check, independently of effluent monitoring, on the effectiveness of containment and
effluent control, and provide public assurance of the effectiveness of containment and
effluent control
 verify the predictions made by the ERA, refine models used in the ERA, or reduce the
uncertainty in the predictions made by the ERA
The licensee environmental monitoring programs are based on the requirements of CSA
standards N288.5, Effluent monitoring programs at Class I nuclear facilities and uranium mines
and mills and N288.4 Environmental monitoring programs at Class I nuclear facilities and uranium
mines and mills. The results from these monitoring programs are used to ensure that the public
legal limit in Canada for effective dose from the operation of NPPs is not exceeded.
The Canadian Radiological Monitoring Network, established by Health Canada, offers
Canadians accurate health assessments based on existing levels of radioactivity near NPPs, as well
as radioactivity that may result from a nuclear accident. The program consists of monitoring
ambient gamma radiation at 34 sites, radioactive aerosols at 26 sites, and atmospheric tritium at
15 sites. These tests are augmented in a few locations with drinking water and milk sampling.
(See appendix C of Canada’s report to the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS for additional
details.) The Ontario Ministry of Labour’s Radiation Protection Service also monitors
environmental radiation, within the province of Ontario.
Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of

Mitigation Measures
In response to concerns raised during the December 2013 Commission hearing for the EA for the
refurbishment of Darlington, the Commission requested CNSC staff to assess the health and
environmental consequences of severe accident scenarios. The assessment, titled Study of
Consequences of a Hypothetical Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation
Measures, was completed in 2014. It involved selecting a source term and various scenarios that
reflected different containment hold-up periods and release durations. Further, to simulate an
accident affecting all four reactor units at Darlington, the amount of radionuclides released in the
scenario was increased fourfold for two of the scenarios. The transport and dispersion of the
radioactive material through the environment was modelled. Based on this, doses were estimated
and compared against provincial protective action levels for Ontario. The protective action levels
were then applied to the estimated doses to determine how far to evacuate, shelter and administer
potassium iodide (KI) pills for ingestion. Based on the assumed implementation and
effectiveness of a given protective action, doses were adjusted accordingly. The residual doses
that remained after the application of protective actions were used as inputs into the human
health risk assessment. Using a methodology consistent with international practice, increased
cancer risk for all cancers combined, leukemia and thyroid cancer (both adult and children) were
quantitatively assessed based on an exposure to radiation from the hypothetical accident
scenarios for the first seven days. The study concluded that, in the unlikely event of a severe
radioactive release, there would be no detectable increased risk of cancer for most of the
population, with the exception of an increase in childhood thyroid cancer risk.
Regardless of the scenario examined, the results of this theoretical study found that dose would
decrease rapidly with distance. Furthermore, for all scenarios examined in this study, the
emergency planning zones established under the Ontario Provincial Nuclear Emergency
Response Plan using the established evacuation criteria would generally be sufficient in size to
accommodate the evacuation needed. Emergency planning is inherently flexible and
consideration of sensitive receptors, such as children in emergency planning, is an integral part
of federal and provincial emergency decision making. In the event of an actual accident with this
level of predicted risk, decision makers could further mitigate the risk in those areas most likely
to be affected through the further administration of KI pills or by evacuation.
Following the public consultation period, the draft report was revised to address the comments
received from the public. The report was finalized and published on the CNSC website in
September 2015.
Release of hazardous substances

In addition to regulating the control of radioactive releases, the CNSC also requires licensees to
control and monitor their releases of hazardous substances. The licensees monitor the releases of
hazardous substances in compliance with the various applicable local, provincial and federal
regulations, and in accordance with CNSC regulations, policies and guides. The amount of
hazardous substances released to the environment is reported to the CNSC per REGDOC-3.1.1.
Independent Environmental Monitoring Program

During the reporting period, the CNSC launched the Independent Environmental Monitoring
Program (IEMP) to align with other Canadian and international regulatory bodies. The IEMP
complements CNSC staff reviews and approvals of licensees’ environmental monitoring
programs and confirms that licensees are adhering to the regulatory requirements, licence
conditions and approved programs throughout the operation of nuclear facilities.
The IEMP is performed by CNSC staff in public areas and consists of sampling environmental
media and analyzing radiological and non-radiological substances released from facilities in all
areas of the nuclear fuel cycle: uranium mines and mills, processing facilities, NPPs, research
reactors and waste management facilities.
Samples are analyzed at the CNSC’s state-of-the art laboratory using industry best practices.
Samples are analyzed for radiological and non-radiological contaminants related to the activities
of the nuclear facility. Samples may be taken for air, water, soil, sediment, vegetation (e.g.,
grass) and foodstuffs (e.g., meat and produce). The results are compared to appropriate federal
and/or provincial guidelines to confirm that the public and the environment in the vicinity of the
facility are safe and there are no health impacts as a result of facility operations. Conclusions and
data are then published to a user-friendly map on the CNSC website. A full technical report is
also available upon request.
IEMP results for Canadian NPPs are available on the CNSC website for the years indicated
below:
 Bruce A and B 2013
 Darlington 2014
 Pickering 2014, 2015
 Point Lepreau 2014, 2015
 Gentilly-2 2015
Article 16 – Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-
site and off-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations
and cover the activities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any
new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it
commences operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as
they are likely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and
the competent authorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation
are provided with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory,
insofar as they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at
a nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the
preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover the
activities to be carried out in the event of such an emergency.
16.1 Emergency plans and programs
16.1 (a) General responsibilities of the licensees, regulatory body and other authorities
In Canada, licensees of nuclear facilities are responsible for onsite emergency planning,
preparedness and response. Onsite nuclear emergencies are those that occur within the physical
boundaries of a Canadian NPP.
Offsite nuclear emergencies are those that have an effect outside the boundaries of a Canadian
NPP. In the event of an accident at an NPP with potential offsite consequences, the offsite
response would follow a process involving the following parties:
 the licensee
 municipal government
 provincial/territorial governments
 federal government
The provincial governments are responsible for:
 overseeing public health and safety and protection of property and the environment
 enacting legislation to fulfill the province’s lead responsibility for public safety
 preparing emergency plans and procedures and providing direction to municipalities that
they designate to do the same
 managing the offsite response by supporting and coordinating the efforts of organizations
with responsibility in a nuclear emergency
 coordinating support from the NPP licensee and the Government of Canada during
preparedness activities and response in a nuclear emergency
Federal government support and response for potential offsite impacts are required for
addressing areas of federal responsibility, including an incident’s effects that extend beyond
provincial or national borders. Likewise, the coordination of federal assistance when requested
by an affected province is also required. Some provinces have agreements with the Government
of Canada for the provision of specific types of technical support. Federal responsibility also
encompasses a wide range of contingency and response measures to prevent, correct or eliminate
accidents, spills, abnormal situations and emergencies, and to support provinces and territories in
their responses to a nuclear emergency. The Government of Canada is also responsible for:
 liaison with the international community
 liaison with diplomatic missions in Canada
 the assistance of Canadians abroad
 coordination of the national response to a nuclear emergency occurring in a foreign
country
Public Safety Canada ensures coordination across all federal departments and agencies
responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. It is responsible for coordinating
the overall federal government response to emergencies in support of the provinces and
territories, including nuclear emergencies.
Public Safety Canada is the lead authority for the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP).
Health Canada is the lead authority for the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP), an event-
specific annex to the FERP. It also has responsibilities related to radiation protection, including
cross-Canada monitoring networks, laboratories and decision-support systems. Health Canada
administers a federal interdepartmental and a federal–provincial nuclear emergency management
committee, as well as a training and exercise program. Internationally, Health Canada and the
CNSC serve as national competent authorities to the IAEA.
In addition to the CNSC, other federal organizations with responsibilities in nuclear emergency
preparedness and response, as described in the FNEP, include:
 the Department of National Defense/Canadian Forces, which are responsible for dealing
with emergencies involving foreign nuclear-powered vessels entering Canadian
waterways
 Transport Canada, which is responsible for the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre
 Environment and Climate Change Canada, which is responsible for providing
atmospheric modelling services to the FNEP Technical Assessment Group and the IAEA
as part of its emergency response functions
 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), which is responsible for providing emergency
radiation mapping and surveying services, providing policy advice and coordinating
federal actions in relation to nuclear liability
 the Public Health Agency of Canada, which is responsible for public health issues and is
the national authority for reporting to the World Health Organization under the
International Health Regulations
Response to Fukushima – Emergency preparedness in general

NPP licensees are required by the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations to submit their onsite
emergency plans to the CNSC as part of the licence application and renewal process. The NPP
licensees’ onsite emergency plans, programs and performance are included in the CNSC
regulatory oversight process (see subsection 16.1(b) for details). However, the Class I Nuclear
Facilities Regulations do not require applicants to submit offsite emergency plans to the CNSC
(although the CNSC has always considered the preparedness of the offsite authorities when
reviewing a licence application). Offsite emergency plans are discussed in subsection 16.1(d).
The CNSC Action Plan assigned an action to the CNSC to initiate a project to amend the Class I
Nuclear Facilities Regulations to require submission of applicable provincial and municipal
offsite emergency plans, along with evidence to support how the licensees are meeting the
requirements of those plans, as part of the licence application. It is anticipated that the
amendments to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations to address lessons learned from
Fukushima will be published in 2017.
Further, the Fukushima review during the IRRS follow-up mission to Canada in 2011
recommended that Canada should assure that the review and assessment of offsite emergency
plans for NPPs include all relevant authorities and are comprehensive, and that the responsible
organizations are capable of fulfilling their respective duties (IRRS recommendation RF7; see
sixth Canadian report for details).
In response to Fukushima, several federal organizations, including the CNSC, Health Canada,
Public Safety Canada, and Global Affairs Canada, conducted reviews and consulted extensively
to identify lessons learned and next steps. A description of the response to Fukushima with
respect to emergency preparedness, including the results of the reviews and findings can be
found in the sixth Canadian report.
In 2013, the CNSC co-hosted, with Health Canada and Public Safety Canada, a multi-
stakeholder event by holding two National Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Workshops
involving key representatives from various organizations at all levels of government and
industry. In the context of addressing lessons from the Fukushima accident, the objectives of
these workshops were to improve the nuclear emergency management network in Canada by:
 ensuring a clear understanding of the various nuclear emergency plans and
interfaces across multiple jurisdictions
 clarifying the related linkages, arrangements, governance structures and their
implementation
 ensuring a better understanding of roles, responsibilities, capabilities and their
integration across jurisdictions
 initiating a risk-based review of emergency response capabilities
 identifying current best practices, gaps and areas for improvements
These workshops helped ensure that offsite emergency plans are comprehensive and that the
participating organizations are capable of fulfilling their duties, thus addressing IRRS
recommendation RF7.
As discussed in subsection 15(a), the CNSC also anticipates that the Radiation Protection
Regulations will be amended in 2017, addressing radiation protection for emergency workers
and other changes.
The Fukushima review during the IRRS follow-up mission also recommended that Canada
should assure that full-scale exercises of offsite emergency plans be held on a periodic basis,
involving licensees and municipal, provincial, and federal organizations (IRRS recommendation
RF8; see sixth Canadian report for details). This finding was addressed through the establishment
of an ongoing nuclear exercise calendar and schedule, maintained by Health Canada through its
nuclear emergency management committees. As part of this, Exercise Unified Response, a full-
scale, national nuclear exercise with participation from all levels of government and NPP
licensees, was held at Darlington in May 2014. Exercise Unified Response, one of the largest
ever held in North America, was determined to be a success and enabled those involved
(operator, regulator, emergency services at all levels of government and industry) to exercise
their emergency plans and response capabilities. As well, Exercise Intrepid held at Point Lepreau
in November 2015 simulated an event which progressed into a severe accident with offsite
implications, and was the first full-scale exercise for this NPP utilizing emergency mitigating
equipment and other Fukushima related modifications. Details of these exercises can be found in
annex 16.1(f). Subsequent exercises of different scope have also been held since that time as part
of the ongoing exercise schedule.
During the reporting period, Health Canada and CNSC represented Canada on the IAEA
working groups to develop the comprehensive report on the Fukushima accident.
Health Canada also participated on the IAEA’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Expert
Group established in response to the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Upon its termination
in 2015, both Health Canada and CNSC represented Canada on the IAEA’s Emergency
Preparedness and Response Standards Committee.
“Invite an IAEA emergency preparedness review (EPREV) mission”
The Fukushima review during the IRRS follow-up mission to Canada also suggested that Canada
would benefit from an international peer review of emergency preparedness (IRRS suggestion
SF9; see sixth Canadian report for details).
As explained above, Health Canada has completed the current series of exercises, which were
intended to validate the FNEP. Health Canada worked with stakeholders to implement the
lessons learned from the 2014 Exercise Unified Response. Health Canada and the CNSC
continue their planning for a future emergency preparedness review (EPREV) mission, including
participating in external EPREV missions to observe best practices for hosting a peer review. An
invitation for an EPREV mission to Canada is expected during the next reporting period.
“Update emergency operational intervention guidelines and protective measures for the public
during and following major and radiological events”
Health Canada is finalizing, following extensive public consultation, the update to the Canadian
Guidelines for Protective Actions During a Nuclear Emergency, which are cited in the Federal
Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP). This update will address protective measures for the public
(including evacuation, sheltering and iodine thyroid-blocking agents) and will include
operational intervention levels and guidelines for water and food-stuff consumption. The
guidance updates the Health Canada document, Canadian Guidelines for Intervention During a
Nuclear Emergency, which recommends evacuation of the population if the projected whole-
body dose exceeds 50 mSv in seven days. The updates are based on the latest guidance from the
ICRP and IAEA (International Basic Safety Standards). The revised guidelines will also
incorporate the existing Canadian Guidelines for the Restriction of Radioactively Contaminated
Food and Water Following a Nuclear Emergency.
The revised Canadian guidelines were released in 2014 for public consultation, followed by a
second round of public consultation in June 2016. After consideration of the feedback and
possible revisions, the guidelines will be finalized and published during the next reporting
period.
The CNSC posted on its website in October 2015 a factsheet on reference levels for nuclear
emergency response and post-accident recovery. The factsheet provides information on the
concept of reference levels, which indicate the level of residual dose or risk above which it is
generally judged to be inappropriate to allow exposures to occur. The factsheet describes how
they apply to the emergency response and post-accident recovery phases of a nuclear accident. It
is also based on the ICRP recommended reference levels for the two situations of the emergency
response phase and the post-accident recovery phase.
“Establish guidelines for the return of evacuees post-accident and to confirm public
acceptability of it”
During the reporting period, the CNSC was involved in a number of post-accident recovery
phase initiatives, including participation in the IAEA’s Modelling and Data for Radiological
Impact Assessments Programme. Working groups within this initiative are studying a variety of
topics, including model testing and comparison for accidental tritium releases and the use of
decision-making tools in the post-accident recovery phase. The work to establish Canadian
guidelines has been informed by the emergency exercises described above.
The CNSC has carried out benchmarking on recovery and, in collaboration with Health Canada,
is developing a discussion paper on a proposed regulatory document that will address recovery.
The main purpose of the discussion paper is to elicit early feedback and engagement with
stakeholders, including federal and provincial governments, on the plans for the regulatory
document that will describe roles and responsibilities for recovery as well as the important
considerations to be addressed in advance of, and during, the recovery phase. The discussion
paper is targeted for publication in the fall of 2016 and the goal is to subsequently publish the
regulatory document during the next reporting period. Both the discussion paper and regulatory
document will undergo an external consultation process prior to publication, helping to ensure
public acceptability of the guidelines.
In addition to the above initiatives related to the Fukushima accident, other specific responses are
described in the following subsections.
16.1 (b) Onsite emergency plans

While the CNSC would continue to have regulatory oversight of the NPP licensees in the event
of a nuclear emergency, the licensees are responsible for onsite emergency preparedness and
response. Paragraph 6(k) of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations specifies the information
related to emergency preparedness that must accompany an application for a licence to operate a
Class I nuclear facility. Specifically, the application must describe the proposed measures to
prevent and mitigate the effects of accidental releases of nuclear substances and hazardous
substances on the environment, the health and safety of persons, and the maintenance of national
security, including measures to:
 assist offsite authorities in planning and preparing to limit the effects of an accidental
release
 notify offsite authorities of an accidental release or the imminence of an accidental
release
 report information to offsite authorities during and after an accidental release
 assist offsite authorities in dealing with the effects of an accidental release
 test the implementation of the measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of an accidental
release
The application should describe the proposed facility, activities, substances and circumstances to
which its emergency plans apply. The emergency plans should also be commensurate with the
complexity of the associated undertakings, along with the probability and potential severity of
the emergency scenarios associated with the operation of the facility.
Each licensee’s emergency plan is specific to its particular site and organization; however, all
emergency plans typically cover:
 documentation of the emergency plan
 basis for emergency planning
 personnel selection and qualification
 emergency preparedness and response organizations
 staffing levels
 emergency training, drills and exercises
 emergency facilities and equipment
 emergency procedures
 assessment of emergency response capability
 assessment of accidents
 activation and termination of emergency responses
 protection of facility personnel and equipment
 interface arrangements with offsite organizations
 arrangements with other agencies or parties for assistance
 recovery program
 public information program
 public education program
Descriptions of the onsite emergency plans for each NPP are provided in annex 16.1(b).
A condition in each licence to operate an NPP requires the licensee to implement an emergency
preparedness program to ensure it is capable of executing its onsite emergency plan. Emergency
preparedness plans and programs are updated and fine-tuned over the life of the NPP as new
requirements are identified or to address changing conditions, operating experience and
identified deficiencies. The CNSC assesses licensees’ emergency preparedness programs and
inspects their emergency drills and exercises. Although the programs have matured and are well
maintained, CNSC staff members have observed that NPP licensees in Canada proactively seek
ways to continuously improve their emergency preparedness programs.
The CNSC Action Plan assigned an action to the CNSC to develop a dedicated regulatory
document on emergency management that incorporates the information in regulatory guide
G-225, Emergency Planning at Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills, and
regulatory document RD-353, Testing the Implementation of Emergency Measures and to review
and update the document. This action was completed in October 2014 with the publication of
version 1 of CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
and Response, which supersedes the two previously mentioned documents. NPP licensees will be
implementing this document in the next reporting period.
CNSC published the updated regulatory document REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Version 2, in February 2016 (see subsection 7.2(i)(b)).
Additionally, CSA standard N1600, General requirements for emergency management for
nuclear facilities was published in May 2014 and revised in March 2016; it addresses lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident. Implementation of these two newer documents will be
pursued in the next reporting period.
All actions on NPP licensees related to emergency preparedness and resulting from the CNSC
Action Plan have been completed. Details of the measures taken in response to the Fukushima
accident with respect to onsite emergency plans can be found in the sixth Canadian report.
16.1 (c) Emergency preparedness expectations for new-build projects

The CNSC is establishing requirements and expectations for emergency preparedness for new-
build projects. The CNSC regulatory document RD-346, Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power
Plants, specifies that the following issues related to population and emergency planning must be
considered when a proposed site is being evaluated against safety goals:
 population density and distribution within the protective zone, with particular focus on
existing and projected population densities and distributions in the region, including
resident and transient populations (updated over the lifetime of the NPP)
 present and future use of land and resources
 physical site characteristics that could impede the development and implementation of
emergency plans
 populations in the vicinity of the NPP that are difficult to evacuate or shelter (e.g.,
schools, prisons, hospitals)
 the ability to maintain population and land-use activities in the protective zone at levels
not impeding implementation of the emergency plans
The “protective zone” is defined as the area beyond the exclusion zone that needs to be
considered with respect to implementing emergency measures. In Canada, the term “exclusion
zone” refers to a parcel of land, within or surrounding a nuclear facility, on which there is no
permanent dwelling and over which a licensee has the legal authority to exercise control. The
size of the exclusion zone is proposed by the applicant and is expected to demonstrate
consideration of effective dose under normal operation and accident conditions, the design-basis
threat (security) and emergency preparedness.
Expectations for emergency preparedness are conveyed, at a high level, to potential applicants in
application guidance for a licence to prepare a site. This is to confirm the applicant has a
forward-looking emergency preparedness program in place as a part of the overall site evaluation
program.
Prior to construction, the proponent is expected to confirm with the surrounding municipalities
and the affected provinces, territories and neighbouring countries that the implementation of
emergency plans and related protective actions will not be compromised during the entire
lifecycle of the proposed site. For example, if a hospital expansion is anticipated as part of a
long-term emergency plan, discussions between the proponent and the municipality should begin
at the site evaluation stage to ensure appropriate agreements are in place prior to construction.
The following CNSC regulatory documents provide further information on these expectations:
 REGDOC-3.5.1, Licensing Process for Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines
and Mills
 RD/GD-369, Licence Application Guide: Licence to Construct a Nuclear Power Plant
The CNSC extends these considerations of emergency preparedness into the requirements for the
licence to construct and the licence to operate power reactors, for which the following regulatory
documents also apply:
 REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident Management, Version 2
 REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants
 REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, Version 2
Specifically, the additional criteria related to emergency preparedness found in these regulatory
documents that need to be considered at the design and construction phase include the following:
 The containment design allows sufficient time for the implementation of offsite
emergency procedures.
 The design and functionality of the main control room, secondary control room and
emergency response facilities reliably facilitate all operations and support required for
onsite and offsite emergency measures.
 The design features and equipment to support post-accident environmental monitoring
are robust and reliable.
 The hazard analysis defines the emergency planning and coordination requirements for
effective mitigation of the hazards.
 The PSA is used to assess the adequacy of accident management and emergency
procedures.
16.1 (d) Provincial and territorial offsite emergency plans

The provincial/territorial governments are responsible for overseeing the health, safety and
property of their inhabitants and the protection of the environment within their jurisdictions.
Accordingly, they assume lead responsibility for the arrangements necessary to respond to the
offsite effects of a nuclear emergency by enacting legislation and providing direction to the
municipalities where the NPPs are located. Typically, their administrative structures include an
emergency measures organization (or the equivalent) to cope with a wide range of potential or actual
emergencies in accordance with defined plans and procedures. The provinces maintain
emergency operations centres to coordinate protective actions for the public and to provide the
media with information. In addition, the provincial governments coordinate support from the
licensees, the Government of Canada, and departments and agents of all levels of government
during their preparedness and response activities.
The provinces determine the needs for and direct the implementation of protective actions, which
include:
 sheltering
 evacuation
 ingestion of KI pills
 ingestion control measures
Furthermore, the provinces also ensure arrangements are in place for:
 facilitating the availability of KI pills
 establishing reception and evacuation centres to accommodate evacuees
 establishing emergency worker centres to ensure radiation protection for emergency
workers
Provincial agencies participated in the national reviews of the lessons learned from the
Fukushima accident. It was concluded that there are no emergency response issues requiring
immediate action at the provincial level. However, the provinces, in conjunction with the CNSC,
Health Canada and Public Safety Canada are pursuing the resolution of the following issues
(related to the discussion in subsection 16.1(a)):
 Although provincial plans primarily address preparedness and response, there are no
guidelines and plans for the recovery phase. Health Canada and the CNSC are developing
a framework for addressing this issue. Refer to challenge C-3 in subsection 16.1(a).
 Full-scale emergency exercises should have a higher priority at the provincial level. As
discussed in subsection 16.1(a), the provinces participated in nuclear exercises
coordinated by Health Canada. Additional details on the exercises can be found in
subsection 16.1(f) and annex 16.1(f).
The offsite nuclear plans are not approved by Health Canada; however, Health Canada reviews
and approves the provincial annexes to the FNEP (see subsection 16.1(e)).
The offsite nuclear emergency plans of the provinces that host NPPs are described in
annex 16.1(d). Additional details for each provincial plan, including a description of planning
zones, event assessment, public alerting and protective measures, are provided in appendix B of
Canada’s report to the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS.
During the reporting period, the CNSC published Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical
Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation Measures, which assessed the health
and environmental consequences of severe accident scenarios. The study took into account
potential scenarios for protective actions, based on offsite emergency plans, to help assess the
possible health impacts of severe accidents. For details, see subsection 15(b).
Distribution of iodine thyroid-blocking agents

REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (2014) includes requirements
for licensees to provide the necessary resources and support to provincial and regional authorities
to ensure a sufficient quantity of iodine thyroid-blocking agents (such as potassium iodide (KI)
pills) are pre-distributed. This involves both pre-distributing KI pills to all residences, businesses
and institutions within the primary zone (typically 8 to 16 km from the NPP) and stockpiling KI
pills within the secondary zone (typically 50 to 80 km from the NPP).
During the reporting period, all NPP licensees with operating reactors worked closely with their
respective regional government officials in the distribution of KI pills. The procurement and pre-
distribution of KI pills for the areas surrounding the OPG NPPs and Bruce Power A and B was
completed by the end of 2015. Pre-distribution of KI pills to residents within the specified area
for Point Lepreau has been in place since 1982.
To date, Canadian NPP licensees have been responsible for the pre-distribution and stock piling
of nearly 8.8 million KI pills in areas surrounding their facilities. Along with the pre-distribution,
the NPP licensees also launched an education campaign through a pamphlet with information for
the public on the use of KI pills.
16.1 (e) Federal emergency plans

The Government of Canada’s emergency planning, preparedness and response are based on an
“all-hazards” approach. The Emergency Management Act sets out broad policy direction and
general responsibilities for Public Safety Canada and all other federal ministers and their
respective departments/agencies. It broadens the scope of emergency preparedness at the federal
level to include the four pillars of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response
and recovery. Public Safety Canada has prepared the all-hazards Federal Emergency Response
Plan (FERP) to address governance and coordination issues for federal entities and to support
the provinces and territories. The Minister of Public Safety is responsible for coordinating the
Government of Canada’s response to any emergency. The FERP is designed to harmonize
federal emergency response efforts with those of the provinces and territorial governments, non-
government organizations and the private sector, through processes and mechanisms that
facilitate an integrated response.
Because of the inherent technical nature and complexity of a nuclear emergency, hazard-
specific planning, preparedness and response arrangements that supplement all-hazards
arrangements are required. The Radiation Protection Bureau of Health Canada administers the
comprehensive Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP), which is integrated with and forms
an annex to the FERP to coordinate the Government of Canada’s technical response and support
to the provinces/territories for managing the radiological consequences of any domestic, trans-
boundary or international nuclear emergency. The FNEP complements the relevant nuclear
emergency plans of other jurisdictions inside and outside Canada.
The FERP and FNEP were updated in 2011 and 2012, respectively; the updates addressed the
lessons learned from Fukushima.
The FNEP describes the roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies as well as
the measures they should follow to manage and coordinate the federal response to a nuclear
emergency based on the scenarios identified in the plan, focusing on the provision of coordinated
scientific support to manage radiological consequences. There are 18 federal departments and
agencies involved with respect to FNEP, including Health Canada, Public Safety Canada, the
CNSC, Environment and Climate Change Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, Global
Affairs Canada, NRCan and Transport Canada. AECL and CNL through the government-owned,
contractor-operated (GoCo) arrangement, provide technical support to the FNEP. All
departments and agencies are responsible for developing, maintaining and implementing their
own organization-specific emergency response plans that align with and support the objectives of
the FERP and FNEP. (Some of these organization-specific plans are described below.) The
Minister of Public Safety is responsible for exercising leadership relating to emergency
management in Canada by coordinating emergency management activities, both among
government institutions and in cooperation with the provinces and other entities. Health Canada
supports this through its federal inter-departmental and federal–provincial nuclear emergency
management committees. (One of these committees is described below.)
The governance provided by the FERP and FNEP allows the various jurisdictions and
organizations that have responsibilities for aspects of nuclear emergency preparedness (municipal
and provincial governments, the licensee, and federal departments and agencies) to discharge their
responsibilities in a cooperative, complementary and coordinated manner. Provincial annexes to
the FNEP describe interfaces between the Government of Canada and the provincial emergency
management organizations in those provinces that have NPPs or ports hosting foreign nuclear-
powered vessels.
During the reporting period, the annexes to the FNEP for Ontario and New Brunswick were
revised. The Ontario annex was tested in Exercise Unified Response in May 2014, following
which it was approved by Health Canada and the Ontario Office of the Fire Marshal and
Emergency Management. The New Brunswick annex was revised and tested during Exercise
Intrepid in November 2015. Lessons learned from the exercise will be incorporated in the annex,
and a final version will be submitted for approval by Health Canada and the New Brunswick
Emergency Measures Organization. The province of Quebec is reassessing the nuclear risk after
the completion of the transition to safe shutdown state of Gentilly-2 in 2014. Discussions for
revising the Quebec annex to the FNEP began in 2016.
Annex 16.1(e) describes the provisions of the FNEP in more detail.
In addition to managing the FNEP, Health Canada’s Radiation Protection Bureau maintains a
24/7 duty officer service that receives notifications of any nuclear emergency, activates
arrangements under the FNEP, and chairs the FNEP Technical Assessment Group. It is
responsible for operating various radiological monitoring networks: the Fixed Point Surveillance
Network, the Canadian Radiological Monitoring Network (see subsection 15(b)) and the
radiation monitoring stations within the Canadian portion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty International Monitoring System. See appendix C in Canada’s report to the Second
Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS for details.
Health Canada also operates radiological sample analysis laboratories (including fixed and
mobile facilities), decision support, mapping and information-management platforms,
contamination-monitoring capabilities (including portal monitors), and internal and external
dosimetry programs for exposed individuals (including emergency workers). Health Canada
provides radiation protection guidance and expertise, maintains a nuclear exercise calendar and
organizes emergency exercises.
One of the emergency preparedness committees administered by Health Canada in the context of
the FNEP is the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Radiological/Nuclear Emergency Management
Coordination Committee. It provides a forum for information exchange and the development of
plans and joint projects to improve nuclear emergency management (e.g., updates to standard
operating procedures and technical assessment products). It also provides advice and assistance
to authorities responsible for nuclear emergency management. During the reporting period,
committee topics included the FNEP exercise and training program, the revision of FNEP
provincial annexes, and the revision of the Health Canada intervention guidelines.
Environment and Climate Change Canada – Canadian Centre for Meteorological and
Environmental Prediction works closely with Health Canada to provide a suite of atmospheric
modelling capabilities for nuclear emergency management, ranging from local to global
atmospheric modelling capabilities, including dispersion and trajectory modelling, and
forward/backward modelling. These products are provided to the FNEP Technical Assessment
Group and provincial science groups. As described in the FNEP, other federal institutions,
including the Department of National Defence and NRCan, also contribute specific scientific and
technical expertise and capabilities necessary to manage the actual or potential radiological
consequences of a nuclear emergency.
Emergency plans of federal departments and agencies

The CNSC has its own nuclear emergency response plan that clearly defines and enables its roles
within the context of the FNEP. The CNSC participates directly in emergency planning activities
with other FNEP core agencies. The CNSC also participates in some exercises to practise
discharging its own emergency-related responsibilities. A general description of the CNSC’s role
in emergency preparedness is provided in annex 16.1(e). The CNSC also has a well-developed
and mature nuclear emergency management program that is based on its emergency response
plan.
Other federal departments and agencies also develop their own nuclear emergency response
plans. For example, Transport Canada administers the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act,
1992 and the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations and operates the Canadian
Transport Emergency Centre to ensure hazardous substances are transported safely and to help
emergency response personnel handle related emergencies, including those involving nuclear
substances. Transport Canada cooperates with the CNSC in emergencies and incidents involving
nuclear substances, in accordance with the FNEP, relevant federal legislation and formal
administrative arrangements.
Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada maintain an all-hazards plan, the Health
Portfolio Emergency Response Plan, which describes its response framework to a range of
emergencies that could impact public health. A specific nuclear emergency annex to this plan,
which supports the FNEP, was developed and approved in 2015.
Details of the activities and reviews conducted by federal government organizations in response
to Fukushima can be found in the sixth Canadian report.
16.1 (f) Emergency training, exercises and drills

Emergency exercises confirm adequate implementation of onsite and offsite provisions in
nuclear emergency response plans. Emergency drills are designed to provide training
opportunities for enhancing the abilities of involved parties to respond to emergency situations
and to protect public health and safety during an event at an NPP or other licensed nuclear
facility. Emergency exercises serve to test the sharing of information and to ensure all response
efforts are coordinated and communicated effectively.
The frequency of emergency exercises at NPPs is defined in CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, Version 1, which was
published in October 2014 and further updated with REGDOC-2.10.1, Version 2 in February
2016. NPP licensees have already implemented or are implementing Version 1. REGDOC-2.10.1
and its predecessors state that licensees are directly responsible for training their personnel and
involving them in emergency exercises, and for appointing qualified personnel to their
emergency teams. A schedule for both emergency drills and emergency exercises is established
every year to ensure all responders, including alternates, have the opportunity to practise the
required skills on a regular basis. All emergency exercise objectives are addressed over a five-
year period, with a full-scale emergency exercise conducted every three years.
CNSC staff members evaluate the full-scale emergency exercises at the NPPs to ensure licensees
are effectively managing and implementing their emergency responses (specifically, the onsite
provisions). During the reporting period, five such exercises were evaluated; the CNSC’s
conclusions are briefly summarized as follows:
 For the Pickering exercise (2013), OPG staff successfully demonstrated readiness to
respond to a nuclear emergency.
 For the Gentilly-2 exercise (May 2014), Hydro-Québec staff demonstrated satisfactory
performance and met the regulatory requirements.
 For the full-scale national exercise at Darlington (Unified Response, May 2014), OPG
demonstrated that its emergency preparedness and response programs were robust and
met the regulatory requirements. The licensee was effective in responding to the
emergency, including from operating safety shutdown systems to continued cooling, and
by providing necessary information and support to offsite authorities.
 For the Bruce A and B exercise (October 2014), Bruce Power staff successfully
demonstrated their readiness to respond to a nuclear emergency and validated
enhancements to its emergency response program.
 For the Point Lepreau (Intrepid, November 2015), NB Power staff and the offsite
agencies demonstrated satisfactory performance in responding to a simulated severe
accident with offsite implications.
In some cases, the municipalities, the provinces and the CNSC will also participate in the
exercises with NPP licensees (to a certain degree). The CNSC observes emergency exercises to
confirm adequate implementation of offsite provisions in nuclear emergency response plans. It
also participates in emergency exercises to practise discharging its own emergency-related
responsibilities and to ensure communication lines are in place and in a state of readiness. Other
federal departments may participate to similarly practise their responsibilities. Exercise Unified
Response validated the full integration of the FNEP, the FERP, Ontario’s Provincial Nuclear
Emergency Response Plan (PNERP), OPG’s Consolidated Nuclear Emergency Plan and the
plans of other non-governmental organizations.
Following the approval of the revised FNEP in 2012, Health Canada developed an evergreen
five-year exercise program for the FNEP. The program includes five main types of exercises to
be included in the long-term exercise plan. The program includes anticipated key FNEP events
and exercises for 2015–2020 as well as an annual nuclear training and event calendar. The FNEP
recommends a large-scale, multi-jurisdictional exercise occurring, in general, once every two to
three years.
Training and emergency exercises conducted during the reporting period are described in more
detail in annex 16.1(f).
16.2 Information to the public and neighbouring states
16.2 (a) Measures for informing the public during a national nuclear emergency
As described in subsection 9(c), the NPP licensees have implemented public disclosure programs
that meet the requirements of CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-99.3, Public Information and
Disclosure. The information to be disclosed would include the impact of natural events (such as
earthquakes), routine and non-routine releases of radiological and hazardous materials to the
environment and unplanned events, including those exceeding regulatory limits. These
requirements therefore cover severe accidents.
For domestic nuclear emergencies, each level of government and the nuclear facility are
responsible for providing emergency public information to the media on their own jurisdiction’s
aspect of the emergency response. The provinces, however, are responsible for providing
detailed protective action messaging to the affected public (done by issuing emergency bulletins
via broadcast and social media). The provinces inform all relevant stakeholders prior to issuing
the emergency bulletins to the public.
The public alerting system for NPPs in Ontario includes the use of sirens within 3 kilometres of
Pickering and Darlington. OPG purchased the sirens and provided funds to the local municipalities
to install, maintain and use the sirens. The sirens have become an asset of the local municipalities.
This system, coupled with the instructional messages broadcast over radio and television, ensures
the population within 10 kilometres of these two NPPs is notified appropriately and in a timely
manner.
At the federal level, the Federal Public Communications Coordination Group, led by Public
Safety Canada and in collaboration with the provinces/territories, coordinates the federal
government’s communications response to the public, media and affected stakeholders
(including private sector stakeholders). Federal government institutions contribute information to
this group according to their mandates. FNEP federal spokespersons present the federal position
on the nuclear emergency, according to the specific issues and in coordination with the
provincial information centres. For emergencies occurring at licensed facilities, the facility
operator and the CNSC provide information about onsite conditions. The Government of Canada
also provides communications in areas of federal jurisdiction (e.g., information to federal
workers in affected areas).
16.2 (b) International arrangements, including those with neighbouring countries

Canada participates in the IAEA International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) reporting system.
Canada has excellent working relationships with the United States for the exchange of
emergency preparedness expertise. In addition, Canada has signed the following international
emergency response agreement and ratified the two conventions listed.
Statement of Intent between Health Canada and United States Department of Energy
Health Canada and the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration
developed a statement of intent supporting joint Canada–U.S. nuclear emergency preparedness
and response capabilities. The statement, which updates arrangements in the previous Canada–
United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan (1996) was signed in February 2014.
It is supported through annual coordination meetings between Health Canada and the U.S.
Department of Energy, with the objective to identify areas where coordination and cooperation,
including information sharing and mutual assistance, would be beneficial to nuclear emergency
management programs and capabilities, and to elaborate strategies for moving forward with
these.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Canada is a signatory of the IAEA’s Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency (1986), which sets out an international framework for cooperation
among countries and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance and support in the event of
nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies. It requires countries to notify the IAEA of the
available experts, equipment or other materials they could offer in assistance. In case of a request
for assistance from an affected country, each country decides whether it can offer the requested
assistance. The IAEA serves as the focal point for such cooperation by channelling information,
supporting efforts and providing its available services. The agreement sets out how assistance is
requested, provided, directed, controlled and terminated. Since 2012, Health Canada and AECL
have registered their radiological biodosimetry capabilities with the IAEA’s Response and
Assistance Network (RANET) in support of this convention. During the reporting period, Health
Canada participated in RANET technical meetings to update the RANET guidelines and to
exchange experience in the practical arrangements for activating/deploying national assistance
capabilities, such as radiological monitoring in response to nuclear or radiological incidents and
emergencies. The CNSC also registered its NPP accident-analysis capability under RANET in
2016.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Canada is a signatory of the IAEA’s Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
(1986), which establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents having the potential for
international trans-boundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another
country. The accident’s time, location, radiation releases and other data essential for assessing
the situation must be reported, both directly to the IAEA and to other countries (either directly or
through the IAEA). During the reporting period, Canada participated in various IAEA organized
Convention Exercises (ConvEx) organized in support of this convention.
16.3 Emergency preparedness for Contracting Parties without nuclear installations

This part of article 16 does not apply to Canada.
Chapter III Part D Compliance with Articles of the Convention

(continued)
Part D
Safety of Installations
Part D of chapter III consists of three articles:
Article 17 – Siting
Article 18 – Design and construction
Article 19 – Operation
Article 17 – Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate
procedures are established and implemented:
(i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear
installation for its projected lifetime;
(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on
individuals, society and the environment;
(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i)
and (ii) so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;
(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation,
insofar as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request
providing the necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable
them to evaluate and make their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their
own territory of the nuclear installation.
In Canada, the term “siting” comprises site evaluation and site selection. The applicant’s
selection of a site is not a regulated activity. However, the resultant site selection case is assessed
as part of the application for a licence to prepare a site. The framework and process for issuing a
licence to prepare a site for an NPP are described in subarticle 7.2(ii), with further details in
subsection 7.2(ii)(b).
Prior to the CNSC’s issuance of a site preparation licence, a positive decision regarding an
environmental assessment (EA), which will be described in this article, is required. The EA
process evaluates the effects of the project lifecycle of a proposed NPP on the environment. The
CNSC separately evaluates the licence applicant’s proposed measures to protect individuals,
society and the environment during site preparation activities.
Fulfilling principle (1) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety as it relates to
siting
Principle (1) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety (VDNS) states that new NPPs
are to be designed, sited and constructed, consistent with the objective of preventing accidents in
the commissioning and operation and, should an accident occur, mitigating possible releases of
radionuclides causing long-term offsite contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or
radioactive releases large enough to require long-term protective measures and actions.
Following the Fukushima accident, the IAEA revised five Safety Requirements, which were
approved by the Board of Governors in March 2015. Subsequently, the Director General of the
IAEA requested the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) to review the need for further
revisions to the Safety Requirements. In August 2015, the Chair of the CSS determined that there
was no need for further revisions because the technical objectives of the VDNS were already
well reflected in the Safety Requirements.
As explained in subsection 7.2(i)(b), CNSC regulations and regulatory documents align with the
IAEA safety standards, including those used for siting NPPs. This article provides further
examples of how the regulatory framework for siting addresses IAEA safety standards.
Therefore, the CNSC framework and processes used in the regulation of activities related to site
preparation ensure that the siting of new NPPs in Canada will meet principle (1) of the VDNS.
See article 18 for a similar statement on the activities of design and construction.
Level of NPP design information expected to demonstrate site suitability

