JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS exempt status of NORD/LB Singapore Branch, in accordance with
Section 32(B)(7)(a) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (Tax
G.R. No. 181459 June 9, 2014
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Respondent.
On July 6, 1998, respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
obtained a loan from Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale
(NORD/LB) Singapore Branch in the amount of USD120,000,000.00
with ING Barings South East Asia Limited (ING Barings) as the
Arranger.3 On September 4, 2000, respondent MERALCO executed
another loan agreement with NORD/LB Singapore Branch for a loan
facility in the amount of USD100,000,000.00 with Citicorp
International Limited as Agent.
Under the foregoing loan agreements, the income received by
NORD/LB, by way of respondent MERALCO’s interest payments,
shall be paid in full without deductions, as respondent MERALCO
shall bear the obligation of paying/remitting to the BIR the
corresponding ten percent (10%) final withholding tax.5 Pursuant
thereto, respondent MERALCO paid/remitted to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) the said withholding tax on its interest
payments to NORD/LB Singapore Branch, covering the period from
January 1999 to September 2003 in the aggregate sum of
₱264,120,181.44.6
However, sometime in 2001, respondent MERALCO discovered that
NORD/LB Singapore Branch is a foreign government-owned
financing institution of Germany.7 Thus, on December 20, 2001,
respondent MERALCO filed a request for a BIR Ruling with petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) with regard to the tax
Code), as amended.
On October 7, 2003, the BIR issued Ruling No. DA-342-2003
declaring that the interest payments made to NORD/LB Singapore
Branch are exempt from the ten percent (10%) final withholding tax,
since it is a financing institution owned and controlled by the
foreign government of Germany.
Consequently, on July 13, 2004, relying on the aforesaid BIR Ruling,
respondent MERALCO filed with petitioner a claim for tax refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate in the aggregate amount of
₱264,120,181.44, representing the erroneously paid or overpaid
final withholding tax on interest payments made to NORD/LB
Singapore Branch.
On November 5, 2004, respondent MERALCO received a letter from
petitioner denying its claim for tax refund on the basis that the
same had already prescribed under Section 204 of the Tax Code,
which gives a taxpayer/claimant a period of two (2) years from the
date of payment of tax to file a claim for refund before the BIR.11
Aggrieved, respondent MERALCO filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on December 6, 2004.12 After trial
on the merits, the CTA-First Division rendered a Decision partially
granting the decision. CTA En Banc affirmed.
The sole issue presented before us is whether or not respondent
MERALCO is entitled to a tax refund/credit relative to its payment of
final withholding taxes on interest payments made to NORD/LB
from January 1999 to September 2003.
Petitioner maintains that respondent MERALCO is not entitled to a
tax refund/credit, considering that its testimonial and documentary
evidence failed to categorically establish that NORD/LB is owned
and controlled by the Federal Republic of Germany; hence,
exempted from final withholding taxes on income derived from
investments in the Philippines.
On the other hand, respondent MERALCO claims that the evidence
it presented in trial, consisting of the testimony of Mr. German F.
Martinez, Jr., Vice-President and Head of Tax and Tariff of
MERALCO, which was affirmed by a certification issued by the
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated March 27,
2002, through its Mr. Lars Leymann, clearly defined the status of
NORD/LB as one being owned by various German States.23
Respondent MERALCO further argues that in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts, petitioner admitted the fact that NORD/LB is a financial
institution owned and controlled by a foreign government.
HELD:
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evidence presented
before us, we find that respondent MERALCO has discharged the
requisite burden of proof in establishing the factual basis for its
claim for tax refund.
First, as correctly decided by the CTA En Banc, the certification
issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated
March 27, 2002, explicitly states that NORD/LB is owned by the
State of Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania, and serves as a regional bank for the said states which
offers support in the public sector financing.
Given that the same was issued by the Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany in the regular performance of their official
functions, and the due execution and authenticity thereof was not
disputed when it was presented in trial, the same may be admitted
as proof of the facts stated therein. Further, it is worthy to note that
the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany was in the best
position to confirm such information, being the representative of
the Federal Republic of Germany here in the Philippines.
To bolster this, respondent MERALCO presented as witness its Vice-
President and Head of Tax and Tariff, German F. Martinez, Jr., who
testified on and identified the existence of such certification. In this
regard, we concur with the CTA En Banc that absent any strong
evidence to disprove the truthfulness of such certification, there is
no basis to controvert the findings of the CTA-First Division, to wit:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence were given
probative value as the First Division ruled that there was no strong
evidence to disprove the truthfulness of the said pieces of
evidence, considering that the CIR did not present any rebuttal
evidence to prove otherwise. The weight of evidence is not a
question of mathematics, but depends on its effects in inducing
belief, under all of the facts and circumstances proved. The
probative weight of any document or any testimonial evidence
must be evaluated not in isolation but in conjunction with other
evidence, testimonial, admissions, judicial notice, and
presumptions, adduced or given judicial cognizance of, and if the
totality of the evidence presented by both parties supports the
claimant’s claim, then he is entitled to a favorable judgment.
