G.R. No.
L-856 April 18, 1949 of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-
appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for
appellant.
 Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P.
Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was
convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's
Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by
electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the
prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5
and 6, all of which, according to the court, were
substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court
found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the
other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their
will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were
used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire
of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims,
were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos
and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of
all the victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce
here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She
testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her
house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the
house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the
house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that
she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown;
that the accused came again and told her that Colonel
Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did
not accept the job; that a week later the accused came
to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some
other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that
Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted
her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel
Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he,
Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a
bed and with force succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her; that on the following night, again
she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was
raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in
hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding
when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That
accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos
took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from
their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance
organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet
Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said
Japanese Colonel might select those first who would
later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters
Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a
life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were
testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother
Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite
once more their testimony in support of the allegations in
court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the
allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by
the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942,
the two girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol,
by the accused and his companion named Vicente
Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr.
Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two,
the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente
Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano
Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion,
Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda
S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to
Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation,
raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with
all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no
avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered
to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also
raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16,
1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to
her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was
then out of the house; that the accused threatened her
with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed
in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they
were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the
car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness
(Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda
returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her
face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to
the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the
presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the
Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but
the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad
against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested
them"; that the said Governor Hontañosas then, said:
"Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese
headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by
the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she
(Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another
Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that
Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but
of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses,
Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the
allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the
said accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her
sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to
bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in
the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese
(Insik Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the
accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence
of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and
intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had
sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the
accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through
violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her against her will; that two days,
later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls
to their home, said accused brought the other girls
Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran,
Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and
violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that
the accused came to get her on the pretext that she was
to be used as witness in a case affecting certain
Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger
sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the
accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel
Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and
after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came
out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana
told her immediately that she was raped against her will
by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the
residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an
uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation,
the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she
returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that
the following day while conducting the two girls back to
their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the
accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana
Bonalos) testified as following: That on June 15, 1942,
the accused came and told her that the Japanese
needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly,
he daughters, under that understanding, started for
Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for
her daughters and she found them in the office of the
Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters
wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana
told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped
her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an
uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her
two daughter to return home on the pretext that the
Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile
they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that
when her daughter returned to her house ultimately, they
related to her (mother) what happened; that both
daughters told her they would have preferred death
rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana
told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is
admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae
regardless of the time that had elapsed between the
occurrence and the time of the information. In the
manner these two witnesses testified in court, there
could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute
truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would
assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through
if they were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all
the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been
proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses
beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his
Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas,
Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of
Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers,
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942;
that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942,
against said nurses were forced to attend another
banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini
and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would
suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those
forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of
said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at
length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and
companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the
hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the
office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely
reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance
held on June and receptions was to select from among
them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel
Mini for immoral purposes that she and her companions
were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he
came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the
nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran
up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be
sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the
room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket
which covered her and telling her that it was only her
pretext that she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully
corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said
testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings
are not questioned, but it is contended that the deeds
committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The
Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues
that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers
has always been, and will always be, a fundamental
concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not
only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the
morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the
Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies
was treason because women's company kept up their
morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at
parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts,
would be treason. For any act of hospitality without
doubt produces the same general result. yet by common
agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe
all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create
relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must
depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw
a line between treasonable and untreasonable
assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence
to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89
Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of
the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may
buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual
and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or
ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's
country enhance his strength and by same count injures
the interest of the government of the giver. That is
treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63
C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's
first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering"
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men
or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was
not treason even though the women and the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the
enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any
more than the women themselves would have been if
they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and
social relations with the Japanese did not directly and
materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken
the power of the United State. The acts herein charged
were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the
Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense
and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable
effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese
might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a
vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature
and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of
Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and
Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation.
Without his cooperation in the manner above stated,
these rapes could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason
finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence
is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged,
the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and
sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts
alleged in the information and established by the
evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the
information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his
provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article
III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused
the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." The contention is not well
taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be
averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In
the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of
the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he
was innocent of treason and thus afforded an
opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under
the general law of criminal procedure convicted for crime
different from that designated in the complaint or
information is allowed and practiced, provided only that
such crime "is included or described in the body of the
information, and afterwards justified by the proof
presented during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil.,
599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of
the offended girls but these assaults are not charged
against him and should be ruled out. The crime of
coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not
be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the
other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of
rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to
17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended
women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it
being understood that the total duration of these
penalties shall not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.
PEOPLE V. PEREZ

FACTS:

-Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason

and was sentenced to death by electrocution.

-TC found the accused, together with the other Filipinos,

recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous
girls and women against their will for the purpose of
using them, to satisfy the sexual desire of the Japanese
officers.

-The Solicitor General submitted an opposite view

stating that the deeds committed by the accused do not
constitute treason. It further discussed that if furnishing
women for immoral purposes to the enemies was
treason because women’s company kept up their
morale, so fraternizing them, entertaining them at
parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts,
would be treason . Any act of hospitality produces the
same result.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of the accused constituted the

crime of treason.

HELD: NO. The law of treason does not prescribe all

kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree
and purpose.

As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of the aid

and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of
the enemies’ hostile designs.

His “commandeering” of women to satisfy the lust of

Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and
boost their spirit.

Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not

directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or
to weaken the power of US. Whatever favorable effect
the defendant’s collaboration with the Japanese might
have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a
vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature
and circumstance of each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape as

principal by direct participation. Without his coordination
in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have
been committed.

G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for
appellant.
 First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L.
Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence
of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's
Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason
but convicted of what the said court terms "complex
crime of crime of treason with murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a
complaint which as amended contains the following
counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised
between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of
Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court
the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become
a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an
enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully well
that the aims and purposes of said organization are
among other to extend every aid and cooperation with
said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against
the United States of America and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a
member of said enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the
enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid
and comfort to them did go out on numerous patrol in
company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and
other elements and other elements resisting said enemy
in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised
between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and the
City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with
treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to
the United States of America and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military
Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the
command of a T. Yushida, performing the function and
duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of
the Cebu district of said military police and did during the
period aforesaid in various places in the Province of
Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court
in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with
treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid
and comfort to them did in company with other member
of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to
apprehend guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and
torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise commit acts
of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the
enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of
America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the
Province of Bohol Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as
a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary
attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of
the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with
soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct
and carry out a so-called mopping up operation for the
purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element
engaged in resistance against said enemy and as a
result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.
4. That on or about during the period comprised between
September 1944 and November 1944 in the City of
Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court
the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy
the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces
with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a
construction of air raid shelters for the protection of
Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in
the acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the
enemy in preparation against the expected landing of
America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality
of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of
Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to
the said enemy in company with Japanese Military
soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino
enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and
otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force
the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio
Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo
Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities.
6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality
of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in
company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the
Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and
informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia
strike him on the face and head with a pistol and
subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco
Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.
7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the
municipality of Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent
to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy
in his capacity as chief undercover man for the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with
Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another
Japanese spy did then and there willfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on
suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said
Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat
herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa
about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in
gathering up arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of
their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano
Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him
in the course of said investigation.
8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod
municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police
Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of
the Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the latter as to the
whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan
food procurement officer of the guerrilla and upon his
denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused
did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter
by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his
stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on
his head and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight
splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality
of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese
Government and her armed forces with treasonable
intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man
informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military
Police Cebu District in company with other informers
said Military Police, did then and there apprehend and
arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and
treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the
whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla,
attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command and
when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her
aforesaid husband's whereabouts herein accused did
slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the
arms strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten
her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise
maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.
10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the
municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused.
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese
Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid
and comfort said enemy in company with five Japanese
soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military
Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his
capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan
Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said
accused did box, beat slap and strike said Victoriano
Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times
and did turn over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan
Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground
that said person were guerrilla and as a result of which
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been
heard of ever since then.
11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba,
Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief
undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese
Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt.
Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the
hostile designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San
Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to
the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of
the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn
company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest
one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a
guerrilla.
13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and
comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia
Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the
Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did
question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the
whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and
when said Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their
whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by
her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely beat her and
otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to
sign a letter addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro
Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese
Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong
did report to said headquarters in compliance of said
letter, he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas,
Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to
give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy
of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District and in
company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and
spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and
did question the latter as the whereabouts of Alejandrino
Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the
course of said investigation, the accused did hang said
Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and
an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his
head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla
whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac,
Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable
intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer
and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of
the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese
soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro,
Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano
Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said Jose
Rada on the charge that said person had contact with
guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality
of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan,
adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said
enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo
Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla
activities and resistance to said enemy.
17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in
different place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines,
particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and
Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy,
thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces,
with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-
sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the
Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the
general mopping up operation conducted by the
Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T.
Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to
Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas
and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality
of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and
its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under the
employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in
company with the member of said Japanese Military
Police under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the
Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture
Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and
some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and, did steal
and carry away the following articles belonging to said
Martin Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.
19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction
of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering
to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an
informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of
the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and
carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario
Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was
captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as
chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese
Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike
Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente
Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an
effort to extract confession of the latter's connection with
guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort
to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in
company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the
Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the
Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal,
Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up
the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on
them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio
Padilla died a few days thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of
Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief
informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese
Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun,
Paulita Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on
suspicion that said persons were cooperating and
helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said
Paulita Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai
headquarters and once thereat herein accused did
torture them by hanging them by their arms did
otherwise maltreat them.
23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market,
Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial Japanese
Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as
member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his
activities and resistance to the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed
the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he
now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending
that the lower court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating
circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary
surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is
being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases against
Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission;
on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved
the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of
the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty
entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of
the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed
upon him;
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances,
treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused
is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and
robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine
of P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in
the contention that appellant should not have been
convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with
murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and
raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged
not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the
crime of treason for which the accused is being
prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the
general charge, they can not be used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399,
January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held
guilty of treason only.
Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been
satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission
that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an
agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested.
Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked
(People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p.
166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have
performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not
been established by satisfactory proof and may not in
any event be considered as mitigating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a
plea guilty on the assurance that he would not be
sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof.
On the other hand, it is denied by both the prosecution
and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying
appellant' motions for reconsideration that "No
responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in
connection with the decision to be rendered in any case
before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the
same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength should not have been considered.
These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the
offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate
the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the
facts alleged in the information show that appellant in
committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented
the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured
guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of
torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears
in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his
treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla
suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then
abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly
shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint
and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these
two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty
and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this
said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of
strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission
of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason
and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes,
wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of
cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be
regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy will
be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy
and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to
the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21
of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities
above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt
guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and
use of superior strength are adsorbed in treason
characterized by killings, the killings themselves and
other and other accompanying crimes should be taken in
to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of
criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed. Were not this the rule
treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on
its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple
murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the
penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range
provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and
harm to which the culprit has exposed his exposed his
country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries
that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading
spirit of the Revised Penal Code just penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the
crime into execution. Where the system of graduating
penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as
in the case of homicides connected with treason, the
method of analogies to fit the punishment with the
enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service
of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's
aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is
reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed
P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty, but
appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances
of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty
should be imposed in its maximum. But since five
member of this court are opposed to the imposition of
the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense
that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon,
Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
People vs Adlawan circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy, the
GR No L-456 penalty should be imposed in its maximum. However,
29 March 1949 five members of the court opposed the death penalty

Facts
This is a review of the sentence of death and fine of
P20,000.00 imposed upon appellant
Cucufate Adlawan by the People’s Court wherein
Adlawan was charged with treason but convicted of the
“complex crime of treason with murder, robbery and
rape.”

Appellant Adlawan pleaded guilty to a complaint against

charged against him. Said complaint states that during
the year 1943 to 1945, Adlawan adhered to the enemy,
the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces,
with treasonable intent to give aid and comfort to said
enemy by going out on numerous patrol in company with
Japanese forces in search of guerilla and other elements
resisting the enemy of the Philippines. In the course of
doing so, Adlawan also committed murder, torture,
robbery, and rape.

Ruling
The People’s Court convicted Adlawan guilty of the
complex crime of treason with murder, robbery and rape.
He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and fine of
P20,000.00.

Upon review before the Supreme Court Adlawan assails

the conviction and the lower court should have
appreciated his mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, that he is a witness utilised by the CIC and
that he saved many civilian lives from the Japanese
forces. He further states that the lower court erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances treachery,
murder, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower

court to the extent that the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua and fine of P20,000.00

Rationale
The Supreme Court said that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength should not have been considered. These are by
their nature inherent in the offense of treason. However,
the facts show that in committing treason, appellant
augmented the wrong by being cruel to captured guerilla
suspects, subjecting them to torture and death. He also
chose to add ignominy by stripping off the clothes of a
guerilla suspect’s wife and abusing them with other
Filipino girls. These two aggravating circumstances of
unnecessary cruelty and
ignominy may be appreciated.

The penalty for the crime of treason is

reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.

