ONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

- versus -
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.

FACTS:

Hortillano, employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation, member of respondent

(Union) filed on January 9, 2006 a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave, and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union (Article X, Section 2 and 4 of the CBA). Claims were due to the death
of Hortillano’s unborn child with wife, Marife Hortillano, having a premature delivery on Jan 5, 2006, while
on her 38th week of pregnancy. The Certificate of Fetal Death indicated that the female fetus died during
labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Continental Steel granted paternity
leave but denied claims for bereavement and other death benefits. Union and Continental Steel mutually
agreed for voluntary arbitration under Atty. Montao.

Union contends:
1. CBA did not specifically state that dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality
2. Case of Steve Dugan of Mayer Steel who was granted said benefits for unborn child
3. Article 1702 of the Civil Code - all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.

Continental Steel contends:

1. 2 elements for entitlement to benefits: death and status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed.
2. Only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41, 42 of Civil Code.

Atty Montao issued a resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and
death benefits. (P4,939.00 for bereavement pay and P11,550.00 for death benefits, total of P16,489.00)

Continental Steel filed Petition for Review on Certiorari, CA affirmed Atty. Montao’s Resolution.

Continental Steel files this Petition again, arguing CBA is clear and unambiguous, literal and legal
meaning of death should be applied.

ISSUE:
WON Continental Steel should grant bereavement leave and other benefits consisting of death and
accident insurance to Hortillano for the death of his unborn child according to the provisions of CBA

RULING: Yes. Court affirms the decision and resolution of the CA and Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montao.

RATIO:

Court not persuaded yet again of Continental Steel’s arguments on these grounds:
 1. Issue of civil personality not relevant. Articles 40, 41, 42 of Civil Code on natural persons must be
applied in relation to Article 37 of same code (Juridical capacity - capacity to do acts with legal
effect). Rights of bereavement leave and other death benefits pertains to parents.
2. Sections 40, 41, 42 does not provide definition of death. It does not state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die.
3. Death defined as cessation of life. Life not synonymous with civil personality. The Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
4. Unborn child can be considered a dependent under CBA. Also legitimate according to Article 164
of Family Code.
5. CBA provisions should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
a. Labor Code - in case of doubt, interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such
should be interpreted in favor or labor.
b. Constitution - utmost protection and justice to labor

In retrospect, Atty. Montao’s decision also applies on these grounds:

1. Article X, Section 2 of the CBA, 3 indispensable elements for bereavement leave:
a. Death
b. Death must be of employees dependent
c. Dependent must be legitimate
2. Article XVIII, Section 4 paragraph (4.3) of CBA, 4 indispensable elements for death and accident
insurance:
. Death
a. Death must be of employees dependent
b. Dependent must be legitimate
c. Proper legal document to be presented
 All said requirements were present.

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of capital should be counterbalanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker. Any doubt concerning rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to
the social justice theory.
 Art. 42 – Death/Extinguishment of personality.

Tomas Eugenio, petitioner-appellant, May 17, 1990

vs. Hon. Alejandro M. Velez, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City, Crisanta Vargas et. al., respondents-appellees

FACTS:

Petitioner Eugenio claims that he has rightful custody of the dead body and right to burial of one Vitaliana
Vargas. Eugenio asserts that the deceased Vargas was his common-law wife, despite the former being
legally married to another woman and the latter was single at the time of her death. The brothers and sisters
of the deceased, herein respondents, were uninformed of Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988 and filed a
petition of writ of habeas corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. The
respondent court issued the writ of habeas corpus on September 28, 1988. Petitioner averred that the writ
of habeas corpus has no effect on corpses, and that he had already obtained a burial permit. However, the
RTC awarded the burial rights to the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondents and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

RATIO:

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines(Eugenio v. Velez).

In the instant case, Petitioner invokes par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code, which states that: “The claim for
support, when a proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse”. Petitioner’s argument is devoid of merit, given that he was not the lawfully-wedded
spouse to the deceased. Therefore, by virtue of Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code:

“Persons charged with duty of burial – if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left
any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.” The surviving brothers
and sisters have the rightful custody of the body and are entitled with the deceased’s burial rights.
 G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee

FACTS:
Jose V. Ramirez during his lifetime was co-owner of a Sta Cruz manila house together with Marie Garnier
Vda. de Ramirez, Jose E. Ramirez, Rita de Ramirez, and Jose Ma. Ramirez. Special Proceeding No.
15026 was instituted to settle his estate upon his death, bequeathing his estate, including the undivided
share in the said property, to his grandchildren and 1/3 to Ms. Angela Butte.

In December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V.
Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for the sum of
P500,000.00. On the same day, Manuel Uy & Sons sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as
judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the sale, sending the same
letter as well as the bank’s, to Mrs. Butte.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering
to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused,
plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal
redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of
the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the
property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.

