EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO,

IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR
GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order[1] and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in
connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the
implementation of the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms Outside of Residence[2] (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to
avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane,
to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR),
thus:

THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT

TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE
COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA LEADER
ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE IDENTITY
OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF JUSTICE.

THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF
OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID THEMSELVES OF
RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN
PUBLIC PLACES.
THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY
THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC
PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY
TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING
THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED
MEN IN THE MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS CAN CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY
PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW.CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER
BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO
WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN
SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY
FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH
BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.

WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND

ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS
FOR PEACE.

Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed

Guidelines quoted as follows:

TO : All Concerned

FROM : Chief, PNP

SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying

of Firearms Outside of Residence.

DATE : January 31, 2003

1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

2. General:

The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a

privilege granted by the State to its citizens for their individual
protection against all threats of lawlessness and security.

As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license,

special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from
carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief,
 Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined by
him and under conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or
persons to carry firearms outside of residence.

3. Purposes:

This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of

the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence as provided for
in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No.
1866, dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also
prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures under which
exemption from the ban may be granted.

4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:

a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed

firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new
PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter
prescribed.

b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby

prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence
except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail
orders issued by competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR,
PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to
organic and regular employees.

5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of

residence.

a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved,
provided, that the persons and security of those so authorized are
under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and
profession are under imminent danger.

b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted

by their respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR,
PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for
the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more
than ten (10) days.
 c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their
respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR,
PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour
duration.

d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport

(PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and competition, provided,
that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with
ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from
the person.

e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps.

6. Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR:

a. Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his

qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry
firearm outside of residence.

b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records

Branch, FED;

c. Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the

Chief of Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by C,
RIID;

d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug Testing

Center, if photocopied;

e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if

photocopied;

f. Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP

Testing Center, if photocopied;

g. Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly

validated by Chief, Operations Branch, FED;

h. NBI Clearance;

i. Two (2) ID pictures (2 x 2) taken not earlier than one (1) year from
date of filing of application; and
 j. Proof of Payment

7. Procedures:

a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR

Secretariat in Camp Crame. In the provinces, the applications may
also be submitted to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and
Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for initial processing before
they are forwarded to the office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The
processors, after ascertaining that the documentary requirements are
in order, shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount
of fees payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay the fees to the
Land Bank.

b. Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance

with existing rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP
for approval.

c. Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid

for one (1) year from date of issue.

d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in

accordance with the provisions of par. 6 above.

e. Application for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in

the Philippines shall be processed in accordance with NHQ PNP
Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and
Carrying of Firearms by Diplomats in the Philippines.

8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms:

a. The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except

those authorized in uniform and in the performance of their official
duties.

b. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and

amusement places, and all other commercial or public establishments.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as
Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief
of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He anchored his petition on the following
grounds:
I

THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY MUCH LESS BY A

MERE SPEECH TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW ON FIREARMS
BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR
GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES.

II

OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN;

THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE POWER TO
JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTS VERBAL DECLARATION ON
GUN BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR
PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS.

III

THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE

QUESTIONED GUIDELINES BECAUSE:

1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH GRANTS

THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE PNP
GUIDELINES.

2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT

BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.

3) THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE

PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD

1866, AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO
POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE SAME BECAUSE

1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE

PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG.
2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.

THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE

CONSTITUTION BECAUSE:

1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY

INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLES INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO
PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF
THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR:

A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF

NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS

OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATE
COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS DUE TO THE
INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE FORCE.

2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT
BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST
CAUSE.

VI

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN

THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN INVALID
EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED THEREFOR ARE
UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS
PURPOSE TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME THEREBY BECOMING
UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW-ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.

VII

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE

AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL EXISTING PERMITS TO
CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP
RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.

VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT AND
OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS WHILE LEAVING
OTHER GUN-OWNERS THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS,
HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA)
UNTOUCHED.

IX

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND

UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY
WERE PUBLISHED.

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO

LAW SINCE THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL THOSE
WHO WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY OUTSIDE OF
RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR PROMULGATION.

Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:

First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;

Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;

Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed

Guidelines is a violation of his right to property?;

Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police
power?; and

Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?

The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioners arguments, he contends
that: (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does
not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do
not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines
do not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the
doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted
with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside
the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. [3] The case at bar is of
similar import as it involves the citizens right to bear arms.
I

Authority of the PNP Chief

Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only

Congress can withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR,
President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and
arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess the legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.[4]
Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is vested in
Congress.[5] Congress may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that delegata potestas non potest
delegari delegated power may not be delegated.[6]
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to
certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.[7] Such licensing power includes the
power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.[8]
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our
Republic, the legislatures tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act
No. 1780,[9] delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1)
to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or
to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2)
to revoke such license any time.[10] Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which
he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. [11] With the enactment of
Act No. 2711, the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, the laws on firearms were
integrated.[12] The Act retained the authority of the Governor General provided in Act No.
1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the Governor-General
resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On January
21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No.
8[13] authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving
and disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This
was followed by Executive Order No. 61[14] designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
as the government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive
Order No. 215,[15] issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965,
granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove
applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke
the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the
Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances
such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 1866[16] perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2
specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first
secure the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary.
With regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he
may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D.
No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of the decree.[17] At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866
is the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power.[18]
In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations,
petitioner argues that the Chief of the PNP is not the same as the Chief of the
Constabulary, the PC being a mere unit or component of the newly established
PNP. He contends further that Republic Act No. 8294[19] amended P.D. No. 1866 such
that the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested
in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the Chief of the Constabulary. [20]
Petitioners submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,[21] the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed
the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of
the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24
thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the
possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law.[22] This is in
conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue detailed implementing policies and
instructions on such matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,
powers and duties of the PNP.[23]
Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the
Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations
for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal
entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal
possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the
Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains
effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September
15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6
of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for
violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of
R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into
the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the
assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a nationwide gun
ban, arguing that she has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms
through a mere speech.
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression
of her policy and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that
President Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive,
President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her
government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and
programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement
them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely
direct the performance of a duty.[24] Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent
Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to
perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office.
II

Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?

Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-

protected right. This, he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore
find it imperative to determine the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American
society. It antedates not only the American Constitution but also the discovery of
firearms.[25]
A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of
firearms is the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America,
which reads:

A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it

pertains to the citizens collective right to take arms in defense of the State, not to the
citizens individual right to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was
contemplated has a profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia
or an armed citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is evident in early
American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached
the United States Supreme Court is United States vs. Miller.[26] Here, the indictment
charged the defendants with transporting an unregistered Stevens shotgun without the
required stamped written order, contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants
filed a demurrer challenging the facial validity of the indictment on the ground that
the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment. The District
Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. On appeal, the Supreme
Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as
referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens
enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of citizen
to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense.

The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.[27] Here, the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not
conflict with the Second Amendment. It ruled that:

While [appellants] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity
with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon
of military type and caliber, still there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever
had been a member of any military organization or that his use of the weapon
under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In
fact, the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the
indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and
ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or
intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the
Second amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free
state.

With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution

grants upon the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language,
the United States vs. Cruikshank[28] decreed: The right of the people to keep and bear
arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent
upon that instrument. Likewise, in People vs. Persce,[29] the Court of Appeals said:
Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right to bear arms which
prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically before us for
consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not designed to
control legislation by the state.
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the
Second Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United States vs.
Villareal:[30]

The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the
claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting
the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions
of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.

Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States
Constitution against the infringement of the right of the people of the United
States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not
included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in
no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar,
not only because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but
also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in
State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in
40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x.

Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the

exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a
constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant
such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was passed to regulate the importation,
acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9 thereof provides:

SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal
protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms
or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before
receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings
bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be
issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General
may prescribe, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two
hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who
are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the
passage of this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be
required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond
duly executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be
security for the safekeeping of such arms.

