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PROF.H.MUJEEB RAHMAN
Postmodern Economics – Introduction
The following quotations by Rorty and Ruccio and Amariglio illustrate one of the
hurdles to understanding Postmodern economics—a lack of consensus among
Postmodernists:
“Just about the only constructive suggestion Marx made, the abolition of
private property, has been tried. It did not work."
(Richard Rorty)2
Another hurdle is that Postmodernists tend not to use traditional language
associated with economics—wages, pensions, interest rates, inflation, Social
Security, retirement, etc. Instead, they use obscure words and phrases such as
fragmentation, differentiation, chronology, pastiche, anti-foundationalism, and
pluralism. More terminology that obscures meaning includes “the undecidability
of meaning, the textuality of discursivity of knowledge, the inconceivability of
pure ‘presence,’ the irrelevance of intention, the insuperability of authenticity,
the impossibility of representation, the celebration of play, difference, plurality,
chance, inconsequence, and marginality.”3 Confusion even surrounds the
meaning of the word person in Postmodern economic terms. Postmodern
economists Ruccio and Amariglio, authors of Postmodern Moments in Modern
Economics, explain, “The Postmodern condition opens up a very different
research agenda for economic scientists should they choose to disown (what
many regard as a necessary fiction) the unified self and move, instead to a fiction
supposedly more in tune with contemporary reality, the decentered self.”4
Ruccio and Amariglio say there is “no singular and unique ‘I.’”5 In other words,
there is no self-identity and no permanent soul or mind. Postmodernists refer to
human beings not as persons, but as subjects, bodies, or units. Person suggests
the existence of a singular and unique I who possesses a personality or human
nature. To Postmodernists, there is no human nature. There is only an ever
evolving, highly sexual, social animal with multiple subjective interests crying out
for recognition and acceptance. Ruccio and Amariglio admit they have “no
interest in determining or representing what the body [subject] ‘really’ looks
like.”6
In the final analysis, while Postmodernists are not in total agreement in every
detail, they are committed to the leftist side of the economic spectrum, favoring,
to varying degrees, some form of government intervention. This intervention may
be more overt, as with Ruccio and Amariglio, or less so, as with Rorty. But in
either case, there is agreement that capitalism is the enemy of social justice. Yet
based on the Postmodern aversion to metanarratives, most hesitate to offer
concrete solutions, preferring instead to experiment with some degree of
socialism for an economic alternative that best suites an ever-changing social
structure.
1
David F. Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 299.
2
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1999),
214.
3
Ruccio and Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics, 17–8.
4
Ibid., 14.
5
Ibid., 167.
6
Ibid., 134.
7
Ibid., 169.
8
Ibid., 129.
9
The Washington Times, April 21, 2005, A2.
10
Ruccio and Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics, 250.
11
Ibid., 249.
12
Ibid., 270.
13
Ibid., 269.
14
Stephen R.C. Hicks, Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from
Rousseau to Foucault (Tempe, AZ: Scholargy Publishing, 2004), 197.
Interventionism over Socialism
Richard Rorty looked at the history of socialism and came to the conclusion that,
practically speaking, it was a failure. Rorty writes, “Just about the only
constructive suggestion Marx made, the abolition of private property, has been
tried. It did not work.”4
Notes:
1
Anthony Thomson, “Post-Modernism and Social Justice,” citing Stuart Henry and
Dragan Milovanovic, Constitutive Criminology: Beyond Postmodernism (London,
UK: Sage, 1996), 4. Available online at
http://ace.acadiau.ca/soci/agt/constitutivecrim.htm.
2
Robert Eaglestone, ed., Routledge Critical Thinkers (New York, NY: Routledge,
2003), 15
3
Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York, NY: New York
Review Books, 2001), 153. Foucault’s biographer, Didier Eribon, wrote, Foucault
“had been seen with an iron rod in his hands, ready to do battle with militant
Communists; he had been seen throwing rocks at the police.” See Eribon’s Michel
Foucault (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 209.
4
Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, 214.
5
Richard Rorty, “Trotsky and Wild Orchids,” in Wild Orchids and Trotsky:
Messages from American Universities, ed., Mark Edmundson (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1993), 47.
6
Ibid.
7
Richard Rorty, “The Communitarian Impulse,” http:// Of all the areas of
contemporary thought, economics seems the most resistant to the destabilizing
effects of postmodernism. Yet, David Ruccio and Jack Amariglio argue that one
can detect, within the diverse schools of thought that comprise the discipline of
economics, "moments" that defy the modernist ideas to which many economists
and methodologists remain wedded. This is the first book to document the
existence and to explore the implications of the postmodern moments in modern
economics.
Ruccio and Amariglio begin with a powerful argument for the general relevance of
postmodernism to contemporary economic thought. They then conduct a series
of case studies in six key areas of economics. From the idea of the "multiple self"
and notions of uncertainty and information, through market anomalies and
competing concepts of value, to analytical distinctions based on gender and
academic standing, economics is revealed as defying the modernist frame of a
singular science. The authors conclude by showing how economic theory would
change if the postmodern elements were allowed to flourish.
Review:
Endorsements:
"This is an excellent and important book. All of the chapters are very good, but
the first chapter is truly outstanding. It is the best discussion of 'postmodernism in
economics' anywhere in the literature."--D. Wade Hands, author of Reflection
without Rules
"Forthright, concisely argued, engaging, and provocative, this book provides a
critical commentary on the appearance of postmodern ideas in economic
thought. But it is much more besides. There is currently no other text that brings
together the material assembled here and that lends it coherence, while also
pointing to the research agenda inscribed within it. The authors provide an
informed guide to past and recent developments in the economic literature, but
they also reveal a terrain littered with neglected challenges and unrealized but
potentially productive projects."--Judith Mehta, Open University, United Kingdom
Table of Contents:
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii
Chapter One
An Introduction to Postmodernism, for Economics 1
Chapter Two
Knowledge, Uncertainty, and Keynesian Economics 55
Chapter Three
The Body and Neoclassical Economics 92
Chapter Four
Feminist Economics: (Re)Gendering Knowledge and Subjectivity 137
Chapter Five
Values and Institutional Economics 171
Chapter Six
Capitalism, Socialism, and Marxian Economics 216
Chapter Seven
Academic and Everyday Economic Knowledges 252
Appendix 283
Appendix B 285
Appendix C 287
Chapter Eight
Economic Fragments 289
References 301
Index 333
www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/anniversary/Tran¬scripts/RortyTXT.htm.
Postmodern Economics – The Need for Experimentation
Notes:
1
Stuart Sim, ed., The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism (London, UK:
Routledge, 2004), 40.
2
Barbara Epstein, “Postmodernism and the Left,” New Politics vol. 6, no. 2 (new
series), whole no. 22 (Winter 1997). Available online at
http://www.wpunj.edu/~newpol/issue22/epstei22.htm.
3
Ruccio and Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics, 295.
4
Ibid., 299.
