POSSESSION
certain building lots which formed a part of the two parcels of
1. G.R. No. L-6546
January 15, 1912
GREGORIA ARNEDO CRUZ, ET AL., petitioner-appellees
vs. DOMINGO DE LEON, ET AL., opponents-appellants
FACTS:
On August 12, 1907, Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, in her own behalf and
in the name and representation of her sisters, Maria Concepcion,
Manuela and Juana, all surnamed Arnedo Cruz, made written
applications to the Court of Land Registration for the registration
of two parcels of land, situated in the barrio of San Miguel, pueblo
of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, of which they claimed to be
absolute owners, and described as follows:
Parcel A, bounded on the north by land of Ramon delos Reyes; on
the east by that of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south by a road from
the barrio of San Miguel; and on the west by the land of Eugenia
de Jesus. It has an area of 222,871.23 square meters.
Parcel B, bounded on the north by the road from the barrio of San
Miguel; on the east by the land of Victoria A. Cruz; on the south
by the Rio Grande de Calumpit; and on the west by the land of
Eugenia de Jesus. It has an area of 14,130.67 square meters. The
estate described, composed two parcel of land, was appraised, for
the purpose of the last assessment, together with the buildings
thereon constructed.
Petioners’ allegations:
1. that there was no encumbrance on the property, nor
any person entitled to any right or share therein,
according to their best knowledge and belief
2. that they acquired this land by inheritance from their
deceased parents, Jose Arnedo Cruz and Maria Santos
Espiritu
3. and that, in the unlikely event of its being impossible
to grant their application in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, they would rely upon the benefits of
chapter 6 of Act No. 926, inasmuch as they had been in
possession of the said lands for more than fifty years,
during which period they were used for the cultivation
of rice, being surrounded by pilapiles, or earthen dikes.
LC:
On February 20, 1908, the court, by an order of the same date
and after the issuance of a decree of general default, decreed the
adjudication and registration of the two parcels of land in the
names of the sisters Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, Manuel Arnedo Cruz,
Maria Concepcion Arnedo Cruz and Juana Arnedo Cruz.
A written petition on December 15, 1908 stated to the court that
Toribio de Leon, Agustin Catanghal, Fulgencio Clarin, Clara de
Leon, Antonio Mundo, Julian de Leon, Joaquin de Leon, Domingo
de Leon, Bernardo Reyes, Ambrosio Carlos, Pedro de Leon,
Florentina Ramos, Monica Laderas, Juana Martinez, Francisco de
Torres, and Mariano Valladar were the owners and possessors of
land concerned in this case.
Opponents alleged that their respective lots were within the
perimeter of the parcels of land registered in the name of the
applicants by the decree of February 20, 1908, and therefore
asked for the annulment of the same, in so far as it affected their
above-described respective lots, and that the costs be assessed
against the applicants.
They therefore petitioned that the previous judgment on
February 20 be reconsidered and reversed, after due procedure,
in so far as their respective lots were concerned.
ISSUE:
WON it is proper to register (in the Court of Land Registration) the
aforementioned two parcels of land with the inclusion of the lots
that are the subject of the oppositions
RULING:
Yes, it is proper to register the two parcels of land, but with the
exclusion of the lots or portions of land owned by the opponents.
It does not show by decisive and conclusive proof, that the lots of
the opponents are comprised within the lands of the applicants,
and that the opponents are and have been in possession of the
lots in question, unduly or precariously, by tolerance of their
legitimate owners, for a less time than the required by statute for
prescription, and without any good right.
It is unquestionable that the said four sisters are the owners and
are in possession of the two said parcels of land, used for the
cultivation of rice and sugar cane and situated in the barrio of San
Miguel, of the pueblo of Calumpit Bulacan, yet they have not duly
established the fact that they are the owners of the portions now
in the possession of the opponents, and whether these lots are
comprised within the perimeter and boundaries of the two said
parcels of land designated on the plan under the letters A and B.
From the foregoing testimony (Santiago V. Cruz and Victoria
Arneda Cruz)
 Santiago V. Cruz, an agent of Teodoro
Tiongson, who was formerly a lessee of the
two parcels of land during three years prior
to 1882, testified that, as such agent, he
had not collected any land rent for the lots,
occupied by many houses, which were
within the land that formed the barrio
called Frances; that the lands leased by
Tiongson from the appellants' mother were
used for the cultivation of rice and sugar
cane; that, at the expiration of Tiongson's
lease, the latter were taken over by Victoria
Arnedo; and that several tenants on shares
lived in their house built on the leased
lands.
  Victoria Arneda Cruz testified that she had
leased the said two parcels of land, used for
the cultivation of rice and sugar cane; that
in the barrio of Frances there were houses,
about fifteen or twenty in number, built on
the lots which adjoined the lands of
Gregoria Arnedo Cruz, some of which lots
are situated on the bank of the river; that in
the contract of lease executed by the
witness and the applicants' mother, the said
lots are not included, for the land leased by
the former only extended to the fences of
the said lots, and this she also had been told
by Teodoro Tiongson, the preceding lessee,
who himself had been so informed by the
owner of the lands, the applicants' mother;
that witness did not know whether the
latter, during her lifetime, collected rent for
the said lots, witness, as lessee, did not
collect such rent for them; that she did not
believe that these lots were comprised
within the lands leased by her, and, finally,
that some of them, occupied by residents of
that barrio, formed a part of the land