Under the NSCA, the decisions made by the Commission on an application for a licence to
prepare a site for a new NPP may be made with high-level facility design information from a
range of reactor designs. The design information provided by the applicant must be credible and
sufficient to adequately bound the evaluations of environmental effects and site suitability from a
range of reactor designs that might later be deployed at the site.
The bounding design parameters must contain sufficient information to describe the NPP–site
interface and take into consideration the characteristics of the proposed site. The underpinning of
the bounding approach is that the environmental effects of the reactor design eventually selected
for construction should be less than the bounding effects assessed in the site evaluation and the
environmental impact statement (EIS), which the applicant prepares as part of the EA process.
Although the CNSC accepts high-level information in support of the site evaluation case, there is
an increased level of regulatory scrutiny during the construction and operation licensing
processes to validate the claims made. When applying for a licence to construct, the applicant
will be expected to submit detailed design information verifying the evaluations presented
previously remain valid. If the level of information provided at the outset is limited, however,
there is a greater likelihood that fundamental barriers to licensing will appear during the review
process for a licence to construct. Thus, it is in the best interest of the applicant to make its
submissions as complete as possible at the outset.
The required level of design information for a site evaluation includes:
 a technical outline of the facility layout (preliminary or schematic in nature)
 qualitative descriptions of all major structures, systems and components (SSCs) that
could significantly influence the course or consequences of principal types of accidents
and malfunctions
 qualitative descriptions of the functionality of the SSCs important to safety
 qualitative descriptions of principal types of accidents and malfunctions to identify
limiting credible sequences that include external hazards (both natural- and human-
induced), design-basis accidents and beyond-design-basis accidents (BDBA, which
include severe accidents)
For EA purposes, the limiting source terms must consider accident sequences that could occur
with a frequency greater than 10-6 per reactor-year of operation. For those less than 10-6 per
reactor-year, but sufficiently close to this frequency, the rationale for not including them for
further analysis should be provided.
For site evaluation carried out in support of licensing (including emergency planning purposes),
the CNSC expects severe accident sequences to be addressed. The severe accident sequences
include, where applicable, multi-unit events, simultaneous with loss of the electrical grid/station
blackout events, and events with a simultaneous loss of offsite power and loss of heat sink for an
extended period of time.
A description of specific (out-of-reactor) criticality events must be provided, showing that these
events do not violate criteria established by international standards and national guidance as
triggers for public evacuation.
If the applicant chooses to pursue a licence to prepare a site without choosing a final NPP
technology, the activities permitted under the issued licence to prepare the site would be limited
to site preparation activities that are independent of any specific reactor technology. Such
activities include clearing and grading the site or building support infrastructure such as roads,
power, water and sewer services, but do not include excavation for the purposes of establishing
the facility footprint.
Regardless of the approach used by an applicant to apply facility design information to its site
selection case, a fundamental expectation of the CNSC is that the applicant will demonstrate the
capability of a “smart buyer”. This means that the applicant will be expected to demonstrate a
clear understanding of the technologies it is proposing to use and the basis from which the site
selection case is developed.
Site evaluation criteria – general

The information provided in an application for a licence to prepare a site is assessed against the
criteria described in the CNSC regulatory document RD-346, Site Evaluation for New Nuclear
Power Plants. RD-346 adapts the tenets set forth by the IAEA safety requirements document
NS-R-3, Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, and its associated guides. RD-346 addresses
some Canadian expectations that are not addressed in NS-R-3, such as protection of the
environment, security of the site, and protection of prescribed information and equipment.
RD-346 elaborates upon the criteria for evaluating the effect of the site on the safety of the NPP
(see subsection 7.2(i)) and the impact of the NPP on the surrounding population and the
environment (see subsection 7.2(ii)(b)). Specifically, RD-346 articulates the CNSC’s
expectations with respect to the evaluation of site suitability over the life of a proposed NPP, and
includes:
 the potential effects of external events (such as earthquakes, tornadoes and floods) and
human activity on the site
 the characteristics of the site and its environment that could influence the transfer to
persons and the environment of radioactive and hazardous material that may be released
 the population density, population distribution and other characteristics of the region,
insofar as they may affect the implementation of emergency measures (see
subsection 16.1(c)) and evaluation of risks to individuals, the surrounding population and
the environment
RD-346 also requires the consideration of certain aspects, such as security and decommissioning
requirements, projected population growth in the vicinity of the site, and possible future life
extension activities, when evaluating the site.
If the site evaluation indicates safety concerns that design features, site protection measures, or
administrative procedures cannot remedy, the site is deemed unacceptable. The site evaluation
includes:
 evaluation against safety goals
 consideration of evolving natural and human-induced factors
 evaluation of the hazards associated with external events
 determination of the potential effects of the NPP on the environment

 consideration of projected population growth in the vicinity of the site along with
emergency planning that takes those projections into account
An example of an evaluation against safety goals, set in the context of OPG’s EIS and
application for a licence to prepare a site for the Darlington new-build project, was provided in
annex 17 of the sixth Canadian report.
Additional details related to site evaluation criteria are provided under subarticles 17(i) and 17(ii)
below.
17 (i) Evaluation of site-related factors

The safety case for the licence to prepare a site includes an assessment of hazards or bounding
analysis and should address the impact of site-specific factors on the safety of the NPP. Such
factors include the site’s susceptibility to flooding (e.g., storm surge, dam burst), hurricanes,
tornadoes, ice storms or other severe weather, and earthquakes. The return periods for severe
weather, flood or wind are not prescribed. However, the applicant is expected to propose
adequate periods based on criteria identified in the IAEA documents that are referenced in
RD-346 (specifically, IAEA safety guides NS-G-1.5, NS-G-3.2, NS-G-3.4 and NS-G-3.5).
Licensees also have to perform a site-specific external hazards screening to identify other
hazards that may require a PSA or a bounding analysis. Further, the licensees must consider
combinations of events, including consequential and correlated events. Examples of
consequential events include external events (such as a cooling water intake blockage caused by
severe weather, a tsunami caused by an earthquake or a mud slide caused by heavy rain) and
internal events (such as a fire caused by an earthquake). Examples of correlated events include
heavy rainfall concurrent with a storm surge or high winds caused by a hurricane.
It should be pointed out that consequential events are also considered in the PSAs (see
subsection 14(i)(d)) required in the licensing process following the application for a licence to
prepare site.
RD-346 requires the applicant to consider climate change when evaluating the potential impact
of these phenomena. An example of this consideration for Bruce A and B was provided in
annex 17(iii)(a) of the sixth Canadian report.
Site-related factors also include the proximity of the site to one or more of the following:
 railroad tracks (possibility of derailments and the release of hazardous material)
 flight paths for major airports (possibility of airplane crashes)
 toxic chemical plants (possibility of toxic releases)
 propane storage facilities or refineries (possibility of industrial accidents)
 military test ranges (possibility of stray missiles)
The above concerns are further affected by projected land use near the site, access to the site,
emergency preparedness and security.
The licence applicant addresses these criteria during the application process for a licence under the
NSCA (and in its EIS), the results of which are integrated into the safety case. Applications
identify and assess the site characteristics that may be important to the safety of the proposed
NPP, including:
 land use
 present population and predicted population expansion
 principal sources and movement of water
 water usage
 meteorological conditions
 seismology
 local geology
17 (ii) Impact of the installation on individuals, society and environment
17 (ii) (a) Environmental assessment

An EA pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA) is initiated
following an application for a licence to prepare a site. An EA under the Nuclear Safety and
Control Act is undertaken for other licensing decisions such as licence renewal/amendment. EAs
identify whether a specific project is likely to cause significant environmental effects taking
mitigating measures into account. The potential impact on the environment is evaluated in the
EA process by examining the effects on parameters such as water supply, air quality, wildlife,
lakes and rivers. EAs ensure that, early in a project, potentially significant adverse effects are
identified and mitigated to the extent possible. In accordance with RD-346, prior to the triggering
of the EA and licensing processes, the applicant is expected to use a robust process to
characterize proposed sites over the full lifecycle of the facility and then develop a fully
documented defence of the site selection. This case forms the backbone for submissions in
support of the EA and the application for a licence to prepare the site, which is reviewed by the
CNSC and other applicable federal authorities.
EAs are conducted at every phase of the lifecycle of a facility or activity. These assessments are
commensurate with the scale and complexity of the environmental risks associated with the
facility or activity.
As stated above, EAs are carried out either under the CEAA or under the NSCA. An
environmental risk assessment (ERA), see subsection 17(iii)(a), forms the basis of an EA, either
under CEAA or under the NSCA. Early in the process, CNSC staff members determine which
EA applies by reviewing the information provided by the applicant or licensee in their
application and supporting documentation.
In accordance with paragraph 15(a) of CEAA, an EA is required when the CNSC is the
responsible authority with respect to a designated project per the Regulations Designating
Physical Activities. In addition, an EA under CEAA is carried out early in the licensing process
(at the beginning of the lifecycle of the project) and serves as a planning tool.
For applicants proposing facilities or activities in areas of Canada subject to land claim
agreements (such as the territories and parts of Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador), CNSC
staff members support the EA process of that land-claim regime and the Commission uses the
information gathered in the EA process in its licensing decision under the NSCA.
There were no EAs conducted under CEAA for Canadian NPPs or new-build projects during the
reporting period. Additionally, there were no applications submitted during the reporting period
for new-build projects. Details on the site evaluation studies for the Darlington new-build project
during the previous reporting period (2010–13) can be found in annex 17 of the sixth Canadian
report. See subsection D.4 of chapter I for additional details on the EA and licensing decisions
related to Darlington new-build.
As described in subsection 15(b), during the reporting period, the CNSC published regulatory
document REGDOC-2.9.1, Environmental Protection: Policies, Programs and Procedures, in
September 2013, superseding regulatory standard S-296, Environmental Protection Policies,
Programs and Procedures at Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills and
regulatory guide G-296, Developing Environmental Protection, Policies, Programs and
Procedures at Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills. REGDOC-2.9.1
amended the guidance to reflect lessons learned from Fukushima.
The CNSC is currently drafting a new version of REGDOC-2.9.1. The updated document, which
will be titled Environmental Protection: Environmental Policy, Assessments and Protection
Measures, will outline the CNSC’s EA and environmental protection practices.
17 (ii) (b) Criteria for evaluating the safety impact of the NPP on the surrounding
environment and population
As stated above, RD-346 stipulates that the evaluation of site suitability includes consideration of
specific factors relevant to the impact of the proposed NPP on the environment and population:
 site characteristics that could have an impact on the public or on the environment
 population density, distribution and other characteristics of the protective zone that may
have an impact on the implementation of emergency measures
The safety impact on the population examines the population dose from postulated events. Given
that the NPP will perform as designed under accident conditions, it is important to consider
population-related factors to meet radiation dose limits set by regulations. Such factors include
the size, nature (e.g., subdivision, rural, industrial, school or hospital), distribution and
demographics of population around the facility. Other factors include: local weather, seismicity,
neighbouring facilities, and air and rail transport corridor activity. The applicant addresses these
criteria in the safety case, which calculates the population doses and verifies that the NPP design
meets its safety targets.
17 (ii) (c) New-build outreach

Outreach to stakeholders and the local populace of the potential site – in particular, explaining
the safety impact and how it is evaluated – is an important activity related to understanding the
impact of a proposed NPP on the population and the environment. Significant outreach was
conducted by OPG for its Darlington new-build project during the previous reporting period
(2010–2013) as described in the sixth Canadian report.
17 (iii) Re-evaluation of site-related factors
17 (iii) (a) Licensee activities to maintain the safety acceptability of the NPP, taking into
account site-related factors
The continued acceptability of the NPP against the criteria mentioned in subarticles 17(i) and
17(ii) is periodically verified against appropriate standards and practices. Possible changes to the
site’s demographics or significant changes to the understanding of the local environment must be
examined through activities that include regular reviews of the licensee’s emergency response
measures, security measures and safety analysis report. Such changes include:
 new insights from updated hazard studies
 changes to neighbouring man-made facilities (such as a newly constructed oil refinery, rail
corridor, airport flight path or chemical plant)
 climate change
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants, requires licensees to regularly submit to the CNSC certain reports describing the effects
of the NPP on the environment:
 updates to facility descriptions and final safety analysis report
 PSA
 ERA
These reports are to be submitted within five years of a previous submission or when requested
by the CNSC. They include consideration of any relevant new techniques or information, which
could include new data or insights related to external events.
Deterministic safety analysis and PSAs are described in subsections 14(i)(c) and 14(i)(d),
respectively. ERAs are described in subsection 15(b).
REGDOC-3.1.1 also requires an annual report detailing the results of environmental monitoring
programs, together with an interpretation of the results and estimates of radiation doses to the
public resulting from NPP operations. See subsection 15(b) for details.
17 (iii) (b) Results of environmental assessments for life-extension projects

An assessment of the environmental effects of life-extension projects helps ensure the continued
protection of the environment during the operation of NPPs. During the reporting period, no EAs
were conducted by NPP licensees for life-extension projects. The Darlington refurbishment and
continued operation EA conducted during the previous reporting period resulted in the need for
the installation of modifications to the NPP to further improve public safety. The modifications
are underway and will be completed during the next reporting period. See annex 18(i) for details
on the modifications to be installed.
17 (iii) (c) Re-evaluation of site-related factors in response to Fukushima

As part of the follow-up to the Fukushima accident, the licensees examined events more severe
than those that have historically been regarded as credible, as well as their potential impacts on
their NPPs. These events typically included earthquakes, floods, extreme weather events (e.g.,
high winds, heavy rainfalls) and events caused by human activities (e.g., explosions).
As reported in the sixth Canadian report, the NPP licensees reconfirmed that the risk posed to
Canadian NPPs from tsunamis is negligible. Nevertheless, NRCan conducted a preliminary
probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment for Canada. As the licensee for the only coastline NPP
in Canada (Point Lepreau), NB Power elected to further study the tsunami hazard to provide a
high degree of assurance that the tsunami risk remains low. The results from the study were
submitted by NB Power to the CNSC in 2015. Staff members from the CNSC, the National
Research Council of Canada and Environment and Climate Change Canada have completed their
respective reviews of the study. Based on the result of these reviews, CNSC staff members are
satisfied with the assessment and related follow-up plans.
The post-Fukushima review reconfirmed the robustness of Canadian NPPs to withstand large
external hazards. However, additional work was undertaken in the previous reporting period (see
the sixth Canadian report) related to screening of external hazards and bounding analyses.
Specifically, for NPPs that have not undergone ISRs and been refurbished, the licensees
conducted more comprehensive assessments of site-specific external hazards to demonstrate that:
 considerations of magnitudes of design-basis and beyond-design-basis external hazards
are consistent with current best international practices
 consequences of events triggered by external hazards are within applicable limits
In the previous reporting period, the licensees completed various tasks, including reviewing the
bases of external events, completing or updating PSAs and expanding their application to
analyze site-specific, external hazards. Furthermore, NPP licensees completed Level l and
Level 2 PSAs (see subsection 14(i)(d)).
For more detailed information on Canada’s re-evaluation of site-related factors in response to the
Fukushima accident, refer to Canada’s report to the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS
and the sixth Canadian report.
17 (iv) Consultation with other Contracting Parties likely to be affected by the

installation
Canadian legislation and related processes (in particular, the CEAA and its regulations) do not
obligate the CNSC or NPP licence applicants to consult with other jurisdictions outside Canada
regarding proposed siting. These jurisdictions are primarily in the United States, the only country
with which Canada shares a land border. However, the CEAA requires that effects to the
environment that may occur outside of Canada (transboundary effects) be included in the EA
review for designated projects listed in the Regulations Designating Physical Activities,
including new NPPs.
Furthermore, public participation opportunities (such as public hearings) are an important
component of the CNSC’s licensing and EA process. The CNSC emphasizes public engagement
and participation, and members of the public, including people from outside Canada, are
provided the opportunity to review licensing and EA documentation and participate as
intervenors in public hearings.
Canada and the U.S. have a longstanding practice of cooperation with respect to transboundary
impacts through such treaties as the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978, and the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement of 1991. In
addition, the CNSC and the U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission have an administrative
arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters,
including the siting of any designated nuclear facility in either country.
Article 18 – Design and construction
(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable
levels and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of
radioactive materials, with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to
mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;
(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear
installation are proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;
(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine
interface.
All operating NPPs in Canada are CANDU designs. CANDU reactors feature heavy-water
coolant and moderator, as well as fuel channel and fuel bundle designs that enable online
fuelling. The pressure tube is the central component of the fuel channel that supports the fuel and
acts as a pressure boundary for the coolant. Some specific CANDU design features related to
assessing and improving defence in depth are described in annex 18(i). The first and second
Canadian reports contain extensive information on the evolution of the design and construction
of CANDU-type NPPs. Canada sponsors significant R&D that address the area of design and
construction (see appendix E for details).
The general CNSC framework and process for issuing a licence to construct a Class IA nuclear
facility (of which an NPP is an example) are described in subarticle 7.2(ii). In response to
existing, and in preparation for potential, new-build licence applications, the CNSC continues to
update its design requirements for NPPs, participate in the Multinational Design Evaluation
Programme (MDEP) and conduct pre-project vendor design reviews. These activities are
described in the following subsections. The CNSC has also developed work instructions for the
review of applications for a licence to construct an NPP. Work instructions are described in more
detail in subsections 7.2(ii)(a) and 8.1(d).
Specific design requirements and licensee provisions related to defence in depth, proven
technologies, and reliable and manageable operation are described in subarticles 18(i), 18(ii)
and 18(iii), respectively, for the currently operating NPPs and potential new-build projects.
Updating design requirements for new-build projects

CNSC criteria for evaluating designs of new NPPs continued to be updated to be technology-
neutral and to allow for the licensing of a wide range of reactor technologies, sizes and uses,
including non-water-cooled technologies.
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power
Plants, was published in May 2014, superseding regulatory document RD-337, Design of New
Nuclear Power Plants. It sets out requirements and guidance for the design of new, water-cooled
NPPs. To a large degree, REGDOC-2.5.2 represents the CNSC’s adoption of the tenets set forth
in the IAEA safety standards document SSR-2/1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, and
the adaptation of those tenets to align with Canadian practices. Annex 7.2(i)(b) describes in
greater detail how REGDOC-2.5-2 reflects various IAEA safety standards. To the extent
practicable, REGDOC-2.5.2 sets technology-neutral requirements related to defence in depth, the
use of proven technology and easily manageable operation of NPPs (e.g., reliability, human
factors). Similar to SSR-2/1, REGDOC-2.5.2 requires the concept of defence in depth be applied
to all organizational, behavioural and design-related safety and security activities to ensure they
are subject to overlapping provisions. Defence in depth is to be applied throughout the design
process and operation of an NPP. The scope of REGDOC-2.5.2 addresses the interfaces between
NPP design and other topics, such as environmental protection, safeguards, and accident and
emergency response planning. Additional details on REGDOC-2.5.2 are provided in annex 18.
The CNSC’s regulatory review of an application for a licence to construct will include a clause-
by-clause assessment of the proposed design against the requirements in REGDOC-2.5.2.
Upgrading designs of existing NPPs

For existing NPPs, the licensees have continuously made design improvements even though
many of the updated design requirements were established after the NPPs were built. For
example, design changes have been made to address new standards, on an ongoing basis, when
the licences are renewed or amended (as described in subsection 7.2(ii)(d)). Furthermore,
life-extension projects have provided an opportunity to upgrade the existing CANDU NPPs to
align with REGDOC-2.5.2 and other new standards. Integrated safety reviews (ISRs) conducted
for life-extension projects and recently introduced periodic safety reviews (PSRs) require the
licensee to determine reasonable and practical modifications to enhance the safety of the facility
to a level approaching that described in modern standards. Integrated implementation plans
identify strengths and shortcomings for each of the safety factors identified in the ISR or PSR,
rank the shortcomings in terms of safety significance, and prioritize corrective measures,
including design and other safety improvements. The design improvements that have been
effected in Canada as part of life extension have addressed the various factors discussed in
subarticles 18(i), (ii) and (iii). The general regulatory approach to life extension is described in
subsection 7.2(ii)(d) and the safety assessment aspects of ISR for life extension are described in
subsection 14(i)(f).
Some examples of design changes to existing NPPs are given in annex 18(i) in the context of
improvements to defence in depth.
Fulfilling principle (1) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety as it relates to
design and construction
Principle (1) of the 2015 Vienna Declaration of Nuclear Safety (VDNS) states that new NPPs are
to be designed, sited and constructed, consistent with the objective of preventing accidents in the
commissioning and operation and, should an accident occur, mitigating possible releases of
radionuclides causing long-term offsite contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or
radioactive releases large enough to require long-term protective measures and actions.
As explained in article 17, the technical objectives of the VDNS were already well reflected in
previous updates of the IAEA Safety Requirements. Furthermore, as explained in
subsection 7.2(i)(b), CNSC regulations and regulatory documents align with the IAEA safety
standards, including those used for design and construction of NPPs (e.g., REGDOC-2.5.2, as
discussed above). Therefore, the CNSC framework and processes used in the regulation of
activities related to design and construction ensure that new NPPs constructed in Canada will
meet principle (1) of the VDNS.
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme

The CNSC plays an active role in MDEP, which has representatives from 14 countries, with the
OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) providing a technical secretariat function. Aiming to
harmonize regulatory requirements and regulatory practices, MDEP seeks to:
 enhance multilateral cooperation within existing regulatory frameworks
 promote multinational convergence of codes, standards and safety goals
 implement MDEP products to facilitate licensing of new reactors
The involvement of the CNSC in MDEP covers multiple areas of interest to Canada, including:
 design-specific safety issues and activities surrounding the AREVA European
Pressurized Reactor and Westinghouse AP1000 designs
 issue-specific activities, such as:
o methods by which multinational vendor inspections can be utilized
o convergence of pressure boundary component codes and standards
o resolution of regulatory issues around digital instrumentation and control
standards
Vendor pre-project design reviews

The CNSC has established a vendor-optional process to assess reactor facility designs based on a
vendor’s reactor technology. The term “pre-project” signifies that a design review is undertaken
prior to the submission of a licence application to the CNSC. This service does not certify a
reactor design or involve the issuance of a licence under the NSCA, and it is not required as part
of the licensing process for a new NPP. The conclusions of any design review do not bind or
otherwise influence decisions made by the Commission.
This process is used by a vendor to evaluate whether its reactor design will be acceptable with
respect to Canadian regulatory requirements and expectations. This includes identification of
fundamental barriers to licensing a new design in Canada. The CNSC has developed work
instructions to guide its assessment of information submitted by the vendor. The process is
divided into three distinct phases. Typically, the CNSC provides a confidential report to the
vendor at the end of each phase and an executive summary is posted on the CNSC website. The
phases of vendor pre-project design reviews and the status of specific reviews are described in
annex 18.
The CNSC has found the vendor pre-project design reviews to be extremely valuable – not only
as part of preparing for future licence submissions but also in investigating new design issues
and their potential impacts on the regulatory framework. This process, in parallel with MDEP
activities, has contributed significantly to the CNSC’s readiness for future licensing activities.
Utilities may find that the vendor pre-project design reviews are helpful for informing
applications for a licence to prepare the site or construct an NPP.
CANDU design-related activities

During the reporting period, Candu Energy completed the development work for the Enhanced
CANDU 6 (EC6) reactor, a Generation III design that represents an evolution from the
CANDU 6 reference design (Qinshan, China). In addition, Argentina announced it had signed an
agreement for the construction of a new EC6 reactor during the reporting period. The EC6
reactor is intended to meet or exceed current regulatory design requirements, such as those in
CNSC regulatory documents REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power
Plants, REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis and REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants. In particular, this evolution has resulted in the
addition of a new safety system (the emergency heat removal system) and the addressing of
requirements related to safety goals, severe accidents, single failure criterion, system
classification, containment design and malevolent acts, and seismic event frequency. The EC6
design also takes into account the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.
During the reporting period, Candu Energy continued to be involved in the overall industry
response to the Fukushima accident to reassess the safety of the existing CANDU reactors, in
Canada and overseas. Candu Energy has provided services to support changes in design,
equipment or processes, based on the Fukushima lessons learned.
Nuclear code of conduct for NPP vendor countries

Canada continued its participation in an initiative sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace to develop Nuclear Power Plant Exporters Principles of Conduct (Principles
of Conduct). Adopted during the previous reporting period, the Principles of Conduct address
several important principles for NPP exports, including safety, health, radiological protection,
physical security, environmental protection, the handling of spent fuel and nuclear waste,
compensation for nuclear damage, non-proliferation, safeguards and ethics. Their purpose is to
complement national laws and regulations, international laws and norms, and the
recommendations of institutions (such as the IAEA) that promote the peaceful use of nuclear
technology as a safe, secure, reliable and efficient source of energy. Semi-annual meetings of the
signatories to the Principles of Conduct have reviewed the lessons learned during their
implementation. Candu Energy is a signatory and is engaging the Secretariat of the Principles of
Conduct to support revision of the organization’s scope and future implementation.
18 (i) Implementation of defence in depth in design and construction

To ensure a low probability of failures or combinations of failures that would result in significant
radiological consequences, design for the defence-in-depth approach considers the following:
 conservative design and high quality of construction to minimize abnormal operation or
failures
 provision of multiple physical barriers (e.g., the fuel, pressure boundary and containment)
that prevent the release of radioactive materials to the environment
 provision of multiple means for each of the basic safety functions (e.g., reactivity control,
heat removal, confinement of radioactivity)
 use of reliable, engineered protective devices in addition to the inherent safety features
 supplementation of the normal control of the NPP by automatic activation of safety systems
or by operator actions
 provision of equipment and procedures to detect failures, along with backup accident
prevention measures to control the course and limit the consequences of accidents
The Canadian approach to NPP safety evolved from the recognition that even well-designed and
well-built systems may fail. However, when the defence-in-depth strategy is properly applied,
no single human error or mechanical failure has the potential to compromise the health and
safety of persons or the environment. Emphasis has been placed on designs that incorporate
“fail-safe” modes of operation, should a component or a system failure occur. The approach also
recognizes the need for separate, independent safety systems that can be tested periodically to
demonstrate their availability to perform their intended functions.
The CANDU design and defence-in-depth strategy allows Canadian NPPs to safely operate and,
when necessary, safely shutdown their reactors, even for low-probability or rare internal and
external events.
Some of the criteria that have guided the design of the currently operating NPPs in Canada and
contributed to defence in depth are described in conjunction with the safety analysis criteria
(described in subsection 14(i)(c)). Specific design criteria and requirements are found in some of
the CSA standards included in the licensing basis for existing NPPs, such as:
 N285.0, General requirements for pressure retaining systems and components in
CANDU nuclear power plants
 N293, Fire protection for CANDU nuclear power plants
As well, REGDOC-2.5.2 contains updated requirements related to defence in depth (see
annex 18) that will be applied to new-build projects and considered as part of ISRs and PSRs.
The existing NPPs made various design improvements to enhance defence in depth during the
reporting period. Some examples of the improvements are provided in annex 18(i).
During the reporting period, CNSC staff deemed the level of defence in depth at all Canadian
NPPs to be acceptable. As provided in the sixth Canadian report, CNSC staff had specifically
assessed the level of defence in depth of existing NPPs in light of the Fukushima accident. It was
concluded that the design basis for Canadian NPPs is comprehensive and that the NPPs met the
design requirements. It was also concluded that the risk to the Canadian public from beyond-
design-basis accidents (BDBAs) at NPPs was very low. Given the design features and defence in
depth for Canadian NPPs, adequate time would be available for long-term mitigation of a
BDBA. Although the risk of an accident is very low, NPP operators implemented several
modifications to improve their ability to withstand prolonged losses of power and other
challenges, such as the loss of all heat sinks. See annex 18(i) of this report and the sixth
Canadian report for details.
18 (ii) Incorporation of proven technologies

Measures are embedded in the Canadian licensing process to ensure the application of state-of-
the-art, proven technologies. In each phase of licensing, documents have to be submitted that
describe, verify and validate the technology employed. These include the design and safety
analysis information contained in the safety analysis report and the quality assurance program for
design and safety analysis.
The CANDU design criteria and requirements include the design and construction of all SSCs to
follow the best applicable code, standard or practice and to be confirmed by a system of
independent audit.
In particular, for pressure boundaries, the CNSC reviews the design against the requirements of
the NSCA and the associated regulations and approves the classification using the requirements
in CSA standard N285.0, General requirement for pressure-retaining systems and components in
CANDU nuclear power plants. The licensee then registers the design with an authorized
inspection agency, which audits the fabrication of the design, inspects the construction,
installation and tests, and countersigns the pressure test results.
Licensees use safety analysis computer codes that have been validated in accordance with the
requirements of CSA standard N286.7, Quality Assurance of Analytical, Scientific and Design
Computer Programs for Nuclear Power Plants.
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants, requires NPP licensees to update their safety analysis report at least once every five years
or when requested to do so by the CNSC. As stated in subsection 14(i)(c), the tools and
methodologies used in the safety analysis report have to be proven according to national and
international experience and reflect the modern state of the knowledge. The safety analysis
report must use or incorporate new methodologies, computer codes, experimental data, and
R&D findings. As a result, some of the events in the safety analysis report are re-analyzed when
necessitated by advances in science and technology.
Further, CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis, stipulates
the selection of computational methods or computer codes, models and correlations that have
been validated for the intended applications. The requirements in REGDOC-2.4.1 will be
gradually addressed for existing NPPs, as explained in subsection 14(i)(c).
Environmental qualification programs at Canadian NPPs also help to prove that safety and
safety-related systems will operate as intended, insofar as they are relied upon to help prevent,
manage and mitigate accidents. The NPP licensees have ongoing programs to systematically
sustain (and, if necessary, update) the environmental qualification of safety and safety-related
systems in accordance with CSA standard N290.13, Environmental qualification of equipment
for CANDU nuclear power plants. To ensure environmental qualification technical issues are
managed in a timely way, these programs typically involve a governance mechanism, a list of
equipment to be maintained in the environmental qualification state, staff training, technical
basis documents, and processes for dealing with emerging issues. The CNSC monitors the
progress of these programs, in addition to ongoing inspections of these systems.
For new-build projects, in addition to the criteria for existing NPPs (such as those found in CSA
standards N285.0, N286.7 and N290.13), there are requirements in CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants, for proving engineering
practices and qualifying designs (see annex 18). The safety analyses submitted in support of the
application will also be assessed against the requirements in REGDOC-2.4.1 related to the use of
methods and inputs that have been proven by validation.
18 (iii) Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation

Consideration is given to human factors and human–machine interfaces throughout the entire
life of an NPP to make sure the NPP is tolerant of human errors.
The consideration of human factors in design and the application of human factors in engineering
are described in subsection 12(e). Detailed design requirements in CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants, that are related to
reliability, operability, human factors and the human–machine interface are provided in
annex 18.
Additionally, CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident Management, Version 2,

published in September 2015, takes into account personnel needs, including aspects such as
information, procedures, training and habitability of facilities required to manage accidents.
To illustrate how human factors and human–machine interface are considered in the design of
Canadian NPPs, one can examine the requirements for safety parameter display. REGDOC-2.5.2
calls for a safety parameter display system that presents sufficient information on safety-critical
parameters for the diagnosis and mitigation of design-basis accidents and design extension
conditions. The safety parameter display system must be integrated and harmonized with the
overall control room human–system interface design. Post-accident monitoring parameters,
parameters that monitor when process or safety limits are being approached and the status of
safety systems are all available on the panel displays for existing CANDU NPPs. Candu Energy
has designed a dedicated safety parameter display system to provide a concise display of critical
safety parameters and safety system status to the operations and emergency response staff, to aid
them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety state of the NPP. This safety parameter
display system has been integrated into the EC6 design in the main control room, secondary
control area, technical support area and emergency support centre.
Article 19 – Operation
(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an
appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating
that the installation, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety
requirements;
(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and
operational experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying
safe boundaries for operation;
(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are
conducted in accordance with approved procedures;
(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational
occurrences and to accidents;
(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is
available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;
(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of
the relevant licence to the regulatory body;
(vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the
results obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing
mechanisms are used to share important experience with international bodies
and with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies.
(viii) The generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear
installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both
in activity and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent
fuel and waste directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of
the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.
19(i) Initial authorization

There were no initial licensing activities related to operating a new NPP during the reporting
period.
The CNSC’s consideration of an application for an initial licence to operate an NPP is predicated
on the applicant having already demonstrated conformance with the requirements for siting,
design and construction (as outlined in subsections 7.2(ii)(b) and 7.2(ii)(c), and in articles 17
and 18). (See subsection 7.2(ii)(d) for additional details regarding information that an applicant
is required to submit with an application for a licence to operate.) The granting of an initial
licence to operate is based upon an appropriate safety analysis and a commissioning program
demonstrating that the NPP, as constructed and commissioned, meets design and safety
requirements.
General requirements related to deterministic safety analysis and PSA are described in
subsections 14(i)(c) and 14(i)(d), respectively. The final safety analysis report submitted with an
application for a licence to operate a new NPP will be assessed against CNSC regulatory
documents REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis; REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants; and REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities:
Nuclear Power Plants.
The objectives of regulatory oversight of the NPP commissioning program are to determine that:
 the commissioning program is comprehensively defined and implemented to confirm that
the SSCs important to safety and the integrated plant will perform in accordance with the
design intent, safety analysis and applicable licensing requirements
 the operating procedures covering all operating and abnormal states have been validated
to the maximum extent practicable
 the commissioning and operating staff have been trained and qualified to commission the
NPP and operate it safely, in accordance with the approved procedures
 the management system has been adequately defined, implemented and assessed to
provide a safe, effective and high-quality working environment to perform and support
the conduct of the commissioning program
Commissioning tests are to be performed in phases and in a logical progressive sequence. There
are at least four phases:
 Phase A: prior to fuel load
 Phase B: prior to leaving reactor guaranteed shutdown state
 Phase C: approach to critical and low-power tests
 Phase D: high-power tests
It should be noted that licensees may incorporate additional phases in a project. There is a
regulatory hold point at the end of each phase and depending on the situation, the CNSC may
request additional regulatory hold points. The selection of regulatory hold points will generally
be agreed upon between the licensee and the CNSC and incorporated into the licence to operate.
Before proceeding to the next commissioning phase, the licensee demonstrates to the CNSC that
all prerequisites established between the licensee and the CNSC necessary for proceeding
beyond the current phase are met. In addition, before transitioning to the subsequent phase, the
licensee assures that SSCs credited in the safety case for that phase have been installed and
confirmed to the extent practicable to meet their designed safety function.
The following steps should be undertaken at the end of each commissioning phase:
 Documents to certify the performance of tests and provide phase clearances for the
continuation of the commissioning program should be prepared and issued.
 Test certificates should be issued by the commissioning organization to certify that the
tests have been completed in accordance with authorized procedures, stating any
reservations about departures from or limitations of the procedures.
 Phase completion certificates should be issued by the commissioning organization to
certify that all the tests in the respective commissioning phase have been satisfactorily
completed (listing all deficiencies and non-conformances, if any). Phase completion
certificates should also list associated test certificates.
 It should be ensured that succeeding phases can be conducted safely and that the safety of
the reactor facility is never dependent on the performance of untested SSCs.
As there is a regulatory hold point in place at the end of each phase, the written request to the
CNSC for approval to proceed beyond a commissioning phase should confirm that:
 all related project commitments tied to the phase have been completed
 all systems required for safe operation beyond the phase are available
 all specified operating procedures have been formally verified and validated
 specified training has been completed and staff are qualified
 all non-conformances and unexpected results identified leading up to the next phase have
been addressed
For each phase of commissioning, the licensee is expected to establish a set of commissioning
control points (CCPs) to achieve a transparent, accountable and effective process for ensuring
that the prerequisites for the release of each CCP have been formally demonstrated.
Some CCPs will also be regulatory hold points, requiring prior authorization by the Commission
or a person authorized by the Commission to proceed further in the commissioning program.
“Non-licensing” CCPs are usually treated as witness points, observed by CNSC staff. Licensees
are expected to exercise appropriate control of all CCPs. All applicable non-licensing CCPs must
be satisfactorily completed to obtain the release from the regulatory hold points.
Details on the conduct of NPP commissioning programs, reactor designer input and the
regulatory oversight of commissioning are provided in annex 19(i).
19 (ii) Operational limits and conditions
19 (ii) (a) Identification of safe operating limits

The requirement for NPP licensees to describe, in an application for a licence to operate a Class I
nuclear facility, the systems and equipment, including their design and operating conditions, is
stated in paragraph 6(b) of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations.
The safe operating limits satisfy regulatory requirements, standards and guidelines related to
NPP design and operation, including defence-in-depth principles. Historically, these are
implemented in operating manuals and impairment manuals (see subarticle 19(iv)).
The full set of requirements for safe operation of a CANDU NPP includes:
 requirements on special safety systems and safety-related standby equipment or functions
(e.g., set points and other limiting parameters, availability requirements)
 requirements on process systems (e.g., limiting parameters, testing and surveillance
principles and specifications, performance requirements under abnormal conditions)
 prerequisites for removing special safety systems and other safety-related or process
standby equipment from service
These requirements are derived from design-basis safety analyses that are described in the safety
analysis report. The safety analysis examines the NPP’s responses to disturbances in process
function, system failures, component failures and human errors. Other requirements (e.g., those
identified through design support analysis or PSA) could include limitations related to equipment
and materials, operational requirements, equipment aging, instrumentation and analysis
uncertainties, and more. Assessments of failure modes and effects analysis can also identify
requirements that form part of the safe operating limits. In principle, the analysis considers all
allowable power levels; however, it is not feasible to analyze in advance every potential state that
could occur throughout the life of an NPP. Therefore, the analysis attempts to consider sufficient
situations to define safe operating limits that encompass the expected variations in conditions at a
reasonable level of system/equipment performance detail.
Operating limits for Canadian NPPs that have the greatest impact on safety are identified in the
operating policies and principles (OP&P; see subsection 9(b)) document and through the safe
operating envelope (SOE) documentation (see subsection 19(ii)(b)). Changes to these limits that
may negatively affect safety require appropriate justification by operations support staff and are
reviewed by the CNSC.
19 (ii) (b) Safe operating envelope project

The purpose of the safe operating envelope (SOE) project was to more clearly define the safe
operating limits for Canadian NPPs, so that they are readily measurable by operations staff. In
the past, the licensees primarily used the OP&P to define relevant operational limits. However,
because the OP&P represent only a subset of the relevant limits, the licensees undertook a
project to more fully define the SOE as a complete and comprehensive set of limits derived from
the safety analysis through controlled processes, based on the requirements of CSA standard
N290.15-10, Requirements for the safe operating envelope of nuclear power plants.
In the process of developing and implementing SOE programs, it was noticed that there was
strong alignment among the NPPs and any variations between them (in terms of the plant
systems) were explicitly identified during the SOE project. To achieve consistency and
rationalize differences, COG documented the industry position in 2013 with respect to
rationalizing the plant systems considered to be part of the mandatory SOE scope for operating
NPPs in Canada, and to identify criteria to rationalize the differences in SOE systems. This
document will allow the licensees to focus on the aspects that are most important to safety.
All NPP licensees performed self-assessments against the requirements of N290.15 during the
SOE implementation process, using the COG document as guidance. Additionally, CNSC staff
conducted independent pilot SOE inspections at Canadian NPPs during the reporting period.
NPP licensees took the necessary steps to address gaps identified in the self-assessments and the
CNSC inspection findings. The inspections confirmed that all NPPs have completed the initial
development and the baseline implementation of their SOE programs.
With SOEs implemented, all licensees commenced the maintenance phase, and will periodically
review document changes resulting from revisions to design, operation, safety analysis or licence
requirements against the SOE documents.
19 (iii) Procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing

Operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of systems, equipment and components at the
NPPs are conducted in accordance with approved governance and procedures. The governance
and procedures are incorporated into various licensee programs (examples are provided in
appendix C) within the structure of the NPP’s management system (see subsection 13(a)).
The governance defines the organizational and administrative requirements for the establishment
and implementation of preventive, corrective and predictive maintenance; periodic inspections;
tests; repairs and replacements; training of personnel; procurement of spare parts; provision of
related facilities and services; and generation, collection and retention of operating and
maintenance records.
The CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-210, Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants,
sets the requirements for policies, processes and procedures for maintaining the SSCs of each
NPP. The range of maintenance activities specified includes monitoring, inspecting, testing,
assessing, calibrating, servicing, overhauling, repairing and replacing parts – all intended to
ensure that the reliability and effectiveness of all equipment and systems continue to meet the
relevant requirements.
CNSC regulatory document RD/GD-98, Reliability Programs for Nuclear Power Plants,
specifies that a reliability program for an NPP shall:
 identify all systems important to safety
 specify reliability targets for those systems
 describe the potential failure modes of those systems
 specify the minimum capabilities and performance levels of those systems needed to
satisfy regulatory requirements and the safety targets of the NPP
 provide input for the maintenance program to maintain the effectiveness of those systems
 provide for inspections, tests, modelling, monitoring and other measures to assess the
reliability of those systems
 include provisions to assure, verify and demonstrate that the program is implemented
effectively
 document the elements of the program
 report the results of the program
The identification of systems important to safety is done using input from PSAs (see
subsection 14(i)(d)), deterministic analyses (see subsection 14(i)(c)) and expert panels.
Operations are governed by the OP&P for each NPP that, among other things, set requirements
for the maintenance and testing procedures for special safety systems to ensure no safety
function is ever compromised by maintenance activities. Safety system testing is required at a
frequency that demonstrates that each safety function is operating correctly and meets
availability limits (typically, greater than 99.9 percent). Each component of a special safety
system is subject to a regular functional test. Specific requirements for testing to confirm the
availability/functionality of safety and safety-related systems are described in
subsection 14(ii)(a).
Procedures used by NPP staff during routine operation of the NPP and its auxiliary systems are
located in the operating manuals. The operating manuals contain:
 system-based procedures that assist the operators during normal operations, such as
system start-up and shutdown and minor malfunctions limited to individual systems
 overall unit-control procedures that coordinate major evolutions such as unit start-up and
shutdown and major plant transients
 alarm response manual procedures that provide the operations staff with information
regarding alarm functions; typical information provided includes set points, probable causes
of alarms, pertinent information, references and operator responses
To aid the safe and consistent operation of the NPPs, detailed station condition records or event
reports are written by the licensees. These documents provide information on undesirable events
considered significant in the operation of NPPs. They are reviewed to confirm safe operation and
help identify necessary corrective actions or opportunities for improvement (see
subarticle 19(vii) for more details). Less significant issues are also reported for trending
purposes.
The NPP licensees implemented several improvements during the reporting period that will
positively affect various aspects of operation, maintenance, inspection, testing and reliability.
Improvements to surveillance hardware and software were also implemented, to improve

component and system surveillance and trending capabilities. At Darlington, the shutdown
system monitoring computer was improved to enhance monitoring, calibrating and testing
capabilities. At Pickering, a new computer interface for generator turbine temperature
monitoring has been installed to improve temperature point monitoring capabilities for the
turbine generator operators. The transition of control room instrumentation from analog to digital
continued at all OPG NPP sites to improve monitoring and control capabilities.
19 (iv) Procedures for responding to operational occurrences and accidents

The Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations require each NPP licensee to have measures to
prevent or mitigate the effects of accidental releases of nuclear substances and hazardous
substances, as well as, measures to assist offsite authorities in emergency preparedness activities.
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Version 2, which will be implemented in the next reporting period, provides the detailed
requirements for onsite emergency plans and response capability. Emergency plans and
programs, including accident management provisions, are submitted to the CNSC as part of the
licence application (see subsection 16.1(b) for details). The CNSC also observes emergency
training, exercises and drills to confirm adequate implementation of the licensees’ onsite
provisions in their emergency response plans.
It is recognized that the consequences of reactor accidents can be minimized by sound onsite and
offsite accident management. This is achieved by developing operating procedures in advance to
assist and guide operators in responding to accidents.
All Canadian NPPs have a comprehensive, hierarchical set of manuals and procedures – covering
normal plant operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions – that are
routinely tested in onsite drills. Although procedures vary among NPPs, the system generally
contains:
 an abnormal incident manual
 a special safety system impairments manual (which may be a subset of the abnormal
incident manual)
 a radiation protection manual (or radiation protection directives)
The suite of abnormal incident manual procedures directs the operations staff following safety
system impairment, process system failure or a common mode event. These are typically event-based
procedures and have as their end points the safe shutdown of the unit. Critical safety parameter
procedures provide support for all procedures but are especially useful during transients. They
provide structure for the augmented monitoring of critical NPP operating parameters during
specific accident conditions and in cases when the specific event cannot be determined. They
also provide symptom-based frameworks for controlling the reactor, cooling the fuel, and
containing radioactivity.
Radiation protection manual procedures are provided to protect the safety of the operators and
the general public under normal conditions and in the event of a significant radiation incident.
These procedures:
 direct event classification and categorization
 provide for offsite notification
 direct protective actions and monitoring during accident conditions
Each NPP licensee maintains a minimum staff complement to make sure there are always
sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified staff available to respond to emergencies (for
details, see annex 11.2(a)).
The fundamental elements of licensee procedures for responding to anticipated operational
occurrences and events were unchanged during the reporting period. As described in previous
reports, licensees developed, and continue to maintain, operating procedures for dealing with
anticipated operational occurrences, situations and events. Events are typically followed up by
formal determination of root causes with corrective actions that are commensurate with the
situation.
Examples of safety-significant operational events occurring at Canadian NPPs during the
reporting period are listed in appendix D. They illustrate how the licensees responded to the
events and how the CNSC conducted regulatory follow-up. The licensees’ efforts to address
these operational events were effective in correcting deficiencies and preventing recurrence.
None of the events posed a significant threat to persons or the environment. For example, there
were no serious process failures at any NPP during the reporting period. There were also no
events that required rating using the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), as all events
based on pre-rating review were assessed as Level 1 or below-scale (i.e., Level 0).
Severe accident management

Severe accident management (SAM) focuses on preventing the progression of an accident into a
severe accident or mitigating a severe accident when the preventive means have failed. It relies
on the design, guidance and procedural provisions used by NPP staff, as well as appropriate
training activities. Response to severe accidents can be enhanced by external resources that
supplement or replace the onsite resources, including fuel, water, electric power or equipment
such as pumps or generators. The CNSC’s requirements and guidance can be found in the CNSC
regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident Management, Version 1, which was published
October 2014 but is also addressed in the CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.2, Accident
Management, Version 2, which was published September 2015.
The severe accident management provisions may differ between NPPs, depending on the
location and nature of the NPP, as some NPPs are single-unit facilities in relatively remote rural
locations and others are multi-unit facilities close to major urban centres.
As noted in the sixth Canadian report, the post-Fukushima review of licensees and their
provisions for using existing plant capabilities, complementary design features and emergency
mitigating equipment in SAM and recovery confirmed that they remain adequate.
Severe accident management guidelines

The development of CANDU generic severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) is
described in annex 19(iv). Conversion of the generic SAMGs into plant-specific ones and
implementation of the plant-specific SAMGs have been completed for each of the Canadian
NPPs except at Gentilly-2. Since the reactor at Gentilly-2 has been shut down and placed in a
safe storage state, the licensee completed the development and implementation of its SAMGs for
the irradiated fuel bay only.
The development and implementation of plant-specific SAMGs require considerations of plant-
specific designs, operation, equipment, instrumentation and organizational structure. This has
included the development of instructions for roles and responsibilities of the personnel involved
in SAM and emergency response, guidelines for control room and technical support group
operations, specific staff training requirements, and appropriate drills and exercises as part of
SAMG validation.
The post-Fukushima review of procedural guidance and design capabilities of operating NPPs to
cope with accidents, including those involving significant core damage, confirmed that SAMGs
are adequate. To further increase the capabilities to mitigate severe accidents, the CNSC
assigned through the CNSC Action Plan, three Fukushima action items (FAIs) to licensees
related to SAMGs:
 develop/finalize and fully implement SAMGs at each NPP
 expand the scope of SAMGs to include multi-unit and irradiated fuel bay events (see the
Canadian report for the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the CNS for details)
 validate/refine SAMGs to demonstrate their adequacy to address lessons learned from the
Fukushima accident
In response, a COG joint project was carried out to address issues related to updating of SAMGs,
containment integrity, hydrogen mitigation and management, and implementation of in-vessel
retention of the core debris as a key strategy for SAM. At the end of this reporting period, the
COG joint project was completed. The above-listed FAIs have been closed for all NPPs. The
implementation of the post-Fukushima updates in SAMGs, and the demonstration of SAMG
effectiveness through exercises and plant drills are ongoing.
The emergency mitigating equipment guidelines (EMEGs) have been developed and
implemented to guide the deployment of emergency mitigating equipment as an additional onsite
capability to provide water and electricity to cope with accidents. Integration of plant procedures
(e.g., abnormal incident manuals, emergency operating procedures) with SAMGs and EMEGs is
ongoing.
Verification of the SAMG/EMEG documentation and training, along with the validation of the
SAM program are being done mainly through table-top exercises, plant drills or large-scale
emergency exercises that simulate severe accident scenarios. One such exercise conducted
during the reporting period was Exercise Intrepid (see annex 16.1(f)).
During the reporting period, CNSC staff undertook a number of activities to review the
licensees’ SAM programs. These activities included:
 desktop reviews of technical basis and documentation for NPP-specific SAMGs
 reviews of the EMEGs and their integration with SAMGs and other plant procedures and
manuals
 interviews with plant staff involving SAM and emergency response
 evaluations of plant drills simulating severe accidents where SAMGs and EMEGs are
exercised
 analytical simulations of severe accident progression with and without the SAMG-
specified actions
 integral assessment while taking into account all the above
Further details on the development and implementation of SAMGs at each NPP during the
reporting period are provided in annex 19(iv).
19 (v) Engineering and technical support

Necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields must be available
throughout the lifetime of an NPP, including during accident conditions or under
decommissioning.
Article 11 addresses licensee financial and human resources, which are planned throughout
the NPP’s life as well as decommissioning. Budgets are also made available to hire external
service providers and establish contracts for support in areas outside the technical or
engineering expertise of full-time staff. All NPP licensees have service contracts with other
Canadian companies that include research, engineering, analysis, assessment, maintenance,
inspections and design support. The CANDU R&D program, which supports the operating
NPPs, is described in appendix E.
Canadian NPP licensees have smart buyer functions to assure that the services rendered to them
serve the purpose and meet the relevant requirements. In short, a smart buyer is an organization
that knows what it will likely receive, its implications, the methodology used by outside
contractors to arrive at certain positions, and how the results received will be managed.
For example, OPG’s smart buyer function establishes a number of key attributes to enable
recognition of the quality of outputs provided by outside organizations that might affect safety:
 sufficient staff to maintain specialized expertise in the required discipline (e.g., thermal
hydraulics)
 in-depth knowledge of past and present regulatory issues
 rapport with regulatory staff specialists
 in-depth knowledge of NPP design and operation
 ability to provide leadership on technical issues within the Canadian nuclear industry
The NPP licensees utilize a design authority function to ensure that the integrity of approved
designs and the design process is maintained. The design authority is executed by the chief
engineer, who has overall responsibility for the smart buyer function. The design authority
encompasses overall responsibility for the design process, approval of design changes, and
assurance that the requisite knowledge of the reference design is maintained as defined and
implemented in the management system. The scope of accountability ensures that:
 a knowledge base of relevant aspects of the facility and products is established and kept
up to date, while experience and research findings are taken into account
 all design information required for a safe facility is available
 the requisite security measures are in place
 design configuration is maintained for approved designs
 appropriate design verification is applied
 all necessary interfaces are in place
 all engineering and scientific skills are maintained
 appropriate design rules and procedures, including codes and standards, are used
 engineering work is executed by qualified staff using appropriate methods in compliance
with procedures
All Canadian NPPs have generally the same reactor design and licensees therefore work closely
with their partners, for example, through COG. Additionally, licensees can easily share technical
and engineering resources. The licensees presently share the same contractors, including
specialists, in such areas as:
 emergency response organizations
 technical support groups that include contractors to provide support during accident
response for SAMG
Further, there are mutual assistance agreements within industry. Membership in organizations
such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and COG also provides access to
assistance between member organizations.
Hydro-Québec is continuing to maintain the necessary engineering and technical support at
Gentilly-2 during the safe storage state. The engineering and technical group at Gentilly-2 has
access to additional support from Hydro-Québec staff working at other non-nuclear locations or
specialized contractor organizations.
At Pickering, significant staff reductions are anticipated to be required as a result of the end of
commercial operations at the NPP. In 2014, OPG established a team to focus on the end of
commercial operations, led by the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Decommissioning and
Waste and reporting directly to OPG’s Chief Nuclear Officer. The team is accountable for the
overall planning for the end of commercial operations at the NPP. This includes the plans for
resourcing as well as plans for the physical plant, such as the safe storage project and
decommissioning plans. Resourcing plans will ensure appropriate staff members are redeployed
internally for decommissioning work.
19 (vi) Reporting incidents significant to safety

Licensees use station condition records or event reports to provide information on undesirable
events that are considered significant in the operation of NPPs. The licensees determine the
significance of these events using specific operational procedures. During the reporting period,
the licensees reported safety-significant events to the CNSC in a timely manner and in
accordance with the requirements of the CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.1.1, Reporting
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants. Additional information on the requirements and the
work of CNSC staff to track and follow up on safety-significant events at NPPs is provided in
subsection 7.2(iii)(b).
The CNSC submits the descriptions of events that meet INES thresholds to the IAEA Nuclear
Event Web-based System (NEWS).
Canada is also committed to reporting to the International Reporting System (IRS), a database of
international events that is operated by both the IAEA and the NEA, on significant events
occurring at Canadian NPPs. Canada appoints a member of the CNSC staff as a national
coordinator to collect, analyze and submit information on events occurring in Canada. Actions
taken in Canada to address events reported internationally are presented annually by Canada
through its delegates to the appropriate fora, such as the IRS technical committee and/or the
NEA Working Group on Operating Experience.
Issues arising from operating experience (other than events) are reported in different fora. At the
CNSC, such issues are disseminated at management meetings and via inspection reports. The
screening of those issues that are to be shared with the public and international fora is performed
as part of the preparation of event initial reports (EIRs), which are submitted to the Commission.
Guidance for screening EIRs is available to assist CNSC staff with preparing these reports for
the Commission.
At all NPPs, the significance of discoveries other than incidents (e.g., unexpected degradation of
equipment, management issues raised through various means including WANO peer reviews,
design weaknesses) is rated using criteria in the corrective action program.
19 (vii) Operational experience feedback

The NPP licensees conduct analysis and trending of events with relatively small safety
significance to help prevent the occurrence of events with more significant consequences. The
licensees have active operating experience (OPEX) programs facilitated by COG, WANO and
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
Existing mechanisms are used to share important OPEX throughout the CANDU industry and
with international bodies and other operating organizations and regulatory bodies.
The process of collecting, analyzing and disseminating lessons learned from information arising
from OPEX is normally part of the licensees’ quality assurance programs. CSA standard N286,
Management system requirements for nuclear facilities, requires measures to ensure OPEX is
documented, assessed and incorporated into the operation of the NPP and its quality assurance
programs, as appropriate. It also calls for sharing this information with personnel in the other
phases of the NPP’s lifecycle.
The primary sources of OPEX information are station condition records and event reports. Other
licensee reports include the licensees’ quarterly and annual reports, in-service reports and internal
audit reports.
The licensees integrate OPEX into all aspects of NPP operation and management. For example,
NB Power has developed a problem identification and corrective action system, while OPG has
an OPEX website that incorporates station condition records. NPP licensees utilize OPEX from the
WANO, COG and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) websites.
COG provides an information exchange program and chairs a weekly OPEX screening meeting
teleconference that serves as a CANDU screening committee of industry OPEX representatives
to review event reports from CANDU NPPs and nuclear industry sources.
Additionally, the CNSC has established the OPEX Clearinghouse program to systematically
review domestic and international events, and to leverage the integrated expertise of CNSC staff,
ensuring that relevant events are followed up in a timely manner. The OPEX Clearinghouse
draws information from several sources including:
 Central Event Reporting and Tracking System, which is a database used to collect and
categorize reported events at Canadian NPPs and track follow-up
 IRS
 NEA Working Group on Operating Experience
Problems or issues that arise from event reviews that may be applicable to other NPPs are
identified and brought to the attention of CNSC site inspectors and different specialist groups in
the CNSC.
CNSC staff members incorporate the results of root-cause analyses in their reviews and
assessments of a licensee’s corrective actions in response to a certain event. Further actions are
requested if the corrective actions undertaken by the licensee are considered inadequate. In
addition, the CNSC site inspectors review the status of corrective actions to make sure they have
been completed expeditiously.
CNSC inspection teams consult the OPEX in the Central Event Reporting and Tracking System
when planning strategies for their audits and in identifying problem areas in operation or
maintenance (such as procedural non-compliance, procedural deficiencies and the use of non-
standard components). Similarly, CNSC assessments often utilize the OPEX recorded in this
database. As part of the inspection baseline, CNSC inspectors check the licensee’s station
condition records or event reports, along with system health reports, to ensure OPEX and the
extent of condition have been applied to the systems by the licensees.
19 (viii) Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste onsite
Responsibility
The Government of Canada has established a radioactive waste policy framework, to ensure the
safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Primary responsibility for the storage and
long-term management of radioactive waste and spent fuel rests with waste producers and owners
(licensees).
Operations
Canadian NPP licensees manage radioactive waste using methods similar to those practised in
other countries. As disposal facilities are not yet available, primary emphasis is placed on
minimization, volume reduction, segregation, conditioning and interim storage of the waste.
A key principle concerning the management of radioactive waste is that its generation should be
minimized to the extent practicable through the implementation of appropriate design measures
and operating/decommissioning practices.
The Canadian nuclear industry minimizes waste through:
 material control procedures to prevent materials from unnecessarily entering into
radioactive areas
 enhanced waste monitoring capabilities to reduce inclusion of non-radioactive wastes in
radioactive wastes
 use of launderable personal protective equipment, instead of single-use items
 improvements to waste handling facilities
 employee training and awareness
Reusing personal protective equipment has helped reduce the potential waste being generated
during the operation of NPPs. Compaction of replaced components has also helped to
significantly reduce the volume of waste generated during operations.
All waste produced at NPPs is segregated at its point of origin as contaminated or non-
contaminated. Low-level and intermediate-level contaminated wastes are further sorted into
distinct categories, such as:
 can be incinerated
 can be compacted
 cannot be processed to further reduce its volume
Further sorting of the waste helps facilitate subsequent handling, processing and storage.
Radioactive waste and spent fuel management

Radioactive wastes resulting from reactor operations are stored onsite or offsite in above- or
below-ground engineered structures. Prior to storage, the volume of the wastes may be reduced by
incineration, compaction or shredding. In addition, there are facilities for the decontamination of
parts and tools, laundering of protective clothing, and the refurbishment and rehabilitation of
equipment.
The NPP licensees have instituted methods to recover storage space after sufficient radioactive
decay or reclaim existing storage space through further compaction (super compaction) and/or
segregation.
It is possible to retrieve all stored radioactive waste.
Spent fuel from NPPs is stored in interim storage at the site where it was produced. When the
fuel first exits the reactor, it is placed in water-filled irradiated fuel bays for cooling and radiation
shielding. After the minimum amount of time in the bays – six to ten years (the exact cooling
period is site-specific) – and when the associated heat generation has diminished, the spent fuel
can be transferred to an onsite, interim dry storage facility.
The use of natural uranium in CANDU reactors results in fuel bundles – either fresh or irradiated
– that cannot lead to a critical state either in air or light water. Therefore, a criticality accident
cannot occur when CANDU fuel is stored in an irradiated fuel bay or dry storage facility. This is
an inherent safety design of the CANDU system.
As for all nuclear activities, the facilities for handling radioactive waste and spent fuel must be
licensed by the CNSC and conform to all pertinent regulations and licence conditions. The waste
management objective throughout the industry – from mines to NPPs – is the same, which is to
control and limit the release of potentially harmful substances into the environment. CNSC staff
members inspect all licensed facilities to confirm the achievement of this objective.
Further information on Canada’s provisions for radioactive waste and spent fuel can be found in
the fifth Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, published in October 2014.
This report is available on the CNSC and IAEA websites.
Appendices
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix A
Relevant Websites
Document or organization Web site
Nuclear Safety and Control Act laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-28.3
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,2012 laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.21
General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-
2000-202
Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-
2000-204
Radiation Protection Regulations laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-
2000-203
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Cost laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/sor-
Recovery Fees Regulations 2003-212
Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2013-
(Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) 139
Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-28.1
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited aecl.ca
Bruce Power brucepower.com
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency ceaa-acee.gc.ca
Canadian Nuclear Laboratories cnl.ca
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission nuclearsafety.gc.ca
Candu Energy Inc. candu.com
CANDU Owners Group www.candu.org
CANTEACH canteach.candu.org
Environment and Climate Change Canada ec.gc.ca
Global Affairs Canada international.gc.ca/international
Fisheries and Oceans Canada dfo-mpo.gc.ca
Health Canada hc-sc.gc.ca
Hydro-Québec hydroquebec.com
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations inpo.info
International Atomic Energy Agency iaea.org
Natural Resources Canada nrcan.gc.ca
NB Power nbpower.com
Ontario Power Generation opg.com
Public Health Agency of Canada phac-aspc.gc.ca
Appendix A
Document or organization Web site

Public Safety Canada publicsafety.gc.ca
SNC-Lavalin Nuclear snclavalin.com/en/nuclear
University Network of Excellence in Nuclear unene.ca
Engineering
University of Ontario Institute of Technology uoit.ca
World Association of Nuclear Operators www.wano.info
Appendix B
Appendix B
List and Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Canada
Reactor Licensee Gross Construction First Operating status

capacity start criticality
(MW)
Bruce A, Unit 1 Bruce Power 830 Jun. 1, 1971 Dec. 17, 1976 Operating
Bruce A, Unit 2 800 Dec. 1, 1970 Jul. 27, 1976 Operating
Bruce A, Unit 3 830 Jul. 1, 1972 Nov. 28, 1977 Operating
Bruce A, Unit 4 830 Sep. 1, 1972 Dec. 10, 1978 Operating
Bruce B, Unit 5 Bruce Power 872 Jul. 1, 1978 Nov. 15, 1984 Operating
Bruce B, Unit 6 872 Jan. 1, 1978 May 29, 1984 Operating
Bruce B, Unit 7 872 May 1, 1979 Jan. 7, 1987 Operating
Bruce B, Unit 8 872 Aug. 1, 1979 Feb. 15, 1987 Operating
Darlington, Unit 1 Ontario Power 934 Apr. 1, 1982 Oct. 29, 1990 Operating
Generation
Darlington, Unit 2 934 Sep. 1, 1981 Nov. 5, 1989 Operating
Darlington, Unit 3 934 Sep. 1, 1984 Nov. 9, 1992 Operating
Darlington, Unit 4 934 Jul. 1, 1985 Mar. 13, 1993 Operating
Gentilly-2 Hydro-Québec 675 Apr. 1, 1974 Sep. 11, 1982 Safe storage state
Pickering, Unit 1 Ontario Power 542 Jun. 1, 1966 Feb. 25, 1971 Operating
Generation
Pickering, Unit 2 542 Sep. 1, 1966 Sep. 15, 1971 Safe storage state
Pickering, Unit 3 542 Dec. 1, 1967 Apr. 24, 1972 Safe storage state
Pickering, Unit 4 542 May 1, 1968 May 16, 1973 Operating
Pickering, Unit 5 Ontario Power 540 Nov. 1, 1974 Oct. 23, 1982 Operating
Generation
Pickering, Unit 6 540 Oct. 1, 1975 Oct. 15, 1983 Operating
Pickering, Unit 7 540 Mar. 1, 1976 Oct. 22, 1984 Operating
Pickering, Unit 8 540 Sep. 1, 1976 Dec. 17, 1985 Operating
Point Lepreau NB Power 705 May 1, 1975 Jul. 25, 1982 Operating
Appendix C
Appendix C
Examples of Program Descriptions and Plans Required to
Support an Application to Renew a Nuclear Power Plant
Operating Licence
Summary of programs organized by CNSC safety and control areas (not limited to the
listed topics)
1. Management system 2. Human performance 3. Operating performance
 Nuclear management system / management  Nuclear operations / operating
nuclear safety policy  Human performance / policies and principles
 Managed systems / records and technical procedures  Safe operating envelope /
document control  Continuous behaviour operational safety
 Business planning / nuclear observation program / limits requirements
organization / organizational of hours of work / minimum  Plant status control /
change control / contractor shift complement chemistry
management program  Leadership and management  Operating experience
 Nuclear safety oversight / training / staff training process / corrective action
independent assessment / nuclear  Reactor safety program /
safety culture assessment reactivity management / heat
sink management / response to
transient
 Accident management and
recovery
 Severe accident management
and recovery
4. Safety analysis 5. Physical design 6. Fitness for service
 Reactor safety program / risk and  Conduct of engineering /  Conduct of maintenance /
reliability program engineering change control / integrated aging management
 Safety report (all parts) / analyses procurement engineering  Equipment reliability /
of record  Design management / component and equipment
configuration management surveillance / reliability and
 Fuel monitoring of systems
 Fire protection important to safety
 Pressure boundary program  Major component / lifecycle
 Environmental qualification management plans
 Software  Non-destructive examination
7. Radiation protection 8. Conventional health 9. Environmental
 Radiation protection / controlling and safety protection
exposure ALARA (as low as  Health and safety policy  Environmental policy /
reasonably achievable)  Conventional safety / work environmental management /
 Occupational action levels protection derived release limits and
environmental action levels
10. Emergency management 11. Waste management 12. Security
and fire protection  Nuclear waste management  Nuclear security
 Emergency management policy / program  Security report
nuclear pandemic plan /  Waste management
consolidated nuclear emergency  Decommissioning planning
plan / preliminary
 Fire protection decommissioning plan
13. Safeguards and non- 14. Packaging and Other matters of regulatory
proliferation transport interest
 Nuclear safeguards  Radioactive material  Financial guarantees / nuclear
transportation liability insurances
 Public information program
 Aboriginal consultation
Appendix D
Appendix D
Significant Events During Reporting Period3
Location/date3 Description Corrective action by licensee Regulatory action
Manual During OPG system engineering OPG conservatively decided to shut down CNSC staff monitored OPG's
shutdown at environmental qualification the units to perform the EQ inspections progress through meetings and
Pickering Units 1 walkdowns, a number of electrical and complete all repairs. OPG performed routine updates. CNSC staff verified
and 4 connectors were found to be a root-cause investigation and that OPG took appropriate measures
misaligned. A technical operability implemented a corrective action plan. to protect the public, its workers and
June 5, 2013 evaluation was initiated to ensure the environment.
proper alignment of the connectors
throughout the station. During the
initial part of this evaluation, 461
connectors were inspected across
Units 1–8. Three connectors on Unit 1
and two on Unit 4 were found to be
misaligned. As a result, Units 1 and 4
were manually taken offline on June 5,
2013, per procedure, to complete
repairs and inspect connectors in
inaccessible areas. A total of 559
connectors have been inspected since
the discovery.
Suspect valves at Licensees reported that some valves, Bruce Power, OPG and NB Power worked CNSC staff concluded that the
Bruce A and B, which may have had suspect material together to determine the extent of engineering assessments and reviews
Darlington, used in their manufacture, were condition. A total of 1,116 valves and conducted by licensees, suppliers and
Pickering and installed at Bruce A and B, valve parts suspected of containing non- authorized inspection agencies had
Point Lepreau Darlington, Pickering, and Point conforming material were found at been thorough and robust. The
Lepreau. The potential non- Canadian NPPs. Of these, 740 were assessments demonstrated the
March 2015 conforming material in the suspect installed in operating NPPs. components were fit for service with
3
All the events listed in this appendix were presented to the Commission during public hearings/meetings.
Appendix D

valves came from a third-party The affected NPP licensees determined no safety issues and that none of the
supplier. These valves had been the extent of condition and submitted safety-related components in service
received as early as 2001 and some related reports to the CNSC. Licensees has had a pressure boundary failure.
have been installed since that time. No determined that there were no operability The CNSC also concluded that the
impairments in special safety systems or safety concerns with the supplied licensees implemented appropriate
or safety-related systems were found valves and components. Moreover, they corrective actions.
attributable to the reported suspect quarantined all suspect components in The involved vendors and licensees
items. storage to prevent installation and completed focused supplementary
identified affected system(s). The
The NPP licensees performed a root- audits to confirm the extent of
licensees determined that there were no
cause analysis of the event. For this condition and validate the results. A
immediate operability or safety concerns
event, the root cause was identified as new CSA N299 standard, Quality
with the supplied valves and components.
the supplier’s employee assurance program requirements for
misrepresenting information on the The licensees committed to submitting the supply of items and services of
material test certificates about the further reports to the CNSC. nuclear power plants is being
materials used to manufacture certain developed and will be published in
This issue has no impact on safety at
parts of nuclear-class valves. 2016. It will provide a systematic and
Gentilly-2.
consistent set of requirements for
As a result of the misrepresented
suppliers for the prevention and
material test certificates, these
detection of counterfeit, fraudulent or
materials no longer met the material
suspect items (CFSIs).
certification requirements of the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel The discovery and reporting of these
Code, Section III NCA 3862 – incidents demonstrated the
Certification of Material. effectiveness of the NPP licensees’
supply chain management and
The vendors who conducted the
procurement quality assurance
engineering assessments concluded
program for discovering and
that there is no safety risk for the
mitigating the intrusion of CFSIs into
continued use of the valves and parts.
their operations as well as the overall
robustness of their supply chain
processes. To further improve the
effectiveness of their programs,
Appendix D

Canadian NPP licensees
implemented a variety of
enhancements after this event to
increase surveillance of sub-
suppliers’ quality programs and to
enhance awareness and training of
supply-chain staff with respect to
CFSI issues.
Heavy water leak A leak of heavy water from a Control room operators were able to CNSC staff followed up on the
during disassembled valve in the Unit 2 quickly diagnose the event and isolate the adequacy of protection offered by the
maintenance of heavy water transfer system occurred leak, per procedures. Unit 2 was shut isolation valve, the quality of the
Darlington Unit during planned maintenance. down normally without any operational or valve chosen for work protection and
2 Approximately 7,000 litres of heavy safety issues. There was no contamination the results of OPG’s root cause
water spilled from piping. The spill of the maintainers at the site of the leak analysis. CNSC staff concluded that
April 14, 2015 was contained in two rooms within because they were wearing appropriate the licensee responded adequately to
confinement and drain tanks, per protective equipment and followed this issue and implemented
design. applicable procedures once the leak appropriate corrective actions.
began. Dose uptakes received by these
maintainers were negligible and were
verified through prompt bioassays and
readings of their thermoluminescent
dosimetry badges. The water was
recovered and, because operators were
wearing appropriate protective equipment,
no operator received any additional dose
during the recovery, cleanup or
decontamination. There were no risks to
any other personnel at the station at any
time.
The cause of the event was the failure of
an upstream isolation point that allowed
Appendix D

the heavy water to pass through the valve
under maintenance.
OPG investigated the event and produced
a root-cause analysis. The analysis
identified the root cause as inadequate risk
perception around guaranteed devices.
Also, two contributing causes were
identified:
 Personnel had a less-than-adequate
questioning attitude when evaluating
worksite conditions.
 Evaluation and application of
operating experience were not fully
effective.
An extent of condition and extent of cause
were also performed. A corrective action
plan was developed and implemented to
prevent a re-occurrence.
Serious injury to During the Bruce B Unit 8 outage, Prior to 2013, rotor inspections were Bruce Power submitted a detailed
a worker at mechanical maintenance staff performed by representatives from event report and root cause report to
Bruce B Unit 8 members at Bruce Power were General Electric, the equipment the CNSC on March 31, 2016. CNSC
attempting to remove the plug inserted manufacturer. In 2013, this duty was staff members are reviewing the
February 1, 2016 into the end of the turbine generator transitioned to Bruce Power employees. reports and corrective actions taken
rotor in order to do a rotor inspection. However, there was no procedure specific to determine whether the NPP
This involved drilling to remove to Bruce Power available for this work. licensee’s response is complete and if
sections of the mechanical plug. While After the event, Bruce Power completed any enforcement action will be
drilling, hydrogen gas, which had an extent of condition and shared its necessary.
leaked past seals in the turbine findings with industry through the COG
generator rotor and was present inside OPEX forum as well as with WANO. A
the rotor bore, ignited and burned the Bruce Power procedure has since been
Appendix D

worker, who suffered burns to his developed and issued. Furthermore,
arms, chest and face. Bruce Power procedures governing the interface
first responders transported the worker between Bruce Power and vendors are
to an offsite hospital for treatment. being revised to document expectations
Work on the generator was stopped for contract supervisors to ensure its
and the work area was quarantined. vendors attend briefings and to ensure
The event was reported to both the Bruce Power personnel assigned to
CNSC and the Ontario Ministry of perform support tasks are aware of
Labour, per regulatory requirements. associated hazards and optimal work
The event occurred on the non-nuclear practices.
side of the plant and there were no
radiological implications from the gas
ignition.
Appendix E
Appendix E
Nuclear Research in Canada Related to
Nuclear Power Plants
E.1 Introduction and context
Canada holds the view that nuclear safety research is important in supporting the safe design and
operation of NPPs. To obtain licensing approval in Canada, applicants (with the aid of the NPP
designer) must be able to provide adequate safety justification. Fulfilling this responsibility
includes the provision of adequate experimental data to support analytical models and safety
analyses. As practice shows, ongoing experimental research is needed to address emerging issues
for operating plants and for plant life extension. New reactor design requires substantial
investment in research and development (R&D) to adequately demonstrate the safety of new
technologies.
R&D supporting NPPs in Canada is conducted by many organizations, including Atomic Energy
of Canada Limited (AECL), Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) and the CANDU Owners
Group (COG), as well as utilities, universities and private-sector laboratories. The following
subsections describe the key elements of R&D supporting NPPs in Canada, where the primary
focus is on CANDU reactor design.
E.2 CANDU Owners Group research and development program

To support the safe, reliable and economic operation of CANDU reactors, the COG R&D
program addresses current and emerging operating issues in the areas of:
 fuel channels
 safety and licensing
 health, safety and the environment
 chemistry, materials and components
 the Industry Standard Toolset (software for design, safety analysis, and operational
support)
 strategic R&D
The COG R&D program is co-funded by domestic CANDU licensees, CNL, the Romanian
Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica and the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company, with
current funding of about $40 million annually, benefitting from a stable multi-year commitment.
COG also arranges other projects that are executed by the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) and other R&D contractors, which leverage another $15–20 million annually for R&D
that supports NPPs in Canada.
Beginning in 2016, COG will embark on a strategic R&D program that will focus on developing
technologies and other solutions to keep CANDU reactors operating safely, reliably and
competitively for an extended plant life.
The COG member organizations also provide significant financial support to the Canadian
University Network of Excellence in Nuclear Engineering (UNENE), an alliance of universities,
nuclear power utilities, and research and regulatory agencies. Established as a not-for-profit
corporation in 2002, UNENE supports and develops nuclear education, research and
development capability in Canadian universities.
Appendix E
Fuel channels
The strategic objective of the fuel channels R&D program is to develop and support adequate
models for the following phenomena and potential degradation mechanisms:
 crack initiation
 fracture toughness through the full operating range over the full operating life
 leak-before-break
 pressure tube rupture frequency
 deuterium ingress
 deformation including pressure tube to calandria tube gap predictions in support of blister
avoidance
 fitness for service of Inconel X-750 fuel channel annulus spacers
Safety and licensing

The COG safety and licensing R&D program is focused on the following areas:
 plant aging
 safety design basis and safe operating envelope of existing facilities
 resolution of outstanding generic safety and licensing issues
 post-Fukushima enhancements and regulatory issues
This program is comprised of working groups and task teams covering containment, fuel and
fuel channels, fuel normal operating conditions, reactor physics, thermalhydraulics and
probabilistic risk assessment (PSA).
Health, safety and the environment

R&D on health, safety and the environment aims to:
 improve plant performance with respect to radiation protection and emissions reduction
(both radiological and conventional)
 develop technologies to address issues associated with future refurbishment and
decommissioning of aging facilities
 address regulatory issues associated with radiation dose management and with generating
the required databases and models to address new and emerging regulations on the
environmental impacts to non-human biota
 maintain R&D capability to address current and future industry issues in the areas of
health physics and environmental impacts
 ensure future expertise will be available to deal with industry problems, by encouraging
funding of R&D in Canadian universities to train future scientists and technologists for
the industry
 leverage COG funding through the undertaking of collaborative research with other
organizations that have common interests
Chemistry, materials and components

The chemistry, materials and components R&D program:
 covers a diverse range of issues that can affect the safe, reliable and efficient operation of
major CANDU systems and their auxiliaries
Appendix E
 is focused to support long-term operation and plant life extension

 is integrated with the EPRI R&D program to maximize synergies and minimize
duplication
It comprises working groups and task teams covering:
 chemistry
 concrete
 steam generator material integrity
 steam generator non-destructive inspection
 steels
 valves
 cables
 buried piping
Industry Standard Toolset

R&D for the Industry Standard Toolset – computer programs for CANDU reactor design and
analysis – addresses:
 qualification, development and maintenance activities on computer codes
 migration to a modern thermalhydraulics code architecture
Strategic R&D
Once launched in 2016, the strategic R&D program will focus on developing the technologies
and solutions needed to keep the current and refurbished fleet of CANDU reactors operating
safely, reliably and competitively for an extended plant life (i.e., 60-90 years).
E.3 AECL/CNL research and development program

AECL, through the Federal Science and Technology (S&T) Work Plan, provides CNL with
$76 million annually to perform nuclear-related S&T research that supports core federal roles
and responsibilities in the areas of energy, health protection, public safety, security and
environmental protection, while maintaining necessary capabilities and expertise at CNL. CNL
also supports the nuclear industry through access to S&T facilities and expertise on a commercial
basis.
The research to be undertaken in the Federal S&T Work Plan is defined within five theme areas:
 supporting the development of biological applications and understanding the implications
of radiation on living things
 enhancing national and global security by supporting non-proliferation and counter-
terrorism
 supporting nuclear preparedness and emergency response
 supporting safe, secure and responsible use and development of nuclear technologies
 supporting environmental stewardship and radioactive management
E.4 CNSC research program

The CNSC funds an external research program to obtain knowledge and information needed to
support the CNSC’s regulatory mission. The program provides access to independent advice,
Appendix E
expertise, experience and information through contracts placed with the private sector or through
grants or contributions to other organizations in Canada and elsewhere. The contracts issued
under the program align with the CNSC’s research-related safety and control areas, which
include:
 human performance management
 safety analysis
 physical design
 fitness for service
 environmental protection
The CNSC research program issues grants and contributions to organizations and programs such
as the following:
 UNENE
 IAEA
o International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned
o Coordinated Research Program on Evaluation of Materials from Decommissioned
Reactors
o FAST Nuclear Emergency Tools
o International Seismic Safety Centre
o Small Modular Reactor Working Group
 OECD/NEA
o Component Operational Experience, Degradation and Ageing Programme
o Cable Ageing Data and Knowledge Project Phase II
o Propagation d’un incendie pour des scénarios multi-locaux élémentaires (program
that conducts research on fire propagation)
o Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP)
o High Energy Arcing Fault Events Project
 USNRC
o Cooperative Agreement of Thermalhydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance
Program
o Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program
o Radiation Protection Code Analysis and Maintenance Program
 CSA Group
 ICRP
The annual budget of the CNSC research program is approximately $4 million, most of which is
allocated to NPP safety research.
E.5 Generation IV International Forum