The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887[31] of Act No. 2711 that
integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No.
1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of
firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation.
R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the
imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be
considered an inalienable or absolute right.
III

Vested Property Right

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. Petitioner invokes this provision,
asserting that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines
deprived him of his vested property right without due process of law and in violation of
the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be
whether life, liberty or property interest exists.[32] The bulk of jurisprudence is that a
license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,[33] we ruled that a license is merely a
permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic
pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.[34] that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive

action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right,

relied heavily on Bell vs. Burson[35] wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that once a
license is issued, continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of
livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interest of the licensees.
Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a drivers license, not a
license to bear arms. The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear
arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a
property right. In Erdelyi vs. OBrien,[36] the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a
firearm brought suit against the defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of
Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial violated her constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth
Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a
firearm, ratiocinating as follows:

Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment do not arise whenever a person has only an abstract need or desire
for, or unilateral expectation of a benefit.x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate
claims of entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from
an independent source, such as state law. x x x

Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. x x x Whether

the statute creates a property interest in concealed weapons licenses depends
largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language that
restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to applicants
who claim to meet the minimum eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law
gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license application
in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such
licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d
at 180 (gaming license under Nevada law);

Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,[37] Conway vs.
King,[38] Nichols vs. County of Sta. Clara,[39] and Gross vs. Norton.[40] These cases
enunciated that the test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends
largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine,
it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected
under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may
be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege
to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed.[41] A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature
sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.[42] The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,[43]held: The correlative power to
revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A
mere license by the State is always revocable.
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as
1908. Thus, in The Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra [44] we ruled:

x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely

optional with himself, but if, for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to
possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose,
for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can
impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms
imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing
possession of the arms he does agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them.

IV

Police Power

At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right

protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be
placed beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held
subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police
measure, thus:

(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the exercise of the police power; and

(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the
need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly
those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of
the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun
ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the
interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are
appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are
not unduly oppressive.In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely
prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms
outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the
comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for
criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been
upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power.[45] In State vs. Reams,[46] it was held
that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the
public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of
all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power. The ruling in United
States vs. Villareal,[47] is relevant, thus:

We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation

prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to
restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and excitement.
We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to
increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any
community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this
without being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It
follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the
police power of the state.

Ex post facto law

In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes
an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law
prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[49] The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered
as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to
petitioners argument, it would not result in the punishment of acts previously committed.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[9]
AN ACT TO REGULATE THE IMPORTATION, ACQUISITION, POSSESSION, USE, AND
TRANSFER OF FIREARMS, AND TO PROHIBIT THE POSSESSION OF SAME EXCEPT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT.
[10]
SECTION 11. An application for a personal license to possess firearms and ammunition, as herein
provided for, made by a resident of the city of Manila, shall be directed to the chief of police of
said city, and it shall be the duty of the chief of the police to forward the application to the
Governor-General with his recommendations. Any such application made by a resident of a
province shall be directed to the governor of the province who shall make his recommendations
thereon and forward the application to the senior inspector of the Constabulary of the province,
who in turn shall make his recommendations thereon and forward the application, through official
channels, to the Governor-General. The Governor-General may approve or disapprove any
such application, and, in the event of the approval, the papers shall be transmitted to the
Director of Constabulary with instructions to issue the license as hereinbefore
provided. The Director of Constabulary, upon receiving and approving the bond, or receiving the
certificate of deposit duly endorsed to the order of the Insular Treasurer, shall issue the license
for the time fixed for such license as hereinafter provided, and the Director of Constabulary shall
transmit the license direct to the applicant, and shall notify the chief of police of the city of Manila
if the applicant resides in Manila, otherwise the senior inspector of Constabulary of the province
in which the applicant resides. The Director of Constabulary shall file the certificate of deposit in
his office. It shall be the duty of all officers through whom applications for licenses to possess
firearms are transmitted to expedite the same.
[11] SECTION 30. The Governor-General is hereby authorized to issue executive orders prescribing the
forms and regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the
provisions of this Act.
[12]
SEC. 882. Issuance of special hunting permits. The Department Head may authorize the Chief of
Constabulary to issue special hunting permits to persons temporarily visiting the Philippine
Islands, without requiring a bond or deposit as a guarantee of security for their arms and
ammunition. Such special hunting permit shall be valid only during the temporary sojourn of the
holder in the Islands, shall be nontransferable, and shall be revocable at the pleasure of the
Department Head.
SEC. 887. License required for individual keeping arms for personal use. Security to be given. Any
person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection or for use in hunting or
other lawful purposes only, and ammunition thereof, shall make application for a license to
possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such
application, and before receiving the license, the applicant shall, for the purpose of security, make
a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for
which the license is to be issued, and shall indorse the certificated of deposit therefor to the
Insular Treasurer; or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General
may prescribed, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred
pesos for each such firearms.
SEC. 888. Mode of making application and acting upon the same. An application for a personal license to
possess firearms and ammunition, as herein provided, made by a resident of the City of Manila,
 shall be directed to the Mayor of said city, whose duty it shall be to forward the application to the
Governor-General, with his recommendation. Applications made by residents of a province shall
be directed to the governor of the same, who shall make his recommendation thereon and
forward them to the Governor-General, who may approve or disapprove any such application.
SEC. 889. Duration of personal license. A personal firearms license shall continue in force until the death
or legal disability of the licensee, unless, prior thereto, the license shall be surrendered by him or
revoked by authority of the Governor-General.
SEC. 899. Revocation of firearms license by Governor-General. Any firearms license may be revoked at
any time by order of the Governor-General.
SEC. 905. Forms and regulations to be prescribed by Governor-General. The Governor-General shall
prescribe such forms and promulgate such regulations as he shall deem necessary for the proper
enforcement of this law.
[13]
(Delegating the CPC to Approve/Disapprove Applications)
15. In carrying out the provisions of Sections eight hundred and eighty-one, eight hundred and eighty-two,
eighty hundred and eighty-eight, as amended by Section two of Act two thousand seven hundred
and seventy-four, eight hundred and ninety-one and eight hundred and ninety-two of the
Administrative Code, empowering the Governor-General to approve and disapprove applications
for personal, special, and hunting licenses to possess firearms and ammunition, the Chief of
Constabulary is authorized and directed to act for the Governor-General.
[14]
Issued on December 5, 1924 by Governor-General Leonard Wood.
[15]
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 905, Administrative Code, as amended, empowering the
President of the Philippines to prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the provisions of the
law relating to the possession, use of firearms, etc., the following regulations are hereby
promulgated.
SECTION 1. In carrying out the provision of Sections 881, 882 and 888 of the Revised Administrative
Code, empowering the President of the Philippines to approve or disapprove applications for
personal, special and hunting license to possess firearms and ammunition, the Chief of
Constabulary or his representative is authorized and directed to act for the President.
SECTION 2. In carrying out the provisions of Section 899 of the Revised Administrative Code,
empowering the President of the Philippines to revoke any firearm license anytime, the Chief of
Constabulary is authorized and directed to act for the President.
[16]
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF
AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
[17]
Section 8 of P.D. No. 1866.
[18]
Baylosis vs. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405.
[19]
AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED,
ENTITLED CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE,
DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES
OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING
STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
Issued on June 29, 1983.
[20]
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 provides:
SECTION 6. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior
and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the administrative aspect of the
provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee
on Justice and Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies of such rules and regulations
within thirty (30) days from the promulgation hereof.
[21]
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. Approved December 13, 1990.
[22] Under Section 2 (11), Chapter 1, Book 7 of Executive Order No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987,
the term licensing includes agency process involving the grant, renewal,
denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or
conditioning of a license.
[23]
Section 26 of R.A. No. 6975.
[24]
Chapter 7, Book IV of E.O. No. 292.