Issues in Postmodern Economics
However, the physics envy characteristic of many of the social sciences has
led modern economists to complicate the mathematics that are necessary to
analyze economic systems per se. Economic systems are essentially accounting
systems, and the unit of account is what we conventionally call “money.”
Economics involves mapping the absolute quantification of value in accounting
systems onto maps of social and natural ecologies. It is in mapping the structure
and dynamics of these ecologies that higher mathematics becomes useful.
An ecological assessment of these levels of human needs reveals that the lower
levels require the exploitation of natural resources, while the satisfaction of the
higher needs is entirely a function of human relationships. (Maslow distinguished
between deficiency needs and being needs.) Thus the economics of lower need
satisfaction is based on the formula:
Far from losing his own self in this return to the world, he carries it thither,
projects it energetically and masterfully upon things, in other words he
forces the other–the world–little by little to become himself. Man
humanizes the world, injects it, impregnates it with his own ideal
substance, and it is possible to imagine that one day or another, in the far
depths of time, this terrible outer world will become so saturated with man
that our descendants will be able to travel through it today as we mentally
travel through our own inner selves; it is possible to imagine that the world,
without ceasing to be the world, will one day be changed into something
like a materialized soul, and, as in Shakespeare’s Tempest, the winds will
blow at the bidding of Ariel, the elf of Ideas. Man and People (New York:
Norton, 1957, pp. 20-21, Original italics; he hastens to add in a footnote: “I
do not say this is certain. . .but I do say that it is possible”).
No small part of the anguish that is today [the mid 20th century] tormenting
the souls of the West derives from the fact that during the past century–
and perhaps for the first time in history–man reached the point of believing
himself secure. …The progressivist idea consists in affirming that humanity–
an abstract, irresponsible, nonexistent entity invented at the time–
progresses, which is certain, but also that it progresses of necessity. (Op.
Cit., p. 26)
The answer to this question requires that we establish some basic theoretical
principles:
The under these principles, the key policy necessity is to have sustainable
accounting rules that:
The basic systems unit of economics should be the sector. Sectors can be
nested with regional metasystems (e.g. metropolitan bioregion, national
economy, etc.) Important sectors include: agriculture, health care, education and
culture, manufacturing, natural resource management, recreation and
entertainment, transportation, public safety. Each of these sectors is an ecology
that operates according to distinctive system dynamics that deserve intelligently
designed accounting systems. The role of the banking system should be both to
recognize these distinctive ecologies and to design metasystems that coordinate
exchange, savings and investment among these ecologies. The following tables
off two templates for assessing the economic issues in sectors:
Since the primary area of growth will be the productivity of service workers,
the highest rate of return will be on regional currency and Kelso accounting
system investments.
Since one consequence of increased productivity (one measure of growth)
should be additional leisure, that leisure can be taxed using a Time Banking
accounting system.
Foreign investors bringing technology could lease rather than sell, thus
maintaining an ongoing stake in the growth to be realized. The growth
potential in the technology area offers modest returns on potentially huge
markets for whoever gets there first, since a working system would be
globally marketable.
The initial foreign investors bringing expertise will be creating beta sites
that will, at least in the early stage, have substantial growth potential for
educational and eco-tourism.
The logical region for a pilot project in Sonoma County is the metropolitan
bioregion of Sebastopol, which consists mainly of the city and the west county
supervisorial district, exclusive of the parts in the Santa Rosa Metropolitan area.
This aret already has much of the social and political infrastructure needed, and it
is small enough to be modeled in a reasonable time frame .
Exchange
Many of the activities of government and the non-profit sector involve both
market and commons components, for example public transportation and higher
education. In these areas, user charges in C$Ds combined with tax and
philanthropic support make sense. Time Credit taxation(along with the authority
of local jurisdictions to implement progressive dollar taxation) can come later.
A few days ago, I ran into one of my favorite economics PhD students at my
favorite Coffee Shoppe. When I first started meeting the economics PhD students
here at Michigan (through the first-year econometrics sequence), I was surprised
by how… normal they all seemed. They were interested in economics, but they
were not “market fundamentalists” or die-hard Hayekian libertarians. For
example, they by-and-large seemed to agree that development economics had
failed the poorer parts of the world over the last few decades, in part due to its
own hubris. We didn’t agree on everything, but we had a lot of common ground. I
began to wonder if the arrogant, imperialist economist was a myth, at least
among Michigan students (who tend to focus on labor and development, and less
so on micro-theory, for example).
Then I met this particular grad student – call her L. The first time I had a
conversation with her came during a discussion of precisely the role of economics
in development. Before class one day, she was arguing with another student that
it was important for economists not to know too much about the countries they
were working in – that it would be at best worthless and at worst outright
harmful. The job of the economist was to bring the Theory and let local experts
worry about the quirky details of the specific place. I wish I’d had a tape recorder!
When I ran into L this past week, though, our conversation was not about
development but rather the role of unobservables in theoretical and empirical
work. She was reading about factor analysis, and asked me what I thought about
it, and I replied something cheeky about economics being a shockingly
postmodern discipline* in that they were quite comfortable analyzing the world
in terms of, and coming up with measures of, unobservable quantities (the classic
example is apparently “effort” in labor studies). Sociology is not free of this habit
– and I’m not particularly opposed to it – but I think it’s interesting how crucial
unobservable concepts are to economic theory and yet how ruthlessly positivist
the rhetoric surrounding economic knowledge can be. Leave “culture” to the
lesser mortals, we economists deal with cold, hard rational money and resources.
I’m exaggerating, of course, but I think there might be a significant grain of truth
there.
In an excellent paper in a similar vein, Espeland and Hirsch (1990) give numerous
examples of the kinds of manipulations possible of accounting profits that, they
argue, made possible the conglomerates of the 1960s. Especially popular tricks
allowed firms to count the earnings of acquired firms retroactively, thus
increasing the apparent profitability of the firm post-merger (I don’t want to
butcher the details, go look at the paper if you are curious). I’m not so interested
in overt frauds – a la Enron – as the general problem of needing to make choices
to end up with a balance sheet that lists a certain amount of profit. Even well-
intentioned accountants not trying to defraud anyone, following generally
accepted practices, make choices that in turn define the observed (accounting)
profits. And on the basis of those observed figures, business decisions are made
(by investors, executives, etc.).
So, where does this all get us? I’m not entirely sure, but I’m enjoying thinking
through these issues – how do you study decision-making? Is it reasonable to say
that (economic) sociology has focused more on the kinds of tools available to the
people making decisions while economics has focused narrowly on more abstract,
and unobservable, constructs?
Postmodern economics
I was chatting to an arts graduate friend recently and I threw in the phrase
“postmodern economics” and how I thought it was an important thing to
understand. This phrase provoked an amused laugh, with my friend denying that
such a thing was even possible. I didn’t follow up on this one too much, as
economics tends to scare artsy-type folk. (Though Complicates have shown that
you can even present high level maths to an arts audience and if done right,
they'll swallow it.)
