Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26
October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the Philippines v.
Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with
modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isip’s conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case
No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its
Amended Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch
XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond
(men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once
in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with
grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal
use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A.
Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale
thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo
A. Jose in the abovestated amount of ₱200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3

Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven
counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion
of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is
insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount of
₱562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from
Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank for
payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said
check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount of ₱562,000.00,
Philippine Currency.4

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the
offense was committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent
data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of No. of Check Amount of

Commission Check
147-84 518644
17 March 1984 ₱50,000.00
148-84 518645
30 March 1984 ₱50,000.00
5
149-84 030086
12 March 1984 ₱150,000.00
155-84 518674
25 March 1984 ₱95,000.00
156-84 518646
29 March 1984 ₱90,000.00
157-84 518669
1 April 1984 ₱25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5)
counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-
84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84
was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to
wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings valued at ₱120,000.00, with the
obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but
the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means of false
pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert them to their own personal use and benefit and paid the same with
Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984,
respectively, in the amount of ₱90,000 and ₱25,000, respectively, which upon
presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in
the abovestated amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of
receipt and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the
checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly
worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case Value of Date of Agreed Check Amount

No. Jewelry Receipt Date of No./Date
Return ₱150,000
257-84 ₱150,000 03-07- 030086/03-
84 03-30-84 12-84 ₱95,000
260-84 ₱95,000
03-20- 03-27-84 518647/03- ₱562,000
261-84 ₱562,000 84 25-84
03-27-84 ₱50,000
378-84 ₱200,000 03-20- 518672/03-
84 - 27-84 ₱50,000

02-03- 518644/03-
84 17-84

518645/03-
30-84

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty.
There being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases
followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of
Appeals in the parties’ respective briefs, are the following:

i) Prosecution Version. –

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced
to complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by
complainant’s father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and
the Isips were then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed
jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded
to (p. 14, ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-
18, tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City,

appellant spouses received from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at
₱200,000.00 with the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on
commission basis for ₱200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same,
they have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn,
October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof.
Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30,
1984, respectively, for ₱50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The
receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as
a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa
while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17
and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s
residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker
Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The
condition was that the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before
March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check
dated March 12, 1984 for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment
(p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses
and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s
residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a men’s ring (7 carats) worth
₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the
ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15,
1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984.
April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid).
The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against
Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from
complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds
valued at ₱120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be
returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-
52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2)
personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984 for
₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped
ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses
Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22
against Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one
(1) baguette necklace worth ₱95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon,
Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips
defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated
March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for
Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP
22 against Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant
informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos
Sur saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted
pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly
signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of
₱562,000.00.

Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’,
Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in
the amount of ₱562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp.
8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the
couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP
22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6,
1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20,
ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who
had his residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic)
3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at
506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of
Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand,
appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta
hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta.
Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business undertakings in
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9;
Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business;
while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in
PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr.,
Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City,
appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-strapped
players which she repledged as security for financing she obtained from one
Nemesio Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr.,
Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he
referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the
Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14;
Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza
Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her
husband who participated only as a witness, started having transactions with
complainant who, on different dates in February, March and April, 1984,
extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry
which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to
complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had
returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of
payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and
real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant
who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose,
and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the
result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant have already been
paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-
8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were initially
dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In
fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against
appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or
paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not
bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some
default in payment and complainant suspected that she would not be able to
redeem the checks or pay for the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain documents to avoid any misunderstanding, with threat
of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-
20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with complainant,
appellant Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him in
one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later,
appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in
Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial
Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra.
Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in
Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of
prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim.
Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱150,000.00; Crim. Case No.
260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose
the amount of ₱562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby
found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of,
from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of ₱200,000.00 value of the
jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these
cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose’s ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of
absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the
defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the transactions
occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of
Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite
City further refuted the defense’s claim that the transactions happened in
Manila. The trial court likewise found the defense’s contention, that the
obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of
personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human nature
to demand payment when the same had already been made and the alleged
set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently
dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of the
complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the
pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-
84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the
checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-
84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to
have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said
cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a
7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning

the following as errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE

CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE
GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES

BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE
ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND

MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY
IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND
THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT
BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died
thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of

the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City
(Branch XVII) –

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
sentence imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he was ordered to
pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged; and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is

REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A.
Jose, jointly and severally, the sums of ₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00,
₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the amounts involved
in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.10

The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was
properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or
that the transactions transpired at complainant’s ancestral home in Cavite City,
and that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial
jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the
ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the
dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry
Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was
no payment to speak of. It also found the defense’s claim of redemption/dacion
en pago – that real and personal properties were conveyed to complainant who
executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases
– to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation
does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as
long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In these
five cases, it ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in
said cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and
petitioner,11 but held them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry
involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s ruling of conviction. It found petitioner’s claims
that he did not receive the jewelry worth ₱200,000.00 mentioned in the
information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those
documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal
prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with
complainant, to be not persuasive.

On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his

deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar
as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him
civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-
84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of
Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended
Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to

par. 3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:

"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is
REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED
of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-
84. He raises the following issues:

First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER

RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN
CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID

OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and
conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that
any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the parties is
immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that
it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral
house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the
transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of
Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in
Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is
likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and
received by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines
venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further
argues that it does not follow that because complainant may have been on
leave from the Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered
into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent
proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and
that the transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84
covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his
alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is

jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. 15 It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced
that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant
had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-
84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved
leave of absence17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that
venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is
his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old
but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.18

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent

evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not
persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance
will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure
goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at
bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone,
not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times
they received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the
checks issued by petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions with complainant
were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot
lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite
City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment

deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. 19 It
is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient
evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that
the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by
petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt
evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely
to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that there is no
showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is
no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was
ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported
by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt21 executed by
petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in question.
Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and merely executed said
receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant
consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and

obligation of what he executed and signed. The following disputable
presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been fair and
regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed 22
Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without first informing
himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood
fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It
devolves upon him then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find
that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the
receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent
evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that
petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from
complainant in Cavite City.

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied
by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the
transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that
any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively
extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties delivered/conveyed
to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance
remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant
executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the
cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of
novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the
receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely
to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied
the application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial
claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to
preserve their good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection
is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in

Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real
properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all,
not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife.
This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed
to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and
his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in
settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he
said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently
dismissed when they delivered properties as payment.27 It follows then that the
obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the
criminal cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his
(alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court of
Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of
novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites have
to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all
parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the
Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks
issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry
involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner
nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that could have
extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear
that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are:
(1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property;
(3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or
property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from
complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00, for
the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner
misappropriated or converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied
receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner
failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage
and prejudice to complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the

same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner),
seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision1 and the July
28, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
81096.

The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as

follows:

It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had
donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their
daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228). Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of
just compensation over said agricultural lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was
only ₱227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for
brevity) assessed the same at ₱317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent,

on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just
Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional
Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein

private respondent, the fallo of which reads:

Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby

preliminarily fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (₱2,896,408.91)
PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby ordered to
pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and
guidelines, minus the sum already remitted per Order dated January 2,
2003.

SO ORDERED.

As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration,

the RARAD-V eventually issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the
decretal portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the

valuation claim of petitioner herein with respect to her due share in the
above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two
Hundred Eleven and 58/100 (₱2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi
City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to
existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order
dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original

Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala of the
RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.

The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the
herein first assailed Order dated 12 November 2003 "for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and
7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia,

"that the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its
precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for dismissal of the case is
not among the instances when a court may dismiss a case on its
motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order

dated 28 November 2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case before the
Tribunal through the present Petition for Review, theorizing:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE

MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB

2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND PENDING
BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY
AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURTS.3

On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the
petition.

The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed
before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the
case before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB
is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of just
compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8,
2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003
Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the
DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in
dismissing petitioner's petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a

Resolution dated July 28, 2004.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT VIOLATE
THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES" WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER
11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just
compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region
V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the
2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the 2003
DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the adjudicators
prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the
DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from the
transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is
governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of
filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not
the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules
prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination of just compensation shall
not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought

directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB
Rules that petitioner brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC
sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the

RTC is an original action and, since the case was filed at a time when
appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003
DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving

claims for just compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the
decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a
party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby

vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
xxx

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under
their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the
case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA
and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No.
6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.

