Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No.

26795 July 31, 1970

J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:
Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay
for hospitalization and stopped studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a
month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge
sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Ratio:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceivedchild shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb).
Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that
for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation
for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts
Hence, the girl has a cause of action

Francisco Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. L-14628
Sept. 30, 1960

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High
School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she,
used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. She gave up teaching and opt to become a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu City where the relationship of him and petitioner and
that they have sexual relations. The petitioner promised to marry Cagigas and that
they have borne a child Chris Hermosisima. Subsequently on July 24, 1954, Francisco
married Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court
of Appeals based its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says
in part that “Moral damages may be recovered from… (3) Seduction, xxx…” However, it
must be noted that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil Code
provision is the same “Seduction” being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal
seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older
than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall than
Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad
herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind “by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.”

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had
divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in
equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where
it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the
shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the
project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd
marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law
rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and
participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City,
in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest
bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.

As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon,
respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on
the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-
judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.

Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City
on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption
period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of
Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to
dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC.
Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the
complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed
ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative
of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a

certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:

Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a
civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil
in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently
of each other.

A prejudicial question is “one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former
an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case”.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as

well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and

laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided
to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as:
making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other
apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of
wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to
attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before
the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an
answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded
exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also
unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to
marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s
unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil
Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to
receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this
case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer,
acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a
US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in
the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner
was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no

standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and
ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja
on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting
marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that
Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for
almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the
latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided
in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the
written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of
the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

Aranes vs. Judge Occiano

AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia
on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of
marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on
January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also
appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date
considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the
wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will
provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple
that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly

issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD:

The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to
the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal

Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

FACTS
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They
had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage
with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During
that time,
Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit
stating that they were both married however due to incessant quarrels, they both
left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived
together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage.
Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez.

ISSUE
WON David Manzano’s marriage with Payao is valid

HELD:
NO. Sanchez fined P20,000.00

RATIO:

1. FC Art. 34: legal ratification of marital cohabitation exempts a couple from

obtaining a marriage license but the ff requisites must be present: lived together
as husband & wife for at least five years, no legal impediment to marry each other,
fact of absence of legal impediment must be present at time of marriage , affidavit
stating that they’ve been living together for at least 5 years & without legal
impediments , solemnizing officer should execute sworn statement that he
ascertained qualifications of contracting parties.

2. None of requisites were present. They declared that they were separated but
judge still solemnized marriage. Mere separation and free & voluntary cohabitation
with another person do not dissolve the marriage tie. Cohabitation for at least
five years exempts them from the marriage license but it does not free them of
their legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

3. Marriage was void & bigamous. Judge displayed gross ignorance of the law.

[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON
CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the
petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the
parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that
the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently,

considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff
and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed,
arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the
parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to
Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3)
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.

Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the
case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the

parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and
129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code,
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes vs
Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).

Terre vs. Terre

211 SCRA 6

FACTS:

Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin.
Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab
initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage.
They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothy’s status. After
getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted
another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with
abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

HELD:

Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her
first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any
declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage
with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON
CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:

The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error
committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner
avers that the court a quohas failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared
void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of
the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court,[1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes
is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela
Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who
are in the custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles50, 51 and 52 of the same code,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with
their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides
that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts
of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant
will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in
equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply."[3] (Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property
regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application
since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30
October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of
the Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
stay."[5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;[6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38"[7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."[8]
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in
co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation[9]
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed.[11]
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and
129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50
of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43,[13]
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to
void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to
do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is
not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41[15]
and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law
has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the
latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article
147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as
it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy
B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living
with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent
successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and
of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be
found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April
1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the
complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent
Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his
answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside
and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had
contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was
married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he
confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their
conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings
with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason
Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to
complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina
Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito
A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as
evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent.
Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the
PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of
extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened
to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already
been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means
to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and
instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the
Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both
parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex
parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled
and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to
the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so.
Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set
still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be
deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The
Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right
to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties
were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on
8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as
follows: she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high
school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then
married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was
aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started
courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant
and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-
16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p.
11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent]
explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their
marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote
"single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there
was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married
before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977
(Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on
June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married
state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported
respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents
(ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she
found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C,
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with
the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before
Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D;
tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent
and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a
prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26);
additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the
Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered closed
for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated
from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent
Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares.
There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan
Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no
judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed
in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and
void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious
defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as
to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the
second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to
each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan
Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if
we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by
other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage
to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and
free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course
and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without
support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a
hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his
actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the
Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his
gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to
take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said
through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent
claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well
of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic
social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil
Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he
had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling
complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law
school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient
basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to
the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT
his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of
this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

Sin vs Sin
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January
1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed
Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings,
nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of
the participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The
records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of
the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

De Ocampo vs Florenciano
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several
children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on
several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff
discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas.
In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they
had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing
a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a
petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of

judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in

the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the
confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is
prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s
statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively
on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of
counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months
prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of
his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her
marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it
is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore
would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their
marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to
no avails. Medical examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were
capaple of sexual conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the medical
examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of nullity and the Trial Court
declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court
citing that it was she and not he that had the problem regarding sexual intimacy.
Issue:
Whether or not non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological
incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses
to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this
is the essential marital obligation, “the procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.

WEIGEL VS SEMPIO-DIY, G.R. NO. L-53703

Posted by kaye lee on 7:07 PM
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Weigel vs Sempio-Diy

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia
Oliva Weigel on the ground that the latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A.
Maxion.

Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because she and Eduardo were
forced to enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that Eduardo was married
to someone else.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:

Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated
with force because it will not be void but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code).
Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need
of introducing evidence on Lilia's prior marriage for then such marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration before she can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.

Jimenez vs. Canizares

L-12790, August 31, 1960

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds
that Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and
such was already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to
answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there was
no collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in
the case. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to
determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again
refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The
marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed
upon the sole testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or
aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether
Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of
the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise
or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy
and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties
that have bound them together as husband and wife.

People vs. Aragon

100 Phil 1033

FACTS:

Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter
subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu
while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between
Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter
worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by
physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While
she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu
found him guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

HELD:

The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with
Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third
marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The
lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place between them. They later
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take effect
on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was
no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead
they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the
instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt
to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had
given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his
ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him.
He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of
Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death
of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred
in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had
already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that
she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish
that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.
They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home.
Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home.
It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation
or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in
the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support
the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law
is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she
can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside
the conjugal home.
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954,
concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955
or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial,
Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was

affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not

constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat.
It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES,
respondents.
In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church
wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of
marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of
the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in
1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration
and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous
marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid
marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court
however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was
affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can
be invoked in the case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.” This means that before one can enter into
a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than
remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon
by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the
provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the
FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a
declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is
valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ’87) cannot be applied
retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia
under the CC which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas
Corpus)
Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody
of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to
see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but
denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention
of the subject of the petition.

Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.

Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation
rights.

Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,
or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more
of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.

A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the
subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority
when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.