So it was interesting to come across this rather fantastic New Yorker article which
manages to also talk about postmodern economics, and has a good stab at
applying Jacques Derrida to high finance. It’s great stuff for all you postmodern
economics types (ie all of you!).
Meanwhile, the New York Times takes a less theoretical (but just as postmodern)
take on mechanics and economics. It echoes some of my own ideas, which one
day I'd love to write about in more detail. In a nutshell, my theory is the credit
crunch explodes the modernist over-reliance on numbers and rigid models, so
opening the way for a postmodernist analysis to emerge. In this, Table and Kay
are already working out some patterns.
I think of economics as the one true modernist social science. Our reliance on
mathematics and mathematical models introduced a statistical and theoretical
rigor that distinguishes economics from the other social sciences. It has also
tended separate the discipline from its 18th century roots in moral philosophy and
it has reinforced our conceit that economics is more like physics than it is like
psychology or sociology.
These are not necessarily bad things. They have provided economics with what I
think is a better developed (than other social sciences, not than physics)
theoretical framework from which empirical analyses can be conducted. It has
resulted in mathematical and statistical rigor that should be the envy of all other
social sciences. However, it has also produced a remarkable uniformity of
perspective, opinion, and belief among the members of the tribe. In the last, it
has come to resemble a religion rather than a science, at least for some.
Had it not been for the recent crises in mortgage and financial markets, most of
the high priests and priestesses of our arcane religion would still be worshipping
at the alters of rational expectations, efficient markets, and Pareto efficient
equilibria; allowing a morbid fear of free-riders and moral hazard to dominate any
attempts to address social issues rationally; and chanting the mantra that
rational, fully-informed self-interest would save the day (even in situations where
information was highly asymmetrical with little hope of remedy).
Economics has been brought down by animal spirits, fat tails, and insularity.
I believe there are several things that will haul us back from the brink of
irrelevance and set us on the track to true science. The one I want to write about
today is economics becoming a legitimate social science instead of a branch of
mathematics. Deirdre McCloskey has written extensively about this. She and
Steve Ziliak have been fighting a two-person war to move the discipline to a more
enlightened approach to statistical inference for years.
I believe it’s time to refocus attention and discussion on the error term. It is often
where much of the action is in our models. It is where unexpectedly catastrophic
events dwell resulting in fat tails. It is where our animal spirits manifest and cause
us to do the right thing or the wrong thing or the thing everyone else is doing
rather than the self-interested, fully-informed rational thing. It is where God and
miracles and chance dwell.
The error term is the unexplained residual. Often it contains 70-90% of the
model’s variation. It may be reassuring to find that price and income matter and
have the expected signs, but if the explanatory power of the model is low, there is
almost certainly more we need to know before we can legitimately call ourselves
scientists.
What does this mean? Null-hypothesis statistical testing still has value, but its
value should be in supplementing a well-researched narrative. P-values and
arbitrary cut-points for statistical significance should be recognized for what they
are: tools for inference that must be placed in context and tempered by what else
is known about the relationships. They are not hard and fast rules that “prove”
anything. Observational data are “observed.” This means we have to “observe”
more than the variables in the model and the supposed instrument. We must
observe context, political, economic, social, and any other even when we can’t
include them adequately in the model. We should question the “independent,
identically distributed” assumption always. It is clear that independence was
highly questionable in finance and mortgage markets. Surely, there are other
examples. Finally, there are always omitted variables. In every model. They are in
the error term. They should not be ignored even if they are believed to be
uncorrelated with regressors. They may well be correlated across individuals.
The error term is and has always been where most of the interesting “action” is.
Economic research must return to rhetoric and rhetorical discourse derived from
extensive research and supplemented by a sounder approach to statistical
inference in order to investigate it. Deirdre McCloskey has said something like this
before me.
Is it a girl thing?
POSTMODERN CONSUMPTION: ARCHITECTURE, ART, AND CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT -
1. INTRODUCTION
'It is the emptiness that fascinates me. People collect altars, statues, paintings,
chairs, carpets, and books, and then comes a time of joyful relief and they throw
it all out like so much refuse from yesterday's dinner table'
The concept of postmodernism was first used by the Spanish author Federico de
Onis in 1934 and then by Arnold Toynbee in his A Study of History, written in 1938
and published after the war in 1947. For Toynbee postmodernism was a new
historical cycle with the end of western dominance, the decline of individualism,
capitalism, and Christianity, and the rise of power of non-western cultures. He
and his contemporaries were negative about this development. They criticised the
lack of a new style and ideology, and the return of former styles and traditions in
an eclectic manner.
Alvin Toffler (1980) was one of the first to popularise three waves or periods in
the history of civilization: the agricultural, industrial, and informational revolution.
We are now on the edge of the third wave with its demassification or
fragmentation of production, media, styles, ideologies, and even societies.
In 1956 for the first time in the USA the number of white collar workers
outnumbered blue collar workers, and by the late seventies America had made
the shift to an information society with relatively few people (13 percent)
involved in the manufacture of goods. Most workers (60 percent) are engaged in
the 'manufacture' of information. Whereas a modern, industrialised society
depends on the mass-production of objects in a factory, the postmodern society,
to exaggerate the contrast, depends on the segmented production of ideas and
images in an office.
The transition from the modern to the postmodern period was and is not without
turbulence. During the second part of the sixties student revolts and protest, such
as in Paris in May 1968 and in other cities, were a sign of a 'cultural shift' from
materialistic to postmaterialistic values (Inglehart, 1977, 1989). Materialistic
values of the older generation emphasize the possession of material goods, law
and order, authority, a strong defense, and the fight against criminality.
Postmaterialistic values of the younger generation are related to freedom of
speech, self-expression, experiences, tolerance, and harmony. Postmaterialistic
values fit well into the postmodern world of pluralism and tolerance. The
transition from modernism to postmodernism is a gradual one: For some persons
and in some domain this shift is more prominent than for other segments and
domains. The year 1960 is thus only an indication of the time of this transition.
First, the dominant ideologies of the modern era will be discussed with emphasis
on their relevance to postmodernism. Then, some general characteristics of the
postmodern era will be discussed especially in architecture and art. We will apply
these characteristics to consumption in a later section of this paper.
3. IDEOLOGIES
In the course of history, kings, warlords, priests, and other authorities reigned
over ordinary people. This was accepted during the pre-modern and modern eras
as a 'natural rule' in society. During the modern era, this natural rule became to
be criticised by ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, communism, anarchism,
fascism, and feminism. Except for communism and fascism, these ideologies will
be briefly discussed (Van Gennep, 1990).
Liberalism is the ideology of the free citizens, the bourgeoisie that gained power
from the nobelty and the state. The emancipation of the citizens started during
the renaissance. Liberalism is the ideology of the American revolution (1775).
Freedom, equality, and brotherhood is the credo of the French revolution (1789).