Canada is a founding member of the Generation IV International Forum, which was initiated in
2001 with the signing of the Forum’s Charter for the collaborative development of next
generation nuclear energy systems that will provide safe and reliable energy in a competitively
priced and sustainable way.
Appendix E
In 2005, Canada, along with four other countries, signed the Framework Agreement for
International Collaboration on Research and Development of six Generation IV nuclear energy
systems. This is a binding international treaty-level agreement that unites all participating
countries in large-scale, multilateral research. As of 2016, nine countries plus Euratom are
signatory to the Framework Agreement, which is currently being renewed.
In 2006, NRCan established the Generation IV National Program to support Generation IV R&D
specifically relevant to Canada and to meet Canada’s commitments. It brings together
government, industry and universities from across the country to participate in the multilateral
development of advanced nuclear-based energy systems, with a focus on improving safety,
reducing waste, lowering costs and increasing resistance to proliferation.
Of the six reactor systems endorsed by the Generation IV International Forum, Canada is
focusing on the development of the supercritical water-cooled reactor system. The system is
viewed as the most natural evolution of existing CANDU technology and best enables Canada to
contribute to the R&D initiative by mobilizing existing Canadian CANDU expertise and research
facilities.
As part of Canada’s overall national program, research funds are granted to universities through
a peer-review process to investigate specific areas that support the development of the
supercritical water-cooled reactor concept. In March 2012, the Government of Canada awarded
grants that will provide $8 million over four years (until 2016) to fund 27 Generation IV research
projects at universities across Canada.
Appendix F
Appendix F
Description and Results of the CNSC’s Assessment and
Rating System for Nuclear Power Plants
The CNSC’s rating system, which assesses the performance of NPP licensees across the 14
CNSC safety and control areas (SCAs), consists of four categories:
FS Fully satisfactory
SA Satisfactory
BE Below expectations
UA Unacceptable
The definitions of these categories are as follows.
Fully satisfactory
Compliance with regulatory requirements is fully satisfactory. Compliance within the area
exceeds requirements and CNSC expectations. Compliance is stable or improving and any
problems or issues that arise are promptly addressed.
Satisfactory
Compliance with regulatory requirements is satisfactory. Compliance within the area meets
requirements and CNSC expectations. Any deviation is only minor and any issues are
considered to pose a low risk to the achievement of regulatory objectives and CNSC
expectations. Appropriate improvements are planned.
Below expectations
Compliance with regulatory requirements falls below expectations. Compliance within the
area deviates from requirements or CNSC expectations, to the extent that there is a moderate
risk of ultimate failure to comply. Improvements are required to address identified
weaknesses. The licensee or applicant is taking appropriate corrective action.
Unacceptable
Compliance with regulatory requirements is unacceptable and is seriously compromised.
Compliance within the overall area is significantly below requirements or CNSC
expectations, or there is evidence of overall non-compliance. Without corrective action, there
is a high probability that the deficiencies will lead to an unreasonable risk. Issues are not
being addressed effectively, no appropriate corrective measures have been taken and no
alternative plan of action has been provided. Immediate action is required.
The CNSC’s annual assessment of NPPs

The CNSC prepares an annual staff report for the Commission and the public on all Canadian
NPPs. The Regulatory Oversight Report for Canadian Nuclear Power Plants integrates
information gathered through CNSC staff licensing and NPPs’ compliance activities. The activities
include:
 technical assessments (desktop reviews of licensees’ management system documented
information, such as policies, methods, procedures and records)
Appendix F
 Type I inspections (onsite assessments of the programmatic aspects of the management

system’s policies, methods, procedures and records)
 Type II inspections (onsite assessments of the outcomes of licensed activities)
The report uses the rating system described on the previous page to summarize the SCA
performance assessments and determine the integrated plant rating for each NPP. The integrated
plant rating combines the ratings for the 14 SCAs to provide an overall safety assessment for
each NPP. The document makes comparisons where possible, shows trends and averages, and
highlights significant issues in the industry at large. It uses a variety of performance indicators to
illustrate safety performance. The annual staff report describes major developments, initiatives,
issues and challenges during the year as related to the operating NPPs. It also describes major
revisions to licence conditions handbooks during the year.
Table F.1 shows the specific areas that comprise each CNSC SCA. Table F.2 compares the
IAEA safety factors to the SCAs. Table F.3 shows the licensees’ performance ratings during the
reporting period. CNSC requirements and performance expectations in the 14 SCAs were met or
exceeded at the NPPs for the three years of the reporting period.
Appendix F
Table F.1: CNSC functional areas, safety and control areas, and specific areas used to rate
Canadian NPP performance
Functional Safety and Specific area
area control area
Management Management Management system
system Organization
Change management
Safety culture
Configuration management
Records management
Management of contractors
Business continuity
Human Human performance program
performance Personnel training
management Personnel certification
Initial certification examinations and requalification tests
Work organization and job design
Fitness for duty
Operating Conduct of licensed activities
performance Procedures
Reporting and trending
Outage management performance
Safe operating envelope
Severe accident management and recovery
Accident management and recovery
Facility and Safety analysis Deterministic safety analysis
equipment Probabilistic safety assessment
Criticality safety
Severe accident analysis
Management of safety issues (including R&D programs)
Physical Design governance
design Site characterization
Facility design
Structure design
System design
Components design
Fitness for Equipment fitness for service/equipment performance
service Maintenance
Structural integrity
Aging management
Chemistry control
Appendix F
Functional Safety and Specific area

area control area
Periodic inspections and testing
Core control Radiation Application of ALARA
processes protection Worker dose control
Radiation protection program performance
Radiological hazard control
Estimated dose to public
Conventional Performance
health and Practices
safety Awareness
Environmental Effluent and emissions control (releases)
protection Environmental management system
Assessment and monitoring
Protection of the public
Environmental risk assessment
Emergency Conventional emergency preparedness and response
management Nuclear emergency preparedness and response
and fire Fire emergency preparedness and response
protection
Waste Waste characterization
management Waste minimization
Waste management practices
Decommissioning plans
Security Facilities and equipment
Response arrangements
Security practices
Drills and exercises
Safeguards and Nuclear material accountancy and control
non- Access and assistance to the IAEA
proliferation Operational and design information
Safeguards equipment, containment and surveillance
Import and export
Packaging and Package design and maintenance
transport Packaging and transport
Registration for use
Appendix F
Table F.2: Comparison of IAEA safety factors to CNSC safety and control areas
IAEA safety factor Related CNSC safety and control areas
Plant design Management system, operating performance, safety analysis, physical
design, fitness for service, radiation protection, conventional health
and safety, environmental protection
Actual condition of Management system, safety analysis, physical design, fitness for
structures, systems and service, radiation protection, conventional health and safety,
components important to environmental protection
safety
Equipment qualification Management system, safety analysis, physical design, fitness for
service, radiation protection, conventional health and safety,
environmental protection
Ageing Management system, human performance management, operating
performance, safety analysis, physical design, fitness for service,
radiation protection, conventional health and safety, environmental
performance
Deterministic safety Management system, safety analysis, physical design, fitness for
analysis service, radiation protection, emergency management and fire
protection
Probabilistic safety Safety analysis, physical design, fitness for service
assessment
Hazard analysis Management system, operating performance, safety analysis, physical
design, fitness for service, radiation protection, conventional health
and safety, environmental protection, emergency management and
fire protection, security, safeguards and non-proliferation, transport
and packaging
Safety performance Management system, operating performance, safety analysis, fitness
for service, radiation protection, conventional health and safety,
environmental protection, waste management
Use of experience from Management system, human performance management, operating
other plants and research performance
findings
Organization, the Management system, human performance management, operating
management system and performance
safety culture
Procedures Management system, human performance management, operating
performance, radiation protection, conventional health and safety,
emergency management and fire protection
Human factors Management system, human performance management, operating
performance, fitness for service, radiation protection, conventional
health and safety
Appendix F
IAEA safety factor Related CNSC safety and control areas

Emergency planning Management system, human performance management, operating
performance, conventional health and safety, emergency management
and fire protection
Radiological impact on Management system, operating performance, environmental
the environment protection
Note: The 14 IAEA safety factors listed above are from IAEA Specific Safety Guide SSG-25, Periodic
Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants.
Appendix F
Table F.3: Performance ratings of safety and control areas for NPPs, 2013–2015
Safety and control area Bruce A Bruce B Darlington Pickering Gentilly-2 Point Lepreau
’13 ’14 ’15 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’13 ’14 ’15
Management system SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Human performance
SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
management
Operating performance SA SA FS SA FS FS FS FS FS SA SA FS SA SA SA SA SA SA
Safety analysis SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA FS SA SA FS SA SA SA SA SA SA
Physical design SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Fitness for service SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Radiation protection SA SA SA SA SA SA FS FS FS FS FS FS SA SA SA SA SA SA
Conventional health and
FS FS FS FS FS FS FS SA FS SA SA FS SA SA SA FS FS FS
safety
Environmental protection SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Emergency management
SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
and fire protection
Waste management SA FS FS SA FS FS SA FS FS SA SA FS SA SA SA SA SA SA
Packaging and transport SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
Integrated plant rating SA SA FS SA FS FS FS FS FS SA SA FS SA SA SA SA SA SA
Legend: FS = Fully satisfactory

SA = Satisfactory
Note: Ratings for the Security and Safeguards and non-proliferation SCAs have been omitted from this table as they are outside the scope of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety.
Annexes
ANNEXES
Annex 7.2(i)(a)
Annex 7.2 (i) (a)

CNSC Regulation-making Process
When making or amending regulations, the CNSC must abide by the Government of Canada’s
regulatory policy Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management, which came into effect in 2012.
This directive updates and replaces the Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (April 1,
2007) and the Government of Canada Regulatory Policy (November 1999). Under the Cabinet
Directive on Regulatory Management, the CNSC works with the Regulatory Affairs Sector of
the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat to assess regulatory proposals at an early stage by
submitting a triage statement that considers the following factors:
 potential impact of the regulation on health and safety, security, the environment and the
social and economic well-being of Canadians
 cost or savings to government, business or Canadians and the potential impact on the
Canadian economy and its international competitiveness
 potential impact on other federal departments or agencies, other governments in Canada
or on Canada’s foreign affairs
 degree of interest, contention and support among affected parties and Canadians
 overall expected impact (i.e., low, medium or high) and the particular analytical and other
requirements to be met
Once the triage statement is approved by the Treasury Board Secretariat, the CNSC, with
assistance from the Department of Justice, proceeds with drafting the regulations and consulting
stakeholders. The CNSC regulation-making process includes extensive consultation with both
internal and external stakeholders. In developing its consultation plan, the CNSC recognizes a
multiplicity of stakeholders with different levels of interest, points of view and expectations
concerning the nature and content of a proposed regulatory regime. Internally, CNSC staff
communications inform interested colleagues of the proposed consultative process and the
proposed regulations. Externally, the CNSC coordinates regulatory consultations with other
departments and agencies.
Draft regulations undergo a series of internal approvals before being presented to the Minister of
Natural Resources for approval for pre-publication in the Canada Gazette, Part I. Pre-publication
in the Canada Gazette is a requirement of the Statutory Instruments Act and Treasury Board
policies. It is intended to ensure all Canadians have the opportunity to comment on the
regulations. The comment period varies from 30 to 75 days. Comments received during the pre-
publication period are posted on the CNSC website for interested parties to provide feedback.
Following the pre-publication comment period, the draft regulations are amended, if necessary,
to take into account comments received from stakeholders. Once the final draft regulations are
completed, they must again be circulated for internal approvals before being presented to the
Commission. Under section 44 of the NSCA, the Commission may make regulations with the
approval of the Governor in Council. Governor in Council approval is granted following a
recommendation for approval from the Minister of Natural Resources. Once approved and
registered, the new or amended regulations are published in the Canada Gazette, Part II.
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)

Regulatory Framework Documents
The information in this annex reflects the status of the CNSC regulatory document program at
the end of the reporting period. As of April 2013, all regulatory documents are referred to as
“REGDOC”. Previous naming conventions are described in the footnote to table 1 below.
REGDOCs may contain regulatory requirements (informing licensees and applicants of what
they must achieve to meet the requirements), guidance (advising licensees and applicants on how
to meet the requirements) or general information on the CNSC’s practices and processes.
REGDOCs are developed using a lifecycle approach, from identification of a regulatory issue or
concern through analysis of the issue to determine the best regulatory tool to address the issues,
development and publication of the document and finally to regular review and updating of the
document. REGDOCs apply lessons learned from industry operating experience and from
international standards and guides, such as those published by the IAEA (see table 1 for details).
Requirements and guidance in REGDOCs are technology-neutral and performance-based where
possible and permit the use of risk-informed approaches.
External stakeholders are provided the opportunity to comment on the proposed contents of
individual REGDOCs through a rigorous public consultation process. This includes publishing
the draft document on the CNSC website and informing stakeholders of this through various
vehicles, including email notifications, the CNSC Facebook page and the Government of
Canada’s “Consulting with Canadians” website. In addition, the CNSC makes use of newsletters
or targeted mail-outs to ensure affected stakeholders are aware of the consultation. Stakeholders
are invited to provide their comments through fax, email, conventional mail and through an
online comment form. Following an initial consultation period, all comments are published on
the CNSC website and feedback on these comments is invited from stakeholders.
Table 1 lists key documents from both the CNSC and the CSA Group (formerly the Canadian
Standards Association) that are relevant to NPPs4. The CNSC documents are available on the
CNSC website at nuclearsafety.gc.ca. Table 1 also shows the CNSC regulatory documents and
CSA standards that are relevant to new-build licensing (as discussed in subsection 7.2(i)(c)), and
lists the IAEA standards that were used in the development of the CNSC regulatory documents
and CSA standards for NPP regulation.
The CNSC licensing process uses a phased approach to implement CNSC regulatory documents
and CSA standards into licence conditions handbooks (LCHs). Many of the newly published
CNSC regulatory documents (REGDOCs) and CSA standards listed in table 1 are in the process
of being incorporated into LCHs upon licence renewal. The table shows which CNSC regulatory
documents and CSA standards are part of the licensing basis for existing NPPs as of the end of
the reporting period. Other documents in the table are typically captured in LCHs for existing
NPPs as guidance (with prefixes G, GD), as information (with prefix P) on policy direction such
as principles, factors and criteria, or as information in licence application guides for new-builds.
4
CNSC regulatory documents for NPPs are technology neutral and can be used for small modular reactors or other
new power reactor technologies if proposed to be built and operated in Canada
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
Table 1: CNSC regulatory framework documents and CSA standards related to NPPs
Doc Number5 Document title Status6 Applicable to new- Associated IAEA safety standard used
build project in development
licensing7
Regulated facilities and activities
Reactor facilities
REGDOC-1.1.1 Licence to Prepare Site and Site Evaluation for x  Safety Series No. GS-R-3
New Reactor Facilities (draft)  Safety Guide No. WS-G-2.3
 Nuclear Security Series 17
 Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3
 Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.2
 Safety Standards Series No. SSG-9
 Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-18
 Safety Series No. GS-G-3.5
 Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.8
 Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2
 TECDOC-1657
RD/GD-369 Licence Application Guide: Licence to Construct a x  Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-4.1
Nuclear Power Plant (2011)
RD-346 Site Evaluation for New Nuclear Power Plants x  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.2
(2008)  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3
5
The naming convention for regulatory documents has evolved over time. The Atomic Energy Control Board (predecessor to the CNSC) issued regulatory
documents and also draft, consultative documents that were designated “C”. CNSC regulatory policies, standards, guides and notices were initially denoted by a
“P”, “S”, “G” or “N”, respectively. Subsequently, the CNSC used the designation “RD” for documents containing requirements and “GD” for documents
containing guidance. To facilitate the use of these documents, requirements and guidance were combined in RD/GD documents, now called simply REGDOCs.
6
Status refers to the inclusion of the document in the licensing basis for one or more operating licences as a regulatory requirement for existing NPPs.
7
Although “CANDU” appears in the title of the CSA standards applicable to new-build licensing, requirements can be applied generally to both water cooled
and non-water-cooled designs. Specific applications and exceptions will be addressed on a case-by-case basis considering specific design information.
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
 Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q
 Safety Series No. 110
REGDOC-1.1.3 Licence Application Guide: Licence to Operate a
Nuclear Power Plant (draft)
Nuclear substances and radiation devices

REGDOC-1.6.1 Licence Application Guide: Nuclear Substances x  Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.9
and Radiation Devices (2015)
Safety and control areas

Management system
REGDOC-2.1.2 Safety Culture for Nuclear Licensees (draft) x
N286-12 Management system requirements for nuclear x  Safety Reports Series No. 42
facilities (2012)  Safety Standard Series No. GS-R-3
N286-05 Management system requirements for nuclear x x  Safety Standard Series No. GS-G-3.1
power plants (2005)  Safety Standard Series No. NS-G-2.9
N286.0.1 Commentary on N286-12, Management system  Safety Standard Series No. NS-R-2
requirements for nuclear facilities (2014)  Safety Standard Series No. NS-R-3
 Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 Rev.1
 Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4
 TECDOC-1101
 TECDOC-1491
N286.7 Quality assurance of analytical, scientific and x X
design computer programs for nuclear power
plants (2016)
N286.7.1 Guideline for the application of N286.7-99 (2009)  Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q
N286.10 Configuration management for reactor facilities  INSAG-19
(draft)  TECDOC-1335
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N299 series Series of standards on quality assurance program  INSAG-15
requirements for the supply of items and services  Safety Standard Series No. GS-G-3.5
for nuclear power plants (drafts)  TECDOC-1329
Z1000 Occupational health and safety management
(2014)
Human performance management
REGDOC-2.2.2 Personnel Training (2014) x  TECDOC-1057
REGDOC-2.2.3 Personnel Certification: Initial Certification x
Examinations (draft)
REGDOC-2.2.3 Personnel Certification: Radiation Safety Officers x
(2014)
Requirements for the Requalification Testing of x
Certified Shift Personnel at Canadian Nuclear
Power Plants, Revision 2 (2009)
REGDOC-2.2.4 Fitness for Duty (draft)
REGDOC-2.2.4 Managing Worker Fatigue (draft)
RD-204 Certification of Persons Working at Nuclear Power x x  Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.4
Plants (2008)  Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.8
RD-363 Nuclear Security Officer Medical, Physical, and x x  Safety Standards Series NS-G-2.8
Psychological Fitness (2007)
G-323 Ensuring Presence of Sufficient Qualified Staff at x
Class I Nuclear Facilities: Minimum Staff
Complement (2007)
G-313 Radiation Safety Training Programs for Workers
Involved in Licensed Activities with Nuclear
Substances and Radiation Devices, and with Class
II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment
(2006)
P-119 Policy on Human Factors (2000) x
Operating performance
REGDOC-2.3.1 Conduct of Licensed Activities: Construction and x  Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-28
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
Commissioning (2016)  Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.3
REGDOC-2.3.2 Accident Management, Version 2 (2015) x x
REGDOC-2.3.2 Severe Accident Management Programs for x  Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1
Nuclear Reactors (2013)  Safety Standards Series No.
NS-G-2.15, STI/PUB/1376
 Safety Standards Guide NS-G-2.15,
STI/PUB/1376
 Safety Reports Series No. 32,
STI/PUB/1167
 Services Series No. 9, IAEA-SVS-09
 Safety Requirements No. SSR-2/2
 Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1
 INSAG-10
 INSAG-12, 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1
 TECDOC-1440
 INSAG-10
REGDOC-2.3.3 Periodic Safety Reviews (2015) x x  Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-25
 Safety Reports series No. 57
 Safety Guide NS-G-2.12
 INSAG-12, 75-INSAG-3 Rev.1
EG-1 Requirements and Guidelines for Written and Oral x x
Certification Examinations for Shift Personnel at
Nuclear Power Plants (2005)
EG-2 Requirements and Guidelines for Simulator-Based x x
Certification Examinations for Shift Personnel at
RD-360 Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants(2008) x  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.10
G-306 Severe Accident Management Programs for x
Nuclear Reactors (2006)
N290.15 Requirements for the safe operating envelope of x
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
nuclear power plants (2010)
Safety analysis
REGDOC-2.4.1 Deterministic Safety Analysis (2014) x x  Safety Reports Series No. 55
 Safety Standards Series No. SSG-2
 Safety Standards Series No. GSR
Part 4
REGDOC-2.4.2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear x x  Safety Standard SSG-3
Power Plants (2014)  Safety Standard SSG-4
 INSAG-10
RD-308 Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactor x
Facilities (2011)
RD-310 Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (2008) x x
RD-327 Nuclear Criticality Safety (2010) x x  Safety Standards No. SSG-5
 Safety Standards No. NS-R-5
 Safety Standards No. SSG-6
 Safety Standards No. GS-R-2
GD-327 Guidance for Nuclear Criticality Safety (2010) x
GD-310 Guidance on Deterministic Safety Analysis for x
S-294 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear x x  Safety Series No. 50-P-4
Power Plants (2005)  Safety Series No. 50-P-8
G-144 Trip Parameter Acceptance Criteria for the Safety x
Analysis of CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (2006)
G-149 Computer Programs Used in Design and Safety x
Analyses of Nuclear Power Plants and Research
Reactors (2000)
C-006 Requirements for the Safety Analysis of CANDU
Nuclear Power Plants (draft)
N290.16 Requirements for beyond design basis accidents  INSAG-10
(2016)  Nuclear Energy Series No. NW-T-2.7
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N290.17 Probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power  Safety Standards Series No. SSG-3
plants (draft)  Safety Standards Series No. SSG-4
N290.18 Periodic safety review for nuclear reactor facilities  Safety Reports Series No. 57
(draft)  Safety Standards Series No. SSG-25
 TECDOC-1740
Physical design
REGDOC-2.5.2 Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power x  Specific Safety Requirements SSR-2/1
Plants (2014)  Safety Guide NS-G-2.15
 INSAG-10
 Safety Series No. 50-P-1
 Safety Reports Series No. 46
 Nuclear Security Series No. 17
 Safety Guide WS-G-2.1
 TECDOC-1657
 TECDOC-967, Rev.1
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
 TECDOC-1276
 INSAG-19
 Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3
 Safety Requirements No. GS-G-3.5
 Safety Requirements No. GS-G-3.3
 INFCIRC-225, Rev.5 (draft)
 Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.1
 Safety Report Series No. 8
 Safety Requirements No.GS-R-2
 General Safety Requirements Part 4
 Specific Safety Requirements
SSR-2/2
 Specific Safety Guide SSG-9
RD/GD-352 Design, Testing and Performance of Exposure
Devices (2012)
RD-337 Design of New Nuclear Power Plants (2008)  Safety Standard Series No. NS-R-1
RD-367 Design of Small Reactor Facilities (2011)
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
G-276 Human Factors Engineering Program Plans
(2003)
G-278 Human Factors Verification and Validation Plans
(2003)
R-77 Overpressure Protection Requirements for Primary
Heat Transport Systems in CANDU Power
Reactors Fitted with Two Shutdown Systems (1987)
Pressure-retaining systems and components
N285.0/N285.6 General requirements for pressure-retaining x x
series systems and components in CANDU nuclear power
plants/Material Standards for reactor components
for CANDU nuclear power plants (2012)
Concrete containment structures
N287.1 General requirements for concrete containment x
structures for nuclear power plans (2014)
N287.2 Material requirements for concrete containment x
(2008)
N287.3 Design requirements for concrete containment
structures for nuclear power plants (2014)
N287.4 Construction, fabrication, and installation x
requirements for concrete containment structures
for CANDU nuclear power plants (2009)
N287.5 Examination and testing requirements for concrete
containment structures for nuclear power plants
(2011)
N287.6 Pre-operational proof and leakage rate testing
requirements for concrete containment structures
for nuclear power plants (2011)
N291-15 Requirements for safety-related structures for
N291-08 Requirements for safety-related structures for x
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
CANDU nuclear power plants (2008)
Seismic design and qualifications
N289.1 General requirements for seismic design and  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.6
qualification of CANDU nuclear power plants  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.10
(2008)
N289.2 Ground motion determination for seismic  Draft Specific Safety Guide DS405
qualification of nuclear power plants (2010)  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.5
N289.3 Design procedures for seismic qualification of  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.6
nuclear power plants (2010)  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.3
N289.4 Testing procedures for seismic qualification of  Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.13
nuclear power plant structures, systems and
components (2012)
N289.5 Seismic instrumentation requirements for nuclear  Safety Report Draft, Rev.12
power plants and nuclear facilities (2012)
Special safety systems
N290.0 General requirements for safety systems of nuclear x x
power plants (2011)
N290.1 Requirements for the shutdown systems of nuclear
power plants (2013)
N290.2 Requirements for emergency core cooling systems
of nuclear power plants (2011)
N290.3 Requirements for the containment system of
N290.4 Requirements for reactor control systems of
N290.5 Requirements for electrical power and instrument x
air systems of CANDU nuclear power plants
(2011)
N290.6 Requirements for monitoring and display of x
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
nuclear power plant safety functions in the event of
an accident (2009)
N290.11 Requirements for reactor heat removal capability
during outage of nuclear power plants (2013)
N290.14-15 Qualification of digital hardware and software for
use in instrumentation and control applications for
N290.14-07 Qualification of pre-developed software for use in
safety-related instrumentation and control
applications in nuclear power plants (2007)
N290.16 Requirements for beyond design basis accidents  INSAG-10
(2016)  Nuclear Energy Series No. NW-T-2.7
Design governance
N290.12 Human factors in design for nuclear power plants x
(2014)
Fitness for service
REGDOC-2.6.3 Aging Management (2014) x  Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12
 Specific Safety Guide SSG-25
 Safety Requirements NS-R-2
 TECDOC-1197
 TECDOC-1188
 TECDOC-1025
 TECDOC-981
RD/GD-98 Reliability Programs for Nuclear Power Plants x  TECDOC-524
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
(2012)
RD/GD-210 Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants  TECDOC-658
(2012)  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.6
RD-334 Aging Management for Nuclear Power Plants
S-98, Rev.1 Reliability Programs for Nuclear Power Plants x
(2005)
S-210 Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants x  Safety Reports Series No. 42
(2007)  Safety Series No. 110
 Standards Series NS-G-2.6
 Safety Standards Series No. 50-SG-07
N285.4-05 Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power x x
plant components (2005)
N285.4-14 Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power
plant components (2014)
N285.5 Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power x
plant containment components (2008)
N285.7 Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power x  TECDOC-1511
plant balance of plant systems and components
(2015)
N285.8 Technical requirements for in-service evaluation of x
zirconium alloy pressure tubes in CANDU reactors
(2010)
N287.2 Material requirements for concrete containment x
(2008)
N287.7 In-service examination and testing requirements x x
for concrete containment structures for CANDU
N287.8 Aging management for concrete containment  Safety Report Series No. 57
structures for nuclear power plants (2015)  Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.12
 TECDOC-1025
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
 TECDOC-1503
 TECDOC-1736
 Technical Reports Series No. 338
N290.8 Technical specification requirements for nuclear
power plant components (2015)
N290.13 Environmental qualification of equipment for x x
CANDU nuclear power plants (2005)
Radiation protection
R-85 Radiation Protection Requisites for the Exemption
of Certain Radioactive Materials from Further
Licensing upon Transferral for Disposal (1989)
RD-58 Thyroid Screening for Radioiodine (2008)
G-91 Ascertaining and Recording Radiation Doses to
Individuals (2003)
G-147 Radiobioassay Protocols for Responding to
Abnormal Intakes of Radionuclides (2003)
GD-150 Designing and Implementing a Bioassay Program
(2010)
G-129, Rev.1 Keeping Radiation Exposures and Doses “As Low  Safety Series No. 21
as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)” (2004)  Safety Series No. 102
G-228 Developing and Using Action Levels (2001)
Conventional Health and Safety
No applicable CNSC regulatory document
No applicable CSA standards
Environmental protection
REGDOC-2.9.1 Environmental Protection Policies, Programs and x
Procedures (2013)
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
REGDOC-2.9.1 Environmental Protection: Environmental Policy,
Assessments and Protection Measures (draft)
S-296 Environmental Protection Policies, Programs and x
Procedures at Class I Nuclear Facilities and
Uranium Mines and Mills (2006)
G-296 Developing Environmental Protection Policies, x
Programs and Procedures at Class I Nuclear
Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills (2006)
P-223 Protection of the Environment (2001)
N288.1 Guidelines for calculating derived release limits x  Safety Report Series No. 19
for radioactive material in airborne and liquid  Safety Series No. 50-5G-59
effluents for normal operation of nuclear facilities  TECDOC-857
(2008)  TECDOC-964
 Technical Report Series No. 472
N288.2-14 Guidelines for calculating the radiological  Safety Guide No. NS-G-3.2
consequences to the public of a release of airborne  Safety Guide No. 50-P-12
radioactive material for nuclear reactor accidents  Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1
(2014)  Safety Guide No. GSG-2
 Safety Guide No. GS-R-2
 TECDOC-955
 TECDOC-1200
N288.2-M91 Guidelines for calculating radiation doses to the  Safety Guide Series No. 50-SG-S3
(R2008) public from a release of airborne radioactive
material under hypothetical accident conditions in
nuclear reactors (2008)
N288.3.4 Performance testing of nuclear air-cleaning
systems at nuclear facilities (2013)
N288.4 Environmental monitoring programs at Class I
nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills
(2010)
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N288.4-10 Environmental monitoring programs at Class I
(R2015) nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills
(2015)
N288.5 Effluent monitoring programs at Class I nuclear
facilities and uranium mines and mills facilities
(2011)
N288.6 Environmental risk assessments at class I nuclear  Safety Reports Series No. 21
facilities and uranium mines and mills (2012)  Technical Reports Series No. 332
N288.7 Groundwater protection programs at Class I  Safety Guide No. WS-G-1.2
nuclear facilities and uranium mines and mills
(2015)
N288.8 Establishing and implementing action levels to
control releases to the environment from nuclear
facilities (draft)
Emergency management and fire protection
REGDOC-2.10.1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response x
(2014)
REGDOC-2.10.1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, x  Safety Standards Series GS-R-2
Version 2 (2016)  Safety Standards Series GS-G-2.1
RD-353 Testing the Implementation of Emergency x  Safety Series No. 73
Measures (2008)  Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2
P-325 Nuclear Emergency Management (2006)
G-225 Emergency Planning at Class I Nuclear Facilities
and Uranium Mines and Mills (2001)
N293-07 Fire protection for CANDU nuclear power plants x  INSAG Series No. 10
(2007)  INSAG Series No. 12
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N293-12 Fire protection for nuclear power plants (2012) x  Same as for N293-07 (above), but not
including Safety Series No. 50-P-9
N393 Fire protection for facilities that process, handle,
or store nuclear substances (2013)
N1600 General requirements for nuclear emergency  Safety Guide GS-G-2
management programs (2014)  Safety Guide GS-G-2.1
 General Safety Requirements GSR
Part 7
Waste management
G-219 Decommissioning Planning for Licensed Activities
(2000)
G-320 Assessing the Long term Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management (2006)
P-290 Managing Radioactive Waste (2004)
N292.0 General principles for the management of  INFCIRC/164
radioactive waste and irradiated fuel (2014)  INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
 Safety Requirements No. TS-R-1
 Safety Guide No. SSG-15
 TECDOC-1325
 General Safety Guide No. GSG-1
 Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.3
 Safety Guide No. WS-G-2.5
 Safety Series No. 111-F
 Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.7
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
 Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.7
 Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-2
 TECDOC-1222
 TECDOC-1256
 TECDOC-1282
 TECDOC-1372
 TECDOC-1398
 TECDOC-1504
N292.1 Wet storage of irradiated fuel and other  General Safety Guide No. GSG-3
radioactive materials (draft)  INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
 Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5
 TECDOC-1267
N292.2 Interim dry storage of irradiated fuel (2013)  INFCIRC/164
 INFCIRC/164/Add.1
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N292.3 Management of low- and intermediate-level x  INFCIRC/164
radioactive waste (2008)  Safety Guide No. DS 390 (draft)
 Safety Series No. 111-G-1.1
 Safety Series No. 111-F
 Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-2
 TECDOC-1222
 TECDOC-1256
 TECDOC-1282
 TECDOC-1325
 TECDOC-1372
 TECDOC-1397
 TECDOC-1398
 TECDOC-1504
N292.5 Guideline for the exemption or clearance from  Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.7
regulatory control of materials that contain, or  Safety Reports Series No. 44
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
potentially contain, nuclear substances (2011)  Safety Series No. 115
N294 Decommissioning of facilities containing nuclear x  TECDOC-1476
substances (2009)  Safety Guide WS-G-5.1
 Technical Report Series No. 420
Security
REGDOC-2.12.1 High-Security Sites: Nuclear Response Force x x
(2013)
REGDOC-2.12.2 Site Access Security Clearance (2012) x x  Nuclear Security Series No. 8
REGDOC-2.12.3 Security of Nuclear Substances: Sealed Sources x  Safety Guide RS-G-1.9
(2013)  TECDOC-1344
 Safety Standards No. TS-R-1
 TECDOC-1355
 INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 (draft)
 INFCIRC/663
 TECDOC-953
 TECDOC-1276
RD-321 Criteria for Physical Protection Systems and x
Devices at High Security Sites (2010)
RD-361 Criteria for Explosive Substance Detection, X-Ray x
Imaging, and Metal Detection at High Security
Sites (2010)
S-298 Nuclear Response Force (2003) x
G-205 Entry to Protected and Inner Areas (2003)
G-208 Transportation Security Plans for Category I, II or
III Nuclear Material (2003)
G-274 Security Programs for Category I or II Nuclear
Material or Certain Nuclear Facilities (2003)
Annex 7.2 (i) (b)
licensing7
N290.7 Cyber security for nuclear power plants and small
reactor facilities (2014)
Safeguards and non-proliferation
REGDOC-2.13.2 Import and Export (draft)
RD-336 Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear Material x  INFCIRC/164
(2010)
GD-336 Guidance for Accounting and Reporting of Nuclear
Material (2010)
Packaging and transport
No applicable CNSC regulatory document
No applicable CSA standards
Other regulatory areas
Reporting requirements
REGDOC-3.1.1 Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants x x  Safety Standards Series SF-1
(2014)
Public and Aboriginal engagement
RD/GD-99.3 Public Information and Disclosure (2012) x
REGDOC-3.2.2 Aboriginal Engagement (2016)
Financial guarantees
G-206 Financial Guarantees for the Decommissioning of
Licensed Activities (2000)
CNSC processes and practices
REGDOC-3.5.1 Licensing Process for Class I Nuclear Facilities x
and Uranium Mines and Mills (2015)
REGDOC-3.5.2 Administrative Monetary Penalties, Version 2 x
(2015)
GD-385 Pre-licensing Review of a Vendor's Reactor Design
(2003)
P-299 Regulatory Fundamentals (2005)
P-211 Compliance (2001)
P-242 Considering Cost-Benefits Information (2000)
Annex 7.2 (i) (c)
Annex 7.2 (i) (c)

Regulatory Framework for Activities Involving Small Modular
Reactors
Over the past several years, a number of technology developers have expressed interest in the
possible deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in Canada and have sought to understand
how the CNSC is establishing a state of readiness to regulate activities that would utilize SMRs.
Government agencies, science and technology institutions, utilities, industry associations and
regulators from other countries have also expressed interest in the CNSC’s readiness
preparations.
Technologies being developed vary significantly in size, design features and cooling types. In
addition, they could be sited in places quite different from past NPP projects. For example:
 small grids where power generators need to remain below, for example, 300 megawatts
electrical (MWe) per facility to maintain grid stability
 edge-of-grid or remote power (off-grid) where power needs are small (2 to 30 MWe) but
are currently very expensive and dependent on fossil fuel
In both cases, alternative uses for these SMRs, beyond electricity generation, are also being
considered. They include steam supplies for industrial applications and district heating systems
and production of value-added products such as hydrogen fuel or desalinated drinking water.
Most SMR concepts, although based on technological work and operating experience from older
NPPs, employ a number of novel approaches. Novel approaches, or even proven approaches
used in different ways, can affect the certainty of plant performance under both normal operation
and accident conditions, raising regulatory questions during the licensing process.
In view of novel approaches, CNSC staff members are conducting investigations to understand:
 key regulatory issues that may need to be resolved in advance in order to meet Canadian
licensing requirements
 adequacy of the existing regulatory framework tools for addressing both potential near-
term and long-term projects
 clarifications or changes that might be needed for regulatory framework tools to ensure
safety in the case of novel approaches
Investigations by CNSC staff have included meetings with technology developers and outreach
activities with the public at conferences and academic institutions. The CNSC published
discussion paper DIS-16-04, Small Modular Reactors: Regulatory Strategy, Approaches and
Challenges, to collect information that can be used to further clarify requirements and guidance.
Even with a flexible regulatory approach, some innovative features may present challenges in
both the interpretation and application of requirements. The CNSC has examined a number of
key areas where potential challenges could exist. In some cases, the CNSC has confirmed that
existing requirements remain valid and useful. In a number of other areas, implications of
innovative approaches need to be more thoroughly examined to confirm whether additional
requirements or guidance are needed.
Annex 7.2 (i) (c)
The following list of topics is covered in DIS-16-04 (although the paper also prompts discussion
on other issues):
 technical information, including research and development activities used to support a
safety case
 licensing process for multiple module facilities on a single site
 licensing approach for a new demonstration reactor
 licensing process and environmental assessments for fleets of SMRs
 management system considerations
o e.g., SMR applicants may operate or be managed quite differently than current
NPP licensees
 safeguards verification
 deterministic/probabilistic safety analyses
 defence in depth and mitigation of accidents
 emergency planning zones
 transportable reactor concepts
 increased use of automation for plant operation and maintenance
 human/machine interfaces in facility operation
 impact of new technologies on human performance
 financial guarantees for operational continuity
 site security provisions
 waste management and decommissioning
 subsurface civil structures important to safety
The CNSC plans to update its regulatory framework for SMRs using feedback from stakeholders
on the discussion paper.
Annex 7.2 (iii) (b)
Annex 7.2 (iii) (b)

Details Related to Verification of Compliance
Table 1 indicates some of the systems and areas of verification activities that are covered by
Type II inspections at NPPs.
Table 1: Systems and areas of verification activities
Processes and functions Facilities and equipment
Fuel handling Control room
Startup Reactor building
Shutdown safety Turbine hall
Heat sinks Battery room
Outage management Control equipment room
Fuel and physics Containment
Pressure boundary Emergency coolant injection
Effluent control and monitoring Shutdown system 1
Environmental monitoring Shutdown system 2
Stand-by safety systems
Safety-related systems
Electrical systems
Annex 8
Annex 8
CNSC Assessment of the IAEA Director General Report of
the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Purpose
This assessment, performed by CNSC staff, addresses the key observations and lessons learned
identified in the IAEA’s report, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director
General (DG-IAEA Report), published in 2015. The DG-IAEA Report was the result of an
extensive international collaborative effort involving five working groups with about 180 experts
from 42 IAEA Member States with and without nuclear power programs, and several
international bodies. The DG-IAEA Report not only examines the causes and consequences of
the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan, but also evaluates measures taken in
response to the accident. The executive summary further synthesizes lessons drawn from five
detailed technical studies completed by the international experts.
The purpose of the CNSC staff assessment was to benchmark the observations and action items
identified in two CNSC documents – the CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report and the CNSC
Action Plan on the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident (CNSC
Action Plan) – against the DG-IAEA Report and to ensure all elements being considered by
international peers were reflected in the Canadian review scope. Other organizations contributing
to this review include Health Canada and Public Safety Canada.
Canada’s general approach to assessing lessons learned and developing the CNSC Action Plan
had previously been weighed against the broader objectives of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear
Safety and its goals for enhanced global nuclear safety. As reported in the sixth Canadian report,
the Canadian responses were well aligned with the IAEA’s objectives. (Annex 8 of the sixth
Canadian report provides extensive information about Canada’s post-Fukushima actions.)
Review
The CNSC assessment of the 45 lessons learned identified in the IAEA-DG Report is given in
tabular form in this annex. The assessment and actions taken are provided against each of the
lessons learned, and are categorized in the following four areas (per the sections of the DG-IAEA
Report):
 the accident and its assessment (section 2)
 emergency preparedness and response (section 3)
 radiological consequences (section 4)
 post-accident recovery (section 5)
From these four categories, the CNSC’s assessment of the lessons learned is presented as two
distinct phases (phase 1 and phase 2, in tables 1 and 2, respectively).
The tables stipulate that many actions are complete and therefore closed with no outstanding
actions; however, it does not necessarily terminate the continuing responsibility for the safe
operation of nuclear facilities. The CNSC ensures this is achieved through its established
licensing, compliance and regulatory framework processes. Where necessary, station-specific
action items were raised to monitor the implementation at Canadian NPPs as part of the
compliance verification program. Additionally, Health Canada’s nuclear emergency management
Annex 8
coordinating committees (as defined in the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP)) and
provincial-level committees provide a venue for ongoing improvements to offsite emergency
preparedness activities at the national level.
Phase 1: Enhancing defence in depth and emergency response

