[G.R. No. 89139. August 2, 1990.]
— Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rudy G. Agravante for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; SEC. 5,
RULE 113 THEREOF. — From the foregoing provision of law it
is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; NOT INCIDENTAL
TO A LAWFUL ARREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The
Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search and
seizure of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argued
that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he
was actually committing or had just committed the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence
of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure
of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. We disagree. At the time the peace
officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED
WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN ARREST; CASE AT
BAR. — However, there are many instances where a warrant
and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been
upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa. As between a
warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is
no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It
is too much indeed to require the police officers to search
the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose.
Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.
[G.R. No. 100910. July 25, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LORETO SALANGGA and LAURETO LOPEZ, accused.
LORETO SALANGGA, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; WHEN
ALLOWED.
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when (a) in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof, the person
to be arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST OF ACCUSED IN CASE
AT BAR, ILLEGAL. — From these provisions, it is not hard to
conclude that appellant was arrested in violation of his
fundamental right against unjustified warrantless arrest.
On the night that he was arrested, he was in his house
peacefully attending to some domestic chores therein. It
cannot be suggested that he was in any way committing a
crime or attempting to commit one. Also, the soldiers had no
personal knowledge of the crime he was being charged with,
nor was he a fugitive from the law. The right of the accused to
be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure
of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the
cases specifically provided by law.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EVIDENCE
SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST,
INADMISSIBLE; CASE AT BAR. — In any event, the
underwear allegedly taken from the accused is inadmissible in
evidence, being a so-called "fruit of a poisonous tree."
Likewise, there is definitely an improbability in the claim of
Talaboc that he was able to recognize the underwear of his
daughter. It is an atypical and abnormal situation under Filipino
customs for a father to be familiar with the underwear of his
daughter. This is highly improbable, and it is plain common
sense that improbabilities must be carefully scrutinized and not
readily accepted.
4. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY
LONG DELAY IN DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE VITAL TO
THE PROSECUTION. — During the initial investigation of
Barangay Captain Laput on July 23, 1987 before Sgt. Gataber,
nothing was ever mentioned regarding the supposed scratches
and bite marks allegedly found on the chest of the appellant.
The truth is that these matters were mentioned in the trial court
only after about two and a half years from the arrest of
appellant. It is indeed strange that such vital evidence
conspicuously found on the body of appellant, if true could be
omitted in the sworn statement of Laput which was taken four
days after the alleged discovery. He and the investigator could
not have been unaware that the supposed scratches and bite
marks were obviously relevant in this kind of crime, more
particularly to prove the reported struggle of the victim a
against her unknown killer. The testimony of Laput thus
suffers from serious flaws attendant to its taking which
accordingly taint its credibility. The long delay in his disclosure
bolsters the suspicion that such testimony is biased, if not
fabricated.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES. — Sworn statements executed before
police officers are usually incomplete and contain data which
are inconsistent with the facts narrated by the witnesses to
said officers. For this reason, courts have generally brushed
aside, as inconsequential, contradictions in the sworn
statement of a witness and his testimony as long as these
dwell only on minor and reconcilable matters.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND IRRECONCILABLE DISCREPANCIES.
—However, the aforesaid allegations on the supposed
scratches and bite marks on the body of appellant can by no
means be considered as minor or trivial matters. The
prosecution, in fact, relies heavily thereon to support its theory
of the case. Since every circumstance must be taken into
consideration in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it becomes crucial for his eventual acquittal when
such discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable
facts, as when the omission in the sworn statement concerns
an important detail which the affiant would not have failed to
mention, and which omission could accordingly affect his
credibility.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
MERE FAILURE TO OBJECT THERETO DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE WAIVER. — We are not persuaded by the
theory that the accused waived their right against the said
unreasonable search and seizure, simply because they did not
object thereto. To constitute waiver, it must appear, firstly, that
the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Courts understandably indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
safeguards and do not deduce acquiescence in the loss of
elementary rights.
8. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; INCRIMINATORY
STATEMENT MADE BY THE ACCUSED DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE. — Since appellant was not
assisted by any counsel during his custodial investigation, his
supposed incriminatory statement is inadmissible and cannot
be considered in the adjudication of this case. Oddly enough,
even Sgt. Gataber was skeptical as to the validity of the
statement he took from appellant. The rule, of course, is that
no in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person in his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR WAIVER. — While
the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be
effected voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Further, waiver
must be with the assistance of counsel. The absence of
counsel at that stage makes the statement, in contemplation of
law, involuntary, even if it was otherwise voluntary in a non-
technical sense.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE RULE. — With
the court now unanimously upholding the exclusionary rule in
toto the constitutional mandate in given full force and effect.
The constitutional edict has been proved by historical
experience to be the practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby
removing the incentive part of the military and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. This is of special public importance
and serves as a shield in the remote provinces and rural areas
to the people who have no access to courts for prompt and
immediate relief from violations of their rights.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
WHEN SUFFICIENT. — Section 5 of Rule 133 provides that
when no direct evidence is available, circumstantial evidence
will suffice when the following requirements are present: (a)
there are more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, before conviction can
be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.
12. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — A meticulous and closer
inquiry into the records reveals that there is really but one sole
circumstance upon which the court relied in its decision, that is,
that Imelda was seen trailing behind appellant by a few meters
on the path towards her house. The prosecution presented two
witnesses on this very same fact but the testimony thereon of
two witnesses cannot convert one circumstance into two. All
other "circumstance" under the prosecution's theory, such as
the underwear allegedly found in appellant's pocket, the
supposed scratches and bite marks on his body, and his
dubious confession to Sgt. Gataber are all products of an
illegal process, aside from their questionable veracity. In our
criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This
determinant, with the constitutional presumption of innocence
which can be overthrown only by the strength of the
prosecution's own evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, irresistibly dictate an exoneration in this case.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; INFERENCE CREATED FOR
FAILURE OF PARTY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE
FAVORABLE TO HIS CAUSE; CASE AT BAR. —We reject the
People's hypothesis on the alleged "confession" of appellant to
a certain Pastor Juan Tapic. The records reveal that there was
a statement of appellant merely saying that he and Lopez were
suspects in the rape and death of Imelda but never did he say
that they were the ones responsible for such crime. Also, if the
prosecution really believed that the appellant truly admitted to
Pastor Tapic his participation in the crime, it is puzzling that
said pastor was not called by the prosecution to take the
witness stand. A party's failure would naturally have been
produced, is open to the inference that the facts were
unfavorable to his case. Verily, that failure to present Pastor
Tapic can only mean that the prosecution itself doubted what
appellant precisely meant when he said that there are two of
them, that is, himself and Lopez.
14. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
WITHOUT TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN,
INADMISSIBLE ON GROUND OF HEARSAY. —We also note
that while the prosecution presented a medical certificate to
prove the alleged rape, it failed to present the physician to
affirm it. In the absence of the doctor's testimony, the contents
thereof are hearsay. At any rate, even if the physician had
been presented there was in fact no need for him to make that
affirmation since the conviction of appellant is based merely on
his supposed inculpatory statement which has no probative
value for having been taken in violation of explicit constitutional
mandates and proscriptions.
15. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF
THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL;
EXCEPTIONS. — Well-entrenched is that rule that the finding
of facts of trial courts carry great weight for these courts enjoy
the advantage of having observed the demeanor of the
witnesses on the witness stand and, therefore, can discern if
these witnesses are telling the truth or not. However, Likewise
well-settled are the exceptions thereto, which are when (1) the
conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculations, (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken absurd or impossible,
(3) there is a grave abuse of discretion, and (4) the finding is
based on a misapprehension of the facts. The evidentiary
bases for the conclusions of the lower court having been
demonstrated to be either incompetent in law or incredible in
fact, the exceptive circumstances have to be given full sway.
16. ID.; ID.; IF INCULPATORY FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF ONE OR MORE
EXPLANATIONS, ONE CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED AND THE OTHER CONSISTENT WITH HIS
GUILT, THEN EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT. — The prosecution's evidence regrettably leaves
much to be desired, unfortunately as a consequence of faulty
investigative work in the first place. This court must, however,
be guided by a rule of long standing and consistency that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
[G.R. No. L-68955. September 4, 1986.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; RATIONALE. — Article IV,
Section 3 of the Constitution is a safeguard against wanton
and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a
citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court
explained in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this
right is so important: "It is deference to one's personality that
lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as
a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry
to his residence. In what haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the
state, however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California,
384 US 757 [1966], Brenna, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116
US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme court
[1966]), could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than
to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards.'"
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL;
ARRESTING OFFICER MUST HAVE PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT. — Under Section 6(a) of rule
113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859). There is no such personal knowledge
in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the
information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of
the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. At the time of the
appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing
any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST ANY
UNREASONABLE SEIZURE; EXCEPTIONS; SHOULD BE
STRICTLY CONSTRUED; REASON. — The right of a person
to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing
a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as
provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrest without warrant or extend its application beyond the
cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; ACTUAL COMMISSION OF
CRIME; ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION. — In arrests without a
warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER; REQUISITES. — It cannot be
presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given
by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to
object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house
does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice
Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
". . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen
in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180,
1181)."
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
OF PERSONS TO BE SECURE AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; WAIVER THEREOF NOT
PRESUMED. — We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTS OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION THEREOF, INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. —
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged
subversive documents were obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
8. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION;
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF
INADMISSIBLE; ADMISSIONS MADE BY ARRESTING
OFFICERS CANNOT BE USED AGAINST ACCUSED. — In
proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two
arresting officers who testified that the accused readily
admitted ownership of the gun after his wife pointed to the
place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the
alleged subversive documents were hidden. Assuming this to
be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never
informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So
that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun
and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after
questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of
Art. IV of the Bill of Rights which provides: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. . . ." The Constitution itself mandates that any
evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting
officers as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be
used against him.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RULE THAT
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TRIAL COURT GENERALLY
GIVEN GREAT RESPECT; NOT ABSOLUTE; REASON. —
We are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial
court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v.
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): ". . . Time and again we have stated
that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the
trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the
obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor,
actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But
we have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise
there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We
must reject the findings of the trial court where the record
discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were
not properly appreciated by the trial court."
[G.R. No. L-27511. November 29, 1968.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, SIMON LUNA, petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. LORENZO M. PLAZA, as Judge of the Municipal Court
of Tandag, Surigao del Sur; HON. SANTOS B. BEBERINO, as
Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Sur; and THE PROVINCIAL
WARDEN of Surigao del Sur, respondents-appellees.
Sisenando Villaluz and Juan T . David for petitioner-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor
Augusto M . Amores for other respondents-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THEREON
NOT INTERFERED WITH BY APPELLATE COURTS. — As a
rule where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial unless there is a showing that it has overlooked certain
facts of substance and value, that if considered, might affect
the result of the case (People v. Sinaon, L-15631, May 27,
1966).
2. ID.; APPEALS; EFFECT OF APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT ON ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW —
Where petitioner or appellant appealed directly to the Supreme
Court and raised therein only questions of law, the effect is
that: he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of
fact (Millar v. Nadres, 74 Phil. 307; Portea v. Pabellon, 47 O.G.
655; Flores v. Plasina, 50 O.G. 1073) and, consequently, the
findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and
precedents, must be deemed final and binding upon the
appellate court (Abijuela, et al . v. Dolosa, et al. L-14245, Dec.
29, 1960).
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANT OF
ARREST; CONDITIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE THEREOF. —
The Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination of witnesses under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Conformably to said provision, Republic Act No.