Appellant is given the benefit of voluntary confession of

guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating
[ GR No. L-319, Mar 28, 1946 ] Commonwealth. Act No. 682, upon constitutional
GO TIAN SEK SANTOS v. ERIBERTO MISA + grounds must be over- ruled, in view of our decision in
DECISION Laurel vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), copy of
76 Phil 415 which will be furnished to petitioner by the clerk of this
court. The petition is denied, with costs.
BENGZON, J.: Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo,
Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen Paras, J., concurs in the result.
apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter
Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned
over last September, to the Commonwealth
Government, and since then detained by the respondent
as a political prisoner. Such detention, he claims, is CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
illegal, because he has not been charged before, nor
convicted by, the judge of a competent court, and PERFECTO, J., :
because he may not be confined under Act No. 682, as We concur with the majority's pronouncement to the
he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor to effect that petitioner is not excluded from the group of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines. persons contemplated by section 19 of Commonwealth
The Solicitor-General, for the respondent, admits the Act No. 682, notwithstanding his foreign status as a
detention, for active collaboration with the Japanese, Chinese subject. We also agree that, if there are facts
doubts the allegation of citizenship, and maintains that, and evidence to justify it, he might be prosecuted for
conceding arguendo petitioner's alien age, he may be espionage, or any other crime not conditioned by the
charged for espionage, a crime against national security citizenship of the offender. But we disagree as to the
wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be denial of the petition, it appearing that petitioner is being
held in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682. deprived of his personal liberty without any due and legal
As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a process of law, and as to this question, we refer to the
Chinese subject. The commitment order No. 291 issued stand we have taken in our dissenting opinion in case G.
by the United States Army authorities describes him as R. No. L-200, Laurel vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372,
such. But it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty ante), the contentions therein we reiterate here.
now. He is included among those contemplated by Petition denied.
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which reads
partly:
"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the
persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the
Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special
Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents,
exhibits and such other things as the Government of the
United States may have turned over in connection with
and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the
aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take,
as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper:
Provided, however, * * *. And, provided, further, That, in
the interest of public security, the provisions of article
one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby,
suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners
are concerned, until the filing 1 of the corresponding
information with the People's Court, but the period of
suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from
the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government."
His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from
the scope of the above provisions. As stated by the
Solicitor-General, he might be prosecuted for espionage,
(Commonwealth Act No. 616) a crime not conditioned by
the citizenship of .the offender, and considered as an
offense against national security.
The contentions advanced during the oral argument,
challenging the validity of said section 19,
[G.R. No. 1352. March 29, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin, for Appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. COERCION. — Held upon the evidence that the
defendant Baculi was exempt from responsibility under
article 8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code.
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. — Extrajudicial
confessions not made voluntarily can not be received in
evidence. (Act No. 619, sec. 4.)
3. FAILURE TO REPORT A CRIME. — Failure to report
to the authorities the commission of a crime is not an
offense punished by the Penal Code.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of
presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime
of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of
the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde
O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because,
without having taken part in the said crime as principals
or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the
corpses of the victim in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this
sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses,
it appears that he did so because he was compelled to
do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not
only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime,
Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the
prosecution. This witness says he was present when the
Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a
member of the group who killed the Americans, but that
he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering
some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began
to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and
Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to
him and striking him the butts of their guns they forced
him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who
performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9,
art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros,
there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged;
there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as
well as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro
Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not
take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor
was he even in the place of occurrence when the burial
took place. The confession of his supposed liability and
guilt, made before an official of the division of
information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as
the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered as legal proof, because the same witness
says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the
defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It
appears besides, from the statements of another witness
for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants
that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which
do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily,
without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not
be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of
the Philippine Commission.)
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities
the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of
the motives for the conviction and which the court below
takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished
by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the
defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a
reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the
defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-
appellant. D E C I S I O N BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL
alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and
intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted
and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan
Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of
Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their
damage and prejudice. [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both
accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven
Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. [if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan
appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial
court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts
proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286
of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No.
532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock
in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers
Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea
some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One
of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano
Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and
leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck
Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and
Juan Jr. to "dapa." [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Then Catantan
told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils.
There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the
bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them
to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat
which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea,
Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-
course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he
would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan
Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set
free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as
they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled
again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his
brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were
tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos [if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the
boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another
boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the
Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito
and that its engine was new. Upon learning this,
Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan
boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered
the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another
town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying
that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you." [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and
Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined
Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its
outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the
Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt
threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water
headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the
two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately
another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely
ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any
attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away
of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of the complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel,
in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished
as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in
Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or
watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo
from one place to another through Philippine waters. It
shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used
in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286
of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person
who, without authority of law, shall, by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compel him to do something
against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may
be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or
seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his
companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the
Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely
boarded the boat, and it was only when they were
already on board that they used force to compel the
Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also
insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently
taking possession or depriving complainants of their
boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another
pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to
approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils
behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD
No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that
Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such compulsion
was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant
and enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing
at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there
anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat
arrived and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded
our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you,
how many were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat
boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came
aboard the pumpboat (underscoring supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your
pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his
revolver at us (underscoring supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did
he say anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring
supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the
pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower
portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did
these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy
into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact
that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was
seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as
he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa"
or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his
face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left
eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to
take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four
passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in
complete surrender to the marauders. The moment
Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full
control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his
hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of
PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at
bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses
of the decree - Whereas, reports from law-enforcement
agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting
the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among
the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries; and, Whereas, it is
imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged
from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing
heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only
means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave
the natural elements and contend with the unknown
forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is
on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend
for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be
to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes
of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the
obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people." Had it not been for
the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the
Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering,
meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-
out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention
of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof
of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only
because their pumpboat broke down and it was
necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would
take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates
their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were
apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils
reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize
the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate
him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it
again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized
through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the
Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of
piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-
appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul
as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court,
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI
INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of
qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder
said to have been committed according to the
information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja
Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers
and without lawful authority, armed with firearms and
taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring
and confederating together, aiding and assisting one
with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of
violence or intimidation against persons and force upon
things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the
pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were
riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-
Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and
take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist
watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P
18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused,
on the occasion of the crime herein above-described,
taking advantage that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into
the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns
at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed
all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of
causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de
Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself,
and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to
said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his
death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused
but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were
apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the
following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations,
this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and
Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and
Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized under the
provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby
sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision
of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the
illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused
who are members of the cultural minorities, under a
regime of so called compassionate society, a
commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id,
p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one
assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-
KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p.
8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry
goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of
Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10,
1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de
Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from
his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000
more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received
under an agreement that they would be sold by the
above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the
value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits
for themselves. However these people neither paid the
value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to
him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed
by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near
Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were
hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de
Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de
Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of
his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman
together with his friends who were also travelling
merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island,
Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from
Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them had a
total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for
Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in
the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-
38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group,
together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling
their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P
3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their
goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold
goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned
to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again
slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not
sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day
when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the
former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de
Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by
Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00
(pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the
night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went
to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp.
48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram
and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They
arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh
going ahead of the group went to a house about 15
meters away from the place where the group was selling
its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by
the group talking with two persons whose faces the
group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After
selling their goods, the members of the group, together
with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island.
They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned
himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On
the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another
pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away
from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram
turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two
shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved
towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons
on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes.
De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he
saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk
Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw
a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja
Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were
divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp.
59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions
ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking
fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it
on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good
to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo
Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio
de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming
away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he
was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till
nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead
bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and
Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat
and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso
where he received first aid treatment. Later he was
brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of
his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and
Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram
was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de
Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to
get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S.
Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings
showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr.
Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan,
examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and
Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death
certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138;
140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the
issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be
believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone
prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the
accused-appellants who claims that they were also the
victims of the crime? The trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses
and how they testified assigned credibility to the former
and an examination of the record does not reveal any
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was
overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial
court's determination. Additionally, the following claims
of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily
robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the
occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it
to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would
make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and
robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
would be premature. However, robbing and killing the
victims while at sea and after they had sold all their
goods was both timely and provided safety from prying
eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to
the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For
as the prosecution stated: "It is of important
consequence to mention that the witness presented by
the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team
for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever
presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter
why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso
Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought
by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to
an army detachment. The Army is known to have no
docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army
soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the
version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by
the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence
was presented and nothing can be inferred from the
evidence of the defense so far presented showing
reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or
fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified
piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The
point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is
the role taken by the PC to whom the report was
allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense. Instead of helping the
accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela,
perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or
believing in the version of the report made by the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the
latter's report and placed the accused under detention WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in
for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.) accord with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary
deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua;
Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the
that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of
incident that their husbands were killed by the P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the SO ORDERED.
appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez,
Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
this claim is baseless in the face of the proven Aquino, C.J., took no part.
conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.
stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the
information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the
following facts appear to have been established to show Separate Opinions
clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling,
the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near CUEVAS, J., dissenting:
the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were considering the gravamen of the offense charged the
talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk- manner by which it was committed, I vote to affirm the
Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and death penalty imposed by the trial court.
overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed Separate Opinions
strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- CUEVAS, J., dissenting:
Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two considering the gravamen of the offense charged the
accused, without order from the two armed strangers manner by which it was committed, I vote to affirm the
transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) death penalty imposed by the trial court.
That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were
divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while
the two accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy
and make them equally liable for the same crime
(People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10
SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any
of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp.
128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was
killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen
because his remains were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still
alive or that he died in a manner different from his
companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979
and when the trial court decided the case on June 8,
1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the
number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not
material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e.
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on
the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime
punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature
of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they
hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death
stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is:
"Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot
wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with
the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims
were hacked; that the appellants were armed with
"barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with
armalites.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. FRANCIS DE GUZMAN Y GALANG,
ACCUSED, MANUEL DURIAS Y ASTRERO, ROBERT
LLZARDO Y KANGA, ALIAS ROBERT RIZALDO,
ISABELO TALLEDO Y ESPIRITU, AND ARSENIO
SABAWIL Y POLON, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS., G.R.
NO. L-689
CRUZ, J.:
From Santiago, Isabela, five men started their trip
together in a jeep on January 4, 1984. Their destination
was Quezon City where, unknown to them at the time,
the law would be waiting for them. The encounter
happened the following evening, when NARCOM agents
arrested all of them in a "buy-bust" operation conducted
with the help of an informer. Eventually brought to trial,
all of them were convicted. 1 The four who were
sentenced to life imprisonment are now before us on
appeal of their conviction.
Of these four, one has since withdrawn his appeal and in
effect confessed his guilt. 2 The other three continue to
protest their innocence and ask for a reversal of the
judgment of the trial court on the ground that their guilt
has not been sufficiently established. The fifth was a
minor at the time of the alleged crime and was meted out
a lighter penalty which has been suspended
The five accused were Manuel Durias the owner of the
jeep; Isabelo Talledo his driver, Francis de Guzman who
supposedly acted as conductor; Robert Lizardo, who
claims to have contracted with Dulias for the trip; and his
companion, Arsenio Sabawil, the minor.
As found by the trial court, 4 the accused met with CIC
Cesar Dalonos in the evening of January 5, 1984, on
West Avenue, Quezon City, to negotiate the sale to him
of three kilos of marijuana. Dalonos who was posing as
an interested buyer, was accompanied by Jessie
Gambito, the informer, who had introduced the former to
De Guzman. De Guzman and Durias were the
spokesmen for the group, the other three being in the
jeep nearby. After agreeing on the price and being
assured of payment, Durias signaled the three to get the
marijuana. Talledo drove off with his two companions
and they returned after half an hour with the marijuana,
which Lizardo and Sabawil handed to Dalonos. The
other narcotics agents who had strategically posted
themselves and were covertly watching the transaction
then pounced on the five men and arrested them. 5
In his brief, Lizardo focuses on the argument that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case and that he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
There is no evidence, he says, linking the marijuana
examined by the PC crime laboratory with him nor has it
been proved that he had no license to possess such
narcotic. 6 This argument does not deserve further
comment for its obvious paucity. His claim that the court
erred in finding there was a conspiracy among the co-
accused, which has a little more substance, will be dealt
with presently.
Durias and Talledo also deny the finding of conspiracy,
but with more vigor than Lizardo. These two, in fact,
have distanced themselves from the other defendants,
claiming a different defense, beginning with the purpose
of their trip to Quezon City. The two insist they were
unaware of the marijuana carried by Lizardo and
Sabawil and had nothing to do with their transaction with
Dalonos. According to Durias, Lizardo and Sabawil had
hired his jeep in Isabela to go to Quezon City and he
agreed to charge them P500.00 provided he could pick
up other passengers. 7 His version of what happened in
the evening of January 5, 1984, is that he and his driver
were waiting in front of the disco pub to which Lizardo
had gone to get the balance of the fare he owed when
upon his return all of them were grabbed by the
narcotics agents. 8 He also denies that Lizardo and
Sabawil had loaded vegetables in his jeep, arguing that
these would have filled his vehicle and prevented him
from taking other passengers.
The fact that his and Talledo's defense does not jibe with
that of the other defendants, he stresses, only shows
that there was no conspiracy among them. If there were,
all five of them would have had a similar story and a
common defense.
This would not necessarily follow as the conspiracy was
to commit the crime, not to defend themselves. It is not
unlikely that although they were one in the plan to sell
the marijuana, they decided to take different tracks in
defending themselves and adopt divergent versions of
their respective roles in the incident in question. After
their arrest, it must have been every one for himself, with
each one trying to disentangle himself from the common
snare in which they were enmeshed.
In any event, the testimony of Durias and Talledo does
have many loose ends and seems to suffer from the
weakness and inconsistencies they would impute to the
evidence of the prosecution. Their version of the trip
from Isabela does not seem to be convincing, nor is their
story of the events that happened after their arrival in
Quezon City any more believable.
Durias and Talledo ridicule the claim of the other
defendants that they had loaded vegetables in the jeep,
stressing that, considering their quantity as described by.
Lizardo, they would have occupied the whole vehicle
and prevented him from taking other passengers.
However, in what he called a "Prayer for Acquittal,"
which he filed with the Court on July 23, 1986, Durias
contradicted himself by declaring inter alia that his jeep
had been hired for P500.00 "to transport the vegetables
in Manila" and by referring to "the bulk of the vegetables
that was (sic) loaded in his said passenger jeepney." 9
Moreover, if Lizardo was not loading any vegetables but
merely carrying his usual pack, why were he and
Sabawil charged a higher fare of P500.00? Durias
testified that, of the twelve other passengers who also
took the trip from Isabela, two alighted in Cabanatuan
City, and were each charged P40.00. 10 If Lizardo and
Sabawil were ordinary passengers, as Durias insists,
they would have been charged at a proportionate rate,
may be double the fare to Cabanatuan City, perhaps
even P100 each, but certainly not P500.00 for the two of
them. If, as Durias claims, he had not known the two
before they met on January 4, 1984, the latter would
have objected to the exorbitant fare of P250.00 each and
would have taken other transportation for a more
reasonable cost.
Furthermore, if the two were really strangers and mere
passengers, why did they not, like the others, alight at
the Pantranco Terminal in Cubao, where the trip was
supposed to end? Why is it that in their case, a special
trip had to be made to take them to West Avenue in
Quezon City and, before that, to the house of Talledo's
sister in Guadalupe, Makati, where they were served
free meals and all of them rested for several hours? 11
In their common brief, Durias and Talledo would have us
believe that they had fed their two passengers in
keeping with traditional Filipino hospitality. This virtue
seems to have been overdone in this case if we are to
also believe that they had met the two passengers only
the day before. It is also difficult to believe that when the
five of them went to West Avenue, it was to enable
Lizardo and Sabawil to get the alleged balance of their
fare in the disco house so they could pay Dunas. The
purpose, as the evidence shows, was different.
The Court finds that there was really no agreement
between Durias and the alleged passengers for a special
fare of P500.00. On the contrary, it is clear that they had
planned in Isabela to take the marijuana to Metro Manila
and there sell it, with the five of them sharing in the
proceeds. The assertion of Durias and Talledo that they
were unaware of the marijuana carried by Lizardo and
Sabawil is incredible in the light of their conduct after
their arrival at Cubao and particularly during the "buy-
bust" operation as described by Dalonos and the other
narcotics agents who testified at the trial. 12
The posture of Lizardo is no less incredible. The best
argument against his story is that given by Durias and
Talledo, to wit, that 480 kilos of assorted vegetables,
including cabbages contained in three sacks and one
sack of beans and four bags of potatoes, could hardly be
accommodated in the jeep, along with the five of them.
13 Moreover, if some of the vegetables were sold that
morning of January 5, 1984, as Lizardo alleges, why
could he and Sabawil not have paid Durias with the
proceeds instead of asking him to wait until 11 o'clock
that night (which he willingly did) so he could collect the
full fare of P500.00? Lizardo and Sabawil had already
received that amount from the partial sale of their
vegetables, 14 if they are to be believed, and so had
enough money to pay their alleged fare in full as early as
that morning.
The trial court correctly assessed the evidence in holding
that, as early as from the start of their trip in Isabela, the
five defendants had already entered into an agreement
for the sale of the marijuana in Metro Manila. This
explains why the five of them stuck together after
arriving in Cubao (although the other passengers all
alighted and went their respective ways), ate and rested
in the house of Talledo's sister, and waited until 10
o'clock in the evening to go to the pub house in West
Avenue for their appointment with the poseur-buyer and
the informer.
De Guzman has admitted as much with the withdrawal
of his appeal and his formal statement that "after
meditating on the incident which led to my conviction
and after having consulted my conscience, I am truly
convinced that the sentence imposed upon me is correct
and I am fully satisfied." 15 Durias and Talledo base
their defense mainly on denial of their knowledge of the
existence of the marijuana and their involvement in their
sale. Lizardo for his part merely invokes the
constitutional presumption of innocence (quoting
verbatim from a textbook without attribution) 16 but
without arguing why the prosecution should be
discredited even if, as he impliedly admits, his defense is
weak.
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not
available in the case at bar not because the defense is
weak but because the prosecution is strong. The
prosecution is strong enough to overcome the
presumption but the defense is not strong enough to
overcome the prosecution. It is true that there are certain
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses but these are only minor lapses that do not
detract from the veracity of their narration of the manner
in which the crime was committed in the evening of
January 5, 1984. The evidence offered against all five of
the defendants has proved to the point of moral certainty
their complicity and active participation in the sale of the
three kilos of marijuana in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
As conspirators, all the accused-appellants are equally
guilty, on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.
17 And even if they were not regarded as conspirators,
they would still be guilty as principals by direct
participation, as the Solicitor General correctly points
out, for they were involved directly in the transporting,
possession and sale of the three kilos of marijuana. 18
They were therefore all properly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 each.
Every one must help in the campaign against drug
addiction. We must relentlessly pursue all lawful efforts
to bring to justice those who would prey on the
weakness of the people, especially the youth, by
tantalizing them with the momentary hallucinations and
fantasies induced by the prohibited narcotics that have
already made alarming inroads in our society. The price
the victims pay for these drugs is not measured in pesos
and centavos only but in terms of promises betrayed,
ambitions derailed, purposes gone wayward and lives
needlessly lost.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code
Facts:
On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch
boats which were on its way in the midst of the islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas
were manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats
were carrying men, women and children. At first, the
Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch
boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo,
attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too tremendous to be described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the two
young women, were again placed on it and holes were
made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the
Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were
able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with
the crime of piracy.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the crime of piracy alleged in this case.
Held:
Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case.
Piracy is a villainy not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in
the sufficient tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no
territorial limits.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has
remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was
reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-
SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a
cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of
kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000
barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87,
was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including
Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly
boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven
fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother
of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates,
including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-
appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint
over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on
the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the
PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel
was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at
San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing
repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel,
reported the disappearance of the vessel to the
Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of
the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy.
However, search and rescue operations yielded negative
results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity
of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive.
The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines
on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on
March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to
and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving
the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,
1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the
same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi
Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan,
Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10,
1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident
to government authorities for a period of two days or
until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The
first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly
painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to
Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to
their respective homes. The second batch was fetched
by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10,
1991 and were brought to different places in Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by
the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The
crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office
for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements
regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified
information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and
brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were
arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents
as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who
managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and
Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in
Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified
piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P.
TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation
of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to
April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning
a motor launch and armed with high powered guns,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO
loaded with petroleum products, together with the
complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the
cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the
Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896
before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola,
notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony
as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the
defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as
the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the
"Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own
respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the
effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing
by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto
Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board,
approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to
be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation
if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even
though they had no sea-going experience. On board,
they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and
ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to
Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March
21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for
nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance
would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither
receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the
charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April
10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as
Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in
Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief
Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of
a vessel, working as such for two years on board a
vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte.,
Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker
lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international
markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi
Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was
seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's
name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile
Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board
the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with
Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to
the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half
of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together
with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on
March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the
vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-
ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was
ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil
and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan,
and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride"
sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was
told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the
port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon
submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong,
Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list
submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of
"M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the
vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer
of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao
met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby"
(who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco
nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the
soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took
samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey
report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name
"Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to
Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in
the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another
transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee"
to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that
that there were food and drinks, including beer,
purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee.
The transfer took ten hours and was completed on
March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the
transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to
Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its
cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a
broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in
Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the
matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of
the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact
vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to
arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being
billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong
checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by
the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to
be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha
Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong
found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was
thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting
accused-appellants of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in
Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said
law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is
mandatory death. However, considering that, under the
1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death
penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong
San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and
Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the
same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit,
jointly and severally, to said corporation the value
thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine
Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid
in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are
hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc.
the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can
no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all
the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said
cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine
Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his
sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of
their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation
and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this
case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City
Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation.
With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The
arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized
as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr.,
and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and
Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the
time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas
Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr.
Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of
them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on
February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This
was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined
seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante,
Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the
custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being
given the opportunity to read the contents of the same;
were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional
rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court
erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were
outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were
not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the
alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No.
7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him;
(2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his
cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or
that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of
theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in
finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4)
the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as
an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial
court erred in making factual conclusions without
evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact
are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the
trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he
was charged as a principal by direct participation under
said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other
accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his
part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy.
He further argues that he had not in any way participated
in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing
the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware
that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was
charged under the information with qualified piracy as
principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he
argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed
within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as
follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of
the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects
and implications of the absence of counsel during the
custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the
crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant
Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be
convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as
such and when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation
(Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on
February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a
non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial,
accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul
Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said
accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and
legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and
that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same.
They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when
asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be
present and to defend himself in person and by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial.
However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by
law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the
same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person
when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the
sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it
is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants
were sufficiently and properly protected by the
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of
the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver
of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274
SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel
during custodial investigation may not be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S.
436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he gives may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The Constitution even adds the more stringent
requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made
in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of
the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants
make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar.
Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the
so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a
phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S.
388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints
all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel,
are inadmissible and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in
evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict
accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with
the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio
Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire
and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the
words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo
of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of
witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the
said Accused as among those who attacked and seized,
the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30
o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with
its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and
the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of
Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles
off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the
Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was
discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the
"M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to
April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can
be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody
by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba
and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit"
(Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their
defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court
that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening
of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the
vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off
the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any
hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is
given to the categorical identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain
denial of participation in the commission of the crime
(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired
by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto
Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their
companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-
shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to
work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of
time without even saying goodbye to their families,
without even knowing their destination or the details of
their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a
long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and
clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed
out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,
Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to
leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and
venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit
five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial
with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place
of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house
in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much
more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
(People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering
that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to
disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10,
1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been
in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do
this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his
place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect,
for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to
determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code).
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times
when conspirators are assigned separate and different
tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in
fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and
others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and
the members of the crew from the shoreline of
Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them
to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers
of the vessel with money for their fare and food
provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-
coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need
not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of
an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-
appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo),
owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his
brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each
other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin,
on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative
of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and
Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel
coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio
Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the
crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he
can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters
as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because
Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has
impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in
Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile
the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in
Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be
omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only
apply to offenders who are members of the complement
or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act
No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the
vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the
law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall
attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
(January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall
mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or
the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement
or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel
in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished
as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the
coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On
the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement
or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended
the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no
need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack
on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition
by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of
the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to
the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is
likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
[1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-
appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him on the
ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though
he was charged as a principal by direct participation
under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of
evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo;
(b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c)
and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless,
the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or
abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands
or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. —
Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or
other peace officers of the government, or acquires or
receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in
any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person
who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy
or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered
as an accomplice of the principal officers and be
punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of
the acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled
jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not
as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]).
Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of
lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983];
People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which
presumes that any person who does any of the acts
provided in said section has performed them knowingly,
unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the
legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in
the commission of piracy, received property taken by
such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided
the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked
cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified
the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with
Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General
Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal
transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer,
and other provisions for their maintenance while in port
(tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General
Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was
accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong
and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of
their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port
Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not
falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that
took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and
prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the
stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not
have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial
court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in
the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as
follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain
Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the
vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T
Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the
vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities,
excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General
Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its
voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A
CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was
scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and
that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of
cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T
Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k.
a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared
the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was
2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not
the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2
CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did
not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio
Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite
"General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on
March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits
"JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely
appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of
cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it
acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of
diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same
irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise
supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end
while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his
end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely
following the orders of his superiors and that he has no
knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot
deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo
since he himself received the same from "M/T
Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly
educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very
suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired.
He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or
even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the
purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and
scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the
"M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of
Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time
nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that
the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in
the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm
did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi
Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum
of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not
even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and
thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the
value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more
than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the
exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was
sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-
appellant Hiong should have been aware of this
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far
away Singapore, spend much time and money for
transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it
were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act
of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-
appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his
firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant
was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to
an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some
lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably,
the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng
Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but
of international law. Such violation was committed on
board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the
means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was
equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie
Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong
presented himself, and the trial court was convinced,
that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain.
These circumstances show that he must have realized
the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim
Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the
transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do
so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-
appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
[G.R. No. 496. December 31, 1902. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, v.
WILLIAM FOWLER ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for
Appellant.
William Lane O’Neill, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CRIMES ON HIGH
SEAS. — Courts of First Instance of the Philippines have
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes committed
on the high seas on board of a transport or other vessel
not registered or licensed in the Philippines.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of
sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of $20, on the
12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton,
then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of
champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel
and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were
taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the
same, without violence or intimidation, and without the
consent of the owner, against the statute in the case
made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the
prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the
Government, counsel for the defendants presented a
demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was
without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as
it appeared from the information that the crime was
committed on the high seas, and not in the city of
Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of
Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which
the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon
these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting
attorney, who alleged that the court has original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty
exceeds six month’s imprisonment, or a fine of over
$100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military
Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction
over all crimes committed on board vessels flying the
flag of the United States has been vested in the Courts
of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws
and orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and
Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil
Commission. He argued that the President of the United
States had unquestionable authority to authorize the
commanding general and the Civil Commission to
establish a judicial system with authority to take
cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this
Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of
some of the States of the Union during the Mexican was
and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of
September, 1901, held that the court was without
jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to
have been committed on the high seas, sustained the
demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants,
with the costs to the Government. Against this order the
prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was
brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a
transport while navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of
the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the
Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law,
Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or
authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes
committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the
provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect
to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with
respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise
concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the
case, Act. No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which
the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were
organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of
seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8,
which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of
any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, on bard a ship or water craft of
any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands
in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this
law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this
class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order
appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa and Ladd,
JJ., concur.
US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of

