Corollary Issues

A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

Issue: Whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution

Opinion of J. Kapunan:

Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands.

 Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral
lands and ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56”.

 By the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all
Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral
domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the
proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards
against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether
or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all
proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the
Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of
the Philippines.

Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed
exclusively of members of indigenous peoples, and that the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples,
including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who
is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral
domains.

 The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples
does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so
incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. The
indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-
indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the
concept of justice.

Petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied
first in disputes involving property, succession and land, and that such laws
shall likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples.
 The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples
does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so
incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s
possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do
 with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as
capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly,
the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.

The objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in

disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are
indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the
constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation
passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea
in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as
long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, and it is not
contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local Government
Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the
resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits
the operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily
used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous
peoples.