International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Advance prediction of the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan

Earthquake: A missed opportunity for disaster preparedness
C. Davis a,n, V. Keilis-Borok b,c, V. Kossobokov c,d, A. Soloviev c
a
Geotechnical Engineering Group, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 111 North Hope Street, Room 1368, Los Angeles, CA 90012, USA
b
Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences and Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1567, USA
c
Institute of Earthquake Prediction Theory and Mathematical Geophysics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 84/32 Profsouznaya, Moscow 117997, Russia
d
Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris, 1 Rue Jussieu, 75238 Paris Cedex 05, France

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Article history: There was a missed opportunity for implementing important disaster preparedness
Received 5 February 2012 measures following an earthquake prediction that was announced as an alarm in mid-
Received in revised form 2001. This intermediate-term middle-range prediction was the initiation of a chain of
28 February 2012
alarms that successfully detected the time, region, and magnitude range for the
Accepted 8 March 2012
Available online 6 April 2012
magnitude 9.0 March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. The prediction chains
were made using an algorithm called M8 and is the latest of many predictions tested
Keywords: worldwide for more than 25 years, the results of which show at least a 70% success rate.
Earthquake prediction The earthquake detection could have been utilized to implement measures and improve
Forecast
earthquake preparedness in advance; unfortunately this was not done, in part due to
Emergency management
the predictions’ limited distribution and the lack of applying existing methods for using
Disaster preparedness
Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami intermediate-term predictions to make decisions for taking action. The resulting
earthquake and induced tsunami caused tremendous devastation to north-east Japan.
Methods that were known in advance of the predication and further advanced during
the prediction timeframe are presented in a scenario describing some possibilities on
how the 2001 prediction may have been utilized to reduce significant damage,
including damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant, and to show prudent cost-
effective actions can be taken if the prediction certainty is known, but not necessarily
high. The purpose of this paper is to show how the prediction information can be
strategically used to enhance disaster preparedness and reduce future impacts from the
world’s largest earthquakes.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction the Tohoku Earthquake) was detected years in advance

The world’s largest earthquakes are predictable within
time, space, and magnitude ranges having limited but
known accuracy. The March 11, 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake, off shore of the Tohoku region, (herein called
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 213 367 0855;
fax: þ 1 213 367 3792.
E-mail addresses: craig.davis@ladwp.com (C. Davis),
vkb@ess.ucla.edu (V. Keilis-Borok), volodya@mitp.ru (V. Kossobokov),
soloviev@mitp.ru (A. Soloviev).
using a combined earthquake prediction algorithm
called M8–MSc, which is based on premonitory seismicity
patterns and prior to this prediction had been validated
by predictions-in-advance. The prediction was initially
announced in mid-2001 nearly ten years in advance of the
earthquake using a standard protocol to a restricted group
of experts and identified the possibility of a magnitude
(M) 8.0 or greater earthquake occurring in an area
covering northern Honshu and Hokkaido. The M8 earth-
quake prediction algorithm has at least a 70% success rate
of importance to disaster managers for predicting great

2212-4209/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.03.001
18 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
(M8.0þ) earthquakes around the world. Since 1992 M8 has
predicted 12 out of 17 earthquakes for this magnitude range
including the 2010 Chili earthquake. The place and time for
each of three mega-earthquakes (2004 Indian Ocean, 2010
Chili, and 2011 Japan) were recognized as in state of
increased probability by the same algorithm aimed at larger
magnitude ranges of mega-earthquakes (i.e., M8.5þ and
M9.0þ ), though in the case of the 2004 Indian Ocean mega-
thrust it was a retrospective application [34].
The 2001 prediction and subsequent extensions pro-
vided a (missed) possibility for considerable damage
reduction. This is a part of the much wider field: chaos
theory/statistical physics approach to predicting extreme
events; joint optimization of prediction and preparedness
[30,14].
An earthquake prediction includes statements for
range of magnitude, geographical area (location), time
interval, and probability of a future event [1]. Currently
there are no identified reliable methods that can precisely
predict the location of a damaging earthquake within an
immediate timeframe (i.e., a few hours to days). Complex
systems such as earthquakes generated in the lithosphere
are not predictable with an absolute precision. A danger-
ous mistake sometimes emerges in literature stating only
precise predictions in space, time, and magnitude are
useful. Actually, predictions might be useful if their
accuracies are known, but not necessarily high. Such is
the standard practice to all prediction problems, including
national defense. The M8 algorithm predicts earthquakes
with intermediate-term (several years) middle-range
(areas of linear dimension 5 to 10 times the earthquake
source zone size) accuracy. The MSc algorithm decreases
the prediction area to a narrow range (2–3 times the
earthquake source zone size) and in some cases nearly an
exact location (within the dimension of the source zone).
The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami created a great
disaster. On March 11, 2011 Japan was subjected to the
largest known shaking from one of the world’s greatest
earthquakes, followed by one of the world’s largest
tsunamis, and the initiation of the world’s second largest
nuclear accident. This earthquake directly affected nearly
41 million people with very strong to extreme shaking.
There were 15,844 people killed and 3450 people remain
missing [43]. Millions of people were left without water
and power. Entire towns were reduced to rubble. Over
440,000 people have been displaced from their homes by
the earthquake, tsunami, fire, or nuclear radiation alert
and radioactive contamination of the environment. Losses
may reach or exceed $235 billion and insurers may pay
out over $42 billion, making this the world’s costliest
natural disaster [46–48,50].
Several decades ago pattern recognition methods [12,13]
were used to identify how the same area in Japan is
susceptible to earthquakes of magnitude 8.2 or greater
[16,17] and paleo-tsunami investigations identified magni-
tude 8.3 earthquakes were possible [38]. This is in contrast
to the regional magnitude 7.4–7.7 earthquake hazards that
were used to prepare the affected communities for earth-
quake strikes [3]. Unfortunately, the M8–MSc prediction,
pattern recognition, or paleo-tsunami information appar-
ently were not used to make the necessary preparations for
the devastating mega-earthquake that struck Japan on
March 11, 2011. This was a missed opportunity that can
be rectified in future earthquakes by establishing better
links and lines of communication between the earthquake
prediction and disaster preparedness communities.
Intermediate-term predictions are not able to be
utilized to prevent all damage and save all human lives,
but they can be used to take certain cost effective actions
to reduce damage and casualties and improve post-
disaster recovery. Molchan [39,40] and Davis et al. [7]
present methodologies and examples on how actions may
be taken in response to predictions. Davis [5] describes
how to apply economic parameters to loss equations for
use in optimizing actions that may be taken in response to
a prediction. Such actions are useful to enhance the
normal long-term seismic risk mitigation methods like
building codes and standard disaster preparedness meth-
ods. A simple description is provided herein to show some
possibilities on how the 2001 prediction may have been
utilized to reduce significant damage to the Fukushima
nuclear power plant and other infrastructure; other cost-
effective actions such as increasing inventory and aspects
for business continuity following an event could be
implemented but are not described herein. This is done
only with the intent to develop a lesson we can all learn
from in order to help reduce seismic risks. This study
identifies the importance of using credible earthquake
predictions to help reduce future potential damage from
the world’s largest earthquakes.
2. Released-in-advance prediction: March 11, 2011 M 9.0
Tohoku Japan Earthquake
Since the design of the M8 algorithm [26] it was used for
the prediction of earthquakes about magnitude 8.0 (hence, its
name) then applied in other magnitude ranges down to
magnitude 5 [11,32,34–36,45]. The M8 and MSc earthquake
prediction algorithms [28,37] had been used in combination
worldwide in advance of the 1988 Spitak (Armenia) and
1989 Loma Prieta (California) earthquakes, whose occur-
rences did confirm the M8–MSc predictions. However, the
official systematic continuous global test was launched in
1992 [18] as a result of the Russian–American collaboration.
The M8–MSc prediction identifies a Time of Increased Prob-
ability (TIP) of an earthquake with magnitude M from a given
magnitude range MM0 þ ¼[M0, M0 þ DM] occurring within a
defined area. (The M8 and MSc algorithms are described in
Appendix A.)
In essence, the prediction methodology of M8 and MSc
algorithms integrated expertise in statistical modeling of
complex systems, non-linear physics of the solid Earth,
and exploratory data analysis; the framework for the
integration was provided by pattern recognition of infre-
quent events (Appendix B describes more detail).
Fig. 1 and Table 1 summarize the global testing of the
M8–MSc algorithm in the areas from Kamchatka to the
Marianas, including the Japanese islands, for the timeframe
1985–2011. Within this time and space alarms were called
targeting at least one earthquake from M8.0þ . All alarms
were initially called for 5 years, covered ‘‘circular’’ areas of
about 1,400,000 km2, had a probability of false alarm f not
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32 19

