May 1

Trammel May

CST373 Ethics in Comm & Tech

February 11, 2018

My name is Trammel May and I am a student at California State University Monterey

Bay. I am enrolled in the Computer Science Online major program and currently enrolled in CST

373 which is Ethics in Current Issues in Communication and Technology. I originally embarked

my academic career as a music major before redirecting my path towards philosophy. My efforts

and experience in philosophy eventually lead me down the academic path towards computer

science. Symbolic logic, mathematics, and metacognition all exist in the intersection of

Philosophy and Computer Science. The goal of this essay is it utilize the various skills I have

acquired in order to analyze the ethical affairs chronicled in the case study of the Volkswagen

emissions scandal. The ethical creep proliferated by this scandal continues to spread into other

social spheres that impact the consumer marketplace, the body politic, and the environment,

across numerous countries. While these stakeholders may serve as the epicenters of direct

impact, the values at stake include the level of transparency of government regulated testing of

consumer products and corporate responsibility to their consumers, their shareholders, and the

environment. In a more general sense, this scandal invokes the social values of honesty and

transparency which this scandal has put at stake.

The Clean Air Act was signed into law by Lyndon B. Johnson on December 17th, 1963

(​H.R. 6518)​. The purpose of this legislation was to regulate the amount of air pollution within

the United States. In 1965 the Clean Air Act was amended through the Motor Vehicle Air

Pollution Control Act. This amendment granted the federal government the authority to establish
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emission standards for motor vehicles (​H.R. 9975)​. They key year is 2004. It was this year that

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) tightened the regulations on nitrogen oxide

emissions. The allowed emissions were moved from 1.25 grams of nitrogen oxide per mile down

to 0.07 grams (​EPA, 2000)​. This is particularly important concerning the Volkswagen scandal as

these new standards primarily adversely affect manufacturers of diesel vehicles and in fact it was

these standards that the EPA had invoiced the Volkswagen Group for being in violation of. The

benefits of diesel engines include better fuel economy, torque, and low-end power (​DeMuro,

2013)​. It is also worthy to mention that the European Union (EU) emissions standards are more

concerned with carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide emissions rather than the nitrogen oxides in

the EPA standards, therefore making it easier for diesel engine based motor vehicles to pass EU

emissions standards than US emissions standards (​Herron, 2015)​. With such benefits, and the

difference in emissions standards in the EU, the market share of diesel engine based vehicles in

the EU is around 50 percent (​EU diesel…, 2016)​.

In 2012 a number of researchers at West Virginia University won an International

Council on Clean Transportation grant in order for them to perform a series of performance tests

on clean diesel vehicles. When the team got to testing Volkswagen clean diesel vehicles, they

uncovered discrepancies upwards to 35 times the emissions they had expected (​Lam, 2015)​. The

team had suspected that cheating had been involved given the huge discrepancies, however it

wasn’t until a year and a half after they had published their data that the California Air Resources

Board and the EPA launched an investigation. This investigation lead to a notice of violation

issued by the EPA against the Volkswagen Group on September 18th 2015 (​VW Notice of

Violation, 2015)​.
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In the EPA’s notice of violation they charged the Volkswagen Group for designing

software that recognized when the federal test procedure parameters were in place and

underperform when such parameters were not met. In other words, the software would

purposefully perform to meet optimum emissions standards when, and only when, it detected

that federal regulatory tests were in process. This resulted in a list of Volkswagen turbocharged

direct injection diesel engine products circulating in the marketplace from 2009 to 2015 that

failed to meet federal standards despite passing the regulatory testing phase (​VW Notice of

Violation, 2015)​. Once this scandal went public, Hans-Dieter Potsch, the Volkswagen chairman

admitted to this behavior. Potsch claims that the company simply didn’t have enough time or

budget to find a technical solution to meet the United States emissions standards. Michael Horn,

who is the chief executive for Volkswagen Group of America, claimed that this was not a

corporate decision but instead the result of the work of several software engineers for the

company. While there is no doubt that a company the size of Volkswagen indeed puts immense

pressure on their employees to meet their goals that could possibly drive rogue employees to

cheat in order to achieve the desired results, investigations assert that it is unlikely the software

could communicate with all the engine systems without the involvement of other developers.

