General Concepts

Law - In its general and abstract sense, is the science of moral laws founded on the rational
nature of man that governs his free activity for the realization of the individual and
social ends of life under an aspect of mutual conditional dependence --- Lapitan v. Phil.
Charity Sweepstakes Office, 4 CAR (2s) 704, cited in Moreno Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 ed., p.
267.

Civil Law - Is that mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations that exists between
members of a society for the protection of interests --- Quisaba vs. Sta. Inez-Melale
Veneer & Plywood, Inc., 58 SCRA 774.

Common Law - It is “the body of judge-made law based on the good sense of the judges who can discern justice
on a case to case basis.” The collection of legal interpretations made by judges. In the US the
interpretations are law unless they are revoked later by new statutory law.

Bagatsing vs. Herrera (65 SCRA 434)

Re: Common Law – Principles, Usages and Rules of Action applicable to the government
and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority on any express
and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. It is a law applied throughout
England by the King’s Court. Common law known as Anglo-American jurisprudence is not
in force in the Philippines, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding on our courts
save only insofar as they are founded upon sound principles applicable to local conditions
and are not in conflict with existing law (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241); nevertheless, many
of the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law have, to all intents and purposes,
been imported into this jurisdiction- hence, these laws can only be construed and applied
with the aid of common law from which they are derived, and, to breathe the breath of
life into some of the institutions introduced in these Islands under American sovereignty,
recourse must be had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law.

In Re: Shoop (41 Phil 213)

Common law based upon Anglo-American Common Law only supplements and amplifies
Philippine Statute Law. Anglo-American common law is effective in the Philippines insofar
as it does not conflict with written law, local customs and institutions.

Cruz vs. Pahati (98 Phil 778)

Between a common law principle and a statutory provisions (Art. 559, NCC), principle of
irredivindicability of title of personal property, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.
“Equity follows the law”.

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KINDS OF LAWS:

a) As to relationship governed.

i. Public Law - governs the relationship between the State and its
citizens and inhabitants. Ex. Constitutional Law, Public International Law,
Administrative Law, and Criminal Law.

ii. Private Law - governs the relationship between citizens, inhabitants

and other persons who may be within its territory. Ex. Civil Law and Commercial
Law.

b) As to Effect.

i. Mandatory - the law imposes something to be done (positive) or

something that cannot be done (prohibitory or negative).

ii. Permissive - laws that are merely directory in nature; it provides rules
of conduct that are not mandatory.

iii. Procedural - laws that establish rules and procedure. Broadly

speaking, these include procedures and doctrine promulgated by the Supreme
Court. --- UP vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 18112, August 23, 2012.

Effect and Application of Laws

ARTICLE 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the

Philippines." (n)

Effectivity and Effect of law to rights, other laws & administrative acts

Summary:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided (A2), and it shall have no retroactive effect, unless contrary is provided (A4).
Furthermore, act executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be
void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity (A5).

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Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law(A6).
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observances shall not
be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary. Laws declared inconsistent with
the Constitution shall be void. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulation shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to law or the Constitution (A7).

Discussion

ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.

PRINCIPLES:

When laws take effect?

General Rule :

Laws take effect 15 days following the completion of its publication.

Exception :

Unless otherwise provided by law. This refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. --- Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 and Umali vs. Estanislao, 209 SCRA 446

Lara vs. Del Rosario (94 Phil 778)

Supreme Court fixed the date of effectivity of the New Civil Code (R.A. 386) on
August 30, 1950 (Art. 2, NCC), by commencing to count the one-year period from
August 30, 1949 (date of release for circulation) not from June, 1949 (date of

Page 3 of 121
publication) of the Official Gazette. (Section 11 of Revised Administrative Code,
which provides that the date of publication of the Official Gazette is conclusively
presumed to be the date of circulation was disregarded by the Supreme Court).

The above provision is amended by EO 200 entitled "Providing For The Publication
Of Laws Either In The Official Gazette Or In A Newspaper Of General Circulation
In The Philippines As A Requirement For Their Effectivity" (issued June 18, 1987).
The above provision is amended by EO 200 entitled "Providing For The Publication
Of Laws Either In The Official Gazette Or In A Newspaper Of General Circulation
In The Philippines As A Requirement For Their Effectivity" (issued June 18, 1987).

What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,

which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." -- ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs. Cesar V.
Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

But what if the law provides a date of effectivity, can

publication be dispense with?

Ans.: No, publication cannot be dispense with as a general rule even if the Statute
has a specific date of its effectivity. In one case, the Supreme Court enunciated
that ----- Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light
of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section
1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by

Page 4 of 121
 law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. . . ."
The clear object of the above quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,13 Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority
holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.

SEC vs. GMA Network, Inc., G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008

On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a
domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent
Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied
for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from
"Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the
extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June
16, 2000.

Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and
Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of
corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.

On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest
the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner
requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the
petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension
of corporate term.

On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting
to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.
In its Memorandum dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that it issued the
questioned memorandum circular in the exercise of its delegated legislative
power to fix fees and charges. The filing fees required by it are allegedly
uniformly imposed on the transacting public and are essential to its supervisory
and regulatory functions. The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and,
therefore, require no publication.

Page 5 of 121
Ruling:

However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum
circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been published
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order
No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
it is otherwise provided."

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and

Employment,13 Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority
holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be

construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531.

This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of

R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at
large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or
regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must
be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the
Office of the National Administrative Register.

A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as

interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SEC’s assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and
amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that
charged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The
fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the
fee is being collected, in this case, the examination and verification
of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its
corporate term.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been

delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The
due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine
whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within
the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it
arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right to property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68163, dated February 20, 2004, and its Resolution, dated June 9,
2004, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Page 6 of 121
When is the Rule interpretative or internal in nature or a letter of instruction,
thus, not requiring publication?

Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, et al. vs. ERC, G.R. Nos. 192117
& 192118, September 18, 2012

Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. The purpose of publication is

to duly inform the public of the contents of the laws which govern them and regulate
their activities. . . . Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and
regulations be published in order to be effective. . . . There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative regulation does not
require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an interpretative
regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already prescribed." It "add[s] nothing to the law" and
"do[es] not affect the substantial rights of any person." Second, a regulation that is
merely internal in nature does not require publication for its effectivity. It seeks to
regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public.
Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or
guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties does not
require publication in order to be effective.

Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances

— a legislative rule and an interpretative rule.

In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., vs.

Department of Finance Secretary, 11 the Court expressed:
". . . a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. In the same way that
laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted
there must be hearing. In this connection, the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
"Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law,
an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties
the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published
in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2)
weeks before the first hearing thereon.

Page 7 of 121
 "(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
"In addition such rule must be published. On the other
hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing."
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the
other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least
to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect
of law. --- (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119761, [August 29, 1996], 329 PHIL 987-1043)

Is the mere mentioning of an Annex in the law makes the said Annex a
valid law or is it not a law? (Publication requirement)

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 180705,
November 27, 2012

Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement for the
Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers" executed by the PCA. [However,] [t]he PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement referred to . . . in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not
reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-
settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an
indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. . . . The publication, as further
held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication
is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number
of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of
effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement. . . . We cannot,
therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law.

PRELIMINARILY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PCA AND EDUARDO M.

COJUANGCO, JR. DATED MAY 25, 1975 CANNOT BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF
A LAW FOR THE LACK OF THE REQUISITE PUBLICATION.

Page 8 of 121
It will be recalled that Cojuangco’s claim of ownership over the UCPB shares is
hinged on two contract documents the respective contents of which formed part
of and reproduced in their entirety in the aforecited Order of the Sandiganbayan
dated March 11, 2003. The first contract refers to the agreement entered into by
and between Pedro Cojuangco and his group, on one hand, and Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., on the other, bearing date "May 1975" (hereinafter referred to as
"PC-ECJ Agreement"), while the second relates to the accord between the PCA and
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement"). The PC-ECJ Agreement allegedly contains, inter alia,
Cojuangco’s personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB ("UCPB") shares
from Pedro and his group. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s acquisition
of the said option from Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement

for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the
Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA. Particularly, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. It is hereby declared that the policy of

the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at
preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by
the implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank
for the benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut
Authority, the terms of which "Agreement" are hereby incorporated by reference;
and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for
free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such
rules and regulations it may promulgate. (Emphasis Ours.)

It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to

above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the
same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact,
publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v.
Tuvera said as much:

Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x.

xxxx

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the
law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

xxxx

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the

Page 9 of 121
 Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

We even went further in Tañada to say that:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and
give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since
the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere
referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its
supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by

reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the
exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof
attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore,
extend to the said

Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its

holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary
transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the
Civil Code. --- Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 180705,
November 27, 2012

BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 1990

XIV
After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Luzon provinces,
the executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to enact a special law
appropriating P1 billion for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for the provinces. In view of the
urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its effectivity clause that it shall take
effect upon approval and after completion of publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1, 1990.
signed into law by the President on July 3, 1990 and published in such newspaper of general
circulation on July 7, 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.
A. As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient observance or
compliance with the requirements for a valid publication? Explain your answer.
B. When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.
C. Can the executive branch start releasing and disbursing funds appropriated by the said
law the day following its approval? Explain your answer.

Page 10 of 121
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes, there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of
publication for its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2, Civil Code)
B. The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and the
last condition was complied with on July 10, 1990. Hence, the" law became effective on that
date.
C. No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1, 1990 and
approved by the President on July 3, 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not yet
complete at the time.

ARTICLE 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is

provided. (3)

Principles:

GENERAL RULE:

LAWS SHALL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT, UNLESS THE CONTARY IS PROVIDED.

Exemptions to the Rule:

1. If the law itself provide for retroactivity (Art. 4), provided it is

Civil by nature --- WAR PROFIT TAX is not an ipso facto law
because taxes are civil in nature not criminal. This is
notwithstanding that its non-payment may give rise to criminal
prosecution for tax evasion, which is after the imposition of the
tax and not before. The same rule is applicable on matters of
imposed interest on unpaid taxes for the same are still civil in
nature. Even if there is express retroactive application, the
same is still void if it is an (a) Ex Post Facto Law or (b) the law
impair the obligation of contracts.

2. If the laws are remedial in nature because in rules of procedure

there is no vested rights. Thus, new rules of procedure can be
made to apply to existing cases.

3. If the Statute is penal in nature provided that it is favourable

to the accused, and provided that accused is not a habitual

Page 11 of 121
delinquent as defined under the Revised Penal Code. However,
the case of Pomeroy vs. Director of Prison, L-14284-14285 also
provided that retroactive application even if favourable to the
accused cannot be applied if the accused case has already been
decided with finality under the principle of stare decisis/res
judicata, or the law of the case. The remedy of the accused is
to ask for pardon.

Case reference:

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the
Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received
a dispatch order from the desk officer. The order directed him and three
(3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for
kidnapping with ransom.

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on

petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP)
Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was
about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached
petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional
rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter
Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division

at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain
Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. Epifanio Deriquito, the
records verifier, presented a certification to that effect signed by Edwin C.
Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition."

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended
P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. The present law now states:

Page 12 of 121
 SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no
other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied)

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive

application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto
law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice
Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on
the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and
the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as
an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice."

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the

same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period
from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum

which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower,
which is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4]
months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months). Hence, the
penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6)
years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in
consonance with the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals and
Barredo v. Vinarao.

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper
disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools
of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is

AFFIRMED in full. --- SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, G.R. No. 164815, February 22,
2008.

Page 13 of 121
4. If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized by
the police power of the State.
5. If the law is curative in nature.

Spouses Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, [July 8, 2005], 501 PHIL
397-412

We agree in the position taken by petitioners.

Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition for certiorari on 17
August 2000, the rule then prevailing was Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 effective 01
September 1998, which provides:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the.
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due
time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein
fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be
less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis supplied)
However, on 01 September 2000, during the pendency of the case before
the Court of Appeals, Section 4 was amended anew by A.M. No. 00-2-03-
SC which now provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.

Page 14 of 121
 No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the
petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration, if one is filed.
In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission, we described this
latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion
brought about by Circular No. 39-98 because, "historically, i.e., even
before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh
period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration
to file a petition for certiorari." Curative statutes, which are enacted to
cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements,
by their very essence, are retroactive. And, being a procedural rule, we
held in Sps. Ma. Carmen and Victor Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito
Legarda that "procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent."
Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from the time they
received the Order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration on 18 June 2000. When they filed their petition with the
Court of Appeals on 17 August 2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed following
the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
last day included. Hence, there can be no doubt that the petition was filed
within the reglementary period for doing so and it was reversible error on
the part of the Court of Appeals in not giving said petition due course.
However, instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals which
would only unduly prolong the disposition of the substantive issue raised,
we shall resolve the petition originally filed therein.|||

6. If substantive right be declared for the first time unless vested rights
are impaired (Article 2253) --- right of the spurious child under the
Family Code but if the parents of the child died before the family
code, the Family Code favourable provision to the spurious child
cannot be allowed retroactive application because the other heirs
already inherited the property, thus, enjoys a vested right. Vested
right or acquired right is defined as some right or interest in property
that has become fixed and established that is no longer open to
controversy ---- Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498. A right is also vested
when it has so far been perfected that nothing remains to be done by
the party asserting it. --- Dones v. Director, et al., L-9302, May 14,
1956

7. Tax Laws.

Page 15 of 121
Pneumonic: CIPCRET – meaning C for contrary is expressly provided, I for
interpretative statutes, P for procedural/remedial laws, C for curative statues, R for
creating new rights, E for emergency laws, and T for tax laws.

Case references:

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of
Caloocan City2 filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the
constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the following
arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation

of the equal protection of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents’ contention that the challenged proviso
retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials under the
following reasoning:

When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws
inconsistent therewith, a different term was ordained. Here, this Court agrees
with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically
exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic)
class of elective officials was significantly separated from the provisions of
paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify
paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials except
barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to include
barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly
made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c)
should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional.
RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post
facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically
provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be
applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair
vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective
post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA
No. 9164.

The COMELEC also argues that the RTC’s invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially
involves the wisdom of the law – the aspect of the law that the RTC has no right
to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle. The
COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one subject-one title rule,

Page 16 of 121
as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is
actually embraced within the title of the law.

Ruling:

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional

law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the Civil
Code is of course self-explanatory — laws enacted by Congress may
permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil
Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

Separately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a
more fundamental reason – the respondents’ retroactivity objection does not
involve a violation of any constitutional standard.

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional

law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the Civil
Code is of course self-explanatory – laws enacted by Congress may
permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil
Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine

constitutional issue is if a law’s retroactive application will impair
vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an
individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine
due process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a
vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that
may be considered protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.

In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But
even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is
no vested right to public office.17 As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there
is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral
exercises.

Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right
to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that
effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again,
the RTC agreed with this contention.

We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if
at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a
public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to
prescribe the qualifications for elective local posts;18 thus, the question of
eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to

Page 17 of 121
 decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on
Elections19 where we ruled that SK membership – which was claimed as a property
right within the meaning of the Constitution – is a mere statutory right conferred
by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership.

One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot
complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those
who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a
mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law
to change or even withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a

"[P]ublic office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office,
much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v.
Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law
prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a "property."
It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property
within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of
law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the
government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the
officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an
office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he
represents. --- COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November
20, 2009

Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the
formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de
futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the
past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."

The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be

unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested
rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. --- PDIC vs.
Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 181556,
December 14, 2009

Page 18 of 121
ARTICLE 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity. (4a) --- Relate this with the last paragraph of Article 17 of the NCC.
--- Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
(11a)

Exceptions:
1. When the law itself authorizes the validity of the act;
2. When the law makes the act only voidable and not void; or
3. When the law makes the act valid but punishes the violator.

Case References:

Nicasio I. Alcantara vs. DENR, et al., G.R. No. 161881, July 31, 2008
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a lessee under FLGLA No. 542, issued by the DENR, of nine hundred
twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land 3 (subject land) located in the
vicinity of Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City.
The subject land, however, is being claimed as the ancestral land of the indigenous
B'laan and Maguindanao people, who maintain that they and their predecessors
have been cultivating, possessing and occupying it since time immemorial. They
claim that Christian settlers (settlers) started occupying the area only after World
War II. As a result, there was constant friction between the indigenous inhabitants
and the settlers, with the disputes, at times, erupting in violence. Overpowered,
the indigenous people eventually lost physical control of much of the land.
Petitioner, a son of one of the settlers, used to hold a pasture permit over the
subject land, which was later on converted into FLGLA No. 542 covering the
subject property. Petitioner claims that FLGLA No. 542 has been subsisting since
1983.
On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao
tribes, filed a complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542
and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities.
Private respondents, the Heirs of Datu Abdul B. Pendatun and the Heirs of the
Sabal Mula Gawan Clan (respondents-intervenors), claiming to represent the
B'laan and Maguindanaoan tribes, aver that they have always possessed the land
until the first settlers occupied the area. They claim that among those who took
the land by force was petitioner's predecessor, Conrado Alcantara. They narrate
that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried to re-take the land, but failed
because the well-armed settlers repelled them. The incident, in fact, led to the
killing of two of their leaders.