Table 1 lists the actions taken in Canada against each lesson learned identified in sections 2 and
3 of the DG-IAEA Report. The information presented here was largely available at the time the
CNSC Action Plan was developed. For this phase, the focus is on identifying any gaps in the
work performed in Canada to date. The status of the actions is summarized and a conclusion is
drawn.
Canadian NPP licenses have addressed the lessons learned given in sections 2 and 3 and there are
no outstanding actions. All CNSC actions to address the lessons learned in these two sections are
closed.
Phase 2: Assessing radiological consequences and post-accident recovery

Table 2 lists the actions taken in Canada against each lesson learned identified in sections 4 and
5 of the DG-IAEA report. The information presented here was not available at the time the
CNSC Action Plan was developed. For this phase, the focus is on ensuring appropriate processes
are either in place or will be developed to address the lessons learned.
The lessons given in sections 4 and 5 have been, or are being, addressed. All CNSC-led lessons
learned have been completed.
For section 4, Radiological consequences, eight of the eleven lessons learned have no
outstanding actions. For the remaining three lessons learned, work is ongoing and it is being led
by Health Canada with input from CNSC. Completion of this work is planned by 2017.
For section 5, Post-accident recovery, five of the nine lessons learned have no outstanding
actions. For the remaining four lessons learned, work is ongoing and it is being led by Health
Canada with input from CNSC. Completion of this work is planned by 2017.
Conclusions
The CNSC Action Plan, developed within one year of the accident, focused on the prevention
and mitigation of similar events of higher consequences and lower likelihood. Actions related to
strengthening defence in depth, enhancing emergency response, improving the regulatory
framework and enhancing international collaboration were quickly imposed on the CNSC and its
licensees of major nuclear facilities. Additionally, actions to strengthen offsite emergency
response were quickly identified and implemented by offsite authorities at the federal and
provincial levels. The actions are well aligned with the lessons reported in sections 2 and 3 of the
DG-IAEA Report. Lessons related to public communication are also well aligned. With the
exception of a very small number of modifications that require design changes by the licensee
(which are on schedule for completion), the implementation of the regulatory requirements has
been completed.
The DG-IAEA Report was developed over the period from 2012 to 2015 and includes lessons
learned that could not have been identified in the first year following the accident, specifically in
the areas of radiological consequences and post-accident recovery. These areas, covered in
Annex 8
sections 4 and 5 of the DG-IAEA report, touch on the subjects of radiation protection, recovery,
remediation and communication, where Canada played a major role in development of the
lessons learned.
Post-accident recovery guidelines addressing the elements of the DG-IAEA Report that speak to
offsite measures related to the transition from emergency early response to recovery are being
drafted by the CNSC. These guidelines will also be based on the outcomes and lessons learned
arising from the mandatory emergency exercises conducted by multiple jurisdictions (including
the CNSC, other local federal/provincial authorities and the licensees) and will be reported to the
Commission via regular updates.
The CNSC Action Plan and its regulatory requirements are now integral to the CNSC’s
licensing, compliance and communication activities to ensure continuous safety enhancement.
For example, the implementation of periodic safety review in the CNSC regulatory framework
introduces an effective tool to improve safety and guard against complacency.
Canadian actions in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident are compatible with and address
the lessons learned that were identified in the DG-IAEA Report. They will also prove to be a
valuable resource for future actions and updates against the lessons learned identified in the
CNSC Action Plan, particularly for the areas of assessing radiological consequences and post-
accident recovery. This assessment affirms that the CNSC was and continues to be on the right
path with respect to its continuous enhancements to safety through committed work and
verification under normal licensing, compliance, regulatory framework and communications
processes.
Annex 8
Phase 1: Enhancing defence in depth and emergency response

Table 1 below reproduces the lessons learned (LL) identified in sections 2 and 3 of the
DG-IAEA Report and provides information about Canada’s actions related to each lesson. The
lessons are numbered based on the section of the DG-IAEA Report in which they appear.
Table 1: Assessment of sections 2 and 3 of the DG-IAEA Report

LL# IAEA lesson CNSC action and assessment
Section 2. The accident and its assessment
2.1 The assessment of CNSC action:
natural hazards needs to
This lesson is addressed in the CNSC Integrated Action Plan, with the
be sufficiently
following action items applicable to all sites:
conservative. The
consideration of mainly A.2.1.1: Re-evaluate, using modern calculations and state-of-the-art
historical data in the methods, the site-specific magnitudes of each external event to
establishment of the which the plant may be susceptible.
design basis of NPPs is
A.2.1.2 Evaluate if the current site-specific design protection for each
not sufficient to
external event assessed in A.2.1.1 is sufficient. If gaps are
characterize the risks of
extreme natural hazards. identified a corrective plan should be proposed.
Even when These action items are closed (or are on track for closure) for all Canadian
comprehensive data are nuclear power plant (NPP) licensees based on an acceptable probabilistic
available, due to the safety assessments (PSAs) and plans for additional work. This additional
relatively short work is still ongoing and subject to CNSC review. Verification is
observation periods, integrated into licensing and compliance processes.
large uncertainties
remain in the prediction Note: Implementation of CNSC regulatory standard S-294 has since
of natural hazards. been replaced with REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, which includes
improvements based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi accident.
CNSC assessment:
 Strengthens defence in depth.
 The assessment of natural hazards will be updated periodically to
reflect gained knowledge and changes in requirements.
No outstanding actions.
2.2 The safety of NPPs needs CNSC action:

to be re-evaluated on a
This lesson is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated Action Plan, with
periodic basis to
the following action item applicable to CNSC staff:
consider advances in
knowledge, and A.11.1 The CNSC will consider the development of a regulatory
necessary corrective framework for the implementation of the periodic safety review
actions or compensatory process.
measures need to be
implemented promptly. In April 2015, the CNSC published REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety
Reviews, as part of its regulatory framework for implementing the periodic
safety review process.
Note: The CNSC has always re-evaluated the safety of NPPs with
frequent reviews (typically conducted every five years) in support
of licence renewals and scheduled safety analysis report updates
(also covering a five-year period). Larger re-evaluations (i.e.,
Annex 8

integrated safety reviews) have been performed in support of NPP
life extensions to identify practicable upgrades. Nevertheless, the
CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report recommended the
implementation of periodic safety reviews in Canada.
CNSC assessment:
 Improves the regulatory framework.
 Re-evaluation of NPP safety on a periodic basis is implemented
via the established compliance program and is a licence
requirement for all Canadian licensees of operating NPPs.
2.3 The assessment of CNSC action:

natural hazards needs to
Natural hazards and combinations of hazards are included in PSAs to meet
consider the potential for
the requirements of the following action items outlined in the CNSC
their occurrence in
Integrated Action Plan:
combination, either
simultaneously or A.2.1.1 Re-evaluate, using modern calculations and state-of-the-art
sequentially, and their methods, the site-specific magnitudes of each external event to
combined effects on an which the plant may be susceptible.
NPP. The assessment of
A.2.1.2 Evaluate if the current site-specific design protection for each
natural hazards also
needs to consider their external event assessed in A.2.1.1 is sufficient. If gaps are
effects on multiple units identified a corrective plan should be proposed.
on an NPP site. Accidents on multiple units are considered in action items A.3.1 (extension
of severe accident management guidelines to include multi-unit accidents)
and A.3.2 (improved modelling of multi-unit severe accidents):
A.3.1 Licensees should:
1. develop/finalize and fully implement severe accident
management guidelines (SAMGs) at each station.
2. expand the scope of SAMGs to include multi-unit and IFB
[Irradiated Fuel Bay] events.
3. demonstrate effectiveness of SAMGs. Licensees should
validate and/or refine SAMGs to demonstrate their adequacy
in the light of lessons drawn from the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident.
A.3.2. Licensees of multi-unit NPPs should develop improved modelling
of multi-unit plans in severe accident conditions, or demonstrate
that the current simple modelling assumptions are adequate. This
assessment should consider elements of HOP [Human and
Organizational Performance] under accident conditions.
Action items are closed for all Canadian NPP licensees based on the
following:
 Acceptable PSAs and plans for additional work. This additional work
is still ongoing and subject to CNSC review as it pertains to site-wide
PSA.
 Implementation and expansion of accident management guidelines,
including coverage for spent fuel storage and multi-unit accidents.
 Development of simplistic analysis models for multi-unit severe
Annex 8

accidents and concrete plans for developing more realistic models. The
CNSC has evaluated the plans and is in agreement with the direction
being taken.
CNSC assessment:
 Verification is integrated into licensing and compliance processes.
2.4 Operating experience CNSC action:

programmes need to
Operating experience (OPEX) programs were assessed and were not
include experience from
identified as a weakness in Canada by the CNSC Fukushima Task Force
both national and
Report (see sections 6.3.7, 6.4.1, 6.5, 9). No actions were raised on
international sources.
licensees.
Safety improvements
identified through The CNSC continues to perform periodic evaluation of licensees’ OPEX
operating experience programs and has introduced an OPEX clearinghouse to make OPEX
programmes need to be reviews more systematic.
implemented promptly.
Licensees use the peer reviews of the World Association of Nuclear
The use of operating
Operators, the CANDU Owners Group and other organizations to obtain
experience needs to be
independent review of their programs, including OPEX. In addition, the
evaluated periodically
and independently. CNSC reports to the IAEA Event Database on events and incidents.
CNSC assessment:
 Defence in depth is acceptable.
No actions required.
2.5 The defence in depth CNSC action:

concept remains valid,
Parts A1 to A6 of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan were aimed at
but implementation of
strengthening defence in depth and improving emergency response.
the concept needs to be
Actions covered all levels of defence in depth, with the majority aimed at
strengthened at all levels
improvements to levels 4 and 5. The CNSC’s regulatory philosophy has
by adequate
shifted from prevention to prevention and mitigation.
independence,
redundancy, diversity The related action items are closed for all Canadian NPP licensees.
and protection against
internal and external CNSC assessment:
hazards. There is a need
to focus not only on  Strengthens defence in depth and enhances emergency response.
accident prevention, but  Verification is integrated into licensing and compliance processes.
also on improving No outstanding actions.
mitigation measures.
Annex 8

2.6 Instrumentation and CNSC action:
control systems that are
This lesson is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated Action Plan:
necessary during beyond
design basis accidents A.1.8 Licensees should provide a reasonable level of confidence that the
need to remain operable means (e.g., equipment and instrumentation) necessary for severe
in order to monitor accident management and essential to the execution of SAMGs
essential plant safety will perform their function in the severe accident environment for
parameters and to the duration for which they are needed. This assessment should
facilitate plant consider elements of HOP under accident conditions.
operations.
The action item is closed for all Canadian NPP licensees.
CNSC assessment:
2.7 Robust and reliable CNSC action:

cooling systems that can
function for both design
basis and beyond design A.1.7 A plan and schedule for optimizing existing provisions and putting
basis conditions need to in place additional coolant make-up provisions and supporting
be provided for the analyses.
removal of residual heat.
All action items are closed for all Canadian NPP licensees. All key
equipment is now in place and the associated changes to procedures,
training and drills have been completed.
CNSC assessment:
2.8 There is a need to ensure CNSC action:

a reliable confinement
function for beyond
design basis accidents to A.1.3 Licensees should evaluate the means to prevent the failure of the
prevent significant containment systems and, to the extent practicable, unfiltered
release of radioactive releases of radioactive products in beyond-design-basis accidents
material to the including severe accidents. If unfiltered releases of radioactive
environment. products in beyond-design-basis accidents including severe
accidents cannot be precluded, then additional mitigation should
be provided. This assessment should consider elements of HOP
under accident conditions.
Hydrogen mitigation has been expanded by accelerating the installation of
passive autocatalytic recombiners at all NPPs. Filtered containment venting
is either installed or committed to at most NPPs.
CNSC assessment:
Annex 8

2.9 Comprehensive CNSC action:
probabilistic and
Per LL #2.1, comprehensive PSAs are performed to meet the requirements
deterministic safety
of action item A.2.1.1 of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan:
analyses need to be
performed to confirm the A.2.1.1 Re-evaluate, using modern calculations and state-of-the-art
capability of a plant to methods, the site-specific magnitudes of each external event to
withstand applicable which the plant may be susceptible.
beyond design basis
Although deterministic safety analyses were in place from initial licensing
accidents and to provide
and have been continuously updated, further improvements to meet the
a high degree of
confidence in the more modern requirements of RD-310, Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power
robustness of the plant Plants, were already in progress as identified in action item A.2.2:
design. A.2.2 Implementation of RD-310, Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power
Plants, is already in progress and being tracked by the
CNSC/Industry Safety Analysis Improvement Initiative working
group.
RD-310 has since been updated as REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety
Analysis, with increased emphasis on multi-unit events and cliff-edge
effects. Implementation of the requirements of REGDOC-2.4.1 is phased in
through safety report update work.
CNSC assessment:
 Strengthens defence in depth and improves the regulatory
framework.
2.10 Accident management CNSC action:

provisions need to be
This lesson is directly addressed through the following actions items in the
comprehensive, well
CNSC Integrated Action Plan:
designed and up to date.
They need to be derived A.3.1.1 Where SAMGs have not been developed/finalized or fully
on the basis of a implemented, provide plans and schedules for completion.
comprehensive set of
A.3.1.2 For multi-unit stations, provide plans and schedules for the
initiating events and
plant conditions and also inclusion of multi-unit events in SAMGs.
need to provide for A.3.1.3 For all stations, provide plans and schedules for the inclusion of
accidents that affect IFB events in station operating documentation where
several units at a multi- appropriate.
unit plant.
A.3.1.4 Demonstrate the effectiveness of SAMGs via table-top exercises
and drills.
Work was phased, beginning with completing the implementation of
SAMGs under A.3.1.1 (which was almost complete at the time of the
Fukushima accident) and then expanding to include irradiated fuel bays
(spent fuel storage) under A3.1.3 and multi-unit SAMGs under A.3.1.2.
Implementation work for A.3.1.2 is still in progress. The effectiveness of
the SAMGs (A.3.1.4) has been demonstrated, but further demonstrations
will be made as work continues.
All action items are closed for Canadian NPP licensees.
CNSC assessment:
Annex 8

 Strengthens defence in depth and improves the regulatory
framework.
2.11 Training, exercises and CNSC action:

drills need to include
Per LL #2.10, this lesson is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated
postulated severe
Action Plan:
accident conditions to
ensure that operators are A.3.1.4 Demonstrate the effectiveness of SAMGs via table-top exercises
as well prepared as and drills.
possible. They need to
All licensees have demonstrated the capability to deploy mobile equipment
include the simulated use
in the prevention and mitigation of a severe accident.
of actual equipment that
would be deployed in the This action item is closed for Canadian NPP licensees.
management of a severe
accident. CNSC assessment:
 Strengthens defence in depth and enhances emergency response.
2.12 In order to ensure CNSC action:

effective regulatory
The CNSC’s independence, legal authority, technical competence and
oversight of the safety of
safety culture have been assessed by the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory
nuclear installations, it
Review Service (IRRS) missions.
is essential that the
regulatory body is Canada hosted an IRRS mission in 2009 that included a thorough peer
independent and review of the CNSC’s independence, legal authority, adequacy of human
possesses legal and financial resources, corporate culture, and technical and scientific
authority, technical support. These areas were assessed to ensure they met the relevant IAEA
competence and a strong requirements.
safety culture.
Canada hosted a follow-up IRRS mission in 2011 that assessed the new (at
that time) IRRS Fukushima core module as well as the CNSC’s responses
to the findings of the 2009 mission. There were no new findings related to
the CNSC’s regulatory independence, legal authority, technical competence
or strong safety culture. The 2011 IRRS mission concluded that the CNSC
response to the Fukushima nuclear accident was robust and comprehensive,
and that the CNSC had an “effective and pragmatic framework” in place to
implement the lessons learned from Fukushima.
Results of the IRRS missions were made publicly available.
The CNSC currently has in place an initiative to define and strengthen its
safety culture as a regulator.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances international collaboration and improves
communication and public consultation.
2.13 In order to promote and CNSC action:

strengthen safety culture,
Annex 8

individuals and The CNSC has in place a comprehensive human and organizational
organizations need to performance program that assesses elements such as licensees’ safety
continuously challenge culture.
or re-examine the
In addition, the CNSC issued a discussion paper titled Safety Culture for
prevailing assumptions
Nuclear Licensees. This paper highlights the importance of safety culture in
about nuclear safety and
the nuclear industry and what has been done, both internationally and in
the implications of
Canada, to promote safety culture. It also sets the CNSC’s strategy for
decisions and actions
safety culture in the Canadian nuclear industry.
that could affect nuclear
safety. The discussion paper predates the Fukushima accident. However, because
safety culture was already an integral part of the licence review process
(under the established safety and control area of the CNSC’s management
system requirements), the CNSC Fukushima Task Force did not identify
safety culture as a gap. Safety culture is continuously evaluated by CNSC
staff.
CNSC assessment:
 Improves the regulatory framework and improves communication
and public consultation.
2.14 A systemic approach to CNSC action:

safety needs to consider
The CNSC has in place a comprehensive human and organizational
the interactions between
performance program that assesses elements such as licensees’ safety
human, organizational
culture.
and technical factors.
This approach needs to The action items listed in the CNSC Integrated Action Plan included
be taken through the consideration of human and organizational performance.
entire life cycle of
nuclear installations. CNSC assessment:
Section 3. Emergency preparedness and response

3.1 In preparing for the CNSC action:
response to a possible
Offsite emergency response is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated
nuclear emergency, it is
Action Plan:
necessary to consider
emergencies that could A.4.1 Licensees should evaluate and revise their emergency plans in
involve severe damage to regard to multi-unit accidents and severe external events. This
nuclear fuel in the activity should include an assessment of their minimum
reactor core or to spent complement requirements to ensure their emergency response
fuel on the site, including organizations will be capable of responding effectively to multi-
those involving several unit accidents or to severe natural disasters. This assessment
units at a multi-unit should consider elements of HOP under accident conditions.
plant possibly occurring
(For onsite emergency response, see LL #2.10.)
at the same time as a
natural disaster. This action item is closed for Canadian NPP licensees.
CNSC assessment:
Annex 8

 Enhances emergency response.
3.2 The emergency CNSC action:

management system for
The need for emergency exercises is directly addressed in the CNSC
response to a nuclear
Integrated Action Plan:
emergency needs to
include clearly defined A.4.2 Licensees should review their drill and exercise programs, to
roles and responsibilities ensure that they are sufficiently challenging to test the
for the operating performance of the emergency response organization under severe
organization and for events and/or multi-unit accident conditions. This assessment
local and national should consider elements of HOP under accident conditions.
authorities. The system,
Emergency exercises involving all responsible agencies have been
including the
performed. Verification is integral to CNSC regulatory oversight.
interactions between the
operating organization Roles and responsibilities of responding organizations at the federal level,
and the authorities, along with interfaces between the federal and provincial/territorial levels,
needs to be regularly were addressed in the update to the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan and
tested in exercises. are further described in the all-hazards Federal Emergency Response Plan.
Federal and provincial nuclear emergency management coordinating
committees meet routinely to ensure common understanding of roles and
responsibilities across all jurisdictions.
Exercises that include all offsite response authorities are incorporated into
an integrated nuclear exercise calendar maintained by Health Canada. They
are also integrated with a national all-hazards exercise calendar.
This action item is closed for all Canadian NPP licensees.
CNSC assessment:
 Strengthens defence in depth and enhances emergency response.
3.3 Emergency workers need CNSC action:

to be designated,
This lesson is being addressed through amendments to section 15 of the
assigned clearly
Radiation Protection Regulations, which addresses doses to emergency
specified duties,
personnel, to ensure it is in line with international practices. (The
regardless of which
amendments are currently being drafted by the Department of Justice.)
organization they work
for, given adequate Coordination of offsite emergency workers is addressed in offsite response
training, and be properly plans through the implementation of emergency worker centres. At the
protected during an federal level, emergency workers who may be mobilized to assist with
emergency. offsite monitoring activities are pre-designated, trained and assigned
Arrangements need to be specific roles and responsibilities according to the existing concept of
in place to integrate into operations and standard operating procedures. Coordination and protection
the response those of emergency workers was tested in recent exercises; lessons learned are
emergency workers who being addressed through inter-jurisdictional activities related to emergency
had not been designated worker operations and safety, and through updates to standard operating
prior to the emergency, procedures. Future exercises to test these arrangements are incorporated in
and helpers who a nuclear emergency exercise calendar maintained by Health Canada.
volunteer to assist in the
Annex 8

emergency response. In addition, this lesson is being addressed through:
 Health Canada’s 2016 update to the Canadian Guidelines for
Protective Actions during a Nuclear Emergency
 Ontario’s 2016 update to the Provincial Nuclear Emergency
Response Plan
 an update to the CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear
emergency management programs, issued in 2014 with a second
edition in 2015
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances emergency response and improves the regulatory
framework.
3.4 Arrangements need to be CNSC action:

in place to allow
The CNSC Fukushima Task Force verified that the responsibilities for
decisions to be made on
making decisions about urgent protective actions are adequately defined.
the implementation of
No action was necessary in Canada. Discharge of responsibilities has been
predetermined urgent
tested in emergency exercises such as Huron Challenge at Bruce Power and
protective actions for the
Exercise Unified Response at Darlington Nuclear Generating Station.
public, based on
predefined plant In addition, the Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical Severe Nuclear
conditions. Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation Measures has determined that, if
the identified protective measures are applied in accordance with plans,
they will be effective in ensuring protection of the public.
CNSC assessment:
 Emergency response is acceptable.
No actions required.

in place to enable urgent
The CNSC Fukushima Task Force verified that the responsibilities for
protective actions to be
making decisions about urgent protective actions are adequately defined.
extended or modified in
response to developing Monitoring is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated Action Plan:
plant conditions or
A.5.3 Licensees should install automated real-time station boundary
monitoring results.
radiation monitoring systems with appropriate backup power and
Arrangements are also
needed to enable early communications systems.
protective actions to be Health Canada also maintains a national real-time radiation monitoring
initiated on the basis of system, with monitoring stations around all nuclear power plants and across
monitoring results. the country to support the initiation of early protective actions based on
monitoring results.
CNSC assessment:
Annex 8


in place to ensure that
protective actions and
other response actions in A.5.4 Licensees should develop source term estimation capability,
a nuclear emergency do including dose modelling tools.
more good than harm. A
The important subject of balancing risks is addressed by provincial and
comprehensive approach
to decision making needs federal off-site plans to a certain extent.
to be in place to ensure Health Canada is currently revising its protective action guidance to align
that this balance is with the recommendations of the IAEA with respect to generic criteria and
achieved. operational intervention levels aimed at doing more good than harm.
Decision makers are encouraged to weigh the possible dose consequences
with other prevailing conditions, such as weather, traffic and time of day,
all of which can influence the success or failure of actions such as
evacuation.
Health Canada will also participate in the development of a new IAEA
document on considerations in the development of protection strategies for
a nuclear emergency at a CANDU reactor.
CNSC assessment:

in place to assist
decision makers, the
public and others (e.g., A.6.1 CNSC staff will meet with provincial and federal nuclear
medical staff) to gain an emergency planning authorities, to ensure understanding of
understanding of recommendations and findings.
radiological health
hazards in a nuclear It is also addressed through emergency exercises such as Huron Challenge
emergency in order to at Bruce Power and Exercise Unified Response at Darlington Nuclear
Generating Station.
make informed decisions
on protective actions. While not specific to decision makers, the CNSC has made available a
Arrangements also need great deal of information on its website (e.g., videos, infographics, feature
to be in place to address articles, online modules) to explain complex concepts, particularly the
public concerns locally, effects of radiation and its sources, in a way that is easily understood by the
nationally and public.
internationally.
Per LL #3.6, this action item is complete.
The CNSC and Health Canada are participating in the development of the
new IAEA safety guide DS475, which will focus on arrangements for
public communications in preparedness and response for a nuclear or
radiological emergency.
The Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan includes arrangements to ensure that
Annex 8

decision makers are informed, in plain language, of potential impacts of a
nuclear emergency.
Health Canada and its partners deliver periodic training on radiological
health hazards and treatment to first responders and medical staff through
the Medical Emergency Treatment for Exposures to Radiation (METER)
program. This training program will soon be available online to increase its
reach. Health Canada has also published the Canadian Guide on Medical
Management of Radiation Emergencies.
CNSC assessment:

developed at the
Canada has begun developing a framework for the post-accident recovery
preparedness stage for
and remediation phases of a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency.
termination of protective
This includes the issue of transitioning from the emergency phase to the
actions and other
post-accident phase.
response actions, and
transition to the recovery In particular, the CNSC has engaged with some of its federal partners in the
phase. development of the strategy for post-accident recovery and there are plans
to host either a workshop or exercise to test this phase of the response once
the framework is either finalized or close to final.
CNSC staff have completed benchmarking the guidelines and strategies
developed by other countries, including France, the United States, the
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), and
other nuclear organizations.
In addition, Health Canada is currently revising its guidelines for protective
actions during a nuclear emergency. While the focus of the new draft
guidelines remains on the early and intermediate phases of the emergency,
recommendations for protective actions, such as temporary relocation and
food and drinking water control, could continue to be applied during the
recovery phase.
The CNSC is participating in the development of the new IAEA safety
guide DS474, which focuses on arrangements for the termination of a
nuclear or radiological emergency.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances emergency response and enhances international
collaboration.
Annex 8

3.9 Timely analysis of an CNSC action:
emergency and the
response to it, drawing
out lessons and A.6.1 CNSC staff will meet with provincial and federal nuclear
identifying possible emergency planning authorities, to ensure understanding of
improvements, enhances recommendations and findings.
emergency
Per REGDOC-2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response, the
arrangements.
CNSC also requires applicable licensees to ensure a sufficient quantity of
iodine thyroid-blocking agents is pre-distributed to all residences,
businesses and institutions within the designated plume exposure planning
zone (primary zone), along with instructions on the proper administration
of these agents.
Potassium iodide (KI) pills have been made available to residents in a
50-kilometre radius around the facilities, with delivery to the doorstep of
every household within an 8- or 10-kilometre radius.
The distribution of KI pills is accompanied by ongoing information and
education programs that explain why the pills are available, how they
should be stored and under what circumstances they should be
administered.
The CNSC has also published the Study of Consequences of a Hypothetical
Severe Nuclear Accident and Effectiveness of Mitigation Measures, which
sheds light on the importance of considering sensitive receptors (i.e.,
children) in emergency planning efforts such as KI pill administration.
Both the Federal Emergency Response Plan and Federal Nuclear
Emergency Plan include the requirement to analyze an emergency and the
response to it, and then develop after-action reports and management
response action plans based on the lessons identified. At the federal level,
Health Canada’s nuclear emergency management coordinating committees,
as well as the Continuous Improvement to Federal Emergency Response
(CIFER) process managed by Public Safety Canada, provide for
implementing and tracking corrective actions.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances emergency response and improves communication and
public consultation.
3.10 The implementation of CNSC action:

international
Requests for assistance are directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated
arrangements for
Action Plan:
notification and
assistance needs to be A.5.2 Licensees should formalize all arrangements and agreements for
strengthened. external support, and should document these in the applicable
emergency plans and procedures. This assessment should
consider elements of HOP under accident conditions.
Regarding international arrangements, part A4 of the CNSC Integrated
Action Plan addresses strengthening international collaboration. In
particular, action items A.12.1 and A.13.1 placed actions on CNSC staff to:
 initiate discussions with CANDU senior regulators to determine areas
Annex 8

of interest where mutual support can be offered during a nuclear
emergency
 participate in collaboration with industry and other government
stakeholders at the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety in August 2012
A.12.1 The CNSC is to initiate discussions with CANDU senior regulators,
to determine areas of interest where mutual support can be offered
during a nuclear emergency.
A.13.1 Canada, as a signatory to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, is
required to participate in triennial review meetings of the
Convention and any extraordinary meeting that may be agreed to
by contracting parties. The CNSC on behalf of Canada is
responsible for coordinating the preparation and submission of the
national reports for peer review and the participation of Canadian
delegates at the review or extraordinary meetings. The CNSC in
collaboration with industry and government stakeholders is to
prepare a national report for peer review by contracting parties
and to participate at the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety on the sharing of lessons learned
and actions taken by contracting parties in response to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.
In keeping with its international commitments, the CNSC will continue to
cooperate with other regulators and industry representatives in the
implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, promote global
nuclear safety through the use of IAEA standards, and continue to support
the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the International Emergency Centre.
As Competent Authorities for the Convention on Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, Health Canada and the CNSC have strengthened their standard
operating procedures for communicating with the IAEA, and have
practised these in recent exercises. Health Canada has implemented a
statement of intent with the United States Department of Energy that
includes arrangements for bilateral notifications of a nuclear emergency.
Health Canada, as Competent Authority for the Convention on Assistance
in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, is actively
engaged with the IAEA on activities to strengthen these arrangements.
Canada has also registered biodosimetry assets under the IAEA’s Response
and Assistance Network, and continues to identify additional assets that can
be registered to support international assistance.
CNSC assessment:
collaboration.
3.11 There is a need to CNSC action:

improve consultation
and sharing of
information among C.1.6 The CNSC is to enhance collaboration with international peers
States on protective through active participation at various international forums to
Annex 8

actions and other exchange communications best practices and lessons learned from
response actions. the Fukushima crisis.
This action item is complete. Canada provided significant resources in
support of the IAEA report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
Health Canada is an active participant in the IAEA International Radiation
Monitoring Information System (IRMIS), whose objective is to share
national real-time radiation monitoring data with Competent Authorities of
other IAEA Member States during normal and emergency situations.
Canada has also contributed to the development of the IAEA’s assessment
and prognosis function.
Finally, Health Canada has put in place a statement of intent with the
United States Department of Energy, which includes provisions for the
sharing of information during a nuclear emergency.
CNSC assessment:
collaboration.
Annex 8
Phase 2: Assessment of radiological consequences and post-accident recovery

Table 2 reproduces the lessons learned identified in sections 4 and 5 of the DG-IAEA Report and
provides information about Canada’s actions related to each lesson. The lessons are numbered
based on the section of the DG-IAEA Report in which they appear.
Table 2: Assessment of sections 4 and 5

Section 4. Radiological consequences
4.1 In case of an accidental CNSC action:
release of radioactive
Boundary monitoring is directly addressed in the CNSC Integrated Action
substances to the
Plan:
environment, the prompt
quantification and A.5.3 Licensees should install automated real-time station boundary
characterization of the radiation monitoring systems with appropriate backup power and
amount and composition communications systems.
of the release is needed.
Health Canada’s fixed monitoring sites provide additional capabilities for
For significant releases,
real-time data. This data is available in real time to emergency response
a comprehensive and
authorities through Health Canada’s web-enabled mapping tool, EMAP.
coordinated programme
Health Canada is also an active participant in the IAEA International
of long term
environmental Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS), whose objective is to
monitoring is necessary share national real-time radiation monitoring data with Competent
Authorities of other IAEA Member States during normal and emergency
to determine the nature
situations.
and extent of the
radiological impact on Arrangements for comprehensive, long-term environmental monitoring are
the environment at the described in federal and provincial emergency response plans, which
local, regional and include fixed and mobile capabilities as well as centralized laboratories for
global levels. radiological analysis of various environmental media. In addition to
provincial authorities, several federal organizations contribute to this
comprehensive capability, including Health Canada, Natural Resources
Canada and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited / Canadian Nuclear
Laboratories. The CNSC has provided and continues to provide support in
terms of technical expertise.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances emergency response/preparedness.
4.2 Relevant international CNSC action:

bodies need to develop
Annex C of the CNSC Integrated Action Plan encompasses a series of
explanations of the
actions related to improving communication with the public:
principles and criteria
for radiation protection  Enhancement of social media tools such as Facebook and YouTube to
that are understandable ensure the CNSC website provides, in plain language, information to
for non-specialists in the public, including information on the safety aspects of nuclear
order to make their facilities and measures to deal with nuclear emergencies.
application clearer for
decision makers and the  Development of a crisis website that can be activated in the event of a
public. As some nuclear emergency in Canada.
protracted protection  Enhancement of the existing educational resources section on the
measures were disruptive CNSC website by targeting a broader audience. CNSC Online is a
for the affected people, a
Annex 8

better communication Web-based educational tool that presents highly technical concepts
strategy is needed to (such as the nuclear fuel lifecycle and nuclear safety) in plain language
convey the justification to Canadians. Where practicable, this interactive tool has made
for such measures and effective use of animated graphics and illustrations.
actions to all
stakeholders, including  Exploration of partnerships with science-based media organizations to
the public. provide media training to specialists and subject-matter experts (with
greater emphasis on crisis communications) so they can better convey
information in plain language.
 Development of a graphic that clearly illustrates to the public the
sequence of potential events during and immediately following an
extreme accident at a Canadian nuclear power plant.
In terms of specifics, a series of items have been developed and posted on
the CNSC website about concepts related to emergencies that the public
should understand. These include fact sheets on managing doses to the
public during a nuclear emergency and a fact sheet on reference levels.
Several YouTube videos have also been created, including a series of “ask
the expert” videos that address various emergency-related topics.
Under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, one of the CNSC’s objectives is
to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to
the public concerning the Commission’s activities and how both the
environment and Canadians’ health and safety are affected by the
development, production, possession and use of nuclear substances and
prescribed equipment.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhancing communications and public education.
 Communication strategies and means are continuously improved
at the CNSC as new information/technologies become available.
4.3 Conservative decisions CNSC action:

related to specific
The CNSC agrees that consistency among international standards – and
activity and activity
between international and national standards – is beneficial.
concentrations in
consumer products and In Canada, controls on foodstuffs (including milk) are established by
deposition activity led to Health Canada and guidelines are presented in the Canadian Guidelines for
extended restrictions and the Restriction of Radioactively Contaminated Food and Water Following
associated difficulties. In a Nuclear Emergency. These guidelines are being revised as part of Health
a prolonged exposure Canada’s broader revision of its protective action guidelines for nuclear
situation, consistency emergencies. The CNSC subscribes to Health Canada’s guidelines on
among international drinking water.
standards, and between
The CNSC will also address this lesson when establishing post-emergency
international and
recovery guidelines for consumer products. Both the CNSC and Health
national standards, is
Canada have begun discussions on developing a framework for post-
beneficial, particularly
accident issues, which will include criteria for a range of recovery
those associated with
drinking water, food, strategies.
non-edible consumer
products and deposition CNSC assessment:
activity on land.  Improves the CNSC regulatory framework/processes and
Annex 8

emergency preparedness.
Work is ongoing under the CNSC and Health Canada with completion
planned by 2017.
4.4 Personal radiation CNSC action:

monitoring of
The CNSC agrees with this lesson learned. This effort would be carried out
representative groups of
collaboratively by a number of government organizations and others. For
members of the public
example, Health Canada has instruments and expertise that can be used to
provides invaluable
carry out personal dose estimates. Health Canada’s National Dosimetry
information for reliable
Services, which provides emergency dosimetry services for emergency
estimates of radiation
responders, can provide personal dosimetry for representative members of
doses and needs to be
the public on request of a province or territory. Expertise is also found
used together with
within the CNSC, applicable provincial authorities and many commercial
environmental
organizations. There are currently provisions in place to allow for both the
measurements and
calculation and measurement of dose. However, details in terms of
appropriate dose
guidance material specific to this topic are needed and should be addressed
estimation models for
as part of the recommendations for the post-recovery phase of the
assessing public dose.
emergency.
CNSC assessment:
 Improves the CNSC regulatory framework/processes and
planned by 2017.
4.5 While dairy products CNSC action:

were not the main
Provisions to restrict the consumption of foodstuffs such as milk are
pathways for the
currently covered in the Canadian Guidelines for the Restriction of
ingestion of radioiodine
Radioactively Contaminated Food and Water Following a Nuclear
in Japan, it is clear that
Emergency. These guidelines are being revised as part of Health Canada’s
the most important
broader revision of its protective action guidelines for nuclear emergencies.
method of limiting
thyroid doses, especially During an emergency, the provincial decision maker responsible for
to children, is to restrict emergency response would lead in the restriction of local food and water
the consumption of fresh consumption. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Health
milk from grazing cows. Canada would be involved in the testing of food and water samples, with
the CFIA taking any necessary regulatory actions, such as product recalls,
to ensure food safety.
Provincial plans also include provisions for longer-term ingestion and
assurance monitoring to ensure appropriate restrictions are put in place
following an emergency. Health Canada and the CFIA work with the
provincial authorities to manage these restrictions.
CNSC assessment:
 Improves Canada’s regulatory framework/processes and
4.6 A robust system is CNSC action:

necessary for monitoring
The CNSC agrees with this lesson learned. This lesson is also partly
Annex 8

and recording addressed through the following action items in the CNSC Integrated
occupational radiation Action Plan:
doses, via all relevant
A.8.1.1 The CNSC will prepare and consult on a discussion paper on
pathways, particularly
potential amendments to the Radiation Protection Regulations
those due to internal
which will include proposed amendments to the emergency
exposure that may be
provisions in the regulations.
incurred by workers
during severe accident A.8.1.3 The CNSC will review results of consultation and prepare final
management activities. It amendments to the Radiation Protection Regulations and propose
is essential that suitable them to the Commission for enactment.
and sufficient personal
protective equipment be Canada’s Radiation Protection Regulations require licensees to ascertain
available for limiting the and record the magnitude of effective dose and equivalent dose received by
and committed to all workers, including during severe accident
exposure of workers
management activities. Workers’ radiation doses must also be monitored to
during emergency
ensure they are below Canada’s regulatory dose limits and maintained as
response activities and
low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), social and economic factors taken
that workers be
sufficiently trained in its into account.
use. The CNSC has drafted revised regulations on emergencies and emergency
dose limits for Canada’s Radiation Protection Regulations, which will be
submitted for consultation in the Canada Gazette, Part I. These
amendments are based on international benchmarking on the control and
minimization of doses to persons in accordance with the severity of an
emergency. They also address requirements related to pregnant workers,
keeping doses ALARA and when a dose limit is exceeded in the context of
an emergency.
As for the availability of adequate radiation personal protective equipment
(PPE) and sufficient training to persons on the use of such equipment,
plans are in place. The CNSC has verified licensees’ adequacy for PPE and
instruments and found them acceptable.
Health Canada provides services to support the monitoring and recording
of occupational radiation doses. Health Canada’s National Dosimetry
Services will provide dosimeters to emergency workers to support external
dose control. Health Canada also maintains the National Dose Registry for
recording and tracking the occupational doses of all workers in Canada. In
response to a recent national exercise in Canada, a multi-jurisdictional
working group has been established to better define roles, responsibilities,
resources and a concept of operations for emergency worker protection.
CNSC assessment:
 Improves Canada’s regulatory framework and processes.
4.7 The risks of radiation CNSC action:

exposure and the
See LL #4.2 above concerning public communication initiatives.
attribution of health
Greater efforts on risk communication are ongoing. As one example, this
effects to radiation need
lesson links very closely with the CNSC’s development of quantitative
to be clearly presented to
health objectives. These objectives will be communicated to the public so
stakeholders, making it
that the health risk associated with a possible emergency (for example) is
unambiguous that any
better understood.
increases in the
occurrence of health
Annex 8

effects in populations are CNSC assessment:
not attributable to
exposure to radiation, if  Work is ongoing under continuous improvement.
levels of exposure are No outstanding actions.
similar to the global
average background
levels of radiation.
4.8 After a nuclear accident, CNSC action:

health surveys are very
The CNSC will be involved in a health survey (in the case of a nuclear
important and useful, but
emergency) and will ensure the purpose and limitations of such a survey
should not be interpreted
are clear.
as epidemiological
studies. The results of Health Canada has produced the Canadian Guide on Medical Management
such health surveys are of Radiation Emergencies, which includes some guidance for longer-term
intended to provide follow-up health surveys. Although the roles and responsibilities for these
information to support surveys still need to be clarified, they will likely include provincial health
medical assistance to the authorities as well as, at the federal level, the Public Health Agency of
affected population. Canada and Health Canada. Health surveys will be included in the recovery
framework currently being discussed by the CNSC and Health Canada.
CNSC assessment:
 Enhances domestic and international cooperation.
4.9 There is a need for CNSC action:

radiological protection
Although addressing the psychological consequences of a nuclear accident
guidance to address the
is not within the CNSC’s mandate, some elements of this lesson will be
psychological
covered as part of the CNSC’s development of a post-emergency strategy.
consequences to
Provisions for managing psychological consequences are included in some
members of the affected
provincial health emergency response plans, such as the Radiation Health
populations in the
Response Plan produced by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term
aftermath of radiological
Care. Health Canada has produced the Canadian Guide on Medical
accidents. A Task Group
Management of Radiation Emergencies, which includes guidance for
of the ICRP has
managing psychological consequences.
recommended that
“strategies for mitigating
CNSC assessment:
the serious psychological
consequences arising  Improves Canada’s regulatory framework/processes and guidance
from radiological during radiological emergencies
accidents [should] be
sought.” No outstanding actions.
4.10 Factual information on CNSC action:

radiation effects needs to
In times of emergency, the ability to think logically is greatly hampered by
be communicated in an
fear. As such, the majority of the effort should be on communication and
understandable and
education during non-emergency periods. (For more details, see LL #4.2
timely manner to
concerning public communication initiatives.)
individuals in affected
areas in order to Additionally, this issue is being addressed as part of the CNSC’s
enhance their development of a post-emergency strategy.
understanding of
Under the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan, the Technical Assessment
protection strategies, to
Annex 8

alleviate their concerns Group includes a “support to communications” function whose task is to
and support their own formulate technical information into plain language for decision makers
protection initiatives. and the public. As follow-up to a recent national exercise, Health Canada is
also working with its partners to provide plain-language training for
designated officials.
CNSC assessment:
planned by 2017.
4.11 During any emergency CNSC action:

phase, the focus has to
To inform regulatory oversight, CNSC staff will continue to monitor the
be on protecting people.
research being conducted at Fukushima and Chernobyl to understand the
Doses to the biota cannot
large-scale consequences of radioactive contamination in the environment
be controlled and could
on populations, communities and the general ecosystem. Based on the
be potentially significant
information to date, the CNSC’s current approach to assessing radiological
on an individual basis.
effects on non-human biota from nuclear accidents (e.g., as part of
Knowledge of the
environmental assessments) remains valid.
impacts of radiation
exposure on non-human
CNSC assessment:
biota needs to be
strengthened by  Continuous monitoring of international activities to ensure all
improving the elements being considered by international peers are reflected in
assessment methodology the Canadian review scope.
and understanding of
radiation-induced effects No outstanding actions.
on biota populations and
ecosystems. Following a
large release of
radionuclides to the
environment, an
integrated perspective
needs to be adopted to
ensure sustainability of
agriculture, forestry,
fishery and tourism and
of the use of natural
resources.
Section 5. Post-accident recovery
5.1 Pre-accident planning CNSC action:
for post-accident
The CNSC is currently drafting post-accident recovery guidelines that
recovery is necessary to
address these issues.
improve decision making
under pressure in the The CNSC and Health Canada are discussing approaches for developing a
immediate post-accident broader recovery framework involving all relevant partners.
situation. National
Additionally, the CNSC Commission has powers under sections 46 and 47
strategies and measures
of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act to make decisions regarding
for post-accident
contaminated lands and to take any measures necessary to protect human
recovery need to be
prepared in advance in health during emergencies.
order to enable an In a post-accident situation, Health Canada will work with its partners to
effective and appropriate provide analysis and communication of radiological analysis of various
overall recovery environmental media. This approach is currently being followed to manage
Annex 8

programme to be put in ongoing concern from the public about the potential contamination of
place in case of a Canadian ocean waters due to the Fukushima accident.
nuclear accident. These
strategies and measures CNSC assessment:
need to include the
establishment of a legal  Guidelines for food and water controls are currently in place as
and regulatory part of provincial and federal emergency offsite planning.
framework; generic Work is ongoing under the CNSC and Health Canada with completion
remediation strategies planned by 2017.
and criteria for residual
radiation doses and
contamination levels; a
plan for stabilization and
decommissioning of
damaged nuclear
facilities; and a generic
strategy for managing
large quantities of
contaminated material
and radioactive waste.
5.2 Remediation strategies CNSC action:

need to take account of
This issue will be considered in the development of post-accident recovery
the effectiveness and
guidelines.
feasibility of individual
measures and the
CNSC assessment:
amount of contaminated
material that will be Work is ongoing under the CNSC and Health Canada with completion
generated in the planned by 2017.
remediation process.
5.3 As part of the CNSC action:
remediation strategy, the
This issue has been considered in the development of post-accident
implementation of
recovery guidelines.
rigorous testing of and
controls on food is In a post-accident situation, Health Canada will work with its partners to
necessary to prevent or provide analysis and communication of radiological analysis of various
minimize ingestion environmental media. This approach is currently being followed to manage
doses. ongoing concern from the public about the potential contamination of
Canadian ocean waters due to the Fukushima accident.
CNSC assessment:
 Guidelines for food and water controls are currently in place as
noted previously.
planned by 2017.
Annex 8

