Roxas vs De Jesus

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding
Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No.
81503 case was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus.

On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. He then delivered to
the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus. Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a
letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the
deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which
I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer.

testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and
Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will
of their deceased mother

They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the
holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by
their mother

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because (a) it was not executed in accordance with
law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and
improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could
have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.

August 24, 1973 - Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic w/c
he found to have been duly executed in accordance with law
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a MR stating that the will was not dated as required by Article
810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month
and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.

December 10, 1973 – Judge disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the
word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year

ISSUE: WON the date "FEB./61” on the will is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code

HELD: We agree with the petitioner.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil
Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution,"
the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will
should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should
prevail.

Respondent Luz Henson says the will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code
in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent further
contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because
statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are strictly
construed.

RULING OF SC:

the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege

If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the
possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to
probate

Court found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wills
and Testaments

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established the Will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial compliance
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is
reinstated

Nazareno v. CA

GR No. 138842, 18 Oct 2000

Facts:

-Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970,
while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980.

-They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. are petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza
Nazareno are the respondents.

-After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case and was appointed administrator of
his father's estate.

-In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several
deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad.

-One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with
the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these deeds, TCTs were issued
to Natividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10, 11, 13 & 14

-Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, w/c had been occupied by Romeo, his wife, & Maximino,
Jr., to Maximino, Jr.

-Romeo filed the present case for annulment of sale w/ damages against Natividad & Maximino Jr. on
the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration

-Romeo presented the Deed of Partition & Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. & Aurea in 1962 &
duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad. However, this deed was not
carried out. In 1969, their parents instead offered to sell to them the lots

-He testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the
sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer
was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.

-Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought the lots in question because she was the only one
financially able to do so

-The trial court rendered a decision declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970,
except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons.

-On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles
to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as
well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
1)Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question to the estate of Maximino Sr. was
proper

2)Whether it was the intention of Maximino, Sr. to give the subject lots to Natividad

Held:

1)Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Facts & circumstances indicate badges of a simulated
sale w/c make the Jan 29, 1970 sale void & of no effect. Natividad never acquired ownership over
the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being w/o consideration.

2)Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad.
As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter
was the only "female and the only unmarried member of the family." She was thus entrusted with
the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10
and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust
constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:

There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the
legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or
only a part thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with
Art. 1061 which states:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. will have to be
upheld for it is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. (calo)

JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA,
respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 75005-06: February 15, 1990 CRUZ, J.:]

Topic: Probate of a Holographic will

Doctrine: A mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did
not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.

Nature: subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.

Facts:

1.A prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died.
2.Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate.

a.Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was
the son of the decedent.

3.Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.

4.Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate
of the holographic wills.

5.The petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of
Venancio's intestate estate.

a..Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed special administrator.

6.After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but
of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital.

7.The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was
not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate.

8.In support of Jose’s claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show
that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this
purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal certificate
where the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who
testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together
several times.

a.As Venancio's legitimate wife — if indeed she was — she should have objected when her husband
abandoned her and founded another family by another woman, and in the same town at that.

b.Maria Vital did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria
Jocson, the alleged partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.

9.Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are one and the same person, arguing that it is not
uncommon for a person to be called by different names. The Court is not convinced.

10.There is no evidence that Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio.

11.What is more likely is that two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the same
name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.

12.What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son
of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive.

a.By his own account, Jose supported himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a
gasoline attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town —
and obviously prospering — and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with
another woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without protest,
taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status

b.If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did
not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble worker while his other children
by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand,
especially if it is considered — assuming the claims to be true — that Jose was the oldest and, by his
own account, the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
Issue:

Does Jose Rivera have a personality to contest the wills?

Held:

The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED

1.The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring
the three witnesses.

a.We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the
Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital,
Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation
whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and
prominent.

2.Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them
to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code.

a.It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811
because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

3.The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera.

4.In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No.
1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate.

5.In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and
claimed that they were spurious.

6.Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil
Code, providing as follows:

i.In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

7.The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been
written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL
LABRADOR,petitioners-appellants,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.

CASE NUMBER

G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990

LAWYERS
Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.

Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PONENTE

PARAS, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE

The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the
Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs,
namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.

On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and
Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is,
before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and
Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T.
No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five
Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)

ISSUE

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is
dated, as provided for in Article 8102 of the New Civil Code.

HELD

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic
will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to
the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with
Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the
will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the
will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he
was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the
nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption
price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the
property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property
belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void.
Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession
of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be
reimbursed the P5,000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby
REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private
respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole
and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he
had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed
alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an
admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation,
hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid
except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

20 JUL[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An
opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of
his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES

[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by
an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s
heirs.

RULING

[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided
for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.”

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil
Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI.

JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO

G.R. No. L-2538

September 21, 1951

FACTS:

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal,
without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however,
by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the
oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children
of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator.

The testator executed 2 wills, one in 1918 and another in 1939. The latter will contained a revocation
clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found.
The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but
subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified
the 1918 will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the 1939 will
which was disallowed for probate.

HELD:

Yes. The court rules that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect
of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the
will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for
the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed
from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the
will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this
principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his
universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS,
CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA MEJIA GANDIONGCO

FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with neither
descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City
and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she executed a last will and testament 3
wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her
properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter’s death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve
without bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo
Miro.

On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for the probate of
Remedios’ last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the original Branch VIII thereof which was
then presided over by Judge Antonio D. Cinco. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically
well and, therefore, will not be assuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of
Jesus Fran on the third page of the said petition. The probate court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on 18 September 1972. Meanwhile, on 31 July 1972, the court appointed
petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.

On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed a manifestation 5
alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs who are entitled to receive
their respective shares have been intentionally omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample
time to file their opposition, after which the hearing be reset to another date.

Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September 1972 a
“Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will” wherein they expressly
manifested, with their “full knowledge and consent that . . . they have no objection of (sic) the
allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo,” and that they have “no
objection to the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran.” 6

No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.

During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish the
jurisdictional facts.
Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the uncontested petition for
probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an order directing counsel for petitioner to present
evidence proving the authenticity and due execution of the will before the Clerk of Court who was,
accordingly, so authorized to receive the same.

The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petitioner Fran’s first witness
was Atty. Nazario R. Pacquiao, one at the subscribing witnesses to the will. The original of the will,
marked as Exhibit “F”, and its English translation, marked as Exhibit “F-Translation”, were submitted
to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petitioner Fran was the second and also the last witness. He enumerated the
names of the surviving heirs of the deceased.

On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the
testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as executor.

On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; 9 copies thereof were furnished
each of the private respondents.

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the
devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion
M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court’s approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees
submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with
the notice of hearing, and state that they had no objection to its approval. 11

After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September 1973 13
approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios
Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares
and decreeing the proceedings closed.

On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of partition of 10
September 1973, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit
their opposition to the allowance of the will, 14 which they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege that:
(a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified
of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time within which to file their opposition,
or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the petitioner, or of the order
closing the proceedings; (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per the ruling in
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were
not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as administrator and not as
executor, thereby proving that the decedent died intestate; (g) the petitioner did not submit any
accounting as required by law; and (h) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and
legatees. Granted. MR by Fran, denied.
RULING: After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been
no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of
Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which
private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probate
court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of
the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless
constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have
been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition,
which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the
proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have
desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment
of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that
they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the
Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must
fail because private respondents were present when the court dictated the said order.