Around 50 employees have come forward to having knowledge of this scandal, some of which of

whom claim to have reported the cheat to supervisors (​Goodman, 2016)​.

It is impossible to pinpoint exactly who is to blame for this scandal, however it is clear

that a culture motivated by fiscal responsibility instead of legal and environmental responsibility

is to blame for the events that transpired. While Volkswagen is the biggest name in this scandal,

it is also important to recognize that this culture is not unique to Volkswagen, and since their
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outing other manufacturers have faced diesel scandals as well, including Hyundai, Nissan,

Renault, Fiat, Volvo, and Jeep (​Carrington, 2015​). It is also worthy to note that although the

primary focus of this scandal is the United States and the European Union, the impact on the

globe is vast, inciting action from more than twenty other governments, of which will not be

discussed, even including criminal investigations. The heavy fines Volkswagen faced are a

deterrent for other companies to cheat, however it does not guarantee or prevent other companies

from cheating or pursue newer more advanced cheating systems. One solution that the EU is

currently evaluating is whether or not to legislate new “Real Driving Emissions Tests” which

cannot be faked like the current tests which simulate conditions (​Johansson, 2018)​.

When it comes to how the media interpreted and packaged the story of the scandal, it is

difficult to categorize the representation given the global nature of the story. For the sake of

brevity and synchronicity with the primary governments involved, media representation within

the United States and the European Union will be of primary concern. According to the

American Press Institute (APi) the purpose of journalism is to, “..provide citizens with the

information they need to make the best possible decisions about their lives, their communities,

their societies, and their governments (​What is the purpose..., 2013)​.” To articulate this in

another manner may be to say that in order to provide citizens with the best information,

journalists should lean towards the informational side of presentation and less on the persuasive

side. Innate personal and cultural biases are impossible to completely eliminate from one’s

writing, however some news publications are blatant with their bias. It may seem easy to shrug

off such bias articles as soley the reflection of the writer and not of the publication, however

every article requires the approval of several editors including the final approval by the editor in
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chief. If an article did not reflect the values of the publication the publication would simply not

public the article.

The language journalists use is very important in how it will inform or sway the reader

and is very telling as to the bias or stand of the writer. There simplest way to ascertain whether or

not an article is presented with a bias in a given direction is to look for “weasel words”. Weasel

words describes a set of information language that invokes a sense of authority within statements

when there is no authority presented. There are several forms of weasel words that will be

discussed as they come up in the news media portrayal of the VW scandal, but some of the most

basic forms include weak adverbs, vague expressions, and unnecessary qualifiers.

CNN published an article on September 25th, 2015 called “Volkswagen scandal...in two

minutes”. This article is an ideal case study because it was published a week after the scandal

began and the goal of the article is to educate readers quickly, trimming all the unnecessary

information out of the article. One other important note is that this article does take place several

days after VW had publicly admitted to deception so a lack of qualifiers such as “allegedly” can

be expected to be missing from such an article which naturally makes it read more accusatory.

Their article is fairly terse and to the point, and at first glance appears to accurately outline the

story beats of all the important events that had transpired thus far in the scandal, however it does

present several weasel words and weasel phrases. The article discusses the fiscal losses

Volkswagen has sustained since the scandal went public and the proceeds to describe what

unnamed and uncited analysts expect as the final result. This is a weasel word because it invokes

a sense of authority but it is intentionally vague as there is no qualifications given to these

experts, no institute or name which solidifies their expertise. At the very beginning of the article
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they summarize the scandal in a single small paragraph. They use weasel words to put the blame

entirely on Volkswagen by saying, “Volkswagen fitted as many as 11 million diesel vehicles

worldwide with software that could cheat…” The official statement from Volkswagen at this

time was that this was not a corporate decision and that it was the result of several employees.