Fig. 1. Global testing of algorithms M8 and MSc aimed at magnitude range M Z 8.0: Space–time distribution of alarms from Kamchatka to the Marianas.
Circles of Investigation (CI, white light) are shown on the left; the space–time distribution of alarms from 1985 to 2011 is on the right (dark gray for M8
and black for MSc). The space coordinate is the distance along the belt (six arrows point to the centers of corresponding circles of investigation). Great
earthquakes are marked by stars. The 2011 mega-thrust (‘‘2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake’’—JMA) is indicated by the big star. The M8
alarm had a July 1, 2011 tentative expiration date but was terminated by margin on January 1, 2011; marked with light gray on the space–time plot.

Table 1 hand side of Fig. 1 for identification of the alarms and their
Prediction targets: Magnitude M8.0 þ earthquakes in Kamchatka– duration.
Japan–Marianas, 1993–2011—data available at http://www.mitp.ru/en/
predictions.html.
All alarms in Fig. 1 were announced in advance and
posted at the following web sites:
Date (yr/mo/day) Lat Lon Depth M Result
(km)  http://www.mitp.ru/predictions.html.
1993/08/08 12.98 144.80 59 8.2 Predicted
 http://users.ictp.it/www_users/sand/index_files/
1994/10/04 43.77 147.32 14 8.1 Predicted DevelopmentofPrediction.html.
1995/12/03 44.66 149.30 33 8.0 Predicted
2003/09/25 41.81 143.91 27 8.3 Missed
2006/11/15 46.59 153.27 10 8.3 Missed As is done with all yet unexpired alarms, access to the
2007/01/13 46.24 154.52 10 8.2 Missed
2011/03/11 38.32 142.37 24 9.0 Near miss/
alarms was limited to about 200 scientists and profes-
outside M8.0 þ sional experts worldwide. This is done in compliance to
the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) guidelines [10] and the Seismo-
greater than 30%, and were re-evaluated every six months. logical Society of America Guidelines for Earthquake
Each re-evaluation resulted in either continuing the alarm Predictors [53] for the public release of prediction,
as originally called, changing the M8 and/or MSc alarm area, because it might trigger social disruption, anxiety of
canceling the alarm, or extending the alarm duration. For population, profiteering, crime, etc. The predictions are
purposes of this paper, and for emergency management use, made available to the general public after a strong earth-
the total alarm region is defined as the seismic locus within quake occurs or the alarm expires, whichever comes first.
the sum of all adjoining circular areas with TIP at the same One alarm sequence of particular importance is that
time, and the total alarm duration is the total time con- shown on the far right of Fig. 1. This alarm initiated in
tinuum for the alarm region. Thus, for this purpose Fig. 1 the middle of 2001 and lasted until 2011. Within this
shows four alarms (these definitions are technically differ- sequence the last earthquake prediction update made by
ent than those used to call individual alarms in each circle of the combined M8–MSc algorithms was released in July
investigation as described in Appendix A. The above defini- 2010, and covered the time until July 2011. This predic-
tions are useful for applying the alarm for emergency tion identified the possibility of at least one earthquake of
management and disaster preparedness purposes). The magnitude 8.0 or greater in Japan prior to March 11, 2011
projection of the prediction regions on the seismic belt axis within the Circle of Investigation (CI) #81 area shown in
at a given time within 1985–2011 are plotted on the right Fig. 1. Fig. 2 identifies the approximate alarm regions.
20 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
Prediction Regions (approximate)
M8 2001-2006
M8 2006-2011
MSc 2001-2006
MSc 2006-2011
Fig. 2. Schematic illustrating the approximate M8 and MSc alarm
regions called during 2001–2006 and 2006–2011 in relation to the
Japanese Islands and the tectonic plate boundaries. The star identifies
approximate epicenter for the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake. Base
drawing from NIED [44]. Exact locations for circles of investigation are
found at http://www.mitp.ru/en/predictions.html.
The large circular area, shown in light gray in Fig. 1, is
predicted by the M8 algorithm. The MSc algorithm was
used to refine the prediction areas to within the smaller
rectangular areas in Fig. 2, shown as black in Fig. 1. As
seen in Figs. 1 and 2, this alarm covered the area where
the Tohoku Japan mega-earthquake actually occurred,
and the epicenter is located within the refined area
predicted by the MSc algorithm. The MSc prediction
region from 2001 to 2011 is located in the Tohoku Region
near the east coast of Honshu, Japan.
2.1. Review of M8–MSc advanced prediction
In mid-2001, the combined M8–MSc algorithm recog-
nized premonitory patterns and diagnosed a TIP for a
MZ8.0 earthquake in the region shown in Figs. 1 and 2,
and an alarm was announced. Using standard procedure for
evaluating the algorithm, updates were made every 6
months until January 2011. In January 2011 the algorithm
for predicting M8.0þ earthquakes detected a small change
in one of the characteristics (the concentration of sources),
which placed its value just below the criteria necessary to
maintain the alarm (see Appendix A for more details on
alarm diagnosis). This small change in value resulted in the
alarm being called off on January 1, 2011, only 70 days
before the M 9.0 Tohoku event [34]. As shown in Figs. 1 and
2, the premonitory detection and application of the M8–MSc
algorithms accurately identified the Tohoku earthquake. The
epicenter was located clearly within the territory defined by
the MSc algorithm, showing how it successfully identified
the narrow range within which the earthquake occurred.
However, the Tohoku earthquake will not be counted as a
successful prediction by the M8 algorithm in the magnitude
range M8.0þ. A concurrent alarm from a M8 algorithm
aimed to predict M8.5þ mega-earthquakes remained in
place at the time the M9.0 mega-thrust earthquake occurred
in Japan [34]; but the use of this algorithm for M8.5þ and
M9.0þ is beyond the scope of the Global test of M8 and
MSc algorithms that has been on-going since 1992 and
therefore cannot be formally regarded as documentation in
advance of the March 11, 2011 earthquake as part of the
global testing for M8.0þ earthquakes. Even so, from a
disaster preparedness perspective the predictions could
have been useful for improving seismic risk management
if the information was utilized to implement appropriate
measures. Unfortunately, the Japanese experts were caught
off guard by the Tohoku earthquake, in part because the
disaster managers were not properly linked with the earth-
quake prediction community resulting in inadequate com-
munication and lack of use of important information.
For the region presented in Fig. 1 seven target earth-
quakes occurred between 1993 and 2011 and four alarms
were called, two of them false. Table 1 shows that three
target earthquakes were predicted and four were missed,
with the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake being
identified as a near miss as previously described. The
most recent chain of alarms had earthquakes occur short
distances outside of the defined prediction regions, an
aspect important to emergency managers in relation to
the need for preparing. This chain is technically consid-
ered a false alarm and the missed earthquakes are
classified as failures to predict because the algorithms
did not detect those specific areas as having a TIP. None-
theless, the algorithm did detect regional characteristics
for potential great earthquakes which could have been
used to enhance preparedness in areas damaged by some
of the undetected earthquakes in Table 1. For example, at
the end of the following section a scenario description is
provided on how the 2001 prediction could have aided in
reducing damage in Hokkaido as a result of the 2003 M
8.3 Tokachi-Oki earthquake.
3. Missed opportunity
An opportunity to reduce the impacts from the Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami disaster has been missed. The
earthquake predictions shown in Fig. 1 were not used to
improve disaster preparedness in the regions of greatest
risk. Fig. 3 shows a simple and straight forward process
where the information provided by credible earthquake
predictions can be used to get properly prepared for the
predicted hazard; a simplified diagram of common seis-
mic risk reduction practices. Davis et al. [6,7] provide
examples on how predictions such as that described
herein can be cost effectively used by infrastructure
owners, disaster managers, and policy makers for redu-
cing seismic risk. A general methodology for such esti-
mates based on optimal control theory is presented by
Molchan [39,40]. Some of their examples and scenarios
could have been considered in advance by the Japanese.
The specific actions that may be implemented in any
region in response to any prediction requires knowledge
of the local conditions at the time of prediction and an
understanding of resident cultures and values. This
undoubtedly holds true for Japan prior to the Tohoku
earthquake. However, there are also many universal
actions of great importance which are described in the
following subsection.
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
Fig. 3. Process for determining actions to implement in response to an earthquake prediction. Smaller bold rectangular boxes provide specific
information related to the larger boxes and as described in the text.
3.1. Scenario use of prediction
In order to provide better insight into how the predictions
could have been utilized, the following scenario is described.