the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the

theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on
board the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants
alleged to the Court of First Instance of Manila that they
were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it
happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila
or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court
extends, they asked that the case be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has

jurisdiction over the criminal case theft committed on
board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not
registered in the Philippines.

Held:

No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime

of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English
Rule states that such crimes are triable in our country
when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel
sailing from a foreign port and which enters the
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel Lawton
was navigating the high seas at the commission of the
crime. Given the location of the vessel at the time, such
act is not triable within our jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-30001 June 23, 1970
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners,
vs.
ANG CHO KIO @ ANG MING HUY and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and
Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, by the Solicitor General in behalf
of the Director of Prisons and the Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 39018-R of said Court, entitled "Ang Cho Kio (Ang
Ming Huy) Petitioner-Appellee versus The Director of
Prisons and the Executive Secretary, Respondents-
Appellees."1 In his petition the Solicitor General prays
this Court "to render judgment ordering the striking out
from said decision of the portions recommending to the
Executive Secretary 'to allow the (petitioner) (respondent
Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy) to leave this country in
the first available transportation abroad' but otherwise
affirming the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus,
with costs in all instances against respondent Ang Cho
Kio @ Ang Ming Huy."
The pertinent facts for the purposes of this decision, as
shown in the record, are as follows:
Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been
charged, tried and convicted of various offenses
committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to
suffer penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45) years, ten
(10) months and twenty one (21) days of imprisonment,
P6,000 indemnity, and P5,000 moral damages, plus life
imprisonment and P6,000 indemnity.2 After serving six
and one-half (6-½) years of his sentence said
respondent was granted conditional pardon on July 4,
1959 by the President of the Philippines. The conditional
pardon partly reads as follows:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, and upon the recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, the unexecuted portions of the
prison terms of prisoner ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA @
PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KE WA @ LUCIO
LEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG
is hereby remitted on condition that he will voluntarily
leave the Philippines upon his release and never to
return to this country. Should the above-named prisoner
refuse to accept said condition, be shall continue serving
his sentence and upon the expiration thereof, he shall be
deported from the Philippines for being an undesirable
alien.
Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon
and actually left the Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist
China, on July 28, 1959.
In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at
the Manila International Airport on a Philippine Air Lines
plane from Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang Ming
Huy." He held a round-trip ticket from Taipeh to
Honolulu, to San Francisco, to Los Angeles, to Chicago,
to Washington D.C. to New York, to Vancouver, to
Tokyo, to Seoul, to Osaka, to Taipeh to Bangkok, to
Saigon, to Hongkong and back to Taipeh. He was
booked on Philippine Air Lines earliest connecting flight
to Honolulu on June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m., or with a
stop-over of about 72 hours in Manila. He surrendered
his passport to the immigration authorities at the Manila
International Airport, and was issued a note that his
departure was scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m.
He left his luggage at the airport and was issued claim
tags. He registered for a three-day stay at the El
Presidente Hotel at Parañaque, Rizal. He contacted his
two friends in Manila, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim. These
two friends invited him to stay longer in the Philippines.
On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the
Bureau of Immigration, where his friend Lim Pin signed a
letter addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration
requesting for a fourteen-day extension of stay in the
Philippines for him. Ang Cho Kio was identified by
inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as
the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July
18, 1959. His identity having been established, Ang Cho
Kio was arrested, and the immigration authorities
conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the
Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him
to proceed with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on
him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.
The supplemental order of recommitment reads as
follows:
TO THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL
WHEREAS, ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA & PHILIPP ANG
@ ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @ LUCIO DEE @ GO ONG
@ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on
July 4, 1959, upon the condition that he will voluntarily
leave the Philippines upon his release and never to
return to this country; and
WHEREAS, said ANG CHO KIO has violated the
condition of his pardon in that on June 26, 1966, he
returned to this country from Taipei and gained entry
under an assumed name, ANG MING HUY, failed to
leave on the first available connecting flight to Honolulu,
his alleged destination; instead requested a fourteen day
extension of his 72-hour transient stop-over; and had in
December 1965 applied for a temporary visitor's visa to
Manila also under his assumed name, ANG MING HUY;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority conferred
upon the President of the Philippines by Section 64(i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby
ordered to recommit to prison said ANG CHO KIO @
KIWA @ PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @
LUCIO DEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @
MR. ONG @ ANG MING HUY to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentences for which he was originally
committed to prison, and upon expiration thereof, to
deliver said person to the custody of the Commissioner
of Immigration for immediate deportation for being an
undesirable alien.
Manila, July 5, 1966.
By Authority of the President: (Sgd.) RAFAEL M. SALAS
Executive Secretary RS/ara.
Ang Cho Kio filed with the Executive Secretary a motion,
dated August 29, 1966, for the reconsideration of the
supplemental order of recommitment. The Executive
Secretary failed to act on the motion for reconsideration,
and so on October 5, 1966 Ang Cho Kio filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasay Branch), making as
respondents in said petition the Director of Prisons and
the Executive secretary. Under date of October 10,
1966, the officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Prisons filed
his return. Under date of October 17, 1966, the Solicitor
General filed a return for the Director of Prisons and the
Executive Secretary.
After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on
January 31, 1967, rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal held that Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy was validly
recommitted to prison by the President of the Philippines
in the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the
provisions of Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the
decision of a special division of five justices, with three
justices concurring, and two justices concurring and
dissenting, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing Ang Cho Kio's petition for
habeas corpus.
We read the following in the majority opinion:
It having been settled that Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is still in force, and that the
respondent Executive Secretary, in the name and by
authority of the President, exercised the power of
recommitment herein under the provisions of said Code,
and not under Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code, it
becomes apparent that any discussion regarding failure
to file the corresponding indictment and the presence or
absence of criminal intent, will be off-tangent. On the
contrary, the issue, in this connection, is whether the
courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the
President, thru his Executive Secretary, of his
administrative power of recommitment. Again, it is
settled jurisprudence that the Chief Executive may
determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition
attached to a pardon given by him has been violated;
and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may
not interfere, however erroneous the findings may be
(Espuelas v. The Provincial Warden, supra; Tesoro v.
Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154).
The aforequoted portion of the majority opinion affirms
the reasons of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. However, the
majority opinion contains the recommendation that Ang
Cho Kio
... be sent out at once from this country and that he be
allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only
when he has been booked for outward flight at the
Manila International Airport so as to avoid the possibility
of any further violation of his conditional pardon. At any
rate it would be to the best interest of the security and
peace of this country to have the petitioner expatriated
from the Philippines, instead of being recommitted for a
long duration of time to prison where his presence may
constitute a constant menace to our country's welfare
and bring about some sinister influence among the
people with whom he will associate or come in contact.
Then the dispositive portion of the majority opinion reads
as follows:
FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petition
herein filed is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner, and with a reiteration of the recommendation
to allow the petitioner to leave this country in the first
available transportation abroad made in the course of
this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Executive Secretary.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of the two justices
opens with the following statement:
We concur with the majority opinion insofar as the
dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus of
petitioner-appellant Ang Cho Kio is concerned, for such
dismissal, in effect, is equivalent to an affirmance of the
appealed decision. However, we beg to dissent from that
portion of the majority opinion recommending that said
petitioner-appellant be allowed to leave this country by
the first available transportation.
In due time the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration, praying for the
deletion from the majority opinion of the
recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the
country on the first available transportation abroad. The
Court of Appeals, by a vote of three to two in the special
division which decided the case, denied the motion.
Hence this appeal by certiorari by the Solicitor General
to this Court.
It is now contended by the Solicitor General that the
majority of the special division of five justices of the
Court of Appeals erred in making a recommendation to
allow respondent Ang Cho Kio to have this country on
the first available transportation abroad. The Solicitor
General maintains that the recommendation is not a part
of the decision binding upon the parties, and is uncalled
for; that it gives the decision a political complexion,
because courts are not empowered to make such a
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the
exercise of judicial powers; that there is no law which
gives the court the authority to recommend to the
President the voluntary departure of an undesirable alien
who is lawfully committed to jail; that the deportation of
aliens sentenced by the courts for violation of the laws of
the land, and even the act of merely allowing such
convicted aliens to voluntarily leave the country, is an act
of state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief
Executive. It is urged by the Solicitor General that the act
of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is
political in character, and the courts should not interfere
with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the
Chief Executive.
In a motion dated April 7, 1969, Ang Cho Kio manifested
that he waived his right to file an answer to any brief filed
by the Solicitor General.4
We agree with the Solicitor General. The case before the
Court of Appeals was for habeas corpus. The only
question to be resolved by the Court of Appeals was
whether, or not, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, had
rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas
corpus. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to
review any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho Kio. The
sentence against him had long become final, and, in
fact, he has served part of the sentence when he was
extended pardon on July 4, 1959, upon the condition
that he should leave the country, never to return. The
opinion of the three justices of the special division of the
Court of Appeals, to which the two other justices have
concurred, found that the recommitment to prison of Ang
Cho Kio was done in the exercise by the President of the
Philippines of his power pursuant to the provision of
Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, and
the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that
power. The majority opinion should have been limited to
the affirmance of the decision of the lower court, and no
more.
The recommendatory power of the courts in this
jurisdiction are limited to those expressly provided in the
law — and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it
may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice such
statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result
in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of
the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in
question, is not authorized under the aforequoted
provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any
sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was
simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio
was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary
under the Director of Prisons. We do not consider it
proper that the majority of the justices in the special
division make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief
Executive, after the same justices have said in their
opinion "that the Chief Executive may determine, alone
and by himself, whether the condition attached to a
pardon given by him had been violated; and in the
exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere,
however erroneous the findings may be." When the
Chief Executive, exercising his powers pursuant to
Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is
assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang
Cho Kio should be dealt with that way under the
circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief
Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho
Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead
is indeed to interfere with the functions of the Chief
Executive. It would be, as urged by the Solicitor General,
an interference on, or an attempt to influence, the
exercise by the Chief Executive of the political powers of
his office. The matter of whether an alien who violated
the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a
political question that should be left entirely to the Chief
Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of
powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to
express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would
reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the
Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature.
It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the
majority opinion of the special division of the Court of
Appeals simply represents the private opinion of the
three justices, and judges should be left free to express
even their private opinions in judicial decisions. We
believe, however, that the better practice should be that
the decision of a court should contain only opinion that is
relevant to the question that is before the court for
decision. After all, courts are not concerned with the
wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation
and application of the law. We believe that judges should
refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their
decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their
competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently
constituted, only five are of the opinion that the
recommendation embodied in the decision of the
majority of the special division of the Court of Appeals,
now in question, should be deleted from the decision.5
Two members of the Court are of a different opinion,6
and three others did not take part in the decision
because of their official actuations relative to the case of
respondent Ang Cho Kio before it reached this Court. 7
There is, therefore, one vote less than the majority of the
Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied,
and the decision of the special division of the Court of
Appeals stands. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Zaldivar,
both thorough and meticulous, is, to my mind, equally
noteworthy for expressing with clarity and precision the
governing principle that should govern the discharge of
judicial functions. It has my full concurrence therefore. I
would like, however, to add a few words to the subject in
view of the significance attached to a matter so
fundamental in character.
The basic premise, of course, is the decisive weight to
be accorded the fundamental postulate of separation of
powers. While the failure of the majority opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals to yield full obeisance to its
implications insofar as the executive is concerned is
brought to light in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar, I would
on my part view it further as an unwarrant assumption by
the judiciary of a role which under the Constitution is
denied it. To be more precise, it is not for any occupant
of any court to play the role of adviser to the Executive.
I entertain serious fears that if the rule were otherwise
not only would there be an infringement of the
separation of powers concept but the delicate and grave
duty of the courts to assure compliance with
constitutional mandates and maintain its supremacy as
called for by the rule of law would be gravely
endangered. Such a point of view I once had occasion to
manifest in a concurring opinion. Thus: "For to go back
to the concept of the rule of law, in the same way that
the legislative and the executive branches are required
to act strictly within the bounds of their competence, the
judiciary, including this Court, is likewise restricted to its
proper domain. The fact that on questions of law it has
the final say makes it all the more imperative that in
passing upon the question of whether or not it is called
upon to act, it takes the utmost care that in assuring
compliance with constitutional limitations, it does not, at
the same time, ignore the limits of its own authority."1
What was said by Justice Malcolm, speaking for this
Court in a 1932 opinion, comes to mind.2 Time has not
impaired its validity; it has but served to confirm it. Thus:
"The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents
one of the three divisions of power in our government. It
is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction by any other department by the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to
the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power
or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions."3
In support of the above view, Justice Malcolm made
reference to the last opinion of Chief Justice Taney of
the United States Supreme Court. This is the excerpt
referred to: "Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being
defined in the organic law of the government, and being
all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize
the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty. ... And while it executes firmly all
the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully
abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly
judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided
to it by the Constitution. ..."4
There is likewise the epochal opinion of Justice Cardozo,
as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,5 when
that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that
would vest in a justice of its Supreme Court the power to
investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion
explained why: "He is made the delegate of the
Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a
public officer. ... At the word of command he is to give
over the work of judging, and set himself to other work,
the work of probing and advising. His findings when
made will have none of the authority of a judgment. To
borrow Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or
sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any
rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any
of its branches. They will be mere advice to the
Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or
reject them altogether. From the beginnings of our
history, the principle has been enforced that there is no
inherent power in Executive or Legislature to charge the
judiciary with administrative functions except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties...
The exigencies of government have made it necessary
to relax a merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so
flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible
approximation, as that of the separation of powers.
Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence of
the judicial function may be destroyed by turning the
power to decide into a pallid opportunity to consult and
recommend ...."
Such a principle in American law, Justice Cardozo could
trace back to Hayburn's Case,6 a 1792 decision. He
made mention of another authoritative precedent, this
too coming from the pen of Chief Justice Taney in 1851,
in United States v. Ferreira. 7 A provision of the Treaty
of 1819 by virtue of which Florida was ceded by Spain to
the United States was to the effect that it was incumbent
on the latter to satisfy claims for injury by Spaniards
whether in the armed forces or civilians due to the
operations of the American army in Florida. In 1823
Congress passed an act to carry into execution this
article of the Treaty. It was therein authorized for the
judges of the superior courts established at St.
Augustine and Pensacola, Florida, respectively, to
receive and adjust all claims arising within their
respective jurisdictions, agreeably to the above article of
the Treaty. Decision favorable to claimants were to be
reported by such judges to the Secretary of the
Treasury, "who, on being satisfied that the same is just
and equitable, within the provisions of the Treaty, shall
pay the amount thereof to the person or persons in
whose favor the said is adjudged."
According to Chief Justice Taney: "It is too evident for
argument on the subject that such a tribunal is not a
judicial one, and that the Act of Congress did not intend
to make it one. The authority conferred on the respective
judges was nothing more than that of a commissioner to
adjust certain claims against the United States; and the
office of judges, and their respective jurisdiction, are
referred to in the law, merely as a designation of the
persons to whom the authority is confided, and the
territorial limits to which it extends. The decision is not
the judgment of a court of justice. It is the award of a
Commissioner. The Act of 1834 calls it an award. And an
appeal to this court from such a decision, by such an
authority from the judgment of a court of record, would
be an anomaly if the history of jurisprudence."
Nor was this the first time in the New York bench that
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, made such a
pronouncement. 8 In holding not legally allowable the
reference to the New York Court of Appeals by the
Industrial Commission of New York, the question of
whether or not it was authorized to require payment into
the stale fund of certain unpaid death benefits, the
distinguished jurist declared: "In that situation our duty is
not doubtful. The function of the courts is to determine
controversies between litigants. ... They do not give
advisory opinions. The giving of such opinions is not the
exercise of the judicial function. ... It is true that in
England the custom of the Constitution makes the
judges of the high court the assistants of the Lords, and
requires them, upon the demand of the Lords to give
'consultative' opinions. But that custom is a survival of
the days when the judge were members of the great
council of the realm. In the United States no such duty
attaches to the judicial office in the absence of express
provision of the Constitution."
There could be no disputing the accuracy of the
observation made by Justice Cardozo in the Richardson
opinion as to the fatal infirmity that would infect the role
of a judge as a counselor of the Executive in these
words: "Centuries of common law tradition warn us with
echoing impressiveness that this is not a judge's work."
In that sense we are as one with the common-law
although we cannot trace it that far back. Failure to
adhere to it gives rise to a grave concern.
Moreover, I would assume that those of us entrusted
with judicial responsibility could not be unaware that we
may be laying ourselves open to the charge of
presumptuousness. Considering that the exercise of
judicial authority does not embrace the alien role of a
presidential adviser, indictment of officiousness may be
hard to repel. It is indefinitely worse if the advice thus
gratuitously offered is ignored or disregarded. The loss
of judicial prestige may be incalculable. Thereafter, there
may be less than full respect for court decisions. It would
impair the confidence in its ability to live up to its trust
not only on the part of immediate parties to the litigation
but of the general public as well. Even if the teaching of
decided cases both here and in the Philippines is not as
clear therefore, there should be, to say the least, the
utmost reluctance on the part of any court to arrogate for
itself such a prerogative, the exercise of which is fraught
with possibilities of such undesirable character.
When it is borne in mind that no undue attention need be
paid to such advice, which may prove to be ineffectual,
even futile, with consequences far-from-flattering to the
judiciary, the language of the then Professor Frankfurter
used with reference to advisory opinions, although set in
a different context, would not be inappropriate. They are
"ghosts that slay." 9 There is no place for them in the
law, not if respect be paid to a coordinate branch, the
Executive, and if, to my mind a more important
consideration, there be no deviation from what thus far
has rightly been conceived to be the fitting and proper
role of the judiciary.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion of my brethren insofar as it
orders the deletion of the recommendation of three of
the five Justices who constituted the special division of
the Court of Appeals which decided this case that the
petitioner Ang Cho Kio be allowed "to leave this country
by the first available transportation." This
recommendation is admittedly not a part of the judgment
of the said Court; it was not within the issue presented
for its resolution; and the fact that it was made at all is a
non-prejudicial matter which does not rise to the
category of reversible error. I would not begrudge the
three Justices who made it the liberty to do so, nor
consider their act as an undue trespass upon
presidential prerogative. What is involved is, to me, no
more than a question of taste, or punctilious observance
of certain proprieties concerning which well-meaning
men may honestly differ; and I am not prepared to say
that there has been such a blatant disregard of either as
to call for the interposition of this Court's power of review
merely for the purpose of ordering the deletion of the
matter objected to.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Zaldivar,
both thorough and meticulous, is, to my mind, equally
noteworthy for expressing with clarity and precision the