The article even mentions this later illustrating that they know that a more accurate

representation of the facts would be to say that the vehicles were fitted rather than Volkswagen

had fitted them. The article also avoids writing about any facts that might educate the reader as to

why any of these events transpired. This indicates that CNN is not concerned with the reasons

behind this scandal, what is most important is to educate their readers on what the scandal

entails, and what the outcome is thus far. It is clear that CNN is biased against Volkswagen and

isn’t concerned with the individuals involved, or their reasons. CNN is ready to put the company

as a whole on the chopping block (​CNN, 2015)​.

On the European side, BBC put out an article titled “Volkswagen: The scandal

explained” on December 10th, 2015. This article is of similar length as CNN’s and has the same

goal, to quickly explain the scandal to their readers. The BBC article takes time to go over the

accusations and Volkswagen’s response separately. This is important because this allows the

article to avoid painting Volkswagen as merely a villain that must be squelched. The article also

takes time to illustrate that VW of America admits their mistake and is actively working to fix all

the systemic issues that lead to the scandal. Lastly the article talks about how this scandal affects

the market and the implications towards other automobile manufacturers. By comparison it may

appear as though BBC has a bias in the favor of Volkswagen, but this is not the case. This article
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shows that their bias is actually towards the larger implications of the events and that BBC does

not seem themselves or their readers as the distributors of justice (​Hotten, 2015)​.

After reading dozens of news articles from the United States and the EU it is clear that

different publications in different countries exhibit different patterns in how they package the

story of the scandal. Press within the United States is not concerned with why Volkswagen

deceived the EPA. Instead the publications package the story as a foreign company swindling the

U.S. regulatory system to sell substandard vehicles within the United States, risking the health of

consumers for the sake of profit. Many U.S. new organizations published articles illustrating

how the software that cheated the system works, even using vehicle diagrams (​Gates et al.,

2015)​. It is also evident that news media within the United States has a stake in the health

interests of its constituency as the U.S. market is directly at potential health risk due to

purchasing vehicles with the false presupposition that environmental standards were being met.

This is evident through articles such as Fortune’s analysis of the scandal in 2015 as well as

Time’s more recent article in 2017 (​Selin, 2015; Alter, 2017)​. European news has changed more

drastically from the start of the scandal to the present. On the other hand, EU news organizations

have been far more focussed on the economic impact of the scandal, often focusing on damages,

fiscal impact, etc. Many European publications such as Euronews avoided using as many

accusatory words in articles back in 2015 (​Euronews, 2015)​. After VW plead guilty of the

scandal on January 11, 2017 it seemed other European countries wanted to put their hands out

for compensation as well, such as Luxembourg as disclosed by Euronews on February 6th, 2017

(​Euronews, 2017)​. European investigations and demands for compensation seemed to have

turned a switch on the representation of the VW scandal in Europe. It was around this time that
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news media sources use language and techniques more similar to how United States articles had

back in 2015. This is likely due to the publications identifying with the wronged class of

individuals for the first time since the scandal began (​Ganter & Strube, 2009)​.

Although news publications have change some of the language they use throughout the

years and based on what is happening in the countries they reside, the news media as a whole has

always packaged the scandal with negative light and condemned the practices that lead to the

scandal as unethical. The focus of the news media has changed constantly as new events

transpire, new information is brought forward, and as the public gets more education on the

scandal itself, however the package of the story has always been one that discriminates against

Volkswagen while sympathizing for those harmed.

The news media is not the only parties that have stakes in this scandal. According to

recent trends collected from the twitter analytics api, it is possible to see the current

demographics and trends around social networking discussions of the Volkswagen scandal. In

particular, when discussing #dieselgate, #volkswagen, #volkswagen scandal, and #vw scandal,

the trend statistics illustrate that 25% of the global discussion takes place within the United

States, 13.18% in the Netherlands, and 5.91% in Germany. In total, the twitter analytics api has

used machine learning to determine that 35.9% of the global discussion has a negative sentiment,

7% has a positive sentiment, and the remaining 57.1% is neutral (​Hashtag Tracking…, 2018)​.

