DAVID, et al. vs., ARROYO, et al.

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow
the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national
emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and
their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day,
she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and
prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases
for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold
rallies. Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to
converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf
David, Akbayan party- list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen
were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few
minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow “standards
set by the government during the state of national emergency.”

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency
and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting
PP 1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by
the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present petitions moot and academic;
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing;
3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017;
4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial Law;
5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto the President the power to legislate;
6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest; and
7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional

RULING:
(1) The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic because
all the exceptions to the “moot and academic” principle are present. The “moot and academic”
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All
these exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates
the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest,
involving as they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms of expression, of assembly and of
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and
in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
present petitions are subject to judicial review.

(2) All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the
issue involved. It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met: (a)the cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be
a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Being
a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. In view of the transcendental importance of this
issue, all the petitioners are declared to have locus standi.

(3) There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s exercise of her calling-out power,
which petitioners did not refute. In other cases, the Court considered the President’s “calling-out”
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. Nonetheless, the Court stressed
that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion.” Under the expanded power of judicial review, the courts are authorized not only “to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but
also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how
the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of the power, “judicial inquiry can go no further
than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not
act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. Petitioners failed
to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally
bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it
obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

(4) PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she
is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. But the President must be
careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power
is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not
only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the
State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. It is plain in the wordings of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her
calling- out power. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts that can be done only under a valid declaration of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants, ban on public assemblies, take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship, and issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

(5) PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to

promulgate decrees. The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.” The operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which
gave former President Marcos legislative power. The ordinance power granted to President Arroyo
under the Administrative Code of 1987 is limited to executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because
they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees
are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. She cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty
to suppress lawless violence.

(6) PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable
for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to
allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(a)there must be a war or other emergency; (b)the delegation must be for a limited period only;
(c)the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the
emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to her pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. There is a distinction between the President’s
authority to declare a state of national emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers.
Her authority to declare a state of national emergency is granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. The exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power
to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.
 (7)The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does not render these
issuances unconstitutional. The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising
from its exertion. PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.
But when in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal. David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were
exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there
a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the
dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was
done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits to hold rallies. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom
of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the
Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press.
It cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. The “acts of
terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and
the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an
amorphous and vague concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.
Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be
indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media
enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.
 GONZALES vs. HECHANOVA

FACTS:
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification
from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Executive
Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,” because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE:
WON RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD:
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in
the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by
our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when
it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
 CHAVEZ vs., JBC

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUE:
WON the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

RULING:
From a simple reading of Section 8, Article VIII, it can readily be discerned that the provision is
clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same
under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the
Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the
Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives
of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially
in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the
precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect
that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that
an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
 IMBONG vs., OCHOA

FACTS:
On 21 December 2012, the Congress passed Republic Act 10354 also known as “The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012.” Shortly after the President placed his signature
on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society, filed Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibitions claiming that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they violate the
rights to life, to health, to freedom of expression and speech, to the privacy of families, to academic
freedom, to due process of law, to equal protection, and against involuntary servitude. Petitioners
also claimed that the provisions also intrude on the autonomy of local governments and the
ARMM, and violate natural law. Furthermore, they claimed that Congress’ delegation of authority
to the FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is invalid. The Respondent, on
the other hand, contend that there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not
yet ripe for judicial determination. Also, Respondent argued that some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law.

ISSUES:
WON the RH Law is unconstitutional?

RULING:
At the onset, the Supreme Court clarified that it has the power to exercise judicial review in the
given controversy because the petition raises a justiciable controversy. It was clarified by the Court
that where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. It is said that
judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and
the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them.

As to the main issue, in general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional (EXCEPT
FOR SOME PROVISIONS) insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods,
devices, and supplies.

The High Court ruled that RH Law does not violate the right to life or allows abortion as the main
crux of claim of the Petitioner. It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. It means (1) One of the
primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation (2) It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed (3) As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use (4) What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum — from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and
second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail. In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
“conception” which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.

Also, the High Court ruled that it cannot question the wisdom behind RH Law for it is not within
the province of the court but of Congress for it is where lawmaking power is lodged. The Supreme
Court clarified that it cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what
the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should
be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary
to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
Nor is it the business of the Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would
be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court
must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.
 SANIDAD vs., COMELEC

FACTS:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for
a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991,
by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of 16 October 1976.