Page 19 of 121
Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning the authority of the
COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the DENR who should have
jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. Petitioner also contended
that the COSLAP should suspend the hearing of the case, as the DENR was then
hearing a similar controversy. SIAEHC

In 1993, despite the pendency of the COSLAP case, and despite

opposition from private respondents, petitioner was able to renew
FLGLA No. 542 when it expired that year. The renewal given to
petitioner was for another 25 years, or until December 31, 2018.
Meanwhile, on October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the
Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and
promote all the rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the
Constitution.
On August 3, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
RENDERED in favour of the complainants and against the
Respondents as follows:
1. Recommends to the Hon. Secretary of DENR the cancellation of
respondent's renewed Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement
(FLGLA) No. 542;
2. Recommending to the DENR to the immediate segregation of the
Three Hundred (300) hectares requested by complainants from the
Nine Hundred Twenty Three (923) Hectares;
3. Recommending to the DENR to declare the entire area of the
Nine Hundred Twenty Three (923) Hectares, the ancestral lands of
the B'laans;
4. Recommending to the DENR after the Cancellation of FLGLA No.
542, to place in possession the petitioners in order to start
cultivation and plant crops for their food and solve the on-going
famine and hunger being experience[d] at present by the Lumads.

In addition, the COSLAP made the following factual findings:

a) The subject land is the ancestral domain of the complainant
indigenous people, whose possession was merely interrupted by
the forcible and violent takeover of outside settlers.
b) FLGLA No. 542 was issued by the DENR without giving due
process to the indigenous communities as oppositors and in
violation of existing laws such as Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 410
and the Constitution.

Petitioner's claim that he has residual rights to remain on the property is based on
Section 56 of the IPRA, which states:

Page 20 of 121
 SEC. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. — Property rights within
the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.

Ruling:

The contention of petitioner has no merit. As stated in the Court's decision in G.R.
No. 145838, the legal dispute surrounding petitioner's FLGLA No. 542 began in
1990, which was before the IPRA's passage in 1997, and even before the FLGLA
was renewed in 1993. Thus, the case is not covered by IPRA, but by other laws
existing at the time the COSLAP took cognizance of the case. IPRA also did not cure
the legal defects and infirmities of FLGLA No. 542, which were already the subject
of controversy by the time the law was passed.
Petitioner further calls for IPRA's application, since "the right to lands of the
ancestral domain arose only in view of the IPRA Law and cultural minorities had
priorly no right to recover their ancestral lands." Petitioner is utterly mistaken or
misinformed. Before IPRA, the right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land was
governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 410, which declared ancestral lands of
national cultural communities as alienable and disposable, and E.O. No. 561, which
created the COSLAP. These laws were the bases of the Court's decision in G.R. No.
145838. That the rights of most ICCs/IPs went largely unrecognized despite these
laws was not due to the laws' inadequacies, but due to government indifference
and the political inertia in their implementation.
It is also clear that when this Court, in G.R. No. 145838, declared FLGLA No. 542 as
illegal and upheld COSLAP's recommendation of its cancellation, petitioner had no
right to the land, and consequently, had no right to remain in the use and
possession of the subject land. Sec. Alvarez's cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 merely
conformed with the Court's findings. The cancellation made by the DENR merely
sealed the fact that FLGLA No. 542 should not have been issued in favour of
petitioner, in the first place. The COSLAP decision has the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution; hence, it must be implemented and is binding
on all parties to the case.
xxx xxx xxx

The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled
conclusively in G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court made the final
finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and that it was made
in violation of prevailing laws; and that it was proper for it to be
cancelled. The Court ruled, thus:
The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the land
area being claimed by private respondents belongs to the B'laan
indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession
of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time
immemorial, a fact which has not been disputed by petitioner. It
was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542
granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming
part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands
of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these

Page 21 of 121
 lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous
cultural group concerned. ASTDCH
The Court finds no reason to depart from such finding by the appellate court, it
being a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any showing that such findings are not
supported by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied)

Again, the decision in G.R. No. 145838 brings out the futility of
petitioner's arguments. In no uncertain terms, that decision declared
that FLGLA No. 542 was illegally issued. Therefore, from that illegal
issuance only flowed an invalid FLGLA, as it is axiomatic in our legal
system that acts executed against the laws are void, and that
administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations that are
contrary to the laws or the Constitution are invalid. Petitioner has no
right or interest to speak of, because it is also axiomatic that no vested
or acquired right can arise from illegal acts or those that infringe upon
the rights of others.

Manuel L. Lee vs. Regino B. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by

law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after
his death. A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On
this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance
with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.

Page 22 of 121
Arturo R. Abalos vs. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No. 155043, September 30, 2004

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal

partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife's consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any
property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the
husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does
not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to
the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of
the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or
their respective heirs. In not a few cases, we ruled that the sale by the husband of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife
when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio because
it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil
Code. Since Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before
the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
provision are void except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
Quite recently, in San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that neither spouse could alienate in favor of another, his or her
interest in the partnership or in any property belonging to it, or ask for partition
of the properties before the partnership itself had been legally dissolved.
Nonetheless, alienation of the share of each spouse in the conjugal partnership
could be had after separation of property of the spouses during the marriage had
been judicially decreed, upon their petition for any of the causes specified in
Article 191 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 214 thereof.
Quite recently, in San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that neither spouse could alienate in favor of another, his or her
interest in the partnership or in any property belonging to it, or ask for partition
of the properties before the partnership itself had been legally dissolved.
Nonetheless, alienation of the share of each spouse in the conjugal partnership
could be had after separation of property of the spouses during the marriage had
been judicially decreed, upon their petition for any of the causes specified in
Article 191 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 214 thereof.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wife's
consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in
Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil Code. In Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., the Court ruled
that the husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal partnership even
without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big conjugal
liability which might endanger the family's economic standing. This is one instance

Page 23 of 121
 where the wife's consent is not required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is
necessary.

When the law itself authorizes the validity of the act?

Executive Order No. 292, Book VII, Chapter 2, Sec. 3 thereof states:

Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out
the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall
be open to public inspection.
=

ARTICLE 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,

public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)

General Rules is that rights can be waived. For the waiver to be valid the following
conditions must be present: (1) Existence of the right; (2) Knowledge of the
existence of the right; and (e) Intention to relinquish the right.

However, there are instances where rights cannot be waived and these are: (1) If the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or (2) If the waiver is
prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law.

Vested Right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign
to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacles exists, and which is immediate
and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Also referred to as “present fixed”
interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. To be vested, a right must have become
a title --- legal or equitable --- to the present or future enjoyment of property --- Go Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201 cited in Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. No.
176556, July 4, 2012.

To wit:

Page 24 of 121
Petitioner Gonzalo S. Go, Jr. (Go) was appointed in 1980 as Hearing Officer III of the Board of
Transportation (BOT), then the government's land transportation franchising and regulating
agency, with a salary rate of PhP16,860 per annum. On June 19, 1987, Executive Order No. (EO)
202 was issued creating, within the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to replace the BOT. The
issuance placed the LTFRB under the administrative control and supervision of the DOTC
Secretary.
On February 1, 1990, the DOTC Secretary extended Go a promotional appointment as Chief
Hearing Officer (Chief, Legal Division), with a salary rate of PhP151,800 per annum. The Civil
Service Commission (CSC) later approved this permanent appointment. In her Certification dated
October 27, 2005, LTFRB Administrative Division Chief Cynthia G. Angulo stated that the
promotion was to the position of Attorney VI, Salary Grade (SG)-26, obviously following
budgetary circulars allocating SG-26 to division chief positions.
The instant controversy started when the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), by
letter of March 13, 1991, informed the then DOTC Secretary of the erroneous classification in the
Position Allocation List (PAL) of the DBM of two positions in his department, one in the LTFRB
and, the other, in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The error, according to the DBM, stemmed
from the fact that division chief positions in quasi-judicial or regulatory agencies, whose decisions
are immediately appealable to the department secretary instead of to the court, are entitled only
to Attorney V, SG-25 allocation. Pertinently, the DBM letter reads:
Under existing allocation criteria division Chief positions in . . . department level
agencies performing quasi-judicial/regulatory functions where decisions are appealable
to higher courts shall be allocated to Attorney VI, SG-26. Division chief positions in
quasi-judicial/regulatory agencies lower than departments such as the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) where decisions are appealable to the Secretary of the DOTC and then
the Office of the President shall, however be allocated to Attorney V, SG-25. (Emphasis
supplied.)

After an exchange of communications between the DBM and the DOTC, the corresponding
changes in position classification with all its wage implications were implemented, effective as of
April 8, 1991.
Unable to accept this new development where his position was allocated the rank of Attorney V,
SG-25, Go wrote the DBM to question the "summary demotion or downgrading [of his salary
grade]" from SG-26 to SG-25. In his protest-letter, Go excepted from the main reason preferred
by the DBM that the decisions or rulings of the LTFRB are only appealable to the DOTC Secretary
under Sec. 6 of EO 202 and not to the CA. As Go argued, the aforecited proviso cannot prevail
over Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, under
which appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are to be made to the CA.
|
Core Issue: Summary Reallocation Improper
Contrary to the DBM's posture, Go maintains that the LTFRB decisions are appealable to the CA
pursuant to Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129 and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. He argues that the grievance
mechanism set forth in Sec. 6 of EO 202 cannot prevail over the appeal provisos of a statute and
remedial law. Go thus asserts that the summary reallocation of his position and the
corresponding salary grade reassignment, i.e., from Attorney VI, SG-26 to Attorney V, SG-25,
resulting in his demotion and the downgrading of the classification of his position, are without
legal basis.

Page 25 of 121
Ruling of the Court:

Summary reallocation illegal

Go argues that the summary reallocation of the classification of his position as Chief, LTFRB Legal
Division to a lower grade substantially reduced his salary and other benefits, veritably depriving
him of property, hence, illegal.
We agree with Go on this count. The summary reallocation of his position to a lower degree
resulting in the corresponding downgrading of his salary infringed the policy of non-diminution
of pay which the Court recognized and applied in Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on
Audit, as well as in the subsequent sister cases involving benefits of government employees.
Running through the gamut of these cases is the holding that the affected government
employees shall continue to receive benefits they were enjoying as incumbents upon the
effectivity of RA 6758.
Relevant to the critical issue at hand is Sec. 15 (b) of PD 985 which, as amended by Sec. 13 (a) of
RA 6758, pertinently reads:
SEC. 13.Pay Adjustments. — . . .
(b)Pay Reduction — if an employee is moved from a higher to a lower class, he shall
not suffer a reduction in salary: Provided, That such movement is not the result of a
disciplinary action or voluntary demotion. (Emphasis supplied.)
Prior to its amendment, Sec. 15 (b) of PD 985 reads:
(b)Pay Reduction — if an employee is moved from a higher to a lower class, he shall not
suffer a reduction in salary except where his current salary is higher than the maximum
step of the new class in which case he shall be paid the maximum: Provided, That such
movement is not the result of a disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be noted, the legislature dropped from the original proviso on pay reduction the clause:
"except where his current salary is higher than the maximum step of the new class in which
case he shall be paid the maximum." The deletion doubtless indicates the legislative intent of
maintaining, in line with the non-diminution principle, the level or grade of salary enjoyed by an
incumbent before the reallocation to a lower grade or classification is effected. It must be made
absolutely clear at this juncture that Go received his position classification of Attorney VI and
assigned SG-26 upon his promotional appointment as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division on February 1,
1990, or after the effectivity of RA 6758. Following the clear mandate of the aforequoted Sec. 15
(b) of PD 985, as amended, Go must not suffer a reduction in his salary even if there was a
reallocation of his position to a lower grade.
Lest it be overlooked, the transition provisos of RA 6758 provide additional justification for Go's
entitlement to continue receiving the compensation and emoluments previously granted him
upon his promotion as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. Go, as an incumbent of said position before
the assailed reallocation was effected ostensibly through the implementation of RA 6758, the
statute's transition provisions should apply mutatis mutandis to him. The pertinent provisions
are Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758, to wit:
Section 12.Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. — All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances, clothing and laundry allowances; . . . and
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may determined
by the [DBM], shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized
salary rates shall continue to be authorized.

Page 26 of 121
 xxx xxx xxx
Section 17.Salaries of Incumbents. — Incumbents of positions presently receiving
salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from
local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the
standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess
compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition
allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent
shall receive in the future.
Pursuant to the principle of non-diminution and consistent with the rule on the prospective
application of laws in the spirit of justice and fair play, the above provisions are, indeed, meant
to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and allowances beyond what may be allowable
under RA 6758. It may be that Go was not the occupant of his present position as of July 1, 1989.
Still the positions in the plantilla of the LTFRB were properly subjected to the standardization
under RA 6758. In fact, the matter of excess of salary and benefits in the application of RA 6758
and PD 985 is a non-issue. What is at issue is the reallocation of the position from Attorney VI,
SG-26 to Attorney V, SG-25. Obviously, the question of who was sitting as Chief of the Legal
Division as of July 1, 1989 is of no moment. Of particular significance is the issue of whether the
reallocation to a lower degree is proper given that Go was already enjoying the salary and
emoluments as Attorney VI, SG-26 upon his appointment on February 1, 1990 as Chief, LTFRB
Legal Division.
While the DBM is statutorily vested with the authority to reclassify or allocate positions to their
appropriate classes, with the concomitant authority to formulate allocating policies and criteria
for bureau-level agencies, like the LTFRB, the investiture could not have plausibly included
unchecked discretion to implement a reallocation system offensive to the due process guarantee.

It is recognized that one's employment is a property right within the purview of

the due process clause. So it was that in Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
the Court categorically held that "one's employment, profession, trade or calling
is a 'property right,' and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable
wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a
constitutional guaranty of due process of law."
Per our count, from his promotional appointment as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division to the time (April
8, 1991) the summary reallocation was implemented, Go had occupied the position and enjoyed
the corresponding salary and emoluments therefor for one year, two months and eight days. In
this length of time, Go's entitlement to the benefits appurtenant to the position has well-nigh
ripened into a vested right.
As the records show, Go, as Attorney VI, SG-26, was receiving an annual salary of PhP151,800.
Consequent to the enforcement of the summary reallocation of his position to Attorney V, SG-
25, this was effectively reduced, reckoned from April 8, 1991, to PhP136,620, or a salary
reduction of PhP15,180 a year. These figures of course have yet to factor in supervening pay
adjustments occurring through the years.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed
interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

Page 27 of 121
To be vested, a right must have become a title — legal or equitable — to the
present or future enjoyment of property.
To us, Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments of his
position as Attorney VI, SG-26. He continues to occupy — at least up to April 11,
2006 when he filed this petition — the position of Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. His
title to Attorney VI, SG-26 is without question, having been legally appointed to
the position on February 1, 1990. And being an incumbent to that position, he has,
at the very least, an equitable right to receive the corresponding salary and
emoluments attached thereto. The summary demotion to a lower salary grade, with the
corresponding decrease in salary and emoluments after he has occupied his current rank and
position, goes against his right to continue enjoying the benefits accorded the position and which
his predecessors must have been receiving. His right thereto has ripened into a vested right, of
which he could be deprived only by due process of law, but which we believe he was denied
through the summary reallocation. With the view we take of this case, Go was neither apprised
nor given the opportunity to contest the reallocation before its summary implementation.
Lest this Decision is taken out of context, the Court wishes to emphasize that it is not its intention
to disturb the reallocation of the position Chief, LTFRB Legal Division to Attorney V, SG-25.
Accordingly, it behooves the DBM and the LTFRB to enforce the classification of
position of Attorney V, SG-25 to those who will succeed Go in the said position.
It bears to stress nonetheless that this pro hac vice case disposition is predicated on the following
key considerations: (1) Go was duly appointed to an office previously classified as a division chief
position with an Attorney VI, SG 26 assignment; (2) under DBM circulars then obtaining, it would
appear that division chief positions carried a SG-26 classification without the qualification set
forth in the DBM's letter of March 31, 1991. In a real sense, therefore, the present controversy
is attributable to the DBM's failure to incorporate, at the outset, the necessary clarificatory
qualifications/distinctions in its position and salary allocation rules/circulars; (3) Go's receipt for
some time of the salary and other emoluments attached to the position was cut short by the
reallocation of the position, resulting in his demotion and downgrading of salary; and (4) the
reallocation was effected by the DBM in a summary manner.

Can Vested Rights be deprived?

Yes just like the mandate under Article 129 and 176 of the Family Code.

PNB vs. Nepomuceno Productions, G.R. No. 139479, December 27, 2002

The focal issue in this case is whether the parties to the mortgage can validly
waive the posting and publication requirements mandated by Act No. 3135.
We answer in the negative.
Act No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on
real property is specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements
of the notice of sale, to wit:

Page 28 of 121
 "Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than
four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for
at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city."

On this score, it is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting
of notices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes
a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.
Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be
dispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may
proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the notice of sale.
We are not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to
waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No. 3135.
In People v. Donato, the Court expounded on what rights and privileges may be
waived, viz.:
". . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it
is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner
or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or role made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large . . . .
"Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by
statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the
rights of others, or would be against public policy or
morals and the public interest may be waived.
"While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by
statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been
said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be
waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure
personal liberty are subjects of waiver."
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much
to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and
condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale.

Page 29 of 121
 Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly,
the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the
mortgagor's benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to
the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary,
unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any
waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom
will invalidate the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable.
"Where required by the statute or by the terms of the foreclosure decree,
public notice of the place and time of the mortgage foreclosure sale must
be given, a statute requiring it being held applicable to subsequent sales
as well as to the first "advertised sale of the property. It has been held
that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with
statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the
sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render
the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale."
Thus, in the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Aguirre, the
foreclosure sale held more than two (2) months after the published date of sale
was considered void for lack of republication. Similarly, in the instant case, the lack
of republication of the notice of the December 20, 1976 foreclosure sale renders
it void.
The right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay
his obligation must be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest the valid exercise of the right
would end. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.

Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
102316, June 30, 1997

Petitioner Valenzuela's arguments revolve around a single issue: "whether or not respondent
Court (of Appeals) committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the stipulation in the
charter party executed between the petitioner and the private respondent exempting the latter
from liability for the loss of petitioner's logs arising from the negligence of its (Seven Brothers')
captain."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Validity of Stipulation is Lis Mota

The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that
the "(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and
any kind of damages to the cargo." The validity of this stipulation is the lis

Page 30 of 121
mota - meaning the cause or motivation of a legal action or lawsuit
--- of this case.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute between the parties that
the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss
of its cargo was the "snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the
logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing
the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event." Likewise undisputed
is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it
contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits
this in its petition.
The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for being contrary to
public policy, citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be
considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or
shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the
custody of the goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less
than that of a good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary
prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or
omissions of his or its employees;
(6) That the common carrier's liability for acts committed by
thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the defective
condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment
used in the contract of carriage."
Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for being contrary to Articles
586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil
Code. Citing Article 1306 and paragraph 1, Article 1409 of the Civil Code, petitioner
further contends that said stipulation "gives no duty or obligation to the private
respondent to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the custody
and transportation of the cargo."
The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private
respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner's lauan logs.
Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were
cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties
in their charter party.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that
responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the
shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the
negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such
Page 31 of 121
stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same
is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We
stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their
duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a
contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the
general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship
transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public
policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that
lessen or remove the protection given by law in contacts involving common
carriers.

Pleasantville Dev't. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 79688, February
1, 1996

The Facts

The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as follows:

Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase
II and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975,
respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time,
Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his
name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced
on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same
subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate
agent of petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess
the lot even before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20,
1975, Kee paid CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00 on January
27, 1975, for the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to
Kee's taking actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and
a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano,
accompanied Kee's wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the
parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to
construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on
the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The
parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter
remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9,
Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City
(MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.

Page 32 of 121
 The First Issue: Good Faith

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's ruling
that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. We agree with the
following observation of the Court of Appeals:
"The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors
committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee
and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would
knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by another,
deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected
from the land and losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the
social humiliation that would follow.
"Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man
in ascertaining the identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of
land registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and
bounds of the property with which he is dealing. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his
property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in
TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision
developer's agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as
well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. Upon
Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site
accompanied by CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively
declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full
faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the
company's positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to
suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to
protect his interests were reasonable. There was no need for him to have
acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the geodetic
engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer
to countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to
their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI.
Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact
transpire. Kee's efforts all went to naught."
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was
what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him
was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of
paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee
was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the
improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause
of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be
bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.

Page 33 of 121
 Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract of
Sale on Installment covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was rescinded long before
the present action was instituted. This has no relevance on the liability of
petitioner, as such fact does not negate the negligence of its agent in pointing out
the wrong lot to Kee. Such circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a
cause of action for unlawful detainer against Kee. Lex
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was
erroneously pointed out to him" because the latter agreed to the following
provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment, to wit:
"13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his
contract he/she has personally examined or inspected the property made
subject-matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural
condition of the lots and from the date hereof whatever consequential
change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the
expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by
him/her."

The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location,
contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the
vendee, having examined the property prior to the execution of the contract,
agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away
his right to recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence. Such waiver
would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law."

People of the Phils. vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and

to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will." This Court
has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel and to remain
silent; and the right to be heard. Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes
a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof
on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice states : ". . . These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel." This provision merely particularizes the
form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other
rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not
offend Article 6 of the Civil Code. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another
of the Constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to
the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

Page 34 of 121
 Pablito T. Villarin, et al. vs. Coronado P. Munasque, G.R. No. 169444,
September 17, 2008

Waiver of personal demand for immediate payment is allowed by Article 6 of the

New Civil Code and such waivers and automatic correction of the procedural
defects thus rendered moot the challenge against the validity of the levy.

Ronilo Sorreda vs. Cambridge Electronics Corp., G.R. No. 172927, February 11,
2010

While management may validly waive its prerogatives, such waiver should not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs. An absolute
and unqualified employment for life in the mold of petitioner's concept of
perpetual employment is contrary to public policy and good customs, as it unjustly
forbids the employer from terminating the services of an employee despite the
existence of a just or valid cause. It likewise compels the employer to retain an
employee despite the attainment of the statutory retirement age, even if the
employee has became a "non-performing asset" or, worse, a liability to the
employer.

F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp., G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012
citing People vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment

of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."

F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp., G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012
citing People vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: . . . the
doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since
the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a
person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden

Page 35 of 121
 by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large.

ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Purpose of Curative Statutes

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to

validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are
intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have
designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action.
They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was
invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have
been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are
retroactive.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corp., G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008

The general rule is that an

unconstitutional law is void; the
doctrine of operative fact is
inapplicable.

Page 36 of 121
 Facts of the Case

Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations

incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative
powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of
a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers
in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag.
This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all
domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. 5 (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the
domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted
the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary
bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the
amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the
RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a
denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a
privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly
of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of
LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the
stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did
not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell
on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.

Ruling

PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared
unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact, which provides that
an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI
wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently
declared to be unconstitutional.
We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be
entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a quo. PPI did not
raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It
cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to extricate itself from the dire
effects of an unconstitutional law.
At any rate, we find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords
no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if

Page 37 of 121
it has not been passed. 54 Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All
levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle
against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put
the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Here, we do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts
paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was
proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank
account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a
refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22
of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of
performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him". We cannot
allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI
must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. vs. National Wages and Productivity
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007

On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board,
Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727 (R.A.
No. 6727), otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, 2 issued Wage Order
No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows:
Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all
employees/workers in the private sector throughout Region II,
regardless of the status of employment are granted an across-the-
board increase of P15.00 daily. 3
The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December
2, 1995 4 and took effect on January 1, 1996. 5 Its Implementing Rules 6 were
approved on February 14, 1996. Per Section 13 of the Wage Order, any party
aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal with the National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB within 10 calendar days
from the publication of the Wage Order.

Page 38 of 121
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated May 7, 1996, the Bankers' Council for
Personnel Management (BCPM), on behalf of its member-banks, requested for a
ruling on the eligibility of establishments with head offices outside Region II to
seek exemption from the coverage of the Wage Order since its member-banks are
already paying more than the prevailing minimum wage rate in the National
Capital Region (NCR), which is their principal place of business.
In a letter-reply dated July 16, 1996, the NWPC stated that the member-banks of
BCPM are covered by the Wage Order and do not fall under the exemptible
categories listed under the Wage Order.
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated July 23, 1996, petitioner sought for
interpretation of the applicability of said Wage Order. The NWPC referred
petitioner's inquiry to the RTWPB. D
In a letter-reply dated August 12, 1996, the RTWPB clarified that the Wage Order
covers all private establishments situated in Region II, regardless of the voluntary
adoption by said establishments of the wage orders established in Metro Manila
and irrespective of the amounts already paid by the petitioner.
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate
by the "floor-wage method" or the "salary-ceiling method" in issuing the Wage
Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a wage
adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-the-board
wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2. In doing so,
the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Order
to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without
a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order
granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.

Ruling:

In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that the function of promulgating rules

and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this guideline is that
administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed,
administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending,
or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid
exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate.
It has been said that when the application of an administrative issuance modifies
existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in this case, the issuance becomes
void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.
Thus, the Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R02-03 is void insofar as it
grants a wage increase to employees earning more than the minimum wage rate;

Page 39 of 121
and pursuant to the separability clause of the Wage Order, Section 1 is declared
valid with respect to employees earning the prevailing minimum wage rate.
Prior to the passage of the Wage Order, the daily minimum wage rates in Region
II was set at P104.00 for the Province of Isabela, P103.00 for the Province of
Cagayan, P101.00 for the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and P100.00 for the
Provinces of Quirino and Batanes. Only employees earning the above-stated
minimum wage rates are entitled to the P15.00 mandated increase under the
Wage Order.

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are
synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government
unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Petitioner seeks to bolster this
contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its
chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings." (Emphasis supplied.)|||

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was
no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This
case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337,
the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution
would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the
present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint
for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a
general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a

Page 40 of 121
 statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In the instant case,
there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is
not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in
the legislative language — from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance"
under RA 7160 — demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held
by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws
more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires
only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly
misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said
rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of
the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate
is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32,
Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain,
the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article
X of the Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy." It merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160. We
stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced
therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given
and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent
domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since
it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only
of a share in eminent domain. Indeed, "the national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it."
\

Commr. v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 187485, 196113 & 197156,
October 8, 2013

The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of
legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as
well as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."

Page 41 of 121
 Commr. v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 187485, 196113 & 197156,
October 8, 2013

The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a
judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act prior to such declaration. In Serrano de Agbayani v.
Philippine National Bank, the application of the doctrine of operative fact was
discussed as follows:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in
its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as
until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that
in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be
valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its
being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This
is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary
is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication. . . .

Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a

"legislative or executive measure," meaning a law or executive
issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such
law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by
the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied
upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid.

Page 42 of 121
 Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management, et al., G.R. No. 179532, May
30, 2011

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the
Civil Code. The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule.

Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management, et al., G.R. No. 179532, May
30, 2011, citing Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp., G.R. No. 166006,
March 14, 2008

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule , only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it.

Judicial directive in applying & interpreting laws

Summary:

Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith (A3). In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law making body intended right
and justice to prevail (A8). No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, and judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines (A9). In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law making body
intended right and justice to prevail (A10).

Page 43 of 121
ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. (2) 2005

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF FACT

Does not excuse one from the
legal consequences of his
conduct.
This refers only to mistakes with
regard to the existence of the
law.
(ARTICLE 3 OF THE RPC, ARTICLE
1390 OF THE CC AND ARTICLE 526
OF THE CC
Constitutes an excuse and is a
legal defense.
May vitiate consent in a contract
and makes it voidable.
Eliminate criminal intent as long
as there is no negligence.

Mistake upon a doubtful or

difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith pursuant
to Article 526 of the Civil Code or
may render a contract voiable.

Article 3 applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal/criminal, and
whether substantive or remedial on grounds of expediency, policy, and necessity
so as to prevent evasion of the law. However, the same is only applicable to
mandatory or prohibitory laws but not to permissive laws or suppletory laws (1
Manresa 56). The same refers not only to the literal words of the law itself, but
also to the meaning or interpretation given to the said law by our courts of justice.

However, ignorance to foreign law is not ignorance of the law, but ignorance of
the fact because foreign laws must be alleged and proved as matter of fact, there
being no judicial notice of said foreign laws --- G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922 IN
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OFCHEONGBOO, deceased MORAADONG,
petitioner-appellant, vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.

Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All
marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity
provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the

Page 44 of 121
 existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary
to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion
([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the
Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon
to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant,
between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the
descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of
the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the
Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated
by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage,
followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and
administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage,
"save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the
same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).

In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of

China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in
the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the
alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty
years and the two cases are the same.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a

second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage
with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still
subsisting.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County,
Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.
He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the
applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. For while Article
256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application,
there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the
benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable
provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when
allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until
his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was
romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has
remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda
Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact elected him and
served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been
handling free legal aid cases.

Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at
the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude

Page 45 of 121
of his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding,
respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second
marriage while the first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides:

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in

continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took
effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed
there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on
October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to
be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This
duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and
to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently
and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ---
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent, A.C. No,
6854, April 25, 2007

However, Ignorance of the fact that the wife that has been missing for more than
ten (10) year, wherein under the Family Code is even already considered
presumptive dead, and notice of such disappearance be properly filed with the
civil registrar before subsequently contracting another marriage give rise only to
a mistake of fact or ignorance of the fact, thus, does not give rise to criminal
liability as compared to pure Ignorance of the law --- U.S. vs. Enriquez (32 Phil.
202)

On the other hand, when one subsequently contract a second marriage believing
that the divorce process of his/her first marriage was validly dissolve is a clear case
of Ignorance of the law and not a mistake of fact. Thus, the erring party is
criminally liable --- People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23)

Lastly, where the mistake on doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis
of good faith (Article 526 of the Civil Code) but the same will not release one from

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 liability but may justify the mitigation of the same --- Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Phil.
217.

The settled rule is that good faith and honest belief that one is not subject to tax
on the basis of previous interpretation of government agencies tasked to
implement the tax law, are sufficient justification to delete the imposition of
surcharges and interest.6 In Connell Bros. Co. (Phil.) v. Collector of Internal
Revenue,7 it was held that:

We are convinced that appellant, in preparing its sales invoices as it did, was not
guilty of an intentional violation of the law. It did not delay filing the returns for
the sales taxes corresponding to the period in question, let alone did so purposely.
The delay was in the payment of the deficiency, which arose from a mistaken
understanding of the regulations laid down by appellee. The ensuing controversy
was, in our opinion, generated in good faith and should furnish no justification for
the imposition of a penalty.

WHEREFORE, modified by eliminating the surcharge of 25% imposed upon

appellant, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

This ruling was subsequently reiterated in Tuason, Jr. v. Lingad,8 where we deleted
the order to pay interest and surcharges, and in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Republic Cement Corporation,9 where the same surcharge was dispensed with
because of the taxpayer's good faith and the BIR's previous erroneous
interpretation of the laws involved. We see no reason not to apply the same
doctrine in the instant case which settles the divergent rulings of the BIR on DST
and establishes the foremost categorical pronouncement of the Court that pledge
transactions entered into by pawnshops are subject to DST. --- G.R. No. 166786
September 11, 2006 MICHEL J. LHUILLERPAWNSHOP, INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

BAR EXAMINATION QUESTION 1996

I
(1) Is there any difference in their legal effect between ignorance of the law and ignorance
or mistake of fact?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Yes, there is a difference. While ignorance of the law is not an excuse for not
complying with it, ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence
(Art, NCC). In addition, mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of
good faith (Art. 526. NCC). Mistake of fact may, furthermore, vitiate consent in a contract and
make it voidable (Art. 1390. NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

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 Yes, ignorance of the law differs in legal effect from Ignorance or mistake of fact. The
former does not excuse a party from the legal consequences of his conduct while the latter
does constitute an excuse and is a legal defense.

ARTICLE 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n)

GENERAL RULE:

1. Only the decisions of the Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this
jurisdiction, thus, decisions of subordinate courts are only persuasive and have no
mandatory effect. However, this rule does not militate against the fact that a conclusion
or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which covers a point of law still undecided in
the Philippines may serve as judicial guide to the inferior courts. – Miranda vs. Imperial,
77 Phil. 1066 and Buatis, Jr. vs. Pp. G.R. No. 1425099, June 28, 2006.

2. OBITER DICTUM and opinions are not necessary to the determination of a case. They are
not binding and cannot have the force of official precedents.

3. A decision of a division of the Supreme Court may be set aside by the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. Provided further that a Supreme Court decision may be set aside by a
contrary ruling of the Supreme Court itself or by a corrective legislative act of Congress,
although said laws cannot adversely affect those favored prior to the Supreme Court
decision.

Stare decisis (Standing by their Decision). The decisions of courts rely on precedents --- use of
past decision to guide future decisions. An earlier decision in a similar fact pattern is a precendet
that guides later decisions, thereby providing greater stability and predictability to the law ---
PNP vs. Palma, et al., 466 SCRA 307.
Two types of Stare decisis:
1) Vertical Stare Decisis --- duty of the lower courts to apply the decisions of higher courts
to cases involving the same facts --- Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160, Dissenting
opinion of Justice Puno.
2) Horizontal Stare Decisis --- the duty of the Higher Courts to follow their own precedents -
-- Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160, Dissenting opinion of Justice Puno.

Cristenelli Fermin vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8 24 of the Civil Code, is

enunciated, thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That

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 decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument. (Emphasis supplied)

Filinvest Devt. Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 146941,
August 9, 2007

The CA, likewise, erred in relying on CTA decisions as jurisprudential basis for its
decision. As this Court has held in the past:
[B]y tradition and in our system of judicial administration this Court
has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal
system of the country, all other courts should take their bearings
from the decisions of this Court, ever mindful of what this Court
said fifty-seven years ago in People vs. Vera that "[a] becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
integrated judicial system of the nation".
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, as embodied in Article 8 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land.

Republic of the Phils. vs. Carlos Flores Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 167741, July 12,
2007

The attachment bond is contingent on and answerable for all costs which may be
adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the attachment should the court finally rule that the applicant is not entitled to
the writ of attachment. Thus, it is a security for the payment of the costs and
damages to which the adverse party may be entitled in case there is a subsequent
finding that the applicant is not entitled to the writ. The Republic of the Philippines
need not give this security as it is presumed to be always solvent and able to meet
its obligations.
The Sandiganbayan thus erred when it disregarded the foregoing presumption
and instead ruled that the Republic should file an attachment bond. The error was
not simply an error of judgment but grave abuse of discretion.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. Here, the Sandiganbayan's January 14,
2005 resolution was clearly contrary to Tolentino.
Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon
itself a power that it did not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings
from the decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or

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 reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important
part of our legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino
"need(ed) to be carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that the rule on
attachment ha(d) undergone through the years." According to the court a quo:
[Tolentino] was decided by the Supreme Court employing the old Code of
Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which was enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901 or more than a century ago.
That was then, this is now. The provisions of the old Code of Civil
Procedure governing attachment have been substantially modified in the
subsequent Rules of Court. In fact, Rule 57 of the present 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is an expanded modification of the provisions of the old
Code of Civil Procedure governing attachment. Unlike the old Code of
Civil Procedure, the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is noticeably
explicit in its requirement that the party applying for an order of
attachment should file a bond.
On this, Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution provides:
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with
the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc;
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc. (emphasis supplied)
The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a
decision in violation of this constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan could not have validly "reexamined," much less
reversed, Tolentino. By doing something it could not validly do, the Sandiganbayan
acted ultra vires and committed grave abuse of discretion.
|||

Filinvest Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., G.R.