While this can grant a high level look at the general demographics where online discussion takes

place and the sentiments involved, it does not give us specifics in regards other demographics or

their exact viewpoints.

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It is important to first recognize that the vehicles manufactured by the Volkswagen Group

and their subsidiaries are not inexpensive and therefore those affected by the scandal are

naturally going to fall into demographics with larger income pools, regions with higher income,

and by proxy demographics with higher education or trade skills. Those with higher education

can understand the environmental and health impact of the scandal where undereducated classes

may simply not have acquired the knowledge to fully understand the impacts. Lower income

communities also generally do not have luxury of being able to invest time to research, follow,

and protest events. For example, a CEO in Silicon Valley is going to be very upset when they

discover that they were lied to about the environmental impact of their vehicle when they spend

their time and resources to lower their carbon footprint. On the other hand someone who lives in

poverty cannot afford the resources or time to make decisions about the environmental impact of

their property and would be grateful just to have a Volkswagen.

There are in fact many other parties other than the mainstream media with their own

perspectives on the scandal and its outcome thus far. First and foremost comes the perspectives

from those who purchased VW vehicles under the false pretense that they met current

environmental regulatory standards. Owners of the 2009 - 2015 2.0 liter, four-cylinder TDIs

were given the option to sell their cars back for the original blue book value plus an additional

compensation (​Bartlett et al., 2017)​. VW consumers are the first line of people who are directly

harmed by the lies and cheating done by Volkswagen. As such, this group of individuals are

rightfully very upset. Many owners feel duped and powerless, and as such taking money back

from the company that swindled them is a cathartic act, especially when coupled with taking

advantage of vague verbiage in the VW buyback terms. The terms only require vehicles to be
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operable in order for consumers to get their compensation, so consumers are stripping out as

much of the internals of the vehicle as possible while still making it operable. This includes

consumers keeping the headlight bulbs, the sound system, and even the bumpers. This is

indicative of a class of individuals who not only want compsenations but retribution (​Wehner,

2016)​.

While the consumers themselves are the immediate individuals impact by the scandal,

they are not the only ones. In fact, everyone who wants to breath clean air within is a stakeholder

in this incident. Particularly environmentalists and environmental groups have taken issue with

the unethical actions of Volkswagen (​Scheer, 2017)​. Harvard and MIT researchers have found

that 59 Americans will prematurely die as a direct result of the excess pollution caused as a result

of Volkswagen cheating on the regulatory tests (​Barrett et al., 2015)​. In other words,

Volkswagens actions are not within victims. The environmental impact is also dire and has lead

to numerous environmental groups reaching out. The Sierra Club, the largest and most influential

grassroots environmental organization, has released statements throughout the scandal

illustrating their stance and their demands. The Sierra Club condemns Volkswagen for their

actions and has demanded recalls on all the affected vehicles, and want to push Volkswagen

towards clean air vehicles with minimal environmental impact as environmental and consumer

health is at risk with any non-clean air vehicle (​Lantry, 2016)​.

The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) does not share the same view

as some of their peer environmentalist groups. PETA used the news of the scandal as a means of

shedding light on what they perceive to be a more important environmental issue which is the

animal agriculture industry. They shed a light on the perhaps unknown inherent hypocrisy that
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exists within all those outraged by the environmental impact of the Volkswagen scandal. They

cite research that illustrates how the environmental damage caused by animal agriculture exceeds

the damage caused by the entire automotive industry. They do not shrug off the scandal or

intentionally trivialize it, but for PETA the scandal is an educational opportunity on the what

they perceive to be larger a much larger issues (​PETA, 2015)​. To give an analogy, PETA sees

the environment as a sinking boat and whereas the environmental impact of animal agriculture is

a primary leak causing the flooding, the Volkswagen emissions are but a few drops of water.

They see the global discussion about the flooding boat is a great discussion but want to turn it

away from the few drops of water to the leak itself.

The Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) represents another perspective held by a

minority of individuals throughout the scandal. While the majority of perspectives fall in line

with that of the mainstream media, condemning Volkswagen for their unethical practices, this

perspective sees the EPA as the responsible party. FEE claims that the expectations presented by

regulations created by the EPA are unrealistic and were based on the assumption that automobile

manufacturer would create new technology in order to meet the new standards. As previously

mentioned, the new regulations effective in 2004 are of the most stringent auto regulations in the

world to date. According to FEE, these regulations are downright impractical and therefore in

fact encouraged companies to cheat when ended up having a much larger negative impact on the

environment than if the EPA had issues more reasonable regulations (​Veksler, 2017)​.

When it comes to analyzing the ethics of the Volkswagen scandal the first requirement is

to establish an ethos or an ethical framework in which to apply. While many ethical frameworks

may result in the same conclusion, the nuanced prongs in the decision tree can vary greatly. In
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regards specifically to the Volkswagen scandal there are three core ethical frameworks which are

most pertinent, Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism, and Deontology. These ethical frameworks differ

from more refined frameworks such as Capitalism and Environmentalism as these frameworks

exist within smaller scopes borrowing from core frameworks and applying them to economics

and consumerism. One last important note before applying these ethical frameworks to the

Volkswagen scandal is to realize that while The Volkswagen Group is not an individual person it

is a moral agent, or rather The Volkswagen Group has moral agency.

Egoism is an ethic of which centers around the self interest of the moral agent. Ethical

Egoism more specifically holds to the maxim such that it is ethical for all moral agents to act in

their self interest. The main criticism of this ethos is that oftentimes individuals own interests

come into direct conflict with others. This criticism is obvious at its surface but it has many

layers and is quite deep. While it is not important to detail every nuance in the critiques of ethical

egoism, it is important to note that sometimes one’s own self interest is directly tied to the

interest of a group despite the information that is immediately available to the individual. In

other words, the individual cannot always act in their own self interest as they may not know

what course of action is truly in their interest. The most important question when applying an

ethical framework to a situation is to answer the question of whether or not a moral agent acted

ethically in accordance with the axioms of the framework. At the surface it is quite easy to regard

the actions of Volkswagen as unethical simply due to the enormous financial and reputational

costs of their actions. That being said, when acting it is impossible to know exactly how events

will transpire and so disregarding the events that preceded the decision to cheat, it is perhaps

more meaningful to address whether or not the decision to cheat was ethical. There is no doubt
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that the financial gain of the decision was indeed within the self interest of Volkswagen, but

what about the inevitable environmental impact? To inflict harm on the environment is to inflict

harm on yourself, however indirect it may be. This is where The Volkswagen Group has an

ethical advantage as an inhuman moral agent; they cannot be harmed by the environment

because a corporation is just an idea recognized by others. The interests of a corporation are

always the interests of today and never tomorrow. Whereas it would be more ethical for a person

to steal a fishing pole instead of a fish, under ethical egoism, it is always more ethical for a

corporation to steal the fish. Herein lies the issue with ethical egoism; how can society under

ethical egoism judge moral agents for acting in their self interest? Indeed under such an ethical

framework the actions of Volkswagen are justified. Coupled with this fact though is also the idea

that the various peoples, governments, and organizations relating against Volkswagen are also

acting in their self interest as well, and therefore also acting ethically. The paradoxical nature of

two conflicting moral decisions existing simultaneously as ethical is an innate consequence of

ethical egoism, which is why many reject it as a serious ethos in which to subscribe. It is clear

that regardless of the societal subscriptions to ethics used to judge Volkswagen, that as a moral

agent Volkswagen simply made a decision that would result in the immediate gratification of its

own interest.

