Agapay vs.

Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a
few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court
found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel
and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter
instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They
sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the
decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their
marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by
both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their
respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual contribution is
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a
sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but
the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to
Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court
finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as
correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when
she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares

G. R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997

Facts:

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed all his prop to
his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by
Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad
Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or
incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petition for probate of the will. The recognized
natural children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape filed an opposition. The court
declared that the will was exec according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled that
Asuncion was never married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares filed
an appeals before the CA with the allegation that the oppositos failed to present ay comp. evidence taht
Asuncion was legally married to another person. The CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with the
modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.

Ruling:

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it
complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does
not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The
intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has
been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was
first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may
become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed
upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not asked
to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of
the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate
proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate
court.

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as

Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.

Jul 23

FACTS: Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia
Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez,
single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.

On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent
Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995
by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.

Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to
vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the
aforesaid lot with the MeTC.

MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot
and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.

RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate
was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special permit
of demolition from the court.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit
the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground
that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal
memorandum.

RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Held:

Co-ownership; nature

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons
have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the
“manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an
exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided
thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.”

Co-ownership; characteristics

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or
material indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and
which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which
determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.

Co-ownership; relationship

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held
pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit
of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express
trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
co-owner is a trustee for the others.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely
sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third
party independently of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot
has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into
by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of
the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

URSULINA GANUELAS, et al. v. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, et al.

G. R. No. 123968, 24 April 2003, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio-Morales, J.)

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.

FACTS: Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of
petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in
consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful
services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents
transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before
the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.

However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking such donation.
After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share in the produce of the properties
despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando,
La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged
that such donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is
necessary in a disposition mortis causa.

On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments because such donation was inter vivos.

The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply
with the formalities of wills and testaments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

HELD: Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs
from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or
acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.

If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership
of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will
and testament.

But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then
the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed
and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it
is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in
the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot
transfer ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title
or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but
that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during
her lifetime.

More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the
donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a
postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that
the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains
an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To classify the donation as
inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the
donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the
latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos
or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may also
underline transfers mortis causa.

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under
Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and
produces no effect.

DIGEST 1 - Spouses Sicad v. CA, et. al.

G.R. No. 125888, 294 SCRA 183, August 13, 1998

FACTS:

The issue raised in the appeal by certiorari at bar centers on the CHARACTER of a deed of donation
executed by the late Aurora Virto DA. de Motinola of the City of Iloilo — as either inter
vivos or mortis causa. That deed, entitled "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was executed by
Montinola on December 11, 1979. It named as donees her grandchildren (respondents herein), namely:
Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also
contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation.

PART I

Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for recording in the Property
Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donor's title) and, in its place,
issued TCT No. T-16622 on February 7, 1980, IN THE NAMES OF THE DONEES.

Montinola however RETAINED the OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPY of the NEW TITLE (No.
T-16622), AS WELL AS THE PROPERTY ITSELF

On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a DEED OF REVOCATION of the donation, 3 and
caused it to be ANNOTATED AS AN ADVERSE CLAIM on TCT No. T-16622

On August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the
CANCELLATION of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her
name), on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus
had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not
effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT
No. T-16622

Respondents opposed the petition. In their opposition dated August 29, 1990, they averred that THE
DONATION in their favor WAS ONE INTER VIVOS which, having fully complied with the
requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious

The Trial Court held that the DONATION WAS INDEED ONE INTER VIVOS, and dismissing
Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit

Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, her appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
33202. She however died on March 10, 1993, while the appeal was pending.
PART II

On March 31, 1993, petitioners Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad filed "Manifestation and
Motion" in which they:

-alleged that THEY HAD BECOME THE OWNERS of the property covered by TCT No. T-16622 in
virtue of a "DEED OF DEFINITE SALE dated May 25, 1992" accomplished by Montinola in their
favor, which was confirmed by "an affidavit dated November 26, 1997 also executed by the latter, and

-prayed that THEY BE SUBSTITUTED as appellants and allowed to prosecute the case in their own
behalf

On June 30, 1995, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, this instant appeal by the petitioners.