In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
(1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A.
No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with
this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed,
there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative
agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent
domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal
cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that
the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the
then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for
violations of the Industrial Peace Act.6

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for
determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with
Section 57 of RA No. 6657.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's
jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for determination of just
compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was
held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the
determination of land valuation. The Court held:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed

an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the
completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding,
the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because
of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just
compensation, thus –

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian

Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would
vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it
is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of
the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and,
therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special
Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.

In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired

jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just
compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary
administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to
perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's
land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.8 x x x

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank

questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek
reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition to fix
just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is

nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial
courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The
first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary

jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner
the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the
courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts
of justice.10

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was

whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's
petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of
the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No.

6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The
valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC
properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of
just compensation.12

The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just

compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the

Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by filing with the
Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of
said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining
period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.

Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the

aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the Adjudicator within the
aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a concurrence
by such party with the land valuation, hence said valuation shall become
final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for
Final Determination. The party who disagrees with the decision of the
Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the Special
Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject property
within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule

XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment

of Just Compensation – The decision of the Adjudicator on land
valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any
party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation

cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a power vested in the
courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the
adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change
the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC.
Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving
petitions for the determination of just compensation.14 In accordance
with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the
RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of
procedure cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's
petition for the determination of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349. July 12, 2001]
BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO S.
BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant

Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban
City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious
irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-
CR-133 entitled People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and
Arlette Mondejar for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged
that respondent judge issued a hold departure order against her on
October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97
which provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an
opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order.
When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge
admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished
a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he
instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997,
he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order
dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process,
respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly
notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in
issuing the assailed hold departure order, recommended that he be
severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.
Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that hold-
departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of
respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. The Court,
in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been
remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence
in keeping abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence.
Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in
1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in
numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be
excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their
quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge their
duties and functions with zeal and fervor.
In recent cases,[1] involving similar violations, this Court imposed the
penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty should
be imposed on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with
the warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167764 : October 9, 2009]
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo
City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also
assailed is the CA Resolution2 dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo
City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged
with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and
exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5,
1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote
the health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a
company to serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel

Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company
physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn
obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports
reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and

residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr.
Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and
had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under
observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum
myoma and must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de
los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also
maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing
that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod
as he had one to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from
the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of
difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted
to the hospital.

The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was

devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out
her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her
right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another

hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the
referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of
money since the disease was already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the
wrong diagnosis of the company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all
healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the
conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no
license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say,
Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where

physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act
like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs
seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower
price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable
religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits.
Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are
cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet
unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although
mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the
brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their
moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the
same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk.
Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who
died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at
236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of

professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a
physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were
entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore
highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character
and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by

counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners

guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence

aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny
Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for
the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months
and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year,
Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as
Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated

February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which

affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a

Resolution dated April 8, 2005.

Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following

grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE

"LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF

MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT
ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF
PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF
THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of

defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist,
portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who
enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the
question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes
with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in
print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's
competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in
basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in
good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend
that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of
the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the
prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden
duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further
contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the
columnist's exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor
and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and
should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law
are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not
the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was
established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew
of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that
factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded
finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of
weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result
of the case − a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in
their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in
court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed
whenever raised as an issue via a Petition for Review on Certiorari .
Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction
in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of
libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the
RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed
before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing
so.
In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume
raised the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised
or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal
case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express
waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was
recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court
which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by
laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a
civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not
present in the instant criminal case.11

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court

held in Macasaet v. People12 that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)13

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written
defamation, to wit:

Article 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit
or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business

manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as
if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of
the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated

as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the

criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may

also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he
actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the

time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of

Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense.15

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private
individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article,
the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the
libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where
Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which
for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and
exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5,
1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN...."

The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication

with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication
was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a

private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of
which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with
others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of
impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and
with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule,
hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general
circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief
and Author-Reporter, ....17

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction
in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article
360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the

word "published" is utilized in the precise context of noting that the
defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of
general circulation in Manila." The Information states that the libelous
articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published
in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart
File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or
first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila
does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in
Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the
Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation
in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first
printed in Cebu.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests

jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation
in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action
in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the
example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would
allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a
reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in
general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep.
Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a

private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged
that the libelous article was "published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire
Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to
show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication
of the alleged libelous article.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a

private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of
Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not
clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City
at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr.
Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged

that the "offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community,"
the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the
offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained
its ruling in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation

or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of
residence is required. However, the residence must be more than
temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a
transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a
place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a
particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual
bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention
of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club,
the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the
Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when
the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the
private complainant may have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the
meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive
of residence there for purposes of venue.21
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the
offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.22
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements
for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo
City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November

24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City.
Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.
January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner vs. BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting

psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit
relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for
the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal
Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash
the Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally married to [AAA],
caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit
relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph
with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-
mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to
the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City.
Their union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and
DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he

acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition
nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his
parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were
married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back
to her parents' house in Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little
to no financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled
her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her
income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and
sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having
an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April
19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in
Singapore during her visit with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the
earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses,
the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with
causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital
infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued

against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order
against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived.10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the

Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift
Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of
BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable
cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime
charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the
acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case
is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since

[AAA] has been suffering from mental and emotional anguish "wherever
she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court
notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said suffering had happened
outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that
there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that
Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had
caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have
occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy
jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the
emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which
denotes the bringing about or into existence of something. Hence, the
mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been
brought about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically
have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction
over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or
render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws -
territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of
(sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there
must be an act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal
nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit
relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to
have been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as

written, quashal of the Information must still be ordered following the
underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in
favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the
arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the
original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration

of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via
the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No.
9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and
worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands
of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital
affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried out
abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is
an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is
experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where
the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where
she resides can take cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No.

9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court

shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed

order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote

the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their
children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the
grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil
aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended
party; and. that this petition should be dismissed outright for having
been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate
proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly
filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should
entertain the petition.
It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting
that the instant petition was belatedly filed. The date erroneously
perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed -
June 2, 2014 - refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of
Court and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this
Comi. The motion was in fact filed on May 27, 2014, well within the
period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the intended
petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a
Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014, granted AAA an additional period of
thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was
awaiting the OSG's response to her Letter16 dated May 26, 2014
requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her
plea for assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present
petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by
this Court or on June 25, 2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will
be better served by entertaining the petition if only to resolve the
question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the
Philippines, et al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition
which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in
the absence of the OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when
the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the
intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of
substantial justice so requires.18
19
Morillo, also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is

acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on
the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance,
etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the
prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the
dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the
evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because
the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as
if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the
court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case,
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a
court of competent jurisdiction.20 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the
original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an
acquittal, which in limited instances may only be repudiated by a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of
discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a
Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised
or involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or
of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the c01Tect application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view
of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus, in
Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the

complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by
law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a
case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with
respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed
therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to
this Court under Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of
the charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence, especially as the
case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The
issue for resolution concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not
Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal
charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed
through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place
outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined
that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to
quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011
ruling that probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of
Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the
RTC furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of
Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee on
Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice
and Human Rights.28

The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present
economic reality that a great number of Filipino families have at least
one parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number
of overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2
million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract
workers or those with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked
overseas without contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No.
9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a
case of psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is
allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological

abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is
also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a
point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of
violence that may be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against

women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,

committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited
to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely

to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public
ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a

woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the

allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential
elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In
Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the
elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262,
as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The

crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to

the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of

R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or

children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the

offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom
such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child
or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living
within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental

or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or

humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to
the children or similar· such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of

psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and
children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical,
sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other
subparts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like

the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological
violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of
the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental
or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the
victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262

criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological
violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise
stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the
law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of
the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.
Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a
myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be
causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or
emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in
the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the

Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It
is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court
over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the
original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to

jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the
case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed
at the option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as
the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable
element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental
or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting
mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element
of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses

employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been
perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the
criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated.
Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved
in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be
filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person
charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in
which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x
x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children
may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In
such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense
was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the

abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in
relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine
territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint
is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the
offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of
respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010.
Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the

information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by
probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to
establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction.
It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband.
What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for
psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental
and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a
prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of
Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No.
146468 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE,
Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No.
27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of
jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On
January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the
amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray
seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost
two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was
made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V.
Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter
to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from
receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May
17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that
respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether
appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999,
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which
reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in
relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City
Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND
NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she
received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate
the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and
intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail
to liquidate said cash advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine Currency,
despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER
ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November
18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete
proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated
and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at
the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation
papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting
Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was
then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26,
whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the
accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No.
6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that
respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on
matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial
of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said
court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant
to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4
of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too
plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the
salary grade of city local officials/heads.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005,

dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without
prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.