The presented scenario is simplified and not intended to
trivialize the necessary scientific or managerial efforts or
attempt to cover the potentially vast and laborious under-
takings that could accompany a true response, and it has the
advantage of hindsight and knowledge of what did transpire
after the Tohoku earthquake. The authors do not intend the
descriptions to be misinterpreted to indicate that such
responses are inconsequential, all damages can be prevented,
or that all critical vulnerabilities can be identified in advance
of such large and extreme events. However, we hope the
importance, logic, and sequence for implementing actions in
response to the prediction can be understood by reviewing
the scenario provided below for the sake of learning from this
disaster in order to reduce future disasters.
A possible use of the 2001 prediction is as follows. In mid-
2001 disaster managers, policy makers, critical infrastructure
operators, and other appropriate people and organizations
learn of the M8–MSc prediction identifying a MZ8.0 earth-
quake may occur sometime within the next 5 years some-
where within the region identified in Figs. 1 and 2. The
probability for this prediction is described as having at least a
70% chance of occurring within the large M8 circle of
investigation shown in Fig. 2 (f¼30%) and approximately
21
50% within the smaller MSc rectangular grids. These prob-
abilities are based on global statistics (e.g. [34]), not the
regional data shown in Table 1. This prediction is assessed as
credible based on the scientific manner in which the algo-
rithms have been developed, their performance over the past
10 years, and recent successful predictions in advance
including the August 8, 1993 M 8.0 Guam, October 4, 1994
M 8.3 Shikotan, April 7, 1995 M 8.1 Samoa, December 3, 1995
M 8.0 Iturup, February 17, 1996 M 8.2 New Giunea, and June
4, 2000 M 8.0 Sumatra earthquakes. From the relatively large
area mapped in Fig. 1 and sketched in Fig. 2, and from later
maps updated every 6 months, no one can determine exactly
where the possible earthquake may occur within the circle,
which day it may occur, or the exact magnitude within the
specified range (i.e., is it a M 8.0, M 8.3, M 9.0 or other?). As a
result, it is clearly recognized that this alarm is not a red alert
or indicating an immediate threat of an impending earth-
quake for particular communities, but also that the risk is
clearly larger than the long term risk for which disaster
preparedness actions are normally undertaken, at least for
parts of Japan. It is understood that the earthquake could
happen at any time after the alarm is released. As a result, the
determination on how to take action in response to this
alarm cannot be delayed.
A review is performed for: (a) the known seismic faults
within the alarm region (large circle defined by M8), and
(b) the magnitude of earthquakes they are expected to
22 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
generate. Considerations for the potential faults having
the capability of generating great earthquakes reveal that
if the earthquake is to occur it will most likely be
generated in a zone along the plate boundary contacts
(Pacific, Eurasian, and Philippine sea; see for example
[44,2]). The narrowed rectangular region shown in Fig. 2
indicates a 50% chance of the earthquake being generated
in the vicinity of the contact between the Pacific and the
Eurasian plates, just west of the Japan Trench. This leaves
a 20% chance of the earthquake being elsewhere in the
prediction region, and may be along one of the other plate
contact zones, and a 30% chance of the predicted earth-
quake not occurring at all.
The Japanese make long-term earthquake forecasts
[24]. The forecasted interplate magnitudes used for seis-
mic hazard analyses within the prediction region in
northeast and northwest Japan are less than magnitude
8.0, except for some very low probable earthquakes of up
to magnitude 8.2 along the Japan Trench. The larger and
more probable forecasted Nankai, Tonankai, and Tokai
earthquakes reach up to magnitude 8.5 along southeast
Honshu [52,24], but the annualized M8 predicted prob-
ability of occurrence is slightly higher by factors of
1.4–2.4. This means that the predicted risks exceed the
current forecasted risks used for making earthquake
preparedness and the forecasts are to be reconsidered in
a rapid manner especially in the refined MSc region.
Evidence for larger earthquakes in northeast Japan is
readily confirmed using the information described in
Appendix B, including M 9.0 earthquakes. The prediction
in Fig. 2 then fosters a wider understanding that M 8.2–M
9.0 earthquakes are considered possible over a much
wider region than previously used in the forecast models
and are consistent with historic subduction zone earth-
quakes in other parts of the world.
This initial review is followed by more detailed hazard
assessments, which are not described in this scenario, and
results in the preliminary finding that there is a high
opportunity for a M 8.0–M 9.0 or larger earthquakes in
northeast Japan. This newly recognized hazard exceeds
the hazard used for regional infrastructure design and
disaster planning. The previously forecasted earthquake
size in south east Japan is consistent with that identified
in this prediction. The conclusion: initiate plans for taking
action in response to this alarm. The action planning
proceeds in parallel with other hazard assessment activ-
ities and each is refined and improved as more informa-
tion and greater understandings are developed.
Many logistical tasks become obvious to implement at
this time including updating emergency response plans,
coordinating disaster response agencies, coordinating
information releases with the media, stocking up on
medical and disaster relief supplies, initiating contracts
for post-earthquake supply and support, reviewing insur-
ance coverage, updating procedures and supplies, enga-
ging the technical community for more detailed hazard
evaluations, identifying vulnerabilities, and other emer-
gency preparedness related activities. In addition, it is
prudent to perform scenario earthquake and tsunami
drills; many Japanese cities perform these regularly but
it is important to ensure that everyone within the high
risk areas participate and to increase the frequency (e.g.,
semi-annually) during the alarm duration. Emergency
response plans should be developed or updated at differ-
ent levels from individuals, families, businesses, local
government, prefecture government, national govern-
ment, non-government organizations, to even interna-
tional support. Fig. 3 shows that once it is determined
that action is to be taken many of the above listed types of
actions should be identified and rapidly reviewed to
ensure their practical implementation is justified (follow
the right side of the flow diagram). When justified, they
should be implemented in a prudent and efficient
manner.
Other types of actions may require more detailed
analyses to ensure they are prudent to implement. Hazard
assessments for potential M 8.0–M 9.0 or larger earth-
quakes are then performed, with a priority and focus
along the Japan Trench. Since time is a critical factor,
some previously known hazard assessments such as the
tsunami evaluations by Minoura et al. [38] and later by
Satake et al. [51] are used and even initially applied to
other areas while more detailed assessments are per-
formed. Results of hazard assessments are distributed to
all potentially impacted communities for their use.
The potential impacted communities are recommended
to have all buildings, critical infrastructure, hazard mitigation
and preparedness plans, emergency response and recovery
plans, social, economic, housing, commercial buildings, ports,
financial systems, insurance coverage, policies, and other
related important aspects reviewed to determine gaps
between the existing hazard preparedness and the predicted
hazard. The potential consequences for each gap are then
assessed and possible measures that will reduce the potential
hazard impacts are identified. Table 2 presents example
measures that are identified. The identified measures are
assessed for cost effectiveness as shown in Table 2, screened
for the time to implement in relation to alarm duration (TIP),
and prioritized for implementation for this alarm. The higher
priories are given to those actions that can be accomplished
in the shortest time frame while having the highest prob-
abilities for reducing the greatest potential impacts. In
addition, some critical actions that may take longer to
implement than the current alarm are prioritized for imple-
mentation with recognition that: (1) the alarm may be
extended longer than the initial 5-year period; and (2) the
improvements provide important risk reduction in relation to
the normal background long-term seismic threat.
For example, the consequences of a nuclear meltdown
are huge; therefore screen the nuclear power plants for
fortifications against tsunami and other hazards that may
impact them. In this review process the existing 5.7 m
high tsunami protection walls [3] at the Fukushima plant
are identified as having a high potential of being over-
topped by the projected 8-m high tsunami wave [38]. The
tsunami wave for an M 9.0 or larger earthquake could be
much higher and requires more detailed evaluation. The
Fukushima plant is located approximately 8 m above sea
level by design, as compared to the approximately 35 m
original ground elevation. The next step is to ask the
question: what would be the consequences of a tsunami
breach at the Fukushima nuclear power plant? Nuclear
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32 23