5.4 Further international CNSC action:
guidance is needed on
The CNSC agrees with this lesson and is monitoring the work of the
the practical application
international community.
of safety standards for
radiation protection in
CNSC assessment:
post-accident recovery
situations.  Continuous monitoring of international activities to ensure all
elements being considered by international peers are reflected in
the Canadian review scope.
5.5 Following an accident, a CNSC action:

strategic plan for
The CNSC agrees with this lesson. This kind of strategic plan would be
maintaining long term
integrated and aligned with licensees’ already established preliminary
stable conditions and for
decommissioning plans and radiation protection programs in accordance
the decommissioning of
with Canada’s Radiation Protection Regulations.
accident-damaged
facilities is essential for
CNSC assessment:
on-site recovery. The
plan needs to be flexible No outstanding actions.
and readily adaptable to
changing conditions and
new information.
5.6 Retrieving damaged fuel CNSC action:

and characterizing and
Retrieving damaged fuel and developing special tools fall under the
removing fuel debris
licensee’s responsibilities. (See the response to LL #5.7 below.)
require solutions that are
specific to the accident
CNSC assessment:
and special methods and
tools may need to be No outstanding actions.
developed.
5.7 National strategies and CNSC action:

measures for post-
The safety assessment should include characterization of contaminated
accident recovery need
waters resulting from potential incidents related to CANDU reactors and
to include the
taking into account the siting guidelines for Canadian NPPs. Based on the
development of a generic
results, the safety assessment should address how contaminated waters will
strategy for managing
be safely managed to protect the environment. This may include addressing
contaminated liquid and
storage capacity and location, treatment technology and monitoring.
solid material and
radioactive waste, As part of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations, the
supported by generic CNSC has unconditional and conditional clearance criteria for the disposal
safety assessments for of solid material. The act of remediation differs from decommissioning in
discharge, storage and that it is done outside of lifecycle planning. Regulatory oversight of the
disposal. remediation activities must be clear, fair and commensurate with the risks
involved.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has
developed the concept of “reference levels” to address the decision-making
challenges associated with regulating accidents. The CNSC will be
incorporating remediation as a topic in an upcoming discussion paper on
waste management and decommissioning, planned for publication in 2016.
Annex 8

CNSC assessment:
 This topic will be covered in a discussion paper on waste
management and decommissioning. Development of the
discussion paper is currently in progress.
5.8 It is necessary to CNSC action:

recognize the
Addressing this issue is beyond the CNSC’s mandate. It is a government
socioeconomic
policy.
consequences of any
nuclear accident and of
CNSC assessment:
the subsequent protective
actions, and to develop No outstanding actions.
revitalization and
reconstruction projects
that address issues such
as reconstruction of
infrastructure,
community revitalization
and compensation.
5.9 Support by stakeholders CNSC action:

is essential for all
The CNSC has established policies and practices that optimize openness,
aspects of post-accident
transparency and stakeholder engagement, including stakeholder
recovery. In particular,
involvement in the decision-making process. However, the importance of
engagement of the
stakeholder involvement has been recognized and is addressed in the draft
affected population in
document on post-emergency recovery, with further development to be
the decision making
based on best practices from the cleanup of other contaminated sites.
processes is necessary
for the success, As stated in this lesson, confidence in the implementation of recovery
acceptability and measures has to be built through processes of dialogue with the affected
effectiveness of the population. This dialogue must take place before an accident happens (i.e.,
recovery and for the while there is no state of panic or fear-mongering by interested parties).
revitalization of
The CNSC and Health Canada are currently discussing approaches for
communities. An
developing a broader recovery framework involving all relevant partners
effective recovery
programme requires the and stakeholders.
trust and the involvement
of the affected CNSC assessment:
population. Confidence Work is ongoing under the CNSC and Health Canada with completion
in the implementation of planned by 2017.
recovery measures has to
be built through
processes of dialogue,
the provision of
consistent, clear and
timely information, and
support to the affected
population.
Annex 9 (c)
Annex 9 (c)
Public Information Programs of NPP Licensees
The public information and disclosure programs of Canadian NPP licensees are required to have
the following elements:
 objectives
 identification of target audience(s)
 tracking of public and media opinion
 public information strategy and products
 public disclosure protocol
 public disclosure notification to the CNSC
 program evaluation and improvement process
 documentation and records
 contact information
The public information strategies and products within the licensees’ programs typically consist
of:
 community newsletters mailed directly to households in the region
 advertising in local newspapers
 regular updates provided to local politicians at the municipal, provincial and federal levels
 an interactive visitors’ centre
 annual open houses on operational performance
 an Aboriginal affairs program
 communication with employees
 an informative website and social media channels
 regular information sessions on topics identified as areas of public interest
 public polling and focus groups to gather information on public opinion
 media releases
These programs are supported by disclosure protocols that outline the type of information on the
facility and its activities that will be shared with the public (e.g., incidents, major changes to
operations, periodic environmental performance reports) and how that information will be
shared.
For illustration, some examples of the public outreach undertaken by Bruce Power and by OPG
during the reporting period are described below.
During the reporting period, Bruce Power:
 consulted with Aboriginal groups and communities whose treaty or Aboriginal rights
may be directly affected by the NPP’s operation
 implemented a new Aboriginal Scholarship Program to assist students as they further
their studies at post-secondary institutes
 launched the Bruce Power site summer bus tour program for visitors
 posted to its website an electronic version of its monthly newsletter
 invested in support programs in the local community (e.g., health and wellness, youth
development)
Annex 9 (c)
 conducted regular provincial and regional public opinion polling to scientifically measure
support in a number of key areas
 hosted telephone town hall meetings so that the Bruce Power Chief Executive Officer
could engage the local population in an open conversation regarding key issues involving
the NPP and the surrounding community
At Darlington, OPG:
 distributed a community newsletter, Darlington Neighbours, three times per year to more
than 100,000 households and businesses in Clarington and Oshawa
 provided regular updates (through letters and briefings) to Durham Regional Council and
Clarington and Oshawa municipal councils
 provided regular updates to existing community committees (Durham Nuclear Health
Committee, Darlington Community Advisory Council) and other stakeholders
 held information-sharing events with First Nations and Métis communities to discuss the
implementation of its Aboriginal relations policy
 distributed to the local community a new nuclear safety guide to provide information
about what to do in the unlikely event of a nuclear emergency
 provided support to community initiatives through its Corporate Citizenship Program
 provided information to the public through its website and social media program, with
more than 27,000 visitors annually to its website and more than 5,000 Twitter followers
 hosted two “open doors” sessions to more than 3,500 members of the public, which
included a tour of the Darlington refurbishment training mock-up facility
In addition to the typical public information programs for existing NPPs, OPG and Bruce Power
also conducted comprehensive outreach programs focused on the pre-distribution of iodine
thyroid blockers (i.e., potassium iodide pills) in 2015. More details can be found in
subsection 16.1(d).
Annex 10 (a)
Annex 10 (a)
Safety Policies at the Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear power poses unique hazards due to the enormous energy in the reactor core, radioactive
material and decay heat produced by the fuel. Nuclear safety involves the protection of workers,
the public and the environment from these hazards. Therefore, as stated in article 10, each NPP
licensee in Canada has given due priority to safety as part of its management system.
Each licensee has adopted a different style of demonstrating its priority to safety, with some
choosing to state high-level safety principles as part of a distinct nuclear safety policy for their
organization.

The OPG nuclear safety policy states that:
Nuclear Safety shall be the overriding priority in all activities performed in support of
OPG nuclear facilities. Nuclear Safety shall have clear priority over schedule, cost and
production.
This policy identifies the Chief Nuclear Officer as being accountable to the Chief Executive
Officer and the Board of Directors to establish a management system that fosters nuclear safety
as the highest priority.
Bruce Power
Ensuring a healthy nuclear safety culture is an objective for the Bruce Power management
system and a means to high standards of excellence. Bruce Power states its commitment to safety
within its nuclear safety policy:
Individuals at all levels of the organization consider nuclear plant safety as the overriding
priority. Their decisions and actions are based on this priority, and they follow up to
verify that nuclear safety concerns receive appropriate attention. The work environment,
the attitudes and behaviours of all individuals reflect and foster such a safety culture.
Bruce Power shall ensure that reactor safety is the overriding priority in its business
decisions and activities, and as the operator of a nuclear power plant accepts that its
fundamental reactor safety objective is to protect the public, site personnel and the
environment from harm, by establishing and maintaining effective defences against
radiological hazards.
This policy provides additional elaboration related to the protection of safety margins,
maintenance of defence in depth, and safety analysis.
Hydro-Québec
For Gentilly-2, the Hydro-Québec policy on nuclear safety has a similar statement of high-level
values and goals, with a set of supporting principles:
Management, Nuclear Production, has assigned its highest priority to nuclear safety at
Gentilly-2. This commitment is supported by the following statements:
Each employee is personally responsible for safety.
Managers must demonstrate their commitment to safety.
Confidence and transparency prevail in the organization.
Annex 10 (a)
Decisions made reflect the priority assigned to safety.

Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
A questioning attitude is valued.
Continuous improvement is sought by the organization.
Safety is continuously under review.
Employees, partners and suppliers respect all safety related requirements.
NB Power
The Nuclear Management Manual, the highest-level document governing the operations of Point
Lepreau, has the following as the first point of the management commitment:
NB Power is committed to the safe, reliable and efficient operation of Point Lepreau
Generating Station.
The organization’s mission is stated as follows:
To operate the Point Lepreau Generating Station to provide electricity safely…
The first of the core values of the organization is stated as follows:
Safety First – We recognize and take seriously the unique safety requirements of the
nuclear core. We are committed to employee and public safety.
In addition, the Nuclear Management Manual is introduced by the following statement:
Our Management System is a combination of the culture and interrelated activities that
are used to direct and carry out work. It includes the management and support of
personnel to enable them to implement the documented processes established within the
Management System so that the performance objectives are achieved safely, consistently
and efficiently.
Employee responsibilities are stated in the NB Power management system and are also stated in
the Station Instruction on Operations Expectations and Practices for Point Lepreau.
Annex 11.2 (a)
Annex 11.2 (a)

Details Related to Training and Numbers of Workers
Improvements to licensees training programs
The following provides examples of how NPP licensees have improved their training programs
during the reporting period.
Fuel handling: Bruce Power
Bruce Power has developed a full-scale fuel handling simulator to assist with fuel handling
training for all necessary staff (e.g., fuel handling control room operators, shift managers, control
room shift supervisors, non-licensed operators, nuclear power school trainees). The simulator
provides real-time simulation of any on-power fuelling machine action and is enhanced with a
graphic display for the development of mental models, which provides a solid understanding of
plant design and system interrelationships.
The fuel handling simulator is unlike any other in the world. The system was modelled with a
degree of precision (+/- 0.1 mm) previously unachieved. The integration of high-fidelity physics
models with an already high-fidelity reactor model is also the first of its kind in the nuclear
industry; it paves the way for training that until now was not even considered.
The fuel handling equipment and environment have been modelled using state-of-the-art, real-
time physics models that make the behaviour of the models precisely match the response of the
NPP. Key physical properties such as mass, inertia and centre of mass are all built into the
models. More importantly, interaction properties are also included (e.g., friction, stiffness,
stiction) and can be easily manipulated through instructor controls. Allowing simulator
instructors to cause virtually any key component to stick, seize or break free lets them recreate
virtually any historical event as well as conduct training for new failure scenarios.
The fuel handling simulator’s scope encompasses the entire fuel route: loading new fuel into the
head from the new fuel room, fuelling the reactors and discharging irradiated fuel in the primary
irradiated fuel bay.
Dynamic learning activities: Bruce Power
Bruce Power has incorporated the use of dynamic learning activities (DLAs) into its training
programs. Every six months, staff members demonstrate that they can apply human performance
tools in a challenging situation. DLAs ensure workers know how to apply these tools in order to
reduce the frequency of workplace errors and minimize the impact of errors that do occur. The
expectation is that all full-time and support staff complete a DLA relevant to their workgroup
every six months. Bruce Power has built a “Murphy’s Alley” trailer that is used for human
performance DLAs. The trailer has two areas at either end that mimic a contamination control
area, and a large middle section that features various pieces of equipment, including valves,
gauges and mechanical and electrical components. As part of the DLA, workers demonstrate
proper use of the human performance tools appropriate for the situation.
The DLAs are typically timed to be completed ahead of scheduled maintenance outages (during
which workloads are typically the highest). During the reporting period, Bruce Power conducted
two DLAs each year. Recent DLAs included maintenance DLAs focused on foreign material
exclusion; operations and work management DLAs focused on job site reviews; chemistry and
Annex 11.2 (a)
environment DLAs focused on procedure use and adherence; radiation protection and industrial
safety DLAs focused on contaminated control area behaviours; and an engineering DLA focused
on technical pre-job briefs. Errors are embedded into the DLAs so workers can demonstrate all
human performance tools to get their DLA credit.
Dynamic learning activities: Ontario Power Generation

OPG has developed and implemented DLAs to sustain and continually improve radiation
protection performance at Darlington and Pickering. The DLAs provide an opportunity for
participants to interact with a worker in a simulated radioactive work area, complete with state-
of-the-art instrumentation and equipment that simulates radiation hazard conditions. This
provides station leaders with the opportunity to demonstrate their skills in a realistic work
environment without exposure to occupational radiation hazards, using instrumentation virtually
identical to that used in the plant.
All OPG station leaders have participated in interactive DLAs to improve the quality of oversight
and mentoring of workers during radioactive work execution. Station leaders have also
participated in DLAs to improve pre-job briefings given prior to radioactive work execution and
to maintain internal dose as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) during work in areas where
airborne radiation hazards are present. Operating and maintenance staff have participated in
DLAs related to handling tritiated fluids and contamination control. A dedicated facility has been
established for the delivery of DLAs in a small group environment to maximize learning
opportunities and hands-on involvement of participants. These DLAs are delivered at both NPPs
to ensure alignment across the fleet.
Dynamic learning activities: NB Power

NB Power has developed an integrated DLA to address the application and use of human
performance tools and techniques by all NPP staff. The activity incorporates three tasks: strainer
cleaning in a field environment, performing manipulations in a radiation area requiring a
radiation exposure permit, and doing calculations in an office. These tasks are done
simultaneously and then integrated to solve a common goal when successful. Successful
completion of tasks requires “engaged, thinking workers” effectively using the organization’s
human performance tools.
All NPP staff, starting with the site vice-president and station directors, are required to complete
the DLA, including contract staff joining the organization to support outages (a total of up to
1,400 staff members). To date, approximately half of the personnel supporting the unplanned
outage have completed the DLA. Staff learning is observed by their peers, supervisors and
managers when they return to work activities, and alignment is achieved with expectations,
critical steps and observation and coaching methodologies. Personnel use the tools in the same
manner as the training they completed before an outage.
Operations and maintenance training creates and maintains job performance capability. This
training normally includes classroom instruction, workshops, on-the-job instruction, full scope
simulator exercises, supervisory coaching and informal briefings. The majority of staff members
are also trained to a radiation protection level that qualifies them to be responsible for their own
protection, able to sponsor supplemental staff and provide radiation protection oversight.
Annex 11.2 (a)
Refurbishment training facility: Darlington Energy Complex

OPG staff and contractors who will be working on the replacement of fuel channels and feeders
at Darlington will be trained in a refurbishment training facility referred to as the Darlington
Energy Complex. This will allow ample time for staff to perform a full “dress rehearsal” of the
intricate work in an environment that replicates the actual reactor vault, before and during project
execution. The purpose of the mock-up is to have the work teams determine best working
techniques before the Darlington refurbishment begins. Mock-up buildings have been an integral
part of previous major projects including refurbishments at Point Lepreau, Wolsong (Korea) and
Bruce Power. Industry best practice and lessons learned have shown that training on realistic
mock-ups results in significantly more efficient field execution.
The mock-up reactor is designed and built to accurately represent the size and space within the
real reactor vaults and identify all interferences (e.g., lighting in access areas) that will be
encountered during the work.
The mock-up equipment in the training centre includes:
 full-scale reactor mock-up with critical target components, interferences, vault cranes,
fueling machine bridge and fueling machine pits
 numerous fuel channel and feeder mock-ups of the target components for those
replacements
The mock-ups have been precisely constructed. There are 480 pressure tubes to be extracted and
inserted in each reactor. As the mock-up does not include the calandria, workers will be able to
see the new tubes sliding into position. Also due for replacement and part of the mock-up are the
960 feeder tubes – one at each end of each fuel channel assembly.
In addition to practicing replacement activities, trainees will also demonstrate understanding of
overall evolution and critical hold points from a radiation protection ALARA perspective by
participating in mock-up rehearsal or “just-in-time” training for the project to replace fuel
channels and feeders.
Requirements and guidance for qualification and numbers of workers

A hierarchy of laws, regulations, licence conditions and regulatory documents specify the
requirements for the number of workers to be present at an NPP as well as the qualifications and
training of personnel who perform critical safety-related activities.
The NSCA and its regulations provide the legislative basis for the number of workers and the
qualification, training, examination and certification of personnel. Specifically, the General
Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations state that the licensee shall:
(a) ensure the presence of a sufficient number of qualified workers to carry on the
licensed activity safely and in accordance with the NSCA, its regulations and the
licence
(b) train the workers to carry on the licensed activity in accordance with the NSCA, its
regulations and the licence
The Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations require each applicant for a licence to construct,
operate or decommission a Class I nuclear facility to provide details about the qualifications,
training and experience of any worker involved in the NPP’s operation or maintenance.
Annex 11.2 (a)
The licensing basis for NPPs include the following requirements related to numbers of workers,
qualifications and training:
 A minimum staff complement (sufficient qualified personnel) must be in attendance at all
times to ensure safe operation of the NPP. This includes a sufficient number of qualified
personnel to ensure adequate emergency response capability. The minimum staff
complement is specified in licensee documents that are submitted as part of the
application for a licence see (subsection 11.2(a)).
 A sufficient number of the following certified positions must be in attendance at all times
at an NPP. These will vary depending upon the design of the NPP:
o authorized nuclear operator/control room operator (all NPPs are required to have
an authorized nuclear operator in direct attendance at each unit’s main control
room panels at all times)
o Unit 0 control room operator (Bruce A, Bruce B, Darlington)
o control room shift supervisor and shift manager for multi-unit NPPs
o shift supervisor for single-unit NPPs
 A certified responsible/senior health physicist must be appointed.
 Certified personnel must meet the relevant certification requirements applicable to their
positions, as specified in CNSC regulatory document RD-204, Certification of Persons
Working at Nuclear Power Plants.
 CNSC guidance document G-323, Ensuring the Presence of Sufficient Qualified Staff at
Class I Nuclear Facilities – Minimum Staff Complement, describes CNSC staff’s
expectations of key factors that must be considered to ensure the presence of a sufficient
number of qualified staff at Class I nuclear facilities.
Annex 11.2 (b)
Annex 11.2 (b)

Workforce Planning Processes
All licensees have assessed the nature of the work performed by staff, the training and
qualifications required, and the existing capacity to do that work. Details on how Bruce Power
has done this are provided in annex 11.2(b) of the sixth Canadian report.
All licensees also have processes to ensure adequate resources and facilities are always available
for responding to planned activities and contingencies. The following is an example of Bruce
Power’s processes to plan and optimize its workforce.
The workforce planning process is reviewed annually as part of Bruce Power’s business planning
cycle. The process includes a talent segmentation exercise that analyzes the requirements for
various positions and the available staff. It identifies the specific criticality levels of all jobs
across the company, as well as the normal complement (e.g., requirements) for those positions.
This information is then applied as business assumptions for future staffing level planning
activities.
Several business assumptions are also applied against actual headcount and job level targets to
mitigate risks to critical positions. An attrition model forecasts future retirements and staff
movements across the site, based on historical retirement and staff movement trends, retirement
surveys, available skills within and outside the organization, and a risk
assessment/environmental scan of internal and external factors. In addition, the lead time (e.g.,
recruitment and training) is identified for all critical positions (including certified staff) and
serves as a basis for “pre-hiring” before an incumbent actually leaves his or her position. This
ensures mission-critical knowledge can be captured and transferred to a new hire, and that Bruce
Power maintains an adequate level of employees in positions required to safely manage the NPP.
Bruce Power’s workforce planning process allows for continuous adjustments to the workforce
plan, as it is considered a living document that must meet business requirements. Senior
managers also review the status of Bruce Power’s planned staffing efforts and other critical
reports semi-monthly.
This experience, knowledge and continual review are now applied to execute a gap analysis
between current staffing levels and the optimal future state. During yearly business planning
sessions, executives and senior managers reconcile current work program requirements and
Bruce Power’s long-term workforce model to develop appropriate staffing levels across the site
for each year of the planning horizon. Consequently, Bruce Power has a system in place to
ensure that current programs are managed, while implementing improvement strategies to reach
its future workforce model and staffing levels.
Annex 12 (a)
Annex 12 (a)
Responsibilities and Accountabilities for Human
Performance at NPPs
Each licensee incorporates, in its management system, an organizational and management
philosophy that uses a hierarchical method to account for human performance:
 The primary responsibility for human performance rests with each individual.
 First-line managers are accountable for monitoring and correcting human performance
issues.
 Management provides the necessary expectations, facilities and tools to aid human
performance.
 Non-line organizations provide independent oversight of human performance.
The priority to safety of each licensee and the focus on safety culture (as discussed in article 10)
are critical to this hierarchical approach. Clear lines of authority and communication are
established, so that individuals throughout the organization are aware of their responsibilities
toward nuclear safety. At the individual level, the emphasis is on personal dedication and
accountability for each individual engaged in an activity that affects the safety of the NPP. An
individual’s recognition and understanding of this responsibility, as well as a questioning and
self-checking attitude, are essential for minimizing human errors.
Human performance tools for workers are used to anticipate, prevent and detect errors before
they cause harm to people, plant, property or the environment. Although these tools can be used
by any employee in a wide range of situations, they are particularly useful to front-line workers
and their managers, who touch plant equipment and are capable of altering its status. Human
performance tools help workers maintain positive control of a work situation, ensuring the job is
done correctly the first time.
Errors by knowledge workers, especially engineers, potentially have the greatest adverse impact
on NPP safety. “In-process” errors are often more subtle than front-line active errors committed
by operators and maintainers on plant equipment, in that they tend to create latent errors that, if
undetected, become embedded in the physical configuration of the plant equipment or
documentation. Additionally, latent errors may go unnoticed for very long periods. Human
performance tools for knowledge workers assist them in anticipating, preventing and catching
most errors related to their work. Knowledge worker tools provide a defensive barrier against
latent errors that can affect plant safety or production later.
Management’s roles and responsibilities to aid in human performance include:
 clearly communicating performance expectations through policies and procedures
 establishing an effective organization with well-defined and understood responsibilities,
accountabilities and authorities
 ensuring an operational safety focus
 hiring sufficient numbers of properly qualified workers
 developing sound procedures to clearly define safety-related tasks
 continuously enhancing the procedures by incorporating lessons learned
Annex 12 (a)
 providing the necessary training and education to emphasize the reasons behind
established safety practices and procedures, together with the consequences of safety
shortfalls in personal performance
 providing sufficient and proper facilities, tools and equipment, and support staff
 conducting self-assessments to promote continuous improvement
 ensuring that human factors issues are systematically considered in any new design or
modification to an existing facility
 providing additional levels of oversight, independent of the line organization, to evaluate
human performance
 ensuring the use of operating experience feedback
Each level of management is also vested with a specific level of authority as defined in their
operating policies and principles (OP&Ps; see subsection 9(b) and subarticles 19(ii) and 19(iii))
and other management system documents. Managers should have a clear understanding of what
they can approve versus what they must refer to a higher authority. Errors are minimized by
requiring anyone who approves a document or activity to verify consistency and compliance
with:
 the individual’s limits of authority
 the applicable external requirements (e.g., laws, regulations and the licence) and
internal boundaries (e.g., OP&Ps, safety reports and quality assurance manuals)
 operating and maintenance practices
 design assumptions and intent
First-line managers are accountable for monitoring and correcting human performance issues.
The primary method is direct observation of pre-job planning and preparation, work execution
and post-job wrap-up activities. The flow of information and the communication of problems
both up and down the line, including identification of human errors, are key to human error
detection and correction.
A formal observation and coaching program assists managers and supervisors in directing their
observation activities in those areas where the most significant impact will be achieved. The
program also provides guidance on effective non-confrontational approaches to interacting with
employees when delivering coaching feedback on performance that met or did not meet the
requirements.
Annex 12 (e)
Annex 12 (e)
Human Factors Engineering in NPP Design and Modification
In the Canadian nuclear power industry, human factors engineering (HFE) is applied in new
designs from the conceptual design phase to the final detailed design, installation and
commissioning phases. In operating NPPs, HFE considers operational, maintenance and aging
management factors – and is integrated in the development of procedures as well as change
control processes when any modifications are made.
A rigorous HFE approach is used in the areas of human system interface components, equipment
layouts, control room habitability, control room display design, panel design and annunciation
design.
A systematic process is defined, documented and implemented to integrate human factors into
the design process. HFE activities are identified and documented for each design and
incorporated into the design plan and/or human factors plan. The plans are based on the
regulatory requirements, international standards and best practices, as well as experience derived
from the application of HFE to previous CANDU design projects throughout the evolution of
CANDU technology. The plans are then implemented to ensure that the resulting design is
compatible with human capabilities and limitations and that the systems and equipment can be
safely and effectively operated and maintained for all postulated system states and operating
conditions. HFE summary reports are produced to document the results of the process. All
licensees and Candu Energy Inc. perform periodic self-assessments of their HFE programs to
confirm they are fully implemented and effective.
The HFE program plan for design aspects of a nuclear project, including refurbishment and new
build, covers 11 elements based on the USNRC document NUREG-0711, Human Factors
Engineering Program Review Model:
 HFE program management
 operating experience review
 functional requirements analysis and function allocation
 task analysis
 staffing and qualification
 human reliability analysis
 human-system interface design
 procedure development
 training program development
 human factors verification and validation
 design implementation (integration)
CSA standard N290.12-14, Human factors in design for nuclear power plants, was published in
December 2014. This standard includes elements of NUREG-0711. All NPP licensees are in the
process of implementing the CSA standard; full implementation is expected during the next
reporting period.
In addition to providing input about the design itself, human factors are also addressed as part of
the constructability, operability, maintainability and safety review as well as in the development
of procedures, instructions and training. Also, human factors considerations and human
Annex 12 (e)
performance tools are used throughout a nuclear facility to address installation and
commissioning of the design as well as the operability, maintainability and safety of NPPs
during operation and shutdown.
Annex 14 (i) (c)
Annex 14 (i) (c)

Details on Deterministic Safety Analysis
Content of the safety analysis reports for existing NPPs
NPP licensees maintain deterministic safety analyses as documented in their safety analysis
reports. Deterministic safety analysis demonstrates that the radiological consequences of
postulated initiating events – which involve a single process failure – and events involving a
single process failure in conjunction with a failure in one of the special safety systems do not
exceed the accident-dependent reference public dose limits specified in the design requirements.
The typical safety analysis report covers the following main areas as given below.
Introduction and site description, which include the following characteristics:
 general description
 geography and land use for recreation and commerce, as well as information such as
population distribution
 meteorology
 hydrology
 geology and seismology
Systems and components, which provide sufficient detail for understanding the interaction of
the systems and for use in following the accident analysis details. The elements typically covered
include:
 safety design philosophy
 design criteria
 structures
 reactor
 reactor process systems
 special safety systems and safety-related systems
 instrumentation and control
 electrical power systems
 turbine/generator and auxiliaries
 fuel and fuel handling
 auxiliary systems
Deterministic safety analysis summaries, which provide the detailed description of the
accident analysis for the NPP. This presents the analysis of all the design-basis accidents to
demonstrate that the safety design objectives of all postulated accidents are met. The elements
typically covered include:
 identification of initiating events
 fuel handling system failures
 electrical system failures
 control failures
 small loss-of-coolant accidents
Annex 14 (i) (c)
 large loss-of-coolant accidents

 loss-of-coolant accident outside containment
 feedwater system failures
 steam supply system failures
 shutdown cooling system, shield cooling system and moderator system failures
 support system failures
 common mode incidents:
o design-basis earthquake
o turbine breakup
o design-basis tornado
o design-basis rail-line blast
o spurious closure of the heat transport loop interconnect valves
o toxic corrosive chemical rail-line accident
o internal fires
 event classification
 description of major computer models
Examples of improvements to deterministic safety analyses

The NPP licensees continually update safety analyses that included the effects of aging of the
primary heat transport system. The effects are due primarily to the diametric creep of the
pressure tubes. Safety analyses have been performed to demonstrate adequacy of safety margins
in the scenarios most affected by aging. As provided in CNSC regulatory document
REGDOC-2.6.3, Aging Management, an important aspect of life management is the impact of
aging on facility safety, including safety margins, as determined through an updated
deterministic safety analysis. This analysis requires a systematic and integrated approach to
aging management.
Revised safety analyses are being conducted in the context of the licensees’ implementation of
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis, which was
published in 2014. The following describes the work being carried out by each licensee to
implement REGDOC-2.4.1.