A trial was held, after which the court dismissed Mrs. Butte’s complaint on the grounds that she has no
right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory
30-day period for legal redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for
damages was likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently established.

ISSUE:
WON Butte has the right of legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez
despite the presence of a judicial administrator with whom the estate was sold

HELD: Yes. Pursuant to several provisions in the Civil Code specifically Articles 1620, 1623, 776, 777,
and 947, Butte can exercise the right of legal redemption despite the presence of a judicial administrator.

RATIO: The existence of a judicial administrator, even as under the Rules of Court they have the right to
the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the
decedent's debts and the expenses of administration under sec. 3, Rule 85, and may bring or defend
actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased under sec. 2, Rule 88, they
do not include the right of legal redemption of the estate because the right of legal redemption only came
into existence after the sale of the share to Uy & Sons Inc which was eight years after the death of Jose
Ramirez.

The redemption right vested in the heirs was not derived from Jose Ramirez since none of them had yet
sold their share to a third-party, providing them nothing to redeem, hence no right of redemption. Under
Art 42 of the Civil Code, death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to
acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind. This supports the fact that Ramirez, upon his death,
could not transmit this right as he had no such right in the first place, much less could he acquire such
right eight years after his death when the sale to Uy & Sons was made.
LAWS/PROVISIONS:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other-
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
(657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the
death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and
by will.In December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose
V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for the sum of
P500,000.00. On the same day, Manuel Uy & Sons sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as
judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the sale, sending the same
letter as well as the bank’s, to Mrs. Butte.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering
to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused,
plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal
redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of
the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the
property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.

A trial was held, after which the court dismissed Mrs. Butte’s complaint on the grounds that she has no
right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory
30-day period for legal redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for
damages was likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently established.

ISSUE:
WON Butte has the right of legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez
despite the presence of a judicial administrator with whom the estate was sold

HELD: Yes. Pursuant to several provisions in the Civil Code specifically Articles 1620, 1623, 776, 777,
and 947, Butte can exercise the right of legal redemption despite the presence of a judicial administrator.

RATIO: The existence of a judicial administrator, even as under the Rules of Court they have the right to
the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the
decedent's debts and the expenses of administration under sec. 3, Rule 85, and may bring or defend
actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased under sec. 2, Rule 88, they
do not include the right of legal redemption of the estate because the right of legal redemption only came
into existence after the sale of the share to Uy & Sons Inc which was eight years after the death of Jose
Ramirez.

The redemption right vested in the heirs was not derived from Jose Ramirez since none of them had yet
sold their share to a third-party, providing them nothing to redeem, hence no right of redemption. Under
Art 42 of the Civil Code, death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to
acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind. This supports the fact that Ramirez, upon his death,
could not transmit this right as he had no such right in the first place, much less could he acquire such
right eight years after his death when the sale to Uy & Sons was made.

LAWS/PROVISIONS:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other-
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
(657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the
death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and
by will.
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME,
JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA,
ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991

Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.

Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme
is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch
IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney
driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven
by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered
varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which
was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La
Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver
of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of
the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
The trial court rendered its decision ordering the defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
(present petitioner) and Alfredo Bislig to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs (present respondent) the sums
of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano
Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said
defendants.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

RULING:
YES. The judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision held the municipality liable for the
quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. Therefore, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of
the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of
private respondents.

APPLICATION/ANALYSIS:
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Consent is implied when the
government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party,
and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter
provided that they can sue and be sued. However, liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test
of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant
the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. The court arrived at the conclusion that
that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and
deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

LAWS/PROVISIONS:

Article XVIII Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
Rule 131: Burden of Proofs and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS (in the syllabus):
See Article 44-47 of the Civil Code (Petitioner is a municipal corporation; therefore, the petitioner is
considered a juridical person governed by laws)
See Sec. 2 and 4 of the Corporation Code. (Petitioner is governed by its charter that created it)
 Corazon Catalan et al. vs. Jose Basa, and Heirs of the late Mercedes Catalan
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
Facts:
1.) On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service as he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia.
2.) On June 16, 1951, Feliciano executed an absolute deed of donation and donated to his sister
Mercedes Catalan, a parcel of land in Pangasinan.
3.) On December 22, 1953, Feliciano was found incompetent by the trial court and appointed People
Bank and Trust Company (BPI) as his guardian.
4.) On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and his wife, Corazon, donated parcel of his property to their son
Eulogio Catalan. On June 24, 1983, Mercedes sold the said property to her children, herein petitioners.
5.) On April 1, 1997, BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership against herein respondents, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was
void ab initio, hence, the Deed of Sale be likewise nullified.
6.) Both the Trial Court and CA found the evidence insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was sane and competent at the time of the deed of donation.