No. 146941, August 9, 2007

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, as embodied in Article 8 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land.

Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. vs. Efren Espiritu, et al., G.R. No. 150394, June
26, 2007

The principle of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle of law
which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction

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 will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity of parties.

De Mesa vs. Pepsi Cola, G.R. No. 153063-70, August 19, 2005

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final
decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc., et al. vs. Brain Masweng, et al., G.R.
No. 180882, February 27, 2013

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once
a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
We have also previously held that "[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, once a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same."

Court of Appeals decision are only persuasive authority; however, they are also precendents that
should be applied by lower courts if there is no Supreme Court Decision --- Mirand vs. Imperial,
77 Phil. 1066.

Decisions of Foreign Courts are not automatically binding and enforceable in the Philippines.
Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign decisions and these foreign decisions should be
proved in court. However, any party may file a Petition to enforce foreign judgment in local
courts under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS 1994

IV
1. Are decisions of the Court of Appeals considered laws?

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 2. What are the binding effects of an obiter dictum and a dissenting opinion?
3. How can a decision of the Supreme Court be set aside?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1. a) No, but decisions of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for inferior
courts on points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a ruling of the Court
of Appeals may become a doctrine. (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1066).
b) No. Decisions of the Court of Appeals merely have persuasive, and therefore no
mandatory effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers a point of law still
undecided may still serve as judicial guide and it is possible that the same maybe raised to the
status of doctrine. If after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis, the Supreme
Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its consideration as a rule of
jurisprudence (Civil Code, Paras).
2. None. Obiter dictum and opinions are not necessary to the determination of a case.
They are not binding and cannot have the force of official precedents. It is as if the Court were
turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects: a dissenting opinion affirms
or overrules a claim, right or obligation. It neither disposes nor awards anything it merely
expresses the view of the dissenter. (Civil Code, Paras)

3. A decision of a division of the Supreme Court maybe set aside by the Supreme Court
sitting en banc, a Supreme Court decision may be set aside by a contrary ruling of the Supreme
Court itself or by a corrective legislative act of Congress, although said laws cannot adversely
affect those favored prior to the Supreme Court decision. (Civil Code, Paras).

ARTICLE 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason

of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)

This provision of law is best illustrated in a post war case involving the extra
ordinary deflation because the Japanese notes were no longer legal tender and
treasury notes were scarce, and there is no provision in the Spanish Civil Code to
cover such situation. Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the Ballantyne scale of
values on the purchasing power of the peso at different stages of the Japanese
Occupation in determining how much is the equivalent of Japanese war notes in
genuine currency. This decision were later codified under Article 1250 of the Civil
Code. – Hilado vs. Dela Costa L-150, April 30, 1949, 83 Phil. 471

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 174689,
October 19, 2007

The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of

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 the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In
our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes
define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change
of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed.
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

ARTICLE 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of

laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail. (n)

GENERAL RULE:
EQUITY FOLLOWS LAW
It is a long-standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.
--- Arsenal vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 40

As for equity, which has been aptly described as a “justice outside legality”, this is applied
only in the absence of but never against statutory law. --- Zabat, Jr. vs. CA, 226 Phil. 489:
Toyota Motor Phil. Versus CAA, 216 SCRA 236: Reyes vs. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August
11, 2003.

Rules of Statutory Construction:

(a) When a law has been clearly worded, there is no room for interpretation.
Immediately, application of the law must be made unless consequences or
oppression would arise (U.S. vs. Allen, 2 Phil. 630)
(b) If there are two possible interpretations or constructions of a law, that which
will achieve the ends desired by Congress should be adopted (U.S. vs. Navarro,
19 Phil. 134)
(c) In interpreting a law, the following can be considered: the preamble of the
statute; the foreign laws from which the law was derived; the history of the

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 framing of the law, including the deliberations in Congress; similar laws on the
same subject matter (in pari material)
(d) Patent or obvious mistakes and misprints in the law, may properly be
corrected by our courts (Torres vs. Limhap, 56 Phil. 141)
(e) Laws of pleadings, practice, and procedure must be liberally construed
(f) Laws in derogation of a natural or basic right must be strictly interpreted.
(g) The Contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative official to a law
which they are duty bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight
(Pascual vs. Director of Lands, L-15816, Feb. 29, 1964)

It is well settled that courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would lead to
absurdities. If the words of a statute are susceptible of more than one meaning,
the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its
adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation. We test a law by its result.
A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice. There are laws
which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them in slavish
obedience to their language. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. --- NPC Drivers and
Mechanics Association, et al. vs. NPC, et al., G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009

BAR EXAMINATION QUESTION 2003

It is said that “equity follows the law” What do you understand by this phrase, and what
are its basic implications? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

“Equity follows the law” means that courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by
rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. (Arsenal v. IAC, 143 SCRA 40
[1986]). Equity is applied only in the absence of but never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor
Phil. v. CA, 216 SCRA 236 [1992]).

Law in relation to customs

Summary:
Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced
(A11). Furthermore, a custom must be proved as a fact, according the rules of evidence (A12).

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ARTICLE 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)

Custom is a rule of human action (conduct) established by repeated acts, and

uniformly observed or practiced as a rule of society, thru the implicit approval of
the law makers, and which is therefore generally obligatory and legally binding.

ARTICLE 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the

rules of evidence. (n)

Requisites before the courts can consider customs:

a) A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rule of evidence ---
Patriarcha vs. Orfate, 7 Phil.370. Thus, there is not judicial notice of custom.
b) There must be a number of repeated acts and uniformly performed.
c) There must be a juridical intention to make a rule of social conduct.
d) There must be a sufficient lapse of time.

Laws application as to time

ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights,
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the

number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included. (7a)

Article 8 of NCC in relation to Section 31 of Revised Administrative Code on “pretermination of

holiday” - The pretermination or the exclusion of the last day which is a holiday, in computing the
period which provides that, “the act may be done on the next succeeding business day”, applies
only to a period fixed by law or the Rules of Court, not to a date fixed by a judge or a government
officer, or ordinary contract.

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Meaning:
The final issue raised is the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public
auction of the mortgaged property that was held on April 11, 1961.
Petitioners contended that the public auction sale that was held on April 11, 1961 which was the
next business day after the scheduled date of the sale on April 10, 1961, a special public holiday,
was permissible and valid pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code which ordains:
"Pretermission of holiday.—Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day."
Respondent court ruled that the aforesaid sale is null and void, it not having been carried out in
accordance with Section 9 of Act No. 3135, which provides:
"Section 9. — Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where
the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred
pesos, such notice shall also be published one a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or
city."
We agree with respondent court. The pretermission of a holiday applies only where the day, or
the last day for doing any act, required or permitted by law falls on a holiday," or when the last
day of a given period for doing an act falls on a holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an
office or officer of the government for an act to be done, as distinguished from a period of time
within which an act should be done, which may be on any day within that specified period. For
example, if a party is required by law to file his answer to a complaint within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved
to the next succeeding, business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case on a certain day
but the said date is subsequently declared a public holiday, the trial thereof is not automatically
transferred to the next succeeding business day. Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last
day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period, but a
date fixed by the deputy sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be made on the next
succeeding business day without the notices of the sale on that day being posted as prescribed
in Section 9, Act ----- (Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. L-32116, [April 21,
1981], 191 PHIL 479-498)

Metrobank vs. Sps. Antonio and Elisa Tan, et al., G.R. No. 178449, October 17,
2008

We, however, have consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period should
be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate
of sale is registered with the Registry of Deeds.
In the case before us, the certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Manila on 20 June 1984. Under Article 13 of the Civil Code, a year is
understood to be three hundred sixty-five (365) days. Thus excluding the first day
and counting from 20 June 1984, respondents spouses Tan had only until 20 June
1985 within which to redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law.

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Prior to this date, they did not exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed
property.
The only credible evidence respondents presented to show that they allegedly
offered to redeem the subject property was the letter of spouses Elisa and Antonio
Tan dated 2 February 1995 where they offered the amount of two million pesos
(in installment) as settlement of their obligation and for the release of the real
estate mortgages on TCT No. 105233. Other than this, we find nothing concrete
to prove that they (spouses Tan) tried to redeem within the one-year period and
even after when this Court ruled in G.R. No. 118585 on 14 September 1995. Their
claims that they tendered their offer to redeem on various times are all
unsubstantiated and which Metrobank has denied. DHETIS
The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to
redeem manifests his/her desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes
the exercise of the right to repurchase. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies
a reasonable and valid tender of the entire purchase price, otherwise the rule on
the redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented. There is no cogent
reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by installments from the
redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the
redemption period.
In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the
redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the purchaser
paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the purchase price; (3) the
amount of any assessment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the
property after the purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per month on such assessment
and taxes.

Arturo O. Radaza, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177135, October
15, 2008

In ascertaining the last day of the period of suspension, one (1) month is to be
treated as equivalent to thirty (30) days, such that six (6) months is equal to one
hundred eighty (180) days. Thus, a preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
months, which begins on 4 April 2007, shall end on 1 October 2007. This is in line
with the provisions of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months,
of thirty days; days of twenty four hours; and nights from sunset to
sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.

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Mitsubishi Motors Phil. Corp. vs. Chrysler Phils. Labor Union, G.R. No. 148738,
June 29, 2004
Petitioner’s argument

The petitioner asserts that the CA erred in ruling that respondent Paras was
already a regular employee when he was served the notice of termination. Citing
Article 13 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner argued that the six-month
probationary period should be computed as follows:
May 27-31 = 4 days
Jun(e) 1-30 = 1 month (30 days)
July 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)
Aug(.) 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)
Sept(.) 1-30 = 1 month (30 days)
Oct(.) 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)
Nov(.) 1-26 = 26 days 22
Hence, according to the petitioner, when the termination letter was served on
November 26, 1996, Paras was still a probationary employee. Considering that he
did not qualify for regularization, his services were legally terminated. As such, the
CA erred in ordering his reinstatement and the payment of his backwages.

The Issues

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not respondent Paras
was already a regular employee on November 26, 1996; (b) whether or not he was
legally dismissed; (c) if so, whether or not his reinstatement had been rendered
moot and academic; and, (d) whether or not his backwages should be computed
only up to February of 1998.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partially granted.

At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed by this
Court in petitions for review on certiorari of CA decisions. Questions of fact are
not entertained. This Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor cases, this doctrine
applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve. The
findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by
substantial evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the Court of
Appeals, such findings are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and
will not normally be disturbed.
However, when the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are inconsistent
with each other, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them
should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts. Considering
that the CA's findings of fact clash with those of the Voluntary Arbitrator, this

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Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as the submissions
of the parties.
Regularization of
Employment
Indeed, an employer, in the exercise of its management prerogative, may hire an
employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform
work. Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, the employer must inform the
employee of the standards for which his employment may be considered for
regularization. Such probationary period, unless covered by an apprenticeship
agreement, shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started
working. The employee's services may be terminated for just cause or for his
failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable standards made
known to him.
Respondent Paras was employed as a management trainee on a probationary
basis. During the orientation conducted on May 15, 1996, he was apprised of the
standards upon which his regularization would be based. He reported for work on
May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from
three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months
consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. This is in conformity with paragraph
one, Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that the months which are not
designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days
each. The number of months in the probationary period, six (6), should then be
multiplied by the number of days within a month, thirty (30); hence, the period
of one hundred eighty (180) days.
As clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, in computing a period,
the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred
eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23,
1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on
respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. He was, by then,
already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.

People of the Phils. vs. Felipe Demate, G.R. Nos. 132310 & 143968-69, January
20, 2004

The Solicitor General, in turn, points out that under Article 13 of the Civil Code
the offense was committed at nighttime, having been committed before the
sunrise. Hence, under Article 14 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, nocturnity should
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. It is clear that in committing the
crime at three o'clock in the morning, the appellants purposely sought the cover
of darkness to make it difficult for them to be identified, says the OSG.
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. First is the
objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the
commission of the offense. Second is the subjective test, under which nocturnity
is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. The two tests
should be applied in the alternative. When appellant Demate asked the
housemaid to let him inside her master's house at 3:00 a.m., we can grant that the
subjective test was passed. However, in the imposition of the penalty on

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appellants, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of nighttime for
two reasons. First, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is already
absorbed by treachery. Second, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8511 did
not specifically allege the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Under the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect
following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
every Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances. Hence, since the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was not
alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 8511, it could not be appreciated
against the appellants.

People of the Phils. vs. Manuel Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 144907-09, September 17,
2002

Accused-appellant Manuel Gutierrez was convicted of two (2) counts of murder

and one (1) count of serious physical injuries and was sentenced to suffer twice
the supreme penalty of death and to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as maximum for the attack upon Lilian Trabel resulting in
serious physical injuries. On automatic review, appellant did not deny his guilt but
faulted the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in
the killing of Lorelie and Rializa. He insisted that insofar as the stabbing of Lorelie
is concerned, Venus Ramos admittedly did not witness the commencement of the
attack, thus defeating the prosecution's bid to establish treachery as an
aggravating circumstance. Appellant also argued that treachery cannot be
appreciated in the killing of Rializa as the evidence established that the assault
upon her was thought of only seconds after the killing frenzy.

The Supreme Court found appellant guilty of two (2) counts of homicide and one
(1) count of serious physical injuries. Treachery was not attendant in the killing of
victim Rializa Trabel because the meeting between the accused and the victim was
casual and the attack was done impulsively or devoid of any plan and it was purely
accidental. The killing of victim Lorelie de la Cruz was not also attended by
treachery. Prosecution witness Venus Ramos did not actually see how the
stabbing began, how it developed, and how the unfortunate victim succumbed to
death on the second floor of the ancestral house. The Court also ruled that the
trial court erred in denominating the assault upon Lilian Trabel as serious
physical injuries for the reason that the medical certificate estimated the healing
period of one (1) month for her wounds. Article 13 of the Civil Code explicitly
provided that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood that they
are of thirty (30) days. Applied by the Court in the present case, the one (1) month
healing period provided in Lilian's medical certificate should thus be interpreted
as referring to thirty (30) days of incapacity. The liability therefore of appellant for
the wounding of Lilian Trabel should fall under Art. 265 of the Revised Penal Code
for less serious physical injuries, and not under par. (4), Art. 263, of the aforesaid
law.

Page 60 of 121
 Ramon Estanislao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143687, July 31, 2001

Spouses Ramon Estanislao, Jr. and Dina Estanislao, petitioners herein, mortgaged
to respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. a parcel of land, registered in their name,
together with the buildings and improvements thereon. The mortgage was
constituted to secure a loan of P200,000.00. For petitioners' failure to comply with
some of its conditions, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the
property was sold to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. as the highest bidder. The Certificate of
Sale issued to the highest bidder was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City on June 9, 1992. On June 4, 1993, petitioner Ramon, Jr. offered to
redeem the property. However, the check was returned to petitioner Estanislao
on the ground that its amount did not include the interests, charges, and
penalties. He was informed that no certificate of redemption could be issued
unless the amount was fully paid and settled. Without waiting for the purchaser's
statement of interest and other charges which he had requested, petitioner again
tendered to private respondents on June 21, 1993 the check for P445,000.00 to
cover the purchase price and another manager's check for P81,521.27 to cover
the interest. The checks were, however, rejected by private respondents for being
inadequate. Thereafter, the petitioner spouses brought suit against private
respondents, seeking the annulment of the affidavit of consolidation of
ownership, the cancellation of the new title, and the payment of damages and
attorney's fees. The Regional Trial Court dismissed petitioners' suit and ordered
them to pay damages to private respondents. Petitioners appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
According to the Supreme Court, the prevailing law at the time of the auction sale
in this case was the 1964 Rules of Court, which spoke of the right of a judgment
debtor to redeem property sold at auction "within twelve (12) months after the
sale," which means within 360 days on the basis of 30 days in a month. The
question was merely of academic interest in this case, because even if the period
of redemption was 365 days, the tender of the full redemption price made by
petitioners on June 21, 1993 was 12 days late counted from the expiration of the
redemption period on June 9, 1993. The right of redemption should be exercised
within the period prescribed by law. Moreover, the tender of payment must be
for the full amount of the purchase price. Otherwise, to allow payment by
installments would be to allow the indefinite extension of the redemption period.
Consequently, the payment tendered by petitioners on June 4, 1993, while made
within the period of redemption (365 days), was ineffective since the amount
offered did not include the interest but was limited to the purchase price. The
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed by the Supreme Court with the
modification that the award of moral damages and attorney's fees to private
respondents was deleted.

People of the Phil. vs. Rolando A. Alfanta, G.R. No. 125633, December 9, 1999

Accused-appellant was convicted of rape aggravated by the circumstances of

nighttime and ignominy by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In this appeal, appellant sought

Page 61 of 121
the reversal of his conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. Appellant
also assailed the decision of the trial court in considering the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime and ignominy. The Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction of the crime charged, but lowered the penalty therein imposed to
reclusion perpetua. The Court found no compelling reason to conclude that the
trial court had erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the
complainant. The Court upheld the trial court's finding that nighttime aggravated
the commission of the offense. Appellant abducted his victim, brought her to an
abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured
of the stillness of the sleeping world. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy
was correctly appreciated by the lower court against appellant in ordering the
complainant to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus
and thereafter ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger
inside her. The Court, however, lowered the penalty of death imposed by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua. According to the Court, while it is uncontroverted that
appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his criminal objective, said
circumstance could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the case at
bar because it was not alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under
the jurisprudentially referred "qualified rape" punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. EAICTS|||

And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances

of nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn. The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. By and
of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is
specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or
it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity
from capture. As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so
considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the Information.
The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of
the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being
recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an
abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured
of the stillness of a sleeping world. The Court has long held that this aggravating
circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence
and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal act.

