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XI.O.

Without Jurisdiction; lack of jurisdiction; excess of jurisdiction; grave


abuse of discretion defined
### Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480

Principle:
JURISDICTIONAL, QUESTION; MEANING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Whether or not the
grounds alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for reconsideration seeking
relief from the effects of the compromise and from the judgment rendered thereon
are or are not sufficient, is not a question of jurisdiction but one of judgment
which we do not decide here. No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners,
and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts:
Province of Tarlac condemned parcels of land for construction of Capas-Murcia road,
then a compromise was entered with petitioners. Judge approved the compromise.
However, the provincial fisca, moved for reconsideration by reason of mistaken
belief in prices fixed by the appraisal committee. Judge acceded the motion and set
aside decision. Petitioners contend that judge was w/o power to set aside decision
being final.

Question:
Was there grave abuse of discretion by the judge?

Answer:
No.

Jurisprudence provides, by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and


whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

It is not claimed that the judgment in question has become final. In fact, it
cannot be so claimed because the fiscal's motion for reconsideration thereof was
presented five days after its rendition. Not having become final, the lower court
has plenary control over it and can modify or set it aside as law and justice
require.
Whether or not the grounds alleged by the provincial fiscal in his motion for
reconsideration seeking relief from the effect of the compromise and the from the
judgment rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is not a question of
jurisdiction but one of judgment which we do not decide here. No abuse of
discretion is shown by the petitioners.

XI.P Excess of jurisdiction distinguished from lack of jurisdiction


### Leung Ben v. O’Brien, 38 Phil 182

Facts:
Obrien filed an action against Leung Ben in the CFI of manila, to recover the sum
of 15,000 alleged to have been lost through gambling. Plaintiff asked fro an
attachment on the ground that the latter was about to depart the Phils with intent
to defraud creditors. Attachment was issued. Defendant thereupon moved to quash
attachment but was dismissed, the petitioner Leung Ben, presented to court his
petition for the writ of certiorari directed against O'Brien and Judge Ostrand and
that the order of attachment issued should be revoked.
The provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there
should be a cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied. The
contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at
gaming is no such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he therefore
insists that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of attachment
is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess
of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently
the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for his relief.

Question:
Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which
there is no statutory authority, can this court grant certiorari?

Answer:
YES.

Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction by the writ of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First
Instance, wherever said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used in


attachment cases, has reference not only to the authority of the court to entertain
the principal action but also to its authority to issue the attachment, as
dependent upon the existence of the statutory ground. (6 C. J., 89.) This
distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an ancillary remedy
incident to the principal litigation is of importance; as a court's jurisdiction
over the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to grant an
attachment as ancillary to such action.
Every complaint must show a cause of action some sort; and when the statue declares
that the attachment may issue in an action arising upon contract, the express or
implied, it announces a criterion which may be determined from an inspection of the
language of the complaint. The determination of this question is purely a matter of
law. On the other hand, when the stature declares that an attachment may be issued
when the defendant is about to depart from the Islands, a criterion is announced
which is wholly foreign to the cause of action; and the determination of it may
involve a disputed question of fact which must be decided by the court. In making
this determination, the court obviously acts within its powers; and it would be
idle to suppose that the writ of certiorari would be available to reverse the
action of a Court of First Instance in determining the sufficiency of the proof on
such a disputed point, and in granting or refusing the attachment accordingly.

### Herrera (supra)

XI.R. Erroneous exercise of jurisdiction


### Napa v. Weissenhagen, 29 Phil. 182
Facts:
An action for the summary recovery of the possession of land against the plaintiff
was by Larong and Bayla, defendants. The tried the cause and found in favor of
plaintiff. Defendants appealed to the CFI but a motion was made by the appellee to
dismiss appeal which was granted as well. This is of purpose to obtain a writ of
certiorari for the revision of the record of the court, revocation of judgment, and
set aside the whole proceeding.

Question:
Should the certiorari not be issued upon the petition in the case despite the facts
stated in the petition are sufficient to issue the certiorari?

Answer:
No.

We have held in numerous cases that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless
it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We have also held that
if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon
all question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and
however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.
It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the
fundamental question before it does not deprive it of jurisdiction whichever way it
may decide. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend
either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness
of the decision made.

The facts that the complaint in the justice's court appeared somewhat like a
complaint in ejectment, and that the judgment of the justice's court took on also
something of the color of a judgment in such an action; and the fact that such
judgment contains some provisions which a justice's court is perhaps without
authority to insert in its judgments is of no particular consequence in the
proceeding before us. If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was
nevertheless appealable, although the losing party might have been able to rid
himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially
the same footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned,
as any other judgment of a justice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate
court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is in any other.

SHORT VERSION

The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an


inferior court could be corrected no longer exists. Its place is now taken by the
appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors can be
corrected only by that method (APPEAL). The writ in this country has been confined
to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for
any other purpose.

If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable,
although the losing party might have been able to rid himself of it by other means.
Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same footing in the
appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of
a justice's court and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as
full and complete as it is any other.

XI.T.1 Plain, speedy, adequate remedy; Definition


### San Pedro v. Hon. Asdala, G.R. No. 164560, July 22, 2009
Facts:

Spouses Dionisio filed with the MeTC a complaint against San Pedro for Accion
Reivindicatoria, quieting of title and damages. Dionisio alleged that subject
property was titled under their name but petitioners with malice claimed the land
as their own. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the subject was incapable
of pecuniary estimation. MeTC denied the motion, ruling that it had original
jurisdiction over actions involving possession of real property of small value.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners
assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the RTC
but was denied again. Petitioners then filed with the CA another petitioner for
certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse by not
ordering the dismissal of complaint Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of
jurisdiction.

Question:
Did the CA acted with grave abuse of jurisdiction in denying the petition for
certiorari?
Answer:
No.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of
the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The aggrieved party is
proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition
for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore,
the correct remedy.

The CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari
outright, on the ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of
appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should
not have been given due course at all.

### Camutin v. Spouses Potente, G.R. No. 181642, January 29, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners were registered owners of parcels of land who resided abroad. Coming
back to the Philippines, they discovered that the house and warehouse of Potente
were erected on their lots. Respondents agreed to pay rents to their lots but
respondents failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals. Camutin filed a complaint
for partition against petitioners in the RTC. For continued refusal to vacate the
property, petitioners filed complaint to the barangay to have respondents removed.
During the brgy conference, parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC. The MTC
summoned the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and clarified that the agreement was only for the
waiting of the result of the RTC's case.
Apparently, MTC erroneously interpreted the brgy agreement as amicable settlement
and ordered a writ of execution ordering the ejectment case suspended until final
resolution of RTC case. MTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners then filed a petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC, but
was dismissed due to certiorari as a prohibited pleading in this case.

Question:
Did the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari?

Answer:
No.

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor


any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. Since the assailed order was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, respondents argue that the
correct mode of review is an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Sec. 2(a), Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.

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