The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered

moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A

CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE
CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT
NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in

question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's
decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did
not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in
Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A.
No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to
public office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred

that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was
defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule,
while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the
paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to
respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the
latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the
accused is public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those
mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official
must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The
same respondent proceeded to cite a decision9 of this Court where it
was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any
act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of
the court.1avvphi1

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the
enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No.
1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office
under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of
Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an
offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed
the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated

by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable
to the people.13

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved
on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. x x x

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a

member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who
was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as

amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was
on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on
May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975,
as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as
the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of
the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their
office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained.
Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since
the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A.
No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606
as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions

of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of

the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
 (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the

position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval

captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher

rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,

and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,

without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade

"27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with

other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are
specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A.
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law,

respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at
the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her
office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with

the following ratiocination:

x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that
the Congress' act of specifically including the public officials therein
mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed
by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their
salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court
was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only
because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D.
No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are committed even by public
officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the
enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the
offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general
qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is a
requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original
jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper
regional or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a

position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated
public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with
violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is
not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding
is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must
involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant
case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated
public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being
prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the
general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a
position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public
office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.1avvphi1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan.

Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v.
Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in
(a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary
grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts
contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved
was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25
and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court
concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are
specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or
felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials'
office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and

employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that
those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in
relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the
public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as
the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the
office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in
relation" to his office.17 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the

crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s
official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official

was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations

that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official
functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with
aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is
intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions.
This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997
resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official
duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that
"accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality,
during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not
have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might
have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations
in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the
Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the

intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions
to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert
jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it
is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said
offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in
relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated

on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to
[an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla
v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle
which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be
considered as committed in relation to the accused’s office if "the
offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court,
through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the

accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and
they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b)

does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It
simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a
well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the
lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
23
always presumed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED

and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated
February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the
case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 162059 - HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 162059 - January 22, 2008]

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along

with her brother, of swindling government funds?cralawred

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at

ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing

the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying
petitioner's motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the

University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to
serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada

the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4,
2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)
to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The

succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill
De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide
alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found

probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special

Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN
D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA,
a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the
University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
"President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose
accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25,
2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and
despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged
or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by

R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of
estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI
(Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that
was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that
amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction

over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since
she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who
held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive

monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents
(BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner's

interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner.
In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-
blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas

a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers
of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
Mechem's definition of a public office, petitioner's stance that she was
not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied

petitioner's motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by

Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no
single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa
committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movant's claim that being merely a member in representation

of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is
of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:

x � �x � �x

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan

has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,
because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is
the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of

law?cralawred

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the

Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and
appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided
by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own
government and to enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their
compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as
it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only

through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-
stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the
governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of

the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of
Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion
that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls
within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does
not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant's contention that the same
of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17

The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4,
2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT

COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely:

(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees;
(c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d)
the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from
the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this Petition for Certiorari outright on

procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to
quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a Petition for
Certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20
Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly

explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely

interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision
is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a
judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying

the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the
court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples
of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the Petition for Certiorari and prohibition against the City Court
of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to
quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from
further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of
the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the Petition
for Certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion

to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the
Petition for Certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the Petition for
Certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal
case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of

discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by

R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioner's contention that the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner
refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant Petition for
Certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or

typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim
twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather
than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11,
1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all
times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved
on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over

petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed
or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the
Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed
with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People
of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary

notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from
the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where
the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as
the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on
August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or
which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. - (a) It shall be unlawful for
any person having family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity
in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their
penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is

not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that
in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should

receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut
evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi
dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by

reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by
the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained
from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken
into view.35 In other words, petitioner's interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole
under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang
batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim
ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong
batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies

committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa v. a
director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government
instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an

Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the
Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No.
30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9,
1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an
attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department
of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation
No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a

regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater

firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court's
ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to the

Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not
have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's cases and
those of the government employees separately charged for the same
crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa
thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional
or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the
regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not
receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not
the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a
public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it
is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987
Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,]
Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because
and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right
in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a

public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27;
she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise
bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In
Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be
of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan

with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential

element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public
office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An

investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article

XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function
by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences,
and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP
is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not
a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according

to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public

officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the
approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by
the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and
that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the

information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that

petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada's

private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the
charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the
Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner
requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation
gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the

source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner's counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,

misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to
quash, the instant Petition for Certiorari and his memorandum, unveils
the misquotation. We urge petitioner's counsel to observe Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55

where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in
connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos
resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he
was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that
a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner's counsel to be more careful and accurate in his

citation. A lawyer's conduct before the court should be characterized by
candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely
suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona* , Nachura,

JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002]

ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL,

petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus i with prayer
for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to annul and set
aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolutionii dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie
case against herein petitioners, and (2) the orderiii denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition,iv petitioners assail the
Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or beyond its jurisdiction.
They impleaded that court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties in
this case.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both
residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the
Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3,
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits,v
filed before the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero
Esquivel,vi municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel,
barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary
detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the
charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO
Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S
Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal
Police Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about
12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents
house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners
arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified
persons accompanied them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2
Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum
Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board
petitioners vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall,
Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him.
Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, Putang-ina mo, papatayin
kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban! (You son of a bitch! I will kill
you, I will create an accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the
municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel shoved PO2
Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill
him, saying Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report. (Kill him, then
create a scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened
to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel likewise threatened him.
Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police
Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck
PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun, while Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel was
holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he
regained his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his
release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he
was in good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely
maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor
believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that
same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members
of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.vii
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical
certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other documentary evidence. viii
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded
the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for
appropriate action.ix
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary
investigation and required petitioners and their companions to file their respective
counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,x petitioners and their companions
denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a
fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They
further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an
illegal possession of firearm complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned
resolutionxi recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries,
and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the other
respondents below were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid
resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777xii for
less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony Eboy
Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778xiii for grave threats against petitioner
mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14,
1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed by the
Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigationxiv
with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied
by the OSP in the assailed orderxv dated December 7, 1998. On December 11,
1998, the Ombudsman approved the OSPs order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they
pleaded not guilty to the charges.
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted
by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners
elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents in rendering the resolution and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners motion xvi reiterating
their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing public respondents to refrain from
prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.xvii
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL
CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE
HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
GRAVE THREATS WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY
EFFECTING THE ARREST OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY
VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM.
CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY; and
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST
PETITIONERS.
Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the
filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the
admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he left the
police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.xviii With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now
estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against
him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.xix
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the
OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is not a proper subject of
a certiorari action. They further postulate that this is the very same defense
advanced by petitioners in the charges against them and being evidentiary in
nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in a full-blown trial.xx
We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts.xxi Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. xxii
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandatexxiii and the courts
will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way
that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.xxiv Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,xxv
we held that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the
exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less
grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he was in good
physical condition when he was released from the police headquarters.xxvi Such
admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records
show that no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavitxxvii nor was
there any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as
an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
reconsideration.xxviii In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit
signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical condition when he
left the police station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of
said document and not to the truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the
admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best
addressed to the public respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its
probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously
held, but now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine
and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision,
resolution or order.xxix
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans exercise of
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners theorize that the latter
has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic
Act No. 7975.xxx As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are
not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.xxxi
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,xxxii Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan,xxxiii and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,xxxiv we already held that
municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that
since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,xxxv provides that it is only in cases
where none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higherxxxvi that exclusive original jurisdiction
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.xxxvii
Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27.xxxviii Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction
over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of
them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.
For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be
denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it
to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. xxxix As
earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to
when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate and
available.xl Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or
sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy
at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for
denying the issuance of the writ.xli In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a
remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the
informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to
blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown any adequate excuse for
their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a
motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed arraignment,xlii but its
denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an
interlocutory order. xliii
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called
to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.xliv The foundation of this rule is the
respect and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing
unnecessary litigation;xlv it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not
properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it.xlvi The
records show that petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction
by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. xlvii The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.xlviii Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or
review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has
been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be
availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be. xlix Moreover, as
earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course
of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus
will not lie.l
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO

PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION through
DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B.
DACERA III, MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P.
LAZARO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of

Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it,
seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge
Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
in Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential

Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on
January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M.
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials
of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave
rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to
respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case
Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82,
and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary
Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents
therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28,
2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed
that the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses
executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and
circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before
the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May
4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials,
and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng
Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this

recommendation was made after taking the sworn statements of Mary
Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and
Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were
attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena

to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the witnesses’ sworn
statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001.
The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose
Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in
a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should
dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of
facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that
according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on

May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an
Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss

which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service

classification has no bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the
crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are
they related to respondents’ discharge of their official duties;
It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of
the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated
October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to
office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and
prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall
rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the
Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by
Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In
the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that the
DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They
argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was
violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of having the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster
their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed
prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary
investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby

GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby
ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,]
and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively,
from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar
as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file
their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject
matter of the investigations before it, or until such Office shall have
categorized the said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not
in relation to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue

without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the
parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the
issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
7
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then
Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco,
and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they
raise the following issues:

I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ
AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08,
SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4
OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE
NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES,
RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE
THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE
SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth
one central question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has
jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency
before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused,
facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second
proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally
directed against the respondents herein in connection with substantially
the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial
court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was
imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration
of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case,
considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and
the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake
here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to
give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the
respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the
accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in
themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The
rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application would
clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based

on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title
III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State

to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be
both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the

Department shall have the following powers and functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and

administer the probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April

11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision

and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution
Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s
Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible
for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of
penal laws.
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any
other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing
jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases involving
public officials, including police and military officials. They likewise claim
that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already taken over
the investigation of these cases, considering that there are already
pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts
and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases; ….10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over
the investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of
other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition
for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling
of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a
preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a
shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on
the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of
the Government have no power and right to add an input into the
Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other
investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to
make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is
the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle
with the investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their
powers with respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to
orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to ordinary common sense.
It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the
Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its
preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled
by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the
actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may
take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the
feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that
provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public
officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold
of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the
proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It
has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming
respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to
desist from interfering with the case already handled by the
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are
deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the
truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the
exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The
hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must
be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office

of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To
discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office
of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch
above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and
foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman and
insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the
Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the
selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be
natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the
rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for
any decrease in their salary during their term of office.14 They were
given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their
cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any elective
office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other
investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the
Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended
to enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the

Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints and
action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze
of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual
powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to
investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own
initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on
reports in the media and those which come to his attention through
sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with
the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that
may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing
the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has
become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal
expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the
Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is given
preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role

played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No.
6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a
case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All this
means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate
the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct

preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the
plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate complaints specifically directed against public
officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a
constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the
executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence
granted to the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent

jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule
is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation,
this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom
to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest
between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In
the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was
initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual

situation similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court
upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No.
1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court
emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct
a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared
authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy
funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of
said case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit
shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-
gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the
impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had
previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against
petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed

a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the
rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel
prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest
was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by
the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman
who has the power to conduct investigation of cases involving public
officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the
authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not
an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority.
However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary
investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners

with sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the
corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised
by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information
without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the
affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of
the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the
complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial
prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and
Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the
letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone
to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed

ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting
findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong
filed a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted
on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she
thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI
and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the

conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of
justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on
specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary
investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family to
anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be
filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and
defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to
where to appear and plead their cause or defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct

possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the
same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding
the guilt of the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary

expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already
started with the Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 147097 - Carmelo Lazatin, et al. v. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et
al.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID

and ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD
DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000,
recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioners, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office
of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-
1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and
violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, as amended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers
and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting
to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was
allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the

Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein
petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds
and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was
approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against
herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective

Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were
granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also
ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution3

dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases
against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA)
to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated October 24,
2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved
and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against
petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated
September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the
subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that:

I.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR

ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.

II.

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF

FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman

had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases
against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring
officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out
that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP
(formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a
separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP
being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no
power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A.
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability
because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as
reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for
expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects
that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale.

It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting
the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP
under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether
said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully
dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the

Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such
other functions or duties as may be provided by law." Elucidating on this
matter, the Court stated:

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the

Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring to the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that
the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers,
functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by
the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of
the Constitution, which provides:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:

xxx

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or
duties as may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers,

functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners
Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of

the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him
with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?cralawred

MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

MR. MONSOD:

Yes.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to

function and exercise its powers as provided by law."

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:

And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be
performed by the Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be
provided by law." The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on
might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these to
the Ombudsman.

MR. COLAYCO:

Madam President, that is correct.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers
but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people
too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on
be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?

xxx

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

xxx

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would

like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present,
but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions
as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the
thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future
time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective.ςηαñrοblεš νιr��
υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

This is not foreclosed.

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an

irreversible disability.7

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the

OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the
Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:

x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the

Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the
Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman
and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.

The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

xxx

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing

Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office
of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored
phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No.
1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's
powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those
powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by

express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable
then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein,
Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan
by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the
Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and
duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through
the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v.

Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the
Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag,
declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770,
the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority
of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized
by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in
Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is,
therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not
proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of

the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of
stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant
consideration.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to

precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides,
thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.14 ςηαñrοblεš νιr�� υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.

Remington Steel Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the importance
of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity

for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice thatwhen a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis
is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the
Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only
on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the
courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason
to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or
why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has
been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the
latter.

The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's

disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases
is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly
ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable
cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It
must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in
First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to
wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence

is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is
extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine
and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed
in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari . An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error
is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari
will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not
for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of
the court a quo.19

Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding

of probable cause would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation
of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the
OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given
due course.

Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc

Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the
value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA

6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the
Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of
the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide
latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention
from the three branches of government. This is to ensure that
his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence.21

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable

cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public
official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what
constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise
of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman

acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting
in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of
control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution
dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or
action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have
been included as a respondent in this petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
560 Phil. 42

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking to nullify the resolution of then
Ombudsman Aniano A.Desierto dated October 12, 1998[2] dismissing the
complaint against private respondents in OMB-0-98-0364,as well as the
order dated January 5, 1999[3] denying the motion for
reconsideration.On February 17, 1998, a complaint was filed by Orlando
L. Salvador in hisofficial capacity as consultant of petitioner Presidential
Commission onGood Government (PCGG) detailed with the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-FindingCommittee on Behest Loans (Fact-Finding
Committee) against the followingprivate respondents, all former officers
of the Development Bank of thePhilippines (DBP) and Pagdanan Timber
Products, Inc. (PTPI):

1. Leonides S. Virata (chairperson of the Board of Governors of DBP)

2. Alicia Ll. Reyes (manager of Industrial Projects, Department I of
DBP)
3. Rodolfo D. Manalo and Verden C. Dangilan (both executive officers
of DBP),[4]
4. Jose Y. Campos
5. Francisco de Guzman
6. Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. and
7. Erwin G. Vorster[5]

The latter four were officers and stockholders of PTPI.

All eight were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA
3019, otherwiseknown as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In our resolution dated August 29, 2001, we dismissed the case insofar
as privaterespondent Virata was concerned since he had passed away.

Petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans

wascreated pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13 dated October 8,
1992 issuedby former President Fidel V. Ramos, with the chairman of
PCGG as chairman,the Solicitor General as vice chairman and one
representative each from theOffice of the Executive Secretary,
Department of Finance, Department ofJustice, DBP, Philippine National
Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Office ofthe Government Corporate
Counsel and the Philippine Export and ForeignLoan Guarantee
Corporation as members. It was tasked to inventory all behestloans,
identify the lenders and borrowers and recommend the course of
actionthat the government should take to recover such loans.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No.