governing principle that should govern the discharge of
judicial functions. It has my full concurrence therefore. I
would like, however, to add a few words to the subject in
view of the significance attached to a matter so
fundamental in character.
The basic premise, of course, is the decisive weight to
be accorded the fundamental postulate of separation of
powers. While the failure of the majority opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals to yield full obeisance to its
implications insofar as the executive is concerned is
brought to light in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar, I would
on my part view it further as an unwarrant assumption by
the judiciary of a role which under the Constitution is
denied it. To be more precise, it is not for any occupant
of any court to play the role of adviser to the Executive.
I entertain serious fears that if the rule were otherwise
not only would there be an infringement of the
separation of powers concept but the delicate and grave
duty of the courts to assure compliance with
constitutional mandates and maintain its supremacy as
called for by the rule of law would be gravely
endangered. Such a point of view I once had occasion to
manifest in a concurring opinion. Thus: "For to go back
to the concept of the rule of law, in the same way that
the legislative and the executive branches are required
to act strictly within the bounds of their competence, the
judiciary, including this Court, is likewise restricted to its
proper domain. The fact that on questions of law it has
the final say makes it all the more imperative that in
passing upon the question of whether or not it is called
upon to act, it takes the utmost care that in assuring
compliance with constitutional limitations, it does not, at
the same time, ignore the limits of its own authority."1
What was said by Justice Malcolm, speaking for this
Court in a 1932 opinion, comes to mind.2 Time has not
impaired its validity; it has but served to confirm it. Thus:
"The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents
one of the three divisions of power in our government. It
is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme
Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction by any other department by the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to
the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power
or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions."3
In support of the above view, Justice Malcolm made
reference to the last opinion of Chief Justice Taney of
the United States Supreme Court. This is the excerpt
referred to: "Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being
defined in the organic law of the government, and being
all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize
the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or
perform any other duty. ... And while it executes firmly all
the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully
abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly
judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided
to it by the Constitution. ..."4
There is likewise the epochal opinion of Justice Cardozo,
as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,5 when
that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that
would vest in a justice of its Supreme Court the power to
investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion
explained why: "He is made the delegate of the
Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a
public officer. ... At the word of command he is to give
over the work of judging, and set himself to other work,
the work of probing and advising. His findings when
made will have none of the authority of a judgment. To
borrow Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or
sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any
rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any
of its branches. They will be mere advice to the
Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or
reject them altogether. From the beginnings of our
history, the principle has been enforced that there is no
inherent power in Executive or Legislature to charge the
judiciary with administrative functions except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties...
The exigencies of government have made it necessary
to relax a merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so
flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible
approximation, as that of the separation of powers.
Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence of
the judicial function may be destroyed by turning the
power to decide into a pallid opportunity to consult and
recommend ...."
Such a principle in American law, Justice Cardozo could
trace back to Hayburn's Case,6 a 1792 decision. He
made mention of another authoritative precedent, this
too coming from the pen of Chief Justice Taney in 1851,
in United States v. Ferreira. 7 A provision of the Treaty
of 1819 by virtue of which Florida was ceded by Spain to
the United States was to the effect that it was incumbent
on the latter to satisfy claims for injury by Spaniards
whether in the armed forces or civilians due to the
operations of the American army in Florida. In 1823
Congress passed an act to carry into execution this
article of the Treaty. It was therein authorized for the
judges of the superior courts established at St.
Augustine and Pensacola, Florida, respectively, to
receive and adjust all claims arising within their
respective jurisdictions, agreeably to the above article of
the Treaty. Decision favorable to claimants were to be
reported by such judges to the Secretary of the
Treasury, "who, on being satisfied that the same is just
and equitable, within the provisions of the Treaty, shall
pay the amount thereof to the person or persons in
whose favor the said is adjudged."
According to Chief Justice Taney: "It is too evident for
argument on the subject that such a tribunal is not a
judicial one, and that the Act of Congress did not intend
to make it one. The authority conferred on the respective
judges was nothing more than that of a commissioner to
adjust certain claims against the United States; and the
office of judges, and their respective jurisdiction, are
referred to in the law, merely as a designation of the
persons to whom the authority is confided, and the
territorial limits to which it extends. The decision is not
the judgment of a court of justice. It is the award of a
Commissioner. The Act of 1834 calls it an award. And an
appeal to this court from such a decision, by such an
authority from the judgment of a court of record, would
be an anomaly if the history of jurisprudence."
Nor was this the first time in the New York bench that
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, made such a
pronouncement. 8 In holding not legally allowable the
reference to the New York Court of Appeals by the
Industrial Commission of New York, the question of
whether or not it was authorized to require payment into
the stale fund of certain unpaid death benefits, the
distinguished jurist declared: "In that situation our duty is
not doubtful. The function of the courts is to determine
controversies between litigants. ... They do not give
advisory opinions. The giving of such opinions is not the
exercise of the judicial function. ... It is true that in
England the custom of the Constitution makes the
judges of the high court the assistants of the Lords, and
requires them, upon the demand of the Lords to give
'consultative' opinions. But that custom is a survival of
the days when the judge were members of the great
council of the realm. In the United States no such duty
attaches to the judicial office in the absence of express
provision of the Constitution."
There could be no disputing the accuracy of the
observation made by Justice Cardozo in the Richardson
opinion as to the fatal infirmity that would infect the role
of a judge as a counselor of the Executive in these
words: "Centuries of common law tradition warn us with
echoing impressiveness that this is not a judge's work."
In that sense we are as one with the common-law
although we cannot trace it that far back. Failure to
adhere to it gives rise to a grave concern.
Moreover, I would assume that those of us entrusted
with judicial responsibility could not be unaware that we
may be laying ourselves open to the charge of
presumptuousness. Considering that the exercise of
judicial authority does not embrace the alien role of a
presidential adviser, indictment of officiousness may be
hard to repel. It is indefinitely worse if the advice thus
gratuitously offered is ignored or disregarded. The loss
of judicial prestige may be incalculable. Thereafter, there
may be less than full respect for court decisions. It would
impair the confidence in its ability to live up to its trust
not only on the part of immediate parties to the litigation
but of the general public as well. Even if the teaching of
decided cases both here and in the Philippines is not as
clear therefore, there should be, to say the least, the
utmost reluctance on the part of any court to arrogate for
itself such a prerogative, the exercise of which is fraught
with possibilities of such undesirable character.
When it is borne in mind that no undue attention need be
paid to such advice, which may prove to be ineffectual,
even futile, with consequences far-from-flattering to the
judiciary, the language of the then Professor Frankfurter
used with reference to advisory opinions, although set in
a different context, would not be inappropriate. They are
"ghosts that slay." 9 There is no place for them in the
law, not if respect be paid to a coordinate branch, the
Executive, and if, to my mind a more important
consideration, there be no deviation from what thus far
has rightly been conceived to be the fitting and proper
role of the judiciary.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion of my brethren insofar as it
orders the deletion of the recommendation of three of
the five Justices who constituted the special division of
the Court of Appeals which decided this case that the
petitioner Ang Cho Kio be allowed "to leave this country
by the first available transportation." This
recommendation is admittedly not a part of the judgment
of the said Court; it was not within the issue presented
for its resolution; and the fact that it was made at all is a
non-prejudicial matter which does not rise to the
category of reversible error. I would not begrudge the
three Justices who made it the liberty to do so, nor
consider their act as an undue trespass upon
presidential prerogative. What is involved is, to me, no
more than a question of taste, or punctilious observance
of certain proprieties concerning which well-meaning
men may honestly differ; and I am not prepared to say
that there has been such a blatant disregard of either as
to call for the interposition of this Court's power of review
merely for the purpose of ordering the deletion of the
matter objected to.
LAUREL V. MISA
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio
Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and
consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen
thereto were then suspended; and that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF
A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT
BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION
HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested
in the legitimate government.
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the
political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is
full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the
international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II,
Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should
necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the
invading power whose interest and requirements are
naturally in conflict with those of displaced government,
if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and
enforce from the inhabit ants such obedience as may be
necessary for the security of his forces, for the
maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper
administration of the country.
77 Phil. 856
FACTS:
The accused was charged with treason. During the
Japanese occupation, theaccusedadhered to the enemy
by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that
hecannot be tried fortreason since his allegiance to the
Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims
that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty
over the country since his acts were against the
Commonwealth which was replaced already by the
Republic.
HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen
owes absolute and permanentallegiance tohis
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was
made; hence, it ispresumed that thePhilippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty
cannot besuspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated
and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended;
rather,it was theexercise of sovereignty that was
suspended. Thus, there is no suspendedallegiance.
Regarding thechange of government, there is no such
change since the sovereign – the Filipinopeople – is still
thesame. What happened was a mere change of name
of government, fromCommonwealth to theRepublic of
the Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of
Japanese occupation, all the political laws of
thePhilippineswere suspended. Thus, treason under the
Revised Penal Code cannot be punishablewhere the
lawsof the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the
change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines
wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since
it was underthe United States. Hence, the acts of
treason done cannot carry over to the new
Republicwhere thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign.
G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
 Assistant Solicitor
General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los
Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First
Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte.
The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in
issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of
Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy and her military forces said
accused being a member of the Philippines
Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany
10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all
armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest
Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of
being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein
accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain
him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same
date the accused and his companions did apprehend
Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were
also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and
sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did
shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the
municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said
accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary
did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary
soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares
for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said
accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut
a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe
especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who
effectively died as a result of said tortures administered
by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines
with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said
accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and
treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary
soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu
City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former
USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein
accused and his companions did tie and torture said
Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary
Headquarters for several days after which he was taken
out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said
accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is
a complex crime of treason with murders with the result
that the penalty provided for the most serious offense
was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the
case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the
court believed that the same result obtained. It opined
that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed
band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth
in the information are merged in and formed part of
treason. They were in this case the overt acts which
besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in
the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and
sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of
aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not
be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities
in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating
circumstances which impelled the court against its
sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we
only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in
which this question was discussed and decided. There
we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation superior strength treachery and
employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural
effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent
in the offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate
the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort
to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long
continued process requiring for the successful
consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective
and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the
crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior
strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out
resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in
collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and
equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the
accused adhered was itself the personification of brute
superior force and it was this superior force which
enabled him to overrun the country and for a time
subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does
not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their
foes only on even terms according to he romantic
traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of
strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission
of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason
and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes,
wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of
cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these
will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary
wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs
17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The
atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is
beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above
paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and
use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason
characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other
accompanying crime should be taken into consideration
for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they
were committed. Were not this the rule treason the
highest crime known to law would confer on its
perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer.
To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in
treason will be adapted within the range provided in the
Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to
which the culprit has exposed his country and his people
and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his
deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised
Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind
that conceived and carried the crime into execution.
Where the system of graduating penalties by the
prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of
homicides connection with treason the method of
analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the
offense may be summoned to the service of justice and
consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case
we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty
is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the
maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified
and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the
legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon,
Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA),
defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
 First Assistant
Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro
C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for
treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered
a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained
the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special
prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating
with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have
sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was
found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7
and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of
P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their
statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito
Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945,
the accused with other Filipino undercovers and
Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had
the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled
by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was
faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to
the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know
what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next
witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw
the accused following an American and the accused
were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different
occasions. The last witness stated that the American
was walking as well as his captors. And there was no
sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at
night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle.
The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not
only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People
vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S.
Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the
aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as
crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to technical designation of the crime.
In his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is
a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
being a member of the Japanese Military Police and
acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that
said accused and his companions did apprehended
Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him
fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by
the accused and his Japanese companions to Yati,
Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing
red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from
there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp
in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese
Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas
and guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his
companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and
Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and
his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo
Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving
them first blows on the face and in other parts of the
body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the
following day while his brother was detained and
thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his
whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the
Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said
accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably
lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos
and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality
of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas
and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact
apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and
Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope,
tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said
Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2
kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet
them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of
Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla
activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects
mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical
injuries on others are not offenses separate from
treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the
United States constitution defining treason, after which
the former was patterned, there must concur both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.
One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an indication that the former counsel did not conduct the
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his
crime and can not be the subject of a separate best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present
punishment, or used in combination with treason to attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal cut any influence in the result of the case and did not
Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for imperil the rights of the appellant.
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4
identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7.
coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to
robbery, because possession of opium and force and be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.
another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of and Padilla, JJ., concur.
course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical
injuries as such if the government should elect to PARAS, J.:
prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.
on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where
murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason that they can not be regarded separately under
their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical
injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating
circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less
painful method of execution will be taken into account to
increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as
in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended
parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the
accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but
count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6
were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal
of the judgment because of the trial court's failure to
appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in
spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who
defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to
be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable
presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all
the proceedings of the trial court, including the
presumption that the accused was not denied the right to
have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is
presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has
been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to
the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact
that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the
defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept
the designation because, as the present counsel
assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's
cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
The statement of the counsel in the court below did no
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to
protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact,
PEOPLE V. PRIETO
FACTS:
-The appellant was prosecuted for treason.
-Two witnesses gave evidence but their statements do
not coincide in any single detail. The first witness
testified that the accused with other Filipino undercovers
and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and
had the witness carry the American to town on a sled
pulled by a carabao. That on the way, the accused
walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled
was faster than the airplane; that the American was
taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did
not know what happened to the flier.
-The next witness, testified that he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese
and other Filipinos.
In the nature of things, the giving aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense
under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when
the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject
of a separate punishment.
However, the brutality with the killing or physical injuries
were carried out may be taken as an aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less
painful method of execution will be taken into account to
increase the penalty.