Table 2
Possible scenario actions to reduce seismic risks in response to alarm. Actions are described in the text.

Item Action Ca ($1000) P ($1000) Gain, G ($1000)

1  f¼ 20% 1  f¼ 50%

Nuclear power plants

1a Raise tsunami wall 10,000 500,000 90,000 240,000
1b Protective generator housing 1000 500,000 99,000 249,000
1c Raise wall þ protective housing 11,000 500,000 89,000 239,000

Home, office, maintenance, industrial buildings

2 Anchor furniture, cabinets, computers, equipment, etc. 11 101 9.2 39.5
3a Relocating out of tsunami inundation area, or 500 1,500  200 250
3b Retrofitting structure for tsunami 280 1,500 20 470

Lifeline systems
4 Railway bridge and track 400 700  260  50
5 Water pipe replacement 420 2100 0 630
6 Highway tunnel landslide repair 2000 2000  1600  1000
7 Power transformers 1500 10,000 500 3500
8 Roadway bridge 500 1500  200 250
9 Liquid Fuel Tank 30 2000 370 970

Cultural
10 Nikko temples 50 100  30 0

Disregard/Unaware of Prediction
11 Do nothing 0  518,401  103,680  259,200

power experts develop many scenarios, one which
includes the loss of emergency generators. If this scenario
was postulated in advance of the Tohoku earthquake
some options to mitigate, as shown in Table 2 items 1a
and 1b, would include the alternatives: (a) raising the
tsunami walls and (b) developing protective housing for
generators to resist the potential flood. These alternatives
are then assessed using the optimizations presented by
Molchan [39,40] and further developed and explained by
Davis et al. [6,7] using
G ¼ Pð1f ÞC a
where G is the gain, P is the cost of damage prevented by
implementing the action, Ca is the cost of implementing
the action, and f is the probability of false alarm. The
value of (1 f) can be taken as 0.50 for hazards resulting
from earthquakes generated along the Japan Trench and
0.20 for earthquakes generated elsewhere in the predic-
tion region (i.e., 1  f can be taken as 0.50 for the 8 m or
higher tsunami wave at the Fukushima nuclear power
plant site). A positive G identifies the benefits are greater
than the costs from an economic perspective and the
action is warranted. A negative G indicates a loss and the
action may not be warranted. Eq. (1) does not account for
the likelihood of damage from a successful prediction in
relation to the larger prediction region relative to the
potential source size. Davis [5] describes how to apply
economic parameters to Eq. (1).
As shown in Table 2 items 1a–1c, assuming a cost Ca of
$10,000,000 for the tsunami wall raising and $1,000,000 for
building the protective generator room, and a $500,000,000
cost P of damage prevented if the generators are adequately
protected to prevent a meltdown then the gain G attained
by taking both actions is $239,000,000 (note P is a very low
value but considered reasonable for a 2001 estimate, the
actual losses may exceed $100 billion; [49]). These are
clearly cost effective measures to implement and both
alternatives are recommended to initiate immediately with
further evaluation to determine the wall height needed to
protect against a tsunami resulting from an M 9.0 or greater
earthquake. Raising the tsunami wall has a further advan-
tage of protecting the entire plant. This simple analysis
shows that several hundred million dollars on fortification
improvements could be cost effectively spent for this alarm
(several hundred billion in improvements would be cost
effective if actual P values were used in the analysis). As a
ð1Þ
result, similar actions and related evaluations are ordered at
all other nuclear power plants, giving the highest priority to
those on the northeast coast, next highest priority in middle,
southeast, and west coast of Japan, and third highest priority
to all other nuclear power plants in Japan based on their re-
evaluated tsunami hazards. Table 2 shows how the second
priority regions having 1f¼0.20 is cost effective. The third
priority is a logical outcome of the tsunami hazard reassess-
ment, which was fostered by the 2001 prediction, and is
implemented in addition to rather than as a direct response
to the prediction.
Another example presented as item 2 in Table 2 is
provided for anchoring cabinets, computers, and equip-
ment for a company located in Miyagi Prefecture. The
company has adequately seismically strengthened build-
ings at an elevation higher than 50 m; tsunami inundation
is not a concern, but strong shaking can potentially
damage their valuable equipment and the information
stored within it. The company can invest Ca ¼$11,000 to
anchor their computers, storage cabinets, and other
equipment so that it will not topple over during ground
shaking to protect $26,000 in equipment replacement
value and the $75,000 worth of information stored;
P ¼$101,000. Using Eq. (1) with 1 f¼0.50, the gain is
24 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
estimated to be $39,500 and the company decides to
rapidly anchor the equipment. A similar company having
comparable costs in Shizuoka Prefecture has a gain of
$9200 and performs the same actions.
Table 2 presents several examples for lifeline systems.
Item 4 in Table 2 presents an example railroad located near
the coast in a potential tsunami inundation zone and on
liquefiable soils in Iwate Prefecture. A bridge and 1 km of
track are identified as being vulnerable to liquefaction and/
or tsunami damage. There is a parallel line outside the
tsunami and liquefaction hazard zones, but it is slower and
for some riders may require an additional 2 h/d to use this
route for getting to their destinations. The cost to improve
the soils to prevent liquefaction damage to the tracks and
bridge is estimated to be Ca ¼$400,000; this mitigation is
also expected to strengthen the bridge to resist tsunami
damage. The damage prevented including costs of customer
disruption is estimated to be P¼$700,000. The gain is
estimated to be $50,000, a net loss, and the company
decides not to perform any mitigation measures, but instead
increases insurance coverage and develops action plans in
case this section of line is damaged and also to make rapid
repairs following the event in an attempt to lessen P.
Items 5 through 9 in Table 2 present examples for other
lifeline systems. The water pipe in item 5 is critical to
providing supply to hospitals in an emergency and crosses
through a liquefiable zone. The costs Ca are for replacing the
pipe with ductile iron pipe having special earthquake resis-
tant joints that allow the pipe to deform under liquefaction
induced permanent ground deformations without leaking.
The existing power transformers in item 7 are on soft soil
sites that will be subjected to differential settlements and
render a large portion of the system unusable; their vulner-
abilities can be mitigated by adding concrete piles as part of
their foundations. The liquid fuel tanks in item 9 are at a port
and unanchored; a tsunami wave may displace and damage
the tanks making them unusable, but can be mitigated by
adding an anchorage system. Table 2 shows items 5, 7, and 9
to be cost effective in any location within the prediction
region. The case in item 6 where a landslide can potentially
block a highway tunnel is not cost effective for this prediction
at any location, but some may still consider its viability based
on the life safety concerns. The roadway bridge in item 8 is
located along the coast and requires strengthening to resist
tsunami forces; and is found to be cost-effective along the
north-east coast of Japan, but not in other areas of the
prediction region. As a result, bridges under this condition
are prioritized for mitigation improvements along the north-
east coast.
Eq. (1) is also used to assess objects of historical value. The
Nikko Temples (located in the Tochigi Province about 50 km
north of Tokyo) are inscribed as one of UNESCOs world
heritage sites and are evaluated for and determined to need
about $50,000 worth of improvements to protect them
against about $100,000 in damage, based on Modified
Mercalli Intensity (MMI) IV shaking from an earthquake
along the Japan Trench. Table 2 shows that item 10 is cost-
effective in this area of the prediction region. However,
similar cultural artifacts elsewhere in Japan may not be
cost-effectively mitigated for this prediction based entirely
on monetary reasons. However, some argue that the cultural
and historic value is greater and other similar artifacts are
also mitigated elsewhere in Japan.
In this scenario many other disaster preparedness
actions are undertaken. Similar infrastructure analyses
are performed for bridges, port facilities, water and
wastewater treatment plants, commercial and office
buildings, other power plants, homes, etc. considering
all the earthquake related hazards previously described.
The assessments are performed by all types of organiza-
tions from individual owners, municipalities, water and
sewer systems, all types of transport systems, financial
and insurance institutions, all levels of government, and
so on. The review is performed throughout the prediction
area using appropriate values of (1 f). Based on assess-
ment results, the needed actions are prioritized and
implemented to mitigate hazard vulnerabilities and make
necessary preparations in a manner previously described.
In July 2006, as a result of monitoring seismicity, the
alarm is extended for another five years and the alarm
region shifts to the north as shown in Figs. 1 and 2
(technically the alarms in the original circles of investiga-
tion expire and new alarms are called in circles of
investigation to the north). The refined prediction area
made by the MSc algorithm remains nearly the same as
that identified in 2001. Confidence in the alarm is
renewed and sustained based on continued successful
worldwide predictions-in-advance using the M8–MSc
algorithms including the recent May 3, 2006 M 8.1 Tonga
earthquake, and several months to years later the April 1,
2007 M 8.1 Solomon Islands, September 12, 2007 M 8.5
and 8.1 Sumatra, September 29, 2009 M 8.5 Samoa, and
February 27, 2010 M 8.8 Chili earthquakes. As a result, the
hazard evaluation process is reviewed once more and
identifies that potential large earthquakes in southeast
Honshu are no longer in the prediction region (namely
Nankai), which somewhat lowers the risk in that region
returning it to the background long-term forecast levels.
Other regions in Hokkaido have increased risks and
actions similar to that previously described are imple-
mented on that island. This took place only a few years
after the 2003 M 8.3 Tokachi-Oki earthquake and tsunami
