CANON 15 CASES and an additional ₱4,000.
00 as appearance fee
A.C. No. 10558 February 23, 2015
MICHAEL RUBY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY.
RUDOLPH DILLA BAYOT, Respondents.
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by
Michael Ruby (complainant) with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo (Atty. Espejo) and Atty.
Rudolph Dilla Bayot (Atty. Bayot) (respondents)
for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
The complainant alleged that he and his mother,
Felicitas Ruby Bihla (Felicitas), engaged the
services of the respondents in connection with a
case for cancellation and nullification of deeds of
donation. Pursuant to the retainer
agreement2 dated August 29, 2009, the
complainant and Felicitas would pay Atty.
Espejo the amount of ₱100,000.00 as
acceptance fee, ₱70,000.00 of which was
actually paid upon the signing of the agreement
and the remaining ₱30,000.00 to be paid after
the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO). The
complainant and Felicitas likewise agreed to pay
the amount of ₱5,000.00 as appearance fee for
every hearing, which was apparently later
reduced to ₱4,000.00.
On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave
Atty. Espejo the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
payment for filing fee.3 On September 16, 2009,
Atty. Espejo filed the complaint for nullification
and cancellation of deeds of donation with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 219. However, the actual filing fee that
was paid by her only amounted to
7,561.00;4 she failed to account for the excess
amount given her despite several demand
letters5therefor.
On September 23, 2009, Atty. Espejo allegedly
asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the
amount of ₱30,000.00 – the remaining balance
of the acceptance fee agreed upon –
notwithstanding that the prayer for the issuance
of a TRO has yet to be heard. The complainant
asserted that the same was not yet due, but Atty.
Espejo told him that Atty. Bayot was in dire need
of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the
amount of ₱8,000.00 supposedly as partial
payment for the balance of the acceptance fee
for the September 22, 2009 hearing.6
On September 25, 2009, Atty. Espejo called the
complainant informing him of the need to file a
separate petition for the issuance of a TRO. She
allegedly asked for ₱50,000.00 to be used as
"representation fee." The complainant was able
to bargain with Atty. Espejo and gave her
₱20,000.00 instead.7
Meanwhile, on September 24, 2009, the RTC
issued an Order8 denying the complainant’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO. The
complainant alleged that the respondents failed
to apprise him of the denial of his prayer for the
issuance of a TRO; that he only came to know of
said denial on November 3, 2009 when he
visited the RTC.9
On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited
the amount of ₱4,000.00 to the bank account of
Atty. Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on
the motion to serve summons through
publications, which was set at 2:00 p.m. on even
date. However, Atty. Bayot allegedly did not
appear in court and instead met with the
complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City Hall
of Justice, telling them that he already talked to
the clerk of court who assured him that the court
would grant their motion.10
Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the
respondents failed to update him as to the status
of his complaint. He further claimed that Atty.
Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their
counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty.
Espejo alone who was the counsel of the
complainant and that he was merely a
collaborating counsel.
In its Order11 dated January 7, 2010, the IBP-
CBD directed the respondents to submit their
respective answers to the complaint.
In his Answer,12 Atty. Bayot claimed that he was
not the counsel of the complainant; that he
merely assisted him and Atty. Espejo. He
averred that Atty. Espejo, with the complainant’s
consent, sought his help for the sole purpose of
drafting a complaint. He pointed out that it was
Atty. Espejo who signed and filed the complaint
in the RTC.13
Atty. Bayot further pointed out that he had no
part in the retainer agreement that was entered
into by the complainant, Felicitas, and Atty.
Espejo. He also denied having any knowledge
as to the ₱50,000.00 that was paid to Atty.
Espejo as filing fees.14
1
As to the ₱12,000.00 that was given him, he
claimed that he was entitled to ₱4,000.00
thereof since the said amount was his
appearance fee. He pointed out that he
appeared before the RTC’s hearing for the
issuance of a TRO on September 22, 2009. On
the other hand, the ₱8,000.00 was paid to him
as part of the acceptance fee, which was then
already due since the RTC had already heard
their prayer for the issuance of a TRO.15
He also denied any knowledge as to the
₱20,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo
purportedly for "representation fee" that would
be used to file a new petition for the issuance of
a TRO.16
Atty. Bayot admitted that he was the one who
drafted the motion to serve summons through
publication, but pointed out that it was Atty.
Espejo who signed and filed it in the RTC. He
also admitted that he was the one who was
supposed to attend the hearing of the said
motion, but claimed that he was only requested
to do so by Atty. Espejo since the latter had
another commitment. He denied requesting from
the complainant the amount of ₱4,000.00 as
appearance fee, alleging that it was the latter
who insisted on depositing the same in his bank
account.17
During the said hearing, Atty. Bayot claimed that
when he checked the court’s calendar, he
noticed that their motion was not included.
Allegedly, the clerk of court told him that she
would just tell the judge to consider their motion
submitted for resolution.18
On the other hand, Atty. Espejo, in her
Answer,19 denied asking for ₱50,000.00 from the
complainant as filing fees. She insisted that it
was the complainant who voluntarily gave her
the money to cover the filing fees. She further
alleged that she was not able to account for the
excess amount because her files were
destroyed when her office was flooded due to a
typhoon. She also denied having asked another
₱50,000.00 from the complainant as
"representation fee," asserting that the said
amount was for the payment of the injunction
bond once the prayer for the issuance of a TRO
is issued.
Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
On May 3, 2011, after due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation,20which recommended the
penalty of censure against the respondents. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty.
Bayot and the complainant had a lawyer-client
relationship notwithstanding that the former was
not the counsel of record in the case. That his
admission that he was a collaborating counsel
was sufficient to constitute a lawyer client
relationship. Moreover, considering that Atty.
Bayot initially received the amount of
₱12,000.00 from the complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that he can
no longer deny that he was the lawyer of the
complainant. The Investigating Commissioner
further found that: Parenthetically, Respondents
had asked and demanded prompt payment of
their attorney’s fees or appearance fees and
even asked for amounts for dubious purposes
yet they, just the same, performed their duties to
their clients leisurely and lethargically. Worse,
when the trusting Complainant had noticed that
his case was headed for disaster and wanted
Respondents to explain their obviously slothful
and listless services, they disappeared or
became evasive thus fortifying the conclusion
that they indeed have performed and carried out
their duties to Complainant way below the
standards set by the Code of [P]rofessional
Responsibility.21 Nevertheless, the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complainant failed
to prove that he indeed suffered injury as a
result of the respondents’ conduct and,
accordingly, should only be meted the penalty of
censure.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution,22 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the
modification that the penalty imposed upon Atty.
Espejo and Atty. Bayot was increased from
censure to suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
Atty. Bayot moved to reconsider the Resolution
dated March 20, 2013 issued by the IBP Board
of Governors.23 The complainant likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration, asking the IBP Board
of Governors to order the respondents to refund
to him the amount he paid to the
respondents.24 In the meantime, Atty. Espejo
passed away.25
On March 22, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution,26 which dismissed the case
insofar as Atty. Espejo in view of her demise.
The IBP Board of Governors affirmed Atty.
Bayot’s suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one year.
On December 3, 2014, the Court issued a
Resolution,27 which, inter alia, considered the
case closed and terminated as to Atty. Espejo
on account of her death. Accordingly, the
2
Court’s disquisition in this case would only be
limited to the liability of Atty. Bayot.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Bayot
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective
allegations of the parties and the circumstances
of this case, the Court modifies the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.
Atty. Bayot claimed that he is not the counsel of
record of the complainant in the case before the
RTC.1âwphi1 He pointed out that he had no part
in the retainer agreement entered into by the
complainant and Atty. Espejo. Thus, Atty. Bayot
claimed, the complainant had no cause of action
against him.
The Court does not agree.
It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the
counsel of record in the case that was filed in
the RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact that it
was only Atty. Espejo who signed the retainer
agreement. However, the evidence on record,
including Atty. Bayot’s admissions, points to the
conclusion that a lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and the complainant.
Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the
complaint that was filed with the RTC. He was
likewise the one who prepared the motion to
serve summons through publication. He likewise
appeared as counsel for the complainant in the
hearings of the case before the RTC. He
likewise advised the complainant on the status
of the case.
More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he
received ₱8,000.00, which is part of the
acceptance fee indicated in the retainer
agreement, from the complainant. It is true that it
was Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to
give Atty. Bayot the said amount. However, Atty.
Bayot admitted that he accepted from the
complainant the said ₱8,000.00 without even
explaining what the said amount was for.
The foregoing circumstances clearly established
that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Atty. Bayot and the complainant. "Documentary
formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession."28 Further,
acceptance of money from a client establishes
an attorney-client relationship.29 Accordingly, as
regards the case before the RTC, the
complainant had two counsels – Atty. Espejo
and Atty. Bayot.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
xxxx
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. x x x x
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
Accordingly, Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the
cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep
the latter informed of the status of his case. He
is likewise bound to account for all money or
property collected or received from the
complainant. He may be held administratively
liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may
have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,30 the Court
emphasized that:
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise
that degree of vigilance and attention expected
of a good father of a family makes the lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his
client but also to the legal profession, the courts
and society. His workload does not justify
3
neglect in handling one’s case because it is
settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as
much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust
money of his client that may come to his
possession.1âwphi1 As trustee of such funds,
he is bound to keep them separate and apart
from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the filing and
processing of a case if not utilized, must be
returned immediately upon demand. Failure to
return gives rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated it in violation of the trust
reposed on him. And the conversion of funds
entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of
professional ethics and betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.31 (Citations
omitted)
Nevertheless, the administrative liability of a
lawyer for any infractions of his duties attaches
only to such circumstances, which he is
personally accountable for. It would be plainly
unjust if a lawyer would be held accountable for
acts, which he did not commit.
The Investigating Commissioner’s findings,
which was adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, did not make a distinction as to
which specific acts or omissions the
respondents are each personally responsible for.
This is inequitable since either of the
respondents may not be held personally liable
for the infractions committed by the other.
Atty. Bayot may not be held liable for the failure
to account for and return the excess of the
₱50,000.00 which was paid by the complainant
for the filing fees. The evidence on record shows
that it was Atty. Espejo alone who received the
said amount and that she was the one who paid
the filing fees when the complaint was filed with
the RTC. That Atty. Bayot had no knowledge of
the said amount paid by the complainant for the
filing fees is even admitted by the complainant
himself during the proceedings before the IBP-
CBD, viz:
ATTY. BAYOT: So, Atty. Espejo ask you
for ₱50,000[.00] as filing fee.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That when he asked you
about that, Atty. Bayot was not present.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That later on you gave
Atty. Espejo the ₱50,000[.00].
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That Atty. Bayot was not
also present at that time.
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
ATTY. BAYOT: That never did Atty. Bayot
ask you or followed-up from you the
₱50,000[.00] that Atty. Espejo was asking
as filing fee?
MR. RUBY: Admitted.
MR. RUBY: You have nothing to do with
the ₱50,000[.00] that was Atty. Espejo.32
Further, in her Answer, Atty. Espejo admitted
that she was the one who failed to account for
the filing fees, alleging that the files in her office
were destroyed by flood. Likewise, the demand
letters written by the complainant, which were
seeking the accounting for the ₱50,000.00 filing
fee, were all solely addressed to Atty. Espejo.
Clearly, Atty. Bayot may not be held
administratively liable for the failure to account
for the filing fees.
Atty. Bayot cannot also be held liable for the
₱20,000.00 which Atty. Espejo asked from the
complainant for "representation fee." The
complainant failed to adduce any evidence that
would establish that Atty. Bayot knew of and
came into possession of the said amount paid
by the complainant.
On the other hand, Atty. Bayot is legally entitled
to the ₱8,000.00 he received from the
complainant on September 23, 2009, the same
being his share in the acceptance fee agreed to
by the complainant in the retainer agreement.
He is likewise legally entitled to the ₱4,000.00
from the complainant on even date as it is the
payment for his appearance fee in the hearing
for the issuance of a TRO on September 22,
2009.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entitled to the
₱4,000.00 which the complainant deposited to
his bank account on October 23, 2009. Atty.
Bayot admitted that there was no hearing
scheduled on the said date; their motion to serve
summons through publication was not included
in the RTC’s calendar that day. Accordingly, Atty.
Bayot is obliged to return the said amount to the
complainant.
As regards the complainant’s charge of gross
neglect against Atty. Bayot, the Court finds the
same unsubstantiated. The Court has
consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
4
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence,
and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint.33
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
gross misconduct or for transgressions defined
by the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of
professional license. Considering, however, the
serious consequences of either penalty, the
Court will exercise its power to disbar or
suspend only upon a clear, convincing, and
satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of
the court and as member of the bar.
The complainant merely alleged that, after the
hearing on the motion to serve summons
through publication, the respondents had "made
themselves scarce" and failed to update him on
the status of the case before the RTC. However,
other than his bare allegations, the complainant
failed to present any evidence that would show
that Atty. Bayot was indeed remiss in his duties
to the complainant.
However, the complainant’s November 4, 2009
letter34 to Atty. Espejo tells a different story. In
the said letter, the complainant asked Atty.
Espejo to withdraw as being the counsel of
record in the case before the RTC in favor of
Atty. Bayot since he was the one who actually
prepared the pleadings and attended the
hearings of their motions. In any case, the
charge of neglect against Atty. Bayot was
premature, if not unfair, considering that, at that
time, the case before the RTC was still in the
early stages; the pre-trial and trial have not even
started yet. That they lost their bid for the
issuance of a TRO is not tantamount to neglect
on the part of Atty. Bayot.
However, Atty. Bayot is not entirely without fault.
This administrative complaint was brought about
by his intervention when the complainant sought
the legal services of Atty. Espejo. Atty. Bayot
undertook to prepare the complaint to be filed
with the RTC and the motion to serve summons
through publication, attended the hearings, and
advised the complainant as to the status of the
case without formally entering his appearance
as counsel of record. He was able to obtain
remuneration for his legal services sans any
direct responsibility as to the progress of the
case. Atty. Bayot is reminded to be more
circumspect in his dealings with clients.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rudolph Dilla Bayot is
hereby ADMONISHED to exercise more
prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his
clients. He is also ordered to return to Michael
Ruby within fifteen (15) days from notice the
amount of Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00)
representing his appearance fee received from
the latter on October 23, 2009 with a warning
that failure on his part to do so will result in the
imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
[ A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014 ]
DARIA O. DAGING, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, RESPONDENT.
This administrative complaint for disbarment
arose from an Affidavit Complaint[1] filed by
Daria O. Daging (complainant) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter,[2] against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis
(respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of
Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased
from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space
located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where
she operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer
Proposal[3] from Davis & Sabling Law Office
signed by respondent and his partner Atty.
Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This
eventually resulted in the signing by the
complainant,, the respondent and Atty. Sabling
of a Retainer Agreement[4] dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying
the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease.
Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and
respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and
informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that
subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under
her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an
ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time,
Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel
as their Retainer Agreement remained
subsisting and in force. However, respondent
appeared as counsel for Balageo in that
ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter,
an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[5]
In his Comment,[6] respondent denied
participation in the takeover or acting as a
business partner of Balageo in the operation of
the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole
proprietress of the establishment. He insisted
5
that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who
initiated the proposal and was in fact the one
who was able to convince complainant to accept
the law office as her retainer. Respondent
maintained that he never obtained any
knowledge or information regarding the business
of complainant who used to consult only Atty-
Sabling. Respondent admitted though having
represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but
denied that he took advantage of the Retainer
Agreement between complainant and Davis and
Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant
of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE as
her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of
the Clients of Respondent in several cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of
May 2005, while Respondent was in his office
doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called
up Respondent informing the latter that his
assistance is needed for purposes of conducting
an inventoiy of all items at the former Nashville
Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the
purpose of] the inventoiy [to which] the latter x x
x responded x x x that she entered | into] a leas
contract with the present administrator of the
building, Benjie Pinlac;
3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie
Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for further
clarification of the matter. Thereafter,
Respondent was later informed that the
business of Complainant was taken over and
operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven days.
Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said
place to Novie Balageo which the latter readily
accepted;
3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent
requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Balageo in conducting an inventory.
Furthermore, Respondent never acted as
partner of Novie Balageo in operating the former
Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for
Ejectment against Novie Balageo and Benjie
Pinlac, Respondent represented the former
thereof without taking advantage of the
retainership contract between the DAVIS and
SABLING LAW OFFICE [and] Complainant as
Respondent has no knowledge or information of
any matters related by complainant to Arty.
Sabling regarding the former's business:
3.g While the Complaint was pending,
respondent was x x x informed by Novie
Balageo and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all
matters x x x which x x x Respondent [was
unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair
play, x x x Respondent [deemed it prudent] to x
x x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo.
Hence, Respondent filed his Motion to Withdraw
As Counsel, x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the [Complaint's]
subject matter, x x x[7]
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner rendered a Report and
Recommendation[8] finding respondent guilty of
betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the
disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage
of another person. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.[9] Upon motion of the respondent,
it reduced the penalty imposed to six months
suspension considering that there is no proof
that respondent actually handled any previous
legal matters involving complainant.[10]
Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a
Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with
respondent's law firm. This agreement was
signed by the respondent and attached to
the rollo of this case. And during the subsistence
of said Retainer Agreement, respondent
represented and defended Balageo, who was
impleaded as one ofthe defendants in the
ejectment case complainant filed before the
MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed
on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with
Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 11,
2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when
respondent withdrew his appearance for
Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable
that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
6
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15,
facts. 2012 Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz
Tingalon L. Davis is found GUILTY of violating
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a Professional Responsibility and is
person whose interest conflicts with that of his hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
present or former client."[11] The prohibition for a period of six (6) months effective upon
against representing conflicting interests is receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer commission of the same or similar offense in the
has acted in good faith and with no intention to future will result in the imposition of a stiffer
represent conflicting interests.[12] In Quiambao v. penalty.
Atty. Bamba,[13] this Court emphasized that
lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines,
paramount importance in the administration of for their information and guidance.
justice.[14]
Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to
Respondent argues that while complainant is a inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is Resolution.
actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling.
He was not privy to any transaction between
Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no
A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013
knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
vs.
taken advantage of an information obtained by
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.
his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement.
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves
We are not impressed. In Hilado v.
conflicting interests may be suspended from the
David,[15] reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty.
practice of law, or even disbarred when
Cabucana, Jr.,[16] this Court held that a lawyer
circumstances so warrant.
who takes up the cause of the adversary of the
party who has engaged the services of his law
Antecedents
firm brings the law profession into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermines the
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this
integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument
complaint for disbarment charging respondent
that he never took advantage of any information
Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust
acquired by his law firm in the course of its
and confidence of a client by representing the
professional dealings with the complainant, even
interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in
assuming it to be true, is of no moment.
a manner that blatantly conflicted with his
Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is
interest.
a client of his law firm, respondent should have
immediately informed both the complainant and
Samson and his relatives were among the
Balageo that he, as well as the other members
investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter,
their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be
Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business
representing conflicting interests and violate the
(ICS Corporation), a corporation whose
Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed,
corporate officers were led by Sison. The other
respondent could have simply advised both
officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison,
complainant and Balageo to instead engage the
Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and
services of another lawyer.
Jhun Sison.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and
may either be reprimand or suspension from the
assist him and his relatives in the criminal
practice of law ranging from six months to two
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to
years.[17] We thus adopt the recommendation of
the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand
the IBP Board of Governors.
letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return
or refund of the money subject of their
WHEREFORE, the