3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in Section 87 (c) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 this paragraph: "No warrant of arrest
shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case
filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses
personally, and the examination shall be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING OF TERM "SEARCHING
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS." — The term "searching
questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration
the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to
determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be
issued and the accused held for trial" (Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules
of Court), such questions as have tendency to show the
commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would
be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be
inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time,
and place of its commission, the possible motives for its
commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial
and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation,
social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim,
his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social
circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the
subject of inquiry may differ from case to case.
5. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION; NOT A
PART OF DUE PROCESS; ACTS OF PETITIONER
CONSTITUTING IMPLIED ADMISSION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AND WAIVER OF IRREGULARITY ATTENDING THE
ARREST. — This Court has held that preliminary examination
is not an essential part of due process of law (People v.
Olandag, 92 Phil. 286). Preliminary examination may be
conducted by the Municipal Judge, prior to the issuance of the
warrant, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the
accused. In the case at bar the petitioner (accused) waived the
preliminary investigation before respondent Municipal Judge,
and he filed a petition for bail. The petition for bail was at first
granted by respondent Judge, but later the order granting bail
was revoked. These acts of the petitioner subsequent to his
arrest constitute an implied admission on his part that there
was a probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
and a waiver of whatever irregularity, if any there was, that
attended his arrest (Doce v. Branch II of the CFI of Quezon, L-
26437, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1031).
6. ID.; ID.; STRICT COMPLIANCE OF THE PROVISION
OF SEC. 87 (C) OF THE JUDICIARY ACT, AS AMENDED,
EMPHASIZED. — We wish to stress, however, that what has
been stated in this opinion is certainly not intended to sanction
the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply
relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to
accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in
determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought
to be avoided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic
Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a
municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first
satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the
witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under
oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment
is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a
person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made,
and swore to, their statements before a person or persons
other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is
filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or
city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended by Rep. Act 3828, in order to avoid
malicious and/or unfounded criminal prosecution of persons.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
TO LIBERTY; WHEN WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT
ALLOWED. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed (Cf. Sec. 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court).
[G.R. No. 113630. May 5, 1994.]
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA,
petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge,
Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; WARRANT OF
ARREST; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE. — Section 2, Art. III
of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall
issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE DEFINED. — As
early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, (32 Phil. 363
[1915]) this Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman
Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted." Probable cause for an arrest or
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. And as a
protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify
a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for
arresting the accused.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STANDARD FOR DETERMINATION
OF ITS EXISTENCE. — Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan (221 SCRA
349 [1993]) sets a standard for determining the existence of
probable cause. While it appears in that case that we have
granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited
latitude in determining the existence or absence of probable
cause by affirming the long-standing procedure that they can
base their findings merely on their personal opinion and
reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be
interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them
loose in the determination of the existence of probable cause,
a delicate legal question which can result in the harassment
and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be charged or
arrested. . . . Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith
alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be
demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the
judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective
one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and
circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a
reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty
of the crime which has just been committed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTIES OF A TRIAL JUDGE
BEFORE ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST; NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — Before issuing a
warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated
11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that probable cause
exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued."
However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived
at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records
and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the
contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the
evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable
cause against petitioners. . . . Verily, respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for
the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally
examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and
his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that
probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found
out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient
to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate
the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already
decided, in Soliven v. Makasiar, (G.R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393); in People v.
Inting, (G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 87 SCRA 788); and in
Lim v. Felix (G.R. Nos. 92466-69, 19 February 1991, 187
SCRA 292). . . . Hence, if upon the filing of the information in
court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the
documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause
exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses
themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open
and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause
exists.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND
SUFFICIENCY; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION,
UNCORROBORATED BY CORPUS DELICTI; CASE AT BAR.
— The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on
the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly
confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and
murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van
Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains recovered. . . . In this regard,
we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin (1 Phil.
239 [1902]) decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his
body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to
the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DESTRUCTION OF HUMAN BODY
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Umbal's claim
that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use
of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the
evening to six o'clock the next morning is highly improbable, if
not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes
by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in
an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators
where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter, the
remains undergo a process where the bones are completely
ground to dust. In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any
insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces
of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. Could
it be that the government investigators did go to the place of
cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they did
not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as
no burning ever took place? To allege then that the body of
Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field
with the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to
gulp.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EVEN LAWYER DOUBTED
CLIENT'S DEATH IN CASE AT BAR. — Strangely, if not
awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June
1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his
counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in
his behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 106253, and on 18 March 1993, a memorandum
before the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case
No. 3896. On 26 November 1993, during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel
again manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I
stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to
be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to
pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van
Twest." Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes
that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's death.
Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in
fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his client would
have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform the court
promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence
of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative," which he did not.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THEORY BEHIND
SUPPOSED DEATH CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. — Under
the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that
the supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an
international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by
petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop
the international manhunt for his arrest.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFERS FROM MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES. — The extrajudicial statement of Umbal
suffers from material inconsistencies where in his sworn
statement, he said that he together with his cohorts were met
by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to
abduct Van Twest. However, during the preliminary
investigation, he stated that he was not part of the actual
meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his
companions who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis
Hotel. Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and
conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter
signed various documents upon being compelled to do so.
During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed
his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe
house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did
not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why
Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house," no explanation
was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC
was not able to comply with the order of the prosecutors to
produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then,
what happened to the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by
petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest? These
and more remain unanswered.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT AS BASIS OF
FILING CHARGES, HARDLY OF ANY PROBATIVE VALUE;
CASE AT BAR. — The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato,
which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing the
charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its
probative value has tremendously waned. The records show
that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating,
was filed after the panel had considered the case submitted for
resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-
affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that
it was extracted through duress and intimidation.
11. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; BILL OF
RIGHTS; SEARCH WARRANT; ISSUED UNDER DUBIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES IN CASE AT BAR. — Most perplexing
however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly
triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the
application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be
served in the two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and
granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September
1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In
support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that
Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993.