61which provided the following criteria to indicate a behest loan:

a. it was undercollateralized;
b. the borrower corporation was undercapitalized;
c. direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like
presence ofmarginal notes;
d. stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation were
identifiedas cronies;
e. deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
f. use of corporate layering;
g. non-feasibility of the project for which financing was sought and
h. extraordinary speed at which the loan release was made.
The Fact-Finding Committee determined that the loan transaction
between DBP andPTPI bore the characteristics of a behest
loan. Specifically, petitioners alleged thatPTPI was a joint venture of
Anchor Estate Corporation and Jardine Group ofCompanies. It was
organized on August 9, 1974 to take over the properties acquired byDBP
from Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. On the same date, PTPI applied
for aforeign guarantee loan in the amount of US $13.5 million to
purchase these and otherbrand-new equipment such as sawmill,
veneering plant and logging equipment. Thefinancial accommodation
was approved on August 14, 1974 or after only fivedays.[6]

According to petitioners, PTPI had no sufficient capital at the time the

loan wasgranted since its paid-up capital amounted to P25,000
only. However, it was able toobtain additional accommodations and
restructuring of accounts up to July 18, 1979.As of June 30, 1986, it had
an outstanding and unpaid balance of P454.85million.[7] In addition, the
loan wasundercollateralized since there were no existing assets offered
as security except forassets to be acquired using the loan proceeds,
assignment of the forest concessions ofPTPI and the joint and several
undertaking of MacMillan Jardine. Petitioner claimedthat the processing
of the original loan application was attended with haste and thatthere
was a deviation of the loan funds to other purposes.[8] They contended
that there was evidence that the loan wasgranted at the urging of
former President Marcos.[9] They also asserted that DBP leased the
properties it acquired byforeclosure to PTPI beyond five years which was
a violation of Section 25 of theGeneral Banking Act.[10]

Accordingly, a complaint was filed in the Office of the Ombudsman for

violation of RA 3019, section 3 (e) and (g). In a resolution dated
October 12, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint. It held that :

(1) there was no evidence that the loan was granted at the behest,
command or urging of previous government officials;

(2) PTPI complied with the DBP requirement that it would increase its
paid-up capital from P25,000 to P1 million;

(3) the loan was not under collateralized and

(4) the complaint was barred by prescription. It denied reconsideration

in an order dated January 5, 1999.

Hence this petition for certiorari.The issue for our resolution is whether
the Ombudsman committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in (1) holding that
the offenses charged in the complaint had alreadyprescribed and (2)
dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause to indict
privaterespondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.Had
the Offenses Prescribed . The Ombudsman held that the ten-year
prescriptive period commenced on the date ofthe violation of law under
Section 11 of RA 3019. The transaction occurred in 1974.Hence, the
complaint was allegedly barred by prescription when it was filed on
February17, 1998.This issue had previously been resolved in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committeeon Behest Loans v.
Desierto.[11] TheCourt held:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g)
of Section 3,R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable
rule in the computation ofthe prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of theviolation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discoverythereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guiltyperson and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons notconstituting double jeopardy.This simply
means that if the commission of the crime is known, theprescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrievedparty, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the
time thequestioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officialsconcerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of
the loans." Thus,we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period for the offenseswith which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should becomputed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from theday of such commission.[12](Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine was reiterated in subsequent cases also involving

petitioners and publicrespondent and is now well-settled.[13]Therefore,
the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date
ofdiscovery of the offenses in 1992 after the investigation of the Fact-
FindingCommittee.[14] When the complaintwas filed in 1998 or after six
years, prescription had not set in.[15]Was There Probable Cause?The
Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he found
that therewas no evidence to establish probable cause to sustain the
charges against privaterespondents. Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019
provide:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
oromissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
followingshall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declaredto be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or

giving anyprivate party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of hisofficial, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident badfaith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
andemployees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses orpermits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or

transactionmanifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officerprofited or will profit thereby.[16]

Grave abuse is defined as:

... such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
public officerconcerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse ofdiscretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive dutyor a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all incontemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despoticmanner by reason of
passion or hostility.[17]

The Ombudsman explained his reasons for dismissing the complaint:

There is no evidence on record to prove that the loan was granted to
PTPIat the behest, command or urging by previous government
officials. Asappearing from its Corporate Profile, PTPI is a company
organized onAugust 9, 1974 to take over the properties acquired by DBP
from Fil-EasternWood Industries, Inc. (FEWI). The foreign currency
loan of US $13.5million will be used to purchase brand new sawmill and
veneering plant andadditional logging equipment since the old
equipment were found to beobsolete.Although at the inception or at the
time the loan was applied, its paid-upcapital amounted to P25,000.00
only, DBP required, under BoardResolution No. 2415, that prior to the
issuance of letter of guarantee andexecution of deed of sale, in order to
cover the pre-operating expenses, PTPIshall first increase its paid-up
capital from P25,000.00 to P1.0 million. Thetraditional equity
requirement equivalent to 25% of investment was waived inview of the
joint and several signature of Macmillan Jardine and the guaranteeof
Macmillan Bloedel and Jardine Matheson. In addition, PTPI shouldalso
comply with DBP's requirement that the 80% collateral ratio
ismaintained.Moreover, the loan granted to PTPI was not
undercollateralized. Based onthe evidence on record, the financial
accommodation was secured by theassets to be acquired; the forest
concession and the joint and several signatureof Macmillan Jardine. In
fact, DBP Board of Governors Chairman LeonidesS. Virata stated in his
Memorandum to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,that "the guarantee
being requested will be more than the value of the assetssince the
working capital requirement of about US $1.5 million and pre-operating
expenses of another US $350 million will be funded out of the US$14
million."[18]

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA

6770 (TheOmbudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecuteany act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omissionappears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.[19] It has been the consistent ruling of the Court
not to interfere withthe Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as hisrulings are supported by substantial
evidence.[20] Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of
the integrity ofpublic service, he has wide latitude in exercising his
powers and is free fromintervention from the three branches of
government. This is to ensure that his Office isinsulated from any
outside pressure and improper influence.[21]

We find no reason to deviate from this rule.

First, the loan accommodation was not under collateralized. The assets
to be acquired by PTPI would serve as collateral for the loan.

The value of these assets, when addedto PTPI's existing properties

(which would also serve as collaterals) was higher than the value of the
loan.

Second, PTPI complied with the DBP requirement to increase its paid-up
capital fromP25,000 to P1 million.

Third, the loan proposal was studied and evaluated by DBP. There was
no showingthat the DBP officials did not exercise sound business
judgment in approving saidloan.

Fourth, petitioners did not point out circumstances or overt acts

indicating acriminal design on the part of the DBP and PTPI officials. In
fact, they did notspecify the particular roles or participation of each of
the private respondents in thecommission of the alleged violation of RA
3019.[22]

Last, the fact that the loan was approved after only five days did not
necessarily provemanifest partiality or evident bad faith because there
was full compliance with bankinglaws, practices and procedures.[23]

In sum, from the facts presented, we cannot conclude that the

Ombudsman committedgrave abuse of discretion in finding lack of
probable cause. The complaint against theprivate respondents should
therefore be dismissed.
The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case,
given its factsand circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically
his call. He may dismiss thecomplaint forthwith should he find it to be
insufficient in form or substance orshould he find it otherwise, to
continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with theinvestigation if, in
his view, the complaint is in due and proper form andsubstance.[24]

In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint without

going through apreliminary investigation.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution

dated October 12,1998 and order dated January 5, 1999 of respondent
Ombudsman in OMB-0-98-0364 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.

597 Phil. 18

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution[2] which denied the
motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of
Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior
thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in
the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of
P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle
and convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of
P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her account
for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds

of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her
salary grade a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4] petitioner further argued that as
she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted
only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose
prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.[5]

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order[6] dated September 7,

2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not
depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable
upon the latter for the offense charged.[7] Moreover, it sustained the
prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that
in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court
set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001
Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory
authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1,
Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the
Information.[8]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which the RTC denied in

its December 18, 2001 Order.[10]

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the latter
dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[12] was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the

Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against
the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this
Supreme Court's ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case,
which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
 2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme
Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case
can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without
violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and
denial of the accused to due process.[13]

Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9,

1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on
March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the
prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial
powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and
prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman
beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was
applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the
March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the
Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time
the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the
case.

The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,[14] wherein

accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the
Court in Uy[15] in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that
were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC
granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the
Court reversed the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same

resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that
the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those
cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining
the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over

cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman
of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature
to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be

equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under
Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly,
the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers
and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To
carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his
office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated
or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The
law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute
cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to

investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to
385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos,
Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by
him with the regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial

Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal
Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,[16]
in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a
criminal complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The
Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court's Uy ruling under its March
20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court's assailed Orders x x x are, in
hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that
the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the
RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time
when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in
Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an
ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed."[17]

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,

constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing
one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of
that law.[18] Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy
interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the
date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or

abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing
that acts may have been performed under the impression of the
constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has
consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation;
thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.[19] But
where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment
of its legislation.[20]

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no

declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine
long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set
aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as
expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect
has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate
investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Tinga,* Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Leonardo-De Castro,** JJ., concur.