[25]
Under the laws of Alfred the Great, whose reign began in 872 A.D., all English citizens, from the nobility
to the peasants, were obliged to privately purchase weapons and be available for military
duty.[25] This body of armed citizens was known as the fyrd.
Following the Norman conquest, many of the Saxon rights were abridged, however, the right and duty of
arms possession was retained. Under the Assize of Arms of 1181, the whole community of
freemen is required to possess arms and to demonstrate to the Royal officials that each of them
is appropriately armed.
The Tudor monarchs continued the system of arm ownership and Queen Elizabeth added to it by creating
what came to be known as train bands that is, the selected portions of the citizenry chosen for
special training. These trained bands were distinguished from the militia which term was first used
during the Spanish Armada crisis to designate the entire of the armed citizenry.
The militia played a pivotal role in the English political system. When civil war broke out in 1642, the
critical issue was whether the King or Parliament had the right to control the militia. After the war,
England, which was then under the control of a military government, ordered its officers to search
for and seize all arms owned by Catholics, opponents of the government, or any other person
whom the commissioners had judged dangerous to the peace of the Commonwealth.
The restoration of Charles II ended the military government. Charles II opened his reign with a variety of
repressive legislation. In 1662, a Militia Act was enacted empowering officials to search and to
seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person or persons whom the said lieutenants
or any two or more of their deputies shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom. Such
seizures of arms continued under James I, who directed them particularly against the Irish
population.
In 1668, the government of James was overturned in a peaceful uprising which came to be known as The
Glorious Revolution. Parliament promulgated a Declaration of Rights, later enacted as the Bill of
Rights. Before coronation, James successor, William of Orange, was required to swear to respect
these rights. The Bill of Rights, as drafted in the House of Commons, simply provided that the
acts concerning the militia are grievous to the subject and it is necessary for the public safety that
the subjects, which are protestants, should provide and keep arms for the common defense; And
that the arms which have been seized, and taken from them, be restored. The House of Lords
changed this to a more concise statement: That the subjects which are Protestant may have arms
for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.
In the colonies, the prevalence of hunting as means of livelihood and the need for defense led to
armament statutes comparable to those of the early Saxon times. When the British government
began to increase its military presence therein in the mid-eighteenth century, Massachusetts
responded by calling upon its citizens to arm themselves in defense. In September 1774, an
incorrect rumor that British troops killed colonists prompted 60,000 citizens to take arms. A few
months later, when Patrick Henry delivered his famed Give me liberty or give me death speech,
he spoke in support of a proposition that a well-regulated militia, composed of gentlemen and
freemen, is the natural strength and only security of a free government
When the first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of Rights, it delegated the task to
James Madison. Madison did not write upon a blank tablet. Instead, he obtained a pamphlet
listing the States proposals for a Bill of Rights and sought to produce a briefer version
incorporating all the vital proposals of such States. Madison proposed among other
rights: The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed and
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service. In the House, this was initially
modified so that the militia clause came before the proposal recognizing the right. The proposal
finally passed the House in its present form: A well-regulated militia, being necessary for the
security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. In this
form it was submitted to the Senate, which passed it the following day.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President (BOCEA National
Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L.
MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335,2 otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005, and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations3 (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.

The Facts

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February
11, 2005.

In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:

RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by
the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to
the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director
General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the
BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative
from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set
criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation;
(5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for
such purpose.5

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was
published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard, and became
effective fifteen (15) days later.6

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the
fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-
file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President, Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed
the present petition before this Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian
B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following
averments:

Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to
comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance Contracts7 (Performance
Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently provided:

xxxx

WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of
2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose
revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.

xxxx

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so
agreed to perform the following:

xxxx

2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to meet the said
target under the following conditions:

a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds
himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act
and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and

b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her
section the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them
to accept their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective
Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or
before March 31, 2008.
x x x x8

BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and
tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that
some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, did not sign.
In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease
the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter
refused to heed them.

In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry
Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during command conferences to make
them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner Umali)
individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said personnel were threatened that if they do not
sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating
status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.

BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy
Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter merely said that he would look into
the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist
from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to sign
Performance Contracts.9 In his letter-reply10 dated February 12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any
BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the
law. Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of the Performance
Contract from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy.11

This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this
Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their
jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.

In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do
not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the
guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the law.
Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with
substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality.

In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that the
law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their shoulders when the Government
itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of
big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested that only the high-ranking
officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones
directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover, despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,14 BOC continually refused to provide
BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on how such reward was distributed.

Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion
to Consolidate15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However, pending action on said motion, the Court rendered
its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer
possible.16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section 1217of R.A. No.
9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of
separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section
1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and
effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.19

Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution20 dated February 10, 2009, requiring them to
submit their respective Memoranda.

The Issues

BOCEA raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE COVERED BIR
AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]

III.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE
RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2
(3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE REVENUE
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN
THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]

V.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.21

BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events unfolded showing the patent
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC employees
exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of ₱196 billion which they surpassed by as much as ₱2 billion for that
year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made advance tax payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC
employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they described as unjust,
unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the
hard task of collecting, received a mere pittance of around ₱8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds Division of BOC-NAIA
collected 400+% of its designated target but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly sum of ₱8,500.00
while the top level officials partook of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a
newspaper showing the list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward.22 It claims that the
recipients thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who performed no collection
functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure of R.A. No. 9335
to set out clear guidelines.23

In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five BOC
officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less
than arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of issuances and the Government’s accession to
regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These
unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse,
subjected them to attrition.24

BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:

1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process because the termination of
employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with
the requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the remedies available to an employee as provided
under the CSC rules.

2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to equal protection of the law because
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of
other revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office,
and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.

3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to security of tenure because R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure
afforded to government employees. The law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of
revenue collection target, which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the
manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the
targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.

5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials
and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose
the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the
benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public officer.25

On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC employees
as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR and
BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the revenue produced by other agencies is
merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection,
the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335 complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the
permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy
laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters
were set in order that the Board may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their
removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR and BOC
employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that
there was no encroachment of judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder since R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that
the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the
BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process, actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the
possible consequences of failing to meet the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from
appealing the unfavorable decision of dismissal.26

In essence, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;

2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process; and

3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually
covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.27

However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.

It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged. The Court
already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which attained finality on
September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this case.

We resolve the first issue in the negative.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.28 Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means
"what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.29However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions,30 one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in
this case.

The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,31 to wit:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful
if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence,
the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields — the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the
valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements
are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.32

Thus, in Abakada, we held,

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test.
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets."

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection [Over] the Percent (%) of the Excess

Revenue Targets Collection to Accrue to the
Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target
was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year
as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and
the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the
case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.

xxx xxx x x x"

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of
the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations
and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no
historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of
revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or
customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or
force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after
careful and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall
be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from
service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and
employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;

xxx xxx x x x"

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity", "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.33

We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as
evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 534 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the
incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he
allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue
Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a)35 of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by
providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with
Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in
all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board.

Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.36 1awphil

Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

xxx xxx x x x"

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and control
of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the
DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
 (8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

xxx xxx x x x"

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the
BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37

As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR and BOC
officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:

Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.38

In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in
Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant
factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner, exemptions42 were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that its
members may be removed for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an
employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him.43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official
or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his constitutional right to due
process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.

We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised by
BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22,44 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.45 1avv phi 1

In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,46 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of a
Bill of Attainder, to wit:

Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills or
statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a
legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by the
ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of
pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified
person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing,
without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People
v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90
L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a
means of legislative oppression. x x x47

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are
amply protected.

A final note.

We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and receipt of
rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government in
general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR,
but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate these pernicious acts of graft and
corruption.48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are
in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the
manifest intendment and language thereof.49 Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.50 We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR are constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-58.

2 Entitled "An Act to Improve the Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Through the Creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and of a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board and for Other Purposes."

3Entitled "Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 9335, otherwise known as the ‘Attrition Act of
2005.’"

4 G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.

5 Id. at 267-268, citing Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 12 of R.A. No. 9335.

6 Id. at 281, 299.

7 Rollo, pp. 90-93.

8 Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied.

9 Id. at 97-102.

10 Id. at 103-104.

11 Id. at 105 and 106.

12 Id. at 139-160.
13 Id. at 163-180.

14 Id. at 182-185.

15 Id. at 135-138.

16 Id. at 197-198.

17 Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. — There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House
of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight
Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become
functus officio and therefore cease to exist.

18 Section 13 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force
and effect.

19 Supra note 4 at 294-299.

20 Rollo, pp. 360-361.

21 Id. at 499-500.

22 Rollo, pp. 432-436, 435. The CHIP-IN Bulletin in its July 2008 issue named the recipients of rewards, the top
five of which were:

1. Napoleon L. Morales Commissioner/OCOM ₱ 5,293,000.00;

2. Suansing, Jr., Horacio P. District Collector ₱ 1,011,000.00;

3. Dir. Reynaldo V. Umali Acting Director ₱ 908,000.00;

4. Bernardo V. Sales Officer-in-Charge, IAG ₱ 908,000.00;

5. Atty. Reynaldo S. Nicolas Deputy Commissioner/AOCG ₱ 908,000.00.

23 Id. at 491-495.

24 Id. 495-499.

25 Id. at 505-543.

26 Id. at 448-471.
27 See Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 317.

28 See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).

29Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005,
469 SCRA 1, 115-116.