Rationalism, tolerance, abolition of slavery, constitutional government, and an
economic 'laissez faire' are the keywords. The economists Adam Smith and David
Ricardo advocated the 'invisible hand' of competition. The laws of supply and
demand will create the equilibrium of optimal benefits for both parties. Although
the abstract principles of liberalism were favorable for society, during the second
part of the nineteenth centery, liberalism degenerated into extreme capitalism
with the negative consequences for the workers. The liberal notions of freedom,
tolerance and equality of men are kept in the postmodern period.
The works of Charles Dickens, 'Les MisTrables' of Victor Hugo, and 'Das Kapital' of
Karl Marx described the conditions of the poor working class. Socialism became
the ideology of the working class, against the oppression of the capitalists. The
Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels (1848) gave a theoretical foundation to
socialism and communism. It stated the necessity of the class struggle and
revolution. The realization of socialism and elimination of private property in
Eastern Europe brought bureaucracy, stagnation, corruption, and an oppressive
state power (Stalin). In the Western democracies it created basic social security
for the unemployed, disabled, and retired workers. In the postmodern era,
socialism tend to elicit the guilt feeling and responsibility for the poor and the
handicapped, ven for those who do not follow the socialist ideology.
Anarchism originated during the French revolution. It is opposed to hierarchy and
institutionalization. The anarchists advocate 'workers' councils' and 'sovjets' as
governing principles. Except for the Commune of Paris (1871), the Council
Republic of Munich (1919), and the Spartacus Revolt (1914-1919), anarchism did
not materialise in actually functioning governments. Proudhon and Bakoenin
were the main anarchist philosophers. From Proudhon is the famous statement:
'Property is theft.' Postmodernism inherited some anarchist ideas such as
independence and an anti-authoritarian attitude.
To some extent, these ideologies seem to have become outdated. Some elements
are kept, such as the emphasis in the feministic and liberal ideologies on
individual and non-sexist responsibilities. Some authors claim the 'end of history'
in postmodern times and state that a dominant liberal-democratic model has
become the dominant model in Western societies. Most fascist and communist
totalitarian states collapsed and a liberal form of capitalism survived. If these
liberal democracies guarantee human rights, dignity, freedom, a certain equality,
a satisfactory consumption level and avoid military wars (but allow economic
wars), the stable situation of the 'end of history' has been reached (Fukuyama,
1992). The train does not continue any more. Let's enjoy civilization as it is. We
cannot expect significant changes in the future.
The end of ideology does not mean the end of styles. On the contrary, the
ideological freedom creates a large variety of styles and genres. First, postmodern
developments in architecture and art will be discussed. Similar developments in
literature and music will not be discussed, in order not to make this paper too
long. Then, I will try to describe the postmodern impact on advertising and
consumer behavior, as relevant for marketing and consumer policy.
4. POSTMODERNISM IN ARCHITECTURE
Modernist architectural styles are characterized by their ideology. They have a
massage to the world. The dominant idea might be minimalism, functionalism,
aestheticism, constructivism, or even elitism or dogmatism. Often, a technical
solution is given to social problems. 'Garden cities,' such as the Bijlmer in South-
East Amsterdam, are designed to separate pedestrians from car traffic, and to
create a park environment around immense apartment buildings. Modernist
architects, such as Le Corbusier, were popular in the communist countries and
were imitated by Soviet architects. Le Corbusier's largest building is the
Tsentrosojuz building, the Central Union of Consumer Cooperations at Moscow,
built in 1936. The Soviet architect Nikolaj Kuzmin, for instance, had explicit ideas
about the 'new man.' The population should be divided into age categories, and
men, women and children should be housed separately. No family life was
planned. Private rooms were not planned either; six people of the same sex living
in communities slept in sleeping rooms and met in recreation rooms. At ten in the
evening, lights would be turned off and at six in the morning, people awake to
have their communal breakfast and to go to their factory or office work. Kuzmin
even planned how many minutes were needed for exercise, shower, breakfast,
etc. The communist paradise was obviously very similar to jail. Modernist
architects were the 'executives' of the socialist ideology. Modernist style fits very
well in the collectivization and urbanization approaches, reducing the differences
between the city and the countryside, until recently employed in Ceaucescu's
Romania.
A specific style, such as De Stijl or Bauhaus, dictates their followers in their design
and restricts their freedom of designs. Pure aestheticism is a 'l'art pour l'art' in
architecture. The International Style of concrete, glass and steel is the dominating
style of the late modernism. This is still a popular style, e.g., the Nationale
Nederlanden and Unilever headquarters close to the Rotterdam Central Railway
Station. It is a rather alienating for those who live and work in these buildings.
Double coding means establishing links of the present with the past, of new
techniques with old patterns, of the elite with the popular. It has always been the
task of architecture to fit new buildings into old structures and thus relating the
present with the past. Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown integrated
Franklin's house at Philadelphia with other buildings and 'ghosted' this house in a
stainless steel construction on Franklin Square.
The architecture of buildings we live and work in, are part of our daily
consumption. We partly adapt our behavior to the built environment. The built
environment facilitates or inhibits well-being and behavioral expressions. The
head office of NMB bank in Amsterdam is a good example. It is a very varied and
complicated building with unexpected corners, windows, and see-throughs.
People who work there are enthousiastic. The apartment building of architect
Friedensreich Hundertwasser in Vienna may be mentioned. All appartments are
different from the outside (and certainly from the inside too). The windows have
different sizes and do not show a regular pattern. The masonry varies showing
different patterns. Ceramic tiles are used for decoration, especially of the pillars
and chimneys. Trees grow on the roofs.
Postmodernism started as a set of plural departures from modernism. Essential
are the pluralism in philosophy and style and a dialectical or critical relation to
pre-existing ideology. There is no single postmodern style in architecture,
although there is a dominating classicism. Jencks (1980) distinguishes six basic
traditions in postmodern architecture.
5. POSTMODERNISM IN ART
Many of the points made for architecture, could be made for art as well. The
modern painter Pablo Picasso became history, inspiring admiration like
Rembrandt but no opposition any more. The linear style of the painter Mondriaan
is still admired, but history as well. Since 1960, a number of departures from
modernism are named: pop art, hyperrealism, photo realism, allegorical and
political realism, new image painting, 'La Transavanguardia,' 'die neue Wilde' (the
New Savages), and neo-expressionism. The international media and the art
market exerted a pressure to produce new labels and schools. Pop artists in the
sixties, such as Andy Warhol, claimed that they were lending respectability to the
images they borrowed from mass culture through an artistic revision (Honnef,
1988). There remains a distinction between art and mass culture, but a painted
Campbell soup tin or Coca Cola bottles became works of art. Traditional art used
images from the past, from religion, the ancient Greeks, and from nature.
Avantgardism still maintained these values to some extent. Transavantgardism,
originating in Italy, found elements of mass culture suitable means to express
their emotions.
Postmodern art shows an unrestrained use of colour, forms, shapes and styles, a
wealth of imagination, and a carelessness towards orthodox artistic conformity.