Petitioners’ contentions:

-the provisions of the deed of donation INDICATE that it was INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT UPON
THE DEATH OF THE DONOR

-the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, and the subsequent actions of the donor
incontrovertibly SIGNIFY THE DONOR'S INTENT TO TRANSFER THE PROPERTY ONLY
AFTER HER DEATH

-the donor DID NOT INTEND to give effect to the donation

Respondent’s defenses:

-the donor CLEARLY INTENDED to effect the IMMEDIATE TRANSFER of OWNERSHIP to the
donees othat the prohibition in the deed of donation against selling the property within ten (10) years
after the death of the donor DOES NOT INDICATE that the donation is mortis causa it is merely a
condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation

othe donor's alleged act of PHYSICALLY KEEPING the title DOES NOT SUGGEST any
INTENTION TO DEFER THE EFFECTIVITY of the donation

-the payment of real property taxes is consistent with the donor's' reservation of the right of usufruct

-the donor's intent is NOT DETERMINED by her self-serving post-execution declarations

-the donation was never effectively revoked

-it should be deemed one inter vivos simply because FOUNDED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF LOVE
AND AFFECTION

ISSUE:

WON the donation in question expressly designated as “donation inter vivos” is a donation mortis
causa?

RULING:

YES, it is a donation mortis causa despite its designation as one that is inter vivos since it was
intended to take effect 10 years after Montinola’s death.

The REAL NATURE OF A DEED is to be ascertained by BOTH its LANGUAGE and the
INTENTION of the parties as DEMONSTRATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT
UPON ITS EXECUTION.
 Particularly, a donation which purports to be one inter vivos BUT WITHHOLDS from the donee
the RIGHT TO DISPOSE of the donated property DURING THE DONOR'S LIFETIME is in truth
one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition – the most essential attribute of
ownership – is NOT TRANSFERRED to the donee while the donor is still alive."

In the instant case, the evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of
donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treñas) WAS READ AND EXPLAINED BY THE
LATTER TO THE PARTIES, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation TAKE EFFECT ONLY
AFTER TEN (10) YEARS FROM HER DEATH, and that the deed include a PROHIBITION ON THE
SALE OF THE PROPERTY FOR SUCH PERIOD.

Not only that. After the recording of the deed of donation, SHE NEVER STOPPED TREATING THE
PROPERTY AS HER OWN. She CONTINUED, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to
POSSESS the property, enjoy its FRUITS and otherwise exercise the RIGHTS OF DOMINION,
paying the property taxes as they fell due — all these she did until she transferred the Property to the
petitioners Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new certificate of title to the ostensible
donees but retained it, too, until she delivered it to the Sicads on the occasion of the sale of the property
to them.

And consistent with these ACTS DENOTING RETENTION OF OWNERSHIP of the property was
Montinola's OPENLY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE DONATION WAS INEFFECTUAL and
could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her death. For this view she sought to obtain
judicial approval. She brought suit on August 24, 1990 to cancel TCT No. T-16622 (issued to her
grandchildren) premised precisely on the invalidity of the donation for failure to comply with the
requisites of testamentary dispositions. Before that, she ATTEMPTED TO UNDO THE
CONVEYANCE to her grandchildren BY EXECUTING A DEED OF REVOCATION of the donation
on March 12, 1987, and causing annotation thereof as an adverse claim on said TCT No. T-16622. She
ALSO EXERCISED INDISPUTABLE ACTS OF OWNERSHIP over said property by selling the
property to the petitioners..

In other words, respondent-donees DID NOT GET POSSESSION of the property donated. They
DID NOT ACQUIRE THE RIGHT TO THE FRUITS THEREOF, or any other right of dominion over
the property. More importantly, they DID NOT ACQUIRE the RIGHT TO DISPOSE of the property
— this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even
laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the
donated property. All these circumstances ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in
question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees ONLY
AFTER THE DONOR'S DEMISE.