(Donato C. Cruz Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 13).26
Consequently, such certification was used by petitioner as basis in
issuing BIR Ruling No. DA-342-2003, which categorically declared
that the interest income remitted by respondent MERALCO to
NORD/LB Singapore Branch is not subject to Philippine income tax,
and accordingly, not subject to ten percent (10%) withholding
tax.1âwphi1 Contrary to petitioner’s view, therefore, the same
constitutes a compelling basis for establishing the tax exempt status
of NORD/LB, as was held in Miguel J. Ossorio Pension Foundation,
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,27 which may be applied by
analogy to the present case, to wit:
Similarly, in BIR Ruling [UN-450-95], Citytrust wrote the BIR to
request for a ruling exempting it from the payment of withholding
tax on the sale of the land by various BIR-approved trustees and tax-
exempt private employees' retirement benefit trust funds
represented by Citytrust. The BIR ruled that the private employees’
benefit trust funds, which included petitioner, have met the
requirements of the law and the regulations and, therefore, qualify
as reasonable retirement benefit plans within the contemplation of
Republic Act No. 4917 (now Sec. 28 [b] [7] [A], Tax Code). The
income from the trust fund investments is, therefore, exempt from
the payment of income tax and, consequently, from the payment of
the creditable withholding tax on the sale of their real property.
Thus, the documents issued and certified by Citytrust showing that
money from the Employees' Trust Fund was invested in the MBP lot
cannot simply be brushed aside by the BIR as self-serving, in the
light of previous cases holding that Citytrust was indeed handling
the money of the Employees' Trust Fund. These documents,
together with the notarized Memorandum of Agreement, clearly
establish that petitioner, on behalf of the Employees' Trust Fund,
indeed invested in the purchase of the MBP lot. Thus, the
Employees' Trust Fund owns 49.59% of the MBP lot.
Since petitioner has proven that the income from the sale of the
MBP lot came from an investment by the Employees' Trust Fund,
petitioner, as trustee of the Employees' Trust Fund, is entitled to
claim the tax refund of ₱3,037,500 which was erroneously paid in
the sale of the MBP lot.
Second, in the parties’ Joint Stipulation of Facts, petitioner
admitted the issuance of the aforesaid BIR Ruling and did not
contest it as one of the admitted documentary evidence in Court.
A judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no
amount of rationalization can offset it.29 In Camitan v. Fidelity
Investment Corporation,30 we sustained the judicial admission of
petitioner’s counsel for failure to prove the existence of palpable
mistake, thus:
A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which
dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or
fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that
the alleged discrepancies are more imagined than real. Had these
purported discrepancies been that evident during the preliminary
conference, it would have been easy for petitioners' counsel to
object to the authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT
presented by Fidelity. As shown in the transcript of the
proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners' counsel
to examine the document, retract his admission, and point out the
alleged discrepancies. But he chose not to contest the document.
Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the petitioners'
counsel was made through palpable mistake.
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that
respondent MERALCO has shown clear and convincing evidence
that NORD/LB is owned, controlled or enjoying refinancing from the
Federal Republic of Germany, a foreign government, pursuant to
the Tax Code.
G.R. No.177484 July 18, 2014
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS VELASCO,
Petitioners, vs. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
represented by its President, ALIZA MA, Respondent.
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a 25,000-square meter
parcel of land in Batangas, a portion of which was being leased to
Waterfields (represented by its President Aliza Ma).
The Contract of Lease (dated May 24, 1994) provides a 25-year
period and renewable upon the option of the lessee. There’s a
provision acknowledging the lessee’s payment of a rental deposit
amounting to P216,000 which is meant to answer for unpaid
rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges. Such deposit
or any balance thereof shall be refunded to the lessee immediately
upon the termination or expiration of the contract.
The parties executed on June 6, 1994 an Amendment to the
Contract of Lease which retained the terms and conditions of the
original contract. Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed
to pay the monthly rental. Hence, Ma sent the spouses Manzanilla a
letter dated July 7, 1997 containing Ma’s promise to pay the rentals
in arrears by way of check payment and a statement that the
deposit stipulated in the lease contract be used exclusively for the
payment of the unpaid utilities and other incidental expenses. It
also stated that the original contract shall be amended according to
the provision of the letter.
Spouses Manzanilla nonetheless filed before the MTC a Complaint
for Ejectment against Waterfields. Paragraph 5 of the complaint
alleges: “subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on
06 June 1994 and on 09 July 1997 x x x.” In its Answer, Waterfields
admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint. It alleged that it had
built substantial improvements over the land; that it just recently
suffered business losses. It claimed that it did not fail or refuse to
pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit in
the amount of P216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as
rental payment in accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract
of Lease. Hence, it argued that the spouses Manzanilla have no
cause of action against it.