30 The recognized exceptions to this principle are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, id. at 117; Santiago v.
Comelec, 336 Phil. 848, 897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Isagani A. Cruz,
Philippine Political Law 87 (1996).

31 G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.

32 Id. at 719-720.

33 Supra note 4 at 277-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.

34 Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 5. Incentives to District Collection Offices. – In the event that the BIR or the BOC fails to meet its
revenue target by less than ten percent (10%), the revenue districts, in the case of the BIR, or the
collection districts, in the case of the BOC, which exceed their respective allocations of the revenue target
(allocated target), shall be entitled to rewards and incentives (district incentive) amounting to ten percent
(10%) of the excess over its allocated target: Provided, however, That any BIR revenue district or BOC
collection office which deliberately foregoes any revenue collection in a given year as part of a scheme to
avoid a higher allocated target for the subsequent year shall not be entitled to a district incentive in such
subsequent year notwithstanding its having exceeded its allocated target: Provided further, That the
allocated target of any such district shall have been reported to and validated by the DBCC as required in
the immediately preceding section.

The district reward shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year
when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released in the same fiscal year.

The allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

35 Sec. 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers
and functions:
 (a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund due to the
agency as provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of this Act: Provided, That the rewards under this Act may also
take the form of non-monetary benefits;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

36Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
78, 167.

37 Supra note 4 at 275-277. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.

38 Id. at 280-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied.

39
Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 158000, March 31, 2005,
454 SCRA 701, 717, citing National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (4th Division), G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 348, 354 and NFD International Manning
Agents v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116629, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 239, 246.

40 Supra note 33.

41 Section 19 of the IRR provides:

SEC. 19. Relevant Factors Affecting Collection. – For purposes of Section 7(a) of the Act and Section 18
of this Rule, the Board shall consider the following, among others, as relevant factors affecting the level of
collection: Provided, That these factors were not taken into account in setting BESF targets:

(a) Enactment of a law that repeals revenue measures, reduces tax and tariff rates, grants tax
exemptions, or otherwise results in the diminution of the tax base or of taxable transactions and activities,
including the entry into force of a treaty or an international agreement that the Philippines entered into
resulting in preferential treatment for certain taxpayers or transactions: Provided, That the Board shall
have the final authority to determine the affected District or Districts as well as the amount of revenues
deemed foregone due to such enactment or entry into force;

(b) Reduction by the President of tariff rates under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines; and

(c) Exercise by the President of the power to open or close any port of entry under Section 702 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

42 Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
 (1) Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and
has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

(2) Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility
covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought
about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board,
termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board. (Emphasis supplied.)

43 Section 9 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 9. Right to Appeal. — An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the
decision of the Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President
(OP), whichever is applicable, in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.

Moreover, Section 20 of the IRR pertinently provides:

SEC. 20. Right to Appeal. An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the
decision of the Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President
(OP), as the case may be, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Board.

For officials who are Presidential appointees, appeal may be filed with the Office of the President. All
other officials and employees may appeal with the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, however,
the decision of the Board shall be immediately executory.

Provided, however, that officials and employees affected by the decision may initially file a motion for
reconsideration with the Board within [fifteen] (15) days from receipt of such decision.

Decisions of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no motion or appeal has been filed.

44 Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

45 Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648, 659.

46 No. L-70484, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 613.

47 Id. at 625. Emphasis supplied.

48 Section 8 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. — The officials,
examiners, and employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs who violate this
Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered
by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance,
misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

49 Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 450, 481.
 Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 142, citing Lacson v. The
50

Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 263 (1999).

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

While I concur with the rest of the Court in dismissing this Rule 65 Petition, I wish to highlight a very important species of
argument that petitioner, could have, but was unable, to develop as a viable ground for granting this Petition. I refer to the
contradiction that government has created — by fostering low-tariff regimes which in turn has created a low customs revenue
base, while at the same time increasing customs revenue collection targets that has been rendered unattainable because of the
low revenue base. I highlight this contradiction only because it shows how terribly askew certain government actions might have
gone, and how the state of ship can possibly start to set aright.

A fundamental requirement for the constitutionality of a statute is for it to pass the test of reasonableness. Applied to this Petition,
the question being asked in effect by petitioner is this: Is Republic Act No. 9335 (R.A. 9335) constitutionally reasonable,
considering that the Government has been embarking on low-tariff regimes embodied in various regional and bilateral trade
agreements, as well as in unilateral tariff-reduction programs?

The argument of reasonableness is not, strictly speaking of the means-versus-ends kind. Rather, it is akin to the requirement of
reasonableness imposed by Article 1186 of the Civil Code, which reads: "The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfilment." This article accomplishes two things in civil cases: (1) it punishes the obligee by deeming the
condition fulfilled despite non-compliance by the obligor because the obligee voluntarily prevented compliance with the condition;
and (2) it lifts the burden from the shoulders of the obligor by not requiring the latter to fulfill a condition which, even though not
inherently impossible, cam no longer be fulfilled because of a voluntary act of the obligee. If we transpose these effects to this
Petition, in the case of customs revenue collections, the State who is the obligee, is denied by law the right to exact compliance
with the revenue targets from the customs employees who are the obligors, because the State prevented the increase in customs
revenue collections, by lowering the revenue base which consists of the customs duties from which such collection increases
could have been sourced.

There is one inherent difficulty in this argument, however. While attacks on constitutionality can be more easily launched against
statutes that contain material internal inconsistencies, the inconsistency in this instance is between, on the one hand, certain
sections of R.A. 93351 and the corresponding implementing rules and regulations2 and, on the other, a series of executive orders
lowering the tariffs on an array of imported goods. As it is, it would be quite difficult to satisfy the level of proof required to
demonstrate how presidential actions have resulted in the lowering of customs duties as to materially affect the ability of
petitioner to comply with collection targets and as to endanger its members’ security of tenure.

Regardless of the difficulty of demonstrating the lowering of tariffs and its impact on customs revenue collections, it must
ultimately be performed by the government for several important reasons.

First, although Petitioner was not able to adduce sufficient proof for the magnitude of the impact of lowered tariff rates on
customs collections, it can be readily seen, nonetheless, how it would be intuitively wrong and unfair to petitioner for the
Government to embark on a policy of lowering tariff duties while increasing customs collection targets, and then to penalize
failure to meet those targets without first estimating the negative revenue impact of the lowered tariff duties.

Second, it must be done simply because the revenue and expenditures estimates of Government must, to the extent possible, be
fact-based and scientifically done. Otherwise, the important constitutional goals of the economy under Article XII, Section 1,
cannot be satisfied. These economic goals largely depend on a supportive, not a destructive, revenue-raising program — part of
which includes customs duties.

A final observation. Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

For the longest time, Congress has not made its voice heard on this matter and has simply allowed the President to determine
tariff rates by one executive order after another. From the above language, it would seem that delegated presidential tariff rate
setting powers has been designed to be exercised only as an exception, and not as the norm. Congress must revisit this
constitutional provision and weigh the question of whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the exercise of this
constitutional duty to set tariffs in favor of the President.3

I vote to deny the Petition. I would also suggest that the Clerk of Court furnish a copy of the Decision to the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Let a copy of this Concurring Opinion also be served to the said officials.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliances with substantive and
procedural due process. Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

xxx

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
under consideration unless the transfer was due to non-performance of revenue targets: Provided,
however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities, force majeure or
economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful
and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That such decision shall be immediately executor: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for
the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; x x x (R.A. 9335)
2 SECTION 25. Powers and Functions. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of the Act;

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph;

xxx

(e) To perform such other functions as are necessary or incidental to its mandated functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations, circulars, memoranda, interpretations and rulings and coordinate with
each other and provide support, whenever necessary, for the proper conducts of its functions; x x x
(Implementing Rules and Regulations)

3A profound discourse on the subject matter can be seen in the article of Former Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, "Deconstruction of Constitutional Limitations and the Tariff Regime of the Philippines: The
Strange Persistence of a Martial Law Syndrome," 84 Phil. L.J. 311 (2009).
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004]

1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 2LT.