DIVISION
[ GR No. 144492, Dec 18, 2008 ]
LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO v. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO +
DECISION
595 Phil. 18

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati
R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South
Cotabato which includes General Santos City (city), assailing that
portion of the Resolution[2] dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against private
respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez (Mayor Nuñez),
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional
Executive Director for Region XI Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan),
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre),
former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of
Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical Director of
the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) (respondents).
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:

Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President

Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The
pertinent provision of which states that:

do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational

and health resort site purposes, under the administration of the
municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be,
a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the said
municipality and more particularly described as follows:

Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation

The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park

A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of

Dadiangas, Municipality of General Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x
containing an area of 52,678 square meters.

On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26),
known as the "Charter of the City of General Santos" was enacted
creating the City of General Santos where it is provided that "The
National Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos the
ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain within the
city." Later, said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August
16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read that "The disposition of all
lands of the public domain within the city shall be in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as
amended: Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from such
disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in this Act."

On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No.

168 was thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an
area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters
and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square
meters which is still equivalent to the original area.

However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos

issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record,
pp. 29-31), which provides that:

do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated

October 3, 1963, which established the recreational and health resort
reservation situated in the Municipality of General Santos, now General
Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain portions of the land embraced
therein and declare the same open to disposition under the provisions of
the Public Land Act, which parcels of land are more particularly
described as follows:
 Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in

the Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of
Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in

the Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of
Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation

No. 168 and is therefore reserved for recreational and health resort site
purposes.

As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free
Patent with the District Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title
were issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two cases were filed by the
local government of General Santos City against the said Heirs of Kusop
for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the Heirs of
Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and
Damages. The said three cases were consolidated before the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, presided by respondent
Judge Abednego Adre.

On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City

passed Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled "Resolution Approving
the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and between the City
Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor and the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park" (Record, pp. 1506-1507).
Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement (Record, pp.
33-39) state that:

1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D

and Y-2, MR-1160-D with combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE
METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall
receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE
METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658)
SQUARE METERS which if added to Lot X, MR-1160-D,
previously donated to the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the
WHEREAS clause, with an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND
 TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS (located in between Lots Y-1
and Y-2), the CITY shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678) SQUARE
METERS.

Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor

Rosalita Nuñez, assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the
heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.

As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent

Judge Abednego Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering the
three pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
states:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in

conformity with Article 6 in correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the same is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as
judgment in these cases. The parties are enjoined to faithfully comply
therewith.

A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.

However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an
Extraneous Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the
"Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order" submitted by the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer and Regional Technical
Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued another Order
[assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three
cases, stating that:

ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence,

the motion for exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D comprising an area of
15,020 SQUARE METERS is GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop
are, however, enjoined to donate to the City of General Santos in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement.

On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for

Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided as
follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75):

Applicants Area applied

1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;

2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;

3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;

4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;

5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.;

6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.;

7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.;

8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.;

9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.;

10. Jose Rommel

- 999 sq. m.;
Saludar

11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;

12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.;

13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.;

14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.;

15. Arsenio delos

- 510 sq. m.; and,
Reyes, Jr.

16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.

The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as
Deputy Land Management Inspector, recommended for the approval of
the survey authority requested by the above-named private
respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418).

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private
respondents by public respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record,
p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots (refer to
subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).

On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, assisted

by respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st
Indorsements (refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421-500)
addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private
respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes no objection
to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application
covering portions thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the
Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said court's order dated
July 22, 1997."

Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo

Dinopol, together with recommendation for approval from respondent
Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the
appraisal amount of P100.00 per square meter and existing
improvements of residential light house per lot with an appraised value
ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers,
Record, pp. 421-500).

Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a

letter-report addressed to the Regional Executive Director of DENR for
each of the sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the private sale of
the subject lots to the above-named applicants-respondents, without
public auction (refer to sample letter-report of recommendation in favor
of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, Renato Rivera,
also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants
addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the
subject lots and of the private sale (please refer to sample
recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o], Record, p. 78).

A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same
date stating therein that on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be
sold (Record, p. 79).

On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued

by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, respondent Asteria
Cruzabra, which titles were also signed by respondent Augustus
Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to
wit:

Record
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No.
Page No.

1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;

2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;

3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;

4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;

5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;

6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;

7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;

8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;

9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;

10. Jose Rommel

P-6388 X-10 107-109;
Saludar

11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;

12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;

13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;

14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;

15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;

16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.

Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-
15 and X-16, the above-named registered owners sold their lots,
through their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in the
amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos
(P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the
name of the vendee on September 25, 1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).

On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7
executed a Deed of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by
respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots X-6
and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter two lots
being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X-15 and
X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or
ceded to respondent Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).[3]

Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit[4]

before the Ombudsman against the respondents together with Cesar
Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar,
Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III,
Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel
Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes,
and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose
Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty.
Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e),
(g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[5] as amended,
and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of
public documents.

The Ombudsman's Ruling

In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman

held that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the
Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the
authority granted to them by the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of
Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuñez
and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the
Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise Agreement had
been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the RTC
found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of
Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of the case, while
Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly
performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the
respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds

that the following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose
names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:

1. CESAR JONILLO - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public

document to the sixteen (16) recommendation reports submitted;

2. RENATO RIVERA - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public

document relative to the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated
August 4, 1997;

3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX

GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT,
JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR,
JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON,
ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ in conspiracy with
public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA- one (1)
count each for private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each
for public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;

4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO - as

conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public
documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;

5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX

GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO,
JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each as conspirator in
the falsification of public document relative to the corresponding
unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;

6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO -

twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for
short-changing the government inn the correct amount of taxes
due for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and

7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX

GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO,
JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each of violation of
section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in short-changing the
government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-
RSBS.
Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned
respondents be filed with the proper courts.

Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS

MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO
NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases
against private respondents, for offenses committed not in
conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper
parties-in-interest.

SO RESOLVED.[6]

On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which

was, however, denied by the Ombudsman in his Order[7] dated April 26,
2000. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were
already filed against the aforementioned indicted and the cases were
already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of
General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said
case.

The Sole Issue

Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:

THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL
DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND ITS CHARTER.[8]

Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence

pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and
those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X
of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a grand conspiracy,
petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and
involvement of each respondent, as follows:

1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997
was part of the grand scheme and was made the basis for the
filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad Guaybar and
his companions. The same Order was likewise used by Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to
the said applications. The assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge
Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment based on the
Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued
 with grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Adre, therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by

reason of their respective offices and as administrators of the
properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay Park is owned
by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet,
Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed
RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no existing
donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city. Likewise, in
their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing
the applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuñez
and Nalangan endorsed the same and interposed no objection
thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand conspiracy and
was utilized as a front for the resale of the said property to AFP-
RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on

August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on
August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date, scheduled the sale of Lot
X to Mad Guaybar and his companions on September 5, 1997.
Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X
on September 5, 1997 without public auction and at the
disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera. Therefore, Diaz,
as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and
Rivera for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for
falsification of public documents.

4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion

for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre, which led
to the issuance by the latter of the assailed RTC Order. Borinaga
and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC that upon verification,
they did not find in the records any deed of donation executed by
the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an
active participant in a grand scheme to defraud the city.

5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not

disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper subject of
a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge and based on
the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed Lot X
to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by
approving their miscellaneous sales application and issuing the
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of
Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports,
and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar
and his companions, to the injury of the city.

6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents

and titles may be considered as ministerial, the circumstances
under which the titles were issued in the names of Mad Guaybar
 and his companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS,
indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand
conspiracy to defraud the city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was
transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September 22, 1997. On
the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a
Joint Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to
be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their respective
lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their
respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano
registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of Absolute Sale in
favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax due thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the
OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof, twelve (12) Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots
were transferred and registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on
October 10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the
registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that
Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions; instead,
she allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-
RSBS so swiftly, that it could only be interpreted as part of the
scheme to defraud the city.[9]

In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion

in the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory functions, by
completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of substantial evidence
which clearly establish the existence of a common design among the
respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition of
Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.