MTC ruled in favor of Manzanilla. It held that Ma’s letter of July 9,
1997 had amended the Contract of Lease. In particular, Section 4 of
the Contract of Lease which provides that the rental deposit shall
answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility
charges was superseded by the portion in Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter
which states that “the deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall
be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and
other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the
lease.”Hence, the MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it
did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying
the rental deposit to its payment of the same. (NOTE: CHECK RTC
AND CA DECISION)
HELD:
Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997; the doctrine of
estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying Ma’s July 9,1997 letter in
this litigation.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
suchadmission was made. "A party may make judicial admissions in
(a) the pleadings, (b) during trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations orstipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding."34
Here, the Complaint alleges:
5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on
06 June 1994 and on 09 July 1997.
Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads:
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.
Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material
allegation that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997.
"It is wellsettled that judicialadmissions cannot be contradicted by
the admitter who is the party [itself] and binds the person who
makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can
offset it."
G.R. No. 182864 January 12, 2015
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. BPI/MS INSURANCE
CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD., Respondents.
For two separate transactions in 2004, Sumitomo Corporation, a
corporation based in Yokohama, Japan shipped on board the vessels
of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. (ESLI) coils of various steel
sheet for transportation and delivery at the port of Manila in favor
of consignee Calamba Steel Center located in Saimsim, Calamba,
Laguna. The Shipments were insured with the respondents BPI/MS
Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS) and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance
Company (Mitsui) against all risks.
The first shipment arrived at the port of Manila in an unknown
condition and was turned over to Asian Terminals Inc. (ATI) for
safekeeping. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by Calamba Steel, it
was found out that part of the shipment was damaged and was in
bad order condition such that there was a Request for Bad Order
Survey. It was found out that the damage amounted to US$4,598.85
prompting Calamba Steel to reject the damaged shipment for being
unfit for the intended purpose.
Sumitomo Corporation again shipped on board ESLI’s vessel coils of
various Steel for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila
in favor of Calamba Steel. Again, the shipment was insured by
respondents against all risk. The second shipment arrived at the
port of Manila partly damaged and in bad order. The coils sustained
further damage during the discharge from vessel to shore until its
turnover to ATI’s custody for safekeeping. Upon withdrawal from
ATI and delivery to Calamba Steel, As it did before, Calamba Steel
rejected the damaged shipment for being unfit for the intended
purpose.
Calamba Steel attributed the damages on both shipments to ESLI as
the carrier and ATI as the arrastre operator in charge of the
handling and discharge of the coils and filed a claim against them.
When ESLI and ATI refused to pay, Calamba Steel filed an insurance
claim for the total amount of the cargo against BPI/MS and Mitsui
as cargo insurers. As a result, BPI/MS and Mitsui became
subrogated in place of and with all the rights and defenses accorded
by law in favor of Calamba Steel.
Opposing the complaint, ATI denied the allegations and insisted that
the coils in two shipments were already damaged upon receipt from
ESLI’s vessels. It likewise insisted that it exercised due diligence in
the handling of the shipments and invoked that in case of adverse
decision, its liability should not exceed P5,000.00 pursuant to
Section 7.01, Article VII of the Contract for Cargo Handling Services
between Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and ATI.
On its part, ESLI denied the allegations of the complainants and
averred that the damage to both shipments was incurred while the
same were in the possession and custody of ATI and/or of the
consignee or its representatives.
The RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the ESLI and
ATI liable for the damages sustained by the two shipments. Upon
appeal, Both ESLI and ATI invoked the limitation of liability of
US$500.00 per package as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 65 or
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The CA absolved ATI
from liability in its decision.
HELD:
ESLI admitted the existence and due execution of the Bills of Lading
and the Invoice containing the nature and value of the goods on the
second shipment. The effect of admission of the genuineness and
due execution of a document means that the party whose signature
it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority.
A review of the bill of ladings and invoice on the second shipment
indicates that the shipper declared the nature and value of the
goods with the corresponding payment of the freight on the bills of
lading. Further, under the caption "description of packages and
goods," it states that the description of the goods to be transported
as "various steel sheet in coil" with a gross weight of 383,532
kilograms (89.510 M3).On the other hand, the amount of the goods
is referred in the invoice, the due execution and genuineness of
which has already been admitted by ESLI, is US$186,906.35 as
freight on board with payment of ocean freight of US$32,736.06
and insurance premium of US$1,813.17. From the foregoing, we
rule that the non-limitation of liability applies in the present case.
We likewise accord the same binding effect on the contents of the
invoice on the first shipment. ESLI contends that what was admitted
and written on the pre-trial order was only the existence of the first
shipment’ invoice but not its contents and due execution. It invokes
admission of existence but renounces any knowledge of the
contents written on it.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances
of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,Rule 18
of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-
trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan,83 this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the
consequences of the disadvantage.
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,85 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact
as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence
is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted
fact from the field of controversy.
The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently
take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Section 4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.
It is inconceivable that a shipping company with maritime
experience and resource like the ESLI will admit the existence of a
maritime document like an invoice even if it has no knowledge of its
contents or without having any copy thereof.