OPG is currently implementing the requirements of REGDOC-2.4.1 by performing several sets
of safety analyses under the new framework. These analyses also incorporate the effects of
primary heat transport aging. Pilot analyses have been completed for loss-of-reactivity control
scenarios and loss of moderator heat sink scenarios. OPG has also performed safety analyses for
loss of flow, small-break loss-of-coolant accidents, and neutron overpower protection accident
scenarios to demonstrate adequacy of safety margins with aged primary heat transport
conditions.
Bruce Power
Bruce Power has embarked on a three-year safety report improvement project, scheduled to be
completed by December 31, 2017, to upgrade the safety analysis summaries section of its safety
report. Bruce Power is adding a common mode failure appendix (not currently included in the
Bruce A and B safety reports) and aligning its safety report framework with REGDOC-2.4.1.
Annex 14 (i) (c)
Through this project, Bruce Power intends to improve and enhance the Bruce A and B safety
reports.
Bruce Power will develop an approach for deterministic analyses in support of seismic events,
fire and floods, drawing from post-Fukushima assessments and probabilistic safety assessments
performed in compliance with CNSC regulatory standard S-294, Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants.
NB Power
During the reporting period, NB Power completed its event identification and classification in
accordance with REGDOC-2.4.1 and performed a clause-by-clause and event-specific gap
assessment against the requirements of REGDOC-2.4.1. It applied a graded approach to
determining the analysis of anticipated operating occurrences (AOOs), which identified that no
further AOO analysis was required at that time. However, based on the REGDOC-2.4.1 gap
assessment, NB Power chose to perform an AOO analysis for fast loss-of-reactivity control
accidents to confirm the findings of the graded approach. Additional AOO analysis may be
identified depending on the outcome of the fast loss-of-reactivity control analysis. NB Power has
performed recent analyses that comply with REGDOC-2.4.1 requirements, including for
postulated large-break loss-of-coolant accidents with coincidental loss of emergency core
cooling. Ongoing safety analysis work that complies with REGDOC-2.4.1 includes analysis of
high-energy line breaks. NB Power will initiate safety analysis work to evaluate the
consequences of small loss-of-coolant analysis, which includes addressing aging effects. All new
analysis will be reflected in future updates to the safety report.
Annex 14 (ii) (b)
Annex 14 (ii) (b)

Aging Management Programs at Each Nuclear Power Plant
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.6.3, Aging Management, establishes the regulatory
requirements and provides guidance for integrated and component-specific aging management
programs at NPPs.
Along with the aging management programs required by REGDOC-2.6.3, Canadian licensees
have developed a series of periodic inspection programs and plans that expand the minimum
inspection and testing program requirements to address operational and safety issues. The most
significant of these programs and plans are described below.
Feeder Pipe Lifecycle Management Plan

This plan establishes an inspection and maintenance strategy to mitigate risks related to feeder
aging and degradation mechanisms. Specific program inspection and maintenance activities are
described to mitigate degradation caused by bend thinning, bend cracking, localized flaws
adjacent to welds and weld cracking. A visual inspection program is included to detect any
localized feeder fretting due to contact with components and structures in close proximity. This
plan also documents the strategy for determining whether feeder replacement is needed.
Fuel Channel Lifecycle Management Plan

This plan presents strategies for ensuring that the effects of fuel channel aging are monitored
(with inspections conducted per CSA standard N285.4, Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear
power plant components) and managed effectively. It also discusses degradation mechanisms –
including pressure tube dimensional changes due to service conditions (axial and diametral
expansion, wall thinning and tube sag), deuterium uptake, fracture toughness changes, pressure
tube to calandria tube contact and the potential for blister growth, as well as re-fuelling-related
service-induced damage to inside surfaces. Degradation mechanisms for fuel channel annulus
spacers are also discussed along with plans to ensure their fitness for service. Research results
are used to guide the inspection plans.
Flow-accelerated Corrosion Program

This program identifies susceptible systems and monitors and manages degradation related to
flow-accelerated corrosion and other degradation mechanisms (such as erosion), mainly in
secondary-side (non-nuclear) and certain primary-side (nuclear) piping systems. The program is
based on the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) program. It uses the Chexal-Horowitz
Engineering Corrosion (CHECWORKS) software as a guide in identifying and selecting
inspection locations and processing measured data to determine thinning rates and acceptability
for continued service. For piping that cannot be modelled using CHECWORKS due to
geometrical constraints or thinning mechanisms (such as small-bore piping or thinning due to an
erosive mechanism), manual calculations are used to evaluate the thinning rate and acceptability
for continued service.
Annex 14 (ii) (b)
Steam Generator Lifecycle Management Plan

This plan establishes the inspection and maintenance strategy used to control risks related to
steam generator aging and degradation mechanisms, and includes measures to detect, record,
trend and mitigate these mechanisms. Program elements include tube wall inspections and
inspections of other internal components (e.g., moisture separators, tie rods, feedwater boxes,
and nozzles), water chemistry management, and primary- and secondary-side deposit
management and removal (via water lancing, internal tube blasting, blow-down practices during
operation and occasional chemical cleaning).
Containment
Requirements for the design, construction, commissioning and in-service inspection of concrete
containment structures are contained in CSA standard N287.7, In-service examination and
testing requirements for concrete containment structures for CANDU nuclear power plants.
Licensees perform periodic in-service inspection and testing of the containment at specified
intervals, to ensure structural integrity and leak-tightness are maintained. As specified by
regulatory requirements, licensees submit the periodic inspection and testing results, as well as
their evaluations, to the CNSC for review. If inspection results indicate an adverse trend, the
CNSC may require the licensee to increase the frequency of the inspection and/or provide
compensatory measures.
Additional inspection requirements for containment components are specified in CSA standard
N285.5, Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power plant containment components.
Component replacement
The Canadian nuclear industry continues to take initiatives to prevent and manage problems with
acquiring replacements for equipment that is no longer available from the original manufacturer.
COG has an Emergency Spares Assistance Process that obtains spare parts from other utilities to
meet the needs of CANDU NPPs. As well, a number of replacement components (including
gaseous fission product detectors, 48-volt indicating fuses, heavy water leak-detection systems,
potentiometers, shut-off rod motors and digital control computers) were acquired through COG
on behalf of several CANDU NPPs. The Canadian industry has also developed some capability,
within an appropriate quality assurance program, to reverse-engineer and manufacture
replacement parts that are no longer available.
Example of Integrated Plant Life Management Plan

Bruce Power is evolving its approach to managing the aging and health of key structures,
systems or components in alignment with evolving regulatory requirements, best practice, and
operating experience. Bruce Power’s asset management approach is an example of the
implementation of an integrated NPP licensee aging management program to support key assets
in reaching their target lifetimes for reliable operations. The asset management approach utilizes
Bruce Power’s existing processes by integrating engineering practices for monitoring system and
component health, periodic inspection, equipment reliability and aging management, thus
continuously gathering data in a “plan-do-check-act” cycle. A number of initiatives and
strategies are underway to achieve or exceed target lifetimes.
Annex 14 (ii) (b)
The program’s scope and process has been developed with consideration for nuclear industry
regulatory requirement documents, along with best practice and guidance documents such as:
 CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.3.3, Periodic Safety Reviews
 CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.6.3, Aging Management
 CNSC regulatory standard S-98, Reliability Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
 IAEA safety guide NS-G-2.12, Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants
Annex 15 (a)
Annex 15 (a)
Detailed Requirements and Guidance for Control of Radiation
Exposure of Workers and the Public
The Radiation Protection Regulations incorporate many of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection recommendations for dose limits (ICRP 60, 1991) as well as its
recommendations on occupational exposure to radon progeny (ICRP 65, 1994). The regulations
address the following:
 implementation and requirements of licensee radiation protection programs
 requirements for ascertaining and recording doses
 definition of action level and the actions to be taken when an action level has been
reached
 requirement for informing workers of the risks associated with radiation to which the
worker may be exposed and of effective and equivalent dose limits
 requirement for when to use licensed dosimetry services to ascertain dose
 effective and equivalent dose limits for nuclear energy workers, pregnant nuclear energy
workers and persons who are not nuclear energy workers
 dose limits that apply during the control of emergencies
 actions to be taken when a dose limit is exceeded and the process for authorizing return to
work
 requirements for licensed dosimetry services
 requirements for labelling containers and devices
 requirements for posting radiation warning signs
The CNSC has developed a number of regulatory documents to assist licensees in matters related
to radiation protection and environmental protection. CNSC regulatory guide G-129, Keeping
Radiation Exposures and Doses “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA), describes
measures licensees can take to keep all doses to persons ALARA, social and economic factors
being taken into account. Elements that the CNSC considers to be essential in the approach to
ALARA are:
 demonstrated management commitment to the ALARA principle
 implementation of the ALARA principle through a licensee’s management of radiation
protection (including provision of dedicated resources, training, documentation and other
measures)
 programs that control exposures to workers and the public
 planning for unusual situations
 development of performance goals and regular operational reviews
CNSC regulatory guide G-228, Developing and Using Action Levels, is intended to help licence
applicants to develop action levels in accordance with paragraph 3(1)(f) of the General Nuclear
Safety and Control Regulations and section 6 of the Radiation Protection Regulations. G-228
provides guidance on the types of parameters that can be used in developing action levels,
requirements for monitoring these parameters and appropriate responses when an action level is
reached.
Licensees must use a CNSC-licensed dosimetry service to measure and monitor radiation doses
of nuclear energy workers who have a reasonable probability of receiving an effective dose
Annex 15 (a)
greater than 5 mSv in a one-year dosimetry period. CNSC regulatory standard S-106, Technical
and Quality Assurance Requirements for Dosimetry Services, contains accuracy, precision and
quality assurance requirements for dosimetry services licensed by the CNSC. The requirements
in S-106 meet, and in some instances exceed, the requirements of IAEA safety guides RS-G-1.2,
Assessment of Occupational Exposure Due to Intakes of Radionuclides, and RS-G-1.3,
Assessment of Occupational Exposure Due to External Sources of Radiation. Licensed dosimetry
services must file the dose results of each nuclear energy worker to the Canadian National Dose
Registry, which is maintained by Health Canada.
Summary of doses to NPP workers during the reporting period

Workers at NPPs are restricted to dose limits of 50 mSv in a one-year dosimetry period and
100 mSv in a five-year period. The data in the tables on the following page show the collective
dose from routine operations and outages, as well as the total collective dose and maximum
individual effective dose received by a worker at Canadian NPPs during the reporting period. As
indicated, no worker exceeded the annual dose limit of 50 mSv. In addition, no worker exceeded
the five-year dose limit of 100 mSv.
Annex 15 (a)
Table 1: Occupational dose summary for Canadian NPPs, 2013–2015

NPP Year Number Collective dose Collective dose from Total Maximum
of from routine outages, (including collective dose individual
reactors operations forced outages) (person-mSv) effective dose
(person-mSv) (person-mSv) (mSv)
Bruce A and B 2013 8 859 6,092 6,951 13.63
2014 8 914 8,017 8,931 20.17
2015 8 882 6,541 7,423 15.40
Darlington 2013 4 382 4,067 4,449 14.15
2014 4 391 1,813 2,204 11.13
2015 4 329 2,311 2,640 9.78
Gentilly-2* 2013 1 0 52 52 2.26
2014 1 0 109 109 7.85
2015 1 0 7 7 1.46
Pickering 2013 6 682 3,764 4,446 14.50
2014 6 721 4,685 5,406 14.50
2015 6 747 4,802 5,549 15.38
Point Lepreau 2013 1 178 47 225 6.59
2014 1 148 397 545 10.20
2015 1 144 76 220 6.6
* The Gentilly-2 reactor was shut down during this period.
Table 2: Maximum five-year individual effective dose to workers at each

Canadian NPP, 2011–2015*
Station Maximum individual effective
dose (mSv)
Bruce A and B 74.4
Darlington 42.6
Gentilly-2 12.3
Pickering 57.8
Point Lepreau 18.7
* Data provided by the National Dose Registry. Regulatory limit is 100 mSv for
the five-year period of January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2015.
Table 3: Total collective dose at all Canadian nuclear power plants, 2013–2015
Year Number of operating reactors Collective dose
(person-Sv)
2013 19 16.12
2014 19 17.19
2015 19 15.84
Annex 15 (b)
Annex 15 (b)
Radiological Emissions from Canadian NPPs
All NPPs release small quantities of radioactive materials, in a controlled manner, into both the
atmosphere (as gaseous emissions) and adjoining water bodies (as liquid effluents). This annex
reports the magnitude of these releases for each operating NPP in Canada for the years 2013 to
2015. This annex also indicates how these releases compare with the derived release limits
(DRLs) imposed by the CNSC. In the majority of cases, the levels of gaseous and liquid effluents
from all operating NPPs were below 1 percent of the values authorized by the CNSC.
Table 1: Gaseous emissions released from Canadian nuclear power plants, 2013–2015
Year Tritium oxide Carbon-14 Noble gases Iodine-131 Particulates
(TBq) (TBq) (TBq-MeV) (TBq) (TBq)
Bruce A1
DRL, 2009–2013 1.35E+05 1.05E+03 4.75E+04 1.18E+00 3.10E-01
Since 2014 1.98E+05 6.34E+02 1.12E+05 1.14E+00 1.73E+00
2013 5.04E+02 2.53E+00 6.66E+01 4.94E-05 4.94E-06
2014 7.51E+02 1.64E+00 5.30E+01 3.94E-04 3.13E-06
2015 7.05E+02 3.15E+00 5.62E+01 5.15E-05 1.06E-05
Bruce B1
DRL, 2009–2013 2.71E+05 1.08E+03 1.06E+05 9.15E-01 7.42E-01
Since 2014 3.16E+05 7.56E+02 2.17E+05 1.35E+00 3.61E+00
2013 2.63E+02 1.10E+00 3.71E+00 4.04E-05 1.86E-05
2014 4.13E+02 1.26E+00 5.25E+01 4.02E-05 1.53E-05
2015 3.74E+02 1.16E+00 5.25E+01 4.01E-05 1.63E-05
Darlington
DRL 5.9E+04 3.5E+02 4.5E+04 1.4E+00 6.7E-01
2013 2.07E+02 1.03E+00 3.16E+01 1.40E-04 2.90E-05
2014 2.71E+02 1.30E+00 4.61E+01 1.63E-04 3.13E-05
2015 2.54E+02 1.34E+00 2.22E+01 1.43E-04 3.45E-05
Gentilly-2
DRL 8.58E+04 1.99E+02 7.70E+04 3.25E-01 1.21E+00
2013 1.14E+02 7.49E-01 9.96E-04 ND 6.26E-07
2014 1.19E+02 4.83E-01 3.15E-03 ND 2.92E-07
2015 1.07E+02 3.80E-01 ND ND 1.34E-06
Pickering Units 1–4
DRL 1.2E+05 2.2E+03 3.2E+04 9.8E+00 4.9E-01
2013 1.83E+02 7.75E-01 1.21E+02 8.44E-06 3.74E-06
2014 2.48E+02 9.13E-01 1.13E+02 1.12E-05 4.13E-06
2015 2.36E+02 1.05E+00 9.25E+01 1.38E-05 5.48E-06
DRL 1.9E+05 2.0E+03 4.7E+04 8.9E+00 7.2E-01
2013 2.42E+02 9.07E-01 6.48E+00 4.35E-06 4.97E-06
2014 2.83E+02 9.06E-01 1.05E+01 5.19E-06 3.81E-06
2015 2.99E+02 1.01E+00 1.64E+01 4.64E-06 1.60E-05
Point Lepreau
DRL 2.8E+05 6.8E+03 1.2E+05 TBq 6.0E+01 1.8E+00
2013 9.1E+01 8.0E-02 3.58E+00 ND ND
2014 6.6E+01 8.4E-02 3.3E+00 ND ND
2015 1.4E+02 8.4E-02 4.8E+00 ND ND
Note 1: DRLs revised on licence renewal in 2014
ND = not detected
Annex 15 (b)
Table 2: Liquid effluent released from Canadian nuclear power plants, 2013–2015
Year Tritium oxide Gross beta-gamma Carbon-14
(TBq) (TBq) (TBq)
Bruce A1
DRL, 2009–2013 2.13E+06 1.00E+02 2.61E+03
Since 2014 2.30E+06 4.58E+01 1.03E+03
2013 1.96E+02 2.12E-06 9.95E-04
2014 1.94E+02 1.02E-03 1.13E-03
2015 2.20E+02 9.17E-04 2.45E-03
Bruce B1
DRL, 2009–2013 2.27E+06 1.07E+02 2.78E+03
Since 2014 1.84E+06 5.17E+01 1.16E+03
2013 4.19E+02 3.95E-03 4.90E-03
2014 6.42E+02 1.99E-03 8.06E-03
2015 6.72E+02 1.53E-03 9.07E-03
Darlington
DRL 5.3E+06 7.1E+01 9.7E+02
2013 1.09E+02 2.75E-02 3.20E-04
2014 1.74E+02 2.99E-02 5.51E-03
2015 2.41E+02 4.86E-02 7.29E-03
Gentilly-22
DRL, 2013-2014 1.16E+07 1.75E+02 2.40E+03
Since 2015 1.44E+07 2.23E+01 3.06E+02
2013 2.14E+02 1.84E-03 1.67E-01
2014 3.56E+02 2.86E-04 5.28E-02
2015 1.51E+02 5.28E-04 3.00E-01
DRL 3.7E+05 1.7+00 3.2E+01
2013 1.17E+02 6.71E-03 Note 3
2014 1.02E+02 8.98E-03 Note 3
2015 9.82E+01 4.87E-03 Note 3
DRL 7.0E+05 3.2E+00 6.0E+01
2013 1.89E+02 2.61E-02 1.72E-03
2014 2.42E+02 2.33E-02 1.47E-03
2015 2.74E+02 1.69E-02 2.80E-03
Point Lepreau
DRL 4.6E+07 3.9E+01 3.3E+02
2013 2.9E+02 1.40E-07 4.30E-03
2014 3.2E+02 6.80E-05 6.60E-03
2015 1.4E+02 1.15E-03 1.00E-02
Note 1: DRLs revised on licence renewal in 2014
Note 2: DRLs revised through licence amendment in 2015
Note 3: The carbon-14 releases in liquid effluent from Pickering Units 1–4 are reported in the carbon-14 releases in liquid effluent from
Annex 16.1 (b)
Annex 16.1 (b)

Onsite Emergency Plans at Canadian Nuclear Power Plants
Bruce Power Nuclear Emergency Plan
The Bruce Power Nuclear Emergency Plan is a corporate-level plan that serves as the common
basis of site-specific nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements. It describes
concepts, structures, roles and processes needed to implement and maintain Bruce Power’s
radiological emergency response capability. It also represents a basis for controlling changes and
modifications to the Bruce Power emergency preparedness capability.
As discussed in the sixth Canadian report, Bruce Power has updated its emergency plan in
response to lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. As well as its response to design-basis
events, the plan now takes into account requirements for supporting a sustained response to a
beyond-design-basis multi-unit event resulting in an extended loss of offsite power for up to 72
hours without assistance. Bruce Power’s emergency response capability is consistent with the
onsite planning basis and process of determining shift minimum complement. This process
involved a review and justification of the staffing requirements required for dealing with the
spectrum of events that could require both operational and emergency response.
The province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP; see annex 16.1(d))
provides the offsite basis for nuclear emergency planning, preparedness and response, with the
primary aim of ensuring public safety in the event of a nuclear emergency. In the context of the
Bruce Power Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, a nuclear emergency is any emergency that
poses a radiation hazard to people or property offsite.
The Bruce Power plan defines a station emergency as a sudden, unexpected occurrence of
unusual radiological conditions with the potential for accidental exposure to staff or the public
exceeding regulatory limits. A station emergency can also be declared for a non-radiological
event requiring protection of onsite personnel and activation of Bruce Power’s emergency
response organization.
The emergency plan is consistent with the corresponding Bruce Power safety analysis and
reports that were provided to the CNSC.
Security (or hostile action) response is addressed through separate provisions. However, the
provisions regarding potential releases of radioactive materials also apply to security incidents
(e.g., the need for offsite notification, situation updates or confirmation of any radioactive
releases). Emergency response related to transportation of nuclear substances is addressed by a
separate plan.
To implement its emergency plan, Bruce Power has developed specific nuclear emergency
preparedness and response arrangements. In the event of an onsite nuclear emergency at the
Bruce Power site, staff would immediately classify the nuclear emergency in accordance with
criteria specified in the station emergency procedure. Should this emergency have offsite
implications, staff would further categorize it according to criteria contained in the PNERP. To
simplify this step, many events have been categorized according to the province of Ontario’s
notification designations.
Annex 16.1 (b)
Emergency drills and exercises are an integral part of Bruce Power’s overall program assessment
process. These exercises are conducted periodically at Bruce Power A and B, in cooperation with
other organizations and jurisdictions that have a role in nuclear emergency preparedness and
response.
Bruce Power maintains emergency public response capabilities within various communications
departments, including employee communications, investor and media relations, government
relations and community relations. The primary targets of Bruce Power’s nuclear emergency
public information program are people who live or work near Bruce A and B as well as certain
Bruce Power employees and contacts who would need to be informed of an emergency. In the
event of a nuclear emergency involving Bruce A and B, Bruce Power’s emergency response
procedures and agreements require the corporation to coordinate its public information efforts
and activities with those of other participating jurisdictions or organizations, such as provincial
agencies operating within the framework of the PNERP.
Bruce Power’s communications response in a given emergency will depend upon the related
circumstances. For events that are not severe enough to warrant activation of the PNERP but
may be of interest to neighbours and other stakeholders, Bruce Power would issue news releases
or verbal briefings to the local media, with copies provided to provincial and municipal officials.
If the situation warrants, Bruce Power may activate its local media centre for briefing or
interview purposes.
More severe events may require activation of the PNERP and the province of Ontario’s Joint
Emergency Information Centre, which is located in the Toronto offices of Emergency
Management Ontario. Pending activation and operation of the centre, Bruce Power’s emergency
response organization would, on an interim basis, communicate relevant information to the public
and the media. With the Emergency Information Centre in operation, the provincial government
would assume control of information regarding the offsite response. The Municipality of
Kincardine would establish a local emergency information centre at its offices. Bruce Power
would assist the municipality with preparing information for the local public by ensuring its
accuracy. Emergency-related information prepared at local and provincial emergency information
centres would be jointly scrutinized for accuracy by all three parties prior to its release.
Ontario Power Generation Consolidated Nuclear Emergency Plan

The OPG Consolidated Nuclear Emergency Plan is a corporate-level plan that serves as the
common basis of site-specific nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements at
OPG’s Darlington and Pickering Nuclear Generating Stations. It describes concepts, structures,
roles and processes to implement and maintain an effective OPG response to radiological
emergencies that could endanger onsite staff, the public or the environment. It provides a
framework for interaction with external authorities and defines OPG commitments under the
PNERP.
Similar to Bruce Power, the OPG Consolidated Nuclear Emergency Plan defines a station
emergency as a sudden unexpected occurrence of unusual radiological conditions with the
potential for accidental exposure to staff or the public exceeding regulatory limits. The OPG plan
focuses on the release of radioactive materials from fixed facilities and on OPG interfaces with
the PNERP (see annex 16.1(d)). The formal scope of the plan excludes hostile (security) action
incidents at OPG nuclear plants, as these incidents are dealt with in detail in other OPG
Annex 16.1 (b)
documents. However, the plan’s provisions regarding potential releases of radioactive materials
also apply to security incidents. These include the requirements for offsite notifications, situation
updates and confirmation of any radioactive releases.
The emergency plan is consistent with the corresponding OPG nuclear safety analyses and
reports provided to the CNSC.
To implement its nuclear emergency plan, OPG has developed site-specific nuclear emergency
preparedness and response arrangements for its NPPs. In the event of an onsite nuclear
emergency at an OPG NPP, OPG staff would immediately classify the nuclear emergency in
accordance with criteria specified in emergency procedures. Should this emergency have offsite
implications, OPG staff would further categorize it according to criteria contained in the PNERP.
PNERP categorization criteria are referenced in procedures to ensure alignment. Offsite
notifications would be made following categorization, within required time limits.
Emergency drills and exercises are an integral part of OPG’s overall process of program
assessment. Exercises are conducted regularly at all OPG NPPs, in cooperation with other
organizations and jurisdictions that have a role in nuclear emergency preparedness and response.
Five drills or exercises are conducted at each OPG NPP annually to test the effectiveness of the
emergency plans and procedures, facilities, equipment and training effectiveness. Included in
these drills are multi-unit severe accidents to validate OPG’s severe accident management
guidelines and the deployment of emergency mitigating equipment.
OPG maintains emergency public response capabilities within its nuclear public affairs
department. The primary audiences for OPG’s nuclear emergency public information program
are those who live or work near OPG NPPs. In the event of a nuclear emergency involving an
OPG NPP, OPG emergency response procedures and agreements require the corporation to
coordinate its public information efforts and activities with those of other participating
jurisdictions or organizations, such as provincial agencies operating within the framework of the
PNERP.
The OPG public affairs response in a given emergency would depend upon the related
circumstances. For events that are not severe enough to warrant activation of the PNERP but that
may be of interest to neighbours and other stakeholders, OPG would issue news releases or
verbal briefings to the local media, with copies provided to provincial and municipal officials.
Should the situation warrant, OPG may activate its onsite or near-site local media centre for
briefing or interview purposes.
More severe events may require activation of the PNERP and provincial and municipal
emergency information centres. OPG may also communicate relevant information within its
jurisdiction to the public and media.
Gentilly-2 Nuclear Emergency Plan

The Hydro-Québec Plan des mesures d’urgence describes its arrangements to cope with actual
or potential nuclear emergencies at Gentilly-2. That publication and various supporting
documents define the Gentilly-2 nuclear emergency preparedness and response plan in detail,
including application criteria, roles and responsibilities, requirements for coordination,
classification of emergency alerts, notification of offsite authorities, communications with the media
and the public, emergency procedures, response logistics, technical and equipment support and
emergency training and drills.
Annex 16.1 (b)
The plan stipulates that abnormal onsite events that increase the risk (radiological or
conventional) to employees, the public or the environment shall be announced by the
declaration of an appropriate level of alert, indicating the severity or potential severity of the
incident. Gentilly-2 has four alert levels:
1. An area alert indicates a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation within a
limited area of the NPP.
2. A station alert indicates a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation within an
important area of the NPP.
3. A local alert indicates:
o significant radioactive materials were released or potentially released to
the environment
o low risk to the population and environment
o no protective measures are required for the population
o the event has been declared by Gentilly-2 authorities
4. A general alert indicates:
o significant radioactive materials were released or potentially released to
the environment
o significant risk to the population and the environment
o protective measures are recommended for the population near Gentilly-2
o the event has been declared by public authorities of the province of
Quebec
Emergency drills are conducted at Gentilly-2 at least once per year. The NPP also participates in
externally organized drills in cooperation with offsite authorities. Gentilly-2 managers, staff and
workers receive both basic and specialized instruction in nuclear emergency preparedness and
response, on an as-required basis.
Gentilly-2 provides emergency preparedness services according to a well-defined process that
includes:
 treatment of information and requests related to the process
 determination of risks (conventional or radiological), activation criteria and alert-level
criteria
 documentation of emergency response (framework and response procedures)
 determination of emergency response organization (mission and responsibilities)
 determination of emergency resources (staff, installations and equipment)
 development of interfaces with offsite authorities
 maintenance and development of communication and public relations framework
 training
 drills and exercises
 emergency preparedness implementation (risk assessment, alert declaration, emergency
response organization activation, notification of offsite authorities, management
intervention, accident assessment, staff protection, recommendation of protection
measures to the population, end of alert and return to normal)
 evaluation of the emergency preparedness process
Annex 16.1 (b)
The emergency preparedness process comprises these major outputs:

 policy and framework documents
 emergency procedures
 collaboration and agreements with offsite authorities
 emergency response organization
 emergency installations and equipment
 tested emergency plans
Point Lepreau Nuclear Emergency Response Plan

The NB Power Nuclear Emergency Response Plan is an all-hazards, onsite emergency plan for
Point Lepreau. This plan serves as the basis for event preparedness, prevention, mitigation,
response and recovery at the station. The plan outlines hazards, command structure, roles and
responsibilities, and processes required to implement and maintain NB Power’s emergency
response capability.
The Nuclear Emergency Response Plan is built on the basis of protecting the NPP, public,
personnel and environment during any event which may occur. The events covered within this
framework include radiological, fire, medical, hazmat, severe weather, natural events, security
and severe accidents.
Although security events are captured within the plan, security response to hostile actions is dealt
with through separate provisions. However, the provisions regarding potential release of
radioactive materials also apply to security incidents.
To support the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan, Point Lepreau has a full suite of response
procedures that are integrated into the station’s management system. These procedures and
response guidelines allow the emergency response organization to affectively respond to and
manage any event which may occur.
The onsite emergency plan is consistent with the corresponding NB Power safety analysis and
reports provided to the CNSC.
Emergency drills and exercises are an integral part of Point Lepreau’s overall emergency
management program. Exercises are conducted regularly with the station’s emergency response
organization, and are done in cooperation with other organizations and jurisdictions that have a
role in nuclear emergency preparedness and response.
In response to the Fukushima accident, Point Lepreau has made significant enhancements that
provide additional depth to its response capacity during severe accidents. These enhancements
include emergency mitigating equipment that provides backup power and water to the station,
training on-shift staff on the deployment and operation of the equipment and integrating the
equipment into emergency procedures.
The New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization (NBEMO), an agency of the provincial
government, is responsible for actions to protect the public. As such, NBEMO manages the Point
Lepreau offsite emergency plan, including the development and testing of its capabilities.
NB Power has a direct partnership with NBEMO, and supports the offsite plan in all aspects.
This includes the mass decontamination plan, which details requisite monitoring and
decontamination in the event that a nuclear emergency requires evacuation of local area
residents.
Annex 16.1 (d)
Annex 16.1 (d)

Provincial Offsite Emergency Plans
Province of Ontario
The province of Ontario possesses the most commercial power reactors (18 operating reactors) of
any jurisdiction in Canada. In addition, a research reactor is located at Chalk River and six U.S.
nuclear facilities lie within 80 km of Ontario. As a result of these hazards, a nuclear emergency
plan – the Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) – has been in place
since 1986. This plan has never been activated (in full or partially), although events have
occurred that resulted in formal notifications to the province. These events were monitored
until it was determined that they posed no risk to the public or environment.
The provincial Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act governs emergency
preparedness and response in Ontario. This legislation requires the provincial government to
formulate a plan for emergencies arising in connection with nuclear facilities. It also permits the
province to designate municipalities that must plan for nuclear emergencies. The Office of the
Fire Marshal and Emergency Management administers the PNERP on behalf of the province
and coordinates nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Ontario.
The PNERP defines a nuclear emergency as an actual or potential hazard to public health, property
or the environment from ionizing radiation whose source is a major nuclear facility within or
immediately adjacent to Ontario. The hazard may be caused by an accident, malfunction or loss of
control involving radioactive material. The plan defines a radiological emergency as an actual or
potential hazard to public health, property or the environment from ionizing radiation resulting
from sources other than a major nuclear facility.
The aim of the plan is to safeguard the health, safety, welfare and property of the province’s
inhabitants and to protect the environment. The PNERP, as the lead provincial document for
offsite nuclear emergency preparedness and response, details the support and coordination of
the activities of provincial ministries, nuclear facilities, the Government of Canada (including the
CNSC) and designated municipalities in order to meet the plan’s objectives.
The PNERP details the arrangements in place for nuclear emergency planning, preparedness
and response in Ontario. The plan covers various components, including:
 aim and guiding principles
 hierarchy of emergency plans and procedures
 description of the hazard
 planning basis
 protective actions
 concept of operations
 emergency organization
 operational policies
 emergency information
 public education
 detailed responsibilities of the various participants
 provincial and municipal committee oversight
Annex 16.1 (d)
Full-scale exercises focusing on nuclear or radiological emergencies are conducted regularly with
the participation of the licensees and different levels of government.
The Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management is currently updating the PNERP,
including a review of the planning basis for nuclear emergency response in Ontario. This review
is being undertaken in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and involves
numerous subject matter experts from multiple jurisdictions and organizations. A full public
consultation on the new draft plan will be undertaken in late 2016.
Province of Quebec
Within the province of Quebec, under the Civil Protection Act, municipalities are responsible for
emergency measures on their territory. In the event their capacity to respond is or is likely to be
exceeded, the Ministère de la sécurité publique would coordinate responses and additional
support from the Government of Quebec. It is to this end that the Organisation de la sécurité
civile du Québec (OSCQ) was established. The OSCQ is responsible for emergency planning
and response to all hazards, including offsite nuclear emergencies. The Plan national de sécurité
civile du Québec provides the terms of reference for all emergencies. The nuclear component of
the OSCQ plan is described in the Plan des mesures d’urgence nucléaire externe à la centrale
nucléaire Gentilly-2 (PMUNE-G2).
The PMUNE-G2 clearly defines the responsibilities of government departments and agencies in
a nuclear emergency at Gentilly-2, with the objectives of minimizing consequences, protecting
the public and providing support to municipal authorities. In effect since 1983, the PMUNE-G2
is updated regularly. In 2002, response procedures and support programs were revised and
subsequently implemented. These are updated on a regular basis.
Under the PMUNE-G2, Hydro-Québec and the OSCQ have separate but complementary
responsibilities for emergency planning and response to an accident at Gentilly-2. As part of this
response, with respect to PMUNE-G2, the OSCQ would open the government operations centre
to coordinate the actions of the various government departments and organizations in Quebec
and to maintain a link with federal institutions. The regional response centre in Trois-Rivières
would coordinate local responses and provide support to the affected municipalities.
The province of Quebec has special detection and analysis equipment capable of characterizing
the environment and the food chain. The PMUNE-G2 master plan was abandoned as of May 26,
2016 due to the reduced offsite risk. The province has indicated that it will now use the Plan
national de sécurité civile du Québec should there be the need to respond to a nuclear emergency
at Gentilly-2 or anywhere in the province.
Another specific plan from the OSCQ is the offsite nuclear emergency plan for Chalk River
Laboratories (referred to as PMUNE-CSF). It is expected to be adopted in late 2016.
Annex 16.1 (d)
Province of New Brunswick

The provincial nuclear emergency program is governed by a partnership between NB Power and
the New Brunswick Department of Public Safety. The primary agencies for emergency
management and public security in New Brunswick are the:
 New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization (NBEMO), which is the provincial
lead agency for emergency management and business continuity, including radiological-
nuclear contingencies
 New Brunswick Security Directorate, which is the provincial lead agency for security and
critical infrastructure protection
The Government of New Brunswick has consolidated public safety and security responsibilities
(including the provincial nuclear emergency program) under the mandate of the New Brunswick
Department of Public Safety, in conjunction with the following enhancements to emergency
preparedness in New Brunswick:
 strengthening the prevention of and preparedness and response for all hazards, including
the integration of crisis and consequence management apparatus under a single
emergency management system
 investing significantly in provincial government Internet infrastructure to make it more
reliable and fault-tolerant and to improve its capacity
 updating and strengthening operational capability at the NBEMO Provincial Emergency
Operations Centre, which includes enhancing the business process and investments in
infrastructure to improve connectivity and collaboration among federal and provincial
intervening organizations, with more focus on operational readiness
 developing a training and exercise strategy for major scenarios, including nuclear
response, so that NBEMO is exercised annually rather than every three years (as in the
past)
 replacing the inventory of potassium iodide pills, updating demographic information for
the emergency planning zone and improving communications systems linking the Offsite
Emergency Operations Centre (owned and maintained by NB Power) and the Provincial
Emergency Operations Centre
New Brunswick Emergency Measures Plan

Under New Brunswick’s Emergency Measures Act, NBEMO has the lead responsibility to
develop provincial emergency action plans and to direct, control and coordinate emergency
responses.
The New Brunswick Emergency Measures Plan, prepared by NBEMO, defines an emergency as
any abnormal situation requiring prompt action beyond normal procedures to limit damage to
persons, property or the environment. The aim of the plan is to designate responsibility for
actions to mitigate the effects of any emergency, other than war, in the province.
The plan defines the lead responsibilities of the New Brunswick Department of Public Safety and
the supporting roles of some 23 departments, agencies or organizations. Representatives of these
stakeholders make up the Provincial Emergency Action Committee, which directs controls and
coordinates provincial emergency operations and assists and supports municipalities as required.
NBEMO has recently updated the committee’s handbook, which includes all the tasks the
different departments are responsible for when there is an event.
Annex 16.1 (d)
The Provincial Emergency Action Committee maintains two states of readiness. The standby
state requires representatives of departments to be available (on call). An emergency state
requires action from NBEMO or other departments. During an emergency state, departmental
representatives are called to the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre and briefed on the
corresponding emergency.
The province is divided into six regions that are overseen by the emergency measures
organization. In each region, emergency management coordinators support the development and
refinement of emergency planning by municipalities and provide advice and assistance on the
development of emergency plans. They coordinate the use of provincial resources to deal with
emergency situations in rural areas and urban municipalities. To accomplish this, regional
emergency committees are formed to provide assistance to municipalities and the population of
unincorporated areas. These committees consist of representatives from the provincial
Departments of Environment, Health, Justice, Natural Resources, Social Development and
Transportation, as well as local governments.
Local authorities are responsible for emergency planning and response within their physical
boundaries and, in some cases, for certain areas outside their boundaries. Communities may
assist each other in accordance with mutual aid agreements. However, when an emergency arises
in which the resources of a community (or group of communities) are insufficient, the province
will provide assistance through the regional emergency committee. Regional emergency
operations centers are located in government facilities.
Point Lepreau Offsite Emergency Plan

NBEMO developed the Point Lepreau Offsite Emergency Plan in accordance with the
framework described above. This plan delineates the immediate actions to be taken by those
involved if an incident at Point Lepreau results in an offsite emergency, outlining their roles and
responsibilities. The plan goes through an annual review to ensure the information contained
within it is accurate.
Should it be necessary to alert the public to an offsite emergency, wardens would oversee
designated areas to ensure residents were appropriately informed of any actions required. An
automated telephone and email notification system has been established to send messages to all
residents. Radio, television and wardens would also be used to advise the public of the need for
any protective actions. Arrangements are in place to help individuals who might require physical
assistance should evacuation prove necessary.
The Government of New Brunswick utilizes the Incident Management System, an organizational
structure based principally on the United States’ National Incident Management System and a
suite of information management and decision support tools. The emergency organization and
tools are designed around the requirement for interoperability with provincial and local
emergency management partners, as well as with federal agencies such as Public Safety Canada,
Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Department of National Defence.
NBEMO maintains a multi-year emergency exercise program that allows regular exercises and
training to take place, fully supported by NB Power through their partnerships. This includes
exercises at the Offsite Emergency Operations Centre (which would be operated and supported
during an event by representatives from both organizations).
Annex 16.1 (e)
Annex 16.1 (e)

Details of Federal Emergency Provisions
Detailed provisions of the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan
Health Canada administers the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP). The latest version of
the plan was endorsed by the Deputy Ministers’ Emergency Management Committee in October
2012. Within the FNEP, a nuclear emergency is defined as an event that has led or could lead to
the uncontrolled release of radioactive material or exposures to uncontrolled sources of radiation,
which pose or could pose a threat to public health and safety, property and the environment.
The FNEP contains:
 an outline of the Government of Canada’s aim, authority, emergency organization and
concept of operations for dealing with the response phase of a nuclear emergency
 a description of the framework of federal emergency preparedness policies, the planning
principles on which the FNEP is based and the links with other specific documents of
relevance to the FNEP
 a description of the specific roles and responsibilities of participating organizations that
are involved in the planning, preparedness or response phases of a nuclear emergency
 provincial annexes that describe interfaces amongst federal and provincial emergency
management organizations, as well as the arrangements for a coordinated response and the
provision of federal support to provinces affected by a nuclear emergency
Five nuclear emergency event categories are defined in the FNEP, according to the potential
scope of impacts on Canada and Canadians:
 Category A: an emergency at an NPP in Canada
 Category B: an emergency at an NPP in the United States or Mexico
 Category C: an emergency involving a nuclear-powered vessel in Canada
 Category D: other serious radiological emergencies or potential threats in Canada that
require a multi-departmental or multi-jurisdictional response
 Category E: a nuclear emergency outside of North America
The scope of the FNEP excludes the following situations:
 emergencies that pose only a limited radiological threat over a localized area and are not
anticipated to exceed the capabilities of regulatory, local or provincial/territorial
authorities to respond, including but not limited to:
o events at licensed nuclear facilities with no radiological offsite impacts or
involving only non-radiological hazards to the personnel at the facilities, the
public or the environment
o transportation accidents involving regulated quantities of radioactive material on
Canadian lands or in Canadian territorial waters
 management and coordination of the Government of Canada’s actions during the recovery
phase
The FNEP includes response levels that escalate as a result of specific triggers. As an event
evolves, the coordinated response to the emergency will be scaled according to the scope of the
emergency and associated triggers. During routine operations, FNEP notification and alerting
capabilities are provided by a 24/7 FNEP duty officer, who monitors situations of interest,
conducts internal reporting, and responds to drills, exercises and requests for information. These
Annex 16.1 (e)
activities are managed by Health Canada’s Radiation Protection Bureau with input from specific
partners when required, and include normal preparedness activities.
The occurrence of a radiological or nuclear emergency would lead to a sequence of response
actions and technical support functions focused on managing the event, mitigating its effects and
protecting the public and environment from actual or potential radiological impacts. The extent
of coordinating arrangements described in the FNEP and occurring between individual
departments and agencies would depend on the nature, magnitude and location of the event, the
responsibilities within federal jurisdiction and the level of assistance requested. The Government
of Canada would conduct emergency operations within the federal mandate and would provide,
in accordance with prior arrangements or at the request of a provincial government, national
support services and resources through the National Emergency Response System and provisions
of the FNEP or a provincial annex in the FNEP.
Under the FNEP, a multi-departmental Technical Assessment Group would be convened to
provide federal-level technical assessment of the threat and risk associated with the radiological
hazard, as well as associated protective action recommendations, as required, for mitigating the
radiological consequences to health, safety, property and the environment. The FNEP Technical
Assessment Group would establish task teams or experts within its operations to undertake
specific technical assessment functions, such as risk assessment and prognosis, environmental-
pathways modelling, radiological assessment, field-based monitoring and surveillance, and
human monitoring.
As the Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents demonstrated, a severe nuclear emergency at an NPP
that is distant from Canada would have a limited effect within Canada. Although small quantities
of radioactive material might reach Canada, they would be unlikely to pose a direct threat (e.g.,
from exposure to fallout) to Canadian residents, property or the environment. Consequently,
Canada’s response under the FNEP to a nuclear emergency occurring outside North America
would likely focus on:
 controlling food imported from areas near the accident
 assessing the impact on Canadians living or travelling near the accident site
 assessing the impact on Canada and informing the public
 coordinating responses or assistance to foreign jurisdictions and organizations (national
or international)
The potential severity of other serious radiological emergencies or potential threats, as defined in
the FNEP, would depend on case-specific factors. For fixed facilities and materials in transit,
appropriate responses to possible emergencies can be planned in some detail. In other situations,
emergency planning can be complicated by such factors as the potential magnitude and diversity
of the radiation threat, the location of the source of the radiation, any impacts on essential
infrastructures and the speed at which related circumstances may evolve.
Emergency management recovery phase
Once a nuclear emergency situation is stabilized and immediate actions to protect public health
and safety were completed, emergency management of the radiological hazard would shift from
the response phase to the recovery phase. FNEP senior officials (from Health Canada and the
CNSC), in consultation with the Chair of the FNEP Technical Assessment Group, the Federal
Assistant Deputy Minister of the Emergency Management and Regional Operations Branch
(Public Safety Canada) and the Federal Coordinating Officer would recommend the return of the
Annex 16.1 (e)
FNEP to a routine reporting level as well as the termination of some or all components of the
FNEP not required for the transition to recovery. The Federal Assistant Deputy Minister
Emergency Management Committee, in consultation with the Privy Council Office, would
approve the transition to recovery and termination of the emergency.
Responsibility for recovery falls primarily within provincial/territorial jurisdiction. If federally
assisted recovery actions were required, the responsibility for coordinating recovery operations
would be assigned to a specific Minister of the Government of Canada by the Privy Council
Office and the Prime Minister.
The FNEP identifies the following federal activities (or support for the provinces) that are
recognized as being part of the recovery phase:
 development of a long-term recovery management plan, including reference levels on
residual dose from long-term contamination and a strategy for restoration of normal
socio-economic activities, including international aspects
 monitoring of contaminated areas, assessment of potential doses to public and workers
and assessment of medium- and long-term health hazards
 environmental decontamination and radioactive waste disposal operations
 maintenance of dose registries for emergency workers
 non-radiological recovery operations
 proactive and transparent public information and international communication related to
all of the above activities
Provisions of the CNSC in emergency preparedness and response