-The lower court believes that the accused is “guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries”, with “the
aggravating circumstances mentioned above”.
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as
crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to the technical designation of the
crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the
appellant is a “complex crime of treason with homicide”.

-Accused being a member of the Japanese Military

Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese
forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort feloniously and treasonably lad,
guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and
Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending
guerillas and locating their hideouts.

ISSUES;

[if !supportLists]1. [endif]Whether the “two-witness”

rule was sufficiently complied.
[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Whether the TC erred in
ruling that the murders and physical injuries were crimes
distinct from treason.

HELD:

1. NO, it was not sufficiently complied. The witnesses

evidently referred to two different occasions. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on
the whole overt act but on any part of it.

2. The execution of some of the guerilla suspects

mentioned and the infliction of physical injuries on others
are not offenses separate from treason. There must
concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid
and comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. FILEMON ESCLETO, Defendant-
Appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.,
and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; THE TWO-WITNESS
RULE. — The process of evaluating evidence in treason
cases might sound like a play of words but the authors of
the two-witness provision in the American Constitution,
from which the Philippines Treason Law was taken
purposely made it "severely restrictive" and conviction
for treason difficult. It requires that each of the witness
must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable,
there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt
act.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the
former People’s Court with treason on three counts,
namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That during the period of Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or
comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, did willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably collaborate,
associate and fraternize with the said Imperial Japanese
Forces, going out with them in patrols in search of
guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or
in sympathy with the resistance movement in the
Philippines; bearing arms against the American and
guerrilla forces in the furtherances of the war efforts of
the Imperial Japanese Forces against the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and mounting
guard and performing guard duty for the Imperial
Japanese Forces in their garrison in the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines.
"2. That during the period of Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of
Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or
comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, did willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably accompany, join,
and go out on patrols with Japanese soldiers in and
around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of
persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance
movement in the Philippines.
"3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to
give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and/or
cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a
guerrilla and did turn him over and deliver to the
Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since
which time, that is, since the said 18th day of March,
1944, nothing has been heard from the said Antonio
Conducto and is considered by his family to have been
killed by the Japanese military authorities."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant’s
membership in the U. N. or Makapili organization nor on
what the patrols he accompanied actually did once they
were out of town", and so was "constrained to rule that
the evidence of the prosecution fails to establish, in
connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of
treason." We may add that no two witnesses coincided
in any specific acts of the defendant. The People’s Court
believed, however, "that the same evidence is sufficient
to prove beyond question defendant’s adherence to the
enemy."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People’s Court
was that it had been fully substantiated.
The record shows that on or about March 11, 1944,
Japanese patrol composed of seventeen men and one
officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas
in barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now
Quezon. As a result, some of the inhabitants of Bibito
and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred,
were arrested and others were ordered to report at the
poblacion. Among the latter were Antonio Conducto, a
guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto’s wife, parents
and other relatives.
Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March
18, 1944, at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, in
obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her
family went to the town from barrio Danlagan. Still in
Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto’s house, told them
to stop and took down their names. With her were her
daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio
Conducto, and three grandchildren. After writing their
names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in
the poblacion where they were questioned by someone
whose name she did not know. This man asked her if
she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not know
where they were. The next day they were allowed to go
home with many others, but Antonio Conducto was not
released. Since then she had not seen her son. On
cross-examination she said that when Escleto took down
their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if
anything would happen to him and his family, and
Escleto answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I
am going to accompany you in going to town."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town,
Filemon Escleto stopped her, her mother-in-law, her
husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the
latter’s wife and took down their names; that after taking
down their names Escleto and a Philippine Constabulary
soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband
asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family,
and Escleto said "nothing" and assured Conducto that
he and his family would soon be allowed to go home;
that Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him
tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has
firearm;" that afterward they were sent upstairs and she
did not know what happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court’s
findings. It will readily be seen from a cursory
examination thereof that the only point on which the two
witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree
is that the accused took down the names of Conducto
and of the witnesses, among others, and came along
with them to the town. Granting the veracity of this
statement, it does not warrant the inference that the
defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of
doing so. What he allegedly did was compatible with the
hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought
it convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the
people under his jurisdiction who heeded the Japanese
order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write
Conducto’s name in order to report on him. The two men
appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew
Conducto intimately, and the latter was on his way to
town to present himself. If the accused had a
treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have
furnished his name and identity to the enemy by word of
mouth. This step would have the added advantage of
concealing the defendant’s traitorous action from his
townmates and of not appraising Conducto of what was
in store for him, knowledge of which might impel
Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by
the prosecution is best demonstrated by the fact that it
included, according to witnesses, Conducto’s wife and
parents and many others who were discharged the next
day. The fact that, according to the evidence of the
prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in the
screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt that the
defendant had a hand in Conducto’s misfortune.
In short, Escleto’s making note of persons who went to
the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak, vague
and uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be
considered direct and damaging is Patricia Araya’s
testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary
soldier, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But
the prosecution did not elaborate on this testimony, nor
was any other witness made to corroborate it although
Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and
relatives who would have heard the statement if the
defendant had uttered it.
Leaving aside the question of Patricia’s veracity, the
failure to corroborate her testimony just mentioned
makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt
act of treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony is
inoperative as a corroboration of the defendant’s taking
down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa.
It has been seen that the testimony was not shown to
have been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it
necessarily have that implication. This process of
evaluating evidence might sound like a play of words
but, as we have said in People v. Adriano (44 Off. Gaz.,
4300 1) the authors of the two-witness provision in the
American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason
law was taken, purposely made it "severely restrictive"
and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we
adverted to the following authorities, among
others:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt
act; or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to
each part of the overt act." (VII Wigmore on Evidence,
3rd ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.)
"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the
whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together
of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the
support of two oaths; . . ." (Opinion of Judge Learned
Hand quoted as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
"The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient
action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding
that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be
supported by the testimony of two witnesses." (Cramer
v. U. S. of A., 65 S. Ct., 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.)
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel
with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the framers
placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than
modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be
considered that such a quantitative measure of proof,
such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude
device at best or that its protection of innocence is too
fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to
conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or
not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered,
however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned
by James Wilson that ’Treason may sometimes be
practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely
difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an
Enemy.’ The provision was adopted not merely in spite
of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but
because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident,
but because one of the most venerated of that venerated
group considered that ’prosecutions for treason were
generally virulent.’" (Cramer v. U. S. of A., supra.)
The decision of the People’s Court will be and the same i
reversed with costs de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon,
Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J. :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Mr. Justice Pablo voted to reverse.
G.R. No. L-9529 August 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosia Padilla and
Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.
 J. M. Cajucom
for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death
by the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court for the
crime of treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was
elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of
the appeal duly interposed by the accused but also
under the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court which provides mandatory review by this
Tribunal of all decisions or judgments of the lower courts
imposing death penalties. Meantime, it was discovered
that the transcript of stenographic notes taken down on
October 8, 1947, before the People's Court was missing
and unavailable, by reason of which and upon
recommendation of the Solicitor General, we
promulgated a resolution on August 1, 1952, remanding
the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses
who testified before the People's Court, namely,
Gregorio Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and
the accused himself. Thus the case was sent to that
court.
On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that he be
allowed to withdraw his appeal so as to avail himself of
the benefits of the Executive clemency granted to all
prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose
cases were pending appeal, on condition that such
appeals be first withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo returned the case to us for whatever
action we may take in view of the withdrawal requested,
for, at all events, the case had to be reviewed by us
regardless of defendant's appeal. The case was
included in the agenda prepared by the Clerk of Court
for September 21, 1953, only on the basis of the motion
for withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without calling the
attention of the Tribunal that defendant had previously
appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which
decision called for an automatic review and judgment by
us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this
Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of
appeals where briefs had not been filed, as in the
present case, said petition for withdrawal was granted by
resolution of September 21, 1953. However, at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same date, and after
the passing of the resolution, appellant filed directly with
this Court a petition reiterating his request for withdrawal
of appeal previously made with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, attaching thereto two documents said
to be copies of the conditional pardon granted him and
of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the office of the
President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was
only on considering this second petition when we
realized the nature of the case and that the withdrawal of
appeal granted on September 21, 1953, was a mistake
and contrary to legal precedents. So, in a resolution
dated October 19, 1953, this Tribunal reconsidered its
resolution of September 21st granting withdrawal of
appeal, and again reminded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimonies
above referred to, with instructions that a new decision
be rendered based on the said testimonies and on the
standing evidence adduced before the People's Court.
The resolution of October 19th read as follows:
By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth
Division of the defunct People's Court after trial of
appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on
several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder
and sentenced him thus —
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the Court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty
of the complex crime of treason and murders as defined
in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection
with Article 48 of the same Code, sentences him to
suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount
of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in
the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia
Tambirao in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the
proceedings."
Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were
sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also
under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules
of Court which provides for review and judgment by this
Tribunal of all cases in which the death penalty shall
have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether
the defendant shall have appealed or not.
It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8,
1947, could not be located, and following the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution
was promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding the
case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
retaking of the testimony of said witnesses.
Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant
Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating
that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted
executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason,
including those whose cases were pending appeal, on
condition that such appeals be first withdrawn,
supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower
court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his
appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10,
1953, directing the return of the case to this Court for
whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of
the petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant
and because the case had to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the
defendant.
The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953.
The agenda of this Court on that date as regards this
was prepared by the Clerk of Court's Office only on the
basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the
defendant. Our attention was not called to the fact that
defendant had previously appealed from a decision
sentencing him to death, which decision called for an
automatic review and judgment by us. So, following the
practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions
for withdrawal of appeals where the briefs have not yet
been filed, as in the present case, said petition for
withdrawal of appeal was granted by resolution of
September 21, 1953. On the same date, however, and
presumably after the passing of the resolution, appellant
Villanueva filed directly with this Court a petition
reiterating the request for withdrawal of his appeal
previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
attaching to his petition Exhibits "A" and "B", said to be
copies of the conditional pardon and of the letter of the
Legal Assistant in the Office of the President addressed
to the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering said
petition that we realized the nature of the case and the
decision appealed to this Court, the withdrawal of which
appeal had been granted by the resolution of September
21, 1953.
An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to
death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any
other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the
briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not
remove the case from the jurisdiction of this Court which
under the law is authorized and called upon to review
the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to
render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as
was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case
of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter
of review by this Court of a decision imposing the death
penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial
court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been passed
upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a
judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said
decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment
and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is
not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review
by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death
penalty is something which neither the court nor the
accused could waive or evade.
Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower
court for the purpose of retaking the testimony of those
witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the case
was virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the
evidence and the testimony received during the trial
before the People's Court which is still intact and
available shall stand and the new trial will be confined to
the testimony of the same witnesses who testified on
October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of
which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances,
it is necessary for the trial court to render a new decision
because the new trial is being held before a new Judge
and there is no assurance that the witnesses testifying,
altho the very same ones who were on the witness stand
on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and
in the same manner that they did at the former trial, altho
they are supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de
Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al, 46 O. G. No. 1, p. 390).
Going over the record of the case, we find that it would
not be too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the
said witnesses as far as possible confine themselves to
the same points on which they testified on October 8,
1947, because the testimonies of said witnesses
including the defendant are referred to and described in
the decision of the People's Court on pages 87, 123, and
124 to 129, and that there are only four witnesses
including the accused himself.
Examining Exhibits "A" and "B" submitted by appellant in
relation to his petition for the withdrawal of his appeal,
we find that although his name appears in the list of
prisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed
to be pardoned conditionally, the pardon itself refers to
the remission of the "unexpired portions of the prison
sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed
below who were convicted by the defunct People's Court
of treason and committed to the new Bilibid Prison to
serve their sentence." It is highly doubtful that the
pardon could have contemplated and included appellant
herein because his sentence of death does not merely
involve a prison term which expires in time. Besides, a
death sentence is not exactly served but rather
executed. Moreover, Exhibit "B" says that "those
prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall
be released only after their appeal has been withdrawn."
The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal
rendered the decision of the People's Court final,
resulting in conviction, this to bring it into harmony with
Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the Constitution which requires
conviction as a condition precedent to the exercise of
Executive clemency. As we have already stated, despite
defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision
imposing the death sentence, there is no definite
conviction or sentence until and after this Tribunal has
reviewed the case and rendered its own decision
affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower court,
unless of course in the new decision of the trial court
based on the new trial a sentence other than death is
imposed, in which case there would be no automatic
review by us.
Let the record of this case be again remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for new trial and
thereafter, for a new decision.
At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the
defense, Ambrosio Tuble and Basilio Taborete, were
introduced. Appellant also presented documentary
evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly
granted him. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found
nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the
decision of the People's Court, and, reproducing said
decision, rendered judgment on October 11, 1955,
sentencing appellant to capital punishment. The case
was again elevated to us for automatic review and
judgment and given the present docket number.
In the amended information filed before the People's
Court, appellant was accused of treason on ten counts,
but the prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of
them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower
court found that Counts 1 and 2 were not proven, and
convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The prosecution established that during the Japanese
occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino citizen, and
owing allegiance to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid
and comfort by rendering service with the Japanese
Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its
Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in the
performance of such service, he participated actively
and directly in the punitive expeditions periodically made
by the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of
the province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson
and mass-murders, specifically as follows:
Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information
recites:
6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of
Baroc and Atabayan, municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent
to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid
and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy
of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in
company with other Filipino spies and several Japanese
soldiers, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan
Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco, Melchor Trieco, Cosme
Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto,
Napoleon Luceno, Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio
Belandrez on the charge that they were guerrilla soldiers
and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and
torture them; that subsequently the persons above-
mentioned were taken away and were not seen or heard
of since then; that on the occasion of the aforementioned
patrol, the above-named accused and his companions,
with intent of gain and without consent of the owners
thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously loot the house of Jose T. Belandrez, taking
therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the amount of
P300; emergency notes in the amount of P1,200; jewelry
value at P500; clothing valued at P200; and other
personal effects; and from the house of Toribia Taleon,
jewelry, watches, clothing and other personal effects
with a total value of P160 more or less.
Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and
Maria Mendoza, corroborating one another, testified that
at dawn of June 10, 1943, appellant, accompanied by
some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house
of Jose T. Belandrez situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and
took therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry worth P300, and
clothing valued at P200; that they also arrested Dionisio
Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno,
members of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the
guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said three
members of the Bolo Battalion never returned.
Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this
Count, reads as follows:
7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August,
1943, in the municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as
he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give said enemy, aid and comfort, in
his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective
Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with
other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest and apprehend several persons suspected of
guerrilla activities, among whom were Federico
Tinamisan, Eustaquio Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador
Tedor, Tomas Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta, Andres
Tayo, Victorio Tuante, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirante,
Rufo Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta,
Hilarion Toga and several others, who were gathered in
the Chapel at barrio Napnapan, where the persons
aforesaid were investigated, maltreated and tortured, as
a consequence of which Salvador Tedor died of the
beating and torture inflicted upon him by the herein
accused and his companions; that the following morning
about thirty-seven persons were taken to the yard of
Valentina Amandoron's house, where Jesus Astrologo,
Carlos Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the
Japanese killed by beheading Andres Tai, Victorio