7
complaints. He also prepared the complaint-
affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on
July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-
affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate
officials of ICS Corporation with several counts
of estafa1was presented to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After the
preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally
charged Sison and the others with several
counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with
Samson and his relatives to discuss the
possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison
and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others
that undergoing a trial of the cases would just be
a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and
her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to
them of a certain property located in Antipolo
City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange
for their desistance. They acceded and executed
the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in
turn they received a deed of assignment
covering land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. R-4475 executed by
Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3
Samson and his relatives later demanded from
Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the
property among themselves. It took some period
of negotiations between them and Atty. Era
before the latter delivered to them on November
27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale
involving the property. However, Atty. Era told
them that whether or not the title of the property
had been encumbered or free from lien or defect
would no longer be his responsibility. He further
told them that as far as he was concerned he
had already accomplished his professional
responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS
Corporation.4
When Samson and his co-complainants verified
the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds
and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they
were dismayed to learn that they could not
liquidate the property because it was no longer
registered under the name of ICS Corporation
but was already under the name of Bank Wise
Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as
their counsel with ICS Corporation.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime
thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him
on September 8, 2004 to remind him about his
guarantee and the promise to settle the issues
with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear
from Atty. Era at all.6
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not
anymore appear for Samson and his group. This
forced them to engage another lawyer. They
were shocked to find out later on, however, that
Atty. Era had already been entering his
appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC
in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam that she and her ICS Corporation had
perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established
Atty. Era’s legal representation of Sison by
submitting several certified copies of the minutes
of the proceedings in the criminal cases
involving Sison and her group issued by Branch
102 and Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City
showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the
counsel of Sison in the cases for estafa pending
and being tried in said courts.8 They also
submitted a certification issued on November 3,
2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison,
an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as
borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit.9
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an
affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and
praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground
of his violation of the trust, confidence and
respect reposed in him as their counsel.10
Upon being required by the Court to comment
on the complaint against him within 10 days
from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the
extension of his period to file the comment to
supposedly enable him to collate documents
relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling
40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.12
By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the
Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure to submit his comment.
In the comment that he subsequently filed on
April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion
on April 23, 2002 of the compromise settlement
between Samson and his group, on one hand,
and Sison and her ICS Corporation, on the other,
had terminated the lawyer-client relationship
between him and Samson and his group; and
that on September 1, 2003, he had been
appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by
Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only for
purposes of her arraignment.
8
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15
In his report and recommendation dated October
1, 2007,16 the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)
found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, for failing to
serve his clients with competence and diligence,
and for failing to champion his clients’ cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that
the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim
that his legal services as counsel for Samson
and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003
upon the execution of the compromise
settlement of the criminal cases; that he even
admitted during the mandatory conference that
there was no formal termination of his legal
services;17 that his professional obligation
towards Samson and his group as his clients did
not end upon execution of the settlement
agreement, because he remained duty-bound to
see to it that the settlement was duly
implemented; that he also had the obligation to
appear in the criminal cases until their
termination; and that his acceptance of the
engagement to appear in behalf of Sison invited
suspicion of his double-dealing and
unfaithfulness.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended
that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of
law for six months, viz:
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is
guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, failing to serve his client, complainant
herein, with competence and diligence and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on
October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, with the
modification that Atty. Era be suspended from
the practice of law for two years.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20 denying
Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration and
affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the
case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a
Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the
Court merely noted the manifestation, and
denied the motion for its lack of merit.23
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged
Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests by accepting the
responsibility of representing Sison in the cases
similar to those in which he had undertaken to
represent Samson and his group,
notwithstanding that Sison was the very same
person whom Samson and his group had
accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He
had drafted the demand letters and the
complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the
filing of the estafa charges against Sison and the
others in the RTC in Quezon City.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client
relationship ended when Samson and his group
entered into the compromise settlement with
Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of
then, for the fact remained that he still needed to
oversee the implementation of the settlement as
well as to proceed with the criminal cases until
they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by
the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that
the execution of a compromise settlement in the
criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the
approval of the compromise by the trial court
was still required, but also because the
compromise would have applied only to the civil
aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect
pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that: "A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus
owed to Samson and his group entire devotion
to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He
was expected to exert his best efforts and ability
to preserve the clients’ cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients
likewise served the ends of justice.26
9
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court
discussed the concept of conflict of interest in
this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.28
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests
on five rationales, rendered as follows:
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that
their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x
x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of
interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of
legal representation. To the extent that a conflict
of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of
effective representation x x x could be
compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the
lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential
information xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of
confidential client information against the
interests of the client, either to benefit the
lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other
client, or to foster an assumed public purpose is
facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the
opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers
will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a
client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect
interests of the legal system in obtaining
adequate presentations to tribunals. In the
absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer
might appear on both sides of the litigation,
complicating the process of taking proof and
compromise adversary argumentation x x x.29
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was
fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is
directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation.30 The rule
is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-
client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge
and information gathered in the course of the
relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers
not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.32 The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.33
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to
explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The spirit behind this rule is that the
client’s confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous
relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility expressly
declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned
duty is to protect the client at all hazards and
costs even to himself.35The protection given to
10
the client is perpetual and does not cease with
the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected
by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney
and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.36
In the absence of the express consent from
Samson and his group after full disclosure to
them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the
most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was
either to outrightly decline representing and
entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or
to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for
herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should
now suffer the proper sanction.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and
PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty
of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
two years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with a warning that his commission of
a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the
personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and
entered m his file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all
lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for its guidance.
Lee v Atty. Simando
A.C. No. 9537 [Formerly CBD Case No. 09-
2489]
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment[1] dated
July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee)
against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando
(Atty. Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now
A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records,
are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of
complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004 until
January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of
Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00).[2]
Sometime during the above-mentioned period,
Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked if
the latter could help a certain Felicito M.
Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. He
claimed that Mejorado was then awaiting the
release of his claim for informer's reward from
the Bureau of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not
know Mejorado personally and she claimed to
be not in the business of lending money, the
former initially refused to lend money. But Atty.
Simando allegedly persisted and assured her
that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will
issue postdated checks and sign promissory
notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-
maker of Mejorado and assured her that
Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty.
Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba
kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo,
gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako";
"Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang
buwan ito, bayad ka na."[3]
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily
calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the
latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and
finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable
amounts of money. Respondent acted as co-
maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to
wit:[4]
Date: Amount
November 11,
Php 400,000.00
2006
November 24,
200,000.00
2006
November 27,
400,000.00
2006
December 7, 2006 200,000.00
December 13,
_____200,000.00
2006
Total: Php1,400,000.00
When the said obligation became due, despite
Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed
and refused to comply with his obligation. Since
Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee
instructed him to initiate legal action against
Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in
touch with Mejorado and ask him to pay his
obligation without having to resort to legal action.
However, even after several months, Mejorado
still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked
Atty. Simando why no payment has been made
yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that
he was supposed to be the co-maker of the
obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di
kasuhan din ninyo ako!"[5]
Despite complainant's repeated requests,
respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal
actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008,
11
complainant was forced to terminate her
contract with Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty.
Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand letter dated
June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity
as the co-maker of some of the loans of
Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent
denied his liability as a co-maker and claimed
that novation had occurred because complainant
had allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado
without his knowledge.[6]
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating
the trust and confidence which she gave upon
him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of
their professional relationship in order to get a
loan for his client. Worse, when the said
obligation became due, respondent was
unwilling to help her to favor Mejorado. Thus,
the instant petition for disbarment against Atty.
Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered
respondent to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him.[7]
In his Answer[8] dated September 17, 2009, Atty.
Simando claimed that complainant, who is
engaged in lending money at a high interest rate,
was the one who initiated the financial
transaction between her and Mejorado. He
narrated that complainant asked him if it is true
that Mejorado is his client as she found out that
Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's
reward with the Bureau of Customs. When he
affimed that Mejorado is his client, complainant
signified that she is willing to give money for
Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the
release of the informer's reward. Eventually,
parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the
amount and that payment shall be made upon
receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim
for informer's reward.[9]
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee
gave Mejorado a total of Php700,000.00 as an
investment but he signed as co-maker in all the
receipts showing double the amount or
Php1,400,000.00.[10]
Respondent claimed that complainant is a
money-lender exacting high interest rates from
borrowers.[11] He narrated several instances and
civil cases where complainant was engaged in
money-lending where he divulged that even
after defendants had already paid their loan,
complainant still persists in collecting from
them.[12] Respondent asserted that he knew of
these transactions, because he was among the
four lawyers who handled complainant's case.[13]
Respondent averred that from the time that
Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close to
each other, the latter had given Mejorado
additional investments and one (1) Silverado
Pick-up at the price of P500,000.00 and fifty (50)
sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the
additional investments made by Dr. Lee to
Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's
investment of around P2 Million which included
the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of
old clothings, the latter required Mejorado to
issue five (5) checks with a total value of
P7,033,500.00, an amount more than the actual
value which Mejorado received.[14]
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and
Mejorado agreed that the issued checks shall be
presented to the bank only upon payment of his
informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the checks
to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's
account had no funds for said checks. Atty.
Simando further denied that he refused to take
legal action against Mejorado. He claimed that
complainant never instructed him to file legal
action, since the latter knew that Mejorado is
obligated to pay only upon receipt of his
informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not
violate their lawyer- client relationship, since Dr.
Lee voluntarily made the financial investment
with Mejorado and that he merely introduced
complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed
that there is no conflict of interest because he is
Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for
informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer
against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no
conflicting interest as there was no case
between Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is
handling for both of them.[15]
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee
denied that what she entered into was a mere
investment. She insisted that she lent the money
to Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as
co-maker and the transaction was actually a
loan.[16] To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted
the written loan agreements/receipts which
categorically stated that the money received was
a loan with due dates, signed by Mejorado and
respondent as co-maker.[17] She further claimed
that she did not know Mejorado and it was
respondent who brought him to her and
requested her to assist Mejorado by lending him
money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for
Mejorado and agreed to sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she
12
was collecting is the payment only of the loan
amounting to One Million Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which
respondent had signed as co-maker. Thus,
respondent's claim that his obligation was
already extinguished by novation holds no water,
since what was being collected is merely his
obligation pertaining to the loan amounting to
Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent,
in his comments, even divulged confidential
informations he had acquired while he was still
her lawyer and even used it against her in the
present case, thus, committing another unethical
conduct. She, therefore, maintained that
respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client
confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the
mandatory conference on January 15, 2010.
Both parties requested for resetting of the
mandatory conference, however, both failed to
agree on a certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as
not to delay the disposition of the complaint,
terminated the mandatory conference and
instead required the parties to submit their
respective position papers.[18]
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty.
Simando guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to
suspend Atty. Simando from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
granted respondent's motion for reconsideration
for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the
penalty of suspension. The Resolution dated
December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case
against respondent was dismissed.
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in
determining whether a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to
fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for
one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is
whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.[19]
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence
to support respondent's violation of the above
parameters, as established by the following
circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-
client relationship between complainant and Atty.
Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees
received by respondent and the latter's
representation in certain legal matters pertaining
to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado
is another client of him albeit in a case claiming
rewards against the Bureau of Customs;
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the
one who introduced complainant and Mejorado
to each other for the purpose of entering into a
financial transaction while having knowledge
that complainant's interests could possibly run in
conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically
such client's interests, he is duty-bound to
protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting
interests between his two clients, respondent
consented in the parties' agreement and even
signed as co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting
interests between his two clients was
demonstrated further by his own actions, when
he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his
obligation to complainant despite the latter's
instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in
the receipts/promissory notes arising from the
loan agreement between his two clients;
13

(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against
Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still
complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear
as counsel for one party (complainant as
creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as
debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests.
He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflict with that of his present or former
client.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict
of interest because complainant and respondent
are his clients in unrelated cases fails to
convince. His representation of opposing clients
in both cases, though unrelated, obviously
constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing.[20] Moreover,
with the subject loan agreement entered into by
the complainant and Mejorado, who are both his
clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of
interest, moreso when he signed as co- maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money
received was an investment and not a loan is
difficult to accept, considering that he signed as
co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is
objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if
he knew all along that the intention of the parties
was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a
lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be
presupposed that he is aware of the nature of
suretyship and the consequences of signing as
co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability
without exposing himself from administrative
liability, if not civil liability. Moreover, we noted
that while complainant was able to show proof of
receipts of various amounts of money loaned
and received by Mejorado, and signed by the
respondent as co-maker, the latter, however,
other than his bare denials, failed to show proof
that the money given was an investment and not
a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise
with respect to the same general matter
however slight the adverse interest may be. It
applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyer's private activity or in the performance of
a function in a non-professional capacity. In the
process of determining whether there is a
conflict of interest, an important criterion is
probability, not certainty, of conflict.[21]
We likewise note that respondent offered
several excuses in order to avoid payment of his
liability. First, in his Answer to complainant's
demand letter, he claimed there was novation
which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he
claimed that the amount received by Mejorado
for which he signed as co-maker was merely an
investment and not a loan. Finally, he alleged
that it was agreed that the investment with
profits will be paid only after Mejorado receives
the payment for his claim for reward which
complainant violated when she presented the
checks for payment prematurely. These
actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of
his reputation as a lawyer.[22]
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of
violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[23] In his last-ditch effort to
impeach the credibility of complainant, he
divulged informations[24] which he acquired in
confidence during the existence of their lawyer-
client relationship.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[25] that the
termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his
client, do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences
acquired in the previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are
enjoined to look at any representation situation
from "the point of view that there are possible
conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of
impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair loyalty to a
client.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No.
XIX-2010-733 suspending respondent Atty.
Amador L. Simando for six (6) months from the
practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all
courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as member of
the Bar.
14

Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court
of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that
we can determine the reckoning point when his
suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE
MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO,
ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P.
DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY.
RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY.
RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED
RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a
complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009
filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo
(complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose
Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J.
Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty.
Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia),
Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G.
Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan,
Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty.
Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty.
Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged
that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz
Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-
Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and
Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated
labor cases2 where he was impleaded as
respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law
firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
The labor cases were terminated on June 5,
2008 upon the agreement of both parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for
qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation
(FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael
Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was
represented by the law firm, the same law office
which handled complainant’s labor cases.
Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment
case against respondents, alleging that they
violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of
the CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE
THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they
indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela
Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that
their association is not a formal partnership, but
one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a
fixed amount every month for the maintenance
of the entire office; and expenses for cases,
such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing,
and the like are shouldered by each lawyer
separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and
receive his own professional fees
exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not
discuss their clientele with the other lawyers and
associates, unless they agree that a case be
handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that
this has been the practice of the law firm since
its inception. They averred that complainant’s
labor cases were solely and exclusively handled
by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm.
Moreover, respondents asserted that the
qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was
handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who
had no knowledge of complainant’s labor cases,
as he started working for the firm after the
termination thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela
confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s
labor cases but averred that it was terminated
on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant did not
have any monthly retainer contract.10 He
likewise explained that he did not see the need
to discuss complainant’s labor cases with the
other lawyers as the issue involved was very
simple,11 and that the latter did not confide any
secret during the time the labor cases were
pending that would have been used in the
criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed
15
that the other lawyers were not aware of the
details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they
know that he was the handling counsel for
complainant even after the said cases were
closed and terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and
Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated
September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner
found respondents to have violated the rule on
conflict of interest and recommended that they
be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of
Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was
indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and
not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as
respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having
been retained by FEVE Farms, created a
connection that would injure complainant in the
qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client.15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation with modification. Instead of
the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the case with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board
of Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated
March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its
February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted
and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation, with modification, (1)
reprimanding the respondents for violation of the
rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the
case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death;
and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the
practice of law for one year, being the handling
counsel of complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions
of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR
provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE
THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained
the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose
those of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with
the IBP’s conclusions that respondents
represented conflicting interests and must
therefore be held liable. As the records bear out,
respondents’ law firm was engaged and, thus,
represented complainant in the labor cases
instituted against him. However, after the
termination thereof, the law firm agreed to
16
represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing
of a criminal case for qualified theft against
complainant, its former client, and his wife. As
the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its
failure to organize and implement a system by
which it would have been able to keep track of
all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the
end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any
potential conflict of interest. As an organization
of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a
collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding
handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to
value coordination in deference to the conflict of
interest rule. This lack of coordination, as
respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable
to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in
the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s
primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been
institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela
included, would have been wary of the above-
mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to
decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement.
Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents,
as the charged members of the law firm, ought
to be administratively sanctioned. Note that the
Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty.
Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of
suspension. As the Court sees it, all
respondents stand in equal fault for the law
firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been
violated. As such, all of them are meted with the
same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
would be dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that
respondents' pronounced liability is not altered
by the fact that the labor cases against
complainant had long been terminated. Verily,
the termination of attorney-client relation
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo
T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of
representing conflicting interests in violation of
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and are
therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar infraction would be dealt with
more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty.
Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys.
Further, let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which
is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 8243 : July 24, 2009]
ROLANDO B. PACANA,
JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MARICEL
PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative
complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against
Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter
with flagrant violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges that
respondent committed acts constituting conflict
of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and
failure to render an accounting of all the money
and properties received by her from complainant.
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the
Operations Director for Multitel Communications
Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company
of Multitel International Holdings Corporation
(Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed
its name to Precedent Communications
Corporation (Precedent).3
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel
was besieged by demand letters from its
members and investors because of the failure of
its investment schemes. He alleges that he
earned the ire of Multitel investors after
becoming the assignee of majority of the shares
of stock of Precedent and after being appointed
as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of
respondent who also happened to be a member
of the Couples for Christ, a religious
organization where complainant and his wife
were also active members. From then on,
complainant and respondent constantly
communicated, with the former disclosing all his
involvement and interests in Precedent and
Precedent's relation with Multitel. Respondent
gave legal advice to complainant and even
17
helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a
lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and respondent although no formal
document was executed by them at that time. A
Retainer Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003
was proposed by respondent. Complainant,
however, did not sign the said agreement
because respondent verbally asked for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee
upon collection of the overpayment made by
Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications
company based in Finland. Complainant found
the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not
within his means.6 Hence, the retainer
agreement remained unsigned.7
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to
receive a demand letter from respondent8 asking
for the return and immediate settlement of the
funds invested by respondent's clients in Multitel.
When complainant confronted respondent about
the demand letter, the latter explained that she
had to send it so that her clients - defrauded
investors of Multitel - would know that she was
doing something for them and assured
complainant that there was nothing to worry
about.9
Both parties continued to communicate and
exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against
complainant. On these occasions, respondent
impressed upon complainant that she can
closely work with officials of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to resolve
complainant's problems. Respondent also
convinced complainant that in order to be
absolved from any liability with respect to the
investment scam, he must be able to show to
the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all
of his interests in Precedent including the funds
assigned to him by Multitel.12
Respondent also asked money from
complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be
used only for his case whenever necessary.
Complainant agreed and gave her an initial
amount of P900,000.00 which was received by
respondent herself.13 Sometime thereafter,
complainant again gave
respondent P1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts
were all part of Precedent's collections and sales
proceeds which complainant held as assignee of
the company's properties.15
When complainant went to the United States
(US), he received several messages from
respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail)
and short messaging system (SMS, or text
messages) warning him not to return to the
Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president
of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant
may later on be implicated in Multitel's failed
investment system. Respondent even said that
ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure
order had been issued against him. Complainant,
thereafter, received several e-mail messages
from respondent updating him of the status of
the case against Multitel and promised that she
will settle the matter discreetly with government
officials she can closely work with in order to
clear complainant's name.16 In two separate e-
mail messages,17 respondent again asked
money from complainant, P200,000 of which
was handed by complainant's wife while
respondent was confined in Saint Luke's
Hospital after giving birth,18 and
another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the
NBI.19
Through respondent's persistent promises to
settle all complainant's legal problems,
respondent was able to convince complainant
who was still in the US to execute a deed of
assignment in favor of respondent allowing the
latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular
phones and accessories stored in complainant's
house and inside a warehouse.20 He also signed
a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to
sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.21
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent
may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire
another lawyer. When respondent knew about
this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as
follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I
shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and
lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all
the same as the SEC report I told you before.
The findings are the same, i.e. your company
was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that
funds were provided you.
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a
quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind,
laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio
really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need
the accounting of all the funds you received from
the sale of the phones, every employees and
directors['] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds
you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted,
every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ
and NBI can have the account opened.
18
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with
Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we
can inform them [that] it was not touched by you.
I have been informed by Efie that your family is
looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very
well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have
no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off.
I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you
cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the
clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of
the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly
and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for
your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people
I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as
your lawyer although I will do all the work. He
can help with all his connections. Val's friend in
the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized
crime who is the entity (sic) who has your
warrant. My law partner was the state
prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have
it covered in all aspects and all departments. I
am just trying to liquidate the phones I have
allotted for you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi
whether we like it or not, we have to give this
agencies (sic) to make our work easier
according to Val. The funds with Mickey are
already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as
attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to
send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but
recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate
clients and government officials harass and
kidnap to make the individuals they want to
come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to
happen. Things will be really easier on my side.
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make
it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give
him the free hand to work with your case. Please
trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I
told you this will happen but we are ready and
prepared. The clients who received the phones
will stand by you and make you the hero in this
scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my
expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an
angel on your side. Always pray though to the
best legal mind up there. You will be ok!
Candy22
On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent's advice,
complainant returned to the country. On the eve
of his departure from the United States,
respondent called up complainant and
conveniently informed him that he has been
cleared by the NBI and the BID.23
About a month thereafter, respondent personally
met with complainant and his wife and told them
that she has already
accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorney's fees
and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to
complainant in appreciation for his help.
Respondent allegedly told complainant that
without his help, she would not have earned
such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved,
complainant accepted respondent's offer but
respondent, later on, changed her mind and told
complainant that she would instead invest
the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business
venture. Complainant declined and explained to
respondent that he and his family needed the
money instead to cover their daily expenses as
he was no longer employed. Respondent
allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her
promise.24
Respondent even publicly announced in their
religious organization that she was able to help
settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold
departure order issued against complainant and
narrated how she was able to defend
complainant in the said cases.25
By April 2004, however, complainant noticed
that respondent was evading him. Respondent
would either refuse to return complainant's call
or would abruptly terminate their telephone
conversation, citing several reasons. This went
on for several months.26 In one instance, when
complainant asked respondent for an update on
the collection of Benefon's obligation to
Precedent which respondent had previously
taken charge of, respondent arrogantly
answered that she was very busy and that she
would read Benefon's letter only when she found
time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed
with respondent's arrogance and evasiveness,
complainant wrote respondent a letter formally
asking for a full accounting of all the money,
documents and properties given to the
latter.27 Respondent rendered an accounting
through a letter dated December 20,
2004.28 When complainant found respondent's
explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter
expressing his confusion about the
accounting.29 Complainant repeated his request
for an audited financial report of all the
properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will
be constrained to file the appropriate case
against respondent.30 Respondent
replied,31 explaining that all the properties and
cash turned over to her by complainant had
been returned to her clients who had money
claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she
said that she was able to secure quitclaim
documents clearing complainant from any
liability.32 Still unsatisfied, complainant decided
to file an affidavit-complaint33 against
respondent before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
19
In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent
vehemently denied being the lawyer for
Precedent. She maintained that no formal
engagement was executed between her and
complainant. She claimed that she merely
helped complainant by providing him with legal
advice and assistance because she personally
knew him, since they both belonged to the same
religious
organization.35 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lÎ
±Ï‰ lιbrαrÿ
Respondent insisted that she represented the
group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her
clients had against the complainant. She also
averred that the results of the settlement
between both parties were fully documented and
accounted for.36 Respondent believes that her
act in helping complainant resolve his legal
problem did not violate any ethical standard and
was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.37
To bolster her claim that the complaint was
without basis, respondent noted that a complaint
for estafa was also filed against her by
complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same
grounds. The complaint was, however,
dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of
evidence.38Respondent argued that on this basis
alone, the administrative case must also be
dismissed.
In her Position Paper,39 respondent also
questioned the admissibility of the electronic
evidence submitted by complainant to the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent
maintained that the e-mail and the text
messages allegedly sent by respondent to
complainant were of doubtful authenticity and
should be excluded as evidence for failure to
conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence
(A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
After due hearing, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report
and Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-
client relationship was established between
respondent and complainant despite the
absence of a written contract. The Investigating
Commissioner also declared that respondent
violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to
her client when she allowed herself to represent
conflicting interests and failed to render a full
accounting of all the cash and properties
entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the
IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation42 denying the motion and
adopting the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The case now comes before this Court for final
action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public
policy, good taste43 and, more importantly, upon
necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including its
weak and strong points. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given to him to take
advantage of his client; for if the confidence is
abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.44 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double ─
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice.45 It is
for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.46
Respondent must have known that her act of
constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered
with demands from investors of Multitel,
eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-
client relationship. Respondent cannot shield
herself from the inevitable consequences of her
actions by simply saying that the assistance she
rendered to complainant was only in the form of
"friendly accommodations,"47 precisely because
at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause
of the opposing parties who had been referred to
her by the SEC.48
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence
of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was
ever forged between her and
complainant.49 This argument all the more
reveals respondent's patent ignorance of
fundamental laws on contracts and of basic
ethical standards expected from an advocate of
justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
20
The absence of a written contract will not
preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties.
Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received
in any matter pertinent to his
profession.50 (Emphasis
supplied.)ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω l
ιbrαrÿ
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical
thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the
services of another lawyer since she was
already representing the opposing parties, or to
desist from acting as representative of Multitel
investors and stand as counsel for complainant.
She cannot be permitted to do both because
that would amount to double-dealing and violate
our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the
concept of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.52
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of
complainant's hapless situation, initially, by
giving him legal advice and, later on, by
soliciting money and properties from him.
Thereafter, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she had acted with utmost
sincerity in helping him divest all the properties
entrusted to him in order to absolve him from
any liability. But simultaneously, she was also
doing the same thing to impress upon her clients,
the party claimants against Multitel, that she was
doing everything to reclaim the money they
invested with Multitel. Respondent herself
admitted to complainant that without the latter's
help, she would not have been able to earn as
much and that, as a token of her appreciation,
she was willing to share some of her earnings
with complainant.53 Clearly, respondent's act is
shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,54 but also toyed with decency
and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that
no Multitel client had ever complained of
respondent's unethical behavior.55 This remark
indubitably displays respondent's gross
ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar.
As a member of the Bar, she is expected to
know that proceedings for disciplinary actions
against any lawyer may be initiated and
prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors,
motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by
the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter56 even if
no private individual files any administrative
complaint.
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and recommendations of the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility
of the electronic evidence submitted by
complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in
toto.
Finally, respondent argues that the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
to disbar her on the grounds of deceit,
malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside
from violation of the Lawyer's Oath, has been
rendered moot and academic by voluntary
termination of her IBP membership, allegedly
after she had been placed under the Department
of Justice's Witness Protection
Program.57 Convenient as it may be for
respondent to sever her membership in the
integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do
so without resolving first this administrative case
against her.
The resolution of the administrative case filed
against respondent is necessary in order to
determine the degree of her culpability and
liability to complainant. The case may not be
dismissed or rendered moot and academic by
respondent's act of voluntarily terminating her
membership in the Bar regardless of the reason
for doing so. This is because membership in the
Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.58 The conduct of a lawyer may make
him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his
client or to third parties, and such liability may be
conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow
21
voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to
terminate one's membership in the Bar
voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first
prove that the voluntary withdrawal of
membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the
public or to evade liability. No such proof exists
in the present case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel
Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
representing conflicting interests and for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
conduct in violation of her Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY
MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA,
JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A.
APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for
allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting
interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which
enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness,
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with clients.
The salient facts of the case
follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc.,
had a Board of Trustees which was divided into
two opposing factions. The first faction, called
the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M.
Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro,
and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called
the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B.
Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and
Marcel N. Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the
respondent as its corporate secretary with a total
monthly compensation and honorarium of
P6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized
Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President
and Treasurer of the complainant at that time,
and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for
Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan
with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet
Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the
complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a
letter to RBP to oppose the loan application
because the Adeva Group appointed Librado
Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly
not registered as stockholders in the Stock and
Transfer Book of the complainant, as members
of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group
also alleged that the complainant was having
financial difficulties.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to
RBP to assure the latter of complainant's
financial capacity to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan
application in the amount of P200,000 which
was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
the properties of the complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order
which nullified the appointment of Librado
Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group
as members of the Board of Trustees of the
complainant. As a result, complainant sent a
letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC
Order.
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the
complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC
Order and informing the latter that the SEC
Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel,
herein respondent. The complainant alleged that
it was only upon receipt of such letter that it
became aware that respondent is also the legal
counsel of RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP
increased the loan to P400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the
Real Estate Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint
for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the
present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for failing to exhibit candor,
22
fairness, and loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the
complaint for disbarment. First, respondent
argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia
Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot
represent the complainant in this disbarment
case because they were not duly authorized by
the Board of Directors to file the complaint.
Second, respondent claimed that he is not
covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest
which applies only to the legal counsel of
complainant. Respondent argued that he merely
served as the corporate secretary of
complainant and did not serve as its legal
counsel. Third, respondent argued that there
was no conflict of interest when he represented
RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage
because all the documents and information
related to the loan transaction between RBP and
the complainant were public records. Thus,
respondent claimed that he could not have taken
advantage of his position as the mere corporate
secretary of the complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating
Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests and
recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for at least one year.
The Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent appeared for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage filed by his former client,
the complainant herein. The Investigating
Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994
to 2001 showing that respondent was paid by
complainant for his retained legal services.
According to the Investigating Commissioner,
these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that
the complainant merely appointed him as its
corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of
complainant's representatives to file this
administrative case is immaterial since
proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of
the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
7704 which affirmed the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and imposed a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for one year against respondent.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the
IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent.
The issue in this case is whether respondent is
guilty of representing conflicting interests when
he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP
in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
complainant against RBP.
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution Nos.
XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP
Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent
represented conflicting interests in violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of
public policy and good taste, this prohibition on
representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.7 In Maturan v.
Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for
the prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the
relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from
his client the weak points of the action as well as
the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage
of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the
fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer
by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained
the test to determine the existence of conflict of
interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been
23
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to
situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former
clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer
represents a client against a former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly,
to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client.11 This
rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse
interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client
is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or
to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him.13 A lawyer may only
be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is
materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after
consultation.14chanrobleslaw
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we
find that respondent represented conflicting
interests when he served as counsel for RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the
complainant, respondent's former client, against
RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner
that respondent was compensated by
complainant for his retained legal services is
supported by the evidence on record, the cash
vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly,
complainant was respondent's former client. And
respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a
case filed by his former client against RBP. This
makes respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests since respondent failed to
show any written consent of all concerned
(particularly the complainant) given after a full
disclosure of the facts representing conflicting
interests.15chanrobleslaw
We also note that the respondent acted for the
complainant's interest on the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant when he
sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to
assure the latter of the financial capacity of the
complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for
RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he
clearly acted against the interest of the
complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no
moment that all the documents and information
in connection with the loan transaction between
RBP and the complainant were public records.
In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following
doctrinal
pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has
been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's
opponent applies equally even though during the
continuance of the employment nothing of a
confidential nature was revealed to the attorney
by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural
Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing
one party in litigation, had formerly represented
the adverse party with respect to the same
matter involved in the litigation, the court need
not inquire as to how much knowledge the
attorney acquired from his former client during
that relationship, before refusing to permit the
attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown
vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney
from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the
extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the
subsequent litigation on the attorney's
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has
been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client,
he acquired no knowledge which could operate
to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent
adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910],
31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information
received by the lawyer from his client is
irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict
of interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating
Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is
imbued with public interest which allows for a
liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings
for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
24
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint
of any person." Thus, in the present case, we
find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr.,
and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute
the complaint for disbarment even without
authority from the Board of Directors of the
complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution

No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-
290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D.
Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawla

25
A.C. No. 1359 October 17, 1991
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO
BOLISAY, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted
and Benito Bolisay filed an administrative
complaint for malpractice against respondent
Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the latter
with having wantonly abused professional
secrets or information obtained by him as their
counsel.
After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on
25 June 1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4
October 1974 referred the complaint to the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a
Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearing where
respondent took the witness stand on his own behalf.
The record of the case shows the following background facts:
In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the
deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was counsel for Luciana Abadilla
and a certain Angela Buted. Involved in said partition case was a parcel
of land Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in
defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership over Lot 9439-
B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that
partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new
Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued in the name of
complainant spouses.
When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named
Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the
defendants, 2
the latter retained the services of
respondent Atty. Hernando however claims that
he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free
of charge. Subject of this case was a contract of
lease executed by Benito's co-defendant therein,
Enrique Buted, over a house standing on a
portion of Lot No. 9439-B. It appears that the
Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to
the aforementioned lot. Benito was then
asserting ownership over the realty by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed by Luciana Abadilla in
his favor. Eventually, the Sy's were ordered to
vacate the house subject of the lease.
Respondent avers that the relationship between
himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case
was terminated on 4 December 1969. 3
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the
heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant spouses, filed a petition on
behalf of the heirs of Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed
Abadilla, seeking the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
of complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were
Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering
Lot No. 9439-B. 4
At the hearing, respondent
Hernando testified that if the petition for
cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B
would no longer be owned by complainant
spouses but would be owned in common by all
the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against
them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in
a letter dated 30 July 1974. 6Respondent
however,
pursued the case until it was eventually
dismissed by the trial court on 2 September
1974 on the ground of prescription. 7
In is Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the Solicitor
General recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for three (3) months for violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics
by representing clients with conflicting interests, and filed before this
Court the corresponding Complaint 8
dated 30 March 1990.
The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether
or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of
interests under the circumstances described
above.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then
prevailing parameters of behavior of members of
the bar, defines a conflict of interests situation in
the following manner:
6. Adverse influence and conflicting
interests.—It is unprofessional to
represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within
the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose. The
obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence
has been reposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Though as regards the first and second cases
handled by respondent, no conflict of interest
existed, the same cannot be said with respect to
the action for specific performance and the
cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own
admission, he defended the right of ownership
over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in
26
the action for specific performance. He assailed
this same right of ownership when he
subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of
complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over
that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a
conflict of interest situation.
It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the
Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases
where a conflict of interests may exist, full
disclosure of the facts and express consent of all
the parties concerned are necessary. 9 The
present Code of Professional Responsibility is
stricter on this matter considering that consent of
the parties is now required to be in written
form. 10 In the case at bar, such consent was
wanting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to
the claims of complainant spouses, he had
never seen nor taken hold of the Transfer
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor
obtained any confidential information in handling
the action for specific performance. 11 The
contention of respondent is, in effect, that
because complainant has not clearly shown that
respondent had obtained any confidential
information from Benito Bolisay while
representing the latter in the action for specific
performance, respondent cannot be penalized
for representing conflicting interests. That is not
the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is,
rather, that the mere fact that respondent had
acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action
for specific performance should have precluded
respondent from acting or appearing as counsel
for the other side in the subsequent petition for
cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of
the spouses Generosa and Benito Bolisay.
There is no necessity for proving the actual
transmission of confidential information to an
attorney in the course of his employment by his
first client in order that he may be precluded
from accepting employment by the second or
subsequent client where there are conflicting
interests between the first and the subsequent
clients. The reason for this rule was set out by
the Court in Hilado v. David 12in the following
terms:
Communications between attorney and client
are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the
course of the dealings between an attorney
and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested
would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant's cause. And the
theory would be productive of other
unsalutary results. To make the passing of
confidential communication a condition
precedent; i.e., to make the employment
conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would
not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is
to be sedulously fostered, to consult with
lawyers upon what they believe are their
rights in litigation. The condition would of
necessity call for an investigation of what
information the attorney has received and in
what way it is or it is not in conflict with his
new position. Litigants would be in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney,
lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding,
if an investigation be held, the court should
accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the
facts that came to him.
Hence the necessity of setting down the
existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n.
183 III., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As
has been said another case, the question is
not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, 14
where the
lawyer was charged with malpractice for having
represented a new client whose interest was
opposed to those of his former clients in another
case:
The record shows that the respondent offered
his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing
that the petitioner had obtained a favorable
judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that
his efforts in the subsequent civil case No.
5952 would frustrate said judgment and
render it ineffectual, as has really been the
result upon his obtaining the writ of injunction
above-mentioned. Obviously his conduct is
unbecoming to an attorney and cannot be
sanctioned by the courts. An attorney owes
loyalty to his client not only in the case in
which he has represented him but also after
27
 the relation of attorney and client has
terminated and it is not a good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another
case other persons against his former client
under the pretext that the case is distinct from,
and independent of the former case. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm in the
following manner:
An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new
client as against a former one, to do anything
which will injuriously affect the former client in
any manner in which the attorney formerly
represented him, though the relation of
attorney and client has terminated, and the
new employment is in a different case; nor
can the attorney use against his former client
any knowledge or information gained through
their former connection. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from
complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of
interest exists. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-
client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that respondent
Hernando is guilty of violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by
representing clients with conflicting interests. We believe, however, that
a heavier penaltyis appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Harold
M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with
a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be furnished to all
courts and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal
record of respondent.
CANON 16 CASES
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014,
affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended
the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for
one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru
its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed
by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed
respondent to file his Answer within 15 days
from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to
do so and complainant sent a query as to the
status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner issued the
Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It
was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days
before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant
together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a
folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties
would be informed if there was a need for
clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case
would be submitted for resolution based on the
documents on file. The Minutes8 of the
mandatory conference showed that respondent
arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after
the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed
her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies
of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos.
2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent
[defendant therein] to pay complainant and her
husband the sum of P100,000.00 and
P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011
28
until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant
was referred to respondent in connection with
her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute
sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services
for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for
which they signed a contract. Complainant paid
respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a
letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation
to the legal problem referred by complainant. He
then visited the latter in her home and asked for
a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60)
days, for the repair of his car. Complainant,
having trust and confidence on respondent
being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount
without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced
the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware
that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased.
She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and
thereafter received from complainant the amount
of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked
about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited
the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for
the service of the summons to the defendant
corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that
the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No.
14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of
Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the
document being questioned in the civil case she
filed. When asked about this, respondent merely
replied that he would take a collaborating
counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon
reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant
noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not
alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the
deed of conditional sale were not attached
thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method
of payment which was not the point of
contention in the case; and 4] the very
anomalies she complained of were not
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her
that those matters could be brought up during
the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to
complainant, requesting that the latter extend to
him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in
the moment of urgency or
emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request
and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to
complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge
in ex ge for a favorable ruling. Complainant
expressed her misgivings on this proposition but
she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00
which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it
is understood that the balance of P25,000.00
shall be paid later after favorable judgment for
plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010,
respondent insisted that the remaining amount
be given by complainant prior to the next
hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again,
complainant handed to respondent the amount
of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case
was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the
dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she
personally checked the status of the case with
the court. She went to the office of respondent,
but he was not there. Instead, one of the office
staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited
complainant and gave her a copy of the motion
for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011,
complainant went to see respondent and
requested him to prepare a reply to the
comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for
reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would
not accept the documents unless these were
amended; and to make the additional averment
that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver
delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with
a message from him that the matters she
requested to be included were mentioned
therein. Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were
not so included. On the same occasion, the
driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a
bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral arguments
on the case had been set the following month.19
29
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to
terminate the services of respondent as her
counsel and wrote him a letter of
termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of
documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December
2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to
respondent, requesting him to pay her the
amounts he received from her less the contract
fee and the actual cost of the filing fees.
Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was
72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was
President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from
1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was
not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise
admitted acting as counsel for complainant for
which he claimed to have received P10,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent
averred that it was complainant, at the behest of
her husband, who willingly offered the amount to
him for his patience in visiting them at home and
for his services. The transaction was declared
as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about
its payment. As regards the amount of
P150,000.00 he received for filing fees,
respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was
persistent in covering the incidental expenses in
the handling of the case. He denied having said
that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations.
Complainant’s husband approved of the amount.
In the same vein, respondent denied having
asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having
received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also
denied having told her that the case would be
discussed with the judge who would rule in their
favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was
complainant who was bothered by the possibility
that the other party would befriend the judge. He
never said that he would personally present a
bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s
comment as to his representation of Tierra
Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing
wrong in this situation since complainant was
fully aware that another counsel was assisting
him in the handling of cases. Having been fully
informed of the nature of her cause of action and
the consequences of the suit, complainant was
aware of the applicable law on reformation of
contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondent demanded just compensation for the
services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered
respondent’s defenses by making reference to
the receipts in her possession, all evidencing
that respondent accepted the amounts
mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty
had relations long before she met him. While
respondent was employed as Provincial Legal
Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte, he was involved in the preparation of
several documents involving Flying V, an oil
company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who
likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant
insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she
extended to respondent was never considered
as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the
Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for
estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and
Recommendation,24 the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-
BOG adopted and approved with modification
the recommendation of suspension by the
Investigating Commissioner and ordered
respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan
of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing
fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said
resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed
a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed
her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG
that an information charging respondent for
estafa had already been filed in court and that a
corresponding order for his arrest had been
issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration
but modified the penalty of his suspension from
the practice of law by reducing it from one (1)
year to three (3) months. Respondent was
likewise ordered to return the balance of the
filing fee received from complainant amounting
to P127,590.00.
30