Ethical egoism is not the only tool in the shed. A much more accepted ethos subscribed to

by moral agents is that of Utilitarianism. This framework is centered around the maxim of that

which the course of action which yields the greatest good to the greatest amount of moral agents

is the ethical course of action. Within it exists a built in rule which dictates that actions should

likewise minimize the amount of harm done to others; harm being antithetical to good. This
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framework requires serious consideration before any action as it is the result of an action that

dictates whether or not the action is ethical. The first question that must be asked when

considering the ethical implications of the Volkswagen scandal is who if anyone benefited from

the cheating. This question must be answered in the context of the moral agents knowledge when

the decision to cheat was made. Those who directly benefited are those who created the software

itself, enabling them to keep their jobs lest the company hire others to do what they could not.

Employees and directors also benefited as the company was able to tap into a market that they

previously did not have access to due to the strict regulations. The shareholders of Volkswagen

also benefited due to the increased profit yields from the U.S. marketplace. In a sense, even those

who purchased the vehicles benefited by gaining access to less expensive models of diesel

vehicles than what they would have cost if Volkswagen had actually invested in the innovative

technology that would have allowed them to pass regulatory tests without cheating. Overall,

there is a lofty sum of individuals who directly benefited from the actions of Volkswagen. The

next question to ask is who was harmed by this decision. The most obvious initial harm is the

harm due to the estimated 59 people who will prematurely expire due to the environmental

damage caused by the vehicles (​Barrett et al., 2015)​. There is the unknowable harm to the health

of all those impacted by exposure to the environments these automobiles were driven in. While

this damage also applies to wildlife and non-human life, this will be avoided as it is based on the

presupposition that animals are moral agents which although is commonly believed is not the

goal of this examination. For that reason the harm to non-human life will not be tallied, although

it very well can be. Lastly, there is also the unknowable and possibly unrepairable damage to the

systems that calibrate, manage, and regulate the automotive industry. At this point it is beginning
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to look like Volkswagen behaved unethically within a utilitarian framework, but is this really the

case? It is important to remember that the end result is of great importance in determining the

utility of a course of action. There are several more variables that need to be examined when

determining the final result of the Volkswagen scandal. Firstly, there are others who were

harmed since the impact, and many of these harms directly conflict with the previously

mentioned good caused by Volkswagen’s actions. The entire fiscal impact as consequence to

cheating on regulatory tests has cost The Volkswagen Group a net of around $30 billion. The

dollar cost and reputational cost has also resulted in Volkswagen shares dropping and

rebounding to 1% lower (​Riley, 2017)​. These consequences have caused severe financial harm to

the company and its shareholders resulting in cutting 30,000 employees (​Associated Pres., 2016)​.

At this point it seems almost impossible to redeem Volkswagen’s actions from a utilitarian

framework, however the positive impact of this scandal may just do that. As mentioned earlier

and on the front of those gaining from the scandal are those who sell their Volkswagen vehicles

back to the company for a value that exceeds what they paid. Part of the settlement with the EPA

also requires that The Volkswagen Group invests $2 billion in researching and creating zero

emissions vehicles which will have much greater positive environmental impact than if the diesel

vehicles had simply met the regulatory standards to begin with. Zero emissions is better for the

environment than emissions (​Volkswagen Clean…, 2017)​. Lastly, and probably the best

consequence, is that this scandal has opened the floodgates with respect to automobile

manufacturers cheating or lying about their emissions. With companies like GM and Fiat now

also under fire, the VW scandal is responsible for shedding light on the unethical practices of the

automobile industry which would have otherwise remained concealed (​Isidore, 2017; Wood,
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2016)​. For these reasons it seems that although Volkswagen’s intentions were not utilitarian in

nature, they are unintentionally, and unintuitively, ethical under the principle of utility.