Significantly, although he was said to be already under their
custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16
September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle
Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. . . . More
importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to
search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners.
In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago,
and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; WARRANT OF ARREST; LACK OF
PROBABLE CAUSE NOT JUSTIFIED BY RIGHT OF STATE
TO PROSECUTE; CASE AT BAR. — The sovereign power
has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from
vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of
justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and
punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self-
preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer a
license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the
State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government
agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a
price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. . . . While
there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-accused,
i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago,
these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the
crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there
is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to
incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived
in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law
appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their
arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves
to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact
happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met. State's
inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending
the petitioners to jail.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
UNDUE HASTE IN FILING THE INFORMATION, A
VIOLATION OF; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bench, the
undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate
interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the
gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary
investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly
eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the
accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's
sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without
giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The
PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a
hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary
inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears
the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for
approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then
petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the
resolution and the information against them.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCHECKED GOVERNMENTAL
POWER BECOMES TYRANNICAL; CASE AT BAR. — The
facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the
seeming immensity of government power which when
unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits
beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on occasion,
for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter.
In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The
case before us, if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal
trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government
agents is not reflective of responsible government. Judges and
law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and prestigious
office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately
inflicting unnecessary injury.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; PREVAILS
OVER THE RIGHT OF STATE TO PROSECUTE. — The
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against
arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle
of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights
which include personal liberty and security against invasion by
the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities.
Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes
precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when
weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards
the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported
enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for
an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner,
and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW ENFORCERS
CAUTIONED TO ACT WITH CIRCUMSPECTION. — Let this
then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other
government agents tasked with the enforcement of the law that
in the performance of their duties they must act with
circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods and
practices cause a disservice to their office and maim their
countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus
caution government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to
be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be
oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law.
While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed
society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness violate
constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a
civilized community.
PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS
LORENZO, SR., LUIS LORENZO, JR., AMAURY R.
GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN
B. PALANNUAYAN, and WONG FONG FUI, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO
ASUNCION, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON.
APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON,
and HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, in their capacities as
Members of the Department of Justice "349" Committee, and
the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
ROBERTO DELGADO, petitioner-intervenor.
Poblador Bautista & Reyes for petitioner Paul G. Roberts, Jr.
De Jesus & Associates for other petitioners.
Laqui Palma Tiuseco Contreras Law Office, Gregorio Fabros,
and Jose A. Espina for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Chavez Laureta & Associates for Intervenor.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; RULING IN CRESPO VS.
MOGUL MERELY ADVISED THE DOJ TO, "AS FAR AS
PRACTICABLE, REFRAIN FROM ENTERTAINING A
PETITION FOR REVIEW OR APPEAL FROM THE ACTION
OF THE FISCAL, WHEN THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION HAS ALREADY BEEN FILED IN COURT." —
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from
taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review,
by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of
the investigation prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as
far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court." More specifically,
it stated: In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST;
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS; WHO MAY ISSUE; PROCEDURE.
— Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Under existing laws, warrants
of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTCs) except those in the National Capital Region,
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), in cases falling within their
exclusive original jurisdiction; in cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when
required; and in cases filed with them which are cognizable by
the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); and (2) by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts in the National Capital Region (MeTCs-NCR) and
the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary
investigations conducted by officers authorized to do so other
than judges of MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs. As to the first, a
warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and
the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. As to the second, this Court
held in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but
[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy
supports this procedure, "otherwise judges would be unduly
laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts." It must be
emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or
resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate
the report and the supporting documents.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN
CASE AT BAR. — Unfortunately, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
43198, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on
12 April 1993 with the trial court. As found by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 1 July 1993, a copy of the Joint
Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court
only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of
Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings
during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of
Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 as of 19 May 1993. Clearly,
when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of
17 May 1993 directing, among others things, the issuance of
warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not
have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's
finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest "after June 21, 1993." It may,
however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of
probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional
requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left
to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
4. ID.; ID.; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW; AN ACT OF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION; CASE AT BAR. — The Department of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when it executed
on 23 July 1993 a unilateral volte-face, which was even
unprovoked by a formal pleading to accomplish the same end,
by dismissing the petition for review. It dismissed the petition
simply because it thought that a review of the Joint Resolution
would be an exercise in futility in that any further action on the
part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion
of the trial court, and that the latter's denial of the motion to
defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly
an exercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the
Department that the determination of the case is within the
court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This infirmity
becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced by
the respondent judge for his denial of the motions to suspend
proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment finds, as yet, no support in
Crespo.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DID NOT RENDER MOOT AND
ACADEMIC THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE
WAS AN IMPROPER ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANTS OF
ARREST. — If the only issue before the Court of Appeals were
the denial of the petitioners' Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and
the public prosecutor's Motion to Defer Arraignment, which
were both based on the pendency before the DOJ of the
petition for the review of the Joint Resolution, the dismissal of
CA-G.R. SP NO. 31226 on the basis of the dismissal by the
DOJ of the petition for review might have been correct.
However, the petition likewise involved the issue of whether
respondent Judge Asuncion gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest despite want of
basis. The DOJ's dismissal of the petition for review did not
render moot and academic the latter issue.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION TO
THE GENERAL RULE THAT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
MAY NOT BE RESTRAINED OR STAYED BY INJUNCTION.
— There can be no doubt that, in light of the several thousand
private complainants in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and
several thousands more in different parts of the country who
are similarly situated as the former for being holders of "349"
Pepsi crowns, any affirmative holding of probable cause in the
said case may be cause or provoke, as justly feared by the
petitioners, the filing of several thousand cases in various
courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the petitioners would
be exposed to the harassments of warrants of arrest issued by
such courts and to huge expenditures for premiums on
bailbonds and for travels from one court to another throughout
the length and breadth of the archipelago for their
arraignments and trials in such cases. Worse, the filing of
these staggering number of cases would necessarily affect the
trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of
their attention, time, and energy, which they could devote to
other equally, if not more, important cases. Such frightful
scenario would seriously affect the orderly administration of
justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions — a
situation already long conceded by this Court to be an
exception to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may
not be restrained or stayed by injunction.