No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether
respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to respondent’s
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The
Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing
conflicting interests. The Court also differs on
the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-
established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not
confined to the performance of his professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer,
he clearly misled complainant into believing that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the
land involved and the extra expenses to be
incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He
demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing
fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to
P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant
who suggested that amount deserves no iota of
credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the
rigors of litigation, would propose such amount
that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to
initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the
excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only
expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of
filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good
faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for
or from his client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose but not used for the
purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence
in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty.
As pointed out, he received various amounts
from complainant but he could not account for all
of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return
the excess money from the alleged filing fees
and other expenses. His possession gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer
does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand
excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible
conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as “representation expenses”
allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the
case, in ex ge for a favorable decision.
Respondent himself signed a receipt showing
that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00
and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross
misconduct that necessarily warrants the
supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of
demanding a sum of money from his client,
purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse
of his client’s trust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public in
the legal profession and the entire Judiciary.
This is the height of indecency. As officers of the
court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public
service and the administration of justice. In no
way should a lawyer indulge in any act that
31
would damage the image of judges, lest the
public’s perception of the dispensation of justice
be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The
denial of respondent and his claim that the
amount was given gratuitously would not excuse
him from any liability. The absence of proof that
the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is
of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s
actuations would seriously erode the public’s
trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was
dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At
this juncture, respondent proved himself to be
negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his
client of the status of the case, and left the client
to personally inquire with the court. Surely,
respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but
was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards
complainant did not stop here. Records reveal
that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16
of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall
not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.” In his private
capacity, he requested from his client, not just
one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The
first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car;
and the next time, he implored her to extend to
him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the
moment of urgency or emergency” but was only
given P22,000.00 by complainant. These
transactions were evidenced by promissory
notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was
never questioned by respondent. These acts
were committed by respondent in his private
capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship
with complainant, but were indubitably
acquiesced to by complainant because of the
trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer.
Nowhere in the records, particularly in the
defenses raised by respondent, was it implied
that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were
given to him out of the liberality of complainant
and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does
not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of
requesting and receiving money as loans from
his client and thereafter failing to pay the same
are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of
fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has
not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held
that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial
obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of
“conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty
of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged
representation of conflicting interests, the Court
finds it proper to modify the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner who concluded that
complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party,
Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
ex ge of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy
and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-
bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even
if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients
are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest. The only exception provided in the rules
is a written consent from all the parties after full
32
disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP.
There is substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for representing conflicting interests in
handling the case of complainant against Tierra
Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered
services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the
fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very
document being questioned in complainant’s
case. While the Investigating Commissioner
found that the complaint in Civil Case No.
14791-65 did not question the validity of the said
contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were
challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose
for which the proscription was made exists. The
Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied
observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against
Tierra Realty and the clear admission of
respondent that he was the one who notarized
the assailed document. Regardless of whether it
was the validity of the entire document or the
intention of the parties as to some of its
provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted
complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was
involved in the execution of the very transaction
under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees
nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is
apparent that respondent was retained by clients
who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written
consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is
prohibited “not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An
attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law
is “a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral
character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a
negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but
a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in
general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient
punishment for the unacceptable acts and
omissions of respondent. The acts of the
respondent constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his
duty to his client, the courts and society render
him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation
of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge
and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the
penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to
return the money he borrowed from complainant
in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v.
Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the
lawyer to return money to complainant if he or
she acted in a private capacity because its
findings in administrative cases have no bearing
on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondent’s administrative
liability. Its findings have no material bearing on
other judicial actions which the parties may
choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive
respondent of his right to appeal since
33
administrative cases are filed directly with the
Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence
required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in administrative
cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence
is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41Furthermore, the Court
has to consider the prescriptive period
applicable to civil cases in contrast to
administrative cases which are, as a rule,
imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering
respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he
received from complainant, as this was
intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship
with the complainant. While respondent’s
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for
the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity,
respondent should be ordered to return the
same as it was borne out of their professional
relationship. As to his other obligations,
respondent was already adjudged as liable for
the personal loans he contracted with
complainant, per the small claims cases filed
against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
“the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court
likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by “purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct,
have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty.
Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct
in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him
from the practice of law and ORDERS him to
pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the
amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.
A.C. No. 5044 December 2, 2013
FELIPE C. DAGALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY.
AMADO T. ADQUILEN,* Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an asministrative
complaint1 filed by complainant Felipe C. Dagala
(complainant) against respondents Atty. Jose C.
Quesada, Jr. (atty. Quesada) and Atty. Amado T.
Adquilen (Atty. Adquilen), charging them for
gross negligence in handling his labor
complaints.
The facts
On November 8, 1994 complainant, assisted by
Atty. Quesada, filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando City, La
Union (NLRC-RAB) Complaint2 for illegal
dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay,
damages and attorney’s fees against Capitol
Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol), and owner
and General Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as
well as its Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De
Jesus, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-
1??1123-94. The said case was, however,
dismissed without prejudice, through an
Order3 dated December 13, 1994 (December 13,
1994 Order), for failure of complainant and Atty.
Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled
mandatory conference hearings despite due
notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged the
services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter
(LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor
case, re-docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-10-
1091-95 (LU).4
Similarly, the case was dismissed without
prejudice on June 28, 1996, this time due to the
parties' failure to submit their respective position
papers.5
Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case
for a third time on August 27, 1996, docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-I-08-1191-96 (LU).6
During its pendency, the representative of
Capitol purportedly offered the amount of
₱74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim,
conditioned on the submission of the latter’s
position paper.7
Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one,
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint "for
lack of interest and failure to prosecute" as
34
stated in an Order8 dated February 27, 1997
(February 27, 1997 Order). Atty. Adquilen and
complainant received notice of the said order on
March 11, 1997 and March 24,
1997,9 respectively. On July 11, 1997,
complainant – this time assisted by Atty. Imelda
L. Picar (Atty. Picar) – filed a motion for
reconsideration10
from the February 27, 1997 Order, which was
treated as an appeal and transmitted to the
NLRC-National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR).11
However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in
a Resolution12 dated June 17, 1998 for having
been filed out of time, adding that the negligence
of counsel binds the client.13
Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate
letters14 dated November 18, 1998 to
respondents, informing them that complainant is
in the process of pursuing administrative cases
against them before the Court. Nevertheless, as
complainant remains open to the possibility of
settlement, respondents were invited to discuss
the matter at Atty. Picar’s office. Only Atty.
Quesada responded to the said letter and
subsequently, through a Memorandum of
Agreement15 dated December 5, 1998
(December 5, 1998 MoA), undertook to
compensate the damages sustained by
complainant in consideration of the non-filing of
an administrative complaint against him. Atty.
Quesada, however, reneged on his promise,
thus prompting complainant to proceed with the
present complaint.16
In a Resolution17 dated June 21, 1999, the Court
directed respondents to comment on the
Complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
However, despite notices18 and the extension
granted,19
Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive
and the subsequent show-cause
resolutions.20 Accordingly, a fine in the amount
of ₱500.00 was imposed21 against him, which he
duly paid on September 19, 2005.22 On the other
hand, Atty. Quesada, in his
Comment,23 admitted having accepted and filed
the initial labor case for complainant. He,
however, explained that he was unable to file
the required position paper due to complainant's
failure to furnish him with the employment
records and other relevant documents. He also
claimed that when he was informed of the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, he
advised complainant to re-file the case with the
assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend
to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of
La Union Province.24 Anent the December 5,
1998 MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was
merely prevailed upon to sign the same for fear
of losing his means of livelihood and license to
practice law, and that he had no intention of
reneging on his promise to pay. Nonetheless,
despite earnest efforts, he still failed to come up
with the agreed-upon amount.25
In a Resolution26 dated March 27, 2006, the
Court resolved to refer the instant administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation
or decision.
The Proceedings Before the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) set the case for mandatory conference on
August 25, 2006 and required the parties to
submit their respective briefs.27
Complainant was duly represented28 by his
counsel at the hearing,29 while respondents filed
separate motions to reset, only to subsequently
waive their respective appearances. Atty.
Adquilen attributed the waiver to his medical
condition;30 on the other hand, in a complete
turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence
of any lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant.31
On March 25, 2009, Investigating IBP
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued a
Report and Recommendation,32 finding that
respondents were grossly negligent in handling
complainant's case in violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). As such, he
recommended that each of them be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was directed to
comply with his undertaking under the
December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of
₱68,000.00, with legal interest from January 20,
1999 until fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was
ordered to pay the amount of ₱6,000.00,
representing the difference between the
₱74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and
the above-stated settlement amount, with legal
interest from date of notice of the order of
dismissal on March 25, 199733 until fully paid.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the afore-stated report and
recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-262
dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011
Resolution), finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules. Consequently, it
directed respondents to pay complainant the
total amount of ₱74,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from notice.34
In a Resolution35 dated September 12, 2012, the
Court noted the Notice36 of the IBP’s November
19, 2011 Resolution, and thereafter sent notices
to the parties as well as the IBP-CBD, the Office
of the Bar Confidant and the Public Information
35
Office. However, the notice sent to Atty.
Adquilen was returned unserved with the
notation "Return to Sender, Deceased."37
Thus, in the Resolutions dated February 20,
201338 and June 10, 2013,39 the IBP was
required to furnish the Court with the death
certificate of Atty. Adquilen.
On August 30, 2013, the IBP filed its
compliance,40 attaching therewith the Certificate
of Death41 of Atty. Adquilen which indicates that
the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to
cardiac arrhythmia.1âwphi1 In view of Atty.
Adquilen's death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision,42 the Court, bearing in mind the
punitive nature of administrative
liabilities,43 hereby dismisses the case against
him. Hence, what is left for resolution is the
complaint against Atty. Quesada.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
Atty. Quesada should be held administratively
liable for gross negligence in handling
complainant’s labor case.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings
of the IBP anent Atty. Quesada’s administrative
liability, but deems it proper to delete the
recommended order for the return of the amount
of ₱74,000.00. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the relationship between a
lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost
trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are
led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful
of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their
affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill,
and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free.44
He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all
his dealings, especially with the courts.45
These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17
and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which
respectively read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
x x x x CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice. x x x x
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 –
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule
18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, the Court finds Atty.
Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules
and Canons. Primarily, Atty, Quesada failed to
exercise the required diligence in handling
complainant’s case by his failure to justify his
absence on the two (2) mandatory conference
hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94
despite due notice, which thus resulted in its
dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained
counsel is expected to serve the client with
competence and diligence and not to sit idly by
and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to attend
scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and
file the required pleadings, prosecute the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urge their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him or her to do so.46
Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled
conference hearings, despite due notice and
without any proper justification, exhibits his
inexcusable lack of care and diligence in
managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon
17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code.
Moreover, Atty. Quesada acted with less candor
and good faith in the proceedings before the
IBP-CBD when he denied the existence of any
lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant, and claimed that the labor case
was handled by another lawyer,47 despite his
previous admission48before the Court of having
accepted complainant's case. To add a perusal
of the complaint49 dated November 8, 1994 in
NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 reveals that
Atty. Quesada signed the same as counsel for
complainant.50
While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the
proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a
judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in
reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into
his character.51
Besides, Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the
allegation that complainant's corresponding
failure to appear during the mandatory
conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-
11-1123-94 was upon his counsel’s advice.52
36
Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to
conclude that Atty. Quesada had indulged in
deliberate falsehood, contrary to the
prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code.53
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.54
In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,55 a lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year for inexcusable negligence that
resulted in the dismissal of complainant’s appeal
and for misrepresentations committed before the
CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule
10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code. In the cases of Cheng v. Atty.
Agravante56 and Perea v. Atty.
Almadro,57 respondent-lawyers were similarly
punished for their negligence in the discharge of
their duties to their client and for
misrepresentation committed before the Court,
in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Hence, consistent
with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the
penalty recommended by the IBP and
accordingly suspends Atty. Quesada for a period
of one (1) year. The Court must, however, clarify
that the foregoing resolution should not include a
directive to return the amount of ₱74,000.00 as
ordered by the IBP in its November 19, 2011
Resolution which represents the settlement
initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor
case. The return of the said amount partakes the
nature of a purely civil liability which should not
be dealt with during an administrative-
disciplinary proceeding such as this case. In
Tria-Samonte v. Obias,58 the Court recently
illumined that disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are only confined to the issue of
whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar
and that the only concern is his administrative
liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyer's professional engagement,
such as the liabilities of the parties which are
purely civil in nature, should be threshed out in a
proper proceeding of such nature, and not
during administrative-disciplinary proceedings,
as in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C.
Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10,
Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, with a stern warning that a
repitition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
On the other hand, the admnistrative complaint
respondent Atty. Amado Adquilen is
hereby DIMISSED in view of his supervening
death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
A.C. No. 7965 November 13, 2013
AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an administrative
complaint1 filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya
(complainant) against Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin
(respondent), the antecedents of which are
detailed as follows:
The Facts
On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into
a retainership agreement2 (retainer) whereby
respondent undertook to, inter alia process the
registration and eventually deliver, within a
period of six (6 ) months,3 the certificate of title
over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in
favor of complainant acting as the representative
of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. In
connection therewith, respondent received from
complainant the amounts of ₱15,000.00 and
₱39,000.004 to cover for the litigation and land
registration expenses, respectively.
Notwithstanding the expenditure of the
₱39,000.00 given for registration expenses
(subject amount) and the lapse of more than
three (3) years from the retainer’s date,
complainant alleged that respondent, without
proper explanation, failed to fulfill his
undertaking to register the subject land and
deliver to complainant the certificate of title over
the same. As complainant was tired of
respondent’s excuses, she finally decided to just
withdraw the subject amount from respondent.
For such purpose, she confronted the latter at
his office and also subsequently sent him two (2)
demand letters,5 but all to no avail.6 Hence,
complainant was prompted to file the instant
administrative complaint.
In his Comment,7 respondent admitted that he
indeed received the subject amount from
complainant but averred that after receiving the
same, the latter’s brother, Erlindo, asked to be
reimbursed the amount of ₱7,500.00 which the
latter purportedly paid to the land
surveyor.8 Respondent likewise alleged that he
later found out that he could not perform his
37
undertaking under the retainer because the
ownership of the subject land was still under
litigation.9Finally, respondent stated that he
wanted to return the balance of the subject
amount to complainant after deducting what
Erlindo took from him, but was only prevented to
do so because he was maligned by complainant
when she went to his office and there, shouted
and called him names in the presence of his
staff.10
In the Court’s Resolutions dated December 17,
200811 and March 2, 2009,12 the case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. After both parties failed to
appear during the mandatory conference, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B.
Hababag (Investigating Commissioner) required
the parties to submit their respective position
papers.13 Complainant filed her position
paper14 on October 8, 2009, while respondent
failed to do so.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On November 6, 2009, the Investigating
Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation,15 finding respondent to have
violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) for
his failure to properly account for the money
entrusted to him without any adequate
explanation why he could not return the same.
The Investigating Commissioner found that
respondent’s acts demonstrated his "lack of
candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client, who
entrusted him with money and documents for
the registration of the subject land."16 The
Investigating Commissioner likewise held that
respondent’s failure to return the subject amount,
despite being given "adequate time to
return"17 the same, "not to mention the repeated
x x x demands made upon him,"18constitutes
"gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even
misappropriation of money"19 in violation of the
above-stated rules. In view of the foregoing, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offenses in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation with modification, ordering the
return of the amount of ₱31,500.00,22with legal
interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice, to complainant.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings
of the IBP anent respondent’s administrative
liability but deems it proper to: (a) extend the
recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1)
year; and (b) delete the recommended order for
the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00.
Anent respondent’s administrative liability, the
Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s
failure to properly account for and duly return his
client’s money despite due demand is
tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively
read as follows:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Records disclose that respondent admitted the
receipt of the subject amount from complainant
to cover for pertinent registration expenses but
posited his failure to return the same due to his
client’s act of confronting him at his office
wherein she shouted and called him names.
With the fact of receipt being established, it was
then respondent’s obligation to return the money
entrusted to him by complainant. To this end,
suffice it to state that complainant’s purported
act of "maligning" respondent does not justify
the latter’s failure to properly account for and
return his client’s money upon due demand.
Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one
essentially imbued with trust so much so that it
is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all
reasonable efforts towards its faithful
compliance. In this case, despite that singular
encounter, respondent had thereafter all the
opportunity to return the subject amount but still
failed to do so. Besides, the obligatory force of
said duty should not be diluted by the
38
temperament or occasional frustrations of the
lawyer’s client, especially so when the latter
remains unsatisfied by the lawyer’s work. Indeed,
a lawyer must deal with his client with
professional maturity and commit himself
towards the objective fulfillment of his
responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the
correct course of action is for the lawyer to
properly account for his affairs as well as to
ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to
another lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien
exception23 under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the
Code, the lawyer should not withhold the
property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the
applicability of such exception or any other
justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed
to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce
warrants his administrative liability.
The Court, however, deems it proper to increase
the IBP’s recommended period of suspension
from the practice of law from six (6) months to
one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to
exercise due diligence in handling his client’s
cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the
Court observes that respondent did not only
accomplish his undertaking under the retainer,
but likewise failed to give an adequate
explanation for such non-performance despite
the protracted length of time given for him to do
so. As such omissions equally showcase
respondent’s non-compliance with the standard
of proficiency required of a lawyer as embodied
in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt
to extend the period of his suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1)
year similar to the penalty imposed in the case
of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.24
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the
foregoing resolution should not include a
directive for the return of the amount of
₱31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board
of Governors. The same amount was given by
complainant to respondent to cover for
registration expenses; hence, its return partakes
the nature of a purely civil liability which should
not be dealt with during an administrative-
disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v.
Obias,25the Court recently held that its "findings
during administrative-disciplinary proceedings
have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties
involved which are purely civil in nature –
meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyer's professional engagement –
as the same should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding of such nature." This pronouncement
the Court applies to this case and thus, renders
a disposition solely on respondent’s
administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C.
Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01
and 16.03, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt
of this Resolution with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE,*Complainant,
v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative
complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by
complainant Eduardo A. Maglente (complainant),
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
against respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr.
(respondent), praying that the latter be directed
to return the amount of P48,000.00 that he
received from the former.
The Facts
Complainant, as President of “Samahan ng mga
Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III,
Incorporated” (Samahan), alleged that he
engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in order to determine the
true owner of the land being occupied by the
members of Samahan.2 In connection therewith,
he gave respondent the aggregate amount of
P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for
the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a
written acknowledgment executed by
respondent himself.3Despite the payment,
respondent failed to file an action in court. When
confronted, respondent explained that the
money given to him was not enough to fully pay
39
for the filing fees in court.4Thus, complainant
asked for the return of the money, but
respondent claimed to have spent the same and
even demanded more money.5 Complainant
further alleged that when he persisted in seeking
restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told
him to shut up because it was not his money in
the first place.6 Hence, complainant filed this
administrative complaint seeking the return of
the full amount he had paid to respondent.
In his defense,7 respondent denied spending
complainant’s money, explaining that he had
already prepared the initiatory pleading and was
poised to file the same, when he discovered
through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite
costly. This prompted him to immediately relay
such information to complainant who undertook
to raise the amount needed. While waiting,
however, the instant administrative case was
filed against him.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated
October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly,
recommended that he be: (a) meted with the
penalty of Censure, with a warning that a
repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer
penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return
the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.10
The Investigating Commissioner found that
respondent clearly received the amount of
P48,000.00 from complainant, which was
intended to answer for the filing fees of a case
he was supposed to file for the Samahan, but
which he failed to do so.11 In this relation, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that had
respondent prepared the complaint and
performed research works, as he claimed, then
he could have kept a reasonable amount for his
effort under the doctrine of quantum meruit, but
unfortunately, he could not present any proof in
this respect.12
In a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with
modification increasing the recommended
penalty from Censure to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for
reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in
a Resolution15 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the findings of the IBP,
except as tothe penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up
the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion,
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable for violating
Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR,17 which reads:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that
complainant engaged the services of respondent
for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in
connection therewith, gave the amount of
P48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite
the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with
his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse
that the money he received from complainant
was not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P48,000.00 that
complainant gave him despite repeated
demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
xxxx
40
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the money
was not used accordingly, the same must be
immediately returned to the client.18 A lawyer’s
failure to return the money to his client despite
numerous demands is a violation of the trust
reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity,19 as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment,20 and
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondent’s administrative
liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and,
at the same time, failed to return the latter’s
money and/or property despite demand, the
Court meted out the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v.
Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of one (1) year for his failure to perform
his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter.22 Similarly,
in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the same penalty was
imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any
legal service to his client as well as to return the
money he received for such purpose.24 In view
of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate
that respondent be meted with the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for
respondent to account for or return the amount
of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note
that “while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve
around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature – for instance, when the
claim involves moneys received by the lawyer
from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.”25Since the aforesaid
amount was intended to answer for filing fees
which is intimately related to the lawyer-client
relationship between complainant and
respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to
be in order.26
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R.
Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of
violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16,
and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return
to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount
of P48,000.00 he received from the latter within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent’s record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT
INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. NICOLAS C.
TORRES, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court’s resolution is the
Complaint1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by
complainant CF Sharp Crew Management
Incorporated (complainant) against respondent
Nicolas C. Torres (respondent), charging him
with violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws engaged in
overseas maritime employment.2 It hired
respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by
profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager
who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal
counsel and to oversee the administration and
management of legal cases and medical-related
claims instituted by seafarers against
complainant’s various principals. Among the
cases respondent handled in his capacity as
Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of
41
seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J.
Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado
(Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua
(Chua).3cralaw
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged
that per respondent’s request, complainant
issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00,
P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00, and
P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective
claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered
that, save for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent
never gave the checks to the seafarers and
instead, had them deposited at International Ex
ge Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under
Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect to
Sampani, complainant also discovered that he
only received the amounts of P216,936.00 and
P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the
requested amount of P652,013.20, through
checks not issued by complainant.6cralaw
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
directly received the instant complaint and on
even date, issued an Order7 requiring
respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed
to do so. Neither did respondent appear in the
mandatory conference scheduled on March 20,
2009 nor did he file his position paper.8cralaw
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August
1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable for
violating the CPR, and accordingly
recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.10cralaw
The Investigating Commissioner found that
respondent had indeed requested and was
issued checks as settlement of the respective
claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua
on the pretense that the requested amounts
represented what was lawfully due
them.11 However, instead of giving the said
checks to the named seafarers, he deposited
the same at the International Ex ge Bank,
Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account
No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except for the check in
the amount of P145,650.00 issued to
Delgado.13cralaw
Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his
Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)14 on March 24, 2010. He
explained that he was not able to timely file an
answer because complainant supplied a wrong
address to the IBP and filed non-bailable
criminal cases against him which caused his
detention in a regular prison cell and, thus, his
inability to comply with the IBP’s
directives.15cralaw
On the merits of the complaint, respondent
maintained that the seafarers’ claims had long
been settled and that the release documents
signed by the named seafarers were already in
actual custody and possession of the
complainant.16 He further contended that he only
signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a
form of guaranty of their genuineness17 and that
he could not have encashed them as they were
all payable to a particular payee.18 Lastly,
respondent claimed that when he resigned in
August 2008, complainant forced him to sign
promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts
which had not been accounted for by the latter in
ex ge for his clearance documents.19 But before
he was able to settle the promissory notes, he
was already arrested in connection with the
criminal cases filed by complainant against
him.20cralaw
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the
IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation with modification, increasing
the recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering
respondent to return the full amount of money
he received from complainant which is legally
due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution23 dated March
8, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its
report and recommendation, except as to: (a)
the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor
of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a
lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity
and good faith.24 The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the
42
duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.25 This
is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics.26cralaw
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
correctly found that complainant had duly proven
its charges against respondent. In particular,
complainant had exposed respondent’s modus
operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance
of checks purportedly for the purpose of settling
seafarers’ claims against the complainant’s
various principals, only to have such checks
(except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an
unauthorized bank account, particularly
International Ex ge Bank, Banawe, Quezon City
Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is
well-settled that “when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a
particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to his
client.”27 This, respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation
constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant,
and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is
duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the
mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR
which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.” Such malfeasance is not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to
the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral
flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.29cralaw
Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts,
the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty
recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence
provides that in similar cases where lawyers
misappropriated their clients’ money, the Court
imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of
disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano
University, Inc. v. Mijares III,30 the Court
disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his
client’s money intended for securing a certificate
of title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly,
in Freeman v. Reyes,31 the same penalty was
imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated
the insurance proceeds of her client’s deceased
husband.
As already discussed, respondent’s conduct of
misappropriating complainant’s money has
made him unfit to remain in the legal profession.
He has definitely fallen below the moral bar
when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest,
unlawful, and grossly immoral acts.32 As a
member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.33 Membership in the legal profession
is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of his clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of
the Court to withdraw the same,34 as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, respondent deserves
the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the
practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP’s
recommendation regarding the return of the
settlement money respondent received from
complainant, considering, among others, that it
was not specifically prayed for in the latter’s
administrative complaint and that the civil liability
of respondent therefor may already be the
subject of existing cases involving the same
parties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is
found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent’s record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is
43
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND
BLESILDA S.
CONCEPCION, Complainants, v. ATTY.
ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case that stemmed
from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and
Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A.
dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross
misconduct for violating, among others, Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged
that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In
this capacity, respondent handled many of their
cases and was consulted on various legal
matters, among others, the prospect of opening
a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005.
Said business, however, failed to materialize.4
Aware of the fact that complainants had money
intact from their failed business venture,
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to
borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he
promised to return, with interest, five (5) days
thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda,
who, believing that respondent would be soon
returning the money, agreed to lend the
aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby
issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in
respondent’s name:6
Check No. Date Amount Payee
0000561925 03- P750,000.00 Elmer dela
23-06 Rosa
0000561926 03- P850,000.00 Elmer dela
23-06 Rosa
0000561927 03- P900,000.00 Elmer dela
23-06 Rosa
Total: P2,500,000.00
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a
piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the
checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he
received the originals of the checks and that he
agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus
monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five
(5) days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006,
the foregoing checks were personally encashed
by respondent.8
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent
promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants
began demanding payment but respondent
merely made repeated promises to pay soon.
On July 7, 2008, Blesilda sent a demand
letter9 to respondent, which the latter did not
heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants,
through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica
dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to
respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied
borrowing any money from the complainants.
Instead, respondent claimed that a certain Jean
Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients,
was the real debtor. Complainants brought the
matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to
reach a settlement.14
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental
Chapter received complainants’ letter-
complaint15charging respondent with violation of
Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits
lawyers from borrowing money from clients
unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent
advice.16
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing
P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that
Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that
complainants had been attempting to collect
from Nault and that he was engaged for that
specific purpose.19
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained
that they extended the loan to respondent alone,
as evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s
name. They categorically denied knowing Nault
and pointed out that it defies common sense for
them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount
of P2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even
know. Complainants also submitted a copy of
the Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which
Nault filed as third-party defendant in a related
collection case instituted by the complainants
against respondent.22 In said pleading, Nault
explicitly denied knowing complainants and
alleged that it was respondent who incurred the
subject loan from them.23
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis
Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint
44
to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case
No. 11-2883.25 In the course of the proceedings,
respondent failed to appear during the
scheduled mandatory conferences.26Hence, the
same were terminated and the parties were
directed to submit their respective position
papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit
any
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his
Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a)
Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a
lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice;
(b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the IBP;
and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all monies and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that
the checks were issued in respondent’s name
and that he personally received and encashed
them. Annex “E”30 of the Verified Complaint
shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of
the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed
to return the P2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated
monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five
(5) days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault
was the real debtor was found to be implausible.
The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if
it is true that respondent was not the one who
obtained the loan, he would have responded to
complainants’ demand letter; however, he did
not.32 He also observed that the
acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed
appeared to have been prepared by respondent
himself.34 Finally, the Investigating
Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer to the Third
Party Complaint which categorically states that
he does not even know the complainants and
that it was respondent alone who obtained the
loan from them.35
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent’s actions degraded
the integrity of the legal profession and clearly
violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the
CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the
mandatory conferences further showed his
disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered
to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants,
with stipulated interest.37
Finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and by the
applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report in
Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11,
2013,38 but reduced the penalty against the
respondent to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law and ordered the return of the
P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal
interest, instead of stipulated interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of
Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was,
however, denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-
29440 dated May 3, 2014
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except
as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with
legal interest, to complainants
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan
from complainants is amply supported by
substantial evidence. As the records bear out,
Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to
P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the
payee.41 Also, Annex “E”42 of the Verified
Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged
receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the
complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest
of five percent (5%) per month within five (5)
days.43The dorsal sides of the checks likewise
show that respondent personally encashed the
checks on the day they were issued.44 With
respondent’s direct transactional involvement
and the actual benefit he derived therefrom,
absent too any credible indication to the contrary,
the Court is thus convinced that respondent was
indeed the one who borrowed the amount of
P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which
amount he had failed to return, despite their
insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor
hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s
acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants,
45
Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint,
categorically denied knowing the complainants
and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by
complainants, it would be illogical for them to
extend a P2,500,000.00 loan without any
collateral or security to a person they do not
even know. On the other hand, complainants
were able to submit documents showing
respondent’s receipt of the checks and their
encashment, as well as his agreement to return
the P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is
bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction
was entered into during the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a
greater influence over the latter in view of the
trust and confidence inherently imbued in such
relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a
lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his clients that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as
true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust
and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over his
client.46 The rule presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the
Court categorically declared that a lawyer’s act
of asking a client for a loan, as what herein
respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a
client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: awlibrary
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent
advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as
what respondent did, is very unethical. It
comes within those acts considered as
abuse of client’s confidence.The canon
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on her obligation.49 (Emphasis
supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed
money from complainants who were his clients
and whose interests, by the lack of any security
on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to
their trust and confidence in respondent,
complainants relied solely on the former’s word
that he will return the money plus interest within
five (5) days. However, respondent abused the
same and reneged on his obligation, giving his
previous clients the runaround up to this day.
Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR
which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the
complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay
the same, respondent abused the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in
so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should
be equally held administratively liable on this
score.
That being said, the Court turns to the proper
penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the
IBP’s return directive
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from
the practice of law for two (2) years after
borrowing P900,000.00 from her client, refusing
to pay the same despite court order, and
representing conflicting interests.51 Considering
the greater amount involved in this case and
respondent’s continuous refusal to pay his debt,
the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the
IBP’s recommendation to suspend him
indefinitely.
46