Elements of 'higher art' are freely intermingled with lesser forms of art. It gives
the impression of a stylistic hotchpotch, a artistic supermarket, a collage or
pastiche. Playfulness exists with cynism. Attitudes range from irony to sarcasm.
'Lack of respect toward any convention' may be the best way of describing the
attitude of transavantgarde artists.
6. POSTMODERNISM IN CONSUMPTION
Although architecture, art, literature, and music are 'consumed' by people, and
are thus examples of consumer behavior, we will now turn to the consumption of
other products and services in the marketplace.
The main characteristics of the postmodern wave according to Toffler (1970) are:
demassification, fragmentation, individualization, and an increasing speed of
change. Firat (1992) discerns five categories of the postmodern condition:
hyperreality, fragmentation, reversal of production and consumption, decentering
of the subject, and paradoxical juxtapositions of opposites. Some of Firat's
categories will be followed but given a somewhat different meaning and some
new categories will be added. It is obvious that these characteristics of
postmodernity are an attempt to chart the recent cultural developments. Others
may observe other trends or evaluate these trends differently. A postmodern
attitude of pluralism and tolerance is really needed here.
The major causes of postmodern change are social and technical. As social
changes may be mentioned: individualization, fragmentation, and paradoxical
juxtapositions. As technical changes will be discussed: hyperreality, complexity,
and value realization.
Social change
POSTMODERN CONDITIONS
Technical change
Finally, the emphasis shifts from the technical production to the usage of goods.
Not until consumers use products they acquire the meanings and values of them.
Postmodernists call this the reversal of production and consumption (Firat, 1992).
The impressive or expressive values are not produced with the purchase but with
the consumption of the product. Toffler (1970) states that production and
consumption coincide: prosumption. Value is produced only when consumers add
effort to the products they bought, just as a dinner at home is only produced with
the purchased ingredients and the time, effort and skills of the consumer.
7. FRAGMENTATION
The grand religious and political values and narratives lost their credibility.
Authorities connected to these narratives lost their authority as well. The
postmodern era is the time of secularization, scepticism and irony,
disenchantment (as Max Weber called this) and a plurality of beliefs.
As the single ideology lost its dominance, so did the single lifestyle. Consumers
adopt a certain lifestyle depending on the product domain (Van Raaij and
Verhallen, 1992). Some authors even go further and state that consumers live by
the moment, by their state-of-mind and mood, and should be segmented
according to their momentary state ('market sentimentation').
In fact, postmodernism allows almost all styles. No central authority dictates the
style for the next season. No Parisian haute couture, but a variety of designers in
London, Milan, New York, Paris and Tokyo propose their designs. Especially
subcultures have an important impact on new and old trends. Fashion specialists
have a hard time explaining which is the dominant style and which will be the
dominant styles for the next season. Sometimes this is explained as a 'fin de
siFcle' phenomenon, with the expectation that a new dominant style will develop
during the next century. Pluralism will, however, not be temporary but is a
permanenet characteristic of postmodernism.
The transition is from few styles to many genres. Not long ago, only one or two
styles were dominant at a time. Either you were for Gothic revival or a hopeless
pagan. Fashions, moral arguments, and conventions forced you in one camp or
another. Scepticism replaced dogmatism. The velocity of change is now much
faster. Almost any style can be revived. Eclecticism is the buzzword.
Superabundant choice and widespread pluralism force us to reassert a freedom of
choice and comparative judgment. Combinations and oppositions create new
alternative genres.
Disjointed experiences
Segmented production
In the modern era, mass production meant an endless repetition of the same
products. Economies of scale are reached by producing more of the same. In the
postmodern era, mass-production is not necessarily producing more of the same,
but more of different varieties and 'personalized versions' of a product. A Ford
Sierra has now so many varieties in colors, accessories, engine types that one will
seldom see two identical cars. The system can even be reversed: the buying
decision comes before the production. Rather than producing and stocking a large
variety of automobiles, customers may compose their own car (with engine types,
accessories, colours, and interiors) on a computer screen, and then order it as
they like it. It will then be mass-produced upon customer's specification.
Similarly, a variety of print media, radio and television stations cater to the
different 'taste cultures' (a term coined by the sociologist Herbert Gans).
Products become isolated from their contexts and even from their original
functions. Consumers, however, may attribute values and meanings to them
independently of their original functions. This may may go as far as 'sacralization'
of products, such as collectors' items, dolls, automobiles, antiques, and 'cult
items' (Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry, 1989). Marketing practice is to glorify
products and brands, and to represent them as independent representations of
images. The 'Just do it!' ad for Nike shoes promotes liberation from traditional
patterns. The brand is the image and the product user is the hero. Benetton
became famous, and for some others notorious, for its anti-traditional and anti-
racist advertising, promoting world harmony and tolerance. Benetton advertising
became more and more detached from its clothing products.
Traditional values and norms are based on principles about society and men's
relation to God. Postmodern values are less or non-principled. The new values
seem to be: irreverence, nonconformity, noncommitment, detachment,
difference, pragmatism, eclecticism, and tolerance.
Segmented media
Mass media are products of the modern era. Newspapers, magazines, and
television channels are losing their large audiences. In 1973 U.S. newspapers
reached their peak with a circulation of 63 million copies daily. Since then, the
newspapers are gradually losing their readership, not only to television, but also
to local and specialised dailies and weeklies. Newspapers with a political ideology
are most severely hit. Major general interest magazines, Life, Look, and Saturday
Evening Post, each went to its grave, and returned later in a more segmented
version (Toffler, 1980).
But the media are not perfectly segmented. We receive a diversity of often
contradictory information. An exhaustive synthesis seems to be untenable. At
best we receive 'video clips' of shattered information. Rather than receiving
organised strings of information, we receive short, modular 'blips': ads,
commands, theories, opinions, news flashes, that not easily fall in pre-set
categories and schemas. The postmodern man digests a 90-second news clip with
a 30-second commercial, a headline, a cartoon, part of a song (Toffler, 1980, p.
166), and it is up to the receiver to make sense out of this, to connect and to
categorise this overload of fragmented information. Journalists and advertisers
alike have to attract the attention of consumers by providing 'exciting' and
'senzational' stimulation in a clutter of others with similar stimulation. Madonna
is a good example. She provokes, elicits protests, gets admiration, but remains a
postmodern goddess with a detached attitude. In her film 'Truth or Dare' she
says: 'I do not endorse any lifestyle, I only describe one.'
8. HYPERREALITY
The reality thus created is 'hyper,' because it is beyond what is the utilitarian and
economic reality in modern times. It is a psychological and social reality for the
brand users who feel this reality, communicate it to others through their usage
behavior, and are judged by others in terms of this reality. Advertising is a
powerful tool to add hyperreality to mundane products and brands. Advertising
becomes part of the hyperreality. Advertising may be even influence the
experience of brand usage. Through advertising After Eight acquired the
hyperreality of a 'upper-class' mint chocolate. People may even judge the quality
of After Eight higher than other mint chocolates, although there may be no
objective product differences.