ESLI also asserts that the notation "Freight Prepaid" and "As
Arranged," does not prove that there was an actual declaration
made in writing of the payment of freight as required by COGSA.
ESLI did not as it could not deny payment of freight in the amount
indicated in the documents. Indeed, the earlier discussions on ESLI's
admission of the existence and due execution of the invoices, cover
and disprove the argument regarding actual declaration of
payment. The bills of lading bore a notation on the manner of
payment which was "Freight Prepaid" and "As Arranged" while the
invoices indicated the amount exactly paid by the shipper to ESLI.
DE GUZMAN vs. FILINVEST
Petitioners herein were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land
measuring 15,063 sqm. The property is enclosed and surrounded by
other real properties belonging to various owners. One of its
adjoining properties is a subdivision owned and developed by
respondent Filinvest which, coming from petitioners' property, has
a potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or
vehicle. As such, petitioners filed on August 17, 1988 a Complaint
for Easement of Right of Way against respondent.
Unwilling to grant petitioners a right of way within its subdivision,
respondent alleged in its Answer that petitioners have an access to
Sumulong Highway through another property adjoining the latter's
property. In fact, the distance from petitioners' property to
Sumulong Highway using the said other property is only 1,500
meters or shorter as compared to the 2,500-meter distance
between petitioners' property and Marcos Highway using
respondent's subdivision.
RTC granted petitioners the right of way across respondent's
subdivision. CA affirmed. (CHECK CA’S RULING ON INDEMNITY)
Petitioners now insist that the right of way pertains only to Road Lot
15 where the fence separating their property from respondent's
subdivision, which was supposed to be removed to grant them
access thereto, is located. On the other hand, it was respondent's
contention that the right of way covers the whole stretch from
petitioners' property all the way to its subdivision's gate leading to
Marcos Highway.
In resolving the same in its Order12 of June 1, 2005, the RTC
deduced, from the April 30, 1993 RTC Decision and the February 13,
1996 CA Decision, that the right of way granted pertains only to
Road Lot 15.
ISSUE: What is the extent of the right of way granted to petitioners
under the April 30, 1993 RTC Decision as affirmed by the CA in its
February 13, 1996 Decision?
HELD:
The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads
within respondent's subdivision and not merely Road Lot 15.
Amongst others, it should be noted that petitioners already
admitted during the remand proceedings that that the right of way
granted to them affects several road lots within respondent's
subdivision. As borne out by the records, respondent formally
offered as part of its exhibits a scale map of its subdivision for the
purpose of proving the identity of the road lots affected by the right
of way.39 In their Comment on the Formal Offer of Exhibits,40
petitioners did not proffer any objection to the said exhibit, but
merely averred that they find irrelevant respondent's submission of
the fair market value of the said roads and that the same were also
being used in common by the subdivision dwellers.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
"A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b)
during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. It is an
established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted
by the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who
makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it."41
Since petitioners already judicially admitted that the right of way
affects a number of road lots, they cannot not now claim that it only
comprises Road Lot 15. Their admission is binding on them.
Besides and logically speaking, if petitioners would indemnify
respondent only for Road Lot 15, it follows then that said particular
road lot should be the only road lot for which they shall be allowed
access. They cannot be allowed access to the other road lots leading
to and from the highway as they are not willing to pay indemnity for
it. In such a case, the purpose of the right of way, that is, for
petitioners to have access to the highway, would thus be defeated.
***PEOPLE vs. BOQUECOSA***
VICENTE JOSEFA, Petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182705 July 18, 2014
At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and
a car figured in a vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig
City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, 3
75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were
damaged. Upon investigation, Meralco discovered that it was a
truck registered in Josefa's name that hit the electricity post.
Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the
replacement cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but
Josefa refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo
Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the RTC of Pasig City.
In its complaint, Meralco alleged that (Bautista) Manoco's reckless
driving resulted in damage to its properties. It also imputed primary
liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and
supervision of Manoco. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that Meralco failed to
establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC
ruled that SPO2 Galang's account of the accident was merely
hearsay since he did not personally witness the incident. It also did
not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7,
1994 since the accident had long occurred in 1991.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in
disregarding the parties' stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the
truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista
was Josefa's employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did
not specifically deny this material allegation in the amended
complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff's return stated that
Bautista was under Josefa's employ until 1993. The CA concluded
that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to
hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was
negligent in driving the truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated
that the employer's presumptive liability in quasi-delicts was
anchored on injuries caused by the employee's negligence. Even
assuming that Bautista was not Josefa's employee, the CA
maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages since the
law presumes that the registered owner has control of his vehicle
and its driver at the time of the accident. It thus ordered Josefa to
pay Meralco. Josefa filed the present petition after the CA denied
his motion for reconsideration.
HELD:
Bautista’s negligence was the proximate cause of the property
damage caused to Meralco.