Tuante, Roque Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania,
Pufo Tulato, Agapito Trompeta, Tomas Trompeta,
Celedonio Tupino, Simeon Ledesma, Hermenegildo
Taleon, Marcelo Turid, Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid,
Jose Tamon, Cornelio Taghap, Eustaquio Doga,
Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU) Lucio (LNU), Juan
(LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo (LNU), and several
others whose names are unknown, while Alfredo
Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and wounded
on their necks but miraculously escaped death.
Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa
Gua, Natividad Duga, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilario Taghap
and Valentina Amandoron who, corroborating one
another, stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was
a Monday, at about six o'clock in the evening, while
Eustaquio Duga and his family were at their home in
Tigbauan, Iloilo, he saw Japanese soldiers and some
Filipinos approaching their house; that Eustaquio Duga
notified his wife and they immediately started to flee; that
unfortunately, they were overtaken by the Japanese
soldiers, and Eustaquio Duga was arrested by herein
appellant who was in company with said Japanese
soldiers; that Eustaquio Duga was taken to the nearby
barrio of Napnapan; that sometime later, Severa Gua
found the dead body of Eustaquio Duga, with his head
almost severed, among other corpses in the yard of the
house of Valentina Amandoron.
On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his
companion Roque Teologo were walking in a barrio road
in Napnapan, Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by
Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that
Trompeta and Teologo were taken to the barrio of
Ermita, of the same municipality, where they were
investigated together with about thirty persons who were
suspected as guerrillas; thence they were brought to the
house of Valentina Amandoron where appellant and his
companions killed in cold blood Trompeta's companions
as well as these persons who were brought there earlier.
Among the twenty-five persons killed on that occasion,
were Andres Tayo, Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato,
Roque Teologo, Jose Taucon and Matias Tiranea.
Count No. 8. The information equally recites:
8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality
of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T.
Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give
said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent,
informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial
Japanese Army; and in company with other Filipino
spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme
Calacasan, Nazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique,
Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevega, Jose Canillas,
Aurelio Calacasan, Graciano (LNU), Juan (LNU), and
three others, names unknown, on the charge that the
persons aforesaid were guerrilla soldiers or guerrilla
sympathizers; that thereafter these persons were taken
to barrio Taal, municipality of San Miguel, where the
accused and his companions set fire to and burned
several houses in the aforesaid barrio; and later to barrio
Baguingin, municipality of Leon, where the above-named
accused and his companions investigated, maltreated
and tortured them; that the above-named accused
further adhering to the enemy did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, and with
evident premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to
death Cosme Calacasan, while tied to a tree with hands
tied behind his back; while Nazario Calimutan was
bayonetted and killed in the same manner by Jesus
Astrologo, Filipino co-spy of the herein accused; while
Graciano (LNU) and Juan (LNU) and two others (names
unknown) were bayonetted to death by the Filipino and
Japanese companions of the accused; that after the
killing of the aforesaid persons, the above-named
accused and his companions did gather the corpses of
their victims in the house of Juan Caya and thereafter
did set fire to and burn that house the dead bodies
inside.
Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each
other, testified that at about eight o'clock in the morning
of August 12, 1943, while Aurelio Calacasan, Cosme
Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique,
Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevieja and Jose
Canillas and several others were in the barrio of
Anonang, Leon, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese
soldiers and taken to the barrio of Taal, of the same
municipality, where they saw appellant and his
companions. After setting afire the houses in said barrio,
appellant and his companions brought the prisoners to
barrio Agboy, of the same municipality, where they were
investigated regarding their guerilla activities or
connections; that during the investigations, appellant
stabbed to death Cosme Calacasan who was a member
of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas;
that after several prisoners were killed, their corpses
were gathered and placed in a house which was set on
fire.
Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended
information recites:
9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality
of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T.
Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy and with treasonable intent to give as he did give
said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent,
informer, spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese
Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and
Japanese soldiers, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and
carry out a raid against and mass arrest of persons
suspected as guerrilla soldiers and sympathizers, as a
consequence of which, about eighty persons, male and
female, both young and old were arrested and gathered
in a schoolhouse and chapel in the barrio of Buenavista,
and thereat investigated, maltreated and tortured by the
herein accused and his companions; that subsequently
about thirty persons including women and children were
taken to the house of Aquilino Sales, where about
fourteen persons were bayonetted and killed by
Japanese soldiers, namely, Julia Cabilitasan, Mercedes
Calopez, Andrea Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel
Canag, Rosalia Calopez, Luz Caldito, Estelita
Camorahan, Roman Cabilinga, Tomas Canag, Luis
Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin, Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio
Caldito; while Paulina Cantara, Alejandro Calsona and
Bienvenido Cabankalan received and sustained bayonet
wounds but survived and were able to escape after the
house of aforesaid Aquilino Sales was set on fire and
burned by said patrol of Filipino spies and Japanese
soldiers.
Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro
Calsena and Perpetua Canag, who testified for the
prosecution, corroborating one another, stated that at
about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943,
several residents of barrio, Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were
arrested by the appellant, who was armed with revolver
and bayonet, and his companions consisting of Filipinos
and Japanese soldiers; that said barrio residents were
brought to the barrio schoolhouse where they were
investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan
was singled out by the appellant who tied her hands
behind her back and brought her under a "doldol"
(kapok) tree, near a chapel, where she was stripped of
all her clothings until she was naked. Appellant
investigated her regarding the whereabouts of her
husband who was a USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after
severely beating Julia Cabilitasan, brought her to the
house of Aquilino Sales where there were other Filipino
prisoners. Shortly thereafter, appellant and his
companions started the massacre of the prisoners.
Appellant stabbed Julia Cabilitasan three times with a
bayonet. In that massacre, fourteen persons including
women and children were killed. Among those killed
were Julia Cabilitasan, Macario Cabilitasan, Roman
Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia Calpit. Later, said
house was set on fire.
Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding
this Count, recites:
10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the
municipalities of Guimbal and Tubuñgan, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent
to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid
and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy
of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in
company with other Filipino spies, Bureau of
Constabulary and Japanese soldiers, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest
Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina Escorido,
Romero Escorido, Edgardo Escorido, Editha Escorido,
Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor Tabanda, Elena
Gierza, Natividad Gersalino, Jovita Gersalino, Ernesto
Tambirao, Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio
Tortugalete, Paz Tabora, Basilisa Taborete, Gloria
Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with
unknown names on the charge that the persons
aforesaid were either guerrilla soldiers, sympathizers
and supporters; that the aforesaid persons were then
taken to the house of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein
accused, did then and their investigate, maltreat, or
otherwise torture Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido and
Eustaquia Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess
as to their connection with the guerrilla movement and
the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that
subsequently the herein accused further adhering to the
enemy did deliver to a Japanese executioner Juan
Gelario, Felipe Tanato, David Garnica, Juana
Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana, who were
all executed and kill one after another; that the killing of
Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana
took place shortly after they were abused and raped by
the Japanese and BC soldiers in the house of Jacinto
Taborete; that while this was going on, Jovita Gersalino
and Lourdes Tabanda were taken to another house by
the herein accused, Filemon Palacios, Jr., Vicente
Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they were abused
and raped; that subsequently the persons gathered were
asked who of them were relatives of Tranquilino
Geonanga for they would be released and when an old
woman answered that they were all relatives of
Tranquilino Geonanga, the Japanese soldiers at once
started to inflict and deliver bayonet thrusts on the
persons gathered and as a consequence of which about
thirty of them were killed and several were wounded:
that subsequently, the herein accused and his
companions proceeded to barrio Buluañgan, where one
Saturnino (LNU) was arrested, investigated, maltreated
and tortured by the herein accused and later killed by the
Japanese.
Gloria Escorido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza,
testifying in support of this Count, and corroborating one
another, stated that at about seven o'clock in the
morning of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and
several Japanese soldiers were on a punitive expedition
in the barrio of Miadan, Guimbal, Iloilo, they arrested the
barrio residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in
Tubongan, Iloilo; that the barrio residents, who were
about fifty persons, were brought to the barrio of Laguna,
Tubongan, Iloilo, were they were investigated and
maltreated; that during the investigation, appellant tied
the feet of Gloria Escorido, hanged her with her head
downward and beat her with the branch of an "aguho"
tree; that appellant likewise brought to the house of
Jacinto Batorete three females, namely, Luz Tabiana,
Jesusa Jimenez and Juana Tabiana where the said girls
were abused by the appellant and his companions; that
appellant also bayoneted to death Sofia Tambirao for the
simple reason that she was the cousin of Tranquilino
Geonanga, an officer of the guerrillas; that appellant and
his companions massacred on that occasion around
thirty persons, among whom were Jovita Gersalino,
Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Sofia Tambirao,
and Edgardo Escorido.
We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated
actively in the punitive raids made by the Japanese
soldiers and in arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas,
but personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely
16 years of age at the time (Count 10), and killed in cold
blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three times
(Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her
three times, with the added ignominy of stripping her
stark naked moments before killing her (Count 9), and
Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of
appellant as testified to by eyewitnesses who have
survived the harrowing massacres, speak eloquently that
his adherence to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort,
was accompanied by cruelty and ruthlessness, in
wanton disregard of the feelings and decency of his
fellow citizens.
The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence
for appellant, his defense in the lower court merely
consisting of (1) his denial of the overt acts imputed
upon him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective
force of the Japanese Army since January 1st, 1944, it
was because he was made to accept the position under
duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for
the good of the people, he having saved many Filipino
lives from Japanese atrocities.
We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record
because of the seriousness of the charges against
appellant, and we find that the evidence for the
prosecution is overwhelming, such that appellant's
counsel de officio instead of filing a brief, made a
manifestation dated November 29, 1955, stating that
"after a thorough study of the records of the case, he
finds nothing therein sufficient to disturb the decisions of
the People's Court and of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo imposing capital punishment on the accused." Said
counsel further stated that "The accused's only evidence
which directly attacked the government's proofs was his
denial of what several witnesses testified to." This
manifestation was considered by this Tribunal as
appellant's brief, in its resolution of December 6, 1955.
Certainly mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon
the positive assertion of the witnesses for the
government establishing incriminating facts, for it is a
well settled rule of evidence that as between positive
and negative testimony, the former deserves more
weight and credit.
Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the
Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in
the detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with
the Solicitor General that "except the lone and self-
serving testimony of the appellant that he was coerced
to cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there
is not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or
coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any
evidence showing that the alleged compulsion or
coercion was grave and imminent."
Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a
defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded find this recommendation to be correct, as it is in
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. (16 C. on the matter; hence the decision of the lower court
J., 91). should be amended accordingly. Furthermore, although
To be available as a defense, the fear must be well- the facts of the case verily justify the imposition of death
founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty
great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion should be, as it is hereby commuted to reclusion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to perpetua, in accordance with law.
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated,
would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely costs.
setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
person. (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384). Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and
Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by Endencia, JJ., concur.
the law. No man, from fear or circumstances to himself
has the right to make himself a party to committing
mischief upon mankind (Lord Denman in Reg. vs. Tyler,
8 Car. and P. (Eng.) 616, vs. Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B.
Div. (Eng.) 273).
When the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of lost testimonies,
appellant attempted to give the case a new twist by filing
a motion to quash on the ground that the pardon
extended him has already extinguished his criminal
liability and that his conviction by the People's Court had
placed him in jeopardy. This motion was denied, but
during the trial appellant was allowed to present
documentary evidence relative to the clemency
extended him, consisting of Exhibit 1 which is a certified
copy of his conditional pardon; Exhibit 2, a certified copy
of the letter of the Legal Assistant of the President dated
June 30, 1953, addressed to the Director of Prisons;
Exhibit 3 the motion to withdraw appeal filed before the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo; and Exhibit 4, the
Tribunal's resolution of September 21, 1953, granting
said withdrawal. In addition, appellant presented an
Exhibit 5 the decision of the People's Court in the case
of People vs. Jesus Astrologo, dated December 11,
1947, sentencing him to death; Exhibit 6 the conditional
pardon extended to said accused dated June 27, 1953;
and Exhibit 7 the letter of the Legal Assistant of the
Office of the President to the Director of Prisons, to show
that said Jesus Astrologo who is now enjoying his
freedom by reason of the pardon extended, has been
allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw his appeal pending
review of his death sentence.
Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we
reiterate our ruling in our resolution of October 19, 1953,
hereinbefore quoted. As to appellant's contention
respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find
it untenable, for the Astrologo case (88 Phil., 423) was
elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he filed his
brief on October 21, 1949, and we rendered judgment on
March 30, 1951, commuting the sentence to life
imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon
granted him on June 27, 1953, or more than two years
after the final judgment, was therefore in order, and
cannot be invoked by herein appellant as a precedent.
As to the payment of indemnity in the amount of P2,000
to the respective heirs of each of the victims of appellant,
the Solicitor-General recommends that this amount
imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000. We
CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the
proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during
the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and
that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending
in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in
the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change
was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the
different courts that functioned during the Philippine
Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during a de
facto government are good and valid.
2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to
annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation.
3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth,
which were the same court existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation of
the Philippines, may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were
reoccupied and liberated by the United States and
Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were reestablished in the Islands.
HELD:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that
all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments of a de facto government are
good and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus
summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy
and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows
directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not
look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its
military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers
of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the
laws war, as established by the usage of the of the
world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and
decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws
which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto
government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
According to that well-known principle in international
law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by
an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very
few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an
invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his
control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take
effect during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by private
persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain
good.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
governments, which are not of a political complexion, are
and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory
occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the
Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on
October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, for it would not have been necessary for
said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid
ab initio.
2. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government”
is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes,
but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the
Philippines or other governmental agencies established
in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking
into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international
law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are
not of a political complexion, of the de facto
governments during the Japanese military occupation
were good and valid before and remained so after the
occupied territory had come again into the power of the
titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not,
and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of
any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law.
3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in
practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of
President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that
“in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually
abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as
they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says:
“From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point
of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the
conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as
military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the
Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had
been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to
reason that the same courts, which had become
reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As
Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place
with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . .
Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain
their original shape upon removal of the external force,
— and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH
G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17,
1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with
the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the
time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to
continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the ground
that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and
that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending
in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in
the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government
established during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto government.
horizontal small
Issues:
1 Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of
the court made during the Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the United States and Filipino forces.
2 Whether or not the October 23, 1944
proclamation issued by General MacArthur
declaring that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts.
3 Whether or not those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them, if the
said judicial acts and proceedings were not
invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:
• Political and international law recognizes that all
acts and proceedings of a de facto government
are good and valid. The Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by
the military force and deriving their authority
from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this
subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during
its military occupation, nor for the rules by which
the powers of such government are regulated
and limited. Such authority and such rules are
derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world, and
confirmed by the writings of publicists and
decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered
territory, or the laws which regulate private
rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror.
. . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either
change the existing laws or make new ones.”
• General MacArthur annulled proceedings of
other governments in his proclamation October
23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would
violate the law of nations.
• If the proceedings pending in the different courts
of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the
Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason
that the same courts, which had become re-
established and conceived of as having in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and
liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the
principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings
in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other
governmental entity, upon the removal of a
foreign military force, resumes its old place with
its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . .
Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies
to regain their original shape upon removal of
the external force, — and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the
whole fibre and content.”
horizontal small
 conqueror to continue local laws and institution
Rulings: so far as military necessity will permit.”
1 The judicial acts and proceedings of the court Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in
were good and valid. The governments by the order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
Philippine Executive Commission and the society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
military occupation being de facto governments, provisional, and the government established by
it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and the occupant of transient character.
proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid. Those not
only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
government, which are not of a political
complexion, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the
leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
2 The phrase “processes of any other
government” is broad and may refer not only to
the judicial processes, but also to administrative
or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or
other governmental agencies established in the
Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking
into consideration the fact that, as above
indicated, according to the well-known principles
of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during
the Japanese military occupation were good and
valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the
titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it
was not, and could not have been, the intention
of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase “processes of any other government” in
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes,
in violation of said principles of international law.
3 Although in theory the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a
matter of course as soon as military occupation
takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his
own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the country
which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of
President McKinley to the Secretary of War
states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws)
are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice
is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection
says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing
forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice
such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision
of the law of nations which compels the
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL.,Defendants-
Appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.

 Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila of the crime of conspiracy to
overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands and the Government of the Philippine Islands, as
defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four
years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $3,000 fine,
and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of
them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and
a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said appellants
to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the trial
and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of
insolvency and failure to pay their respective
fines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that
during the latter part of the year 1903 a junta was
organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of
Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong, for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and
establishing in its stead a government to be known as
the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina; that one
Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this
conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the
military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the
furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward
the end of December, 1903 the said Ricarte came to
Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the
steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the
Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city of
Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was
perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in
Hongkong that at these meetings new members were
taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the
enlistment of an army of revolution and the raising of
money by national and private loans to carry on the
campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and
commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were
granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the
officers thus appointed to raise troops and take
command thereof; and that the conspirators did in fact
take the field and offered armed resistance to the
constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in
their design of overthrowing the Government because of
their failure to combat successfully with the officers of
the law who were sent against them and of the failure of
the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant
Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was
an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote
and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to
aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him secretly
200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista was
present, taking part in several of the above-mentioned
meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators were
discussed and perfected, and that at one of these
meetings Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte,
assured him that the necessary preparations had been
made and that he "held the people in readiness."
chanrobles virtual law library
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon,
united with the conspirators through the agency of one
Jose R. Muñoz, who was proven to have been a prime
leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of
Ricarte, and by him authorized to distribute bonds and
nominate and appoint certain officials, including a
brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed
revolutionary forces; that at the time when the
conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of
Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the said
Muñoz whereat plans were made for the coming
insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muñoz
offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the
signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing
the troops; and that at a later conference he assured the
said Muñoz that he had things in readiness, meaning
thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with
the terms of his commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united
himself with the conspirators; that he had accepted the
appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of
the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking
any further action in the matter, and merely because he
did not wish to vex his friend Muñoz by refusing to do so,
and that when Muñoz offered him the appointment as
brigadier-general he did so in "a joking tone," and that
he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila
organizing the conspiracy at that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
These statements, however (except in so far as they
corroborate the testimony of Muñoz as to the fact that he
had several interviews with Puzon at which plans were
entered into for the advancement of the cause of the
conspirators), can not be accepted as true in the light of
a written statement signed by Puzon himself at the time
when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence,
and occupation? - A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in
Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age;
married; by profession a teacher of primary and
secondary schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion,
No. 195, district of Quiapo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do
not know him, but by name,
yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in
these Islands and with what object he came here? And if
you know it to be true, through whom did you get such
information? - A. In the first place I had notice of his
coming to the Islands as well as his object by reading
the newspapers of Manila, and secondly because J. R.
Muñoz told me the same on one occasion when I was in
his house to visit him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other
person? - A. No, sir; I have no more information than
that which I have mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by
Ricarte? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in
this organization, and who is it who invited you to join it?
- A. J. R. Muñoz, who is general of division of this new
organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking
me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of
signal corps, to which I, on account of his request and in
view of the fact that the said Muñoz is a friend of mine
from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have organized
absolutely nothing in respect to this
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you
any commission for it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said
employment and although they gave me an order to
organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had
neither the confidence nor the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor
the will to carry out what was intrusted to you, why did
you accept employment as general of the brigade? - A. I
accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a
friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the
obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not
deny that he made this statement, but he attempted to
explain it away by saying that when he made it he was
so exited that he did not know just what he was saying.
He does not allege that improper means were taken to
procure the confession, and it was proven at the trial that
it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of
violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of
reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an
intelligent man and was for eighteen years a school-
teacher and later a telegraph operator under the Spanish
Government, and during the insurrection he held a
commission as an officer in the signal corps of the
revolutionary army. His confession is clear and
intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he
was so excited as not to know what he was saying when
he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it
inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record
in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence
against him in the light of the decisions of this court in
the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes
1
(2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuñez et
al. 2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de
la Serna et al. 3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528), and United States vs.
Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case
at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by
the fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused
actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment in
question and in doing so assumed all the obligations
implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this
case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused
accepted the appointment is taken into consideration
merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the
conspirators. In the first of these cases - the United
States vs. De los Reyes - the accused was charged with
treason, and the court found that the mere acceptance of
a commission by the defendant, nothing else being done
either by himself or by his companions, was not an
"overt act" of treason within the meaning of the law, but
the court further expressly held that -
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the
playing of the game of government like children, the
secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags
and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose
of duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary .
. . should not be dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case - the United States vs. Nuñez et al. --
wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the
court held that, aside from the possession of
commissions in an insurgent band, there was no
evidence to show that it they had committed the crime
and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never
united with any party of brigands and never had been in
any way connected with such parties unless the physical
possession of these appointments proved such relation,"
and that it appeared that each one of the defendants
"were separately approached at different times by armed
men while working in the field and were virtually
compelled to accept the commissions." chanrobles
virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it
was contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he
was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a
commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion that
the evidence did not sustain a finding that such
confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine
laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of
such an appointment, when it is not shown that the
possessor executed some external act by the virtue of
the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt
of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique
Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record
was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant
was found at his house."chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et
al. there was testimony that four appointments of officials
in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the
house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said
case reaffirmed the doctrine that "the mere possession
of the documents of this kind is not sufficient to convict,"
and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the
case that at the time these papers were received by the
appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the bundle and discovered the nature of the contents he
assistant councilmen of the barrio in which lived, a destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any
witness for the Government, showed him the envelope, dealings with the conspirators in relation to the
and stated to him he had received these papers; that he conspiracy or the object for which it was
didn't know what they were and requested this organized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
councilman to open them. The coucilman did not wish to law library
do that but took the envelope and sent it to the We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and
councilman Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this sentence before us, in so far as it affects the said
envelope contained the appointments in question and Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his
that the appellant did not act under the appointment but proportionate share of the costs of both instances de
immediately reported the receipt of them to the oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should be
authorities." chanrobles virtual law library acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set a
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might liberty forthwith, and that the judgment and sentence of
appoint a person in no wise connected with them to the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco Bautista
some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed,
person would afterwards accept the commission and except so far as it imposes subsidiary imprisonment in
thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible that the event of insolvency and failure to pay their respective
such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail or fines, and, there being no authority in law of such
otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the provision, so much of the sentence as undertakes to
person thus nominated, and that such appointment impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby
might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
all this, the person in whose possession the appointment law library
was found might be entirely innocent of all intention to After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance
join the conspiracy, never having authorized the herewith, when the record will be returned to the trial
conspirators to use his name in this manner nor to send court for execution. So
such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein library
it has been proven that such appointments have been Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the 
 Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur as to the penalty
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the imposed upon Bautista and dissent as to that imposed
officers of the law they might be used as evidence upon Puzon.
against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is
shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven
that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as
an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may
properly be taken into consideration as evidence of his
relations with the conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open
court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason
should be applied in this case, but this court has always
held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal
courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring
to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from
the crime of treason, and that this constitutional
provision is not applicable in such cases. ( In re Bollman,
4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348.)chanrobles
virtual law library
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction
of Aniceto de Guzman. The finding of his guilt rest
substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds
from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been
prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of raising
funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it
does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of
the existence of the conspiracy or that, when he
received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what
the contents of the bundle was, nor that ever, on any
occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these
bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE
LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y
ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE,
accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de
Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario
Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime
of piracy in an information filed before the then Court of
First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981,
at the vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial
waters of the Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi,
Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable Court, the above-named accused Wilfred de
Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario
Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another and armed
with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit:
three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one
(1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by
means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did
then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously
take, steal and carry away against the consent of the
owners thereof, the equipments and other persona)
properties belonging to the crew members and
passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of
cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred
Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos
(P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of passengers and
crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational
charts and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine
Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the
said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the
abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry away the
properties abovementioned, the herein accused in
pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation, treacherously attack, assault,
stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior strength,
use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador
Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que,
Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi
Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini
Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil,
Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho,
Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan,
Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul
Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que,
Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola
Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim
Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which
caused their instantaneous death and likewise causing
physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal Issao
Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji
Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution
which could have produced the death of said persons,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause
independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, night
time and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo
of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime
Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel,
pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5,
1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty
of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a
plea of not guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and
substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he
was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to
suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced
"to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil
liabilities of the four defendants because "there was a
separate civil action for breach of contract and damages
filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85
against the several defendants, including the four
accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before
Us on automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30
in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and
registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo
wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30,
1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of
the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the
vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or
three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion
occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin
and, after awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed
to the motor launch to hide and on his way through the
engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then
appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico
Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's
companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's
house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted
by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other
crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks
of copra and the dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael
Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood
guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard
commotions from the motor launch, followed by gunfire.
He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He
saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico
Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they
were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que
were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to
move, he realized that he was also hit on the right side
of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till
daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the
commotion from one of the cabins. He ordered his men
to open the door but it could not be opened. After awhile,
the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them.
Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until
appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him.
Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled
and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in
hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and
Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate
Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something
worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who
ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well
as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the
vessel reached an island where the four appellants were
able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to
load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases
which were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime
Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce
and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them:
dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of
ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well
as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the
vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-
Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten
dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely:
Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi,
Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and
Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez
and Dario Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in
imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants
Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y
Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece
Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in
giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10"
and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce
y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that accused-appellant Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; (4) in
holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce
y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his
personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named
defendants, namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in
G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974,
provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If
physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a
result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or no
homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims
without means of saving themselves, or when the
seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a
vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty
of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is
committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower
court committed no error in not considering the plea of
the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find
them to be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave
a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian
authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15")
before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila.
When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was
offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was
not objected to by the defense, aside from the fact that
Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the
truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that
correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of
Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat,
you have signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the
authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R.
No. L-61069), which We likewise declare to be without
merit, evidence shows that his participation in the
commission of the offense was positively testified to by
the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a
passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness,
passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him
(Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil
Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce
firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and
crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and
the fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter
Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat,
there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with
the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave
a statement to the authorities stating therein his
participation as well as those of his companions
(Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by
the Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the
National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and
brought them to Manila where they executed their
respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce
delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00,
respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex
watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned over
to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the
questions and answers pertinent to Section 20 of the
1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you
that you are under investigation here in connection with
the robbery committed on the M/V Noria last August 31,
1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a
right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our
questions here. You have the right to be represented by
counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you
decide to be represented by a lawyer but cannot afford
one we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you
decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall be
voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise
of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here
maybe used for or against you in any court in the
Philippines. Now do you understand an these rights of
yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow
to signify that you so understand all your rights as above
stated and that you do not need the services of a
lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and his right to
counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants,
(Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as
they are with each other as each admits his participation
and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for
doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct
of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of
the crime is a circumstance showing the presence of
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a
consequence, every one is responsible for the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos,
Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part,
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being
sufficient direct evidence and positive Identification by
eyewitnesses.
I take exception, however, to the statement therein that
accused Peter Ponce "was fully advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and his right to
counsel." The monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No"
have been stricken down by the Court as utterly
unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the
constitutional right to silence and to counsel in People
vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my separate
concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of
People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No. 60118, prom. February 28,
1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the Court's
requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA
538) that "the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the judgment of conviction, there being
sufficient direct evidence and positive Identification by
eyewitnesses.
I take exception, however, to the statement therein that
accused Peter Ponce "was fully advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and his right to
counsel." The monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No"
have been stricken down by the Court as utterly
unacceptable as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the
constitutional right to silence and to counsel in People
vs. Caguioa (95 SCRA 2). in line with my separate
concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of
People vs. Itlanas (G.R. No. 60118, prom. February 28,
1985). As therein stated, I subscribe to the Court's
requirement in Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile (121 SCRA
538) that "the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel" in order to assure that it is
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given.
People v. Rodriguez, District Ct. App. CA 1960