Issue: WON the Deed of Donation was void ab initio.

Held: No. The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. Decision of CA affirmed.

Ratio:
Well-settled is the principle that a person executing a deed of donation is presumed sane and competent
and the burden of proof to state otherwise rests upon the person who alleges it. In the case at bar, the
heirs of Feliciano failed to present sufficient proof and therefore, capacity was presumed. Moreover, a
person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence, wherein fact, Feliciano
was even able to enter a contract of marriage. Given the prevailing circumstances, that due to insufficient
proof of incompetency, lack of evidence of fraud by respondents, and the substantial evidence of a
marriage contract showing Feliciano was of sound mind, the deed of donation was valid.
Civil Code, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving contest to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.
 G.R. No. L-11872 | December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Plaintiff:
1. Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu,
but since Luis died, complaint was directed to Jose Espiritu.
2. Plaintiffs, along with sisters Concepcion and Paz, are all children and heirs of Margarita Espiritu,
deceased sister of Luis Espiritu.
3. 1897- Margarita Espiritu left her property, a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of
Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, which plaintiffs and sisters share a portion of through their
father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu.
4. 1910 – Luis Espiritu allegedly by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the
plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum
of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz,
notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795. They also claim
that the land can produce P450 per annum worth of rice, which Luis received from 1901 until his death.
5. Counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the
sale they made to Luis Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their
equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

Defendant:
1. On May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due
authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000
a portion of said land.
2. Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, sold under pacto de retro (Deed of sale with
right of repurchase) to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land to meet
the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the
successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600.
3. On May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria
del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, ratified said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to
their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the
sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu.
4. Defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby
losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu.

→ Plaintiffs deny all allegations, and said that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, the plaintiffs
were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of
said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-
complaint.
→ Records reveal that on May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for
the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation. Wenceslao Mercado
y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the
interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name
and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein
set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife,
then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894. However, even prior to said date, on May 14th of the same year,
1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, the land that
had belonged to his deceased wife and which now forms a part of the land in question — a transaction
which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs."
→ Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, died. Plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with
their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required
legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910,
in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600
and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu,
for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument
and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan.
→ When the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been,
respectively, 19 and 18 years of age according to a witness of the parochial church of Apalit
→ Evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu
employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document
Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910.

ISSUE:
WON the plaintiffs, who were allegedly minors at the execution of the deed of sale, but attested that they
are of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the
instrument executed by them so they may obtain the restitution of the land sold
RULING:
No. The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was
conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of
6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of
the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under
security of the pledged property.

RATIO:
It cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial
instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as
a result of the execution of said document.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale
to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative
to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the date of May
17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the
age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa
and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal
certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was
actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910,
inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does
not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.

Moreover, the notarial document is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which
gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in
interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)

CONCURRING OPINION:
Carson, J.

In the prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of infancy,
must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's representations as to his
majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to believe, and did in
fact believe the minor capable of contracting.

Estoppel to disaffirm — (I) In General. — The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general rule applicable to
infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have created an estoppel against him to
disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the acts or admissions of other persons.
(II) False representations as to age. — According to some authorities the fact that an infant at the time of
entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he had attained the age of
majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the infant from disaffirming the same or setting up
the defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also authority for the view
that such false representations will create an estoppel against the infant, and under the statutes of some states
no contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor's representations as to his majority, the other
party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting. Where the infant has made no
representations whatever as to his age, the mere fact that the person with whom he dealt believed him to be
of age, even though his belief was warranted by the infant's appearance and the surrounding circumstances,
and the infant knew of such belief, will not render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm.

LAWS / PROVISIONS:
Law 6, tit. 19, Partida 6. is, in part, as follows:
If he who is minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age,
and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at
law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should no (3) afterwards be released from
liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that
the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers.
→ Similar to the doctrine of estoppel: the principle that precludes a person from asserting something
contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that person or by a previous pertinent judicial
determination (applied in many common law courts – US)

Civil Code
Art. 1218. Payment by a solidary debtor shall not entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors if such
payment is made after the obligation has prescribed or become illegal.
 SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
GR No. 173822, 13 October 2010

FACTS
On April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended
the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the
house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a
barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desder’s house, she heard "thundering steps"
as if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at
the prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, that’s
enough!; that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the
clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously
adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to
the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and
Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.

The petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued
by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon. Dr. Abrantes confirmed
that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and
abdomen.

The Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos,
Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the cost.

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction. After the CA denied their motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners now appeal. The Court again affirms their conviction, but reduced the
penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at
the time of the commission of the crime. His immediate release from prison is ordered because he already
served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were
entitled in order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

ISSUES
1. W/N Salvador Monreal is criminally liable for murder due to his age when he committed the crime.