Josefa judicially admitted in his motions and pleading that his truck
hit the electricity post. In a motion to dismiss dated March 17, 1997,
Josefa stated:
"1. This action was commenced by plaintiff to recover from
defendant the sum of ₱384,846.00 as actual damages resulting from
the vehicular mishap which occurred on April 21, 1991 along Ortigas
Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila, whereby defendant’s
dump truck with plate No. PAK 874 hit and bumped plaintiff’s 45-
foot wooden pole;"
Josefa further declared in his motion for reconsideration dated
February 22, 2008:
[T]he manner who and why the accident occurred was not
explained. In the absence of any description on such important
aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly imputed to Pablo
Manojo Bautista simply because the truck he was then driving
bumped to electric post. The causal connection between the fault or
negligence and the damage must be shown. x x x Analyzing the
testimony of Elmer Abio, what was established is the following:
a) Somebodybumped the back of the jeepney he was driving on
April 21, 1991;
b) When his back was bumped, he had no control because it was so
sudden;
c) He bumped the approaching car, while the truck bumped into the
Meralco post that three (3) transformers;
d) The pole with 3 transformers fell on the truck.
It may be asked: "Who was that somebody that bumped the back of
Abio" "What was the reason why the truck bumped the
post?""What happened to the car that was bumped by Abio
because he had no control?" "Which happened first, the bumping of
the back of Abio or the bumping of the post by the truck?" "Was the
bumping of the back of Abio and the bumping of the car the
proximate cause why the truck hit the Meralco post?"42 (Emphases
and underlines ours) Lastly, Josefa pleaded in his petition before
this Court:
Nowhere in the records was it shown how and why the accident
occurred on April 21, 1991.
In the absence of any description on such important aspect, fault or
negligence cannot be properly imputed to petitioner, simply
because his truck bumped into Meralco’s electricity post. The causal
connection between the petitioner’s supposed negligence and the
damage was not shown. Neither was it proved tobe the proximate
cause of the damage.
These statements constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal
admissions of the causation in fact between the truck and the
electricity post.Judicial admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedingsin the
same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to
prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless
previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.44 A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial
admissions remove an admitted fact from the field of controversy.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
CLT Realty Development Corp. v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corp.
G.R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious
Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which
measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City,
Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or
Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT
No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on, smaller lots forming
part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons. Several
subsequent subdivisions, consolidations, and one expropriation of
the Estate, spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name
"Land of Caveat Emptor." One of these disputed lots was Lot 26, the
property subject of this litigation. The conflict arose due to an
overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted
CLT to file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title,
Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-15463 against Hi-Grade.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-
Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's title because it
suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid
realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered as a
conclusive proof of ownership.
Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence and serious and patent errors
in the court's appreciation of evidence and factual findings based on
the decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT v.
Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association."
The RTC denied the motion for utter lack of merit. According to the
RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sto. Niño is not a newly-
discovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce
such evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence. Hi-Grade's
reliance in the aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the
court in Sto. Niño already reconsidered its decision and upheld the
validity of CLT's title.
During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to
Admit and Take Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate
Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice
and Human Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and
Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in a Resolution. Included in the Resolution,
however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes
judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not
bound by the findings and conclusions therein. S
Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals
ruled as baseless the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of
CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalino, on the alleged patent
infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of
Appeals, Vasquez and Bustalino never testified that the issuance of
TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the registration procedures in
1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are
incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land
registration at that time. Reversing the Decision of the RTC, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report.
Ruling:
Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit
of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may
properly take and act on without proof because these facts are
already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume
something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary
support. Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court
dispenses with the traditional form of presentation of evidence, i.e.
the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings such as cross-
examination.
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may
be taken judicial notice of.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to
adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even
consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the
initiative of the parties. . . . The reports cannot conclusively
supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may
be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other
pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were
rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade
the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments
presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and
analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept
or reject them.
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but
will be examined and evaluated based on its probative value. The
Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why the taking of judicial
notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican
principle. Thus:
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this
Court is altogether a different matter. Certainly, a determination by
any branch of government on a justiciable matter which is properly
before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The
finding of the Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for
remedial legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens
title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the
competence to make such a determination and once final, the same
binds not only the parties but all agencies of government.
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was
conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate
Report to determine the decision on the case.
G.R. No. 185518 April 17, 2013
SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, Petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES FAUSTINO CHINGKOE AND GLORIA CHINGKOE,
Respondents.
Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82834 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. They claim that sometime in 1990, out of tolerance
and permission, they allowed respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix,
and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property situated at No.
58 Lopez Jaena Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City. Due to the
intercession of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell the
property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only
after Felix and Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price, and after
respondents’ settlement of their mortgage obligations with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). After further prodding
from their mother, however, and at Felix’s request, Faustino agreed
to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of a Deed of Absolute
Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents
themselves drafted the deed, the parties again agreed that the
document would only be completed after full payment.