(not detected by the M8 algorithm) struck that island.
Even though this region was not detected as having a
great earthquake some damage was averted due to the
preparations in response to the 2001 alarm because
hazard evaluations identified portions of Hokkaido to
have the potential for shaking and tsunami damage if an
earthquake did occur in the northern end of the predic-
tion region. Preparations include strengthening vulner-
able structures, improving post-earthquake fire fighting
capabilities, and adding tsunami barriers. In the Tokachi-
Oki earthquake shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1 there were
nearly 600 injuries suffered and many homes and other
buildings were lost.
In January 2011 the alarm is called off and classified as
a false alarm. There is no significant reversion of any
actions taken in response to this alarm, nearly all mea-
sures remain in place. On March 11, 2011 a mega-thrust
earthquake strikes northeast Japan and followed by a
great tsunami. This is the Tohoku earthquake. Due to
the extensive measures undertaken in response to the
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
alarm shown in Fig. 1, a significant amount of damage
was averted and numerous lives saved.
3.2. Additional aspects on the scenario use of prediction
The information presented in the previous subsection
clearly identifies how some very high risks could have
been significantly reduced, or in some cases averted
altogether, if proper assessments were made using the
information provided by the alarm. This is irrespective of
the alarm being called off only weeks in advance of the
Tohoku earthquake. Knowing there was a 30% probability
for the predicted earthquake not to transpire, even if the
earthquake did not occur by July 2011 the implementa-
tion of reasonable and prudent actions would have still
helped Japan prepare for the inevitable earthquake strike.
Application of the process shown in Fig. 3 for the other
past earthquakes predicted by the M8–MSc algorithms
and shown in Fig. 1 may have also resulted in earthquake
risk reductions in advance of the impending earthquakes.
For example, the 1986 prediction could have been used by
Guam to improve the stability of vulnerable school and
hotel buildings that were damaged [8] by the impending
August 8, 1993 earthquake. The 1992 prediction could
have been used to mitigate vulnerable bridges and hospi-
tals [42] that were damaged by the October 4, 1994
earthquake and destructive tsunami on Shikotan Island.
The costs in Table 2 use average values and are not based
on detailed estimates, but instead are considered as reason-
able order of magnitude estimates based on similar condi-
tions found in developed and urbanized areas around the
world using direct and indirect costs. The estimates could be
improved using exact conditions at specific sites in Japan
with the cost factors for the years (2001 and forward) the
estimates would have been made. Each situation requires its
own evaluation and may result in different conclusions than
those described in the scenario. However, higher level
estimates based on site specific detailed evaluations would
not change the understanding of how to use Eq. (1) for
decision making purposes supported by the examples given
above. Additionally, improvements in decision making can be
obtained with the use of distribution functions on expected
costs rather than averages.
The above examples show how the process in Fig. 3 helps
to rationalize and prioritize the development of protective
actions. However, not all safety measures are justifiable
either due to potential losses as exemplified above, lack of
resources to implement, or lack of time to implement in
relation to the alarm duration. The lack of resources and time
to implement can be exemplified by reviewing tsunami
barriers for protecting entire coast lines such as the world’s
largest at Kamaishi Bay. The Kamaishi Bay protective barrier
raises 8 m above the sea and was completed in 2008 at a cost
of $1.4 billion after 30 years of work [3]. The hazard analysis
previously described identifies this barrier to have insuffi-
cient height to protect the city from a tsunami that may
result from a successful prediction. The cost and time to raise
this wall to approximately double its capacity is too great to
accomplish for the initial five-year duration of this alarm. It
is also inconceivable to consider developing similar walls
elsewhere in response to this alarm considering only a
25
five-year duration. As a result, instead of preventing inun-
dation other alternatives should also be addressed for this
alarm such as post-earthquake evacuations, strengthening
buildings, moving materials and supplies to higher eleva-
tions, etc. Item 3 in Table 2 considers options for: (a)
relocating a structure out of a tsunami inundation area or
(b) strengthening an existing concrete building to resist the
tsunami and maintaining important artifacts on floors
higher than the expected flooding. For the cases presented
it is more cost effective to mitigate than relocate. Now
considering that tsunami barriers may provide cost-effective
and sufficient protection to communities, the initiation of
such barriers may be warranted based on the alarm in areas
needing smaller and much easier to build fortifications than
that in Kamaishi Bay. These could possibly be completed in
time if the projects were given sufficient priority, especially
since the current alarm was extended for five years. How-
ever, the cost-effectiveness should be weighed against other
alternatives similar to items 3a and 3b in Table 2. Even if
alarm time extensions were not made, the barriers would
provide protection from great earthquakes expected to
occur in the longer-term if that construction process were
sufficient to maintain stability against the Tohoku earth-
quake and tsunami. This is not to argue if such barriers are
or are not warranted when considering the long-term
hazards; further review of this protective strategy is beyond
the scope of this paper. Other large and lengthy projects
could undergo similar evaluation processes.
A catalog of all possible missed opportunities is not
provided herein; only some of the missed opportunities
are exemplified in order to illustrate how the alarm could
have been used for improving and accelerating seismic
risk reduction during the TIP. In addition, the logistical
actions identified in the previous subsection are nearly
always found to be cost-effective as noted by Davis et al.
[7]. As a result these types of actions were not repeated in
Table 2.
It is seen that not all important and critical actions can be
implemented, even for this alarm that went on for nearly 10
years. This emphasizes the need for accurate seismic hazard
assessments and continuously implementing risk reduction
measures. The most beneficial use of M8–MSc predictions is
to enhance the long-term disaster risk reduction and emer-
gency preparedness measures that should already be on-
going. The scenario illustrates how intermediate-term earth-
quake predictions can be used to enhance normal hazard
mitigation procedures.
The above description is a scenario identifying how
damages may have been prevented if the appropriate
actions were taken in response to the prediction. Unfor-
tunately no actions were taken in response to the alarm.
Table 2 item 11 also shows the option of doing nothing
during the alarm. The estimates in Table 2 item 11 only
include those examples presented in the scenario and
listed as items 1 through 10. There is no initial cost for
doing nothing. However, there is also no investment into
improving damage prevention and reducing negative
impacts from the predicted earthquake. As a result,
Table 2 shows a significant loss for all f if no action is
taken. The harsh reality of this situation was exposed in
the aftermath of the great Tohoku Japan earthquake.
26 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
4. Tohoku earthquake
On March 11, 2011, only 70 days after the M8 alarm
for M8.0þ earthquakes was canceled, the M 9.0 Tohoku
earthquake struck off the east coast of Honshu, Japan, as
shown in Figs. 1 and 4, at 2:46 p.m. local time. This was
one of the five most powerful earthquakes ever recorded.
The earthquake resulted from thrust faulting on or near
the subduction zone plate boundary between the Pacific
and the Eurasian plates [2]. The hypocenter was located at
a depth of about 32 km approximately 129 km east of
Sendai, Honshu, Japan [54]. The fault slipped upwards in
the order of 30–40 m over an area approximately 300 km
long (along-strike) by 150 km wide (in the down-dip
direction), lifting up the seafloor as much as 9 m [55].
The main shock was preceded by a M 7.2 foreshock on
March 9, 2011 and followed by at least six major (M
7.0 þ) and 120 strong (M 6.0 þ) aftershocks.
The scale of the Tohoku earthquake disaster exceeds
that of all previous disasters. Fig. 4 and Table 3 identifies
Fig. 4. Tohoku earthquake hazard maps. Left: map of seismic shaking intensities (MMI) estimated by the USGS [54]. Right: map of observed tsunami
wave height [22] at official recording stations.
Table 3
Estimated population exposure. Prepared using data obtained from USGS [54].
MMI
VII VIII
Damage potential Moderate Moderate/Heavy
No. of cities 114 (incl. Tokyo) 13
Population 34,736,000 5,841,000
how the earthquake resulted in a large area of the
Japanese island of Honshu being shaken with MMI of VII
or more, directly affecting nearly 41 million people resid-
ing in about 128 different cities. The shaking lasted up to
6 min in some locations and generated the largest ever
recorded accelerations of 2.7g measured directly in the
Miyagi prefecture, 75 km from the epicenter.
The seafloor uplift generated a large tsunami wave at sea
on the order of 15–20 m high [3] that propagated throughout
the Pacific Ocean. The tsunami affected more than 2100 km
of the eastern Japan coastline [19] and traveled up to 10 km
inland [50]. Fig. 5 shows the tsunami wave height distribu-
tion along the coast as measured at official recording stations.
The preliminary reported inundation depth reached up to
about 27 m and the run-up height reached up to about 38 m
[20]. The world’s largest tsunami protection wall at Kamaishi
Bay rises 8 m above the water and was overtopped by a 14 m
wave [3,23].
The tsunami was far more deadly and destructive than
the actual earthquake. Entire communities were devastated
Total
IX X
Heavy Very Heavy
1 (Furukawa) 0 128
255,000 0 40,832,000
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32 27