On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of
the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru
a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and
Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was
filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed
as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

ISSUE:
WON the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion
as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional
Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given
the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President’s
decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the
people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated
their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly
shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and
delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973
the people had already resolved against it.

In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to
a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for
the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of
an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy,
not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a
misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary
cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments
to the Constitution.

At any rate, the Supreme Court ruled that since no National Assembly was existing at that time,
the President can propose amendments to the Constitution because he also holds such power
granted by the Constitution in the absence of the national assembly.
 LA SUERTE CIGAR vs., CA

These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by
cigarette manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Petitioners
argued that since stemmed leaf tobacco is a raw material for tobacco products, the same is exempt
from the payment of excise tax under the tax code. Moreover, Petitioners argued that when such
stemmed leaf tobacco is sold in bulk to other manufacturers, the same is not subject to tax since
Section 137 of the Tax Code provides as follows:

SEC. 137. Removal of tobacco products without prepayment of tax. — Products

of tobacco entirely unfit for chewing or smoking may be removed free of tax for
agricultural or industrial use, under such conditions as may be prescribed in the
regulations of the Ministry of Finance. Stemmed leaf tobacco, fine-cut shorts,
the refuse of fine-cut chewing tobacco, scraps, cuttings, clippings, stems or
midribs, and sweepings of tobacco may be sold in bulk as raw material by one
manufacturer directly to another, without payment of the tax under such
conditions as may be prescribed in the regulations of the Ministry of Finance.

‘Stemmed leaf tobacco,’ as herein used, means leaf tobacco which has had the
stem or midrib removed. The term does not include broken leaf tobacco.

In view of the authority of the Secretary of Finance, it promulgated Revenue Regulations V-39
defining what are the activities of tobacco manufacturers and RR No. 17-67 classifying
“manufacturers and imposing taxes on the importations of stemmed leaf tobacco since the only
exemption granted by law is “sale” from one manufacturer to another and the same does not cover
“importation.” The cigarette manufacturers contend that the two RRs are invalid since the
Secretary of Finance cannot, by mere regulation, limit the classes of manufacturers that may be
entitled to the tax exemption, and that there was an undue delegation of power to the Secretary.

Also, Petitioners argued that since for a long time prior to the transactions herein involved, the
Collector of Internal Revenue had never subjected their purchases and importations of stemmed
leaf tobacco to excise taxes. This prolonged practice allegedly represents the official and
authoritative interpretation of the law by the Bureau of Internal Revenue which must be respected.

ISSUE:
WON the Secretary transgressed the principle of delegation of power in providing that importation
of stemmed leaf tobacco is not included in the exemption of specific tax considering that they were
never subjected before?

RULING:

The SC ruled that there was no undue delegation and that the RRs are valid.

The High Court clarified that the power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed
or revoked only by the legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated
by Congress to any other branch of government or private persons, unless its delegation is
authorized by the Constitution itself. Hence, the discretion to ascertain the following — (a) basis,
amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions
from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax — may not be delegated away by Congress.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement
and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like
the Secretary of Finance in this case, called as permissible delegation of legislative powers.

Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make
explicit what is general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the law.
Such rules and regulations, when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, “deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in
view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their specific expertise
in their respective fields.” To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of statutory
authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane
to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law
prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of
our tax laws.

Hence, on the issue of the RRs, the SC ruled that a reading of the entire RR No. V-39 shows that
the regulation pertains particularly to activities of manufacturers of smoking and chewing tobacco,
cigars and cigarettes. This was rightly so because the regulation was issued to enforce the tax law
provisions in relation to the manufacture and importation of tobacco products. On the other hand,
RR No. 17-67 clarified RR No. V-39 by explicitly designating the manufacturers of tobacco
products as L-7 permittees (Section 2), in contrast to wholesale leaf tobacco dealers and those that
process partially manufactured tobacco such as stemmed leaf tobacco. RR No. 17-67 did not create
a new and restrictive classification but only expressed in clear and categorical terms the
distinctions between “manufacturers” and “dealers” of tobacco that were already implicit in RR
No. V-39.

Since the two revenue regulations, RR Nos. V-34 and 17-67, are in pari materia, i.e., they both
pertain specifically to the regulation of tobacco trade, they should be read and applied together.
The SC ruled that statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the
same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

The SC further ruled that it is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted,
not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
“interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,” or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

The foregoing rules on statutory construction can be applied by analogy to administrative issuances
such as RR No. V-39 and RR No. 17-67, especially since both are issued by the same
administrative agency.