On 24 July 2001, respondents sent a demand letter6 to petitioners
asking them to vacate the premises. To this date, petitioners have
refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint7 for
unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer,
petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 October 1994, claiming that respondents had sold the
property for ₱3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and in
cash on the same day. Due to respondents’ adamant refusal to
surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were allegedly
constrained to file an action for specific performance with Branch
96 of the Quezon City RTC on 31 January 1995.
The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners
and dismissed the Complaint. RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC
in toto.
The CA reversed the findings of the lower courts and ruled that a
mere plea of title over disputed land by the defendant cannot be
used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of
possession. Citing Refugia v. Court of Appeals, the appellate court
found that petitioners’ stay on the property was merely a tolerated
possession, which they were no longer entitled to continue. The
deed they presented was not one of sale, but a "document
preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners upon the
insistence and prodding of their mother to soothe in temper
respondent Felix Chingkoe."11
Petitioners now argues that the CA committed reversible error
when it admitted and gave weight to testimony given in a different
proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the
Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue herein (unlawful
detainer). They fault the CA for citing and giving credence to the
testimony of Tan Po Chu, who was presented as a witness in
another case, the action for specific performance filed by
petitioners.
The CA indeed quoted at length from the testimony of Tan Po Chu,
and culled therefrom the factual finding that the purported contract
of sale had never been consummated between the parties. The CA
cited as basis her testimony from Civil Case No. Q-95-22865: that
she witnessed Felix signing the blank deed, and that upon its
signing, there was no payment for the property. This account
directly contradicts petitioners’ claim that payment was made
simultaneously with the perfection of the contract.
Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony
in Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. They cite the general rule that courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As
early as United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated: "In the
absence of objection and as a matter of convenience, a court may
properly treat all or part of the original record of a former case filed
in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made
to it for that purpose by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated."
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in
the absence of objection,’ ‘with the knowledge of the opposing
party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’ the case
is clearly referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the
case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as
part of the record of the case then pending.’
In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated
28 November 2008,17 petitioners never objected to the
introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing the
testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-
22865. As shown by the records and as petitioners admitted in their
Reply, the testimony was already introduced on appeal before the
RTC. In fact, it was petitioners themselves who specifically cited Civil
Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number,
purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue,
in order to compel delivery of the title.
Given these facts, the CA committed no reversible error in taking
judicial notice of the records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. In any
case, the said testimony was not the only basis for reversing the
RTC’s Decision. Independent of the testimony, the CA – through its
perusal and assessment of other pieces of evidence, specifically the
Deed of Absolute Sale – concluded that petitioners’ stay on the
premises had become unlawful.
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.
RESPONDENTS.
Arnado wasa natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship
upon naturalization as citizen of United States of America.
Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign
citizenship. On November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of
candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his declaration
as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua,
one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando
was not a citizen of the Philippines, with a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American
and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that
he has been using his American passport even after renunciation of
American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against
Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc
stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the
grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63
through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile,
Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the
second highest number of votes. This Resolution resolves the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20,
2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials
elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30,
2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office.
While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the
motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the
validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to
run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for
the reversal of this Court’s Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead,
he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of
Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed,
however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when
he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on
April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American
citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an
American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US
passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates
this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must
be presented as public documents2 of a foreign country and must
be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference
to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered
in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law
of the United States "providing that a person who is divested of
American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-
acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued
prior to expatriation."
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for application in the case
before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate
of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law
and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s
disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires
those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek
elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship,
when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running
for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who
seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates
the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national –
even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to
allow a complete disregard of this policy.
DELA LLANA VS BIONG
On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North
Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the
front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.
Juan stopped the when the signal light turned red. A few seconds
after the car halted, a dump truck owned by Rebecca Biong and
driven by Joel Primero containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed
the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the
impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was
shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart
from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain
became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no
longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr.
Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her
condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash
injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to
her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical
therapy to alleviate her condition.
Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that
she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of
her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine
and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation
released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela
Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite
the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, on
May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost
the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and
claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the
complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since
June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees.
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness
and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost
the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove
her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate
dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical
certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash
injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical
examinations. Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car
because the truck’s brakes got stuck.
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit
and strong when they met several days after the vehicular accident.
She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Joel.
ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
HELD:
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal
relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury.
Her claim that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury was not
established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence
during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law
on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our
solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of
the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim,
unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.
FIL-PRIDE vs. BALASTA
Respondent Edgar A. Balasta was hired by petitioner Fil-Pride
Shipping Company, Inc. (Fil-Pride) for its foreign principal, petitioner
Ocean Eagle Ship Management Company, PTE. Ltd. (Ocean Eagle).
Respondent was assigned as Able Seaman onboard M/V Eagle
Pioneer.