RULING
1. Yes, but since he is a minor when he committed the crime, his sentence shall be lowered to the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law.

RATIO:
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC. But
reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18
years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of
the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion
temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal
was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of
prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum period.

LAWS/PROVISIONS

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006):

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be
resolved in his/her favor.

Article 68, Revised Penal Code:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of
Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

(2) Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Republic Act No. 9344

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to
appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They
shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
 Hernandez v. Santos, GR No. 169217, 7 August 2009

Cecilio C. Hernandez, et al. vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos

G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009

Facts:

Felix’ first wife gave birth to Lulu Hernandez, but the former died to due to complications. Lulu
was then left under the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. Being the sole heir of
Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties estimated at P50M in 1997. Lulu went on to live
with her father and step-sisters. Due to her “violent personality”, Lulu stopped schooling and
wasn’t able to finish her elementary education. Upon reaching the age of majority, Felix
administered Lulu’s properties and upon his death, petitioners herein took over the task.

From 1968 to 1993, petitioners took various “projects” involving Lulu’s properties, including: 1.)
Felix allegedly purchasing one of her properties to develop Marilou Subdivision; 2.) Ma. Victoria
selling an 11-hectare land to Manila Electric Company; and 3.) Cecilio leasing a 45-hectare
property in Montalban, Rizal.

After learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate, Lulu sought assistance to her
maternal cousin, respondent herein. On October 2, 1998, Respondent filed a petition for
guardianship before the RTC, alleging that Lulu was incapable of taking herself and managing
her estate because she was of weak mind. In September 2001, the RTC approved the
guardianship. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Meanwhile, Lulu moved to an apartment in
Marikina, and sometime in November 2003, she was abducted. Upon investigation, it was
discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Subsequently,
respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus. CA granted the petition. Petitioners claim that
under Art. 194 to 196 of the Family Code, they have the rightful custody. On the other hand,
respondent argues that Lulu had been maltreated and that on a medical report dated November
21, 2005, Lulu had unspecified retardation with psychosis.

Issue: Won the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian
over her person and property.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the appointment of respondent as judicial guardian. Hence,
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is proper. Furthermore, petitioners are ordered to render
an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated
for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (Lulu), within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed
against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San
Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

Ratio:

par. 5, Art. 195 Family Code

“The following are obliged to support each other: 5.) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether
of full or half-blood”.
The SC adopted the findings of the RTC, wherein the respondent presented sufficient evidence
to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in
taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard
to the respondent’s appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not
trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was
a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.

Sec. 50, Rule 103 Rules of Court

“an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted”.

Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to
thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and
her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.

Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental
sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC.

Sec. 2, Rule 92 Rules of Court

Under this rule, the word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read
and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and person s
not being of unsound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind.
 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

DOCTRINE:
If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1 year period is
irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a person
reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement must be satisfied. (Bernas book)

FACTS:
1.) Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which was her father’s hometown, in 1938
when she was 8 years old. She pursued her studies (GS,HS, College) in the aforementioned city and
subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she went to Manila to work in the House of
Representatives. Two years after,she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
in Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. In 1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they
lived in San Juan, Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived in the Malacanang
Palace when her husband became the President.This time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila. After their exile in Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and indicated in herCoC that she was a
resident and register voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
2.) Marcos filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
3.) The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her disqualification alleging that she did not meet the
1 year constitutional requirement for residency.
4.) Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked for the number of years of
residency, that she had been a resident for 7 months.
5.) Marcos filed an amended CoC changing “7 months” to “sincechildhood”, claiming that it was an honest
misinterpretation that she
thought she was being asked for her actual and physical presence in Tolosa, and not her domicile.
6.) The COMELEC found the petition for her disqualification meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC.
For them, it was clear that Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
In election cases, the term residence has always been considered synonymous with domicile. This is the
intention to reside in the place coupled with the personal presence.
When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to go back to Tacloban. Thus, her animus
revertendi(intention to return) points to Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there must be conduct indicative of such intention.
7.) The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but issued are solution allowing for her
proclamation should she obtain the highest number of votes. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and directed the suspension of her proclamation.
8.) Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said elections and prayed for her
proclamation. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year.

RULING + RATIO:
The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application of ‘Domicile’ and ‘Residence’ in
election law.
-
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and domicile lies in the fact that residence is the
PHYSICAL presence of a person in a given area and domicile is where a person intends to remain or his
permanent residence. A person can only have a single domicile.
-
It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that residence for election
purposes is synonymous with domicile. It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences
in her lifetime. The Courts reiterate that an individual does not lose his domicile even if she has
maintained different residences for different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention of
abandoning her domicile of origin.The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the ff reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
Civil Code kasi sa Art 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the family.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres.Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

DISPOSITION: COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.