and some towns were nearly completely destroyed by the power plant, for purposes of explaining the application of
tsunami. In total, there are more than 19,000 dead or missing, Eq. (1). It is difficult for researchers to acquire post-event
mostly elderly people, and about 5900 reported injuries. data of sufficient detail shortly after an event that is
There are 1,090,000 buildings damaged or destroyed, of useful for the cost analysis presented herein. However,
which 127,197 totally and 232,083 partially-collapsed, item 9 in Table 2 represents an actual case of a liquid fuel
mostly residential, from shaking, tsunami, and fire [43]. Over system performance based on specific observations in
440,000 people have been displaced from their homes by the Ishinomaki, but lack actual cost data; the costs are rough
earthquake, tsunami, fire, and nuclear radiation alert and estimates. Further information for this case is presented
radioactive contamination of the environment [50]. On here to make a tangible link between potential mitigation
March 11, 2011 around 4.4 million households in north- options and actual performance and to show how post-
eastern Japan were left without electricity and 1.5 million event observations can be used to improve the use of
without water. One dam failed, the earth-fill Fujinuma Dam, predictions.
in Fukushima Prefecture killing eight people and causing Figs. 5 and 6 show damage to two liquid fuel storage
other property damages [21]. Numerous fires ignited as a tanks in Ishinomaki City following the tsunami. Fig. 5
result of damage from shaking and the tsunami. In Kesen- shows the foundations for two tanks, one tank is missing
numa oil leakage resulted in a fire that burned several square and the other has slid off of its foundation. Fig. 6 shows
kilometers. An explosion at the Cosmo Oil refinery caused a the missing tank from Fig. 5 that floated away in the
fire that burned for two days [50]. The earthquake and tsunami and was placed on its side on a city street. These
tsunami created an estimated 25 million tons of rubble and tanks were located near the port and could have been
debris in Japan [56]. used for storage of critically needed fuel supplies follow-
All affected nuclear power plants reportedly shut down ing the earthquake and tsunami, if they had not been
safely after the shaking. The Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant damaged. Damages to these tanks and their connecting
had a fire ignite in the turbine building, but did not affect the
reactors. The Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant was shut down and
able to maintain cooling for the reactors. The Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plants I and II were impacted by tsunami
waves that overtopped seawalls and destroyed diesel backup
power systems, leading to severe problems at Fukushima I,
including at least three large explosions and radioactive
leakage. Over 200,000 people were evacuated [56,9]. Damage
to the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants has resulted in the
second worst nuclear accident in history creating loss of
usable lands, impacts on food and water, and many other
impacts including radiation concerns across the Pacific
Ocean. Losses from damage to the Fukushima nuclear power
plants and resulting radiation may exceed $100 billion [49].
This great earthquake and tsunami has also severely
impacted the local and global economy. Financial institu-
tions estimate the disaster could cost from $122 billion to
$235 billion, or 2.5 to 4 percent of Japan’s gross domestic
product [46]. The government has estimated infrastruc- Fig. 5. Damage to liquid fuel storage tank in Ishinomaki City; tanks
ture damage from the earthquake and tsunami at $190– moved off of foundations.
295 billion. These estimates could make this the world’s
costliest natural disaster [47]. The total insured loss is
between $21 billion on the low end and $34–$42 billion
on the high end, ranking the Tohoku earthquake among
the largest insurance industry losses [50,48]. Impacts
from this earthquake have the potential to permeate
through the global economy for several years to come.
Some of this damage and destruction could have been
reduced, or even eliminated altogether, if appropriate con-
nections were made with disaster managers following the
alarm announcement. If such connections between predictors
and preparers were made, decisions on what and how to take
action could have proceeded in a manner somewhat as
described in Section 3.1 resulting in saved lives and property.