Respondent was declared fit to work after undergoing the
mandatory Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He
commenced his duties as Able Seaman aboard M/V Eagle Pioneer
on February 23, 2005. Among respondent’s duties as Able Seaman
are the following:
Sometime in August and September 2005, while aboard M/V Eagle
Pioneer, respondent experienced chest pains, fatigue, and shortness
of breath. He was examined by a physician in Gangyou Hospital in
Tianjin, China, and was diagnosed as having myocardial ischemia
and coronary heart disease. He was declared unfit for duty and was
recommended for repatriation.
Respondent was thus repatriated on September 18, 2005 and was
immediately referred to the company-designated physician, Dr.
Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz). He was subjected to laboratory, X-ray,
2D echo, and electrocardiogram tests, as well as 24-hour Holter
monitoring. In Dr. Cruz’s September 18, 2005 medical report,8
respondent was diagnosed with hypertension and myocardial
ischemia.
On February 16, 2006, respondent consulted and was examined by
an independent physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), who
issued a medical certificate11 containing the following diagnosis: He
is not expected to land a gainful employment given his medical
background due to his illness.
Respondent filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with
petitioners, but the latter denied the same.
On February 10, 2006, respondent filed against the petitioners a
Complaint13 for the recovery of disability benefits, illness
allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and
attorney’s fees.
It appears from the record that on February 24, 2006, respondent
underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery. He then continued
his treatment with Dr. Cruz, who for his part continued to diagnose
respondent with severe coronary artery disease.
In his Position Paper14 and Reply,15 respondent stated and argued
that in the performance of his duties as Able Seaman, he inhaled,
was exposed to, and came into direct contact with various injurious
and harmful chemicals, dust, fumes/ emissions, and other irritant
agents; that he performed strenuous tasks such as lifting, pulling,
pushing and/or moving equipment and materials on board the ship;
that he was constantly exposed to varying temperatures of extreme
hot and cold as the ship crossed ocean boundaries; that he was
exposed as well to harsh weather conditions; that in most instances,
he was required to perform overtime work; that the work of an Able
Seaman is both physically and mentally stressful; and that as a
result, he contracted his illness which required him to undergo
bypass surgery. He added that despite being examined by the
company-designated physician, he continued to suffer episodes of
severe chest pain, difficulty in breathing and other discomforts
related to his illness; that his health has not improved, and was
instead deteriorating, which thus led him to consult an independent
physician (Dr. Vicaldo); that Dr. Vicaldo declared him unfit to work
as seaman in any capacity and that his illness was work-related; that
despite the lapse of more than six months, the company-designated
physician has failed to make a finding regarding his condition, which
thus entitles him to permanent total disability benefits; that his just
claim for disability benefits was denied by petitioners, which forced
him to file the labor complaint; and that he should thus be paid
US$60,000.00 disability benefits with interest, 120 days illness
allowance based on his salary of US$390.00 or the amount of
US$1,560.00 with interest, ₱500,000.00 damages, and attorney’s
fees of 10% of the recoverable amount.
Petitioners, on the other hand, stated and argued in their Position
Paper16 and Reply17 that respondent filed a labor complaint even
before the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, could complete
his examination and treatment of respondent’s condition, which
thus prompted them to deny his claim for disability benefits; that
the independent physician Dr. Vicaldo examined respondent only
once on February 16, 2006, and thus could not have arrived at a
competent diagnosis of respondent’s condition; that in the absence
of a competent diagnosis and substantial evidence, respondent’s
claim for benefits cannot stand; that respondent’s illness is not
work-related, and that his lifestyle caused, or was a contributing
factor to, his illness; that contrary to respondent’s claim, the latter
has been paid his illness allowance in full; that respondent’s medical
expenses are being shouldered by them; and that respondent is not
entitled to damages and attorney’s fees as a result of prematurely
filing the labor case. Petitioners thus prayed that the labor case be
dismissed.
HELD:
Regarding the issue of compensability, it has been the Court’s
consistent ruling that in disability compensation, "it is not the injury
which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity."30 Moreover,
"the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A31 does not preclude
other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The
POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries
that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."
Just the same, in several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary
artery disease, as well as other heart ailments were held to be
compensable.33 Likewise, petitioners failed to refute respondent’s
allegations in his Position Paper that in the performance of his
duties as Able Seaman, he inhaled, was exposed to, and came into
direct contact with various injurious and harmful chemicals, dust,
fumes/emissions, and other irritant agents; that he performed
strenuous tasks such as lifting, pulling, pushing and/or moving
equipment and materials on board the ship;
that he was constantly exposed to varying temperatures of extreme
hot and cold as the ship crossed ocean boundaries; that he was
exposed as well to harsh weather conditions; that in most instances,
he was required to perform overtime work; and that the work of an
Able Seaman is both physically and mentally stressful. It does not
require much imagination to realize or conclude that these tasks
could very well cause the illness that respondent, then already 47
years old, suffered from six months into his employment contract
with petitioners. The following pronouncement in a recent case very
well applies to respondent:
x x x His constant exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the
varying temperature, like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and
the coldness outside, coupled by stressful tasks in his employment
caused, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is already recognized
that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally
resulting in wear and tear of the human body.