As the federal nuclear regulatory body, the CNSC participates in nuclear emergency prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery activities as part of its responsibilities under Canadian
legislation. The CNSC emergency management program is aligned with the Emergency
Management Act.
Because the CNSC’s regulatory obligations extend to a wide range of circumstances, facilities,
activities and materials, it must plan for its possible involvement in a similarly diverse range of
emergency scenarios. The CNSC maintains an Emergency Operations Centre at its headquarters
in Ottawa to enhance its ability to respond to nuclear emergencies. This facility is used during
ongoing FNEP and CNSC drills and training exercises, to confirm nuclear emergency
preparedness. The CNSC Emergency Operations Centre operates using public electricity but it
can also rely on an emergency generator in the event of loss of the electricity grid. The CNSC
has an alternate site for emergency staff to assemble should its main headquarters be
inaccessible.
To fulfill CNSC regulatory policy P-325, Nuclear Emergency Management Policy, and the
CNSC Emergency Response Plan, emergency management relies on staff to assess the
significance of an emergency and to communicate these findings to senior management, staff,
the public, media, the licensee and all levels of government.
The CNSC Emergency Response Plan is the document that describes the strategies and
guidelines the CNSC would follow to cope with a nuclear emergency. In particular, it describes:
 emergency situations that could require CNSC involvement
 the role of the CNSC in nuclear emergencies
Annex 16.1 (e)
 the role of interfacing parties

 the CNSC’s emergency preparedness organization
 the concept of “operations”
 the CNSC’s equipment infrastructure
 preparedness and training requirements and exercises
The plan is issued under the authority of the President of the CNSC, in accordance with the
objectives of the NSCA and its regulations and the Emergency Management Act. The plan is
designed to provide a compatible interface with the emergency plans and procedures of CNSC
licensees, provincial governments, the Government of Canada and international organizations. It
draws upon provisions of the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations and
the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 and associated regulations and includes
formal agreements with various organizations and jurisdictions.
Ultimately, the implementation of the CNSC Emergency Response Plan in the event of a
declared emergency could involve the following parties:
 the CNSC’s emergency organization
 CNSC employees
 CNSC licensees
 transporters, shippers and others involved in or affected by the transport of nuclear
substances
 departments and agencies of the Government of Canada
 provincial government departments and agencies
 news media organizations
 the USNRC
 the IAEA
The CNSC Emergency Response Plan is in effect at all times in one of four operating modes:
 In normal mode, the CNSC plans, trains and conducts exercises to maintain its
emergency preparedness. In this mode, the CNSC also responds to events that do not
warrant activation of the emergency organization.
 In standby mode, the CNSC alerts responders and monitors the status of events that may
require an emergency response at some stage.
 Operations enter the activated mode when the CNSC decides that an emergency
response is necessary and activates preparations for such a response.
 The recovery mode follows the activated mode and consists of activities to restore a non-
emergency state, such as the standby or normal modes.
Within the context of the CNSC Emergency Response Plan, a nuclear emergency is any
abnormal situation associated with a radiological activity or a CNSC-licensed activity or facility
that could require prompt action beyond normal procedures to limit damage to persons, property
or the environment.
These nuclear emergencies could be offsite or onsite emergencies. For example, a nuclear
emergency could be created by events related to the:
 release (or potential release) of radioactive contaminants or any nuclear substance
prescribed in the NSCA from a Canadian or foreign NPP or other CNSC-licensed facility
 loss, theft, discovery or transport of nuclear substances within or outside of Canada
Annex 16.1 (e)
The nature of the CNSC’s involvement could range from exchanging ideas and information to
coordinating plans, attending training programs, participating in exercises and responding to
actual emergencies. The CNSC Emergency Response Plan provides corporate guidelines for
employee involvement. Specifically, it defines the CNSC staff members who would participate
in the emergency organization (depending upon the nature of the emergency). Responsibilities of
CNSC staff members in the event of a nuclear emergency parallel their responsibilities during
routine CNSC operations.
As part of the CNSC’s Emergency Response Plan, the CNSC has established various technical
and administrative arrangements. These include bilateral cooperation agreements with other
national and international jurisdictions, as well as a CNSC duty officer program whereby anyone
can seek emergency information, advice or assistance 24 hours a day for actual or potential
incidents involving nuclear materials or radiation.
Annex 16 (f)
Annex 16.1 (f)

Description of Major Emergency Exercises, Training and
Other Initiatives
Exercise Unified Response
Exercise Unified Response was a full-scale, national nuclear exercise with participation from all
levels of government, including the facility operator, Ontario Power Generation (OPG). It was
held May 26–28, 2014. This exercise involved more than 54 participating organizations and
more than 2,000 participants, as well as international observers. The last major nuclear exercise
of this scope and complexity was CANATEX-3, which was conducted in 1999. Since this last
major exercise, and also in response to the 2011 Fukushima accident, the nuclear response plans
for the licensees have been revised or updated. Exercise Unified Response provided an excellent
mechanism to test at all levels revised plans and processes established since the Fukushima
nuclear emergency.
Exercise Unified Response’s overall objective was to test the preparedness of OPG, government
and non-government agencies, and communities for responding to a nuclear event at Darlington
by evaluating current response plans, procedures and capabilities. A specific federal objective
was to validate the revised Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP).
Overall, the CNSC, as regulator, determined that it was able to meet the exercise objectives and
demonstrate that its regulatory oversight was delivered in accordance with its mandate, including
providing objective information to the public and media. In addition, the CNSC demonstrated its
technical capability to assess a severe accident and its potential consequences.
The offsite response organizations – including municipal, provincial and federal agencies –
demonstrated their ability to work in an integrated manner to effectively respond to a low-
probability nuclear emergency.
OPG’s emergency preparedness and response programs, which had been approved by the
Commission, were found to be robust and compliant with regulatory requirements. The licensee
effectively responded to the emergency scenario – for example, in addressing safety shutdown
systems and continued cooling, or providing necessary information and support to offsite
authorities.
Although issues were identified, the participating organizations demonstrated that they can
respond effectively to a severe accident in order to protect the public, infrastructure and the
environment. Exercise Unified Response successfully validated the FNEP, demonstrating that its
governance structure and concept of operations are sound. The exercise also served as a means to
validate the FNEP’s Ontario annex. The findings from the federal interdepartmental portion of
the exercise were summarized into 45 recommendations that were tracked in a management
action plan, along with corrective actions, most of which were implemented by the end of March
2016.
In the spirit of continuous improvement, all participating organizations performed a self-
evaluation. The lessons learned from Exercise Unified Response are being used to further
strengthen and improve onsite and offsite emergency response plans.
Annex 16 (f)
Exercise Intrepid
NB Power and the provincial authority, the New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization,
conducted a full-scale emergency exercise called Exercise Intrepid on November 17–18, 2015.
This exercise was the largest full-scale emergency exercise ever conducted for NB Power and the
province, and fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency plans.
The exercise involved more than 1,000 people across 35 agencies participating through local,
municipal, provincial and federal levels of the government, including CNSC staff from
headquarters as well as the site office at Point Lepreau.
Exercise Intrepid simulated an event at the station that progressed into a severe accident with
offsite implications, and was the first full-scale exercise for Point Lepreau utilizing emergency
mitigating equipment and other Fukushima-related modifications. There was also a proactive
evacuation of the community conducted with volunteers requiring the deployment of offsite
resources. The response required full activation of both onsite and offsite emergency response
organizations, including the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, Horizon Health, Ambulance NB, the Red Cross, the CNSC Emergency
Operations Centre, the Health Canada Emergency Operations Centre and the Federal Nuclear
Emergency Plan Technical Assessment Group.
In the scenario, Point Lepreau was faced with a series of challenges that included loss of
Class IV onsite power, which occurred as a result of a severe weather system. This necessitated
deploying emergency mitigating equipment to provide backup power. Simulated failure of plant
components required a planned venting of the reactor building, later challenged by an unplanned
release. During the scenario, there was also a contaminated casualty sent to the Saint John
Regional Hospital via ambulance, which allowed for testing of this emergency plan component.
The lessons learned will be used to further strengthen and improve both the onsite and offsite
emergency response plans.
Human monitoring table-top exercise

To further investigate specific issues that were not fully tested in Exercise Unified Response,
Health Canada worked with its stakeholders to organize a table-top exercise on human
monitoring. The objectives of this exercise, held in November 2015, were to evaluate concepts of
operation for triaging exposed and unexposed individuals, test policies and concepts of
operations for the human monitoring aspects of nuclear events, and test the interoperability
between first responders/receivers and federal, provincial and municipal emergency response
organizations. The exercise used a variety of exposure scenarios. Participants demonstrated their
broad ranges of expertise and knowledge and responded positively and collaboratively to
practising a collective response during the exercise.
IAEA participation in Canadian exercises

Exercise Unified Response included an international component, specifically notification to the
IAEA by the national competent authorities (i.e., the CNSC and Health Canada) and notification
through the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) by the CNSC. Several action items were
identified and resolved as a result of this exercise. During Exercise Intrepid, the new IAEA
Annex 16 (f)
assessment and prognosis function, as well as joint procedures between Health Canada, the
CNSC and the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, were tested. Canada is among the earliest
countries to test this function. Several recommendations have been identified to improve these
procedures.
IAEA Convention Exercise series

Between 2013 and 2015, Health Canada took part in 14 exercises of the IAEA Convention
Exercise (ConvEx) series. The most comprehensive was the December 2015 exercise: a scenario
that involved a simulated illicit radiological source placed inside the international departure
lounge of the Mexico City international airport. The source affected both Canadians and
international travellers departing for Canada. This was an event that involved a simulated
international transboundary incident, testing the capabilities and roles for both international and
domestic response using the IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and
Emergencies (USIE) site.
METER training and RN-Med-Prep

The Medical Emergency Treatment for Exposures to Radiation (METER) course is delivered to
train medical professionals who respond to the medical aspects of a radiological or nuclear
emergency. This course is periodically offered by Health Canada at various locations across
Canada. During the reporting period, five METER sessions were delivered to over 200 trainees.
The Radiological/Nuclear Medical Emergency Preparedness and Response (RN-Med-Prep)
project was a two-and-a-half year initiative to expand the METER training package and further
enhance the Canadian medical community’s state of readiness in facing a radiological or nuclear
emergency. This project divided the course offerings into multi-level training options, including
an eLearning module covering radiation basics, radiation biology and protection strategies.
RN-Med-Prep gained accreditation from the College of Family Physicians of Canada in
New Brunswick in 2014.
Radiological assurance monitoring training

On request from the provinces and territories, Health Canada and FNEP partners will provide
support for field operations during a nuclear emergency. The role of the FNEP field team is to
perform field radiation monitoring and surveillance and to provide assurance monitoring in the
zones where the population is being maintained. Regular offsite training is organized for the
Health Canada field team and FNEP partners. The objectives of this training are to maintain
readiness and expand operational capacity, comply with health and safety practices, and “train
the trainer.” During the reporting period, four training sessions were organized and many federal,
provincial/territorial and municipal organizations participated.
Canada benchmarking project

Health Canada, as lead for the FNEP, led a project to benchmark all of the tools intended to be
used by the various federal and provincial emergency response organizations to estimate offsite
radiological doses during a nuclear emergency. This benchmarking project was initiated to
address areas for improvement identified during Exercise Unified Response in May 2014: the
need to develop improved interorganizational exchanges of information related to dose
projections during a nuclear emergency, and the need to improve communications to decision
Annex 16 (f)
makers on uncertainties and limitations inherent in the tools currently used in Canada (and the
rationales behind the use of alternate scenarios).
The objectives of this benchmarking project were to:
 provide an overview of tools currently used by the various nuclear emergency response
organizations in Canada (including the Accident Reporting and Guidance Operational
System, which is the primary tool used by Health Canada to generate dose projections in
a nuclear emergency) and to improve understanding of their interoperability
 benchmark tools against each other by running a standardized scenario and analyzing the
results such that the uncertainties and limitations of various tools are better understood
 provide recommendations for managing multiple results produced by these tools in the
event of a nuclear emergency in Canada
The project was completed and a final report was published in March 2016.
International benchmarking project

Health Canada and the CNSC participated in an international benchmarking project sponsored by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA) that focused on software tools for modelling the nature and quantity of radioactive
materials that could be released during accidents at NPPs. The project’s objective was to
benchmark software tools used to estimate consequences of accidents at nuclear facilities and to
help identify strengths and weaknesses of the tools used for source-term and dispersion
modelling. Health Canada’s Accident Reporting and Guidance Operational System was one of
the software programs analyzed. Health Canada contributed by modelling a scenario involving
an accident at Point Lepreau. The NEA published the final project report in December 2015.
Exercise Huron Challenge – Trillium Resolve

Exercise Huron Challenge – Trillium Resolve, a major nuclear exercise at Bruce A and B, will
take place in October 2016. Bruce Power and the Province of Ontario are involved to the fullest
extent with designing and participating in this exercise. At the federal level, elements of the
FNEP will be tested.
Annex 18
Annex 18
Supporting Details Related to CNSC Design Requirements
and Design Assessments
Design requirements in CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2
CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power
Plants, sets out technology-neutral expectations (to the extent possible) for the design of new,
water-cooled NPPs. REGDOC-2.5.2 includes direction on:
 establishing safety goals and objectives for the design
 utilizing safety principles in the design
 applying safety management principles
 designing structures, systems and components (SSCs)
 interfacing engineering aspects, NPP features and facility layout
 integrating safety assessments into the design process
REGDOC-2.5.2 describes five levels of defence in depth:
 preventing deviation from normal operation as well as failures of SSCs
 detecting and intercepting deviations from normal operation to prevent anticipated
operational occurrences from escalating to accident conditions and to return the NPP to a
state of normal operation
 minimizing accident consequences by providing inherent safety features, fail-safe design,
additional equipment, and mitigating procedures
 ensuring radioactive releases from severe accidents are kept as low as practicable
 mitigating the radiological consequences of potential releases of radioactive materials
during accident conditions
In general terms, the dose acceptance criteria in REGDOC-2.5.2 follow from the postulate that
the risks due to a new technology should not be significant contributors to existing societal risks.
The dose acceptance criteria must also be sufficient to ensure that very few accidents will require
protective measures. The safety goal for large-release frequency is expressed in terms of the
release of cesium-137 that could require long-term relocation of the local population to mitigate
potential health effects. The safety goal for small-release frequency is expressed in terms of the
release of iodine-131, which would require temporary evacuation to mitigate health effects. To
achieve a balance between prevention and mitigation, a third goal is defined to limit the
frequency of severe core damage. This ensures the designer does not place too much reliance on
reactor containment. The actual safety goals are shown in subsection 14(i)(d).
REGDOC-2.5.2 stipulates that SSCs important to safety are of proven design and are designed
according to appropriate modern standards. Where a new SSC design, feature or engineering
practice is introduced, adequate safety is proven using a combination of supporting R&D
programs and an examination of relevant experience from similar applications. A qualification
program is established to verify that the new design meets all applicable safety expectations.
New designs are tested before entering service and are then monitored in service to verify that
their expected behaviour is achieved. REGDOC-2.5.2 stipulates that the NPP design draws on
operating experience in the nuclear industry as well as on relevant research programs.
Annex 18
REGDOC-2.5.2 also contains requirements related to reliability, operability and human factors
(as they relate to design).
The requirement in REGDOC-2.5.2 to design for reliability includes considering common-cause
failures and allowances for equipment outages. There are design requirements related to single-
failure criteria for safety groups and fail-safe designs for SSCs important to safety. There are also
special considerations for shared instrumentation among safety systems and the sharing of SSCs
between reactors.
REGDOC-2.5.2 sets a requirement for various safety actions to be automated so that operator
action is not necessary within a justified period of time from the onset of anticipated operational
occurrences or design-basis accidents. Appropriate and clear distinction between the functions
assigned to operating personnel and to automatic systems is facilitated by the systematic
consideration of human factors and the human–machine interface. The need for operator
intervention on a short time scale is kept to a minimum.
REGDOC-2.5.2 requires a human factors engineering (HFE) program that facilitates the
interface between operating personnel and the NPP by utilizing proven, systematic analysis
techniques to address human factors. The program must promote attention to plant layout and
procedures, maintenance, inspection and training, as well as the application of ergonomic
principles to the design of working areas and environments. The NPP’s design must facilitate
diagnosis, operator intervention and management of the NPP’s condition during and after
anticipated operational occurrences, design-basis accidents and beyond-design-basis accidents.
This facilitation is achieved by adequate monitoring instrumentation and plant layout, and
suitable controls for the manual operation of equipment.
The HFE program should:
 reduce the likelihood of human error as much as is reasonably achievable
 provide means for identifying the occurrence of human error and methods by which to
recover from such error
 mitigate the consequences of error
Human factors verification and validation plans are established for all appropriate stages of the
design process to confirm that the design adequately accommodates all necessary operator
actions.
REGDOC-2.5.2 also stipulates that the human–machine interfaces in the main control room, the
secondary control room, the emergency support centre and the plant provide operators with
necessary and appropriate information in a usable format that is compatible with the necessary
decision and action times. Design requirements are established for both the main control room
and emergency support centre to provide a suitable environment for workers under all possible
conditions, taking ergonomic factors into account.
Vendor pre-project design review

The CNSC process for vendor pre-project design review is divided into three distinct phases.
Phase 1: The CNSC confirms that submissions for the specific design demonstrate that the
vendor understands Canadian regulatory requirements and expectations. The scope of
submissions is fixed by the CNSC.
Annex 18
Phase 2: The CNSC confirms that submissions for the specific design demonstrate that the
proposed design complies with REGDOC-2.5.2 and related documents. The scope of the review
is fixed by the CNSC and usually involves assessment in 16 specific topical areas:
 defence in depth, SSC classification, dose acceptance criteria
 reactor core nuclear design
 means of shutdown
 fuel design
 emergency core coolant and emergency feedwater systems
 reactor control system
 containment
 pressure boundary of the primary heat transport system
 severe accident prevention and mitigation
 fire protection
 quality assurance program
 human factors
 out-of-core criticality
 robustness, safeguards and security
 safety analysis
Phase 3: Based on feedback received from the CNSC in phase 2, the vendor may discuss, in
more depth, resolution paths for any design issues identified in phase 2. The scope of
submissions is fixed by the vendor.
The review does not include non-technical considerations such as:
 design costs
 completion of design
 scheduling factors relative to the review of a licence application
 capacity factors
 design changes that could be required as a result of future findings
The following activities had been completed related to vendor pre-project design reviews:
 The Phase 2 review of the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor was completed in June 2013.
 The Phase 3 review for Candu Energy Inc.’s Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) reactor was
completed in June 2013.
 The Phase 1 review of the ATMEA reactor was completed in June 2013.
Annex 18 (i)
Annex 18 (i)
Details Related to Assessing and Improving
Defence in Depth
This annex describes the NPP licensees’ work to continuously improve safety of their facilities.
In terms of design aspects relevant to lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, the designs
of Canada’s NPPs (all of which are CANDU reactors) include several features that prevent
accidents and can help mitigate impacts should an accident occur. These were described in
annex 18(i) of the sixth Canadian report.
At the time of the Fukushima accident, reassessment of protection against external hazards had
already occurred for some of the NPPs subject to integrated safety reviews (ISRs) for
refurbishment projects. During the previous reporting period, various activities were completed
to assess specific external hazards: these were described in the sixth Canadian report.
Enhancements to defence in depth were completed in various categories and continued in the
recent reporting period.
This annex provides an update of the improvements made during the reporting period with
respect to defence in depth.
Although the risk of an accident is very low, NPP operators have implemented modifications to
improve their NPPs’ ability to withstand severe external events and other challenges, such as a
prolonged loss of power or the loss of all heat sinks. In addition to modifications already
described in the sixth Canadian report, Point Lepreau installed a water-tight, manually operated
flood door for the reactor building personnel airlock to withstand beyond-design-basis accident
(BDBA) conditions (such as a reactor building flood resulting from prolonged emergency water
injection). Also, OPG has installed flood barriers at Darlington and Pickering to provide
additional protection for standby and emergency power generators.
Besides the consideration of specific hazards, the licensees have systematically verified the
effectiveness of, and supplemented where appropriate, the existing NPP capabilities in BDBA
and severe accident conditions. In particular, they have addressed:
 makeup capabilities for steam generators, primary heat transport system and connected
systems, moderator, shield tank and irradiated fuel bays
 overpressure protection of main systems and components
 control capabilities for hydrogen and other combustible gases
 containment integrity to prevent unfiltered releases of radioactive products
 design requirements for the self-sufficiency of a site (e.g., availability and survivability of
equipment and instrumentation following a sustained loss of power, capacity to remove
heat from a reactor)
 control facilities for personnel involved in accident management
 emergency mitigating equipment (EME) and resources that could be stored onsite
(separate from the protected area) or stored offsite and brought onsite if needed
The licensees have evaluated means to provide additional coolant makeup from alternate
sources. Some modifications are completed or already in progress. Canadian NPP licensees have
procured additional EME and developed procedures for its deployment.
Annex 18 (i)
The deployment of EME is being implemented by NPP licensees. As an example, OPG is

deploying its EME in two phases. The scope of the implementation of EME Phase 1 was for
accident mitigation with the objective to cool and contain the reactor core using passive water
inventories in situ as well as portable pumps, generators, and portable uninterruptible power
supplies. Phase 2 addresses containment pressure, water recovery and hydrogen mitigation
strategies. In addition, Phase 2 will result in the re-powering of plant equipment required to
mitigate containment pressure rise and that recover the water from the sump while introducing
strategies to mitigate hydrogen buildup and ensure irradiated fuel bay cooling is maintained.
Work is still under development for the implementation of EME Phase 2.
The licensees have also evaluated the structural response of the irradiated fuel bay to seismic
events and elevated temperatures (up to boiling). They have implemented enhancements to
improve coolant makeup capacity to the irradiated fuel bay.
In addition, OPG plans to install permanent fire water pumps at Darlington to augment the
existing emergency service water system for supply to the firewater system. OPG will also install
permanent piping from the emergency service water system to allow the new firewater pumps to
supply emergency makeup water to the heat transport system.
To address the topic of overpressure protection of the main systems and components, the
licensees demonstrated that the installed relief valves on the bleed condenser provide sufficient
relief capacity and mitigate pressure boundary failure due to overpressure. Licensees are still
assessing existing margins-to-failure and investigating potential design changes for shield tank
and calandria vault pressure relief. For example, Darlington is installing additional overpressure
protection in all four units to prevent potential shield tank failure in the extremely unlikely event
of total and sustained loss of heat sink to any unit. This allows for optimal design and effective
operation of the containment filtered venting system described below by protecting the shield
tank from potential failure, thus precluding a challenge to the containment system.
All Canadian NPPs have installed passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) – in some cases, as
part of refurbishment projects prior to the Fukushima accident – for protecting against hydrogen
buildup in the containment and detonation that might cause structural damage and consequently
the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment. NPP licensees are continuing to
perform confirmatory assessments demonstrating the efficacy of PARs for severe accidents, and
have determined that PARs are not needed in the irradiated fuel bay areas.
During its refurbishment, Point Lepreau had installed an emergency containment filtered venting
system. Licensees other than Point Lepreau are evaluating the means to prevent containment
system failures and, to the extent practicable, unfiltered releases of radioactive products in
BDBAs, including severe accidents. The options being considered include emergency filtered
containment vents. For example, OPG is installing a containment filtered venting system at
Darlington to prevent containment system failure from over-pressurization following the unlikely
event of a multi-unit severe accident. The system will limit radioactive releases of fission
products to the environment through the use of high-efficiency dry metal fiber filter modules
using the Westinghouse technology.
NPP licensees have established special measures for obtaining information on which to base
recovery actions for the period when batteries have become exhausted but portable diesel-
powered generators have not yet been installed. The licensees have identified practicable
upgrades to extend the duration of power supplies to instrumentation and control equipment.
Annex 18 (i)
Licensees evaluated the installation of generators to provide backup power for instrumentation,
as well as additional battery-powered instrument readout devices.
For example, Bruce Power installed a third emergency power generator at Bruce B to allow
refurbishment of the existing two emergency power generators while maintaining the emergency
power system’s reliability. A third emergency power generator is being installed at Darlington to
improve the availability and reliability of the emergency power system. Once installed, prior to
the start of the first unit refurbishment outage, there will be three emergency power generators
that are fully capable of providing power to key equipment on all four Darlington units for fuel
cooling and monitoring.
The licensees are demonstrating that the equipment and instrumentation necessary for severe
accident management – and essential to the execution of the SAMGs – will perform their
function for the duration for which they are needed. In addition, licensees have evaluated the
habitability of control facilities under conditions arising from BDBAs and severe accidents. In
fact, through COG, the Canadian nuclear power industry developed a generic methodology in
2014 with which to evaluate the habitability of control facilities during a severe accident,
including non-radiological hazards.
The licensees have also assessed options for water and temperature monitoring from a safe
location in the case of a loss of cooling inventory. They are procuring emergency equipment
(e.g., power supplies, pumps) that could be stored onsite or offsite and used to provide backup
services during a BDBA.
The following are additional examples of design changes made at Canadian NPPs during the
reporting period that were not associated with refurbishment projects or the response to the
Fukushima accident. They are examples of enhancements to defence in depth that are routinely
made (e.g., during maintenance outages). They address requirements for design-basis accidents
as well as conditions predicted for BDBAs and severe accidents:
 Bruce Power and OPG modified the 37-element fuel bundle design to improve safety
margins for certain anticipated operational occurrences and design-basis accidents at
Bruce A, Bruce B and Darlington. This minor design change was achieved by reducing
the diameter of the centre fuel element and creating more coolant flow area in the vicinity
where fuel dry-out first occurs during accidents. This re-optimization resulted in heat
transfer performance improvement and delayed dryout, without adverse impact on online
fuelling systems.
 Bruce Power upgraded the delayed neutron monitoring system at Bruce A. This system
allows for the quick detection of fuel defects such that the defect fuel can be removed
from the reactor during on-line fuelling.
 OPG modified the powerhouse steam venting system at Darlington to increase overall
system availability and reliability through the installation of additional control units on
each unit. The system automatically activates vent panels on sensing either high
temperature or high pressure (indicative of a steam piping failure) to protect the
powerhouse by venting steam.
During the reporting period, Bruce Power implemented the following safety
improvements that were identified through the PSA. Specifically, the licensee:
 installed emergency mitigating equipment at both Bruce A and B, which includes
makeup water to the boilers, heat transport system and moderator system
Annex 18 (i)
 made improvements at Bruce A to enable automatic isolation of the calandria shield tank
 enhanced the robustness of containment for multi-unit events
 improved the reliability of Group 2 equipment at Bruce B
 upgraded apparatuses for very early smoke detection at Bruce A and B
Annex 19 (i)
Annex 19 (i)
Conduct and Regulatory Oversight of Commissioning
Programs
Before an NPP is commissioned, several CNSC staff members are located at the NPP site to
observe and report on the commissioning and start-up processes and activities.
CNSC staff members do not attempt to follow all aspects of a licensee’s commissioning
program. Rather, reliance is placed on the licensee’s internal review process, which is
mandated by the commissioning quality assurance program. Detailed commissioning
specifications define the acceptance criteria to be used in inspections and tests performed as part
of the commissioning program. Typically, the licensee’s procedures require the designers to
approve commissioning specifications for a particular system or component, to verify that:
 the program is checking the right items
 the acceptance criteria being used are appropriate to prove that the equipment can perform
the safety functions intended in the design
In some cases, partial tests are done if complete tests are not practical (as in the case of
commissioning tests of emergency core cooling systems). For example, in the past, while
commissioning tests were done that involved injection of emergency coolant into the reactor
core, tests in which cold water is injected into a hot core were not attempted, because such tests
could lead to high stresses in the primary coolant system components. The components are
designed to withstand these stresses during a limited number of emergencies, but exposing them to
such high stresses simply for testing purposes could not be justified.
The commissioning quality assurance program also requires the process of approving the
specifications and results to be documented. Any failure to meet the acceptance criteria must be
referred back to the design organization, which will decide which, if any, design changes are
required. CNSC staff can perform inspections, at any time, to confirm that procedural
requirements are being complied with and that appropriate decisions are made.
Direct involvement of CNSC staff in commissioning concentrates on a few major tests, such as
those that check the overall NPP response to specific events (e.g., a loss of normal electrical
power supplies). CNSC staff members also witness major commissioning tests of special safety
systems, such as functional tests of the shutdown systems where the reactor is actually tripped
and the rate of power reduction is measured (and compared to the rate assumed in safety
analyses).
When reviewing commissioning, CNSC staff members concentrate on these major tests because
they are considered particularly important to safety. These tests check the overall performance of
an NPP’s safety features and can reveal problems that tests of individual components would not
detect. CNSC staff members also review test proposals, including detailed commissioning
specifications, which are examined to confirm that the tests’ acceptance criteria are consistent
with the system’s safety design requirements (as defined in the licence application). When tests
are completed, CNSC staff members review the test results and commissioning reports.
The CNSC requires the licensee to submit commissioning completion assurances prior to first
loading of fuel, prior to leaving reactor guaranteed shutdown state, and upon completion of
approach to critical, low-power tests and high-power tests.
Annex 19 (i)
Commissioning completion assurances are written certifications with the following statements:
 Commissioning has been completed according to the process described in the licence
application.
 Commissioning results were acceptable.
The completion assurance statements may contain lists of tasks not yet completed, such as the
completion of commissioning reports that are not prerequisites for the approvals being sought.
This helps to ensure that these tasks are not subsequently overlooked.
Typically, the licensee holds a series of commissioning completion assurance meetings to review
the work done on particular systems. CNSC staff members at the site attend some of these
meetings.
Annex 19 (iv)
Annex 19 (iv)
Severe Accident Management Guidelines
In 2002, the Canadian NPP licensees, in coordination with COG, formed a working group on
severe accident management (SAM). Its objective was to formulate severe accident management
guidelines (SAMGs) for CANDU reactors based on international best practices. The emergency
operating procedures at that time addressed a number of accident situations well beyond design-
basis accidents. However, they tended to focus on the use of equipment and systems within the
scope of their intended purpose and within the constraints of normal operating rules. The
objective was to extend the scope of SAM beyond these procedures in the event that significant
core damage occurs or is imminent, ensuring all reasonable measures are taken, with any
available equipment, to mitigate core damage and releases from containment. The goal was to
provide better guidance for control room staff to manage and exit severe accidents.
In parallel with the first phase of the COG SAMG project, the CNSC published regulatory guide
G-306, Severe Accident Management Programs for Nuclear Reactors, in 2006. This guide was
superseded in 2015 with the publication of CNSC regulatory document REGOC-2.3.2, Accident
Management, Version 2, which incorporates enhancements resulting from lessons learned from
the Fukushima accident.
The first phase of the COG SAMG project concluded early in 2007. It adapted the Westinghouse
Owners Group approach to SAM for use in CANDU reactors, producing a set of generic
guidelines applicable to all operating CANDU models along with a more focused set of guidance
documents for each CANDU models (CANDU-6, Pickering and Bruce/Darlington). COG
extended the project to overseas members, providing the opportunity for all CANDU-6 reactor
operators to participate in and benefit from information developed during the project.
The licensees adapted the generic SAMG strategies and guides to each NPP. The second phase
of the project, also coordinated by a COG working group, dealt with implementing project
documents, adapting SAMG strategies and guides to each specific site and operating
organization, interfacing the SAMGs with control room emergency operating procedures,
validating the SAMG documentation against a wide variety of scenarios and providing the
emergency response organization with the training necessary to implement SAMG strategies
during emergencies.
Exercises to verify the effectiveness of the developed strategies and documentation focused
initially on potential core damage scenarios, identified by probabilistic safety assessments as
constituting the highest residual risk. This implementation phase commenced in 2007, and all
licensees have completed exercises and drills to test and validate their emergency organization
response to SAMG events.
Following the Fukushima accident and in response to the CNSC Action Plan, a joint project
coordinated by COG was formed to examine the work necessary for extending SAMGs based on
lessons learned and to provide the Canadian nuclear industry with additional support. The COG
joint project has also been opened to interested international members who wish to take
advantage of the work. The scope of the COG joint project includes:
 extension of SAMG programs to encompass the shutdown/low-power states
 extension of SAMG programs to more fully consider multi-unit events
 development of SAMGs for irradiated fuel bay events
Annex 19 (iv)
 development of a methodology for assessment of equipment and instrument survivability

following severe accidents
 verification of strategies for maintaining containment integrity during severe accident
conditions
 verification of strategies for in-vessel retention to prevent calandria failure and corium-
concrete interaction
 development of a methodology for assessment of control facility habitability
Following completion of the above elements, individual licensees are expected to implement the
findings or apply the methodologies and then take remedial actions, if necessary.
In addition to extending the SAMG framework, Canadian licensees have procured portable
diesel generators and portable water pumping capability to augment defence-in-depth capabilities
should all AC power be lost and heat sink capability be compromised following an extreme
external event. Deployment of this emergency mitigating equipment would be triggered from
appropriate emergency operating procedures as a measure to prevent a severe accident and
would also be incorporated into SAMG procedures to mitigate severe accident progression, if
needed.
The following summarizes the progress of SAMG implementation for each NPP licensee.
Bruce Power
During the reporting period, Bruce Power issued updated SAMG implementing documents: it
also initiated training for operations and emergency response staff. A validation exercise was
completed in 2015 at Bruce A and a major exercise will be conducted in 2016 at Bruce B. Bruce
Power also completed the implementation of a SAMG program for Bruce A and B for both
single and multi-unit events.
The key elements of this program include:
 a user’s guide
 two control room guidelines
 a diagnostic flow chart
 a severe challenge (hazard) status tree
 seven severe accident guidelines
 four severe challenge guidelines
 six computational aids
 two severe accident exit guides
Implementing these elements included a number of enabling procedures and minor design
changes. Training of the operations and emergency response crews is completed, and SAMG
drills are performed on a periodic basis.
Bruce Power also worked in conjunction with Ontario Power Generation (OPG), through COG,
on implementing multi-unit SAMG provisions. The COG project defined the generic
requirements for multi-unit response and updated the SAMG technical basis document using
insight from the Fukushima event as well as recent analyses from various PSA studies. This
work was completed during 2015. Bruce Power has completed SAMGs for the irradiated fuel
bays. Training of staff for the irradiated fuel bay SAMGs is ongoing and will be complete in
mid-2016.
Annex 19 (iv)

OPG has undertaken a four-phase approach to SAMG implementation:
1. Phase 1, or emergency response organization implementation, focused on developing
NPP-specific guidance, including:
o a user’s guide
o control room guidelines
o a diagnostic flow chart
o a severe challenge (hazard) status tree
o severe accident guidelines
o severe challenge guidelines
o computational aids
o severe accident exit guides
Training programs, including a SAMG overview and an in-depth SAMG user program,
were developed and delivered to key members of the emergency response organization.
The full suite of SAMG documentation has been made available in emergency response
organization facilities. SAMG drills specific to Darlington and Pickering were conducted
at the OPG corporate emergency operations facility to verify the effectiveness of the
developed strategies and documentation. Phase 1 implementation was completed by the
end of 2010 and OPG has assembled a SAMG technical team to join the emergency
response organization duty roster.
2. Phase 2, or NPP implementation, involved the integration of SAMGs with the existing
NPP emergency operating procedures, further development of enabling instructions and
site-specific SAMG documents, and training of operations staff. Phase 2 was completed
for all OPG NPPs at the end of 2011.
3. Phase 3 addressed improvements identified during Phase 2. These included improving
and validating the enabling instructions for field staff, ensuring SAMG strategies reflect
the most current and accurate technical information, conducting training for emergency
response organization and plant staff, and including the use of emergency mitigating
equipment in SAMG strategies (this equipment was procured after the Fukushima
accident for use in the event of a station black-out). Additional training of field staff in
the use of SAMG and enabling instructions was carried out in 2013. Table-top drills were
performed for each OPG site, using the site-specific SAMGs, and onsite drills were
carried out in 2013. The onsite drills involved plant staff using site simulating activities
to cope with a SAMG scenario. Phase 3 was completed by the end of 2013.
4. Phase 4 was completed by the end of 2015 and involved updating the SAMGs, followed
by table-top drills and onsite drills. The focus of Phase 4 was to include multi-unit and
irradiated fuel bay response in the SAMG strategies. OPG is working in conjunction with
Bruce Power, through COG, on implementing multi-unit SAMG provisions.
NB Power
Point Lepreau completed implementation of its SAMG program in late 2011, following
extensive drills of the emergency response organization as a proof of concept that the SAMG
procedures could be appropriately enacted if a severe accident occurs. Further drills are being
considered to more fully train operating staff on enabling instructions. The requirement for
Annex 19 (iv)
SAMG drills and ongoing training of the emergency response organization has been incorporated
in the emergency preparedness program and included as part of an overall, five-year emergency
exercise plan with offsite emergency response organizations.
As an outcome of a COG joint project, Point Lepreau staff have completed implementation of
SAMGs for the irradiated fuel bay along with the requisite staff training. New SAMG guidance
has also been implemented for severe accidents that could occur in the shutdown or low-power
state and to address possible severe radiation events involving the dry fuel storage canisters and
spent radioactive waste management facility.
Other SAMG implementation measures include the following:
 Assessments consistent with the COG joint project methodology related to survivability
of equipment and instrumentation during severe accident conditions have been
completed. These assessments also evaluated plant habitability to provide a high degree
of assurance that an accident can be managed from control facilities and that mitigating
actions can be carried out.
 Compensatory measures and design modifications have been identified as appropriate
and are being progressed.
 The majority of Fukushima-related design modifications have been implemented at Point
Lepreau with the exception of providing external water to the calandria for moderator
water makeup as part of an enhanced in-vessel retention strategy. It is expected that
design modification will be completed during the next reporting period. Implemented
design modifications include:
o portable backup power and connection points to critical plant loads, the onsite
emergency management facility, information technology infrastructure and the
switchyard for control of auxiliaries
o connection points for external water supply to key heat sinks for accident
prevention and mitigation
o portable equipment including in-situ refuelling capability and deployment
vehicles (stored in a hardened structure)
o a radiation boundary monitoring system that provides real-time radiation
measurements to the emergency response organization
 SAMG and other procedures have been revised to ensure that emergency mitigating
equipment can be deployed reliably within a time frame defined by critical performance
objectives derived from severe accident analysis timing and other assessments.
 Training and drills have been performed to verify that the equipment can be deployed
with confidence within required time frames.
Gentilly-2
Gentilly-2 was shut down at the end of 2012, and no plans were made to further develop SAMGs
for the NPP. However, Hydro-Québec completed the development and implementation of a
specific program for the irradiated fuel bay during the reporting period.

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Canadian National Report for the

Convention on Nuclear Safety

Canadian National Report

Commission) and CNSC regulatory document REGDOC-3.5.2, Administrative Monetary

Acronyms, Abbreviations and Specific Expressions................................................................ vii

Chapter I – Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

Chapter II – Summary ............................................................................................................... 13

Chapter III – Compliance with Articles of the Convention .................................................... 19

Part A General Provisions.......................................................................................................... 19

Article 6 – Existing nuclear power plants ................................................................................. 20

Part B Legislation and Regulation ............................................................................................ 23

Article 7 – Legislative and regulatory framework ................................................................... 24

Article 8 – Regulatory body ....................................................................................................... 56

Article 9 – Responsibility of the licence holder ........................................................................ 76

Part C General Safety Considerations ...................................................................................... 81

Article 10 – Priority to safety ..................................................................................................... 82

Article 11 – Financial and human resources ............................................................................ 89

Article 12 – Human factors ...................................................................................................... 100

Article 13 – Quality assurance ................................................................................................. 107

Article 14 – Assessment and verification of safety ................................................................. 111

Article 15 – Radiation protection ............................................................................................ 130

Article 16 – Emergency preparedness..................................................................................... 138

Part D Safety of Installations ................................................................................................... 153

Article 17 – Siting ...................................................................................................................... 154

Article 18 – Design and construction ...................................................................................... 163

Article 19 – Operation .............................................................................................................. 170

APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................... 183

Appendix A Relevant Websites................................................................................................ 184

Appendix C Examples of Descriptions and Plans Required to Support an Application to

Appendix D Significant Events During Reporting Period .................................................... 188

ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................. 205

Acronyms, Abbreviations and Specific Expressions

ACR Advanced CANDU Reactor

EC6 Enhanced CANDU 6

Type II inspection all verification activities related to routine (item-by-item) checks

B. Outcome of the Sixth Review Meeting

CNS Challenges for Canada from the Sixth Review Meeting

C. National nuclear framework and policy

C.2 National nuclear policy

D. Nuclear power industry and recent major activities

Partial Map of Canada Showing the Locations of NPPs

Appendix B provides basic information on all NPP units in Canada.

D.2 Life extension of existing NPPs

Bruce A and B refurbishment

In preparation for refurbishment, OPG has constructed a full-scale mock-up of a Darlington

Pickering extended operation

D.3 Transition to a safe storage state

D.4 New-build projects

E. Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

Overall safety performance

Regulatory framework and improvements

Assessments and peer reviews

CNS Challenge C-5: Update emergency operational interventional guidelines and

CNS Challenge C-6: Transition to decommissioning approach

Summary of measures that address the Vienna Declaration on

Summary of other safety improvements during the reporting period

Summary of planned activities to improve safety

Chapter III – Compliance with Articles of the Convention

Article 6 – Existing nuclear power plants

6 (a) List of existing nuclear power plants

6 (b) Justification of continued operation of Canadian nuclear power plants

General safety framework and overall description of safety evaluations

Safety evaluations and improvements