Such construction is consistent with the rule that tax exemptions, deemed to be in derogation of
the state's sovereign right of taxation, are strictly applied and may be granted only under clear and
unmistakable terms of the law and not merely upon a vague implication or inference.

The onus of proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax lies with the
cigarette manufacturers. Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. Accordingly, statutes
granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority. The cigarette manufacturers must justify their claim by a clear and
categorical provision in the law. Otherwise, they are liable for the specific tax on stemmed leaf
tobacco found in their possession.

Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not precluded from
making a new interpretation of the law, especially when the old interpretation was flawed.
Erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent
correct application of the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error
on the part of its agents. Hence, prolonged practice of the BIR in not collecting the specific tax on
stemmed leaf tobacco cannot validate what is otherwise an erroneous application and enforcement
of the law. The government is never estopped from collecting legitimate taxes because of the error
committed by its agents
 TOLENTINO vs., SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

Petitions were then filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 contending that it did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630.

ISSUE:
WON RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

RULING:
The SC ruled that the argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution is misplaced. According to the
High Court, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives.

To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be
to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments,
added by the High Court. Indeed, the SC furthered, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action
by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day.
But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings
on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
of legislative practice.
 GARCILLANO, et al. vs., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and SENATE

FACTS:
Tapes containing wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President's instructions
to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the
lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged “original” tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers
of the House.

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
indefinitely. Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed
a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the
said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and
the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of
the House proceedings.

Due to the suspension of the House’s inquiry, the Senate also issued a resolution calling for an
inquiry on the said issue. On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed another Petition for Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking
to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry because of its unpublished
Rules on Inquiry

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the
“Hello Garci” tapes while the Supreme Court dismissed the Petition filed by Garcillano for being
moot and academic because the House already terminated its Inquiry.

ISSUES:
WON the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees governing the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation should be published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.

RULING:

The Court, dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. The SC stressed that the
exercise of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies and the Court will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary
to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.

The recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the “Hello Garci” inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition was dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended
to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished, the High Court said.

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court granted the same. The SC ruled that the Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “the Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules
is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “Laws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
 IN RE CUNANAN

FACTS:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A.
972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed
if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although
for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the
correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 –
75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the
S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and
secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise
adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large,
the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUE:
WON the Congress has the power to

RULING:
As a preliminary, the SC said that an adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly of those who
want to practice law. The SC then said that the Judicial system from which the Philippines has
been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, according to the High Court,
has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue
to reside in in the SC.

Moreover, the SC ruled that the retroactivity of the law is invalid in such a way that what the law
seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the Court but the lack of will or the defect in
judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Constitution to
Congress because it lies exclusively within the judiciary.
The Supreme Court ruled that the law is unconstitutional because there was a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court as it is in effect a judgment
revoking the resolution of the court, and only the SC may revise or alter them, in attempting to do
so, R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.

Through the said law, the SC said that the Congress has exceeded its power because it has not
power in the first place to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar.
 BELGICA vs., OCHOA

FACTS:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions 2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject
matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system's conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

“Pork Barrel” refers to than appropriation of government spending meant localized projects and
secured solely and primarily to bring money to a representative’s district. It also refers to legislative
control of local appropriations. In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to
as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature. The earliest form of
“Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines is Act 3044 or the Public Works Act of 1922. When
martial law was declared pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued. The “Support for Local
Development Projects” (SLDP) under the article on “National Aid to Local Government Units”
was the new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that was introduced by the Batasang
Pambansa. “Congressional Pork Barrel” was revived in the form of the “Mindanao Development
Fund, and “Visayas Development Fund” under Corazon Aquino Administration. The Senators and
Luzon Legislators created “Countrywide Development Fund” (CDF). There is other form of
“Congressional Pork Barrel” called “Congressional Insertions” (CI) under Ramos Administration.
Under Estrada Administration, The CDF was removed and replaced with three separate forms of
CIs, namely, the “Food Security Program Fund,” the “Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,”
and the “Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund.” Also the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. Under Arroyo Administration, the
2005 GAA was re-enacted in 2006. The PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect
to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, and their participation in the
proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. The Government Procurement Policy
Board (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations of the Government Procurement Reform Act “RA 9184”.

The PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for
individual legislators and the Vice-President in 2011. LGUs are now allowed to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects because of
the 2013 PDAF Article. The Malampaya Funds was created under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under Section 12, Title IV of PD 1869 were both issued
by President Marcos. He issued PD 1993 amending Section 12 of PD 1869.

ISSUE:
1. WON (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners
have legal standing to sue.
2. WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on (a)separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of
legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability.

RULING:
The petitions are partly granted.
1. (a) Yes, the petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” The questions in these cases are ripe for adjudication
since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization are currently existing
and operational; therefore, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. The Court must dispel the notion that the issues
related to PDAF, had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents.
The annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality and that the President
does not have constitutional authority to do so. The Court will decide if the case is considered
moot and academic by using the moot and academic principle: (1) petitioners allege grave violation
of the constitution, (2) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of
exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (3) there is a practical need for
a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, but
more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
in accordance with constitutional principles and (4) the preparation and passage of the national
budget is an annual occurrence.

(b) Yes, the issue raised is subject to judicial review because the issue is about the constitutionality
of the law. The expanded the concept of the power of the Judicial Department is the power to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government as stated in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

(c) Yes, Petitioners have legal standing. As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds. As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

2. Yes, the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional
for violating the constitutional provisions on:

(a)separation of powers – the power of the Congress is to make laws, the power of the President is
to enforce laws, and the power of the Court is to interpret laws. The principle of separation of
power is to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch and unduly encroaches on the
domain of another. The Legislative department formulates an appropriation act and in
implementing the national budget the role of the Executive department. Based on the findings and
recommendations in the Report made by CoA “an illustration of how absolute and definitive the
power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
[principle of separation of powers.]” the provisions under 2013 PDAF Article showed the
legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects. The Court
declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional.

(b) non-delegability of legislative power - Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is
lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is
clear from Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
power of appropriation, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary
that they themselves also determine. The 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the power of appropriation the Constitution does not allow the congress to delegate the
power to the individual member of Congress.

(c) checks and balances – Under Section 27 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the President
has a power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him
by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” After the GAA is passed
the intermediate appropriations are made by legislators. It means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. The appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President's power of item veto.

(d) accountability - The post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, therefore impairing public accountability.
 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005. RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law in view of the fact that the Congress will still approve
the IRR of the said law.

ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. It is unconstitutional. Although, according to the SC, the power of oversight is intrinsic in the
grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, according to the Court, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d)
to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception of public interest. Hence, congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se because it does not necessarily constitute an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.

However, according to the High Court, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment
“beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, according to
SC, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation.

Hence, the SC ruled that any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes of IRR fall in this class. Legislative veto is a
statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they
take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power a sit
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
 LEAGUE OF CITIES vs., COMELEC

FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities
were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did
not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No.
9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100
million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed
by R.A. No. 9009.

ISSUE:
Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

RULING:
*This is the flip-flopping decisions of the SC. Decisions are identified as to dates.

(1) November 18, 2008 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because
sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and
not into any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The
criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria
prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government units (LGUs)
in national taxes.” (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18,
2008)

(2) March 31, 2009 Resolution

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

(3) April 28, 2009 Resolution

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

(4) December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The laws are unconstitutional. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 (1)
decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16
municipalities into cities.

It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million
that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as
the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its
status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable
treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment
of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone
through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should
be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR
No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities
of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling
already became final and executory and was recorded in the SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments
on May 21, 2009.)

(5) August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional
the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. “Undeniably,
the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as
the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on
the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where
there is no prior decision,” the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November
18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly
provides that “no city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code.” It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be
embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an
exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the
LGC. “The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused
its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the
Constitution,” the Court held.

The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even
if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)

(6) February 15, 2011 Ruling LATEST DECISION - CONTROLLING

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the
High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.

(7) April 12, 2011 RESOLUTION

Yes! The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. The Supreme Court said that they should not
ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion
bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the Local
Government Code prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, the Court said that it
should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and
by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the
Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income
requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.

The High Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well
aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by
the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th
Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities
covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities
Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No.
9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the
same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of
respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably
voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of
both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the
Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by
necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.
 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs., SENATE

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing
the constitutionality of RA 10153.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.” The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification. Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM
under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials
to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections
to the second Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA
No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite. Pursuant to RA No.
9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations
for the ARMM elections.

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the
validity of said laws. On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of
ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their
term on September 30, 2011. The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094
in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people
of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the “elective and representative” character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant
to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of
control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
(A) WON the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections?
(B) WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto.