Notably, it is "a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker,
having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically
separated from his family for the entire duration of his contract,
bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to
perform his work well. The strain is even greater in the case of a
seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at
work abroad and away from his family."
G.R. No. 192571 April 22, 2014
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, vs.PEARLIE ANN F.
ALCARAZ, Respondent.
For resolution is respondent Pearlie Ann Alcaraz's (Alcaraz) Motion
for Reconsideration dated August 23, 2013 of the Court's Decision
dated July 23, 2013 (Decision).
At the outset, there appears to be no substantial argument in the
said motion sufficient for the Court to depart from the
pronouncements made in the initial ruling. But if only to address
Akaraz's novel assertions, and to so placate any doubt or
misconception in the resolution of this case, the Court proceeds to
shed light on the matters indicated below.
Standards for regularization; conceptual underpinnings.
Alcaraz posits that, contrary to the Court’s Decision, one’s job
description cannot by and of itself be treated as a standard for
regularization as a standard denotes a measure of quantity or
quality. By way of example, Alcaraz cites the case of a probationary
salesperson and asks how does such employee achieve regular
status if he does not know how much he needs to sell to reach the
same.
The argument is untenable.
First off, the Court must correct Alcaraz’s mistaken notion: it is not
the probationary employee’s job description but the adequate
performance of his duties and responsibilities which constitutes the
inherent and implied standard for regularization. To echo the
fundamental point of the Decision, if the probationary employee
had been fully apprised by his employer of these duties and
responsibilities, then basic knowledge and common sense dictate
that he must adequately perform the same, else he fails to pass the
probationary trial and may therefore be subject to termination.
The determination of "adequate performance" is not, in all cases,
measurable by quantitative specification, such as that of a sales
quota in Alcaraz’s example. It is also hinged on the qualitative
assessment of the employee’s work; by its nature, this largely rests
on the reasonable exercise of the employer’s management
prerogative. While in some instances the standards used in
measuring the quality of work may be conveyed – such as workers
who construct tangible products which follow particular metrics,
not all standards of quality measurement may be reducible to hard
figures or are readily articulable in specific pre-engagement
descriptions. A good example would be the case of probationary
employees whose tasks involve the application of discretion and
intellect, such as – to name a few – lawyers, artists, and journalists.
In these kinds of occupation, the best that the employer can do at
the time of engagement is to inform the probationary employee of
his duties and responsibilities and to orient him on how to properly
proceed with the same. The employer cannot bear out in exacting
detail at the beginning of the engagement what he deems as
"quality work" especially since the probationary employee has yet
to submit the required output. In the ultimate analysis, the
communication of performance standards should be perceived
within the context of the nature of the probationary employee’s
duties and responsibilities.
The same logic applies to a probationary managerial employee who
is tasked to supervise a particular department, as Alcaraz in this
case.1âwphi1 It is hardly possible for the employer, at the time of
the employee’s engagement, to map into technical indicators, or
convey in precise detail the quality standards by which the latter
should effectively manage the department. Factors which gauge the
ability of the managerial employee to either deal with his
subordinates (e.g., how to spur their performance, or command
respect and obedience from them), or to organize office policies,
are hardly conveyable at the outset of the engagement since the
employee has yet to be immersed into the work itself. Given that a
managerial role essentially connotes an exercise of discretion, the
quality of effective management can only be determined through
subsequent assessment. While at the time of engagement, reason
dictates that the employer can only inform the probationary
managerial employee of his duties and responsibilities as such and
provide the allowable parameters for the same. Verily, as stated in
the Decision, the adequate performance of such duties and
responsibilities is, by and of itself, an implied standard of
regularization.
In this relation, it bears mentioning that the performance standard
contemplated by law should not, in all cases, be contained in a
specialized system of feedbacks or evaluation. The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that not all employers, such as simple
businesses or small-scale enterprises, have a sophisticated form of
human resource management, so much so that the adoption of
technical indicators as utilized through "comment cards" or
"appraisal" tools should not be treated as a prerequisite for every
case of probationary engagement. In fact, even if a system of such
kind is employed and the procedures for its implementation are not
followed, once an employer determines that the probationary
employee fails to meet the standards required for his regularization,
the former is not precluded from dismissing the latter. The rule is
that when a valid cause for termination exists, the procedural
infirmity attending the termination only warrants the payment of
nominal damages. This was the principle laid down in the landmark
cases of Agabon v. NLRC9 (Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing
Corporation v. Pacot10 (Jaka). In the assailed Decision, the Court
actually extended the application of the Agabon and Jaka rulings to
breaches of company procedure, notwithstanding the employer’s
compliance with the statutory requirements under the Labor
Code.11 Hence, although Abbott did not comply with its own
termination procedure, its non-compliance thereof would not
detract from the finding that there subsists a valid cause to
terminate Alcaraz’s employment. Abbott, however, was penalized
for its contractual breach and thereby ordered to pay nominal
damages.