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify
the IBP’s Resolution insofar as it orders
respondent to return to complainants the amount
of P2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon.
It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such
cases, the Court’s only concern is the
determination of respondent’s administrative
liability; it should not involve his civil liability for
money received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement. In this case,
respondent received the P2,500,000.00 as a
loan from complainants and not in consideration
of his professional services. Hence, the IBP’s
recommended return of the aforementioned sum
lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case,
and thus cannot be sustained. law
2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester
Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant
Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine
Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos &
64/100 (Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with
the Cashier of this Office, wjthin ten (10) days
from receipt hereof
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of
merit.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela SO ORDERED.3

Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is implementation of said writ, however,
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law complainant discovered that respondent had
for a period of three (3) years effective upon already collected the total amount of ₱95,000.00
finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said
a commission of the same or similar acts will be amount in the following manner:
dealt with more severely. This Decision is
immediately executory upon receipt. Vo
uch Amoun
Date Purpose
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the er t
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of No.
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administration for circulation to all the courts. 0210 780 ₱20,00 Attorney'
5120 2 0.00 s fees
04

02/13 783 10,000 Partial

A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014 /2004 3 .00 payment
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, for
vs. judgment
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
0212 784 10,000 Partial
RESOLUTION 6120 8 .00 payment
DEL CASTILLO, J.: 04 for
judgment
This is a verified Complaint for
Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct1 filed with 03/12 789 20,000 Partial
this Court on September 18, 2006 by /2004 4 .00 payment
complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) for
against respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas judgment
(respondent).
0410 793 5,000. Partial
Factual Antecedents
2120 2 00 payment
Complainant alleges that he engaged the 04 for
services of respondent relative to a labor judgment
case2 he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro
Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 0410 794 5,000. Partial
6120 payment