On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective

defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:

1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor

(OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to
review the pieces of evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during
the preliminary investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v.
Office of the Ombudsman[10] and Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[11] this Court accorded highest respect for the factual
findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because the respondents, based on their
counter-affidavits, have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for
the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.[12]

2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists

between her and other respondents charged before the
Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to Cruzabra
refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts. Such
 allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy was
committed; they are merely conjectures and bare allegations.
Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no
convincing evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims
that the canceled OCTs do not contain any restriction to transfer
the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that it
would be most unfair if she would be made a part of the alleged
conspiracy simply because she exercised her ministerial functions
as Register of Deeds.[13]

3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive

Director of the DENR, he is duly authorized to sign patents and
reconstituted patents. Since the standard procedure and processes
were complied with, Momongan simply relied on his subordinates
and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance
with law, department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to
require him to scrutinize every phase of a report of a subordinate
is a very tall order.[14]

4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution[15] of the Senate

Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security, dated December
23, 1998, not one of the respondents was recommended for
prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the
Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted properly, and
even sought the opinion of the OSG before the Compromise
Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due
to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no
motion for execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino,
husband of petitioner, after Mayor Nuñez lost in the elections.
Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo
Kusop did not execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He
declared that the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case when
the Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus, the
issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X and enjoining
the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement,
was proper.[16]

5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not

be disturbed, as they are not attended by grave abuse of
discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance with law; that
as the Regional Technical Director is not required to go to the
premises of the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he
may rely on the data submitted by the CENRO and reviewed by
the PENRO.[17] Moreover, Borinaga argues that the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's
Resolution was filed out of time.[18] The Certification[19] dated
October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of
the Office of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was
 personally served with a copy of the assailed Resolution on
February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she
filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on February 4, 2000.

6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he

participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots
covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he issued the notice of
sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite documents submitted
to his office.[20]

7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did not
violate the Charter of the City, because when she entered into the
Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, she was
authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No.
87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and
public hearings. The same was also referred to the OSG, which
recommended its approval. When the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop filed a
Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell
the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor
of the city. While they admit to have issued Indorsements, they
made it clear that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally
feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that they had no
intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even
filed a case against Mad Guaybar and his companions.[21]

Our Ruling

The instant Petition lacks merit.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22] provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the

Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the
order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the

interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.

Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed

that she received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the
Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish that her
Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to
refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned
Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed
Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are a number of instances when
rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this
case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of
the motion for reconsideration. After the respondents made such
allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue
head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the
motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion
for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant
Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the substantive issue raised, the
petition is likewise bereft of merit.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and

pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.[23] Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that
indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule
would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if
they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.[24]

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the
finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in
this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,[25] where we
laid down the following exceptions to the rule:

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional

rights of the accused;

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to

avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;

6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance;

10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the

accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an

arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in
contemplation of law.[26]

The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is

found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate
from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-
Arao in dismissing the charges against respondents, as approved by
Ombudsman Desierto, thus:

Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is

constrained to limit its evaluation of the issue on the participation of
each respondent in the titling of Lot X, whether the same would
constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.

1. Respondent Abednego Adre - His participation extends only to his

issuance of an Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the
Compromise Agreement.

A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise

Agreement confirms the Order of the respondent that indeed Lot X was
excluded. The Order of respondent judge was made in accordance with
the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that respondent judge
assisted in preserving the claim of the government of General Santos
City over Lot X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private
respondents.

2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan - Said respondents' participation in

the titling of Lot-X was when they issued or caused the issuance of
Indorsements stating therein that "this office (Office of the Mayor)
interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your (CENRO)
office may pursue on the application covering portions thereof (Lot-X)."

The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be

construed as a waiver on the part of General Santos City on its claim
over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to take
the necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has the
responsibility, authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable
lands to deserving claimants.

Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that

respondents Nuñez and Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to the
claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact, they protected the
interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a case for
nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.

x x x x

[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L.

Momongan, Asteria E. Cruzabra - Based on the evidences on record,
these respondents were in the regular performance of their official
functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to the fact
that the documents for titling were submitted to their respective offices
as a matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to
follow the established procedure upon finding that all the documents for
titling were submitted.[27]

Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence

of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove
that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal
of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner
fails.[28]

Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an

accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in

conspiracy with the former;

(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties, or in relation to his or her
public functions;

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference to such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable neglect.[29]

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019,

the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done
with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith
per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad faith
must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment
or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of
fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior
purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or
intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to consequences
as far as other persons may be affected.[30]

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no

showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective
acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not
bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the
Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience.[31]

Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and

those indicted. However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy
alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence. At best,
the evidence adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in
the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the burden of proof
rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of
complainant's case is not a ground for the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation.[32] For it is fundamental that conspiracy
cannot be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or
by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
design.[33] This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
478 Phil. 771

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and its May
23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio
dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near
their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky
Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others
arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo
binili and sumbrero mo?"[2] Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."[3] Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio
slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group
then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted,
"Yariin na 'yan!"[4] Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and
tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to
run. The group chased him.

While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas' family
driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and
pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael
Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away
from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan
on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the
latter's house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and
when they got to the Platas' house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo d'yan,
putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!"[5] Dela Peña, Cagara, and
Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police
station to seek assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint

against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide[6] and against Robert
Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and
Dela Peña filed several counter-charges[7] for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela
Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No.
97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex
"Toto" Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).

In their counter-affidavit,[8] the Punzalans argued that the charges

against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying
in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases
instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral

Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda
Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the
Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached
him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert,
magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko
at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho."[9] In her defense, Rosalinda denied
having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City

dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan,[10] holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged
defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon
him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a
state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.[11] The charge of
Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also
dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peña's
claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of
Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier
against the latter.[12]

Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of

Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero
issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1) that the charge
of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to
Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against
Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide;
and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be
downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for three (3) counts of
slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two
(2) counts [of] other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin;
information for attempted homicide against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin,
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador,
Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for
malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap,
Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson
Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and
John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their

co-respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6,
2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution
and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the
movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case
should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were
uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and
anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against
Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should
first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove
that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is
REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the
separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats,
attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all
respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing

Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11,
2000.[15]

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be
directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda;
one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall and 14
others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto"
Ofrin.[16]

On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the
questioned Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11
October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and
attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander "Toto" Ofrin,
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la
Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente "Joven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.

The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby

affirmed insofar as it directed the withdrawal of information for two (2)
counts of other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.[18] Hence, the instant

petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND

SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS
OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND
OCTOBER 11, 2000.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY
THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND
WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES,
WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER
PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.[19]

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is

sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against
petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against
petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in
the judge's findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of
law and fact, appeal is the remedy.[20]

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the

respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power
to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the
power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by
law, he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.[21] In the
case of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,[22] it was held that grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power,
abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.[23]

We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave

abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October
11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of
Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the
decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control"
includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision
of subordinate officials or units.[24]

In the case of People v. Peralta,[25] we reiterated the rule that the right
to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,[26] we
declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion
to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been
shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
presented by the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during

a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an
executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not
convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute
when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the
evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests
primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.

Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the

purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor

to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the other
respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of whether
or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the
defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on
the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the
occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable
cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the
hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found
that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his
Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners

other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to
dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a
countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated June
18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise
investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the
shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a party
to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein respondent Dencio
Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the
shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner
Rainier Punzalan.

In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v.
Guingona[27] that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown
to have been made with grave abuse.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, directing the
withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and attempted
homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,

concur.
 DIVISION
[ GR No. 171175, Oct 09, 2009 ]
PEOPLE v. ARTURO F. DUCA +
DECISION
618 Phil. 154

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the
Decision[1] dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.

The CA decision reversed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-D[3]
which affirmed an earlier decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo
Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:

It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca,
were charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined
and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code in an Information which reads:

"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian,

Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and mutually
abiding each other, with intent to cause damage, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a
Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house
covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal
Assessor's Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that
the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of
Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the latter
was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on
December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his
own signature thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned
private complainant Pedro Calanayan."

Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded `not guilty'. Then trial
on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro
Calanayan (hereinafter "Calanayan"), private complainant herein, filed
an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F.
Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor
of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by the aforesaid
defendants, the said decision became final and executory. On November
22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the
decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was likewise
satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca
covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was
issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.

On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of
Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and
Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and
Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor
Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.

When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that
the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by
her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she presented Property
Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of the said
exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market
value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the
signature affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and
subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal
Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The
signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo
Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the
signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that
time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as
evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila.
Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother
Aldrin. That because of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were
able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against
Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting
the plaintiffs from the property in question.

Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca.
Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution as she
was in Manila at that time.