5. Example case: liquid fuel storage tanks

Fig. 6. Damage to liquid fuel storage tank in Ishinomaki City; tank
Section 3.1 presented general actions not specific to floated (photograph provided courtesy of the Japan Water Works
system or site locations, except for the Fukushima nuclear Association).
28 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
pipelines mostly resulted due to the lack of anchorage to
their foundations. Table 2 shows the costs of damages
for direct and business interruption losses is estimated to
be $2,000,000. The estimated cost for taking action in
advance of the disaster in a manner similar to that
explained for the scenario use of earthquake is estimated
to be $30,000. Thus, these estimates indicate the anchor-
ing mitigation is relatively inexpensive compared to the
total estimated losses. The prediction could have been
used to help identify this needed lifeline improvement.
6. Prediction strategies and disaster preparedness
The advanced prediction combined with documented
results of the great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster
provide a good example for illustrating the possibility of
implementing different earthquake prediction strategies for
critical infrastructure and the general public. Examples of
critical infrastructure damages resulting from the Tohoku
earthquake were presented in the previous section. Of the
many different types of critical infrastructure damages two
stand out above the rest as a result of significant secondary
damages and cascading costs caused by their failures; they
are the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant and Fujinuma Dam.
Damages and costs go well beyond the direct impacts from
their failures and impacts will linger for years, if not decades,
to come. As previously identified, losses from the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plant may exceed $100 billion. Total loss
estimates from the Fujinuma Dam are not available, but may
reach hundreds of millions of dollars based on other similar
types of problems (including property loss, casualties, litiga-
tion, loss of irrigation, business impact, replacement costs,
etc.). These losses exceed the costs to prevent such damage
by orders of magnitude; see Table 2 for the nuclear example.
In such cases, it is cost effective to do everything possible to
ensure these types of failures do not occur. Using Eq. (1) to
estimate f at the breakeven point when G¼0 identifies that it
was cost effective to take action for the Fukushima nuclear
power plant with a 99.99% probability of false alarm. The
breakeven point for the dam failure will not reach the same
levels, but could easily result at f¼80–90%; dams located
above more populated areas may reach a break even at
f¼99%. As a result, critical infrastructure should: (1) review
the earthquake hazards on a continual basis and implement
necessary mitigations to increase the probability that failures
do not occur; (2) continually maintain normal emergency
preparedness measures, and (3) escalate emergency prepa-
redness and response activities when expected risks exceed
background levels, including changing priorities and applica-
tion of temporary measures. Earthquake prediction strategies
can be implemented to aid in the above mentioned disaster
preparedness activities needed for critical infrastructure.
Developers of earthquake prediction algorithms have
certain freedom to choose appropriate tradeoffs between
different kinds of prediction errors to allow for adequate
preparedness decisions to be made [40,25,7]. For a given
magnitude range and TIP, different earthquake prediction
algorithms can be created to adjust the rate of false
alarms f and failures to predict n. Disaster preparedness
can be more flexible and efficient if earthquake predic-
tions were carried out in parallel with several versions of
an algorithm. This is exemplified in the following com-
parison of preparedness actions typically considered for
critical infrastructure and the general public.
Algorithms having more false alarms may be used to
develop response actions for critical facilities (e.g., dams,
nuclear power plants, emergency operations centers, etc.).
Examples from the Tohoku earthquake described herein
show how cost effective measures could have been taken
and duplicated during several alarms for critical infra-
structure. As a result, organizations that operate critical
infrastructure are more likely to tolerate a higher level of
false alarms to ensure protective measures are in place
when an actual event occurs. On the other hand, the
general public rapidly becomes insensitive to frequent
alarms, which results in a need to implement strategies
that consider the consequences of alarms having lower f,
but possibly greater n. Actions usually undertaken by the
general public, except for logistical actions, in places like
Japan where well developed long term earthquake pre-
paredness programs exist typically require a much lower f
to be cost effective as compared to critical infrastructure;
this is shown in some of the examples presented herein
and in Davis et al. [7]. This indicates a strategy applied to
the general public could include well developed long term
disaster preparedness programs, periodic enhancement of
logistical actions, and earthquake prediction alarms hav-
ing lower f as compared to alarms applied to critical
infrastructure. As a result, the error tradeoffs that inher-
ently exist in an earthquake prediction algorithm can be
calibrated to provide multiple algorithm versions for
more efficient use with critical infrastructure and the
general public. This has not yet been done but is the focus
of further study. The strategies described herein identify
how earthquake predictions can be incorporated along
with other risk reduction methodologies to enhance
disaster preparedness.
At the same time disaster managers and policy makers
have certain freedoms to choose appropriate tradeoffs on
how to utilize the alarm information for making decisions
and selecting the appropriate set of temporal and perma-
nent preparedness measures to undertake. The alarms
described herein provide examples on how such tradeoffs
and decision making could have been utilized if the
proper links between earthquake predictors and disaster
managers were made. As previously described, the con-
centration of sources changed marginally, and only by
1.5%, but the ‘‘black box’’ code for the M8 algorithm, fixed
in 1992, cut off the alarm for M8.0þ earthquakes purely
for scientific purposes. If the alarm were being used for
actual disaster preparation purposes, a reasonable person
could have made a decision to continue with the M8.0þ
alarm, at least for certain critical infrastructure and
sectors within the regions of concern. At the same time,
a concurrent alarm for predicting M8.5þ and M9.0þ
earthquakes remained in place, but was not part of the
Global testing [34] and the algorithm version, being
within the development stage, was too recent to provide
useful values of f to use for decision making purposes.
Nonetheless, under the circumstances in relation to the
M8.0þ alarm and knowing the very high values of f that
can be tolerated for certain critical infrastructure, a policy
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
maker could have chosen in this specific case to enact the
M8.5þ and M9.0þ alarms from a limited set of very
critical locations. Unfortunately, these and other related
decisions were not able to be contemplated due to the
lack of communication between earthquake predictors
and disaster managers. However, these last minute deci-
sions would not have significantly changed the final
outcome, but the outcome and resulting devastation
could have been modified, at least somewhat, if the
M8.0þ alarm were used to implement cost-effective
mitigation actions in the years, months, and days prior
to March 11, 2011. The authors hope that this case study
shows the importance of using credible earthquake pre-
dictions to help reduce future potential damage from the
world’s largest earthquakes and helps to create better
communication links between earthquake predictors, dis-
aster managers, and policy makers.
7. Conclusions
Earthquake predictions covering the area of north-
eastern Honshu identified a 70% chance of a magnitude
8.0 or greater earthquake to occur sometime between
mid-2001 and mid-2011 using the combined M8–MSc
algorithm. These predictions accurately identified the
March 11, 2011 M 9.0 Tohoku earthquake and could have
been utilized to make important preparations to reduce
damage from the actual earthquake. Damage prevention
could have included the resulting release of radiation
from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, among many
other things ranging from personal evacuations to trans-
port corridors to better financial systems management
(banking, insurance, etc.).
The primary reasons for not using the prediction for
improving preparations in advance of the Tohoku earth-
quake were postulated to include: (1) inadequate links
between emergency managers and the earthquake pre-
diction information; and (2) no practicing application of
existing methodologies to guide emergency preparations
and policy development on how to make decisions based
on information provided for an intermediate-term mid-
dle-range earthquake prediction having limited but
known accuracy. Processes were identified [39,40,6,7]
and examples provided for the Tohoku earthquake on
how reasonable, prudent, and cost effective decisions can
be made in a rapid manner to reduce damaging earth-
quake effects. Using information provided by the M8–MSc
algorithms has the capability of reducing the worldwide
impacts from the largest earthquakes.
Appendix A. M8 and MSC algorithms
A.1. M8 and MSc algorithms
Algorithm M8 provides intermediate-term middle-
range predictions having characteristic alarm durations
of about 5 years [25]. The algorithm MSc provides a