Violeta Batara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127906, December 16, 1998

Both the trial court and the appellate court were not accurate in computing the
period to appeal in question. In the case before us, the applicable law is the last
paragraph of Art 13 of the Civil Code which reads "In computing a period, the first
day shall be excluded and the last day included." Here, counsel for petitioners
received copy of the trial court's decision on 6 November 1995. A motion for
reconsideration dated 17 November 1995 was mailed and considered filed by the
court a quo on 21 November 1995 which was the last day of the 15-day period
within which an appeal may be perfected. In computing petitioners' period to

Page 62 of 121
appeal, this last day should be excluded so that when their counsel received copy
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 23 February 1996
petitioners still had one (1) day within which to perfect an appeal. This one day
should again be computed in accordance with the manner aforecited. By excluding
the date of receipt and including the next day which was 24 February 1996, a
Saturday, the delay incurred by petitioners reckoned therefrom totaled ten (10)
days as they filed their notice of appeal only on 5 March 1996.||| ---- The rule
of procedure here is no longer valid because under the new rule, when one gets a
denial of their MR the parties are given another 15 days from receipt of the denial
of the MR.

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993

Appealed Ruling of the Court a quo

The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March

28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended
Record on Appeal, p. 108). The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the
dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3
of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be "published once a
week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, defendant-appellee bank
failed to comply with this legal requirement. The Supreme Court has held that:
"The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight
deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least
voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. 1058, G.R. No. 42589, August 31, 1937
and October 29, 1937). Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(reproduced in Sec. 18(c) of Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in
Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co. (38 Phil. 808, G.R. No. 1309,
October 18, 1918), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without the notice
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure induced thereto by the judgment
creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title passes. This is regarded as the
settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may be elsewhere (Borja vs.
Addison, 14 Phil. 895, G.R. No. 18010, June 21, 1922).
. . . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in
compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale (59
C.J.S. 1314)." (Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November 8, 1988; 167
SCRA 16, 23-24).
In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading showing that there
was no compliance of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act 4118, with respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real
properties in this case, we have no choice but to declare the auction sale as
absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said
auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the Certificate of Sale,
the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal effect.
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)

Page 63 of 121
Supreme Court Ruling:

Now, in support of the theory on adherence to the conditions spelled in the

preliminary portion of this discourse, the pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie
vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA 122 [1983]: p. 135, Rollo) is sought to be utilized to
press the point that the notice need not be published for three full weeks.
According to petitioner, there is no breach of the proviso since after the first
publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969
(the last day of the second week), while the third publication on April 12, 1969 was
announced on the first day of the third week. Petitioner thus concludes that there
was no violation from the mere happenstance that the third publication was made
only a day after the second publication since it is enough that the second
publication be made on any day within the second week, and the third publication,
on any day within the third week. Moreover, in its bid to rectify its admission in
judicio, petitioner asseverates that said admission alluded to refers only to the
dates of publications, not that there was noncompliance with the publication
requirement.
Private respondent, on the other hand, views the legal question from a different
perspective. He believes that the period between each publication must never be
less than seven consecutive days (p. 4, Memorandum; p. 124, Rollo).
We are not convinced by petitioner's submissions because the disquisition in
support thereof rests on the erroneous impression that the day on which the first
publication was made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code.
It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of
what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139 [1938]; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was interpreted
to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days—a definition
which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al.
(38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the interpretation in Derby as to the
publication of an ordinance for "at last two weeks" in some newspaper that:
. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the
first day's publication from the computation, and the cases above
cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ.
Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;
the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient
advertisement for the second week because the period for the first week should
be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should
be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the
announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated
with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of
duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of
seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins
(1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).

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Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning
point, in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the
purpose of counting the first week of publication as to make the last day thereof
fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of extending the first week
by another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been the unwritten
intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion of
the first day of publication is in keeping with the computation in Bonnevie vs. Court
of Appeals (125 SCRA 122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion to pronounce,
through Justice Guerrero, that the publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July
14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act No. 3135. Respondent
court cannot, therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no compliance with
the strict requirements of publication independently of the so-called admission in
judicio.

State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99308, November
13, 1992

Under Article 13 of the New Civil Code, a year is understood to be of three

hundred sixty-five (365) days. Thus, excluding the first day and counting from
August 25, 1983 (under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the New Civil Code), and
bearing in mind that 1984 was a leap year, Cuenca had only until August 23, 1984,
the 365th day after registration of the sale on August 24, 1983, within which to
redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law. It was thus already
beyond the redemption period when Cuenca filed her suit below on August 24,
1984. It should be stressed in this regard that it is not proper to count, as Cuenca
submits in her Rejoinder, the period on the basis of 30 days per month. The law
speaks of a "one year" period within which to redeem, not twelve months as in
the case of redemption by a judgment debtor under Section 30 of Rule 39.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the period of one year within which to
redeem in the case at bar is to count 365 days from August 24, 1983.
Consequently, the last day to redeem would be and indeed fell on August 23,
1984, said year being a leap year (cf Go vs. Dizon, et al, G.R. No. 75915-16,
September 18, 1992).|||

Sps. Go It Bun vs. Baltazar R. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 75915-16, September 18, 1992

The necessary implication, consequently, is that the period of redemption is one

(1) year, as has been stated in some decisions of the Court, from the registration
of the sheriff's certificate of sale. My position is that the redemption period should
be considered as having lapsed five (5) days earlier, that is, in March 13, 1982 in
this case.
Section 30 of Rule 39 provides that "(t)he judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may
redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months
after the sale . . .," and not within one (1) year. Of course, it is already settled that
the phrase "after the sale" really means after the date of registration of the
certificate of sale. What is here in question, instead, is the computation of the
redemption period of "twelve (12) months."

Page 65 of 121
 Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that "(w)hen the laws speak of years, months,
. . ., it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; . . ." and it is only "(i)f months are designated by their name,
(that) they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have."
Now, the Rules of Court have the force and effect of law, and in the rule
applicable to the case at bar the months involved are not specifically designated.
Accordingly, applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the redemption period in this
case and other cases falling under Section 30 of Rule 39 should consist of 360,
and not 365, days since said Section 30 speaks of only twelve (12) months which,
under the rules of computation in the aforestated Article 13, is not necessarily
equivalent to one (1) year.
While the 5-day variance pointed out here, resulting from what I suggest is the
correct basis for computation pursuant to said Article 13, does not affect the
disposition of the present case but even reinforces the conclusion therein, under
like situations in other cases involving the correct duration of the redemption
period such divergence could very well mean the difference between either the
legal entitlement of the judgment creditor to or an extended opportunity for
recovery by the judgment debtor of the auctioned property.

Laws application as to all person citizen and non-citizen as to

crime/s, security, safety, family, properties, status rights of succession, forms
and solemnities

Summary:

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations (A14).
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad (A15). Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found (A16).

The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution (A17).

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country (A17).

Page 66 of 121
 Law as to Penal statutes

ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)

This article embodies the principle of diplomatic immunity. Thus, under the rule
on Exterritoriality, the fiction of international law by virtue of which certain foreign
persons and their things are exempted from the jurisdiction of a state on the
theory that they form an extension of the territory of their own state. Also, under
the rule on Extraterritoriality, the rule wherein exemption of foreign persons from
laws and jurisdiction of a state in which they presently reside, an exemption which
can only exist by virtue of a treaty stipulation to this effect.

Example:
A, an American citizen is residing in the Philippines. He committed
a crime of murder. Sued for the same, he interposed the defense
that since he is an American Citizen, he cannot be bound by
Philippines law. Is his contention correct? Why?
Ans. No. Penal laws and those of public safety and security shall be
binding upon those who live and sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to generally accepted principles of international law and
treaty stipulation. (Article 14 of the NCC)

Law as to Family, Status, Condition and Legal Capacity

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

GENERAL RULE:

A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. --- Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 139 SCRA 139, 1985.

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The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. --- Garcia vs. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001.

DOMICILIARY THEORY: A conflict of law theory by virtue of which a particular

matter affecting a person, such as his personal status, is determined by and/or
subject to the jurisdiction of the law of his domicile.

Rule for Absolute Divorce:

If the action is brought in a Foreign Court between foreigners, the foreign decree
of absolute divorce will be recognized as valid here only if the following conditions
concur:
a. The foreign court must have had jurisdiction to grant the absolute divorce;
b. The divorce must be recognized as valid by the national law of the parties.

Lex Nationali means the Law of the Country of the person shall apply.

Paula T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from 1927 to 1957 and a naturalized American citizen. On February 22, 1937,
Lorenzo married petitioner Paula Llorente. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in
barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines
to visit his wife in 1945, he discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was
"living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to
the United States and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel,
John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The Superior Court of the
State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be
true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. The divorce decree became
final in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in
the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From
1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife and produced
three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. The trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over

Page 68 of 121
Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a petition
for the issuance of letters testamentary. The trial court denied Alicia's petition and
ruled that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente was void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore, her marriage to Lorenzo was likewise
void. The trial court appointed Paula Llorente as legal administrator of the estate
of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. Respondent Alicia filed with the trial court a
motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Alicia appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its decision, affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court. The trial court declared Alicia as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased Lorenzo may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. Petitioner Paula moved for
reconsideration, but was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court and
recognized as valid and as a matter of comity the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
According to the Court, the "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to the general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can, therefore, refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident and there was also no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine was called for or required by New York State
law. The Court also said that the clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property
to his second wife and children by her was glaringly shown in the will he executed
and the Court did not wish to frustrate Lorenzo's wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity. The Court remanded the cases to the court of origin
for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente's will and
determination of the parties' successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26,
2013

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

Page 69 of 121
 BAR EXAMINATION 2009

XX
(A) If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, files a petition for change of
name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A) New York law shall apply. The petition of change of name file in New York does not
concern the legal capacity or status of the petitioner. Moreover, it does not affect the registry
of any other country including the country of birth of the petitioner. Whatever judgment is
rendered in that petition will have effect only in New York. The New York court cannot, for
instance, order the Civil Registrar in the Philippines to change its records. The judgment of the
New York court allowing a change in the name of the petitioner will be limited to the records
of the petitioner in New York and the use of her new name in all transactions in New York.
Since the records and processes in New York are the only ones affected, the New York court
will apply New York law in resolving the petition.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(A) Philippine law shall apply (Art 15, NCC). Status, conditions, family rights and duties
are governed by Philippine laws as to Filipinos even though sojourning abroad.
ALTENATIVE ANSWER:
(A) If Ligaya, a Filipino, files a petition for change of name with the District Court of New
YoRk, the laws of New York will govern since change of name is not one of those covered by
the principles of nationality.
(B) If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for change of
name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) Philippine law will apply. The petition for change of name in the Philippines will
affect only the records of the petitioner and his transactions in the Philippines. The Philippine
court can never acquire jurisdiction over the custodian in the US of the records of the
petitioner. Moreover, change of name has nothing to do with the legal capacity or status of the
alien. Since Philippine records and transactions are the only ones affected, the Philippine court
may effect the change only in accordance with the laws governing those records and
transactions that law cannot be but Philippine law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(B) U.S. law shall apply as it is his national law. This is pursuant to the application of lex
patriae or the nationality principle, by which his legal status is governed by national law, the
matter of change of name being included in the legal status. The Supreme Court has reiterate
in several cases, that the lex patriae as provided in Article 15 of the Civil Code is applicable to
foreign nationals in determining their legal status (supra).

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 BAR EXAMINATION 2005

II
In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In 1987,
they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the same year. He
then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988. They had two sons, James
and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu married Tirso, by whom she had a
daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
a) Discuss the effect of the divorce obtained by Sonny and Lulu in Canada. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The divorce obtained by Sonny in Canada was not valid because he and his wife were
both Filipino citizens. Divorce between a Filipino couples is not valid under Philippine law even
though they are living abroad. (Art. 15, Civil Code)
b) Explain the status of the marriage between Sonny and Auring. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the divorce obtained by Sonny was void, his marriage to Auring is necessarily
void ab initio because of his subsisting marriage to Lulu. (Art. 41, Family Code)
c) Explain the status of the marriage between Lulu and Tirso. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The marriage between Lulu and Tirso is also void ab initio because Lulu is still validly
married to Sonny.

BAR EXAMINATION 1995

II
While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a
parcel of land situated in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.
1. What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale? Explain your
answer and give its legal basis.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Under Art. 16 par. 1, NCC, real property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated. Since the property is situated in the Philippines, Philippine law applies. The rule of
lex rei sitae in Article 16 prevails over lex loci contractu in Article 17 of the NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Afghanistan law governs the formal requirements of the contract since the execution
is in Afghanistan. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they

Page 71 of 121
are executed. However, if the contract was executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in Afghanistan, Philippine law shall apply.

2. What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land? Explain your answer
and give its legal basis.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. Japanese law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land being his personal
law on the basis of an interpretation of Art. 15, NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS;
2. a. Since capacity to contract is governed by the personal law of an individual, the
Japanese seller's capacity should be governed either by his national law (Japanese law) or by
the law of his domicile, depending upon whether Japan follows the nationality or domiciliary
theory of personal law for its citizens.
b. Philippine law governs the capacity of the Japanese owner in selling the land. While
as a general rule capacity of persons is governed by the law of his nationality, capacity
concerning transactions involving property is an exception. Under Article 16 of the NCC the
capacity of persons in transactions involving title to property is governed by the law of the
country where the property is situated. Since the property is in the Philippines, Philippine law
governs the capacity of the seller.

3. What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land? Explain your answer and
give its legal basis.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. Philippine law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land. In addition to the
principle of lex rei sitae given above. Article 15 of the NCC specifically provides that Philippine
laws relating to legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines no matter
where they are.

Law as to real and personal properties

ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. --- Lex Rei Sitae
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
--- Lex Nationali

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 Lex Nationali means the Law of the Country of the person shall apply.

Lex Rei Sitae means the law of the Country where the property subject of the
contract is situated shall govern the contract

Renvoi Doctrine means that when the national law of the foreign refers back the
issue on his succession to the Philippine Jurisdiction, thus, the law of the domicile,
which in this case the law of the Philippines, shall govern.

Transmission Theory is a case where the national law of foreigner who was
domicile of the Philippines before his death provides that said foreigner’s
successional rights shall be govern by a 3rd State. Thus, the 3rd State law shall
govern.

Forum Non Conveniens is a rule wherein it is provided that the Philippine Court
or Tribunal may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:

(1) That the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to;
(2) That the Philippine court is in position to make an intelligent decision
as to the law and the facts; and
(3) That the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision. --- Manila Hotel Corporation vs. NLRC, 343 SCRA 1 (2000)

GENERAL RULE:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated/located.
EXCEPTION:
In intestate and testamentary succession, it is the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration that shall be applied regardless of the nature and
location of the property with respect only to the following:
a. Order of Succession
b. Amount of successional rights
c. Intrinsic validity of will; and
d. Capacity to succeed.

RENVOI DOCTRINE --- AZNAR V. CHRISTENSEN GRACIA, G.R. NO. L-16749, JAN. 31,
1963
Literally means a “referring back”, this doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another, and the issue
involved is with regard to:
1. Order of succession;
2. Amount of successional rights;
3. Intrinsic validity of will; and
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 4. Capacity to succeed.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption is one where the foreign law should be

proved by the party who alleged its existence and its provisions. If there is
no such proof, the foreign law shall be presumed to be the same as the
domestic law.

Aznar vs. Garcia (7 SCRA 95)

Re: Article 16, NCC – Doctrine of Renvoi applied where deceased Edward Christensen, an American
citizen of the State of California, died testate as domiciliary of the Philippines, leaving properties in the
Philippines. The validity of the provisions of the will depriving testator’s acknowledged natural child should
be governed by Philippine law pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California. The doctrine of renvoi has been defined thus: “When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law, is the reference to the corresponding rule of Conflict of Laws
of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system, i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law, minus the Conflict of Law rules?”The Supreme Court ruled that the reference is
not only to the internal law, but also to the Conflict of Laws rule of the foreign country which refers the
case to the country of domicile adopting the doctrine of renvoi in the Philippines.

Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)

Re: Article 16, NCC. – Doctrine of Renvoi was not applied where the decedent was a citizen of
Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. However, if Texas has a conflict of laws rule
adopting the rule of the lex rei sitai, renvoi would arise where the properties involved are situated in
another country other than the country of which the decedent is a domiciliary or a national.

BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS

Problem A:
Alex was born a Filipino, but was a naturalized Canadian Citizen at the time of his death on
December 25, 1998. He left behind a last will and testament in which he bequeathed all his
properties, real and personal, in the Philippines to his acknowledged illegitimate daughter and
nothing to his two legitimate Filipino sons. The sons sought the annulment of the last will and
testament on the ground that it deprived them of their legitimes but the daughter was able to
prove that there were no compulsory heirs or legitimes under Canadian law. Who should prevail?

Ans. The daughter should prevail. Alex was already a Canadian citizen at the time of his death.
2nd paragraph of Article 16 of the NCC provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration. Hence, Canada law shall govern.