On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name
Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed the defense that he was
duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax declaration.

On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a

decision, dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon
said accused a prison term of two years, four months and one day to six
(6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia
is acquitted for lack of evidence.

The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining

witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of
P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
plus cost.

SO ORDERED."

Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24,

2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a decision,
disposing the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting
accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification defined and
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing
upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one
day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and
ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the
amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00
plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is
AFFIRMED.

x x x.

SO ORDERED."[5]

Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated
its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing
the RTC decision. The CA held:

However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not
duly authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the
contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly
authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house
erected on the land registered under their mother's name.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not
have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real Property under Property Index
No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin
Duca, his brother, participated in the accomplishment of the said
document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It
must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo has already been
authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house in the latter's
name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of
Arturo was confirmed by the latter's execution of an Affidavit dated
January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of the said tax declaration
(Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on June
17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the
beginning had already been cured so much so that the said document
became valid and binding as an official act of Arturo.

If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was
signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrin's subsequent execution of
Exhibits "6" and "7".

The RTC's conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by

Aldrin was a mere afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any
criminal liability has no basis since from the very start, it has been duly
established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo to
cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his
house constructed on his mother's lot for taxation purposes.[6]

Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA'S APPEAL
WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
THEREON.[7]

Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the
CA resolved the respondent's appeal without notifying the People of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same
and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.
Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this
Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it acted on respondent's appeal without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of
the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being
violative of due process.

In his Comment,[8] respondent argues that there was no denial of due

process because the prosecution was properly represented by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the
presentation of evidence under the control and supervision of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on the
private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn,
the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not
afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent,
he should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor's failure to
inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before

the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x
x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of

Cariño v. De Castro,[9] it was held:

In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the

Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in
the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the
specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the
Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines in all criminal cases.[10]

Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,[11] the Court made the

following pronouncement:

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the
Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial
courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal
actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the
Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not
the fiscal.[12]

And in Labaro v. Panay,[13] the Court held:

The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to

represent the Government or the People of the Philippines before us and
before the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any
court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or
proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. [14]

Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is

regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as
such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of
the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on Duca's petition. A copy of the CA
Resolution[15] dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment
was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty.
Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC
Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General
had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the
CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the
prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.[16] ruled as follows:

When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and

prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs.
Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-
33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20
SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA
1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic

constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdiction
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37
SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack
of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA
78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]).
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a `lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).[17]

The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases,
that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in
support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio
and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be
heard.[18]

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving

the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for
review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material
allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is,
therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to
be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered.
Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and
an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society
offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice
then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[20]

Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of

Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the
adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to
be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the

petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding
the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a

petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The
respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party,
in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent
failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a
copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.[21] The service
of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the
Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor
General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in
appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent's failure
to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition
as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has
no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead
of dismissing respondent's petition, proceeded to resolve the petition
and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General's comment.
We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed
decision.

On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies
only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against
whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special
civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors.[22] This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In
National Housing v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held:

However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

we held that while generally a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an
opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not
intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the
case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine
qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error
is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on
certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and
passed upon by the lower court.[24] (emphasis supplied)

The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is
justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings.
The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, *, Velasco, Jr.,** Brion,*** and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

 DIVISION
[ GR No. 193681, Aug 06, 2014 ]
PEOPLE v. PHILIP PICCIO +
RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Resolution[2]
dated September 15, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31549 which granted respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution[3] dated January 21, 2009, thereby dismissing petitioners'
notice of appeal[4] from the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875[5] for
libel on the ground that petitioners had no personality to appear for the
State and appeal the criminal aspect of a case because the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) did not give its conformity to the
same. Assailed further is the Resolution[6] dated September 2, 2010
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the September 15,
2009 Resolution of the CA for lack of merit.

The Facts
On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the
Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency the advertising arm of the
Yuchengco Group of Companies, to which Malayan Insurance Company,
Inc. is a corporate member filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City against a group called
the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting on the
website www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 an article entitled
"Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance
with Coalition." As alleged in the complaint, such publication was highly
defamatory and libelous against the Yuchengco family and the
Yuchengco Group of Companies, particularly petitioners Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee (petitioners).[7]

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City[8] found probable cause
to indict 16 trustees, officers and/or members of PEPCI, namely,
respondents Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan, Ma. Annabella Relova Santos,
John Joseph Gutierrez, Jocelyn Upano (Upano), Jose Dizon, Rolando
Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio (Bonifacio), Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente
Ortuoste (Ortuoste), Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Juvencio Pereche, Jr.
(Pereche, Jr.), Ricardo Lorayes, Peter Suchianco, and Trennie Monsod
(respondents) for 13 counts of libel.[9]

The criminal information in I.S. No. 1-11-11995 was soon after raffled
to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC) and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-875. Upon motion of respondents
Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr., the RTC, in an Order dated
May 23, 2007, quashed the criminal information for libel and dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction,[10] holding that the criminal information
failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or
where the offended parties reside.[11] It subsequently denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated February 11, 2008.[12]

On February 29, 2008, the People of the Philippines (People), through

the private prosecutors, and with the conformity of public prosecutor
Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr., filed a Notice of Appeal.[13] Soon after,
petitioners filed the Brief for the Private Complainants-Appellants[14] as
directed by the CA. The OSG, for its part, however, sought suspension
of the period to file the required brief pending information and
endorsement from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on whether it is the
People or the private complainant that should file the same.[15]

Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion[16] dated

October 20, 2008 stating that it had received an advisory from the DOJ
that the latter had no information about the case and, thus, prayed that
it be excused from filing the appellant's brief.

Meanwhile, respondents Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr.

filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal,[17] citing as grounds for dismissal the
fact that the Brief for the Private Complainants-Appellants filed by
petitioners did not carry the conforme of the OSG and that ordinary
appeal was not the appropriate remedy. In a Resolution [18] dated
January 21, 2009 the CA denied the said motion and directed
respondents to file their appellee's brief.[19]

Instead of filing the required appellee's brief, respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, prompting petitioners and
the OSG to file their respective comments.[20]

In their Comment/ Opposition[21] to the said motion for reconsideration,

petitioners insisted that the trial court's order of dismissal was a final
order from which an appeal was available; that the notice of appeal was
signed by the public prosecutor and therefore valid; and that
jurisprudence shows that the conformity of the OSG is not required
when grave errors are committed by the trial court or where there is
lack of due process.

In its Comment,[22] the OSG concurred in the propriety of the remedy of

an appeal against the assailed order, but nonetheless, asserted that the
appeal, without its conformity, must fail because under the law it is only
the OSG that should represent the People in criminal cases.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution dated September 15, 2009, the CA dismissed the appeal

on the ground that the OSG had not given its conformity to the said
appeal.[23]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[24] but the same was

denied by the CA in a Resolution[25] dated September 2, 2010, hence,
this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioners, being mere
private complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a
criminal case even without the OSG's conformity.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The CA correctly dismissed the notice of appeal interposed by

petitioners against the May 23, 2007 Order of the RTC because they,
being mere private complainants, lacked the legal personality to appeal
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875 (resulting from the quashal of
the information therein on the ground of lack of jurisdiction).

To expound, it is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in

appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested solely in
the OSG[26] which is the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or
the people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of
the people as the ends of justice may require.[27] Explicitly, Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code[28]
provides that:

SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor

General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(Emphases supplied)

Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal

case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is
only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People. [29] The rationale therefor is rooted in the
principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is
the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.
For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in
interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent
them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.[30] In
view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled
to the avails of the suit,[31] an appeal of the criminal case not filed by
the People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The
private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability
of the accused is concerned.[32] He may also file a special civil action for
certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end
of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case. [33]

Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to
preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking
the reversal of the RTC's quashal of the information in Criminal Case No.
06-875 and thereby seeking that the said court be directed to set the
case for arraignment and to proceed with trial,[34] it is sufficiently clear
that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of
respondents for libel. Being an obvious attempt to meddle into the
criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG, their
recourse, in view of the above-discussed principles, must necessarily
fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively
to the People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the appeal
through the representation of the OSG. Petitioners have no personality
or legal standing to interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since
the OSG had expressly withheld its conformity and endorsement in the
instant case, the CA, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal. It must,
however, be clarified that the aforesaid dismissal is without prejudice to
their filing of the appropriate action to preserve their interests but only
with respect to the civil aspect of the libel case following the parameters
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated

September 15, 2009 and September 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31549 dismissing petitioners' appeal from the dismissal
of the criminal case for libel are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, and

Leonen,* JJ., concur.