Postmodernists often mention show business, Las Vegas, the IMAX theater,
Disneyland or EuroDisney and other phantasy and magic worlds as examples of
hyperreality. Many vacation and recreation parks possess hyperrealistic elements
and non-authentic attractions, e.g., the 'tropical swimming park' with palm trees
while it is freezing outside. The spectacle and the spectacular often are hyperreal.
'Escape' magazines, such as Playboy, and movies, such as James Bond, produce a
hyperreality for their watchers and readers. Numbers of tourists visit the IMAX
theater as they visit the Grand Canyon to 'really experience the Canyon.' Cities
renovate the wharf and city center as images of the past. The 'Boston tea party' is
almost daily simulated for tourists. Sound and light shows conjure up the past and
create a hyperreality. In these examples a 'virtual reality' is created or enhanced
with help of media and theater, in order to provide the desired experiences to the
audience. Computer simulation such as Cyberspace creates a virtual reality of
buildings and scenery that may be used by architects and town planners to 'walk'
through a not yet created built environment. Flight simulators are just a first step
into cyberspace. The futuristic idea in the movie 'Total Recall' may become true. A
travel agency delivers a dream tour, realized in cyberspace without transporting
the tourist over long distances. Media experiences compete with real
experiences.
In the near future, it may be expected that 'virtual reality' will become a new and
exciting product/service. Through computer simulation, virtual realities may be
created for the visual, auditory and even kinesthetic senses. How does it feel to
fly at sound speed or to raft on a wild river? People no longer have to travel to
distant sightseeing objects, but may experience being at the Chinese wall or
Amazone river, actually being at their local 'Omniversum.'
Although hyperreality may have started as a 'rich and thick' meaning structure,
the meaning may have become detached from the object ('free floating' as
semioticians would say) and become only 'surface without substance.'
Implications of hyperreality are thus: lack of context and loss of history.
Hyperreality may thus become a set of disjointed experiences. Examples are seen
on television: news flashes, videoclips, superimposed images, animations, and 10-
seconds commercials create a visual image, pastiche and collage. Younger
generations are more accustomed to television and movies than to print media,
and thus more to visual rather than to textual information processing. The print
media have become more pictorial and thus visual. Through media sponsorship
and the merging of the editorial and advertising content of media brand names
become an important part of this collage. Voyeuristic exposure to the spectacle
seems to have become the cultural passtime. The duality of the appearance
(surface) and the essence (substance) is largely dead in postmodernity. The
surface is the essence and the medium is the massage (McLuhan, 1964).
9. VALUE REALIZATION
In modern times, the image represents the product. But value is no longer a
property of the product, but a property of the image. The product represents the
image and the image is the reason of the consumer to buy and to use the product.
Toffler (1980) predicts the rise of the prosumer, a combination of producer and
consumer. This is not a new phenomenon, because almost all services and
products require an active input and participation of the consumer to enjoy the
benefits. What is a restaurant dinner without the good humour and positive
participation of the customers? The benefits of a novel are only enjoyed by
reading it. A dinner at home requires ingredients from the marketplace and a lot
of household production of preparing and cooking to obtain the pleasure of the
meal. Do-it-yourself home maintenance, medical self-care, and 'distance
education' are prosumptive activities on the increase.
In traditional rhetoric, the subject is the agent that acts through objects and
situations to produce certain benefits and value realizations. Knowledge and
independent behavior is possible through the Cartesian idea of the separation of
mind and body. Persons are able to distance themselves from the experience of
'being' (the state most animals are in) to observe themselves and to develop a
state of 'knowing.' The products of modernity are thus under the control and in
the service of consumers in order to create benefits for themselves. Products are
there to allow the achievement of human goals.
'Being in control' is a major goal of postmodern consumers realising that their hifi
equipment, their fax and washing machines, VCRs, and personal computers, are
often too complex to be mastered completely. Consumers often only use a
limited set of the possible product functions, feel uneasy about the latent options
and happy with at least the functions they actively master.
Postmodern advertising is shocking for some and liberating for others. Ads show a
newborn baby or a dying Aids patient with the United Colors of Benetton. Many
ads show no product at all but attract attention with a bizarre combination of
visuals and impressions. The pastiche of flashes seems to be basically unrelated to
the product or the brand, although the ads may elicit positive senzations and
emotions without an deep meaning.
The modern era was a time of consistency; the postmodern era requires a
kaleidoscopic sensibility and tolerance. The postmodern era brings a taste for
variety, incongruity, heterogeneity, irony, double meaning, and paradox. Daily
newspapers bring us a strange variety of 'news.' Newsstands are overloaded with
special interest magazines. In the films of Federico Fellini, a mad competition of
opposite tastes create hilarious misunderstandings and sadness. Not everyone
likes this kaleidoscope of pluralism. Most people make their choice and restrict
themselves to one or two genres. This loyalism makes the plurality work
coherently. But even if everybody is limited to a few minority taste cultures, there
remains a residual taste for pluralism.
The media become dominated by the 'market.' Editors agree that their articles are
sponsored by advertisers. The newsworthiness of events is determined by the
market. News programs on commercial television, the covers and articles of
magazines are designed to attract audiences and buyers. Voters become buyers
of carefully 'designed' political candidates rather than political programs. The
American presidential elections are built on, often commercial, campaign funds,
advertising, and the 'right' issues at the 'right' time. Poll taking and market
research have very similar functions. The roles of citizen and consumer become
similar and seem to merge. Marketing becomes an imperialistic art and science,
dominating western culture and society at the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992).
The consequences for consumer research and marketing are manifold. In the
liberal-democratic postmodern societies, marketing may play a key role in giving
meaning to life through consumption. Is marketing with its value realization
replacing ideologies and religion? And is this a good thing for mankind? Value
realization through consumption may be practical and utilitarian. In this sense it is
not replacing ideology. Value realization may be hedonic and momentary and is
thus often superficial and ego-centered. Self-marketing is mostly self-centered, as
it is concerned with improving one's own position and welfare among others.
Although marketing may induce people to donate money to 'good causes,' such as
the Red Cross and Greenpeace, by appealing to their guilt feelings, it is certainly
not enough to give 'real' meaning to one's life.
REFERENCES
J. Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, St. Louis, MO:
Telos, 1981.
R.W. Belk, M. Wallendorf and J.F. Sherry, Jr, The sacred and the profane in
consumer behavior: Theodicy on the Odyssey, Journal of Consumer Research, 16,
1989, 1-38.
D. Bell, The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,
New York: The Free Press, 1962, revised edition.
U. Eco, Travels in Hyperreality, San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986
[translation from Italian].
F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: The Free Press,
1992.
E. Goffman, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, Woodstock, NY: The
Overlook Press, 1973.
R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among
Western Publics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
M. Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, London: Faber and Faber, 1990
[1984].
A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1934- (12
volumes).
T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1899.