Page 74 of 121
Problem B:
In his lifetime, a Pakistani citizen, ADIL, married three times under Pakistani Law. When he died
an old widower, he left behind six children, two sisters, three homes, and an estate worth at least
30 Million pesos in Philippine currency. He was born in Lahore, but last resided in Cebu City where
he had a mansion and where two of his youngest children now live and work. Two of his oldest
children are farmers in Sulu, while the two-middle-aged children are employees in Zamboanga
City. Finding that the deceased left no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Two other siblings objected arguing that it should be
in Jolo before the Shari’ah court since his lands are in Sulu. But Adil’s sisters in Pakistan want the
proceedings held in Lahore before Pakistani Court.

A) Which court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue for the intestate proceedings?
B) What law shall govern succession to his estate?

Ans.

A) The proper venue is Cebu City with respect to properties in the Philippines. Under Article 16
of the New Civil Code, the properties of ADIL that are located in the Philippines shall be
governed by Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, the venue for intestate proceedings is
the place of domicile of the decedent at the time of his death. Since Adil last resided in Cebu
City before his death, then the intestate proceeding should be filed in Cebu City.

B) The law that shall govern with respect to succession shall be the national law of the
decedent with respect to the order of succession and the amount of successional rights.

Problem C:
While in Afganistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a parcel of land situated
in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.

A) What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale?
B) What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land?
C) What law governs the capacity of Ramoncito, the Filipino?

Ans:

A) Philippine laws apply. Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that real properties are
subject to the laws of the country where the same is situated ---- Lex Rei Sitae. Although the
contract was entered into in Afganistan, it is submitted that Lex Rei Sitae still applies and
prevails over Lex Loci Celebracionis.

B) The laws of Japan govern the capacity of Mr. Sato. The legal capacity of a person is governed
by the personal law of the same person – Lex Nationali.

C) The laws of the Philippines govern the capacity of Ramoncito because he is a Filipino. Article
15 of the NCC provides that law relating to legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines even though they are living abroad.

Problem D:
Boni and Anne, who are both Filipino citizens, met while working overseas. The became
sweethearts and got engaged to be married on New Year’s Eve aboard a cruise ship in the
Caribbean. They took the proper license to marry in New York City, where there is a Philippine
Consulate. But as planned, the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the Norwegian-
registered vessel in a private suite among selected friends. Back in Manila, Anne discovered that
Boni had been married in Bacolod City five years earlier, but divorced in Oslo only last year. His
first wife was also a Filipina but now based in Sweden. Boni himself is a resident of Norway where
he and Anne plan to live permanently. Was Boni capacitated to marry Anne?

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 Ans.

No. Since Boni is a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine law. Article 15 of
the New Civil Code provides that law relating to Family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though
they are living abroad. Boni is still married under Philippine laws. The divorce that he and his
first wife obtain is not recognized in the Philippines because both of them are Filipinos. --- Paula
T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000

Law as to forms, solemnities & prohibitive laws

ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. --- LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)

LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS

 As a general rule the law of the place where the contract is made or
entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligations
and interpretation. This is the rule even though the place where the
contract was made is different from the place where it is to be
performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place
of performance are the same. --- Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, 228
SCRA 23 (1993)

Page 76 of 121
Lucio C. Morigo vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts of the case:

The accused is being charged for Bigamy and was found guilty by the Court a quo and the
Appellate Court. Part of the established facts of the case is the fact that the second
marriage was not solemnized before a person who can validly solemnize marriage.
However, if was also an undisputed fact that accused was previously married to another
Filipino in the Philippines but filed a divorce in Canada, which petition was granted by the
Canadian Court. Relying on the decree of divorce, the accused executed a contract of
marriage and signed the contract but not before an authorized person who can solemnize
the marriage.

Ruling:

The Philippine Supreme Court reverse the order of conviction mainly because the element
of bigamy, which is entering of a second marriage while the first marriage subsist is not
attendant in the present case. The fact that the second marriage was merely done thru
the signing of a marriage contract but not solemnized by an authorized solemnizing officer
clearly shows a fatal defect in the alleged second marriage for in reality there is no second
marriage to talk about, to wit:
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed
a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of
the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.

However, with respect to the divorce decree, the same is not valid for as enunciated by
the Supreme Court in the case of Ramirez v. Gmur --- 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918), which held that
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine
the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. The divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact
that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration
of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.||

Page 77 of 121
United Airlines Inc vs. CA (357 SCRA 99)

Re: Article 17, NCC. – Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationes: According to this doctrine, as a general
rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation. This is true even though the place where the contract was made is
different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the
place of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply Philippine laws, the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued even though the flights were between states of the United States of
America, the place where the obligations were to be performed. (Note: Another leading case: Zalamea vs.
CA, 228 SCRA 23).

BAR EXAMINATION

Problem A:
Mr. A, a Filipino, executed a will in Kuwait while there as a contract worker. Assume that under
the laws of Kuwait, it is enough that the testator affix his signature in the presence of two witnesses
and that the will need not be acknowledged before a notary public. May the will be probated in
the Philippines.

Ans.

Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines. Article 17 of the New Civil Code provides that
forms and solemnities of wills shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. Hence, the formalities of the will are valid even if Philippine laws are not complied
with so long as the will complies with the formalities of a will mandated under the laws of
Kuwait.

Decisions of Foreign Courts.

Foreign courts decisions are not automatically binding and enforceable in the Philippines.
Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign decisions and these foreign decisions should
be proved in court. However, any party may file a Petition to enforce a foreign judgment
in local courts under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

(a) In recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute

their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law --- Fujiki vs. Marinay, et
al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013. For example, they cannot decide on the family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity of a foreign citizen
who is a party to the foreign judgment.

(b) In actions for recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts will only determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2)whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground
to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Page 78 of 121
Page 79 of 121
 Suppletory application of this Code

ARTICLE 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special
laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

Bank of the Phil. Islands vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G.R. Nos. 149454 & 149507,
May 28, 2004

Facts of the case:

On November 8, 1982, plaintiff CASA Montessori International 5 opened Current Account No.
0291-0081-01 with defendant BPI[,] with CASA's President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of its
authorized signatories.
"In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been
encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of P782,000.00.
It turned out that 'Sonny D. Santos' with account at BPI's Greenbelt Branch [was] a fictitious name
used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA. Third
party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the
checks.
"The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9) checks and concluded that
the handwritings thereon compared to the standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by
the latter.
"On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for Collection with Damages against
defendant bank praying that the latter be ordered to reinstate the amount of P782,500.00 in the
current and savings accounts of the plaintiff with interest at 6% per annum.
In opposing the payment of Interest, defendant BPI argues that the imposition of interest is not
allowable since nowhere is it provided under the Negotiable Instrument Law that interest as
damages can be awarded for reason of lack of stipulation in the document in question.

Ruling:

For the failure of BPI to pay CASA upon demand and for compelling the latter to resort to the courts
to obtain payment, legal interest may be adjudicated at the discretion of the Court, the same to
run from the filing of the Complaint. Since a court judgment is not a loan or a forbearance of
recovery, the legal interest shall be at six percent (6%) per annum. "If the obligation consists in the

Page 80 of 121
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of . . . legal interest, which is six percent
per annum." The actual base for its computation shall be "on the amount finally adjudged,"
compounded annually to make up for the cost of money already lost to CASA.
Moreover, the failure of the CA to award interest does not prevent us from granting it upon
damages awarded for breach of contract. Because BPI evidently breached its contract of deposit
with CASA, we award interest in addition to the total amount adjudged. Under Section 196 of the
NIL, any case not provided for shall be "governed by the provisions of existing legislation or, in
default thereof, by the rules of the law merchant." Damages are not provided for in the NIL. Thus,
we resort to the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. Under Article 2 of the Code of Commerce,
acts of commerce shall be governed by its provisions and, "in their absence, by the usages of
commerce generally observed in each place; and in the absence of both rules, by those of the
civil law." This law being silent, we look at Article 18 of the Civil Code, which states: "In matters
which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied"
by its provisions. A perusal of these three statutes unmistakably shows that the award of interest
under our civil law is justified.

Page 81 of 121
 CHAPTER 2
Human Relations (n)

Preliminary:

Article 19, 20 and 21 provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffer
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which
though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. These are so called catch-all provisions because they
provide the bases for actions for damages in the absence of any express provision.

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

The requisites of abuse of right are as follows:

1. There is a legal right or duty;

2. The legal right or duty is exercised in bad faith; and
3. The exercise is for the sole intent prejudicing or injuring
another.

Aytona vs. Castillo (4 SCRA 1)

Re: Article 19, NCC - Midnight (December 26, 1961) mass appointments of Aytona by President
Garcia, whose term ends on December 30, 1962, was declared void by the Supreme Court as an abuse of
a right.

Cebu Country Club, Inc. vs. Elizagaque (542 SCRA 65)

Re: Article 19, NCC – There is abuse of right when the change which requires unanimous vote thru
“black ballsystem” for admission as proprietary member of the Cebu Country Club, was not published and
was not printed on the application form for proprietary membership of the club and applicant was not
informed why his application was not approved; moreover, applicant’s motion for reconsideration of the
rejection of his application was ignored by the Club without any explanation for the rejection. Club was
liable for moral damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 and 2219, NCC.

Sample cases:

a) A creditor – taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings

were to be instituted by the debtor if the creditors did not come to an
understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent’s asset among
Page 82 of 121
 them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such
understanding --- schemed and transferred its credit to a sister company in the
United States which, in turn, secured a writ of attachment in court therein
thereby gaining control over the plane of the debtor in the US --- Velayo, etc.
vs. Shell Co., L-7817, October 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 186 (1956)

b) A mortgagee abused its right when it recovered the mortgaged vehicle without
court action preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default --- Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December
6, 2006

c) There is abuse of right if the principal unreasonably terminated an agency

agreement for selfish reasons ---- Arturo P. Valenzuela, et al vs. The Hon. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 1, G.R No. 83122, October 19, 1990

d) There was abuse of right where a temporary restraining order was issued by
the CA against the writ of demolition issued by the lower court but the
petitioners still pursued the demolition. There was abuse of right in this case
and the fact that the writ of demolition was not subsequently annulled is of
no moment --- G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 731

e) There was also abuse of right when the petitioner unduly terminated its
hauling contract with private respondent who sympathized with the picketing
workers of the petitioner --- Petrophil Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
122796, December 10, 2001

Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October
1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a
400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he
received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. del Prado), in behalf of
Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves
the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions
will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of
such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against
Nala and Atty. del Prado.
Atty. del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was
merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership.
Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late
husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square
meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said
property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of
spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he
occupies.
Ruling:
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Page 83 of 121
 It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on
the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose
or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty.
del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first
place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her
husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously
sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for
damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims
ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand
letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or
malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests
over the property.

ASJ Corp., et al. vs. Sps. Efren and Maura Evengelista, G.R. No. 158086, February 14,
2008

Facts of the case:

Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the large-scale business
of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products 4
in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of
the hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and his
family.
Sometime in 1991, respondents delivered to petitioners various quantities of eggs at an agreed
service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Each delivery was
reflected in a "Setting Report" indicating the following: the number of eggs delivered; the date of
setting or the date the eggs were delivered and laid out in the incubators; the date of candling or
the date the eggs, through a lighting system, were inspected and determined if viable or capable
of being hatched into chicks; and the date of hatching, which is also the date respondents would
pick-up the chicks and by-products. Initially, the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs
and by-products to respondents. But as their business went along, respondents' delays on their
payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as there may be, into the
next delivery, out of keeping goodwill with respondents.
|||

On February 3, 1993, respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products
covered by Setting Report No. 108, but San Juan refused to release the same due to respondents'
failure to settle accrued service fees on several setting reports starting from Setting Report No. 90.
Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by Setting Report No. 113 and
P15,000.00 in cash as partial payment for the accrued service fees.
On February 10, 1993, Efren returned to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products
covered by Setting Report No. 109, but San Juan again refused to release the same unless
respondents fully settle their accounts. In the afternoon of the same day, respondent Maura, with
her son Anselmo, tendered P15,000.00 to San Juan, and tried to claim the chicks and by-products.
She explained that she was unable to pay their balance because she was hospitalized for an
undisclosed ailment. San Juan accepted the P15,000.00, but insisted on the full settlement of
respondents' accounts before releasing the chicks and by-products. Believing firmly that the total
value of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura
promised to settle their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan. San Juan disliked the
idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery compound if they
should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him.
On February 11, 1993, respondents directed their errand boy, Allan Blanco, to pick up the chicks
and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 110 and also to ascertain if San Juan was still willing
to settle amicably their differences. Unfortunately, San Juan was firm in his refusal and reiterated
his threats on respondents. Fearing San Juan's threats, respondents never went back to the
hatchery.

Page 84 of 121
Ruling:

Although the retention of the chicks and the by-products was justified. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court ruled that San Juan's subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain among
those treated with impunity. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right
if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Here, while petitioners
had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly
found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding
pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo F. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18,
2008 & GF Equity, Inc. vs. Arturo Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005

Standards in the Exercise of One's Rights and Duties

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010, citing Ramas v.
Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must
be intentional.

ASJ Corporation, et al. vs. Sps. Efren & Maura Evangelista, G.R. No. 158086, February
14, 2008 & Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Themistocles Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No.
157314, July 29, 2005

Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following
elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Page 85 of 121
 Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Artemio Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

ASJ Corp., et al. vs. Sps. Efren and Maura Evangelista, G.R. No. 158086, February 14,
2008

An act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object
of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated,
an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.

Titus B. Villanueva vs. Emma M. Rosqueta, G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 & 192073, September 11,
2013, citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan, 483
Phil. 525, 538 (2004)

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because
[it is] recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with

Page 86 of 121
 negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose
of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to injure another.

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently

causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Michael John Z. Melto vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007

Petrophil Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001

Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, G.R. No. 100755, February 10, 1994

Titus B. Villanueva vs. Emma M. Rosqueta, G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

BAR EXAMINATION 1996

II
Rosa was leasing an apartment in the city. Because of the Rent Control Law, her landlord could not
increase the rental as much as he wanted to, nor terminate her lease as long as she was paying her rent. In
order to force her to leave the premises, the landlord stopped making repairs on the apartment, and caused
the water and electricity services to be disconnected. The difficulty of living without electricity and running
water resulted in Rosa's suffering a nervous breakdown. She sued the landlord for actual and moral
damages. Will the action prosper? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, based on quasi-delict under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code (Articles 19,
20 and 21) because the act committed by the lessor is contrary to morals. Moral damages are recoverable
under Article 2219 (10) in relation to Article 21. Although the action is based on quasi-delict and not on
contract, actual damages may be recovered if the lessee is able to prove the losses and expenses she suffered.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

a) Yes, based on breach of contract. The lessor has the obligation to undertake repairs to make the
apartment habitable and to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the
entire duration of the contract (Article 1654. NCC). Since there was willful breach of contract by the lessor,
the lessee is entitled to moral damages under Article 3220, NCC. She is also entitled to actual damages, e. g.
loss of income, medical expenses, etc., which she can prove at the trial.

Page 87 of 121
 b) Yes, based on contract and/or on tort. The lessor willfully breached his obligations under Article
1654. NCC, hence, he is liable for breach of contract. For such breach, the lessee may recover moral damages
under Art. 2220 of the NCC, and actual damages that she may have suffered on account thereof. And since
the conduct of the lessor was contrary to morals, he may also be held liable for quasi-delict. The lessee may
recover moral damages under Article 2219 (10) in relation to Article 21, and all actual damages which she
may have suffered by reason of such conduct under Articles 9, 20 and 21.

c) Yes, the action should prosper for both actual and moral damages. In fact, even exemplary
damages and attorney's fees can be claimed by Rosa, on the authority of Magbanua vs. IAC (137 SCRA 328),
considering that, as given, the lessor's willful and illegal act of disconnecting the water and electric services
resulted in Rosa's suffering a nervous breakdown. Art. 20 NCC and Art, 21, NCC authorize the award of
damages for such willful and illegal conduct.

BAR EXAMINATION 2009

IX
Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all their
legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the situation, Atty.
Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the couple’s property in Quezon
City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the property in his name. Subsequently, Atty.
Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built an auto repair shop on the property. In 2004, Luis
registered the deed of conveyance, and title over the property was transferred in his name.
In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and discovered
what had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer. What action or
actions will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will institute the following actions against Atty. Tan:
(a) A civil action for damage for the fraudulent transfer of the title in his name and to
recover the value of the property;
(b) An action against the National Treasurer for compensation from the State Assurance
Fund which is set aside by law to pay those who lose their land suffer damages as a
consequence of the operation of the Torrens system;
(c) A criminal action for forgery or falsification of public document;
(d) A complaint with the Supreme Court/Integrated Bar of the Philippines to disbar or
suspend him or other disciplinary action for violation or the Code of Professional Ethics.
Any action against Luis will not prosper because he is an innocent purchaser for value.
The Title to the land he bought was already in the name of the person who sold the property
to him, and there is nothing on the title which will make him suspect about the fraud
committed by Atty. Tan.

Page 88 of 121
ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 147566, December 6, 2006

The Supreme Court penalized and granted damages to the employee and against SMC for
hiring the employee indirectly using Labor only contractor, thus, causing injury and
inconvenience to the employee, to wit:
Considering, however, the supervening event that SMC's Magnolia Division has
been acquired by another entity, it appears that private respondent's
reinstatement is no longer feasible. Instead, he should be awarded separation
pay as an alternative. 21 Likewise, owing to petitioner's bad faith, it should be
held liable to pay damages for causing undue injury and inconvenience to the
private respondent in its contractual hiring-firing-rehiring scheme.

Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. Ricardo F. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18,
2008 & GF Equity, Inc. vs. Arturo Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005

Standards in the Exercise of One's Rights and Duties

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010, citing Ramas v.
Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

Page 89 of 121
 A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.

Titus B. Villanueva vs. Emma M. Rosqueta, G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

Breach of Promise to Marry

Hermosisima vs. CA (109 Phil 629)

Mere breach to marry by itself is not an actionable wrong except if the act is contrary to morals,
good customs, etc. under Article 21, NCC; as when a woman 26 years of age voluntarily submitted herself
to a man 10 years younger than herself; However, in the case of Wassmer vs. Velez (12 SCRA 648) Re:
Article 21, NCC – Breach of promise to marry where groom formally set date of wedding with all necessary
preparations and to walk out is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs under Article 21 and
groom liable to moral damages (Article 2219 (10)) and exemplary damages (Article 2232), both of NCC.

By itself it is not actionable. By way of exception breach of promise to marry may be

actionable for being contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy just
like in the following cases:

1) Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery and seduced
her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family
who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered
as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to
teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and
even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiff even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love
affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home, Held; The wrong
defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the New Civil Code. --- Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

2) Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good

Page 90 of 121
 customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article
2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner". The argument is devoid of merit as
under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . .
. reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award. --- Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, Decemeber 26, 1964.

3) When the man failed to appear during the ceremony with the intent to humiliate or
embarrass the woman --- Victorino vs. Nora, CA G.R. No. 13158-R, October 26, 1955.

ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another,

or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.

Conditions of an Accion in Rem Verso

Unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that
the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff
has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. The
principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty
to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.

LBP vs. Alfredo Ong, G.R. No. 190755, November 24, 2010

This case involves a situation where a debtor of land bank realized that they cannot pay
their loan with said bank and decided to sell the mortgage property to Alfredo. After
entering and executing the agreement, the debtor and Alfredo with their lawyers went to
land bank so as to inform the bank of the sale and Aflredo’s assumption of the liability of
the debtor.

After learning of the agreement between the debtor and Alfredo, Land Bank required
Alfredo to comply with the bank’s requirement for assumption of liability and even
required Alfredo to pay the amount of P750,000.00.

Page 91 of 121
After the lapse of time, thru a notice of foreclosure, Alfredo learned that the property he
bought from the debtor was foreclosed by Land Bank without even informing him. When
Alfredo inquired of the reason, he was told by the bank that his application for a loan
under the assumption of liability was disapproved, and his payment was forfeited. Is
there unjust enrichment is this case?

Ruling:

We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredo's payment. Unjust
enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience." There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person
is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order
that the accion in rem versomay prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment
has no right to receive it.
The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed
disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no right
to receive it.
Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that "[e]very person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Land Bank, however, did not even bother to inform Alfredo that
it was no longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sy's mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his
interest in the loan when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughter's loan
had not been paid. Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP750,000, he
would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment without
returning it when demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The
outcome of the application would have been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit
investigation before accepting Alfredo's payment. He would have been notified that his
assumption of mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of
paying PhP750,000. The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredo's application cannot be
said to have been fair and proper.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Normelito J. Ballocanag, et al., G.R. No. 163794, November 28,
2008

Facts of the case:

Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the subject 182,941-square-meter
land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina Castillo (or
Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued
pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements
and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es], more than a hundred
Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name
and was issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it turned out that about
162,500 square meters of this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore,
cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for "Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion"
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic [petitioner], as
represented by the Bureau of Forest Development (or BFD), it was explained that the source[,]

Page 92 of 121
Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-
79606, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued.
Thus, in this case, Reyes prayed that he be reimbursed for his introduced improvements under the
context of unjust enrichment in favor of the government.

Ruling:

To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State — because
the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable forest land and
belongs to the State is already final and immutable — would inequitably result in unjust
enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. This basic doctrine on unjust enrichment simply
means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's
expense. 29 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this
wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant case. There is
enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would come into possession of — and may
technically appropriate — the more than one thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private
respondent. There is impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the
improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of valid cause for the
State to acquire these improvements, because, as discussed above, Reyes introduced the
improvements in good faith. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that
Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

Allied Banking Corp. vs. Lim Sio Wan, et al., G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008

In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust enrichment, thus: "Under Article 22
of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another."
In the instant case, Lim Sio Wan's money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-terminated and
withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in
Producers Bank's account in Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no reason
that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans' placement should be deposited in FCC's account purportedly as
payment for FCC's money market placement and interest in Producers Bank. With such payment,
Producers Bank's indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby benefitting the former. Clearly,
Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts
the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.
It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been
unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCC's money market placement with Producers
Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Bank's payment thereof was justified. FCC
was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the indorsement on the check was
forged cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the
check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.

Page 93 of 121
 Benguet Corp. vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., G.R. No.
163101, February 13, 2008

Principle of Unjust Enrichment; Principle of Equity.

The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited
without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another's
expense or damage.

LCK Industries Inc., et al. vs. Planters Dev't. Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007

Under the principle of unjust enrichment — nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari
potest — no person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
This principle of equity has been enshrined in our Civil Code [Article 22]. We have held
that there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains the money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Equity, as the complement
of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts.

Vicente S. Almario vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007

Enrichment consists in every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage appreciable in

money.

Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage,

so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value
incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing
belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the
defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of
value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant,
such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a
right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the
defendant.

Vicente S. Almario vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007

The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or

injury to the plaintiff.

The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or

injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the
deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation for a prestation
or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff,
or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to

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the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is
enough that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant
would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the
plaintiff is derived.

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007

Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case.

Equity is exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to
reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so." The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to
prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the
special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction.

Antonio Chieng vs. Sps. Eulogio and Teresita Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007

A person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit
is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The main objective of the
principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of
another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not
be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense. One condition for
invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.

Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico, Jr. and Edna Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011

There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience." The principle of unjust enrichment
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification,
and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.

LBP vs. Paz O. Montalvan, et al., G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012

The DAR unjustly enriched itself when it appropriated the entire 147.6913-hectare real
property of respondents . . . because the entire lot was decidedly beyond the area it had
intended to subject to agrarian reform under the VOS arrangement. . . . Under the Civil
Code, there is unjust enrichment when a person retains the property of another without
just or legal ground and against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good

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 conscience. Hence, although the Court affirms the award of just compensation for the
expropriated portion owned by respondents, the Republic cannot hold on to the excluded
portion consisting of 75.6913 hectares, despite both portions being included under one
new title issued in its favor. The consequence of our finding of unjust and improper titling
of the entire property by the Republic is that the title over the excluded portion shall be
returned or transferred back to respondents Montalvan, with damages.

R.V. Santos Company, Inc. vs. Belle Corp., G.R. Nos. 159561-62, October 3, 2012

[T]he rationale underlying the owner's right to seek an evaluation of the contractor's work
is the right to pay only the true value of the work as may be reasonably determined under
the circumstances. This is consistent with the law against unjust enrichment under Article
22 of the Civil Code which states that "[e]very person who through an act of performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
Expounding on this provision in a recent case, we have held that "[t]he principle of unjust
enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it."

Int'l. Hotel Corp. vs. Francisco B. Joaquin, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013

It is notable that the confusion on the amounts of compensation arose from the parties'
inability to agree on the fees that respondents should receive. Considering the absence
of an agreement, and in view of respondents' constructive fulfillment of their obligation,
the Court has to apply the principle of quantum meruit in determining how much was still
due and owing to respondents. Under the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is
allowed to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered despite the lack of a
written contract. The measure of recovery under the principle should relate to the
reasonable value of the services performed. The principle prevents undue enrichment
based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without
paying for it. Being predicated on equity, the principle should only be applied if no express
contract was entered into, and no specific statutory provision was applicable.

ARTICLE 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's

property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

Rafael Patricio vs. Oscar Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989

Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on
the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the
court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private
respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the
presence of several persons.

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 The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good
customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he
was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse
and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter.
Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not
adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in
appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36),
without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the
complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the reason underlying an
award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral
injury caused upon his person, thus —
". . . Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: L

'ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.'

xxx xxx xxx"

In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed
upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary
damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an
antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic.
The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled
to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, although such award
cannot be recovered as a matter of right.
In cases where exemplary damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are also
recoverable.

|||

ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.

Francisco Rayos vs. Ponciano G. Hernandez, G.R. No. 169079, February 12, 2007

In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of P557,961.21 out of the P1,060,800.00 award
for damages paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said scheme, respondent actually collected
fifty-three percent (53%) or more than half of the total amount due the petitioner; indeed, he
appropriated for himself more than the amount which he had already turned over to and actually
received by his client.
As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and hopeless with
the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan, on
26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent release by NAPOCOR of the water through the
spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to face the loss and destruction of his family's
properties. Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to recover the damages

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 for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and readily agree to
the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his attorney's fees.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in
this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in
conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of
the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers should not be permitted
to get a lion's share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless. Contracts for legal services
between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of
the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to guard a client, especially an
aged and necessitous client, against such a contract.

Sps. James and Florence Tan vs. Carmina Mandap, G.R. No. 150925, May 27, 2004

As the party seeking to enforce the contract, the petitioners should have presented evidence
showing that the terms of the deeds of sale to the Vasquez spouses were fully explained to
Mandap, Sr. But petitioners failed to comply with the strict requirements of Article 1332, thereby
casting doubt on the alleged consent of the vendor. Since the vendor in this case was totally blind
and crippled at the time of the sale, entirely dependent on outside support, every care to protect
his interest conformably with Article 24 of the Civil Code must be taken. Article 24 is clear on this.

ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Petitioners presented no evidence disproving that (1) Mandap, Sr. was totally blind and suffering
from acute diabetes such that he could no longer discern the legal consequences of his acts, and
(2) that undue influence was exerted upon him, which vitiated his consent.
It is true that he who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it. However, since fraud and
undue influence are alleged by respondents, the burden shifts to petitioners to prove that the
contents of the contract were fully explained to Mandap, Sr. Nothing, however, appears on record
to show that this requirement was complied with. Thus, the presumption of fraud and undue
influence was not rebutted.

Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp., G.R. Nos. 180880-81
& 180896-97, September 18, 2012

While contracts of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being
subversive of public policy, the same can only be done when, under the circumstances,
the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely depriving the former of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

Sample Problems:

Melecio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga who are muslim and belonging to the
cultural minority are married. They applied for a parcel of land which was granted.
While they were separated, a certain Alfonso Non approached Melecio and
convinced him to sell a parcel of land at P200.00 per hectare which belonged to
her wife. He assured Melecio that he could secure his wife’s signature, otherwise,
the contract would be void. With such understanding, he signed the document.

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 It turned out that the deed involved the sale of more than 54 hectares in favor of
John Sycip. Can the land be recovered?
Ans. Yes. This case is similar to Heirs of John Sycip, et al vs. CA, G.R. No. 76487,
Nov. 9, 1990 where the Supreme Court said that it is not disputed that the private
respondents are Muslims belonging to the cultural minority or non-Christian
Filipinos. Any transaction involving real property with them is governed by the
provision of Sections 145 and 146 of the Revised Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu, Section 120 of the Public Land Act, as amended and Republic Act No.
3872 where it is provided that any transaction involving real property with said
non-Christian tribes shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein the
same was executed or his representative duly authorized in writing, and that the
contract should be worded in the language that they can understand.

ARTICLE 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display

during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by
order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.

Element of Thoughtless Extravagance:

1. There must be an acute public want or emergency;

2. The person seeking to stop it must be a government or private charitable institution.

ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.

Types of violation of the right to privacy:

(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs;
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiffs;

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 (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and
(4) Appropriation for the defendant’s advantage of plaintiff’s likeness or name --- Prosser and
Pollo vs. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 11, 2011.

Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 & 192073, September 11,
2013, citing Manaloto v. Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law.
The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every
plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently
protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of
persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil
Code may also lead to the payment of moral damages under Article 2219 (10) 75 of the
Civil Code.

Rodrigo Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000

Sometime in July, 1985, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion angrily accosted respondent Nestor Nicolas
at the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting adulterous relation with his deceased
brother's wife, Florence Concepcion, also Nestor's business partner. As a result of the incident,
Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his
neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with Nestor by not contributing capital anymore so
much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope
with their commitments to their clients and customers. Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo
demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for
which spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas filed a civil suit against him for damages. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Nicolas spouses and awarded them damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner argued that in
awarding damages to the private respondents, appellate court was without legal basis to justify its
verdict since the act imputed did not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code and did not
constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Petitioner also criticized the appellate
court for not taking into account the fact that the judge who penned the decision was in no position
to observe first hand the demeanor of the witness of respondent spouses as he was not the original
judge who heard the case.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the trial
court provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the appellate court in favor of
private respondents. Private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous
and insulting language. The Court also ruled that the fact that the case was handled by different
judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for
damages had been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal.
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 (2) - Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another

RCPI vs. Alfonso Verchez, et al., G.R. 164349, January 31, 2006

Facts: RCPI failed to deliver the telegram causing conflict between family members, thus, sued for
damages under Article 26 among others.

Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPI's negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of
mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it
disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are,
therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the
instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.

Blas F. Ople vs. Ruben D. Torres, et al., G.R. 127685, July 23, 1998

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System," was issued by the President on December 12, 1996. Petitioner challenges the
constitutionality of said Administrative Order on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate; and (2) its impermissibility intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. Petitioner contends that the Administrative Order is not a mere
administrative order but a law and, hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He further
alleges that said Administrative Order establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
In declaring the Administrative Order null and void for being unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
held that the Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
said administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy.
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to privacy is recognized and enshrined
in several provisions of the Constitution. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in
our laws. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show
that A. O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. What
is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreath of A. O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
A. O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. Even while we strike down A.
O. No. 308, we spell out that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to accumulate,
store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Given the record-keeping

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 power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A. O. No. 308 gives
the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
|||

Invoking Article 26 as basis, the Supreme Court said:

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. |||

(3) - Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends

Jerome Castro vs. People of the Phil., G.R. 180832, July 23, 2008

(4) - Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.

Philex Mining Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 125704, August 28,
1998
This is not to state that the taxpayer is devoid of remedy against public servants or employees,
especially BIR examiners who, in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.
First, if the BIR takes time in acting upon the taxpayer's claim for refund, the latter can seek judicial
remedy before the Court of Tax Appeals in the manner prescribed by law. Second, if the inaction
can be characterized as willful neglect of duty, then recourse under the Civil Code and the Tax Code
can also be availed of. Article 27 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 27. Any person suffering material
or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary action that may be taken." More importantly, Section 269(c) of the
National Internal Revenue Act of 1997 states: ". . . (c) wilfully neglecting to give receipts, as by law
required for any sum collected in the performance of duty or wilfully neglecting to perform, any
other duties enjoined by law." Simply put, both provisions abhor official inaction, willful neglect
and unreasonable delay in the performance of official duties. In no uncertain terms must we stress
that every public employee or servant must strive to render service to the people with utmost

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 diligence and efficiency. Insolence and delay have no place in government service. The BIR, being
the government collecting arm, must and should do no less. It simply cannot be apathetic and
laggard in rendering service to the taxpayer if it wishes to remain true to its mission of hastening
the country's development. We take judicial notice of the taxpayer's generally negative perception
towards the BIR; hence, it is up to the latter to prove its detractors wrong. In sum, while we can
never condone the BIR's apparent callousness in performing its duties, still, the same cannot justify
Philex's non-payment of its tax liabilities. The adage "no one should take the law into his own
hands" should have guided Philex's action.

Jose V. Nessia vs. Jesus M. Fermin, G.R. No. 102918, March 30, 1993
On the defense of lack of appropriation, while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled by
mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may,
nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not
act on the vouchers. This provision against official inaction finds its ally in Sec. 3, par. (f) of R.A.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," which
criminalizes "[n]eglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification,
to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of . . .
discriminating against any interested party." It is apparent that public officials are called upon to
act expeditiously on matter pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying
approval or disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic
process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and
the plaintiff is left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be
equated with "disapproval."

David P. Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85464, October 3, 1991

The acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to procedures), as he insists in this petition,
yet it does not follow, as we said, that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no
valid reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three
employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had
pending obligations when, their clearances were filed for consideration, warranting similar official
action. The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr. Curio. It is
no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge, according to the
Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after all,
complying merely with legal procedures since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to
the three retiring other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting
unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio. It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under
which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance
of duty be done with justice and good faith. We believe that the petitioner is liable under Article
19. The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified by Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which
holds the defendant liable for all "natural and probable" damages. Hermenegildo Curio
presented evidence that as a consequence of the petitioner's refusal to clear him, he failed to land
a job at the Philippine Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Authority. He also testified
that a job in either office would have earned him a salary of P2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in
five years. Deducting his probable expenses of reasonably about P1,000.00 a month, or P60,000.00
in five years, the petitioner owes him a total of actual damages of P90,000.00.

ARTICLE 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial

enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

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 Calamba Medical Center, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 176484, November 25, 2008

The circulation of such list containing names of alleged union members intended to
prevent employment of workers for union activities similarly constitutes unfair labor
practice, thereby giving a right of action for damages by the employees prejudiced.

ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.

Samson Ching vs. Clarita Nicdao, et al., G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007 & Remedios
Nota Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from
or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.

The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to
him.