Deontological ethics are often referred to as duty based ethics. They are the belief that

moral agents have a moral obligation to act a certain way. The important question when making

a decision which has moral implication is for the moral agent to ask themselves whether the

decision is good or bad. For Immanuel Kant, a renown deontological philosopher, deontological

ethics can be boiled down into the idea that one should only act such that the one wills their

maxim a universal law. Kant calls this axiom the Categorical Imperative (​Johnson & Cureton,

2016)​. In the case of the Volkswagen scandal the implications of such a maxim consequentially

detteriates society and is not only undesirable but unethical. To understand this is to understand

the maxim which dictates the actions of Volkswagen. By finding it morally permissible to cheat

and/or lie for a moral agent’s personal gain requires by means of the Categorical Imperative for

all moral agents to be permitted to do the same. As a universal truth this renders all contracts

void therefore unravelling the fabric of the social contract altogether. There is in fact no

deontological consideration that would permit the behavior of Volkswagen without by definition

opening Volkswagen, and by proxy Everyone, vulnerable to the same agency.

While the Volkswagen scandal itself seems to be approaching some level of closure, the

impact will be long felt. As mentioned earlier, Volkswagen’s unethical behavior was the catalyst

which called into question the the ethics of many other automobile companies, since putting

them under the public microscope (​Team, 2015)​. As time continues to roll forward there is no

doubt that more companies will be implicated in cheating on emissions tests, as many have

already. Emissions is not the only issue though, with a new lack of trust from consumers and
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regulators with regard to automobile companies comes scrutiny and investigation into other

claims made by players in the industry. With Takata Corporation pleading guilty to over 100

million air bags, underreporting of fatal accidents by Honda, and boosted fuel economy numbers

from Kia, Hyundai, and Ford, it is clear that cheating on regulatory tests are just the tip of the

iceberg when it comes to dishonesty, cutting corners, and general unethical business practices in

the automotive industry (​Mehrotra & Welch, 2017)​. As technology continues to advance so does

the ability for companies to successfully implement deceptive tactics to get the edge in the

marketplace, and this issue will only get worse. While the focus has largely been on automotive

practices it is important to note that all companies are subject to the implication of using software

to cheat. Applied Ethicist Michael Baer of Arizona State University completed a study where his

team found that workplace culture can unintentionally incentivize cheating. Cultural attributes

such as the pressure to perform highly can become overwhelming resulting in employees seeking

illegitimate means of boosting their performance (​Reedy, 2017)​. With a job market that becomes

increasingly more competitive and technology enabling easier means of cheating, there is no

doubt that this issue is going to get worse and seep into other markets outside the automobile

industry (​Rugaber & Boak, 2015)​. According to Baer, the best way we can combat this problem

is by changing the competitive nature of the business culture. This includes applying less

pressure to employees, making the rule boundaries clear and concise, and establishing realistic

performance expectations (​Reedy, 2017)​.

During the investigation and analysis of the Volkswagen scandal, my perspective has

changed several times. While my perspective has evolved, I should note that my conclusion has

not. From the beginning I found the behaviors of Volkswagen to be unethical and that will
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probably never change. That being said, my initial perspective was focused on the audacity that a

company would have to lie to their patrons. The act of lying is one that I deem unethical in

principal as well as categorically. After researching the events that transpired I discovered that

the scandal has yielded several positive outcomes as discussed earlier. I considered the

implications of bad actions yielding good results. I approached this from the perspectives of

Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism, and Deontology. This shift in perspective allowed me to examine

angles I would have otherwise rejected. In the end I find myself in agreeance with deontological

perspectives because in the end, a society cannot function when principles such as honest, or

honest business practices are abandoned in the name of utility or self interest. Approaching the

issue

This issue is one that may not be going away soon but it is one that society can solve. I

agree with Baer’s, that in order to shift companies away from unethical behavior, first we must

change the culture. I also believe that the regulatory systems constructed to protect consumers,

the environment, and a free market should inspect software. This could be done by providing tax

incentives for open sourcing software and/or requiring that proprietary software is also ran

through a regulatory linting process. This would inspect and ensure that all government

regulations are not bypassed and could also include security checks. More importantly, the

legislation that would enable regulators to perform such duties would have to be carefully

constructed. If companies opt not to open source their software, this provides a massive

intellectual property risk, and intellectual property should be protected as well. There would also

have to be clear boundaries preventing the government from requiring software to have back

doors in order to pass regulatory examination.

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