second approximation to M8, strongly reducing the alarm
area to a narrow or exact range. Predictions are made first
by M8. Then, the areas of alarm are reduced by MSc at the
cost that some earthquakes are missed in the second
29
approximation of prediction (i.e., the confidence in MSc is
slightly lower than that for M8). In the timeframe from
1985 to 2011 there have been 19 target earthquakes in
the M8 investigation regions and 14 of them have been
successfully predicted by M8. In the timeframe from 1992
to 2011 there have been 17 target earthquakes in the
combined M8–MSc investigation regions and 8 of them
have been successfully predicted by MSc and 12 of them
have been successfully predicted by M8 [34,35]. These
results indicate the success rate for M8 is at least 71% and
47% for MSc (rounded values of 70% and 50% are used in
the main body for calculations in Table 2).
Molchan and Romashkova [41] performed a detailed
study on the M8 prediction results for magnitudes up to
8.5 and 8.7. Their results are slightly different than that
identified by Kossobokov [34,35] because Molchan and
Romashkova [41] re-evaluated the entire earthquake catalog,
finding some earthquake magnitudes have been revised (e.g.,
1995 Iturup earthquake), and they reviewed prediction
successes based on varying magnitude threshold and predic-
tion space. Molchan and Romashkova [41] report success
rates ranging from 52 to 60% for the M8 algorithm, but did
not review the MSc algorithm. The primary differences
between the Molchan and Romashkova [41] and Kossobokov
[34,35] results can be understood as follows. The Molchan
and Romashkova [41] results represent an attempt to strictly
identify success of the M8 algorithm that is purely defend-
able at a scientific level but have huge margins of reserved
uncertainty (their choice of k¼ 65, the ratio of total area for
all CI’s to one CI, appears to heavily overestimate the number
of degrees of freedom due to a formal evidently incorrect
split of space into a set of non-intersecting areas). Molchan
and Romashkova [41] also eliminate some of the earthquakes
reported as successful predictions by Kossobokov [34,35] and
add some earthquakes that fall inside the magnitude–spatial
domain of global testing due to regional bias in magnitude
determination (e.g., for earthquakes from New Ireland and
New Britain regions, P.N.G., and the 2008 Wenchuan, China
earthquake). Note that sizing earthquakes remains a very
difficult and rather uncertain problem of contemporary
seismology. Therefore, the success rates as reported by
Kossobokov [34,35] and Molchan and Romashkova [41] are
both of significant importance to disaster managers because
earthquakes were identified to meet the prediction criteria or
within a very close margin that resulted in impacts that may
have been mitigatable with knowledge of the prediction.
Since Molchan and Romashkova [40] do not identify results
for MSc, the results reported by Kossobokov [34,35] are used
for analysis in this paper. However, since the Molchan and
Romashkova [41] most conservative minimum reported
success rate for M8 is about the same as the one for M8–
MSc given by Kossobokov in [34,35] is reflected in Table 2 in
the right hand column.
The M8 and MSc algorithms are summarized below.
Fig. 1 shows the case study prediction from the combined
algorithms encompassing the area where the March 11,
2011 M 9.0 Tohoku Japan occurred.
A.2. Algorithm M8
This algorithm was designed by retrospective analysis
of seismicity preceding the greatest (MZ8.0) earthquakes
30 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
worldwide, hence its name [26,27,31]. In 1992 an experi-
ment was launched aimed at real-time earthquake pre-
diction on a global scale using the M8 algorithm [18]. The
area targeted for prediction in M8.0þ magnitude range
(i.e., from magnitude 8.0 to 8.8) covers 80% of the major
seismic belts—the territory for which the earthquake
catalog is sufficiently complete to apply the algorithm.
This territory is scanned by overlapping circles with
diameter of 121 1333 km (see Fig. 1). Predictions are
made separately for each circle.
The algorithm for issuing M8 alarms is illustrated in
Fig. 1, showing the case history of several predictions
stretching from Kamchatka to the Marianas. Within each
CI several characteristics of seismicity are monitored. The
number of earthquakes (seismic flux rate) and its devia-
tion from long-term trend (differential of rate, i.e. accel-
eration) are complemented with the linear concentration
of sources to depict the expanded phase space of seismic
activity averaged over a large time window (six years);
each measure is computed in two magnitude intervals to
make description of seismicity more robust giving six
functions. The fourth characteristic depicting earthquake
clustering over one year provides a total of seven func-
tions used for scoring the M8 algorithm. An alarm, a TIP of
an earthquake occurring, is issued for five years when
clustering and at least five other characteristics (a total of
6 out of 7 characteristics) become ‘‘very large’’ at approxi-
mately the same time. The algorithm is re-evaluated
every 6 months and updates to the alarm are made as
necessary. Updates may include calling the alarm off in
any or all circles of investigation, or calling new alarms for
other circles of investigation. From a non-technical per-
spective these updates look like adjustments to the
alarm regional space and timeframes. A more detailed
and technical description of the M8 algorithm can be
found at the web site http://www.mitp.ru/en/m8pred.
html and Keilis-Borok and Kossobokov [26,28,29].
A.3. Algorithm MSc
Algorithm MSc or ‘‘The Mendocino Scenario’’ [37] was
designed by the retroactive analysis of the regional
seismic catalog prior to the Eureka earthquake (1980,
M¼7.2) near Cape Mendocino in California, hence its
name. MSc is applied whenever the seismicity is suffi-
ciently high to allow the algorithm to be used. It is aimed
at the reduction of the territory where a strong earth-
quake is already predicted by some other algorithm.
Seismic activity in the territory of the original alarm is
analyzed in more details, in the overlapping small cells
and smaller magnitude range. The alarm is confined to the
area where seismicity is high but irregular, interrupted by
short intervals of quiescence [33]. Additional technical
details describing applications of the MSc algorithm are
found at the web site http://www.mitp.ru/en/mcspred.
html and Kossobokov et al. [37]
The MSc algorithm prediction is localized to the spatial
projection of all recent ‘‘sufficiently large’’ clusters of
square cells being in a state of ‘‘anomalous quiescence’’.
‘‘Anomalous quiescence’’ suggests a locally high level of
seismic activity during formation of a TIP and after its
declaration. A ‘‘sufficiently large’’ size of clusters suggests
large scale correlations in the recent times [33].
Fig. 1 illustrates the MSc algorithm application from
1985 to 2011 in an area stretching from Kamchatka to the
Marianas.
Appendix B. Past studies recognizing rare events
Pattern recognition methods were employed to iden-
tify earthquake prone areas for the first time in the 1970s
[12,13], and were later used to define areas prone to great
earthquakes having MZ8.2 [17]. As shown in Fig. B1,
major seismic belts were divided into D and N segments
where, respectively, earthquakes with MZ8.2 are possi-
ble (even yet unknown) and not expected to nucleate. The
division is based on pattern recognition of rare events,
which is not to be mixed with statistical pattern recogni-
tion. This methodology was developed by the School of I.
Gelfand and is successful in a multitude of applications,
among them is predicting earthquake prone structures in
different regions and magnitude ranges [15].
Fig. B1 identifies the location for the March 11, 2011 M
9.0 Tohoku Japan earthquake. As seen in Fig. B1, this
earthquake did occur on the D segment as shown by the
arrow. This example provides another confirmation point
on the validity of pattern recognition methods in assess-
ment of seismic hazard.
Paleo-tsunami studies reported in the past decade
identified the potential of great and unusual earthquakes
to strike Japan off the north east coast of Honshu in the
Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate Prefectures. Inter-plate
earthquakes of M 8.1–8.3 were considered highly prob-
able [38,51] and magnitudes up to 9 were identified as
possible [4]. Historic tsunami waves were estimated to be
on the order of 8 m high [38] for an M 8.3 earthquake.
Great earthquakes of M 8.0–8.5 have been recognized
with probabilities of 50–90% of occurring in 30 years in
Fig. B1. Earthquake prone segments of major seismic belts. D points are
prone to nucleate earthquakes of M Z 8.2, N points are where strong
earthquakes (MZ 8.2) are considered not possible. The arrow points to
the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake showing it is located at a D
point. Modified from Gvishiani et al. [17].
 C. Davis et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 1 (2012) 17–32
southeast Honshu along the Nankai Trough shown in
Fig. 2 [52,24].
The previously mentioned studies used in combination
with the July 2001 earthquake prediction described
herein indicates that the initial prediction, and all semi-
annual updates through January 2011, identified the
potential for earthquakes greater than M 8.2 to occur. In
the prediction region north of the Sagami Trough (see
Fig. 2) M 8.2 is the maximum magnitude considered to
occur, and their probabilities of occurrence are very low
[52,24]. Unfortunately, prior to the Tohoku earthquake
the seismic hazards used for implementing protective
measures in northeast Honshu were primarily based on
magnitudes ranging from 7.4 to 7.7, and associated
tsunami wave heights of 4–5 m [3].
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