(A) The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position
that the Constitution mandates synchronization of election citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. The High Court stated that while the Constitution
does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least
number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to
once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by
RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

The reiterated its ruling that it is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same
hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992. It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-
mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day
or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three
years. That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.

The SC furthered that, although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor,
vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of “local”
elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled “Local
Government.” Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.

(B) As to the second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and
with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands.
Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform
its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as
the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in
sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.
Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional
discretion. However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that
Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no
vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress. RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact
only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim
measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.

Lastly, the House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative
discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification for urgency and promptly enacted
RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review. The
petitioners, however, failed to provide with any cause or justification for this course of action.
Hence, while the judicial department and Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President’s
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers
and respect due to the co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand, the High Court added. In any case, according to
the Court, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement
for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators
and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the
purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they
shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process. The Court finds, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates
and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In
this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
 LIDASAN vs., COMELEC

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and
taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections
assailing the constitutionality of RA 4790 and praying that Comelec’s resolutions implementing
the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in
the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Thereafter, the Office of the President
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by
correcting legislation. However, Comelec, by resolution, declared that the statute should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WON RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province
of Lanao del Sur,” but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title?

RULING:

The SC declared that RA 4790 is null and void. The SC clarified that under the constitution,
the constitutional provision on law-making contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second.
The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance in the present case,
according to the SC, is the second directive.

The SC ruled that the subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill. This
constitutional requirement, the SC reasoned, “breathes the spirit of command.” Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House
where the bill, being of local application, originated.

Moreover, the High Court furthered, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the
bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, added by the SC, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

The SC said that the test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where
it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is bad.

To be sure, added by the Court, that the title — “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” — projects the impression that only the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.
The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” the SC ratiocinated, read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive because in application, the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del
Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur.
Finally, as for the SC, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of
the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
 PHILCONSA vs., GIMENEZ

FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836
insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). According
to the Petitioners, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision
constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire
after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every
four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree,
while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20)
years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every
year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution. The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not
constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis
for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.

ISSUE:
WON Republic Act 3836 is unconstitutional?

RULING:
Yes, the High Court observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of
section 12, subsection (c) of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS.
This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of
RA. No 3836, however, refers to members of Congress and elective in any manner to the subject
of CA. No. 186 establishing the GSIS and which provides both retirement and issuance benefits to
its members. Hence, the constitutionality requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient
to reflect their contents is not met by the title of said RA. No. 3836, thus, void. The SC also
reasoned that, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the
aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other emoluments”.
This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments.”
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because
it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides
for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to
take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision
clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is
therefore unconstitutional.
 BANAT vs., COMELEC

FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing the statute. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-
sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34,
37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable
application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
Petitioner argues the following:
1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of
RA 9369.
2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).According to petitioner, under the
amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President
and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
(COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in
the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining
pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government
concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant
minority parties at Pon election day.Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties
to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable
and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be
regulated by law.

ISSUES:
WON RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
The SC ruled that RA 9369 is constitutional.
1. According to the SC, RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act
No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated
Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and
Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of
Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No.
7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.
Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election laws to achieve its
purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The
provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA
7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA
7166, respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the
assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and
BP 881, among others.

2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the
adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any
discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC
adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain
pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. COMELEC has the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the
COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified
and explained.

4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this
only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and,
therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is
a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC,
poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure
the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated
by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the
poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG
also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and
minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll
watchers inside the polling precincts.
 GIRON vs., COMELEC

FACTS:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The present Petition also
seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from further implementing the
aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on the ground that these provisions would enable
elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds from the
time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.

On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections
12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which specifically requires: “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated
to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to
the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed,
while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law
concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective
certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity. On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC,
opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas
v. Executive Secretary.

ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule.

RULING:
NO. The provisions are not unconstitutional.
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just
law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove
that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail. The SC said that after a thorough review of the arguments raised, it finds that
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
Petitioners, according to the High Court, have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse
its ruling in Fariñas, in which the SC has already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006
are comprehensive enough to include subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda.

The SC ruled that the proscription under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution is
aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title, the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive
a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.” Section 2 of the law provides
not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. The Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice,
action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same
was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. (Emphases
supplied and citations omitted)
The above reasoning similarly applies to the claim of unconstitutionality with respect to
Section 12 of the Fair Election Act. The questioned provision reads:

SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots
have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes
but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces
where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter:
Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the same family name, this provision shall
not apply.