RYAN H. QUISAI, TSG. ELMER D. COLON, CAPT. JULIUS W.
ESPORO, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. GIL P. LOZADA, SGT.
RAYMUND DUMAGO and PFC. REGIE A.
ALAGABAN, petitioners, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), B.GEN.
MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as Judge Advocate General
(JAG) of the AFP, and OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
AUTHORITY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 162341. October 25, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS

OF CPT. RUPERTO L. REASO, LTSG. NORBERTO E. SANTIAGO,
1LT. DANNY C. CANAVERAL, 1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT.
EMERSON L. MARGATE, 1LT. JEFFREY GAUGUIRAN, LTJG.
CEFERINO CHECA, LTJG. MARCO ANGELO J. ANCHETA, LTJG.
ELMER TORRIADO, LTJG. RONALD A. GALICIA, 2LT.
LAUREFEL P. DABALES, 2LT. MARY JAMES A. TAYABAN, 2LT.
JASON P. PANALIGAN, 2LT. RYAN QUISAI, 2LT. NESTOR
JASON CAMBA, 2LT. ARCHIBALD RANEL, 2LT. RESINO S.
ORTEZA, 2LT. NOEL F. TOMENGLAY, 2LT. LEOPOLDO
APELLANES, JR., 2LT. JONATHAN D. COSTALES, 2LT.
OSWALD IAN DIRA, 2LT. SAMSUDIN T. LINTONGAN, 2LT.
ALQUIN CANSON, 2LT. JUNIBERT S. TUBO, 2LT. EDWIN
DUETAO, 2LT. MARK P. DAMASO, 2LT. JIOVANNI PALLIAN,
2LT. EDGARDO AGUILAR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER, 2LT.
LARRY S. CENDANA, 2LT. AVELINO SAHLI, 2LT. LEXINGTON
ALONZO, 2LT. FILMORE RULL, ENS. VICTOR ODULLO, ENS.
IAN LUIS BADECAO, ENS. RONALD E. DISO, ENS. ARJOHN
ELUMBA, ENS. BRIAN BABANG, ENS. ANTONIO BOSCH, ENS.
TED CEREZO, ENS. HAROLD DAVE PRE, ENS. JEFFREY
BANGSA, ENS. JONAH ARUGAY, ENS. JONATHAN J.
ADLAWAN, ENS. EMERSON ROSALES, ENS. ELMER CRUZ,
ENS. REX P. CALLANO, ENS. JUVENAL AZURIN, ENS. LYLE
ROSOS, ENS. CESAR CARMEL TAMBA, CPO. LEONIDO FERNIN,
EM3 RONNIE GUMIA, PO3 ROULEX MAGISA, TSG. JESUCRAIS
SOLEDAD, SSG. NORBERTO MARTINEZ, SSG. BERTING
CABANA, SSG. JOERY ROJO, PO2 EDWARD ABUAC, SSG. LEO
GAPAYAO, SSG. ROMAR ARQUERO, SSG. RALLON BEBASA,
SSG. LORENZO GLORIOSO, SSG. NOEL AGGALUT, SSG.
PHILIP VITALES, SSG. FRANCISCO BOSI, JR., SSG. BONIFACIO
BARRION, SSG. RUBEN SORIANO, SSG. RONALD REYES, SSG.
WILFREDO LEAL, SSG. GUILLERMO LAVITORES, SGT.
ALFREDO ALEGADO, JR., SGT. GREGORIO SANDAGON, SGT.
JIGGER PACULBA SGT. JOJO ABANDO, SGT. JUANITO
JILBURY, SGT. ERIC CASTINO, SGT. ANTONIO CARABATA,
SGT.REYNANTE DANTE ESCATRON, SGT. NOLI FORONDA,
SGT. JERAN TABUJARA, SGT. RESTITUTO DEBORJA, SGT.
NILO ENASO, SGT. JULIUS WESFIRO, SGT. ROLDAN ANDO,
SGT. LORENZO CARRANZA, SGT. DANTE SANTOS, SGT.
WALTER MANALANSAN, SGT. JUDE ARQUISOLA, SGT.
HERMAN LINDE, SGT. ALEXANDER SICAT, SGT. FLORANTE
ROSETTE, SGT. ROMELO SY, SGT. JOEY MEMBREVE, SGT.
ADONIS PRADO, PO3 JESSMAR LANDONG, PO3 ROBERTO
TRIPULCA, PO3 SONNY MADARANG, PO3 RHOMMEL LORETE,
PO3 CARISTOFEIL TIKTIK, PO3 RENATO BUSTILLO, PO3
JERRY ASUNCION, PO3 LUDIVICO CLEMENTE, CPL. REY
RUBIOS, CPL. EMMANUEL TIRADOR, CPL. OLIVER
COMBAUCER, CPL. JOEL ABAYA, CPL. RANDEL CENO, CPL.
RONALD RETUTA, CPL. JULIUS TANALLON, CPL. FILOMENO
RAMIREZ, CPL. JIGGER ALAMEDA, CPL. RAYMUND DUMAGAO,
CPL. EDGAR VELASCO, CPL. RAMONCITO TAMPON, SN1
ALLAN DULAP, SN1 JERRY REGALARIO, SN1 JOEL MASENAS,
SN1 JONATHAN PEREZ, S1HM ROMUALDO GANANCIAL, SN1
ROEL GADON, F1EM GARY PAYOS, SN1 ZANDRIX GACU, SN1
ROMMEL ANONUEVO, SN1 WILLIAM ABLITER, SN1 GERMINIO
FERNANDEZ, SN1 ARNEL CAPUNO, SN1 CLEOFAS PAMIENTA,
S1HM TIMOTEO ABARRACOSO, S1CD GERARDO
DEDICATORIA, SN1 LEONOR FORTE, JR., CPL. JEOBAL
GONZALES, CPL. ALADIN GOMEZ, CPL. HARDY GLAGARA,
CPL. CESAR A. PADILLA, CPL. JERSON ALABATA, CPL.
OLIVER GERIO, CPL. TEDDY ANTONIO, CPL. DENNIS LOPEZ,
CPL. RUEL MOLINA, CPL. ALVIN CELESTINO, CPL. BENJAMIN
RAMBOYONG, JR., CPL. GERRY CALINGACION, CPL.
ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, CPL. JONATHAN DAGOHOY, CPL.
CLECARTE DAHAN, CPL. RAYMOND PASTRETA, CPL.
LORENZO BIAO, CPL. ALEX PENA, CPL. ROGUN OLIVIDO, CPL.
MONCHITO LUSTERIO, CPL. GEORGE GANADOS, CPL.
MICHAEL BALISTA, PVT. 1ST CLASS MAXINIAR BALANAY,
PVT. 1ST CLASS BONIFACIO CAOALO, PVT. 1ST CLASS REGGIE
ALAGABAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ANGELO MARQUEZ, PVT. 1ST
CLASS JOHN GAIHAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS MARCIAL CAISA, PVT.
1ST CLASS CARLOS FILLIOS, PVT. 1ST CLASS PATROCENIO
PATENO, PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLLY BERNAL, PVT. 1ST CLASS
NOVIDA RUIZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS MELCHOR ALOOS, PVT.
1ST CLASS JOEL MALALAY, PVT. 1ST CLASS JULIETO BANAS,
JR., PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLAND BANAAG, PVT. 1ST CLASS
NIXON MAGALLIS, PVT. 1ST CLASS RICHARD LARCE, PVT.
1ST CLASS SINDY BONOTAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ARNOLD
PULPULAAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS ABRAHAM APOSTOL, PFC.
CHARLES AGNER, S2RM JULIUS CEAZAR ALFUENTE, PFC.
EDILON ANDALEON, PFC. RONALDO BAYOS, PFC. MARCIAL
BAYSA, S2EM ABRAHAM BILLONES, CPL. ABNER BIRAL, PFC.
JEFFREY BOLALIN, SN2 JEFFREY BONCACAS, 1LT PATRICIO
BUMIDANG, JR., S2BM JOSEPH BUSCATO, CPT. EINSTEIN
CALAOA, JR., PFC. EDWIN CANETE, SN2 EZRA JERRY
CARUMBA, S2PH GLENN CARUMBA, SGT. ARIMATEO B.
CEDENO, SN2 ALEX CHAN, PO3 COCARI GONZALES, FN2
ALEX DEL CALLE, PFC. HANZEL DELA TORRE, SN2 SONNY
DELA VEGA, PFC. JOSE DEMONTEVERDE, 1LT. JOSE ENRICO
M. DINGLE, PFC. ALADINO DOGOMEO, ENS. DENNIS DONGA,
PFC. RUEL ESPINILLA, PFC. RODRIGO FERNANDEZ, SN2
JULIUS GARCIA, SGT. ALLAN INOCENCIO, TSQ. JESUCRAIS
SOLEDAD, PFC. JERSON LABILLES, CPL. DANILO LAGRIMAS,
SN2 ALLAN LEONOR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER LO, S2BM
JERIC LORENA, S2DP ANGELITO LOYLOY, PFC. LUIS NOVIDA,
SN2 EMMANUEL LUMACANG, CPL. RIZAL MANIMTIM, PFC.
GALIB MOHAMMAD, SSG. GIL MONTOJO, PFC. BENJAMIN
NANGGAN, PFC. ARNOLD NIALLA, SN2 FERNANDO PACARDO,
SGT. JOVITO PACLEB, PFC. CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, LTJG.
 JENNIFER PILI, PFC. CARLOS PILLOS, PFC. JOCIL
REGULACION, S2DC GARY REYES, S2EM VALENTIN SAMAR,
LT/SG. NORBERTO SANTIAGO, JR., FN2 FRANCISCO SEVILLA,
JR., SN2 MIKE SOLAR, SN2 ROMMEL SOLIS, PFC. JOJIT
SORIANO, CPT. EDMAR B. SORIOSO, SSG. JUAN TUQUIB, SN2
JOEL TYBACO, S1BM RONALDO URBANO, S2HM EDGAR
VASQUEZ, SGT. IGNACIO VIGAR, ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, petitioner, vs. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, BRIG. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., as AFP Judge Advocate General, and ALL
PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR STEAD AND UNDER THEIR
AUTHORITY, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR, J.:

Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the
General Court-Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with
violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in
connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.
In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this Court a Petition
for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment
Order[1] dated August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said commitment order, all
the Major Service Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take custodial responsibility of all the
military personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny belonging to their respective
commands. This included all the junior officers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to
as Capt. Reaso,[2] et al.) who are subject of the instant petition for habeas corpus. The
commitment order, however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, LtSG.
James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo
O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon would remain under the custody of the Chief
of the ISAFP.[3]
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et al.),
seven of the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the General Court-
Martial from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for alleged
violations of the Articles of War.
 Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya who, as
Chief of Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control over all the members and
agencies of the AFP, and Brigadier General Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP and officer in command of the Judge Advocate General
Office (JAGO), the agency of the AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings.

Background[4]

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP the Philippine Armys Scout Rangers
and the Philippine Navys Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises
of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the
Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building
and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.
The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a
small number of junior officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were
later identified as including Navy LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine Capt.
Gary Alejano.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement
through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood
to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Among those grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms
and ammunition to the enemies of the State, the bombings in Davao City which were
allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain
more military assistance from the United States government, and the micro-
management in the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command
and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration.
Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their
positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a state of rebellion and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting
down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating
their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and later,
indefinitely.
In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the
Government team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between
the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the
occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were
out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
 The Filing of Charges

Under the Information[5] dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers
who took part in the Oakwood Incident with violation of Article 134-A (coup detat) of the
Revised Penal Code.[6] Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. (G.R.
No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso,
et al. (G.R. No. 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al.,
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by
Judge Romeo F. Barza.
On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial
court:

1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and

2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of
the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against
the 316 other accused. [7]

While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated
October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup detat [8] against only 31 of the original
321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of
evidence.
Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its
Order[9] dated November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended Information[10] dated October
30, 2003 charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup detat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code.[11] Only the following were charged
under the Amended Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO, LTSG. ANTONIO
F. TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG. JAMES A. LAYUG, CPT.
LAURENCE LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT. GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR
FAELDON, CPT. ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO, JR., CPT.
JOHN P. ANDRES, CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT. FLORENTINO B. SOMERA, 1LT.
CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS, 1LT. SONNY S. SARMIENTO, 1LT. AUDIE S. TOCLOY, 1LT.
VON RIO TAYAB, 1LT. REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R. SAN JUAN, 1LT.
WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON, 1LT. NATHANIEL N. RABONZA, 2LT. KRISTOFFER
BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT. JONNEL P. SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S. PASCUA, 1LT.
FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG. MANUEL G. CABOCHAN, LTSG. EUGENE LOUIE
GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G. TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S. PASCUA, JR., ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, PO3 JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR GONZALES, and several
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. Further, the said Order expressly stated that the case
against the other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who
are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In
another Order dated November 18, 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment
orders against those 31 accused charged under the Amended Information and set their
arraignment.
Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped
as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were charged before the General Court-
Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the
Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer).[12] On the
other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained charged under the
Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for violations of the
Articles of War.
Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of
Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the
original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148)
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the Orders dated November 14 and

18, 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza, the Omnibus Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over
all charges filed before the Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and 2)
Implement the August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the prosecution to produce
evidence to establish probable cause are hereby considered MOOT AND
ACADEMIC and, lastly, all charges before the court-martial against the accused
(those included in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused
(those included in the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat.[13]

In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court-Martial set on
March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of
War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident.
The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
162318, this Court, in the Resolution dated March 16, 2004, directed the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition.[14]

The Petitioners Case

In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the petitioners
advance the following arguments:
 I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND THE GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES
BECAUSE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT
THE OFFENSES ARE NOT SERVICE-RELATED AND ARE PROPERLY WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVILIAN COURTS;[15] and
II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER DETAIN THE
JUNIOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS THE CHARGES FOR COUP
DETAT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF EVIDENCE UPON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.[16]
Citing Section 1[17] of Republic Act No. 7055,[18] the petitioners theorize that since the
RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared that the
offenses for which all the accused were charged were not service-connected, but
absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the General Court-Martial no
longer has jurisdiction over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO
have no authority to constitute the General Court-Martial, to charge and prosecute the
petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with
the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is
no longer any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order dated
August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the charge against them
for coup detat had already been dismissed.
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be enjoined from
constituting the General Court-Martial and from further proceeding with the court-martial
of the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection
with the Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the petitioner prays
that the respondents be ordered to explain why the detained junior officers and enlisted
men subject of the petition for habeas corpus should not be released without delay.

The Respondents Arguments

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to
dismiss the petitions. The respondents contend that the Order dated February 11, 2004
promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and
declared that the charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the
Amended Information, were not service-connected, is null and void. They aver that at
the time that the said motion was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784
as the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order
dated November 14, 2003. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer
had any personality to pursue the Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the
petitioners were not real parties in interest at the time that their Omnibus Motion was
resolved by the RTC (Branch 148).
 The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not given an
opportunity to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion. Worse, they were not even
given a copy of the Order dated February 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be
enforced against the respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.
The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the February 11, 2004
Order as it declared, on one hand, that the charges filed before the court-martial were
not service-connected, but on the other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion was
moot and academic. According to the respondents, these two pronouncements cannot
stand side by side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic, because the
accused who filed the same were no longer being charged with coup detat under the
Amended Information, then the trial court did not have any authority to further resolve
and grant the same Omnibus Motion.
The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et
al. were not being charged with coup detat under the Amended Information, the trial
court could not make a finding that the charges filed against them before the General
Court-Martial were in furtherance of coup detat. For this reason, the declaration
contained in the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2004 Order - that charges filed
against the accused before the court-martial were not service-connected - cannot be
given effect.
Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents vigorously
assert that the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. filed with the
General Court-Martial, i.e., violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are, in
fact, among those declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of this
provision. This means that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the same being properly cognizable by the General Court-Martial. Thus, the
RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its
February 11, 2004 Order that the charges against those accused before the General
Court-Martial were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime
of coup detat. Said pronouncement is allegedly null and void.
The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping. Apparently, a
similar petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition with injunction and prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order) had been filed by the petitioners co-accused
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case was resolved
against the petitioners therein.
The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue

The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
 The Courts Ruling

We rule in the negative.

