EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-
283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386,
396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-
707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or
at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise,
we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule
to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so
to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden
a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5 (Under the generic denomination of laws, the regulations, Royal Decrees,
Instructions, Circulars and Royal ordinances dictated in accordance with them by the Government in use of its power are also
understood.)

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The
law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which
had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to
wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566.
It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed
to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained
since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these
unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some
other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

FERNAN, J., concurring:

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS
MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical
statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if
the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matter
of public concern.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule,
it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect."

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically,
they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette.

In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2
of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution
and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of
a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in
full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court.

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to
the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject
of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not
to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even,
say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies
to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
One reserved his vote and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should
be made. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter
and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As
far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the
law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable,
to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of
the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and
to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and
U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one
day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that
said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and
that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930
both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations
and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws,
resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no
force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence
of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute
in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is
true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof),
namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as
made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of
the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
 El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el
sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta,
advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

(The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 1 of the Civil Code in the Judgment of June 22, 1910, in the sense that under the
generic denomination of laws, the Regulations, Royal Decrees, Instructions, Circulars and Royal orders are also understood.
in accordance with the same by the Government in use of its power. The executive branch has also understood this, as
evidenced by the fact that many of its provisions contain the warning that they begin to govern the same day of its publication
in the Gazette, a warning that would be perfectly useless if it were not applicable to the case the article 1 of the Civil Code)

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official
Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding
at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first
time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law
or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings.
(Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a
matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law
there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed
any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos,
presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is
only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir
that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article
854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it
were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to
the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da
a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el
nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

(The rights attributed to the nasciturus are not mere expectations, not even in the technical sense that modern doctrine
gives to this legal figure, but constitute a case of the so-called 'rights in a state of pendency'; the birth of the subject in the
conditions provided by art. 30, does not determine the birth of those rights (which already existed in advance), but it is a
fact that has declarative effects.)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in
error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her
abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva,
against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the
trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot.
In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy
from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with
the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she
again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida,
she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant
and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board;
he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application
of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of
the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article,
in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona
natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado",
Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is
easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In
the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for the
death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242;
and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art.
2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because
the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to
have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had
filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife,
would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to
warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.