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ "BOBONG" and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ateneo Legal Aid Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the morning of August 8, 1995, the PNP, Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio
Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon and SPO1 Pamplona to proceed
to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, after the latter
received an information from his informer that an alleged
marijuana pusher will be passing at that place anytime that
morning. At around 9:30, a "trisikad" carrying Nasario Molina
and Gregorio Mula passed by. SPO1 Paguidopon then pointed
at Nasario and Gregorio as the pushers. The team then
immediately boarded the vehicle, overtook the "trisikad" and
then requested it to stop. Mula then handed the black bag,
which he was holding to Molina. After introducing himself as
police officer, Pamplona requested Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona
however insisted on opening the bag, which revealed the
marijuana leaves inside.
For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana,
accused-Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula were found by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City guilty of violation of Section
8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced
them to death. The court a quo anchored its judgment of
conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the
peace officers, were valid because accused-appellants were
caught in flagrant delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.
Hence, this automatic review.
In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the
Supreme Court held that the accused-appellants manifested
no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a
bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said
to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a
crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused
appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to
effect an in flagrant delicto arrest. Moreover, it could not be
said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Thus, the Court
held that the arrest of accused-appellants did not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted
on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted
as evidence against accused-appellants. HEcIDa
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE:
EXCLUSIONARY RULE; RATIONALE FOR THE RULE. —
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and
seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by
virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon
the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of
the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary
rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which
bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures Thus: Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding Without this rule, the right to
privacy would be a form, of words, valueless and undeserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The constitutional
proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO
LAWFUL ARREST; A LAWFUL ARREST MUST PRECEDE
THE SEARCH; PERMISSIBLE WARRANTLESS ARREST. —
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the
search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of
Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT WHERE
IMPLIED ACQUIESCENCE TO THE SEARCH WAS GIVEN
UNDER COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. — Moreover, it could
not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALITY OF THE SEARCH
RENDERS ARTICLES SEIZED INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE. — Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed
by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice
but to find in favor of accused-appellant.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST; IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST. — In People v.
Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante
delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as
recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable
cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE. —
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in
People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO BE VALID. —
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
9. ID., ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a
bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said
to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a
crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that
accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal
statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it
not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in
the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the
arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject
of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. EICSDT
[G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL
AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE BASED ON AN
INFORMER'S TIP, AT A TIME WHEN ACCUSED WAS NOT
COMMITTING A CRIME, ILLEGAL; EVIDENCE OBTAINED,
INADMISSIBLE. — Where it is not disputed that the PC
officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized
the bag he was carrying, and that their only justification was
the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular
informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of
a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained was inadmissible.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO URGENCY COULD BE
INVOKED IN PRESENT CASE TO DISPENSE WITH
OBTENTION OF ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANT. — The
present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at
least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS
NOT COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED.
— In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It
was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification
by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the
officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
AQUINO, J., Dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
ARREST AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME IS LAWFUL;
SEARCH LIKEWISE LAWFUL.— I hold that the accused was
caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his
bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently
disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized
transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited
drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was
committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without
a warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search
of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a
search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of
Court).
[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN
MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sison Salomon Gonong Miranda & Associates for accused-
appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was apprehended by members of the Cavite PNP
transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag
and a carton box weighing 28 kilograms. The PNP officers
alleged that they acted on a tip-off by an informant that a drug
courier would be arriving from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana. TECIHD
Appellant during the trial disavowed ownership of the
prohibited drugs. He admitted coming all the way from Baguio
and proceeded to Dasmariñas, Cavite, but denied carrying any
luggage with him. The trial culminated in a verdict of guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in a decision of the trial court which
imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant.
All errors assigned by the appellant, i.e. insufficiency of
evidence, unlawful warrantless search and seizure, and failure
of prosecution to establish that the 28 marijuana bricks
confiscated from him were the same marijuana examined by
the forensic chemist and presented in court, did not impress
the Court.
The reversible error or the trial court lies in its imposition of the
penalty of death on appellant. As amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act
now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case
of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said
Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus,
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. aDcHIS
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of
the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by
the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum
penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory
law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be
gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, the rules wherein were observed
although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of
the of quantity provided in Section 20.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY;
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY
NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — In the present appellate
review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was
legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.
This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the
evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual
findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of
the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers
to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of
appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-
serving in nature.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHERE AN
OFFENSE MAY BE COMMITTED IN DIFFERENT MODES,
AN INDICTMENT WOULD SUFFICE IF THE OFFENSE IS
COMMITTED IN ANY MODES SPECIFIED THEREIN. — The
governing rule with respect to an offense which may be
committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that
an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have
been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein.
This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways
of committing the offense should be considered as a
description of only one offense and the information cannot be
dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. THEcAS
3. ID.; ID.; CORROBORATED EVIDENCE; COULD BE
DISPENSED WITH BY THE PROSECUTION. — For one, the
testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1
Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay
as both testified upon matters in which they had personally
taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be
dispensed with by the prosecution, more so where what he
would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on
whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal
presumption.
4. ID.; ID.; INFORMANTS ARE GENERALLY NOT
PRESENTED IN COURT. — Informants are generally not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identities
and preserve their invaluable services to the police.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES FOR THE
PEOPLE PREROGATIVE OF THE PROSECUTION. —
Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court
as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course.