Similar Jurisprudence

In a decision handed down in 1946, the Court construed a deed purporting to be a donation inter vivos
to BE IN TRUTH ONE MORTIS CAUSA because it stipulated (like the one now being inquired into)
"that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties SHALL REMAIN FOR THE EXCLUSIVE
BENEFIT AND DISPOSAL OF THE DONOR, Margarita David, DURING HER LIFETIME; AND
that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated PROPERTIES COULD NOT BE
DISPOSED of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible,"

On these essential premises, the Court said, such a donation must be deemed one "mortis causa,
because the combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation
and of the above-quoted clauses thereof was that THE MOST ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
OWNERSHIP — the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products,
profits, possession — REMAINED WITH MARGARITA DAVID DURING HER LIFETIME, and
would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death." So, too, in the case at bar, did these
rights remain with Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could not pass to the donees until ten (10)
years after her death.
In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that the DECISIVE CHARACTERISTICS of a
donation mortis causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that "the donor not only
reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,
specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could
not be disposed of in any way,; thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of
ownership, the power to dispose of the properties."

The case of Alejandro v. Geraldez 20 cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its challenged
judgment IS NOT QUITE RELEVANT. For in the deed of donation there in issue, there was a partial
relinquishment of the right to dispose of the property, in the event only that this became necessary "to
defray the expenses and support of the donors." That limited right to dispose of the donated lots, said
this Court, "implies that ownership had passed to ** (the donees) BY MEANS OF THE DONATION
and **, therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic
of a donation inter vivos."

On the other hand, in the case at bar, the donees WERE EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED TO MAKE ANY
DISPOSITION OF ANY NATURE or for any purpose whatever during the donor's lifetime, and until
ten (10) years after her death — a prohibition which, it may be added, makes inapplicable the ruling
in Castro v. Court of Appeals, 21 where no such prohibition was imposed, and the donor retained only
the usufruct over the property.

The prohibition of disposition in Montinola’s Deed of Donation is NOT just a condition

The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition against
their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for
its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the
property, which they do not.

The argument also makes no sense since such a revocation (upon respondents’ violation of the
prohibition) would NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN THE RESTORATION of the donor's
ownership and enjoyment of the property (siyempre, rights of the innocent third party shall not be
impaired ^_^).

Transfers founded on considerations of love and affection are NOT necessarily donations inter vivos

It is also ERROR TO SUPPOSE that the donation under review should be deemed one inter
vivos simply because FOUNDED ON CONSIDERATIONS OF LOVE AND AFFECTION.
In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra, 22 this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in
consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos(solely) because
transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason."

In case of doubt, resolve in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests

Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that
in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least
transmission of rights and interests

DIGEST 2 SPS SICADvs CA

294 SCRA 183 – Succession – Donation Mortis Causa vs Donation Inter Vivos
In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed entitled “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in favor of her
three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The deed however
provided that that the donation shall be effective only 10 years after Montinola’s death. In 1980, the
original title of the parcel of land subject of the donation was cancelled and a new title was given to the
Valderramas. Montinola however retained the original title and she continued to perform acts of
ownership over the parcel of land.

In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude committed against her by the
Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she overheard the Valderramas plotting against
her life. In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her grandchildren’s title be cancelled.
She said that the donation is actually a donation mortis causa and that the same is void because the
formalities of a will were not complied with. In the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto
and Evelyn Sicad.

The Valderramas opposed the petition. In 1993, while the case was still pending, Montinola died. The
petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” is actually a donation mortis causa.

HELD: Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa. Montinola not only reserved for herself all the fruits
of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that without
the knowledge and consent of the Montinola, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose
of the properties. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the done (in this
case the Valderramas) the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth
one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa “the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee
while the donor is still alive. The donation is therefore void because the formalities of a will, which is
essentially a donation mortis causa, were not complied with.