ARTICLE 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. --- Dependent Civil
Action

Discussion:

Dependent Civil Action are actions to enforce civil liability arising from criminal liability. Civil
Liability arising from crime or delict is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, but a separate
case may be filed to enforce the same. Such case may be filed ahead of the criminal action or

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after reservation, upon rendition of final judgment in the case. However, in both cases, the civil
action is dependent civil actions: (1) if a case was filed ahead of the criminal case, the separate
action shall be suspended until a final judgment is rendered in the criminal case; (2) If no case is
filed, a separate case cannot be filed until rendition of final judgment; (3) Civil Liability is
extinguished if the criminal case resulted in acquittal with a finding that the act complained of
was not actually committed by the accused.

Effect of acquittal: Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedures states that civil
liability is extinguished if the criminal case resulted in acquittal with a finding that the act
complained of was not actually committed.

What if the accused died before final conviction?

People of the Phils. vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:
a) Law - See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1,
Rule 111.

b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
|||

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ARTICLE 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

Discussion:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. These so-called independent civil actions include:
(1) Action based on Quasi-delict;
(2) Action for violation of Civil and Political Rights under Article 32;
(3) Action for Defamation, Fraud or Physical Injuries under Article 33;
(4) Action for Neglect of Duty by Public Official under Article 34

Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Flora San Diego-Sison, G.R. No. 155223, April 3, 2007
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she used
a fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is
baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony filed by
respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against
her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by
respondent against petitioner. ED

Republic of the Phil. Thru the DPWH vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116463, June 10,
2003

After accomplishing the required dredging work in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte,
the Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against
the petitioner RP, thru the DPWH, maintaining that DPWH paid only 79.22 percent of the
accomplished work, leaving a balance of P30,799,676.00. Upon verification, DPWH discovered that
NIC, through its officers, connived with some DPWH officials in falsifying public documents to make
it appear that NIC had completed a major portion of the project when no dredging work was
actually performed. Thus, the petitioner RP, thru the DPWH, filed a counterclaim for the return
of P146,962,072 plus interest and exemplary damages. Petitioner also filed with the
Sandiganbayan a case for estafa thru falsification of public document and for violation of RA No.
3019 against former DPWH Minister Hipolito and those involved in the anomaly. Subsequently,
the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion to Consolidate the civil case with the criminal cases in
the Sandiganbayan. The RTC issued an order denying the motion, which the CA affirmed on appeal.
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the civil action filed by NIC cannot be
consolidated with the criminal cases in the Sandiganbayan, because: the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the collection case; secondly, consolidation of the civil action filed by the NIC
with the criminal cases amounts to a counterclaim or a third-party complaint against petitioner

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and DPWH, which is not allowed under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; finally, pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 111, the Sandiganbayan must first resolve whether
the act of entering into such contract is a crime under the anti-graft law before any civil action
based on the contract can proceed.
In the instant case, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in itself. That
act, which is prohibited by law, is the entering into dredging contracts that are manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government. A contract executed against the provisions of
prohibitory laws is void. If the dredging contracts are declared illegal, then no valid obligation
can arise from such contracts. Consequently, no civil action based on such contracts can proceed
independently of the criminal action . . . Clearly, NIC's civil case before the Malabon trial court
does not fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code. This calls then for the application of the second
paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 111 which states that "if the criminal action is filed after the said
civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may
be found before judgment on the merits." Consequently, the civil case for collection pending in
the Malabon trial court must be suspended until after the termination of the criminal cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan.

Jose S. Cancio, Jr. vs. Emerenciana Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002

Petitioner filed three cases of violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of estafa against respondent.
All six criminal cases were dismissed for various reasons. As to the three cases of estafa, it was the
prosecution that moved for its dismissal with reservation as to its right to file a separate civil action
arising from the said criminal cases. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a case for collection of sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. The court,
however, dismissed the case on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal cases against the
respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute was an adjudication on the
merits, which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing
of the civil case amounted to forum-shopping. The trial court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition.

The Supreme Court held that from a reading of the complaint filed by the
petitioner, his cause of action was based on culpa contractual, an independent
civil action. Hence, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the
instant case, may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without reservation in the criminal action. As such, it was distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings. In the same vain, the filing
of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent
did not amount to forum-shopping because the law expressly allows the filing of
a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
The instant petition was granted.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the present Rules,
the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is
given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules, however, the
independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the
Civil Code.|

To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
Under Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." Thus, in
Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code,

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 held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust
Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from
the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal
proceedings.||

ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

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(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which
has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's
act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a
right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. 141309, December 23,
2008

There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public
collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals," thus:
1. Of Duties to the Public. — The first of these classes embraces those officers whose
duty is owing primarily to the public collectively — to the body politic — and not to any
particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of
the public treasury.

The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the
distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see
that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him,
that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but
these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large
and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to
him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and
proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather
than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by
considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways,
but it is not a duty to any particular individual of the community. IDSaTE

These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to
define the general doctrine.

2. Of Duties to Individuals. — The second class above referred to includes those who,
while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their
respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual
to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to
him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation
from fees paid by each individual who employs them.

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 A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in
recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private
judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in
passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good
conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular individual
concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance

of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed,
as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or
the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the
one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability."
Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual
cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have
been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the
individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has
touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual. The
remedy in this case is not judicial but political. ACIDTE
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special
injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public
duty. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public
only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a
wrong. A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can
still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-
performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man
might have an action, all men might have the like — the complaining individual has no better right
than anybody else. If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated
is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular
injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.
Juxtaposed with Article 32 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that
an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or
omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the
former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject
of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort
for impairment of rights and liberties."
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries
of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which
the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon, we granted
the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due to
the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the right of petitioner
to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal
withholding of his horserace prize winnings.

Eli Lui vs. Sps. Eulogio and Paulina Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004

Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of the
complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial
Court and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages
filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the
petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions
against them.
The petitioners' contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable." This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who

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appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of the
constitutional provision because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right.
Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the performance of
official functions.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption against
any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. The fact that the aggrieved person did not object
to the entry into her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein. A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto,
either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the
opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure
to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search
and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated
her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and
his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional
right. D

Benjamin D. Obra vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120852, October 28, 1999

On June 26, 1985, petitioner Benjamin D. Obra, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences in Baguio City, wrote petitioner Brig. Gen. Tomas Dumpit, then the Commanding
General of the Regional Unified Command I (RUC) of the Philippine Constabulary, requesting
assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by private respondents in illegal mining.
Accordingly, the elements of the RUC seized an Isuzu "ELF" truck belonging to private respondents
as it was entering the alleged illegal mining area in Palasa-an, Mangkayan, Benguet. Private
respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages, with an application for a temporary
restraining order. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It found
that no investigation had been conducted either by petitioner Obra or his office or by petitioner
Dumpit to verify the complaint of Jeannette Grybos before the vehicle was ordered seized by
them. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that, under Article 32 of the Civil Code and the ruling in
Aberca v. Ver, private respondents were entitled to actual and compensatory damages, moral
damages, and exemplary damages in the total amount of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P10,000.00, plus costs of the suit. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
decision in toto. In this petition, petitioners contended that they could not be held liable for
damages in the performance of their duty in good faith.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes
liable any public officer who is directly or indirectly responsible for violating an individual's
constitutional rights. According to the Court, petitioner Dumpit cannot evade responsibility for
his acts by claiming that he merely performed a ministerial duty in ordering the implementation
of Obra's request. Otherwise, Article 32 could easily be avoided by the mere plea that the officer
concerned was only carrying out a ministerial duty. Petitioner Dumpit was a ranking military
official. It is unseemly for him to claim that he was merely executing a ministerial act.

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 Feliciano Galvante vs. Orlando C. Casimiro, et al., G.R. No. 162808, April 22, 2008

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint;
rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed
with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the
RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under
Article 32, in relation to Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;

xxx xxx xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for
damages with the regular courts or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG, as petitioner did
in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action with the Ombudsman.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune
from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being
outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity
for official actions.

A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were
not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in
the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent
of the defendant. This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President
Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection
on civil liberties.

Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of
an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a
tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that
deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other
actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative
Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer

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liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be
committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties,
Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant
case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011,
citing Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, November 16, 1999

[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is
under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.
This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act
results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring
officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is
separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

Eduardo M. Cojuangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999

Better Buildings vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109714, December 15, 1997

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws

Lolito G. Aparicio vs. Ermelindo C. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93, July 25, 1989

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures

Feliciano Galvante vs. Orlando C. Casimiro, et al., G.R. No. 162808, April 22, 2008

Silahis Int'l Hotel Inc., et al. vs. Rogelio S. Soluta, et al., G.R. 163087, G.R. No. 163087,
February 20, 2006

Eli Lui vs. Sps. Eulogio and Paulina Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same.

Paz S. Baens vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57091, November 23, 1983

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf.

Sps. Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing vs. MERALCO, G.R. No. 142943, April 3, 2002

Page 113 of 121

 Lolito G. Aparicio vs. Ermelindo C. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93, July 25, 1989

(19) Freedom of access to the courts

Lolito G. Aparicio vs. Ermelindo C. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93, July 25, 1989

Last paragraph

Lolito G. Aparicio vs. Ermelindo C. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93, July 25, 1989

ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. --- Independent Civil Action

William Madarang, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 143044, July 14, 2005

On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her husband, Eduardo Chan-
Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against petitioners William Madarang and Evans
Kho in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19266 and raffled
to Branch 84 (RTC, Branch 84). The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a
1990 dark gray Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 08605800 2 dated May
31, 1991; and that on January 29, 1994, petitioners, through force and intimidation, took
possession of the subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 allegedly
executed by private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang.
On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner Madarang was charged with
Falsification of Public Document in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24930 and raffled to Branch 32. On the same date, petitioners
were charged with Grave Coercion in the same MeTC which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-
24931, also raffled to Branch 32. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question was filed by petitioner Madarang in the MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the
replevin case pending in RTC, Branch 84 are intimately related to the issues pending before the
MeTC, the resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the criminal
case for falsification.
|||

Ruling:

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the civil case for replevin
may proceed independently of the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion, especially
because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding
the parties liable therein differs.

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 Manolo P. Samson vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004

At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section
168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as
admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

Int'l Flavors & Fragrances (Phil.) vs. Merlin J. Argos, G.R. No. 130362, September 10,
2001

Two separate informations for libel were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro
Manila against Hernan H. Costa, managing director of petitioner corporation, committed against
respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director,
respectively, also of petitioner corporation. Respondents also filed a civil case for damages at the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, against Costa and petitioner corporation. Respondents sued
petitioner corporation civilly in its subsidiary capacity for Costa's alleged defamatory acts.
Petitioner corporation moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, ruling
that respondents failed to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. On motion of the
respondents, the trial court reversed its decision. Petitioner corporation moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court. Petitioner corporation's appeal as well as
motion for reconsideration were dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
The principal issue for the Court's resolution was whether or not respondents can sue petitioner
corporation for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article
33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against Costa, petitioner
corporation's employee. HCEISc
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that both the trial and the appellate courts erred
in failing to dismiss respondents' complaint against petitioner corporation based on the latter's
subsidiary liability while the criminal libel cases against its employee, Costa, were pending before
the MTC. The Court, in the case of Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), held that Article 33 of
the Civil Code contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does
not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee
is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its
subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature. Thus, respondents claim
for damages from petitioner - corporation based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa
before the latter's conviction was premature.
|||

Espero Salao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107725, January 22, 1998

A complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted
on him by petitioner. Private respondent submitted in evidence a certification and receipts in
support of his claim for damages. The expenses were incurred for an operation at Martinez

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 Memorial Hospital which necessitated private respondent's confinement at the said hospital. For
his part, petitioner claimed it was private respondent who tried to assault him and he only acted
in self-defense. The trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner. On appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. Petitioner then brought this appeal questioning
the award of damages and attorney's fees to private respondent. Petitioner raised as additional
ground the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on
the same incident, the Municipal Trial Court found him not guilty and accordingly dismissed the
case against him.
The appeal is without merit. Issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal in the Supreme Court without violating the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. The propriety of the award of damages and the effect of petitioner's acquittal in the
criminal cases were not questioned by petitioner in the court a quo. Consequently, he is barred
from raising these questions for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats is not
conclusive of his liability for damages to private respondent. This case is separate, distinct and
independent of the criminal action and requires only a preponderance to prove it.

Jose Bordador vs. Brigida D. Luz, G.R. No. 130148, December 15, 1997

Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry while respondent Brigida
Luz was their regular customer. On several occasions, respondent Narciso Deganos, brother of
Brigida, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from petitioners amounting to P382,816.00.
The receipts stated that some of them were received for a certain Evelyn Aquino and the rest were
received for Brigida Luz. Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit
the proceeds and return the unsold items to petitioners. However, Deganos remitted only the sum
of P53,207.00. He neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold
item to petitioners. Hence, petitioners instituted an action for recovery of sum of money against
Deganos and Luz claiming that Deganos acted as agent to Brigida Luz when the former received
the subject items in her behalf. And because Deganos failed to pay for the same, Brigida, as
principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with him therefor. Brigida denied that she had
anything to do with the transactions between petitioners and Deganos. She claimed that she never
authorized Deganos to receive any item of jewelry in her behalf and neither did she actually receive
any of the articles in question.
In the absence of consent to the acts of the supposed agent or authority therefor, no agency
whatsoever was created. Hence, the supposed principal cannot be held liable; only Deganos was
liable to the petitioners for the amount and damages claimed. Petitioners attempt to foist liability
on the respondent spouses Luz through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless
and ill- advised

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. It is worth noting that this civil case was
instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed and that although there was a
move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the
duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with
the civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. It is clear therefore, that
this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case especially because while both
cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable
therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to claim that the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in the present case would be preemptive of the outcome of the criminal
case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict between the disposition of this civil case and the
outcome of the pending criminal case is illusory.

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 People of the Phils. vs. Rogelio C. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was
charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged. L
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of
the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Does death of the accused pending appeal

We are thus confronted with a single issue:
of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

Ruling:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior
to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

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ARTICLE 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. (1973a)

Carmen L. Madeja vs. Felix T. Caro, G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an
independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095). The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July
31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code, is
not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred
in the result.

Cancio vs. Isip (391 SCRA 393)

Re: Articles 31 and 33, NCC and Rule 111, New Rules of Criminal Procedure of 2000. – There is no
need to make reservation to file an independent civil action based on Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176, NCC.
Hence, although the civil case filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission in the previously filed
criminal cases, there is no forum shopping, as they are based on different causes of action; the criminal
cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal and the civil case for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual.

ARTICLE 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or

fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Manolo P. Samson vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. No. 160054-55, July 21, 2004

ARTICLE 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense,

charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds
no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the
prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged
offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff
to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.

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If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended
until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

Concept of Concurrence of Causes of Action and Remedies:

Under the NCC, a single act or omission may give rise to two separate causes of action. The
separate causes of action may be based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 or on any of Arts. 32,
33 or 34 of the NCC. In fact, the separate basis of liability may even be contract. The rule is
expressly recognized under Article 2177 and Arts. 32, 33 and 34 subject only to the proscription
against double recovery.

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

ARTICLE 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

ARTICLE 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed
by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall
not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

CONCEPT: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution

of which is a logical antecedent of the issue/s involved therein. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

REQUISITES:
1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based.
2. In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and
3. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
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CONSEQUENCE:
The existence of a prejudicial question suspends the criminal action. The
rationale behind the principle of suspending criminal case in view of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000.]

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. for petitioner.

Petitioner, an engineer, was charged with bigamy by Liliana, herein private

respondent, for contracting a second marriage with Julieta Santella while his marriage
to her was still subsisting. Private respondent also filed an administrative case against
petitioner with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for immorality and
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.
Prior to the filing of the bigamy charge, petitioner has filed an action for the
annulment of his marriage with Liliana. Petitioner in the criminal and administrative
cases moved to suspend the proceedings claiming that the pendency of an annulment
of marriage is a prejudicial question to the resolution of the cases. The trial court and
the PRC denied the motion. Resort to the Court of Appeals failed to produce any
positive result. Hence, these two petitions for certiorari with this Court which were
consolidated.
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused and for it to suspend the criminal action.
The pendency of the civil action for annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial
question to a bigamy case for the outcome of the annulment case had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in bigamy because all that
is necessary is that the first marriage is subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted. Furthermore, under the law, a marriage even one which is void or
voidable is deemed valid until declared otherwise. Also, there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Reynaldo V. Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995

A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital
to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a
logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as
that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must
be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a

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 civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case."

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil
action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal
case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was
instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives were made in accordance with law. More importantly, the resolution of the civil
case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action.

Problem:

A, B and C are the heirs of X and Y who left a parcel of land. A was able to obtain title over the land
so B & C filed an action for declaration of nullity of the title and partition. Then they occupied a
portion of the land without A’s knowledge and consent, hence, they were sued by A for violation
of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. Before they were arraigned, they moved
to suspend the criminal action on the ground of a prejudicial question. Rule on the motion.

Ans. The motion should be granted on the ground of a prejudicial question. There is prejudicial
question because in order to convict B and C it must first be proven that they are not the owner of
the lot in question. Considering that the issue of ownership is pending determination before
another court, which resolution will be determinative of whether B & C are not owners or are
owners of the lot in question, and the same is also determinative of B & C’s guilt, the same is clearly
showed that there is a prejudicial question.

Bobis vs. Bobis (336 SCRA 747)

Re: Article 36, (NCC Prejudicial Question) and Article 40, FC – In a prosecution for bigamy, for
contracting a second marriage, respondent cannot raise prejudicial civil case of a case for declaration of
nullity of first marriage for lack of a marriage license. Under Article 40, FC, the respondent committed
bigamy when he contracted the second marriage with petitioner (second) wife before final judgment by a
court of competent jurisdiction declaring such first marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts.

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