6. ID.; ID.; APPELLANT CAN RESORT TO COERCIVE
PROCESS TO COMPEL EYEWITNESS TO APPEAR. —
Appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process
of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the
court below, but which remedy was not availed of by him.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
CONSTRUED. — Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays
down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT ALLOWED. — In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary
rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus,
(1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5)
searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk"
measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST, LEGAL; CASE AT BAR. — On the
defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on
appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the
search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of
the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, REQUIRED. —
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated,
necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. DTIaHE
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED.
— The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely
a relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having
reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude
as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
12. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENTIARY MEASURE FOR
PROPRIETY OF FILING CRIMINAL CHARGES AND FOR
EFFECTION OF A WARRANTLESS ARREST, LIBERALIZED.
— Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that
the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal
charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest,
has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory
rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which
was of a higher degree or quantum, and was even used with
dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the
American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its
concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts
warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent
state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to
believe that the accused person had committed the crime.
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were
clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under discussion,
by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides
in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology
used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the
investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial," or where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore,
be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest
should be considered as legally authorized.
13. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS
ARREST AND SEARCH VALID WHERE ACCUSED WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. — In the case at bar, as
soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the
informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was
at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin
recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was
likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which
appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized
that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a
seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced
themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and
show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant
voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1
Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without
bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and
his luggage to their headquarters for questioning. Here, there
were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that,
at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of
probable cause, and which by themselves could properly
create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the
law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause
and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a
crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his
belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
ScAIaT
14. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHEN AN
INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS TO A SEARCH, HE IS
PRECLUDED FROM LATER COMPLAINING THEREOF. —
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is
borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers
approached appellant and introduced themselves as
policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage,
and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the
officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily
acceded presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that
the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an
individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have
the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
MAY BE WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY. — After all,
the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
other rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly. Thus,
while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a
warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the
search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law, the case of herein appellant is evidently
different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts
of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed
as a clear waiver of his right.
16. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; NON-
OBSERVANCE WILL NOT STRIKE DOWN PROCEEDINGS
IN THE LOWER COURT WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT
CONFESS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND
WHERE HIS GUILT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY
OTHER EVIDENCE. — Appellant questions the interrogation
conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not
allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not
duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities
here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act
No. 7438 which defines certain rights of persons arrested,
detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties
of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and
providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the
proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck
down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything
during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory
evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession
or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise
have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more
importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by
other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered
and admitted in evidence in the court below. ECTIHa
17. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT, AS
AMENDED; UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION OF
MARIJUANA; PENALTY. — As amended by Republic Act No.
7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now
provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of
indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section
4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
reclusion perpetua and death. As found by the trial court, there
were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second
paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper
imposable penalty.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT OF PERSON
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO; NOT MET WHERE
PERSON ARRESTED WAS MERELY ALIGHTING FROM A
PASSENGER JEEP. — Justice Panganiban begs to disagree
with Justice Regalado's conclusion that the warrantless search
conducted upon the person of appellant was valid for being "a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court." Under the cited provision, an arrest
may be lawfully effected upon a person caught in flagrante
delicto, i.e. in the very act of committing a crime. He does not
see how Appellant Montilla who was apprehended while
merely alighting from a passenger jeepney carrying a travelling
bag and a carton could have been perceived by the police as
committing crime at the very moment of his arrest. DHIETc
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWFUL ARREST MUST PRECEDE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH. — In the very recent en banc case
of Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, the Court through Mr. Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., clearly and unanimously explained the
concept of search incidental to a lawful arrest, and he quote:
"In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
case, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime,
of the fruit or the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means
of escaping or committing violence."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE BY
ARRESTING OFFICER OF OFFENSE, REQUIRED; CASE AT
BAR. — Jurisprudence is settled that under in flagrante delicto
rule, "the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view." The
circumstances of the case at bar is patently wanting in
fulfillment of the above standard. For one, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that Montilla either had just
committed or was committing or attempting to commit an
offense. Secondly, even if we equate the possession of an
intelligence report with personal knowledge of the commission
of a crime, still, the alleged felonious act was not performed in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officers. The
lawmen did not see appellant exhibit any overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion
that he was embarking on some felonious enterprise. Neither
was there any mention at all by the police of any outward
indication, such as bulkiness on his body that could have
suggested that he was carrying a firearm, or any peculiar smell
emanating from his baggage that could have hinted that he
was carrying marijuana. In short, there was no valid ground for
the warrantless arrest.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "HOT PURSUIT DOCTRINE,"
CONSTRUED. — Parenthetically, neither could Appellant
Montilla's arrest be justified under the "hot pursuit" rule. In
People vs. Burgos, the Court said: "In arrests without a warrant
under Section 6(b) [of Rule 113, Rules of Court], however, it is
not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The
fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL,
THERE CAN BE NO VALID INCIDENTAL ARREST. —
Another parallel case is People vs. Encinada, where the
appellant was searched without a warrant while also
disembarking from a ship, on the strength of a tip from an
informant received by the police the previous afternoon that the
appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs, the search
yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. Encinada's
arrest and search were validated by the trial court under the in
flagrante delicto rule. In reversing the trial court, this Court
stressed that when he disembarked from the ship or while he
rode the motorela, Encinada did not manifest any suspicious
behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. Under such bare circumstances, no act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to the
accused. In short, he was not committing a crime in the
presence of the police; neither did the latter have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that he just committed an
offense. Where the search was illegal, there could be no valid
incidental arrest.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST; RAW
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NOT SUFFICIENT
GROUND. — The Court further said that raw intelligence
information was not a sufficient ground for warrantless arrest.
Having known the identity of their suspect the previous day,
the law enforcers could have secured a judicial warrant even
within such limited period. aADSIc
7. ID.; ID.; SEARCH WARRANTS; APPLICATION
ALLOWED DURING SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS AND LEGAL
HOLIDAYS. — Under the circumstances of the instant case,
there was sufficient time for the police to have applied for
search warrant. The information that appellant would be
arriving in the early morning of June 20, 1994 at Barangay
Salitran, Dasmariñas, Cavite, was received by the police at
2:00 p.m. of the preceding day. The fact that it was a Sunday
did not prevent the police from securing a warrant.