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC
(Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all
charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but
absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot be given effect. For
reasons which shall be discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The trial courts declaration was
made when the Omnibus Motion
had already been rendered moot
and academic with respect to
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. by reason of the
dismissal of the charge of coup
detat against them
The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus
Motion, which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, acquire jurisdiction over all the
charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. The said
Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under
the Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was subsequently
superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31
were charged with the crime of coup detat. In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC
(Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290
accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said
Order became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been
filed by any of the parties.
Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on
February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November
14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which
only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed,
including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., because they were no longer
parties to the case. This was conceded by the RTC (Branch 148) itself as it stated in the
body of its February 11, 2004 Order that:

Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the
movants first concern in their omnibus motion, i.e., assume jurisdiction over all
charges filed before military courts in accordance with R.A. 7055, has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the Order dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the
case against TSg. Leonel M. Alnas, TSg. Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno,
et al. and finding probable cause in the Order dated November 18, 2003 against
accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, et al., issued by
Judge Barza.

In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case
against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over
all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the
Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the
prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused. [19]

Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC (Branch 148) held
that the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. And yet, in the same
dispositive portion, the RTC (Branch 148) still proceeded to declare in the last clause
thereof that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included
in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in
the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, on its
perception that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were
committed in furtherance of coup detat; hence, absorbed by the latter crime.
As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed,
there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot
and academic. Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no further relief could
be granted to them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly
considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. And in the
same manner that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the
court,[20] any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 are no longer
binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself
recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that in view of the Order of
Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused,
the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the
military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003
of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or
by any of the accused.[21]
Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with
coup detat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the
charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-
connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made
by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Such declaration was made by the
RTC (Branch 148) in violation of
Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject
to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units,
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special
penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons,
shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be
tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes
or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those

defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
laws, or local government ordinances.

The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are
considered service-connected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No. 408
(CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the
Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property. Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or
Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to
Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97 General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction
over the foregoing offenses. The following deliberations in the Senate on Senate Bill No.
1468, which, upon consolidation with House Bill No. 31130, subsequently became Rep.
Act No. 7055, are instructive:

Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but this will have to
be on page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be another paragraph, but still
within Section 1. This is to propose a definition of what service-connected means,
because this appears on line 8. My proposal is the following:

SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN THOSE COMMITTED BY

MILITARY PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO THE LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR
SUPERIOR OFFICER OR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY
EXERCISE OR MISSION.

I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion as to what service-connected

offense means. Please note that service-connected offense, under this bill, remains
within the jurisdiction of military tribunals.

So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President.

Senator Taada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this
amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be
under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following
amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS
SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE
LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75,
ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97,
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.

This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected

offenses or crimes would be.

The President. What will happen to the definition of service-connected offense

already put forward by Senator Shahani?

Senator Taada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article
I have mentioned in the Articles of War.

SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION

The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I
will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. [There was none.]

It was 5:02 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION

At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President. The session is resumed.

Senator Taada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my

amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and style.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is approved.[22]

In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Taada, the principal sponsor of SB No.
1468, emphasized:

Senator Taada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by

persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which
are service-related or connected. And we specified which would be considered
service-related or connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408. [23]

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts
of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and
Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered service-connected
crimes or offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case.[24] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law.[25] It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the
parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the
parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts. [26] Once vested by law on a
particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of
a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative
enactment which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.[27]
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot
divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of
Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior
Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as
service-connected offenses or crimes under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same
provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that violations
of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance
of coup detatand, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a
reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup
detat against the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them.
The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against the
petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the petitioners committed the
violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup
detat.
In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, the RTC
(Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. [28]
 At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better perspective the
raison detre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, jurisdiction over offenses
punishable under CA 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, committed
by persons subject to military law was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD) Nos.
1822,[29] 1850[30] and 1852.[31] These presidential decrees transferred from the civil courts
to the military courts jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the AFP,
the former Philippine Constabulary, the former Integrated National Police, including
firemen, jail guards and all persons subject to military law.
In 1991, after a series of failed coup detats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was enacted. In his
sponsorship speech, Senator Taada explained the intendment of the law, thus:

Senator Taada. The long and horrible nightmare of the past continues to haunt us to
this present day. Its vestiges remain instituted in our legal and judicial system.
Draconian decrees which served to prolong the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule
our new-found lives. Two of these decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and
Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, remain intact as laws, in spite of the fact
that four years have passed since we regained our democratic freedom.

The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated in the case of Olaguer vs.
Military Commission No. 34 that the greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of
human memory.

PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses committed by members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the Integrated National
Police, including firemen and jail guards, and all persons subject to military law
exclusively triable by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction over common
crimes rightly belongs to civil courts.

Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military. Likewise, Article VIII, Section 1 declares that the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National Defense, (146 Supreme Court
Reports Annotated, page 406), the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Gutierrez
declared:

The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes at a time when all
civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest
chapters in the history of the Philippine Judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military tribunals
... the many judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence and self-respect will require plenty of time
and determined efforts to cure.

The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong to them is only
a beginning.

...

Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning,
military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal
offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. ... [32]

Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to
the civilian courts the jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within
their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated
by the Articles of War.

Conclusion

The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341)
prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do
so.[33] Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body.[34] The term court
necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al.,
as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003
issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 [35] of the Articles of
War.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
which they have not been vested by law.[36] As earlier discussed, the General Court-
Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al.
under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from
exercising its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Azcuna, J., on leave.

[1]
Rollo, p. 18. (G.R. No. 162341)
[2]
On August 19, 2004, Capt. Ruperto L. Reaso filed with this Court a Motion to Withdraw as One of the
Petitioners in G.R. No. 162341 and prayed that the law office of Atty. Pulido be enjoined from
representing him.
[3]
Rollo, p. 18. (G.R. No. 162341)
[4]
The narration of the events that transpired on July 27, 2003 is largely taken from THE REPORT OF
THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION dated October 15, 2003. The Fact-Finding Commission,
headed by Retired Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, was created under
Administrative Order No. 78 dated July 30, 2003 of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
investigate the Oakwood Incident.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 18-29. (G.R. No. 162318)
[6]
The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about July 27, 2003 or on dates prior and subsequent thereto, in Makati City, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and swiftly attack and
seize by means of intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth the Ayala Center, particularly Oakwood
Premier Hotel and its immediate vicinity, a facility needed for the exercise and continued
possession of power, and directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, rise publicly and take arms against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, demanding the resignation of the President and members of her official cabinet and
top officials of the AFP and Philippine National Police, for the purpose of seizing and diminishing
state power.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[7]
Rollo, p. 100. (G.R. No. 162318)
[8]
ART. 134-A. Coup detat How committed. The crime of coup detat is a swift attack, accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of
the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks,
public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power,
singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons,
belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without
civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As added
by RA No. 6968, 86 OG 52, p. 9864 [1990].)
[9]
Rollo, pp. 63-66. (G.R. No. 162318)
[10]
Id. at 57-62.
[11]
The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about July 27, 2003, and on dates prior and subsequent thereto, in Makati City, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), together with several John Does and
Jane Does, conspiring, conniving, confederating and mutually helping one another, each
committing individual acts toward a common design or purpose of committing coup detat, by did
then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously plan, orchestrate, recruit, instigate,
 mobilize, deploy and execute said common design or purpose of committing coup detat, swiftly
attack and seize by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth the facilities of the
Ayala Center, particularly Oakwood Premier Hotel and its immediate vicinity, for the exercise and
continued possession of power, directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of
the Philippines, by did then and there, withdraw support and demand the resignation of
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and members of her official cabinet and top
officials of the AFP and the Philippine National Police, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing
state power.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 31-51. (G.R. No. 162318)
[13]
Id. at 70.
[14]
Id. at 72.
[15]
Petition in G.R. No. 162318, p. 7; Petition in G.R. 162341, p. 11.
[16]
Petition in G.R. No. 162341, p. 13.
[17]
Infra.
[18]
An Act to Strengthen Civilian Supremacy Over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction Over Certain Offense Involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Other Persons Subject to Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police,
Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 68-69. (G.R. No. 162318)
[20]
Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 301 (2002).
[21]
Supra at 19.
[22]
Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 122, May 21, 1990, p. 837.
[23]
Id. at 839.
[24]
Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. v. Panlilio, 411 SCRA 142 (2003).
[25]
Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333 (2000).
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 279 (1990).
[28]
See People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000).
[29]
Providing for the Trial by Courts-Martial of Members of the Armed Forces Charged with Offenses
Related to the Performance of their Duties (January 16, 1981).
[30]
Providing for the Trial by Courts-Martial of Members of the Integrated National Police and Further
Defining the Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial over Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(October 4, 1982).
[31]
Amending Section 1 of P.D. No. 1850 (September 5, 1984).
[32]
Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 116, May 9, 1990, pp. 670-671.
[33]
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 (2003).
[34]
Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 (2000).
[35]
The provision reads:
 Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a
serious offense under these articles shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances
may require; but when charged with a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be
placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this article shall
thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by
proper authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks his arrest or who escapes from confinement,
whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority, shall
be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and
any other person subject of the military law who escapes from confinement or who breaks his
arrest, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority,
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
[36]
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490 (1996).
 DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary
restraining order) filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge
Advocate General, respondents.