47
 04 1 00 for
judgment
04/13 794 5,000. Partial
/2004 4 00 payment
for
judgment
04/16 795 10,000 Partial
/2004 4 .00 payment
for
judgment
0413 797 10,000 Partial
0120 7 .00 payment
04 for
judgment
Total ₱95,00
Amount: 0.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent
misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is
authorized to receive payments on his behalf,
when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to
the respondent to remit to him the amount of
₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of
₱20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the
Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa,
Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the
summons to attend a conference before the
barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he
received ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
installments, but denies that he was not
authorized to accept it. He explains that
complainant agreed to pay him additional
attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total
monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees
that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and
to refund all expenses respondent incurred
relative to the case. Thus, from the total award
of ₱189,491.60, the sum of ₱17,226.57
representing respondent's professional fees has
to be deducted, leaving a balance of
₱172,275.13.6 Then from said amount,
complainant proposed that he will get
₱100,000.00 and the balance of ₱72,275.13
shall belong to respondent as and for his
additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred
while handling the case. However, after
receiving the amount of ₱95,000.00 and
deducting therefrom the amounts of
₱20,000.007 attorney's fees, ₱17,000.00 earlier
given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the
sheriff, what was left to respondent was only
₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this
amount is way below the promised 25o/o
attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the
total amount of ₱72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event,
complainant will still be receiving a sum greater
than what he expects to receive. He avers that
complainant is still entitled to receive from
spouses Lopez the sum of ₱93,491.60. Adding
the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted
to complainant, the latter will get a total amount
of ₱110,491.60. This amount, according to
respondent, exceeds the amount of
₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and
expected to receive.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On
January 31, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation9 with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that the respondent be meted the
penalty of two (2) years suspension.
Respondent is also ordered to return, in
restitution all the amounts in his possession
which are due to complainant, less his rightful
attorney's fees.10 On October 28, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-
2011-139,11 which approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending respondent from the
practice of law for two years, but with the
modification that respondent should restitute the
sum of ₱85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his
failure to promptly account to his client the funds
received in the course of his professional
engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility
demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to
lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the
Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
"account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client." Rule 16.03
thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client
when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate
occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30,
2004 received payments for attorney's fees and
partial payments for monetary awards on behalf
48
of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite
the number of times over close to three months
he had been receiving payment, respondent
neither informed the complainant of such fact
nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only
when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and
being implemented when complainant
discovered that spouses Lopez had already
given respondent the total amount of
₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary
awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld
and refused to deliver to the complainant said
amount, which he merely received on behalf of
his client, even after demand. Complainant
brought the matter before the barangay, but
respondent simply ignored the same. Such
failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return
the money after demand raises the presumption
that he converted it to his own use.14 His
unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants
the imposition of disciplinary action against
him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that
complainant authorized him to receive payment.
He implies that he is also authorized to apply the
sum of money he received from spouses Lopez
to his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for
the case, in the total amount of ₱72,275.13.
However, after deducting from the amount of
₱95,000.00 the amounts of ₱20,000.00,
₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to
respondent, to his dismay was only ₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed
by the Investigating Commissioner, other than
his self-serving statements, there is nothing in
the records which would support respondent's
claim that he was authorized to receive the
payments. Neither is there proof that
complainant agreed to pay him additional 25%
attorney's fees and reimburse him for all
expenses he allegedly incurred in connection
with the case. Respondent did not present any
document, retainer's agreement, or itemized
breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to
support his claim.1âwphi1 In any event, even
assuming that respondent was authorized to
receive payments, the same does not exempt
him from his duty of promptly informing his client
of the amounts he received in the course of his
professional employment. "The fiduciary nature
of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or
from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt
accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client."16 "The fact that a lawyer
has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in
his hands collected for his client does not relieve
him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting."17Moreover, a lawyer has no right
"to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself by the mere fact alone that the client
owes him attorney's fees."18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately
account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him,
demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action."19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in
the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer
to account for and to return money or property
belonging to a client has been suspension from
the practice of law for two years."20Thus, the IBP
Board of Governors did not err in recommending
the imposable penalty. Considering, however,
that this is respondent's first offense and he is
already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the
exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion,
finds that a penalty of one year suspension is
sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds
respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of
gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for one (1) year
upon the finality of this Resolution, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act or offense shall be dealt with more severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant,
within 90 days from finality of this Resolution,
the net amount of ₱85,500.00 with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from finality of this
Resolution until the full amount is returned.
Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty.
Sanicas' record as a member of the Bar.
A.C. No. 6246 November 15, 2011
(Formerly CBD No. 00-730)
MARITES E. FREEMAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint,
filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman,
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in
obtaining money from her, without rendering
proper legal services, and appropriating the
proceeds of the insurance policies of her
deceased husband. Complainant also seeks
49
recovery of all the amounts she had given to
respondent and the insurance proceeds, which
was remitted to the latter, with prayer for
payment of moral and exemplary damages.
In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit1 dated April 7,
2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant
alleged that her husband Robert Keith Freeman,
a British national, died in London on October 18,
1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied
for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and
funeral, but their visa applications were denied.
Complainant engaged the services of
respondent who, in turn, assured her that she
would help her secure the visas and obtain the
death benefits and other insurance claims due
her. Respondent told complainant that she had
to personally go to London to facilitate the
processing of the claims, and demanded that the
latter bear all expenses for the trip. On
December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the
amount of ₱50,000.00. As acknowledgment for
the receipt of ₱47,500.00 for service charge, tax,
and one round trip ticket to London, respondent
gave her a Cash/Check Voucher,2 issued by
Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin
thereof, the notations in the amount of
"₱50,000.00" and the date "12-5-98" were
written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998,
she acceded into giving respondent the amount
of ₱20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the
visas, as shown by the Temporary
Receipt3bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes
Law Office (respondent's law firm). On
December 18, 1998, she went to see
respondent to follow-up the visa applications,
but the latter asked for the additional amount of
₱10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary
Receipt4 bearing said date, issued by
respondent’s law firm. After several phone calls
inquiring about the status of the visa applications,
respondent told her, "Mahirap gapangin ang
pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka
sa Embassy." (It is difficult to railroad the
process of securing visa, because you are
blacklisted and banned by the Embassy).
Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her
that to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell
out ₱18,000.00 as "panlagay" or "grease
money" to bribe some staff of the British
Embassy. After a week, respondent informed
her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would
be issued on a later date, as she had convinced
the British Embassy to issue resident visas
instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that
to expedite the release of the resident visas, she
should again give ₱20,000.00 and a bottle of
wine, worth ₱5,000.00, as "grease money" to
bribe the British Embassy personnel. After
several weeks, respondent told her that the
period for visa applications had lapsed, and that
another amount of ₱18,000.00 was needed to
reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for
₱30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary
Receipt,5 dated April 19, 1999, to be used for
booking the former's flight to London, and
₱39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary
Receipt6 dated May 13, 1999, to cover the
expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary
receipts were issued by respondent’s law firm.
Complainant said that despite repeated follow-
ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead,
she received a picture of her husband's burial,
sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the
deceased. She later learned that respondent left
for London alone, without informing her about it.
Respondent explained that she needed to go to
London to follow-up the insurance claims, and
warned her not to communicate with Grist who
allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her
husband's insurance policy. She told respondent
that she received a letter7 dated March 9, 1999
from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M.
Coroner's Court, London, informing her about
the arrangements for the funeral and that her
late husband was covered by three insurance
policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society
(Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln
Assurance Company (British National Life Policy
No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable
PLC (Policy No. 2779512).8 Respondent offered
to help and assured her that representations
with the insurance companies had earlier been
made, so that the latter would be receiving the
insurance proceeds soon.
According to the complainant, respondent
required her to affix her signature in a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA),9dated November 6,
1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the
respondent to follow-up the insurance claims.
However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA]
she signed was not notarized, but another
SPA,10 dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on
April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her
signature therein was forged. Later, she came
across a similar copy of the SPA,11 dated April 6,
1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third
SPA], but this time, additionally bearing the
signatures of two witnesses. She said that
without her knowledge and consent, respondent
used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999,
in her correspondence with the insurance
companies in London.
Complainant discovered that in an undated
letter,12 addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of
Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512),
respondent made representations that her
husband left no will and that she had no verified
information as to the total value of her husband's
estate and the existence of any property in
London that would be subjected to Grant of
Representation. Said letter requested that
complainant be advised on the value for probate
50
in the amount of £5231.35 and the procedure for
its entitlement. Respondent added therein that
"As to the matter of the installments due, as
guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs.
Freeman requests that the remittance be sent
directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East
Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at
Malakas St. Barangay Central District, Quezon
City, Philippines under the account name:
Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary
account until further notice."
Subsequently, in a letter13 dated July 29, 1999,
addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln
Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent,
declaring that she is the "Counsel/Authorized
Representative [of the complainant], per SPA
dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999],"
replied that she had appended the documents
required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth
certificate), in her previous letter,14 dated April
20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that
pursuant to an SPA15 executed in her favor, all
communications pertaining to complainant
should be forwarded to her law firm; that she
sought clarification on whether complainant is
entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if
so, the amount due and the requirements to be
complied with; and that in the absence of a
Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left
no will), she "enclosed an alternative document
[referring to the Extrajudicial Settlement16 dated
June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in
support of the claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs.
Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence
Freeman)." In the same letter, respondent
reiterated that complainant "requests that any
amount of monies due or benefits accruing, be
directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7
at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St.,
Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola,
which serves as her temporary account until
further notice."
Complainant declared that in November 1999,
she made a demand upon the respondent to
return her passport and the total amount of
₱200,000.00 which she gave for the processing
of the visa applications. Not heeding her
demand, respondent asked her to attend a
meeting with the Consul of the British Embassy,
purportedly to discuss about the visa
applications, but she purposely did not show up
as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On
the supposed rescheduled appointment with the
British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her
to Airtech Travel and Tours, and introduced her
to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's
owner, who assured her that he would help her
secure the visas within a week. Marquez made
her sign an application for visa and demanded
the amount of ₱3,000.00. After a week, she
talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary
of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask
respondent to return the total amount of
₱200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer17 dated June 20,
2000, respondent countered that in 1998,
complainant, accompanied by former Philippine
Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner
Josefina Bauzon and another woman whose
identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice
regarding the inheritance of her deceased
husband, a British national.18 She told
complainant to submit proof of her marriage to
the deceased, birth certificate of their son, and
other documents to support her claim for the
insurance proceeds. She averred that before
she accepted the case, she explained to
complainant that she would be charging the
following amounts: acceptance fee of
₱50,000.00, ₱20,000.00 for initial expenses, and
additional amount of ₱50,000.00 on a contingent
basis. She said complainant agreed to these
rates and, in fact, readily paid her the said
amounts. With an SPA,19 dated April 6, 1999
and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA],
having been executed in her favor, she made
preliminary communications with the insurance
companies in London regarding complainant's
claims. Having received communications from
said insurance companies, she stated that
complainant offered, which she accepted, to
shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel
accommodation, so that she can personally
attend to the matter. She left for London in May
1999 and, upon her return, she updated the
complainant about the status of her claims.
As to the visa arrangements, respondent said
that when she met with complainant, she asked
her why she had not left for London, and the
latter replied that her contacts with the embassy
had duped her. She explained to complainant
that she could refer her to a travel consultant
who would handle the visa arrangements for a
fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that
when complainant acceded to such arrangement,
she accompanied her, in December 1999, to a
travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours,
who found out that complainant's previous visa
applications had been denied four times, on the
ground of falsity of information. Thereafter,
complainant was able to secure a visa through
the help of the travel consultant, who charged
her a "professional fee" of ₱50,000.00. She
added that she had no participation in the
foregoing transactions, other than referring
complainant to the said travel consultant.
With regard to the alleged falsified documents,
respondent denied knowledge about the
existence of the same, and declared that the
SPA,20 dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized
on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis
51
for communications with the insurance
companies in London. She stated that in her
absence, complainant, through wily
representations, was able to obtain the case
folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary,
and never returned the same, despite repeated
demands. She said that she was unaware of the
loss of the case folder as she then had no
immediate need of it. She also said that her
secretary failed to immediately report about the
missing case folder prior to taking a leave of
absence, so as to attend to the financial
obligations brought about by her mother's
lingering ailment and consequent
death.21 Despite repeated requests, complainant
failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law
firm was prevented from pursuing the
complainant's insurance claims. She maintained
that through complainant's own criminal acts and
machinations, her law office was prevented from
effectively pursuing her claims. Between
January to February 2000, she sent complainant
a billing statement which indicated the expenses
incurred22 by the law firm, as of July 1999;
however, instead of settling the amount, the
latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade
payment of her obligations.
On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion
Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate
Resolution with Comments on Respondent's
Answer, alleging, among others, that upon
seeing the letter23 dated March 9, 1999 of the
Coroner's Court, respondent began to show
interest and volunteered to arrange for the
insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was
agreed upon between the parties, as the
amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal
fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to
the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed
to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount
to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with
the assistance of a travel consultant
recommended by respondent; that upon return
from abroad, respondent never informed her
about the arrangements with the insurance
companies in London that remittances would be
made directly to the respondent's personal
account at Far East Bank; that the reason why
respondent went to London was primarily to
attend the International Law Conference, not
solely for her insurance claims, which explained
why the receipt for the ₱50,000.00, which she
gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel,
Inc. (in the amount of ₱47,500.00) and that she
merely made a handwritten marginal note
regarding the receipt of the amount of
₱50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA
[referring to the second SPA] in favor of the
respondent, bearing her forged signature, the
amount of £10,546.7 [should be£10,960.63],24 or
approximately equivalent to ₱700,000.00, was
remitted to the personal bank account of
respondent, but the same was never turned over
to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and
that she clarified that she never executed any
SPA that would authorize respondent to receive
any money or check due her, but that the only
SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the
purpose of representing her in court proceedings.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal
complaint25 for malicious mischief, under Article
327 of the Revised Penal Code, against
complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former
client of respondent), for allegedly barging into
the law office of the former and, with the use of a
pair of scissors, cut-off the cords of two office
computer keyboards and the line connections for
the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric
fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in
an estimated amount of ₱200,000.00. In the
Resolution,26 dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant
City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended
that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence. The case was subsequently
dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure
of respondent to appear during the preliminary
investigation of the case.27
Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for
estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, against respondent,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by
respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
in the Resolution28 dated October 21, 2002,
recommended that the information, dated
February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and
that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of
evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant
City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information.29 Consequently, in the
Order30 dated November 27, 2002, the trial court
granted the withdrawal of the information, and
dismissed the case.
In the Report and Recommendation31 dated
August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent to have betrayed
the trust of complainant as her client, for being
dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for
herself the insurance proceeds intended for
complainant. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that despite receipt of the
approximate amount of ₱200,000.00,
respondent failed to secure the visas for
complainant and her son, and that through
deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for
herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of
complainant's husband. Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
52
law for the maximum period allowed under the
law, and that she be ordered to turn over to
complainant the amounts she received from the
London insurance companies.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-
166,32 adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with modification that respondent
be disbarred.
The Court agrees with the observation of the
Investigating Commissioner that complainant
had sufficiently substantiated the charge of
gross dishonesty against respondent, for having
appropriated the insurance proceeds of the
complainant's deceased husband, and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so
much to punish the individual attorney himself,
as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard for their oath of office have
proved them unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in them as members of the bar.33
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it
does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court, with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice,
by purging the profession of members who, by
their misconduct, have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.34
Being a sui generis proceeding, the main
disposition of this Court is the determination of
the respondent's administrative liability. This
does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs,
such as moral and exemplary damages as
prayed for by the complainant, which may very
well be the subject of a separate civil suit for
damages arising from the respondent's wrongful
acts, to be filed in the regular courts.
In the absence of a formal contract, complainant
engaged the legal services of respondent to
assist her in securing visa applications and
claiming the insurance proceeds of her
deceased husband. There are conflicting
allegations as to the scope of authority of
respondent to represent the complainant. A
perusal of the [first] SPA,35 dated November 6,
1998, which was not notarized, showed that
complainant merely authorized respondent to
represent her and her son, in order to protect
their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial
and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of
any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of
her deceased husband, both in the Philippines
and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA,36 dated
April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999,
allegedly bearing the forged signature of
complainant, in addition to the foregoing
representations, authorized respondent to
appear and represent the complainant, in
connection with her insurance claims, and to
receive monies and/or encash treasury warrants,
checks arising from said claims, deposit the
same, and dispose of such funds as may be
necessary for the successful pursuit of the
claims. The [third] SPA,37 also dated April 6,
1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly
bearing the forged signature of complainant, but
additionally bearing the signatures of two
witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the
second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations.
The three SPAs, attached to the pleadings of the
parties and made integral parts of the records of
the case, were not certified true copies and no
proof was adduced to verify their genuineness
and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the
representation of respondent in her behalf with
regard to the insurance claims; however, the
admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that
she received payment from complainant, her
client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
a lawyer-client relationship.38
Be that as it may, assuming that respondent
acted within the scope of her authority to
represent the complainant in pursuing the
insurance claims, she should never deviate from
the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that
a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that
a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client, and
Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of a client when
due or upon demand.
When a lawyer receives money from the client
for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for a particular purpose.
53
And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client.39 In the present
case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary
receipts issued by respondent, with the
letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes Law Office,
indubitably showed that she received the total
amount of ₱167,000.0040 from the complainant,
in connection with the handling of the latter's
case. Respondent admitted having received
money from the complainant, but claimed that
the total amount of ₱120,000.0041 she received
was in accordance with their agreement.
Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered
an accounting or, at least, apprised the
complainant of the actual expenses incurred.
This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy in
the actual amount that respondent should
receive, supposedly pursuant to an agreement
of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as
there was absence of a formal contract of legal
services.
Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant
gave ₱50,000.00 to the respondent for the
purpose of assisting her in claiming the
insurance proceeds; however, per Application
for United Kingdom Entry Clearance,42 dated
December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's
primary purpose in traveling to London was to
attend the International Law Conference in
Russell Square, London. It is appalling that
respondent had the gall to take advantage of the
benevolence of the complainant, then grieving
for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into
believing that she needed to go to London to
assist in recovering the proceeds of the
insurance policies. Worse, respondent even
inculcated in the mind of the complainant that
she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of
giving "grease money" or lagay, in the total
amount of ₱43,000.00,43 to the British Embassy
personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in
the normal course of conducting official business
transactions, as a means to expedite the visa
applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
More importantly, apart from her bare denials
that no remittance was made to her personal
bank account, as shown by the monthly
transaction report (covering January to
December for the years 2000-
2001),44 respondent never attempted to
reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory
explanation, as to why she failed to render an
accounting, on the proceeds of the insurance
policies that should rightfully belong to the
complainant vis-á-vis the correspondence by the
insurance companies based in London,
pertaining to the remittance of the following
amounts to the respondent's personal bank
account, to wit: Per letter45 dated November 23,
2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator,
Customer Services Department of Lincoln
Financial Group, addressed to complainant,
stating, among others, that "An amount of
£10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of
Attorney on 27th September 2000)," and per
letter,46 dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff
Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of
the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited,
addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln
Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among
others, that "I can confirm that a death claim was
made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an
amount of £471.06 was sent by International
Moneymover to the client's legal representative,
ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City,
Philippines." Clearly, there is no doubt that the
amounts of £10,489.57 and £471.06 were
remitted to respondent through other means of
international transactions, such as the
International Moneymover, which explains why
no direct remittance from the insurance
companies in London could be traced to the
personal bank account of respondent, per
monthly transaction report, covering January to
December for the years 2000-2001.
A criminal case is different from an
administrative case, and each must be disposed
of according to the facts and the law applicable
to each case.47 Section 5, in relation to Sections
148 and 2,49 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that
in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the
rule to the present case, the dismissal of a
criminal case does not preclude the continuance
of a separate and independent action for
administrative liability, as the weight of evidence
necessary to establish the culpability is merely
substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that
the criminal complaint for estafa against her was
already dismissed is of no consequence. An
administrative case can proceed independently,
even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense
evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that
the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime
was committed. More so, in the present
administrative case, wherein the ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case was because the
trial court granted the prosecution's motion to
withdraw the information and, a fortiori,
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
54
In Velez v. De Vera,50 the Court ruled that the
relation between attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of
the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics
provides that the lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit or gain,
he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client. Money of the client
or collected for the client, or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer, should
be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not, under any circumstances, be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs the public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the
funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. Those
who are guilty of such infraction may be
disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law.51 Indeed, lawyering is not a
business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.52
In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the
privilege to practice their profession for breach
of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients'
moneys and properties. In Manzano v.
Soriano,53 therein respondent, found guilty of
grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds
belonging to his client) and malpractice,
represented therein complainant in a collection
suit, but failed to turn over the amount of
₱50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and,
to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated
deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at
the same time, the notary public. In Lemoine v.
Balon, Jr.,54 therein respondent, found guilty of
malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct,
received the check corresponding to his client's
insurance claim, falsified the check and made it
payable to himself, encashed the same, and
appropriated the proceeds.1âwphi1
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not
capital that yields profits. The returns it births are
simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom
from government interference, is impressed with
public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation.55Respondent's repeated
reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and
unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies,
to the extent of milking complainant's finances
dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the
insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong
to complainant, in the guise of rendering
legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed
the norms of honesty and integrity required in
the practice of law. This being so, respondent
should be purged from the privilege of exercising
the noble legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P.
Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct
and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let
her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified
of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the
personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to
complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds
of the insurance policies remitted to her by
Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of
£10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance
Company Limited, £471.06, or in the total
amount of £10,960.63, which is approximately
equivalent to ₱700,000.00, pursuant to the
prevailing ex ge rate at the time of the subject
transaction.
A.C. No. 4808 November 22, 2011
TERESITA T. BAYONLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds
and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
- Code of Professional Responsibility.
This canon of professional responsibility is at the
center of this administrative complaint for
disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit,
conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty.
Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her
client.1
Antecedents
55
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who
had jointly owned a parcel of land situated in
Butuan City in their lifetimes. They died without
leaving a will. Their land was thereafter
expropriated in connection with the construction
of the Bancasi Airport. An expropriation
compensation amounting to ₱2,453,429.00 was
to be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle,
Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory
heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Paz’s
granddaughter and son.2
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes
with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and
breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that on October
21, 1993, she and Alfredo had engaged the
legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their
share in the expropriation compensation from
the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan
De Oro City,3agreeing to her attorney’s fees of
10% of whatever amount would be collected;
that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had
collected ₱1 million from the ATO; that
Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’
attorney’s fees, would be ₱75,000.00, but Atty.
Reyes had delivered to her only ₱23,000.00,
and had failed to deliver the balance of
₱52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on
June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had collected the
amount of ₱121,119.11 from the ATO; that
Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes’
attorney’s fees, would be ₱109,007.20, but Atty.
Reyes had handed her only ₱56,500.00, and
had failed to deliver the balance of ₱52,507.20;
and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for
depriving her of her just share.4
In her comment dated February 10, 1998,5 Atty.
Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had
engaged her legal services for the purpose of
collecting their share in the expropriation
compensation; that as consideration for her
services, Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed upon
a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given
to Bayonla more than what had been due to her;
that Alfredo had received from the ATO the
check for the second release corresponding to
the share of both Bayonla and Alfredo; that
Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the
second release; that on June 5, 1995 she had
received out of the second release by the ATO
only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and
Alfredo had agreed to bear the expenses for the
collection of their share; that she had incurred
travel and other expenses in collecting such
share; and that she should be absolved from
liability arising from the complaint.
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.6
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro (Commissioner Navarro) rendered a
report,7 whereby she found and recommended
against Atty. Reyes as follows:
In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned,
the issue hinges only on the complainant’s
position; one of the heirs of Paz Durban whose
legal services of the respondent was not
revoked.
The parties were required to submit documents
relative to their respective defenses (sic)
specially the actual amounts released by ATO,
actual amount due to the complainant as her
share, the remittances made by the respondent
to the complainant of her share and receipts to
prove the same.
Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an
answer without the necessary documents
required of them and attached only a xerox copy
of the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya
for the heir of Pedro Durban which had already
been previously attached to the records of this
case.
In the said computation it appears that for the
release on February 17, 1993, the heirs of
Durban received ₱84,852.00 and for the second
release each of them as well as the complainant
was entitled ₱121,119.11. It could be inferred
from here that complainant was supposed to
received (sic) ₱205,971.11 as her share.
Inasmuch as the attorney’s fees of 40% was (sic)
supported by evidence instead of (sic)
complainant’s allegation of ten [10%] percent;
then respondent was entitled to ₱82,388.45 as
attorney’s fees; leaving a balance of
₱123,582.66 due to the complainant.
Respondent’s allegation that she gave more
than what was alleged by the complainant is
untenable for she did not submit evidence to
prove the same, therefore, as it is complainant’s
allegation that she received only ₱79,000.00 for
her share as a whole shall be considered for the
moment until such time that proofs to the
contrary shall have been submitted.
Considering that complainant was supposed to
receive the amount due her which was
₱123,582.66 and actually received only
₱79,000.00; then respondent still has to remit to
complainant the amount of ₱44,582.66.
From the records of this case respondent
alleged that she only collected the 40%
attorney’s fees for the second release whereby
Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban
received the check from ATO and got a large
part of the same. Respondent did not mention
how much she got as attorney’s fees against
complainant’s share but on the whole amounting
56
to ₱496,895.00 which is unfair to the
complainant.
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban,
complainant herein should have been advised
by the respondent and given a breakdown of
whatever amount was received or came to her
knowledge as complainant’s counsel. Short of
the foregoing, respondent violated Rule 16.01
Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; to wit:
"Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client."
Respondent was given a ce to rectify whatever
errors or misgivings (sic) she had done for her
client but she unfortunately failed to do so and
did not comply with the Order dated October 29,
1998.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the
Undersigned respectfully recommends that the
respondent be required to render an accounting
or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant
of all the collected shares due the complainant
and remit to the latter the said amount of
₱44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent had complied
with the aforementioned, she is suspended from
the practice of her legal profession.
Respectfully submitted.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of
Commissioner Navarro through Resolution No.
XIII-99-165.8
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on
September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of
Governors denied her motion for reconsideration
through Resolution No. XIV-99-117.9
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for
reinvestigation. However, through its Resolution
No. XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28, 2001, the
IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction, stating that
the matter had already been endorsed to the
Court.10
On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP
Board of Governors to report on whether Atty.
Reyes had already accounted for and remitted
the amount of ₱44,582.66 to Bayonla.11
On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors informed the Court that per the
manifestation of Bayonla’s counsel Atty. Reyes
had not yet rendered an accounting and had not
yet remitted the amount of ₱44,582.66 to
Bayonla.12
Through her manifestation dated September 4,
2002 to the Court,13 Atty. Reyes posed some
queries, as follows: (a) whether she could be
compelled to pay the amount of ₱44,582.66 to
Bayonla even if the latter’s claims had been
based on perjured statements; (b) whether the
payment of the amount would operate to dismiss
the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the
balance of Bayonla’s share; and (c) whether she
could deposit the amount of ₱44,582.66 with
either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.
Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that
the IBP Board of Governors did not accord to
her the right to confront Bayonla during the
investigation conducted by the IBP Board of
Governors; that Bayonla’s counsel had induced
Bayonla to file the estafa charge against her;
and that this had prompted her to initiate a
disbarment complaint against Bayonla’s
counsel.14
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) recommended the final
resolution of this case.15 The recommendation
was noted by the Court on June 29, 2010.16
Issue
Whether or not the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of
Governors were proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors, which were supported by the records,
but we modify the sanctions to be imposed on
Atty. Reyes.
I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of her client that
may come into her possession. Rule 16.01 of
Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of
Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand, subject to the lawyer’s lien over
the funds, or the lawyer’s option to apply so
much of the funds as may be necessary to
satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the
relationship between a lawyer and her client is
highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a
great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is
no question that the money or property received
by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the
57
latter.17 Conformably with these canons of
professional responsibility, we have held that a
lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all
the property and money she has collected for
her client. This obligation includes the prompt
reporting and accounting of the money collected
by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment
to his client.18
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle
would each receive the amount of ₱84,852.00
out of the first release, and the amount of
₱121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total
share from the two releases was ₱205,971.11.
With Atty. Reyes being entitled to ₱82,388.44 as
attorney’s fees, the equivalent of 40% of
Bayonla’s share, the net share of Bayonla was
₱123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered
to her only ₱79,000.00,19 which was short by
₱44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and
despite the orders from the IBP Board of
Governors for her to remit the shortage,20 Atty.
Reyes refused to do so.
By not delivering Bayonla’s share despite her
demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated
canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as
the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably
money held in trust to be immediately turned
over to the client.21 The unjustified withholding of
money belonging to the client warrants the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the
lawyer.22 Without doubt, Atty. Reyes’ failure to
immediately account for and to deliver the
money upon demand was deceit, for it signified
that she had converted the money to her own
use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had
reposed in her. It constituted gross misconduct
for which the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law became justified pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign
court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension. (As amended by SC Resolution
dated February 13, 1992.)
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle
to administrative proceeding against respondent
The filing of the perjury charge by Atty. Reyes
against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by
Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or
excuse the duty of Atty. Reyes to render an
accounting and to remit the amount due to
Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such cases
inhibit this administrative matter from proceeding
on its due course. It is indisputable that the
pendency of any criminal charges between the
lawyer and her client does not negate the
administrative proceedings against the lawyer.
We explained why in Suzuki v. Tiamson,23 to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases
are different from administrative matters, such
that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. In this
light, we refer to this Court’s ruling in Berbano vs.
Barcelona, citing In re Almacen, where it was
held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is
the determination of respondent’s administrative
liability and our findings herein should not in any
way be treated as having any material bearing
on any other judicial action which the parties
may choose to file against each other. [emphasis
supplied]
58
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Naldoza 24 that –
xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial
court’s finding of civil liability against the
respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
finding in the administrative action before this
Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the
civil action absolve the administrative liability of
the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the
simultaneous pendency of an administrative
case and a judicial proceeding related to the
cause of the administrative case, even if the
charges and the evidence to be adduced in such
cases are similar, does not result into or
occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or
deprivation of due process to the parties in
either of the cases.25
III
No denial of due process to respondent
Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her
right to due process because the IBP Board of
Governors did not permit her to personally
confront the complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyes’s contention
valid. She was accorded full due process, for
she in fact participated in all stages of the
proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law until she has
had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against her, to produce
witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by
herself or counsel.26 Contrary to Atty. Reyes’
insistence, however, the IBP Board of
Governors was under no legal obligation to
conduct a trial-type proceeding at which she
could have personally confronted Bayonla. In
other words, the lack of such proceeding neither
diminished her right to due process nor deprived
her of the right. A formal investigation entailing
notice and hearing is required in administrative
proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative
need of notice and hearing does not always
mean the holding of an adversarial trial-type
proceeding. Due process is still satisfied when
the parties are afforded the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence
in support of their respective sides.27 As the
Court said in Samalio v. Court of Appeals:28
Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as
long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it
is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by
the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take
the place of their direct testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the
various pleadings which he filed with the Board
of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer
and two motions to dismiss, as well as other
motions and papers. He was also able to
participate in all stages of the administrative
proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to
the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to
the CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. And any
seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by
a party who has had the opportunity to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration. [bold
emphasis supplied]
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors
actually conducted a formal investigation of the
complaint against Atty. Reyes upon the directive
of the Court. In her formal investigation of the
complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed both
parties to submit their respective proofs on the
actual amounts released by the ATO, the
amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty.
Reyes’ corresponding contingent fees, the
remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the
receipts showing such remittances.29 In due
course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written
answer, attaching to the answer the documents
supporting her defenses.30 Commissioner
Navarro took all of Atty. Reyes’ submissions into
good and proper account, as borne out by her
report.31 And even after the IBP Board of
Governors had adopted Commissioner
Navarro’s report (and its recommendation), Atty.
Reyes was still afforded the fair opportunity to
challenge the adverse findings by filing her
59
motion for reconsideration, although such
motion was ultimately resolved against her.32
IV
Sanction
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in
the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer
to account for and to return money or property
belonging to a client has been suspension from
the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez,
Jr. v. Langit,33 the lawyer who withdrew the
rentals pertaining to his client totaling
₱255,000.00 without the knowledge of the client
and who ignored the demand of the client to
account for and to return the amount was
suspended from the practice of law for two years.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,34 the lawyer received
₱155,000.00 from the adversary of his clients as
partial payment of a final and executory decision
in favor of the clients pursuant to a secret
arrangement between the lawyer and the
adversary, and deposited the amount to the
lawyer’s personal bank account without the
knowledge of the clients; the lawyer thereafter
refused to surrender the money to his clients.
The suspension of the lawyer for two years from
the practice of law was ordered by the Court. In
Small v. Banares,35 a similar penalty of
suspension for a period of two years from the
practice of law was imposed on a lawyer who
had failed to file a case for the purpose of which
he had received an amount of ₱80,000.00, and
to return the amount upon demand. In Barcenas
v. Alvero,36 the Court suspended for a period of
two years from the practice of law a lawyer who
had failed to immediately account for and to
return ₱300,000.00 received from a client for the
purpose of depositing it in court, after the lawyer
had been found not to have deposited the
money in court.
Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had
striking resemblance with the sins thus
sanctioned in the aforementioned precedents,
the proper penalty for her is suspension from the
practice of law for two years, with warning that a
similar offense by her will be dealt with more
severely.
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla
the amount of ₱44,582.67, which the IBP Board
of Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of
restitution. Although the Court renders this
decision in an administrative proceeding
primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a
member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s
silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be
both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross
ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds
or property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the
respondent’s liability. That has been the reason
why the Court has required restitution of the
amount involved as a concomitant relief in the
cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra,
Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, and Small v.
Banares, supra.
In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12%
per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the
date when she was formally charged with
disbarment. This rate of interest was prescribed
by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and
Small v. Banares.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the
practice of law for a period of two years effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a
similar offense by her will be dealt with more
severely.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to
complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days
from receipt of this Decision the amount of
₱44,582.67, with interest of 12% per annum
from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the
complainant a complete written accounting and
inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had collected
from the Air Transportation Office as
expropriation compensation; (b) the total amount
due to the complainant; (c) the total amount she
had actually remitted to the complainant; and (d)
the amount she had deducted as her contingent
fee vis-à-vis the complainant.1âwphi1
Within the same period of compliance, Atty.
Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant, authentic written
proof that her accounting, inventory, and
payment were furnished to and received by the
complainant in due course.
This Decision is without prejudice to any
pending or contemplated proceedings against
Atty. Reyes.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower
courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a copy of it to be included in
Atty. Reyes’ file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10568 January 13, 2015
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]
MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
60
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by
Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas
Lerios-Amboy (Atty. Amboy) for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she
engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27,
2007 in connection with a partition case. In
accordance with the Retainer Agreement
between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty.
Amboy ₱50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the
latter’s engagement, Soliman paid her
₱25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised
Soliman to no longer institute a partition case
since the other co-owners of the property were
amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty.
Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to
the said property from the coowners to the
individual owners; the ₱25,000.00 already paid
to her was then treated as payment for her
professional services.2
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy
₱16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In
the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told
Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance
of the titles to the property because of the failure
of the other co-owners to submit certain
documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that
someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can
help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee
of ₱80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy
told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed
to reduce the amount to ₱50,000.00.3
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of
₱8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as
payment for the real property tax for the year
2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount
of ₱50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as
payment for the latter’s contact in the RD.4
On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed
Soliman that the certificates of title to the
property werethen only awaiting the signature of
the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy
failed to deliver the respective certificates of title
of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject
property.5 On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboy’s
secretary informed Soliman that their contact in
the RD was asking for an additional ₱10,000.00
to facilitate the release of the said certificates of
title. Soliman then refused to further pay the
amount being asked by Atty. Amboy’s
secretary.6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking
Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the
said titles, but the latter was not responding to
her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty.
Amboy’s secretary went to the office of a certain
Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman
asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the
50,000.00as payment for the release of the said
titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received
any amount to facilitate the release of the titles
and claimed that the reason why the same could
not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to
file certain documents.7
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy
thereafter refused to release the pertinent
documents she gave to her for the processing of
the titles to the property or give back the
₱50,000.00 that was already paid to her.8
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had
a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied
having received any amount from the latter
pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed
that the retainer agreement was not
implemented since the partition case was not
instituted. She claimed that she merely
undertook to research, gather and collate all
documents required in the partition and in the
transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the
individual owners. She denied having failed to
submit the relevant documents to the RD which
caused the delay in the processing of the said
titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman
for ₱50,000.00 to facilitate the release of the
said titles.9
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and
Recommendation,10 which recommended the
suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of
law for six (6) months. The Investigating
Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility by
failing to observe due diligence in dealing with
Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform
the latter of the status of the proceedings for the
issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution,11 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the
modification that the period of Atty. Amboy’s
suspension from the practice of law was
increased from six (6) months to two (2) years
and that she was ordered to return the entire
amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration12 of the
Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution13 dated March 21, 2014.
After a thorough perusal of the respective
allegations of the parties and the circumstances
of this case, the Court affirms the penalty
imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his clientand that he should be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.14 A lawyer
61
is mandated to serve his client with competence
and diligence;to never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed
of the status of his case and respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.15
The circumstances of this case clearly show that
Atty. Amboy, after receiving ₱25,000.00 as
payment for her professional services, failed to
submit material documents relative to the
issuance of separate certificates of title to the
individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the
issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted
the commission of an illegal act when she asked
from Soliman the amount of ₱50,000.00 to be
paid to her "contact" inside the office of the RD
in order to facilitate the release of the said
certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the
payment of ₱50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed
to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title.
Insteadof procuring the release of the
certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy
asked for an additional ₱10,000.00 from
Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence
and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a
client.1âwphi1 Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined
the legal processes, which she swore to uphold
and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty.
Amboy bound herself to respectthe law and
legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of
Atty. Amboy to return the amount of ₱50,000.00
which she paid inorder to facilitate the release of
the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry,
Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila,
denied having received any amount from Atty.
Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman
after a demand therefor was made following her
failure to procure the issuance of the certificates
of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer
shall deliver the funds and property of his client
upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified
withholding of money belonging to a client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action.16 "A lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."17
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and
18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of
this Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED
to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
she received from the latter, plus legal interest
thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution
until fully paid. The respondent is further
DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court
written proof of her compliance within thirty (30)
days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy's personal record as
an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed
by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina
Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath,
docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty.
Espejo through her godmother, Corazon
Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction,
Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her
lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow
two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000)
from her (Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria
went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with
Atty. Espejo where they discussed the terms of
the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to
her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no
reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the
same meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate
Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the
latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the
payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously
issued and turned over to Victoria a check1dated
February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the
62
loan amount and agreed interest. On due date,
Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the
deposit of the check for the reason that she was
still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a
bank loan to fund the check. However, after a
couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no
word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the
check was already funded enough. In July 2009,
Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated
July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest
which accrued due to the late payment of the
principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said
check but, to her dismay, the check bounced
due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed
to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands.
Worried that she would not be able to recover
the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit
to her account the first check in the amount of
PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo
of the fact. However, the said check was also
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria
thereafter became more aggressive in her
efforts to recover her money. She, for instance,
personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand
letter dated August 3, 2009.3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria
filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on
August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before
the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and
subpoenas issued by the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office which she personally
received and continued to ignore Victoria’s
demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled
preliminary investigation where she promised to
pay her loan obligation.5
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another
check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of
two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP
275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the
said check was again dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds.6 Atty. Espejo did not file
any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the
charges against her. On November 17, 2009,
the case was submitted for resolution without
Atty. Espejo’s participation.7Victoria thereafter
filed the instant administrative case against Atty.
Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the
CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A.
Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty.
Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s
administrative complaint failing which would
render her in default. The warning,
notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any
Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner
Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear
for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010.
The notice stated that non-appearance of either
of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her
right to participate in further proceedings.9
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria
appeared.10
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued
an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear
during the mandatory conference and her failure
to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was
declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand,
was directed to file her verified position paper,
which she filed on June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July
15, 2010, the CBD recommended the
suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of
law and as a member of the Bar for a period of
five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint
for disbarment despite due notice and to appear
on the scheduled hearings set, shows his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court
and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office
as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction.
Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks
with insufficient funds and despite repeated
demands [she] failed to comply with her
obligation and her disregard and failure to
appear for preliminary investigation and to
submit her counter-affidavit to answer the
charges against her for Estafa and Violation of
BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also
warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors
passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the
modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension
from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo
was also ordered to return to Victoria the
amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice with legal interest
reckoned from the time the demand was made.
The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondent’s grave
misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
63
years and Ordered to Return to complainant the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(₱250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned
from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this
Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to
Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the
records of this case.15
The Court’s Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its
recommendation in part.1âwphi1 Atty. Espejo
did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or
traverse allegations that she issued unfunded
checks to pay her obligation. It has already been
settled that the deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned.16
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II,
We explained that the prompt payment of
financial obligations is one of the duties of a
lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his
monetary obligations to the complaint but
offered no justifiable reason for his continued
refusal to pay. Complainant made several
demands, both verbal and written, but
respondent just ignored them and even made
himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his
financial obligations to complainant, respondent
never offered nor made arrangements to pay his
debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize
any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing
worthless checks, an act constituting gross
misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that
it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at
all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he
must promptly pay his financial obligations.17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and
issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of
no moment. As We have held in several cases,
a lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but
also for gross misconduct outside of his
professional capacity. While the Court may not
ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non- professional or private
capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney
where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as
to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the
privilege which his licenses and the law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the
issuance of a series of worthless checks, which
is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this
case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her
commitment to her oath, for which she may be
disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render her unworthy
of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order. It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of
the profession she should hold in high esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the
respondent who issued worthless checks for
which he was convicted in the criminal case filed
against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law. The same sanction was imposed
on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino
having been found guilty of gross misconduct for
issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of
property the title of which was only entrusted to
him by the complainant.19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is
aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer
to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This
constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which
amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In
Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer
must maintain respect not only for the courts,
but also for judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by
his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the
IBP requiring him to file an answer to the
complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at
the mandatory conference. Although respondent
did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave
him another ce to defend himself through a
position paper. Still, respondent ignored this
directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for
authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is
expected to uphold the law and promote respect
64
for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must
observe and maintain respect not only to the
courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has
empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for
the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of
worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed
the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule
1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule
7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. CANON 11 – A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST
ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years, as
recommended by the IBP, commensurate under
the circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain
the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo
to return the money she borrowed from Victoria.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings
have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may to choose me against
each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a
trial of an action, but rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The
only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of
the amount of money that should be returned to
the complainant.22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B.
Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and
violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for two (2) years affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant and recorded in the personal files of
respondent.
A.C. No. 8826, March 25, 2015
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-
CAMBA, Complainant, v. ATTY. OTILIO SY
BONGON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative
Complaint1dated September 14, 2010 filed by
complainant Shirley Olayta-Camba (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Otilio Sy Bongon
(respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred
and be directed to return the amount of
P112,449.55 that he received from the former.
The Facts
In her complaint, complainant alleged that on
March 1, 2000, she engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of titling and/or
reconstituting the titles to the real estate
properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, situated in
the Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan,
both in the province of Albay. In connection
therewith, she claimed to have given the
aggregate amount of P112,499.55 to respondent,
broken down as follows: (a) P20,000.00 as
partial payment for legal services; (b) P162.00
as payment for certification fees; (c) P5,000.00
as advance payment for the reconstitution of
titles; (d) P30,000.00 as payment for land taxes
and titling of properties; (e) P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; (f) P19,337.55 as payment for
documentary stamps on the estate of Bernabe
Olayta; and (g) P28,000.00 as payment for
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Taxes.
Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to
update complainant regarding the status of the
matters referred to him. Thus, complainant
terminated her engagement with respondent and
demanded for the return of P112,499.55, but to
no avail.2 Hence, she filed the instant complaint
before the Court.
In his defense,3 respondent asserts, inter
alia, that he only received P55,000.00 and that
the rest of the money was received by a certain
Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an
employee of his law firm.4Further, respondent
averred that he had already offered to return the
65
amount of P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming
that he already earned the fees for legal
services in the amount of P20,000.00 for having
studied the matter entrusted to him and drafted
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Deed) that
underwent several revisions.5
The Court, in a Resolution6 dated August 15,
2011, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation7 dated April
17, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01
and Rule 16.03,Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and,
accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted
with the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months; and (b)
directed to return the amount of P55,000.00 to
complainant.8
The Investigating Commissioner found that
complainant indeed engaged respondent’s
services for the purpose of reconstituting four (4)
titles as well as preparing the Deed, and that the
latter received legal fees in connection therewith.
Despite this, respondent did not perform his
undertaking in accordance with the engagement
and likewise failed to return complainant’s
money despite demands. The foregoing acts
were deemed to be in violation of the lawyer’s
oath, as well as the CPR, thus, rendering
respondent administratively liable for the same.
However, in view of respondent’s old age, his
condition of having undergone a triple heart
bypass surgery, and considering that this is his
first offense, the Investigating Commissioner
opted to mitigate the administrative penalties
imposed upon respondent.9
In a Resolution10 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with
modification decreasing the recommended
penalty to suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months. On motion for
reconsideration11 of respondent, his period of
suspension was further decreased to one (1)
month in a Resolution12 dated May 3, 2014. To
date, respondent has not filed a petition for
review before the Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up
the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him.13 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable for violating
Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR,14 which reads:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, complainant engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of titling
and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate
properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as
preparing the Deed, and in connection therewith,
allegedly gave various amounts to respondent,
of which the latter admitted the receipt of only
P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent
failed to comply with his undertaking and offered
the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles
and the preparation of the Deed were delayed
due to the Deed’s several revisions; and that
Bernabe Olayta’s surviving heirs were living in
different places, making it difficult to secure their
presence, much less obtain their signatures to
the said Deed.15
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he
failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00 that
he personally received from complainant despite
repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
66
from the client. Canon 18of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
xxxx hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN
and property of his client when due or upon WARNING that a repetition of the same or
demand. x xx. similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

xxxx Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return

Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if not used
accordingly, the money must be returned
immediately to the client.16 As such, a lawyer’s
failure to return the money to his client despite
numerous demands is a violation of the trust
reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity,17 as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment18 and,
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
to complainant Shirley Olayta-Camba the
amount of P55,000.00 he received from the
latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Resolution. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondent’s personal record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which
is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Having established respondent’s administrative

liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed on him.

Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases

where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and,
at the same time, failed to return the latter’s
money and/or property despite demand, the
Court imposed upon them the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-
Ribaya v. Lawsin,19 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure
to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter.20 Similarly,
inMeneses v. Macalino,21 the same penalty was
imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any
legal service to his client as well as to return the
money he received for such purpose.22 These
pronouncements notwithstanding, there have
been instances where the Court tempered the
penalty imposed upon a lawyer due to
humanitarian and equitable considerations.23 In
view of the foregoing, and taking into
consideration respondent’s advanced age,
medical condition, and the fact that this is his
first offense, the Court finds it appropriate to
sustain the recommended penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
month.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Otilio Sy

Bongon is found GUILTY of violating Rules
16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of

67