What the discussion of the Legislators tells us is that Congress did not limit the law to the lifting
of the political ad ban. After combing through various laws, they found other election practices
that they considered inequitable. Some of these practices included the appreciation of the votes
cast in case of a late substitution of candidates and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective
officials upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to “level the playing field,”
Congress fashioned a law that would address what they determined were unfair election practices;
hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.

After a careful analysis of the foregoing, the SC finds that the assailed Section 12 (Substitution of
Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the
title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the
measures embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the Petition and the
petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.

On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise various arguments
that we deem are matters of policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate that
the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the law. Judicial power does not include
the determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the
Court may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress that is empowered by
the Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we feel that petitioner's reasoning
would be best addressed by the legislature.
 PHILJA vs., PRADO

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petition assails the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitution providing that “Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The title of the bill is
not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The SC ruled that
although, it is convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation
of a more efficient and effective postal service system. However, its ruling is that, by virtue of its
nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said
law.
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and the Supreme Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD
26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. However, the SC
ruled that it already laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading
of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court. Applying these
principles, according to the Court, it shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

Be that as it may, SC still annulled Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1,
of the Constitution providing that no person shall “be deprived of the equal protection of laws.” It
is worth observing, according to the High Court, that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a
government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it
cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for
the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.
Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of
the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
 BOLINAO ELECTRONICS vs., VALENCIA

FACTS:
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television
(channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then
Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed
that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.

ISSUE:
WON Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any of his right has been violated by the
refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation
to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the
1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations
particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no
damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation
of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president
vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

Executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions. Thus, if the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
 MABANAG vs., LOPEZ VITO

FACTS:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held
on 23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of
the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had
not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House
of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence, these three senators and eight representatives
did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated “Resolution of both
houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto,” nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Resolution passed by Congress, proposing
amendments to the Constitution, which has already been considered as an enrolled bill. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective Houses. The petition
for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly
contrary to the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution, which is already considered an enrolled bill?

RULING:
NO, an enrolled bill is binding to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that what it can do
is to determine if there were irregularities in the journal of Congress, it if finds no irregularities,
then such Journal is binding and the enrolled bill as deliberated in the said Journal is conclusive to
the Court. The Supreme Court ruled that it is called to respect an enrolled bill, which has been duly
introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each House, approved
by the president and filed by the secretary of state. The Supreme Court also said that the
deliberation as reflected in the Journals of both Houses are considered political questions to which
Courts may not inquire as a courtesy.

The SC further held that a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the
“enrolled bill rule” born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each
other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution “consists of (only)
two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.” There is no logic in attaching political character to
one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed
to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
 CASCO PHIL. CHEM., INC., vs., GIMENEZ

FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid
in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central
Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and
formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt
is urea formaldehyde. Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in the
provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and,
“formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde”
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea
formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made
on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE:
WON the term “urea formaldehyde” as appearing in the enrolled bill be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde” as introduced by a legislator?

RULING:
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.

The opinions or statements of any member of Congress, according to SC, during the
deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed
in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has
been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
 MORALES vs., SUBIDO

FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934
as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the Mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of
Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for
“failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section
10 of the Police Act of 1966, which provides that “No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation,
or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of
any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.”

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department
of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was
being deliberated upon, the approved version actually provides that “No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city
and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed
Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.”

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went
on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached
to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE:
WON the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter?

RULING:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the
Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth
trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as
holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being
confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.
 ARROYO vs., DE VENECIA

FACTS:
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same
day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos. Subsequently, a petition was filed challenging the
validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation
is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House?

RULING:
The SC ruled that the Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them
as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter
complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of
a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Also, after considering the arguments of the parties, the SC finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. The SC held that
to disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in
a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or
the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
 US vs., PONS

FACTS:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were
delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the
customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to
any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation
thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of
trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed
the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress)
was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01
March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE:
WON the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed
made a law on February 28, 1914?

HELD:
The SC may look into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court
and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the
SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court
did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill in this particular case.
 ASTORGA vs, VILLEGAS

FACTS:
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers
of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the
lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee
on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations.
During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently
approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved
by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later
found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that
had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines
withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that
the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not
invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE:
WON RA 4065 was validly enacted.

RULING:
No, the law was not validly enacted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated
and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew
their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was
never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that
the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.