Administrative Circulars 13 and 19, s. 1987 allow applications
for search warrants even "after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays" where there is an
urgency and prompt action is needed. Surely, with the
attendant circumstances, the arresting officers could have
easily justified the urgency of the issuance of a search warrant.
8. ID.; ID.; STRICTER GROUNDS FOR VALID ARREST
AND SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANT THAN ISSUANCE
OF WARRANTS THEREFOR. — Law and jurisprudence in
fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches
without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefor. In
the former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed
the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought
to be arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime
that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply
determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was
committed by the accused.
9. ID.; ID.; ARREST; ACTUAL DISCOVERY OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS, DOES NOT CURE ILLEGALITY OF
ARREST OR SEARCHES. — Justice Panganiban submits that
if the police doubts the exact identity or name of the person to
be arrested or the exact place to be searched, with more
reason should they seek a judge's independent determination
of the existence of probable cause. The police, in such
instances, cannot take the law into their own hands, or by
themselves conclude that probable cause exists. He reiterates
that the actual discovery of prohibited drugs in the possession
of the accused does not cure the illegality off his arrest or
search.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHERS, WAIVED IN
CASE AT BAR. — In any event, notwithstanding the illegality
with which the search and arrest of Appellant Montilla was
effected, J. Panganiban have to concur with the majority in
affirming his conviction, only for the reason that appellant
waived his right to object to such illegality. It appears that he
did not protest when the police, after identifying themselves,
asked him to open his baggage for inspection. The fact that he
voluntarily submitted to the search, without any force or
intimidation on the part of the police, signifies his consent
thereto. Voluntary consent is a valid waiver of one's right
against unreasonable searches. Furthermore, upon
arraignment, Appellant Montilla pleaded not guilty and
proceeded to participate in the trial. Established jurisprudence
holds that a plea is tantamount to foregoing an objection to the
irregularity of one's arrest. The right to question the legality of
appellant's arrest may therefore be deemed to have been
waived by him. ECcTaS
HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Entila & Entila Law Offices for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Anthony Escordial was convicted of robbery
with rape by the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City and was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In his appeal
before the Court, appellant questioned the legality of his arrest
without warrant and the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. HacADE
The Supreme Court acquitted appellant. The Court upheld
appellant's claim that his arrest is illegal and does not fall under
any of the circumstances of allowing a warrantless arrest. The
Court, however, ruled that appellants act of pleading guilty to
the crime charged during the arraignment without questioning
his warrantless arrest effectively waived his right to object to
the legality of the arrest. The Court doubted the credibility of
the victim because of the fact that she has not actually seen
the face of her assailant and the apparent suggestiveness of
the show-up identification conducted by the police authorities.
The Court did not disregard the possibility that her identification
of appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the
circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant
determination to seek justice.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST WARRANTLESS ARREST, VIOLATED; RIGHT OF
APPELLANT TO OBJECT THERETO, DEEMED WAIVED;
CASES AT BAR. — The cases at bar do not fall under
paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball
court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when
he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an
escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without
a warrant. The question is whether these cases fall under
paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime.
The phrase "personal knowledge" in paragraph (b) has been
defined in this wise: Personal knowledge of facts in arrests
without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officer making the arrest. In these cases, the
crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-
appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after
the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not
present when the crime was committed, they could not have
"personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
commission of the crime" so as to be justified in the belief that
accused-appellant was guilty of the crime. The arresting
officers had no reason for not securing a warrant. However, the
records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged against him during his arraignment on
February 25, 1997 without questioning his warrantless arrest.
He thus waived objection to the legality of his arrest. As this
Court has held in another case: [The accused] waived
objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest,
considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against
them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest
must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived,
the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial,
free from error. The technicality cannot render subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict
the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of
the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF A SUSPECT UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION IS INADMISSIBLE IF NOT DONE WITH
THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL. — As a rule, an accused
is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as
accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the
police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial
investigation when these out-of-court identifications were
conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an
accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the
accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified
by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of
identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations
of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the
presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the
results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that
matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is
inadmissible as evidence against him. Here, accused-appellant
was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3,
1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason
Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various
dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-
appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-
court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding
these identifications should have been held inadmissible for
being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'" TaIHEA
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY;
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION DEEMED WAIVED BY ACCUSED'S
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PRESENTATION OF
WITNESSES WHO WILL TESTIFY ON THE MATTER. — Be
that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately
when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or
when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of
them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence,
accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to
object to the admissibility of these testimonies. Furthermore,
the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not
render the in-court identification of accused-appellant
inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree." This in-
court identification was what formed the basis of the trial
court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived
or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a
consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him.
However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another
matter altogether.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; MERE
SPECULATIONS AND PROBABILITIES CANNOT TAKE THE
PLACE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. —
Coupled with failure of Michelle to see the face of her
assailant, the apparent suggestiveness of the show-up places
in doubt her credibility concerning the identity of accused-
appellant. The possibility that her identification of accused-
appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the
circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant
determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this
Court. Michelle's identification of accused-appellant is further
rendered dubious by the disparity between her description of
her attacker and the appearance of accused-appellant.
Michelle's affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on
the back of her assailant when the latter was raping her. But,
when she testified in court, Michelle admitted that she did not
see keloids on accused-appellant although she said that his
skin was rough. This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on
the back of accused-appellant when he tried to look for it. In
fact, it would appear that accused-appellant had no such
markings on his back but had only small patches which could
not even be readily seen. In dismissing the disparity between
accused-appellant's appearance and Michelle's description of
her attacker, the trial court dwelt on the apparent roughness of
accused-appellant's skin and the probability that Michelle might
have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant.