The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada

H. R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997

I.

Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry
and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC
RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes
and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the spouses
Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff
Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of
kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account
of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching
themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not
paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's;
that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family,
and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".

Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza but it was reversed on appeal by the
Quezon City RTC.

Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that attempt.

It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as
mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen
Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said
will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants'
claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that
defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that
Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority
to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's
legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Cañiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.

Issue:

1.Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and

2.Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

Ruling:

1.The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that
they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).

An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and
the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to
take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be
situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical
and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate
carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

2.As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas
thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the
guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they
were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted
for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. The heirs of the

deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000] JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS AND MARIA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

“That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall
set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla”

a)….It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G.
Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year
to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
TwentyFive (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza on the month of December of each year.

If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer, lessee or transferee shall also
have the same obligation to the testator’s sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to the sister
and nearest relatives.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner),
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

Coscolluella filed a case against the transferee bank and the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. They were declared
in default except Johnny Rabadilla whose default order was lifted upon filing of an answer. He also
entered into a compromise agreement which he failed to fulfill.

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted
heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as “near descendants” without a
definite identity or reference as to who are the “near descendants” and therefore, under Articles 843
and 845 as not written.

RULING: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the
heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendantswould substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

No fideicommissary substitution either. Dr. Rabadilla and his heirs are allowed to alienate the property.
In fideicommissary substitution, the heir is not allowed to alienate it because his duty is to preserve and
transmit it to the second heir. Also, if Dr. Rabadilla is the fiduciary and the near descendants of the
testator are the second heirs, it violates the requirement of law that the fiduciary and the
fideicommissary must be within the one degree relationship. In fact, the near descendants are not in
anyway related to Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs.
G.R. No. 112443.January 25, 2002] TERESITA P. BORDALBA,petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL
JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF
ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN
JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY,respondents.

FACTS: a land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and
located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot is part of a parcel of
land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by
the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.In 1947, an extra-judicial partition:

1)1/3 in favor of -(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent
Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed
Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo
Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and

3)1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his family
occupied since 1945.

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land
owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of
said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition.She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.

Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land adjudicated to him by
way of extra judicial partition.

petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of Title No.
0-571 (FP) over said lot.

private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant
complaintagainst petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural
Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through purchase
from her mother who was in possession since 1947.
the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421
and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it
declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are
purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale.

Appealed to CA. affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.It ruled that since private
respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to
reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents.

RULING: Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other than their bare allegations todispute their heirship,
no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations.Besides, in order that an heir
may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is
necessary.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents’
predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when
she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in
upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of
the lot in question to them.

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998 HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO
CUARIO,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of
JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A.
SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO CARLOS A. SAMPAYO,
GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C.
SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and
LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A.
SAMPAYO,respondents

FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado, were the co-owners of the
property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa
Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with a house erected thereon. Lourdes died
intestate and without issue. The private respondents are all claiming to be collateral relatives of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City.

The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to produce that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. Ignacio died and he was substituted by his children.

At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that
they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as
co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her certificate of live birth showing
that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo Reyes
testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo,
the only living sibling of Lourdes. They also presnted the baptismal certificates of Lourdes’ deceased
siblings in order to prove their relations and that only Josefina is alive.

Rosario testified that the subject property was coowned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti
and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since
1937. She also said that it was Ignacio who pays the real estate tax and the expenses. Liurdes also left
her share to the spouses. no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim.

On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respodents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It
further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential
house and lot for confirmation by the court. Appealed to CA, which in turn affirmed the decision.

RULING: a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private
respondents became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of
Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and
all other incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law, including the right to demand partition
under Art. 777 of the Civil Code. the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the
decedent, as completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death.

If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spuoses, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. It was established during the trial that
Lourdes died intestate and without issues. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim
to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.