Page upon page of print has been devoted to the post-modernism. But what
actually is it, and what implications does it have for informal educators? Barry
Burke investigates.
recognise that things never stay the same. Greek philosophers were quite aware
that society changed continuously. Heraclitus maintained that society was in
constant flux, everything was always on the move. You can’t jump in the same
river twice, he maintained. Philosophers and thinkers have, throughout time,
believed that society moved according to immutable and unchanging laws, that
there was a driving force that drove society onward. In modern times we have
looked towards the evolution of society as a progressive one. Humankind, as a
result of the development of rational and scientific thinking, was not only
conquering the world we live in but also looking to the stars.
Modernism
This progressive movement of society is associated with what has been described
as modernity or modernism. It is essentially a historical period in Western culture
and has its origins in the Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century. The
Enlightenment, and the historical period that it brought in, it can be argued, is
characterised by three major features.
These three features were regarded by many as universal values. It was believed
that through these the old ruling classes with their outmoded ideas could be
defeated. Modernity was ‘revolutionary’ and in many respects the French
Revolution of 1789 was the personification of these features. They heralded the
advent of capitalism as a new mode of production and a transformation of the
social order. These basic beliefs provided the basis upon which humanity was to
be able to achieve progress.
Until quite recently, there was a common belief that despite all the trials and
tribulations suffered throughout the world, there was a general movement
towards human emancipation. It was felt that society moved on. There were blips
in this movement, it was not smooth: wars and famines, natural and man-made
disasters took place but these were usually overcome and we all moved on.
However, in the late 1970s, a movement began amongst French intellectuals, that
questioned this view of society as moving onwards and upwards, and that there
was some unseen driving force within society. It rejected any notion that we were
still within the modern era brought in by the Enlightenment, two hundred years
ago. The modern world according to these new thinkers had clearly brought in the
era of industrial capitalism and scientific thinking but it had also brought in the
world of Aushwitz, of the possibility of nuclear war, the horrors of Nazism and
Stalinism, of neo-colonialism, Eurocentrism, racism and Third World hunger. If this
was the legacy of modernism, it wasn’t very pleasant. Had the ideas of the
Enlightenment brought us to this? If it had, they thought, to what extent had it
been justified by grand theories of society? Wasn’t it more appropriate to see
these theories as quite dangerous? They also felt that if modernism had brought
in the type of society loosely described as modern industrial society then surely
we had now gone beyond it? Had we not now entered a new age - the age of
post-modernism?
So what is post-modernism?
Art
Firstly, there is postmodern art - not just painting and sculpture but also
architecture, music, literature, drama etc. It’s main features are a lack of depth
and of meaning. There is a diversity of forms and content. The art critic Suzy
Gablik gave a talk in Los Angeles where she spoke about the
While this may sound strange, you do not have to go to Los Angeles to see what
she was talking about. Throughout the UK, for example, new buildings have been
going up over the last decade or so that seem completely out of keeping with
anything that has gone before. Many of our cities have been ‘rejuvenated’ by
architects who have been given free reign to satisfy their professional fantasies.
London Docklands is a good example here. Take the Docklands Light Railway
through what used to be one of the world’s busiest ports and you will see post-
modern architecture in all its glory. Similarly, adverts and pop videos are good
examples of postmodern art. Using operatic arias to promote football matches,
classical music to persuade us to fly a particular airline, watching Pavarotti in the
Park - there is no longer a distinction between high and popular culture (‘anything
goes with anything, like a game without rules’).
Culturally, the growth and influence of the media whether it is the advertising
industry, television or film has also led to tremendous changes in how people see
the world. Many postmodernists would argue that image is everything, image is
reality. Disneyland, MTV, Macdonalds is real life. Real life is what we see on
television, television becomes real life. Krishan Kumar maintains that
postmodernists see the media in a quite different way to those who regard it as
merely a method of communication.
For them the media today do not so much communicate as construct. In their
sheer scale and ubiquity they are building a new environment for us, one which
demands a new social epistemology and a new form of response. The media have
created a new ‘electronic reality’, suffused with images and symbols, which has
obliterated any sense of an objective reality behind the symbols … In hyperreality
it is no longer possible to distinguish the imaginary from the real …" (Kumar
1997:99).
Philosophy
The second trend within post-modernism is a philosophical one. In the 1970s, the
group of French philosophers, I have already mentioned, mainly on the Left, had
become disillusioned with the heady days of the late 1960s when Western Europe
and the United States were in political turmoil. For a short period in 1968, there
seemed a strong possibility that major political changes could take place
throughout the Western world as a result of action by students, trade unionists,
anti-Vietnam war protesters, liberal Communists and militant Socialists. This was
not to be and in France where the struggle was arguably the most intense, this led
to a waning of the huge influence previously wielded by the large Communist
Party (to which most of these intellectuals owed allegiance). This disillusionment
led to their disengagement with politics and their distrust of grand theories, such
as Marxism, which they felt attempted but failed to explain the reality of social
life and began to form ideas that slotted in to the themes explored by
contemporary artists. Despite their many disagreements, they stressed the
fragmentary and plural character of reality. They denied human thought the
ability to arrive at any objective account of that reality. Any ideology or social
theory that justified human action as a means to progress or order was
condemned as meaningless. The grand social theory or narrative that justified
human activity, whether it was Marxism, liberalism or Fascism is no longer
credible, they argued. There are no universal truths. All they have done in the
past is legitimate the power of those who know and deny power to those who do
not know.
New Times
Thirdly, these two trends, in art and philosophy, seemed to reflect what was going
on in the social world. It was felt by many, particularly on the British Left, that we
were actually living in what they called ‘New Times’. At the heart of these ‘New
Times’ was the shift from the old mass-production Fordist economy to a new,
more flexible, post-Fordist order based on computers, information technology
and robotics. Marxism Today, wrote (in 1988) that our world is being remade.
Mass production, the mass consumer, the big city, big-brother state, the
sprawling housing estate, and the nation-state are in decline: flexibility, diversity,
differentiation, mobility, communication, decentralization and internationalisation
are in the ascendant [my emphasis]. In the process our own identities, our sense
of self, our own subjectivities are being transformed. We are in transition to a
new era. (quoted in Callinicos 1989:4)
Many people accept that we do live in a different kind of society today to that of a
relatively few years ago. However, what type of society is it that we now live in? A
number of theories have already been put forward, some of which you may be
familiar with.
Post-industrial society?
The concept of the post-industrial society is linked with the work of Daniel Bell.
He maintained that there was a progression from traditional society based on
agriculture to industrial society based on modern manufacturing industry and
then to post-industrial society where the emphasis on the production of goods
has been overtaken by the service economy. This post-industrial society,
according to Bell, has meant a change in the social structure so that we now live
in a ‘knowledge society’ run by university-trained professionals and a technical
elite whereas before we lived in an industrial society run by industrialists and
employers. Bell’s analysis of the trend away from the traditional industrial base
typical of Western Europe and North America won a considerable amount of
support but it needs to be looked at with a more critical eye.