However, mere speculations and probabilities cannot take the
place of proof beyond reasonable doubt required by law to be
established by the prosecution. Michelle Darunday was a civil
engineer in the City Engineer's Office in Bacolod City.
Considering her educational attainment and professional
status, it is improbable that she was mistaken as to what she
felt on her attacker's back at the time she was raped. A mere
protrusion on the back of the neck of the assailant could not
possibly have been mistaken for keloids.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SHOWN TO EXIST YIELD TWO OR MORE INFERENCES,
ONE OF WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, WHILE THE OTHER OR
OTHERS MAY BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE FINDING OF
GUILT, THE COURT MUST ACQUIT THE ACCUSED; SAID
EVIDENCE DOES NOT FULFILL THE TEST OF MORAL
CERTAINTY AND IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. — Another circumstance
casting doubt on the credibility of Michelle's identification is her
lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant at the
Pontevedra police headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, and Nestor Dojillo
testified that Michelle failed to see any identifying marks on
accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in
pinpointing the latter as the culprit. With Gemarino being a
policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay
captain, these witnesses were all, in one form or another,
connected with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed
to ascribe any ill motive on the part of these defense
witnesses, who are without doubt respectable members of the
community, their testimonies that Michelle showed no reaction
in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up in Pontevedra
police station deserve greater credence than the testimony of
Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant
was her attacker. The defense evidence established that
Tancinco was abusive policeman who had made up his mind
as to accused-appellant's guilt and who had no compunction in
doing whatever means necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure his
conviction. We note further that the testimonies of these
defense witnesses coincide with Michelle's testimony that she
kept quiet when she saw accused-appellant at the Pontevedra
police station on January 3, 1997. This being so, her reaction
to the show-up at the Pontevedra police station upon seeing
accused-appellant, the man who supposedly raped her twice in
an ignominious manner, is contrary to human nature. It may be
that she was filled with rage so that upon seeing accused-
appellant she was unable to show any emotion. But it is
equally possible that, as defense witnesses Gemarino,
Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not immediately
recognize accused-appellant as her attacker and only pointed
to him as her assailant upon promptings by the police and her
companions. "[W]here the circumstances shown to exist yield
two (2) or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence, while the other or others may be
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the
accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction." AaCTcI
[G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA
HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Terencio R. Yumang, Jr. for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant (Chua Ho San) prayed for his acquittal and
the reversal of the judgment finding him guilty of transporting,
without legal authority, the regulated substance
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A.
7659. The trial court sentenced him to die by lethal injection. In
view thereof, the judgment was brought to the Supreme Court
for automatic review.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. However,
pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the charge was
THE
amended for illegal transport of a regulated drug, to which he
was convicted. The RTC found the prosecution successfully
discharged its burden of proving the charge. It characterized
the search as incidentals to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
hence, it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine
hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futility
of informing Chua of his constitutional right under custodial
investigation considering the language barrier, and such
irregularity was rectified when the accused was duly arraigned
and actually participated in the trial of the case.
The Supreme Court held that the search made was not
incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. From all indications, the search was
nothing like a fishing expedition. Indeed, the likelihood of Chua
having actually transported the items cannot be quickly
dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly
disregarded. The decision of the trial court was reversed and
set aside and the accused-appellant was acquitted of the crime
charged.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
PRIVACY; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THE
CONSTITUTION BARS STATE INTRUSIONS TO A
PERSON'S BODY, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE
EXCEPT IF CONDUCTED BY VIRTUE OF A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT; EXCEPTIONS. — Enshrined in the Constitution is
the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly
ordains that people have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to
said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is
the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of
course, forestall reasonable searches and seizures. What
constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the
rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court; "otherwise such search and seizure become
'unreasonable' within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision." This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs
searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
ARRESTS, CONSTRUED; PROBABLE CAUSE, MEANING.
— In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of
such fact or as recent case law adverts to personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive
of probable cause. The term probable cause had been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with
respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested. (1 BERNAS 87) As applied to searches, probable
cause refers to the existence of facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles
or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
In People vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998], the Court
acknowledged that "the evidentiary measure for the propriety
of filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting
warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSISTENT REPORTS
OF RAMPANT SMUGGLING AND DIFFERENCE IN THE
APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED'S WATERCRAFT FROM THE
USUAL BOATS THAT COMMONLY CRUISE OVER THE
AREA DO NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE. — This
Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable
cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist —
accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information
that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach
bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The
fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA
attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely
walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the
officers approached him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A LAWFUL ARREST MUST
PRECEDE A VALID SEARCH; THE PROCESS CANNOT BE
REVERSED. — While a contemporaneous search of a person
arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or
proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and
which search may extend to the area within his immediate
control where he might gain possession of a weapon or
evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the
search. The process cannot be reversed.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENTED SEARCH, A
LEGITIMATE WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE AGAINST OBTRUSIVE SEARCHES;
ELEMENTS; CASE AT BAR. — The State then attempted to
persuade this Court that there was a consented search, a
legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Appellant Chua never exhibited that he knew, actually or
constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or
that he intentionally conceded the same. This can be inferred
from the manner by which the search was performed.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF CONSENTED
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; EXCEPTION.
— More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from
appellant Chua's alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his
right against such an intrusive search. This Court is not
unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented
warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the
police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no
room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was
requested. In some instances, the accused even verbally
replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood
the nature and consequences of such request.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH;
CASE AT BAR. — It was eventually discovered that the bag
contained the regulated substance. But this is a trifling matter.
If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to
confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of
felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a
poisonous tree how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did
not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this
case — because the police admitted that they never harbored
any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient,
feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE;
CONSPIRACY; MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; CASE AT BAR. — This Court calls the attention of the
trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy.
This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported
by the records. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment
nor raised in the pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. It is
also fundamental that conspiracy must be proven just like any
other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond
reasonable doubt.