The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence

reports that some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had
abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the
government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP mostly from the elite units of the Armys
Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare Group entered the premises of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands
emblazoned with the emblem of the Magdalo faction of the Katipunan.[1] The
troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and
corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the enemies
of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support
from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the
Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top
brass of the AFP and PNP.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the
AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking
place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five
oclock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to

dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to
the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives
placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned
to their barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the

authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and

recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup
detat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of

War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the
arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed
the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Makati City an Information for coup detat[2] against those soldiers,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61,
presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza.[3] Subsequently, this case was consolidated
with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before
Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation
of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
 On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625
creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing
with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408,[4] as amended, against the same military
personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect
toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of
Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for
mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243
(including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion
praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with
the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.[5]

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals
Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after
the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial
Report to the AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel
involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial with
violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a

reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the
321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed
with the RTC an Amended Information.[6]

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended
Information and dropped the charge of coup detat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel

submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report[7] to the JAGO, recommending
that, following the doctrine of absorption, those charged with coup detat before the
RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles
of War.
 For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order[8] stating that all
charges before the court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not
service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup detat. The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners applications for
bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-

charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He
recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the

AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to
submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court
the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist
from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation
to the Oakwood incident.[9]

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its
Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-
connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup detat, the military tribunal cannot
compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No.
7055 specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of War are service-
connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The
law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court
martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under
R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of
the court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition

raising the additional issue that the offense charged before the General Court
Martial has prescribed.Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their
original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for
purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that almost two years
since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio
Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable
circumstances;[10] that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the
prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War;[11] that the offense
charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;[12] that the General Court Martial ruled,
however, that the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26,
2005;[13] that (a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming
apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed
its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned; [14] and
that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court
martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005.[15]

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition
be denied for lack of merit. He alleges that contrary to petitioners pretensions,
all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005.[16] The
(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present
and, (o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges
and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13,
2005).[17]

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to
the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to
military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term officer is construed to refer to a
commissioned officer. Article 2 provides:
 Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons
are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the
term any person subject to military law or persons subject to military
law, whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary,
all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees
undergoing military instructions; and all other persons
lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for
training in the said service, from the dates they are required by
the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except
when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil
court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried
by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may,
in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall
be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial
may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the
Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays
down the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by
the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e.,
where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly,
the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the service-
connected crimes or offenses as limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War. Violations of these
specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction
between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed
by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve

the peculiar nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with
service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature,
aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest
degree of military efficiency.[18] Military law is established not merely to enforce
discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the
State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and
safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body.[19] The administration of
military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the
armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and
its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this
reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any
organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline
both in peace and in war.[20]
 Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court
martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003
at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and
abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the
State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected
and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to
protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War[21] provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any
officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary
second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring
ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is
service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of
R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution
and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of
the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such
penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
 Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer
be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11,
2004 as not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the
alleged crime of coup detat, hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in
making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the
court martial the jurisdiction over service-connected crimes or offenses. What the
law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the
law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so.[22] And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law as they find it,
not as they like it to be.[23] Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya.,[24] this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo,

Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC
(Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11,
2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were
not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime
of coup detat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made
without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are considered
service-connected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
 Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military

courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not
divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations
of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War as these are considered service-connected crimes or
offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-
martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during

the deliberation of this case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that
the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is
absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat. Firstly,
the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute,[25] unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies
only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-
connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus,
the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]),
applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an
armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that
of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military
personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not
allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or
unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior
may question his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order
or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil
court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed,
military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the

Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces
(see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops
Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial
form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control,
and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over
decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War;
quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or

similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a military
personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401
[1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75
Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial
proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and in
furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the civil
courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one
of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA
7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their

Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The
contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were
actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters
involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier
of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues
affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be
resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts.[26]
 Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is
directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[27] Stated differently, prohibition is
the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law.[28]

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in
convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

 RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28,
2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFAS DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE
MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
(ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA
PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT
ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH
PREJUDGED PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
(MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations[1] for grave oral defamation filed against
petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner
allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On
April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice
from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes,
dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the
order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.[2]
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed
in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a
crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted
the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were
directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines,
as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in
the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case,
rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered
while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the
provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian
Development Bank, to wit:

Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:

(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors Motions
for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As
we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling
within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues
that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against
him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general,
cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not
petitioners utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.

The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and
it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l. net

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit,
the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based
on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief
Justice Marshall said:

. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,
and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
 . . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
through the proper political agency. . . .

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper
of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the
peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be
easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder
belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and
that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it.

Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in
the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation
of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in
the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories
of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the
two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any
parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for
the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said
territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him,
is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese
residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and
(4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was
then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N.
Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port
and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and
seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there
fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing
said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be
tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in
stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of
some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
 The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be
provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from
the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof
the following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or
unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully
fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay
a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals
are disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was
sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts
over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within
any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep.,
614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which
such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission
thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have
been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian
vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the
laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of
the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law
(Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The
ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the
proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and
the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection
to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial
waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power
without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from
local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times.
In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the
effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from
the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory
was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144),
Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port
may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within
whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva
Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of
war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding
founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256;
Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official
exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and
finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign
ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-
628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit
Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231;
British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory
have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says
that —

It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels

that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a
foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by
act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean
Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said
that —

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient
and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern
the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise
provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as
judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb
the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The
order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or
general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed
upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn
from the cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the
vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the
United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have
the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and
Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for
the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault
and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there
was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic
channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to
Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
 I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with
the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in
the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction
is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be
held amenable under the local criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and
crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or
crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is
made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such
magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is
not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local
judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden
to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and
if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused,
to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by the
municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on
board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance
of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language
requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country.
The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the
captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose
port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the
court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in
this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals
were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of
the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into
which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it
does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act
was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea,
when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or
intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not
show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This
point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and
'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design —
done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done."
To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the
present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests
upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was
conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary
to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must
be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is
good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in
this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means
for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes"
and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and
that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between
foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with
its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People
(Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of
the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it
has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress
to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express
terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated
into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern
the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary
powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual
procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the Union,
and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to
prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government
should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which
had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local
legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress
has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature
and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of
the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no
longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370,
385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory,
although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to
create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force.
(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of
Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De
Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S.,
197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all
laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the
United States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1,
Act of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result
of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States
on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government
of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and
on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was
signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of
the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty
of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United
States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and
the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was
governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The
military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military
or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the exercise
of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed
and the rights determined.

President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment
of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the
military government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should
be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the
raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of
public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military
governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or
for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment
for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by
Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised
previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to
administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1,
1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with
the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the
President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the
action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been
imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress
thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the
protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions.
The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the
treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1,
1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by
law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The
government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from
the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United
States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In
neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement
of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers,
and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto
power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement
of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.

In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject
to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the
States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions,
must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State
judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government
of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that
the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted
to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The
validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a
grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the
Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative
authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to
specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to
exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is
conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply
as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty.
Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of
the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of
the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The
situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the
Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until
annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has
been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the
United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of
the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue
of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to
which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the
Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the
authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after
the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
(Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act
has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and
the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce
between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended
by Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be
left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court
from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the
port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully
sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and
risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said
ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any
 provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming
into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such
cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in
case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to
stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this
case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year.
The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience
the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three
hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them
individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is
untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals
upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.