Facts: Mrs. Rodriguez left her four children unattended

in their home in LA. A fire broke out in the home late in
the evening. Three children were pulled out of the fire by
neighbors, but Carlos, age two, was lost. Defendant was
found near a bar, although she had not been drinking,
she stated knowledge of the fire.

Issue: Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a

finding of involuntary manslaughter?
(Was there evidence of criminal intent or criminal
negligence?)

Holding: No

Procedure: Bench trial found def guilty of involuntary

manslaughter. New trial denied. Order and judgment
reversed.

Rule: Involuntary manslaughter “is the unlawful killing of

a human being without malice, in the commission of a
crime, not a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or
w/o due caution and circumspect . . ." Criminal
negligence is a required element of this crime. Criminal
negligence is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act
of the slayer tended to endanger life and that the fatal
consequences of the negligent act could reasonably
have been foreseeable.

Court Rationale: There was no evidence that the death

was the result of natural and probable result of a
criminally negligent act. There was no evidence def
realized her conduct would in all probability produce
death. There was no evidence connecting def in any way
to the fire. Mere negligence is not sufficient to authorize
a conviction of invol. manslaughter.
G.R. No. L-985 January 23, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
 Assistant Solicitor
General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V.
Sian for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's
Court finding the appellant, Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty of
treason and sentencing him to suffer fifteen years of
reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand
pesos and the costs.
According to the information, from February, 1944, to
March, 1945, in Cebu City and its environs, the appellant
(1) "did consistently and continuously traffic in war
materials and sold them to the enemy," and (2) "did join
and serve the enemy as informer, agent, and spy." The
People's Court held that the second count was not
proven, and the appealed judgment of conviction is
predicated solely on the first count.
Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's
adherence to the enemy is inferable from the following
alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20,
1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house
of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, the latter's cousin
(Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese, examined
appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's
identification card written in Japanese and Chinese
characters tending to show that the appellant was a
Japanese undercover. (b) In January 1945, after a trip to
Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were
guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese notes were no
longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next
day, Rufina Cepeda was arrested by the Japanese and
their undercovers and asked about things she saw in
Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her
release, the appellant came to her house and got some
chickens for the consumption of the Japanese who
arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep once in a
while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of
giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized in
the brief for Government as follows: In the middle of
April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum
crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a
construction company operated by the Japanese Army.
Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same
entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which
was not known. About the third week of December,
1944, the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping
push a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and
spare parts into the intermediate and high school
premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor
pool.
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political
laws and change of sovereignty as heretofore
expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt acts
imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven.
With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the
testimony of the prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria to
the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not
corroborated by any other witness. With respect to the
alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the
appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An
essential part of the overt act charged in the information
was therefore lacking. No pretense was made that the
appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged
delivery of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts
can be disregarded. The only detail that may at most be
considered established by the prosecution refers to the
fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart
loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even
uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was
brought either to the intermediate school premises or the
high school building. Indeed it was acknowledged by the
lower court that the witnesses for the Government did
not know how the appellant disposed of the articles
loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really
sold for a definite price alum crystals and water pipes,
the same did not per se constitute treason. As said
articles or materials were not exclusively for war
purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry an
intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the
enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale
was treasonable in view of the other proven acts
showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears,
however, that the alleged acts of adherence performed
by the appellant took place after the overt act in
question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant
made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain,
uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where
two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one
compatible with the presumption of innocence will be
adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778,
October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the
appellant acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
 Assistant Solicitor
General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a
fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs, Carmelito
Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the
decision of the People's Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads
as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito
Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria, Carlos
Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March,
1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or about
the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places
hereunder stated, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a
foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly
adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which
the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid
and/or comfort, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a
member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei
Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, joined
an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies
and a Japanese soldier, which went to the house of
Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak
Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico
Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting
said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared
and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said
accused directed several men in the patrol in picking up
the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the
afternoon of the same day, the same party of spies,
including the accused and eight members of the
Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of
Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully
and treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez
and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house;
that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and
then taken along by said patrol after setting fire on the
house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were
found lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and
that Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison
in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused,
accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro Raviñera,
Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo
Santiago, and others who were all armed, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy
aid and comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in
Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and
brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that
he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio
information to the guerrillas and at the same time
supporting them; that said Unson was released on the
same day, but on the next day he was again arrested
and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena,
Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in
company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose
Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all
members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were
all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him
under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over
to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion
were concealing themselves near the house of Romulo;
and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was
heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5
o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by
two Japanese Military Police and two undercover
operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and
apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two
Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a
search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to
the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to
inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and
adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in
the morning, the accused then acting as an informer of
the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy,
did wilfully, feloniously and treasonably cause the
Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended
Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was
thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and
unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused
accompanied by an armed group of undercover
operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to
give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to
the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he
was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a
member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the
Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial
Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies;
that he took military training from the Japanese and bore
arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier,
taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in
the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo,
Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried
ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from
Bautista to the mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt.
Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the
Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño, where he was
stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity,
and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and
Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the
mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias
Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the houses of
the victims which were burned and looted by the same
hands, on the day following the arrest, effected by the
accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and
several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which
was still tied to a tree showed that it had been
disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and the
corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated.
Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times as
Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the
garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of.
Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting
his presence in the previous morning raid, he did not
come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid
in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy
took place, was not given by the lower court enough
weight to prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses,
thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states
that the accused admitted having taken part in the raid of
the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but
claims that he tried to save Unson, only the latter was
accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's
behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson,
Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last
that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed
in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the
arrest, the exhumation having been effected with the aid
of those who claimed to have seen how his life was
ended. These facts relate to the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of
Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower court
found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of
Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the accused raided
the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and
arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The accused simply
alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was
in Gagalañgin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he
was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to
accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's
house and admitted that he was present throughout the
investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the
accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully
twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this
defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the
facts alleged in the information and proved by the
witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan,
alleged in the sixth count, according to the lower court,
has been abundantly established, disbelieving
appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest because
appellant himself testified that he promised to see what
he could do about Labalan and accepted three chickens
from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at
the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's
conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one, two,
three, four, and six of the information are fully supported
by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's brief alone, in
taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's
brief compromises one hundred thirty printed pages, it
failed completely to point out any specific error in the
conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting
himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the
penalty imposed is unjustified, and that the acts
committed by the accused do not constitute treason but
ordinary crimes against the victimized persons.
Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese
occupation has not been impeccable, counsel wants us
to consider what the accused did in behalf of the
guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and
that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public
vengeance, but to attain the correction of the guilty
person, such purpose will not be attained with
appellant's death as decreed by the lower court.
Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a
spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids only
because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he
had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it either in
obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to
intercede in behalf of some prisoners; that he remained
in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who
appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may
continue helping those who were detained by the
Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by
the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was
released only after he had been made to promise to
indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the
involuntary promise exacted from him, he did not cause
the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this
testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear,
positive, and straightforward declarations of the
witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he,
too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance
movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for
some Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from
criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as
alleged in the counts in the information which were
declared proven by the People's Court.
The performance of righteous action, no matter how
meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or
mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs,
and although appellant had saved the lives of a
thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing
of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said
that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10).
We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that
the acts committed by him are not punishable as treason
and that the People's Court who tried him had no
jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the wrong
theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant
guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there is
disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed,
because, while nine of the ten members taking part in
the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the
death penalty imposed by the lower court, the writer of
this opinion takes the position that the penalty the
accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the
medium penalty provided by law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as
follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity,
and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances
should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the
circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature
that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of
acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single
time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil.,
801), so much so that there are some accused of
treason for just one count and there are others for
several counts, their number not changing the nature of
the offense committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the
members of this Court in the imposition of the death
penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and
appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P15,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla,
and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority (except Mr. Justice Perfecto)
that find the appellant guilty of the crime of treason as
alleged in the information, that is, with two aggravating
circumstances. Among the atrocities committed by the
appellant and companions stand, in bold relief, those
testified to by Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr., and Dolores
Calacasan and related in the same decision of this
Court, to the effect that Federico Unson, Jr., was
crucified against and tied to a tree, and then
disemboweled with bayonet thrusts; and that Isaias
Perez's body was mutilated with his ankles severed from
the trunk and thrown around the place where the crime
was committed. And I dissent from the dissenting vote of
the writer of the decision, Mr. Justice Perfecto, which
prevented the imposition by this Court of the death
penalty imposed upon the appellant by the lower court.
The killing of the victim was unquestionably attended by
treachery, that is, by means, method or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly to insure its
execution without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make, and by a
deliberate augment of the wrong done by the offense by
causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission.
But the writer of the opinion says:
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances
should be considered as aggravating, while the
undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the
circumstances in question are essential elements of the
treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature
that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of
acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single
time, but in different times, it being a continuous crime
as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil.,
801), so much so that there are some accused of
treason for just one count and there are others for
several counts, their number not changing the nature of
the offense committed.
The reason or ground on which the dissenter bases his
conclusion that the aggravating circumstances above
specified cannot be taken into consideration in the
present case, is clearly wrong. Said aggravating
circumstances have nothing to do with the integral
elements of the crime of treason as charged and
committed by the appellant. The fact that the crime of
treason may be committed by a single overt act or a
series of overt acts, committed at one and the same time
or at different times, does not, by any means, make
those circumstances essential elements of the offense
committed by the appellant. Said circumstances were
not even inherent in or included by the law in defining
the crime of treason. The words "treason" as defined
and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is completely
different and independent from "treachery" as an
aggravating circumstance provided for in the same
Code.
The crime of treason is committed by a citizen, not by
merely adhering to the enemy and giving the latter aid
and comfort in abstract, but by committing one or more
overt acts which constitute aid and comfort to the enemy
to which the traitor adheres; and evidently, the
commission of such overt act as the killing of the victim
in aid of the enemy may be attended by the aggravating
circumstances above specified, for they were not
necessary in order to give aid and comfort to the enemy.
Of course, if one of the aggravating circumstances
provided by law is inherent or included in the overt acts
charged as in aid or comfort of the enemy, it cannot be
taken into consideration as aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of that particular crime of
treason.
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur partly in the result. The information and the
evidence sufficiently make out at least a case of murder,
qualified by treachery. Appellant had committed other
atrocities for which he could correspondingly be
convicted under the information and evidence of record.
As spy, he may also be tried in a military tribunal and, if
found guilty, sentenced accordingly. While he might be
guilty of a violation of article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, I hold, in conformity with my dissenting opinion in
Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856), that said legal provisions
was not in force at the time of the commission of the
crime. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is in
accordance with the law, but the provision regarding
payment of a fine should be eliminated and the appellant
sentenced to indemnify in the proper amount the heirs of
the victim.