owned by her, adjacent to the lands of the
applicants, while others were a part of the
lands of the latter.
it is concluded that, in the successive lease of the said two parcels
of land, there were not included lots which appear to have been
occupied by various residents of the locality, apparently the
opponents, and, inasmuch as the latter were long prior to 1882 in
material possession of the lots which were occupied, without
having made any acknowledgment of the applicants' alleged
ownership, nor of that of their predecessor in interest; and,
further, since there is no evidence to show how and in what
manner the opponents and their predecessors in interest began
to occupy the lots in question and that they entered upon the
same through the tolerance of their alleged owners, and also
that the said lots formed a part of the two parcels of land sought
to be registered, it would be improper to hold that the disputed
lots should be included in the registration.
As for all other aspects of the case, let it be borne in mind that by
abandonment, negligence or carelessness, owners provided with
the most perfect titles may be deprived and dispossessed of their
properties by usurpers who, by the lapse of the time specified by
law, acquire the same by prescription. (Arts. 1930 and 1959, Civil
Code.)
Civil possession, according to the article 430 of the same code, is
the holding of a thing of the enjoyment of a right, together with
the intention of acquiring ownership of the thing or right. Every
possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and
should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or
possession must be restored to him by the means established in
laws of procedure. (art. 446, Civil Code.)
For reasons aforesaid, and with the modification specified, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed; but before completing the
inscription and registration of the said parcels of land in the name
of the applicants, with the exclusion of the portions of land owned
by the opponents, a correct survey, which must be duly approved,
shall be made of the said properties, and a plan shall be drawn,
for the purpose of the issuance of the proper title in accordance
with the law. No special finding is made as to the costs. So
ordered.
6. G.R. No. 80638 April 26, 1989
GABRIELELANE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents.
CASE DOCTRINES
General Rule: Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
differentpersonalities
Exception: in the case of co-possession
Shouldaquestion arise regarding the fact ofpossession;
1. the presentpossessor shallbe preferred;
2. if there are twopossessors, the one longer inpossession;
3. if the dates of the possessionare the same, the one who presents a title;and
4. if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determinationof its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
On August 16, 1961, Ordinary Residence Permit No. 1675 was
issued by the Bureau of Forestry authorizing the petitioner (Elane)
to occupy four hectares of public forest land situated in Sitio
Upper Kalaklan, Olongapo, Zambales (Exhibit A), on which he
constructed a warehouse and a gasoline station pursuant to
permits issued to him by the said bureau (Exhibits C, C-1, 1 and J),
which on February 10, 1970 were declared for purposes of
taxation in his name (Exhibits E and E-1) and taxes due thereon
were paid (Exhibits F-4 and F-5).
On January 19,1977, the parcel of land in question, designated as
Block V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427,
containing an area of 42,086 square meters, covered by the
sketch (Exhibit G), having been declared alienable and disposable,
the petitioner filed an application with the Bureau of Lands to
purchase it under Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (111-4)
9019 (Exhibit M).
On March 1, 1980, the petitioner wrote to the respondent
advising him to stop construction of the building that he was
putting up within the parcel of land in question (Exhibit H).
On March 6, 1980, the respondent having refused to desist from
constructing the building that he was putting up, the petitioner
filed the instant complaint for forcible entry in the then City Court
of Olongapo.
Chua’s allegations:
1. That on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property,
he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-
concrete building on a portion thereof, without his
knowledge and consent.
2. The order made by private respondent upon petitioner
to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter.
Elane’s claims:

1. that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest

Development over a parcel of land located at Upper
Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or
less, designated as Block V, LC Project No. 14,
Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, as allegedly evidenced
by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10,
1979
2. that he has been in possession and occupation of that
parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since
1970 having originally erected a hut thereon which was
later replaced by a bungalow
3. and that the land has been declared for taxation in his
name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him
for the years 1970 to 1979

MTCC decision: dismissed the complaint

RTC decision: affirmed the MTCC

CA decision: reversed the RTC and MTCC

ISSUE:

WON private respondent Chua has a better right over the

property.

RULING:

Yes. Having been in prior continuous possession, private

respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.

In sum, private respondent was in earlier possession of the

contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his
warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before
petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and
he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As
provided by the Civil Code -

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be

recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the case of
co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; ...

Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, without

pronouncement as to costs.