In the first place, it was never the case that the majority of the workforce in the
UK were ever involved in manufacturing except for a brief period in the 1950s.
Usually less than half of the working population were in manufacturing. Secondly,
although there has been a shift from manufacturing into the service sector, this
can be accounted for by the increased productivity in the manufacturing sector
(which means that fewer people can produce more goods). The service sector, on
the other hand, is labour-intensive and productivity is relatively poor. This does
not mean that the British economy is becoming post-industrial but it does mean
that fewer people are employed in the manufacturing sector.
Where Bell was also mistaken is when we look at the social consequences of this
change. Bell maintained that the replacement of manufacturing by service
industries would usher in the knowledge society and a vast increase in white-
collar employment. There would be created an elite of technicians, information
experts, computer buffs, systems analysts, financial managers etc. What actually
happened was that as the service sector took on more workers, they included not
only more managers, executives, professionals and administrators but also more
clerical workers who were often low paid and as insecure as any worker in
manufacturing industry. Similarly, with the expansion of supermarkets in the
retail sector, more and more non-clerical workers were employed at fairly low pay
and high levels of insecurity.
Post-Fordist capitalism?
Associated with the journal, Marxism Today, and the writings of Stuart Hall and
others, the post-Fordist thesis argues that contemporary capitalism is
experiencing a shift in its character. Fordism can be seen as a system of mass
production involving the standardization of products; large scale use of dedicated
machinery suitable only for a particular product; and the ‘scientific management’
of labour and assembly line production. The high fixed costs involved required
guaranteed mass markets. As a result you could say that Fordism was
characterised by mass production and mass consumption. This in turn was
encouraged by mass advertising, the protection of national markets and
intervention by the state to ensure that there were no catastrophic falls in
demand.
This actually worked for many years after the Second World War. However at the
end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Fordism, it is argued, collapsed.
In its place, a new variant of capitalism, post-Fordism began to take shape. Just as
Fordism was production-led so post-Fordism is consumer-led. The introduction of
computers has meant that distribution systems have enabled retailers to avoid
overstocking and has allowed mass markets to be split up into the targeting of
specific groups. Targeting specific groups of consumers has meant that design has
become a major selling point. Henry Ford said that when he brought out his first
car, the buyer could have any colour he wanted as long as it was black! Post-
Fordist industry cannot do that. Every major car produced today has a number of
models the consumer can choose from. Commodities are no longer bought simply
for the use value they have, but also for the lifestyle that goes with their design.
Just think of Adidas and Nike advertising. Image is all important in the
postmodern era.
The problem is that it is not at all clear whether post-Fordism actually exists.
There are still mass markets for standardised products. People still want washing
machines, fridges and cars. The technology is not necessarily dedicated to one
specific product but can be reused for different products and although the
workforce has changed, secure and well-paid employment is not necessarily
guaranteed for anyone, not just the low-paid. These are important points that the
post-Fordists have not quite come to terms with.
Disorganised capitalism?
A third theory, I want to examine briefly is that of Scott Lash and John Urry. They
argue in their book, The End of Organised Capitalism, that Western societies are
currently undergoing a transition from ‘organised’ to ‘disorganised’ capitalism.
Organised capitalism - which existed for most of the twentieth century – involved:
Disorganised capitalism, which is how Lash and Urry characterised today’s society,
consists of the disintegration of state regulation, the expansion of world markets
dominated by multinational corporations, the undermining of the nation state,
the growth of manufacturing in the Third World and the decline of manufacturing
in the West. Accompanying this is the growth of a ‘service class’ that undermines
trade unions and the labour movement with the subsequent erosion of class-
based politics. Finally, cultural life becomes more fragmented and pluralistic. All
of this is reflected in the rise of post-modernism.
To me, a lot of what they say makes sense. The disintegration of the role of the
state, particularly in welfare provision; the erosion of trade unionism and the
growth of individualism and consumerism; the globalisation of the market and
manufacturing; the development and growing influence of the multinational
corporation all point to a qualitative change in society.
However, one of the real problems with the concept of post-modernism is that it
is all so vague. Henry Giroux writes about its ‘diffuse influence and contradictory
character’ (Giroux 1997:117). There is no agreed definition so that it is embraced
by both many on the Left and the Right with equal fervour. The emphasis on
flexibility and diversity can be seen as both a positive characteristic and as a
negative one. It is positive in so far as it draws us away from seeking "the Truth".
There is a complete rejection of any grand theories to explain social phenomena.
Iconoclasm is the order of the day. Scepticism replaces certainty. ‘New ideas and
fresh conceptualisations, new discourses such as feminist, post-colonial, gay and
green discourse have been found necessary to help explain the contemporary
condition’ (Usher et al 1997:6). Diverse perspectives are welcomed and difference
is celebrated.
On the other hand, Phil Cohen describes what he terms ‘the post-modernist
overview’ as one "which does not privilege any of the elements in play … but
juggles around trying to keep as many ideas in the air at once as it can’. He warns,
however, that ‘in the wrong hands it can quickly degenerate into collage and
pastiche in which everything is rendered equivalent in the cultural supermarket of
ideas’ (Cohen 1997:390/1). This relativism with everything being rendered
equivalent or anything going with anything sits uncomfortably in a world that can
be quite frightening for those who hanker after an ordered world. Zygmunt
Bauman, one of the foremost writers on post-modernism, sheds some light on its
ability to debunk old established ideas and discredit outdated modes of thinking
when he describes its ‘all-deriding, all-eroding, all dissolving destructiveness’.
post-modernity, according to Bauman ‘does not seek to substitute one truth for
another, one life ideal for another … It braces itself for a life without truths,
standards and ideals’ (Bauman 1992:vii, viii, ix). It is quite easy to see how the rise
of religious fundamentalism, whether Christian, Islamic or Jewish, seems
attractive to some people afraid that their world is being undermined. The rise of
the Right-wing ‘Moral Majority’ in the United States, the hankering after a return
to ‘Victorian values’ in Britain are also examples of how some people have
reacted to their fear of change.
Implications
However, what does this mean for the informal educator? Do we, in our day-to-
day practice, work on the assumption that values are relative? Can we talk about
core values? If difference is celebrated, what about commonality, mutuality and
co-operation? How do we work in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-faith and
pluralist society? Can we talk about informal educators working for ‘the common
good’? Is there such a thing as ‘the common good’?
Certainly, these dilemmas are very real. On the one hand, most of us would
accept that in any decent society we are all dependent on each other, that we do
share many things in common. However, this can appear extremely bland to
those who clearly see themselves to be different. It is very easy to marginalize
people by ignoring differences. We hear talk about the Scottish nation, the
Protestant (or Black) community, the Germans, ‘local youth’ etc. Who decides
who is included in these descriptions and who is excluded? The question of
identity is crucial here.
Take the notions of being black, gay or thin. These are identities that are socially
constructed, and given meaning by our fragmented society. However, we have to
ask ourselves the question why these socially constructed categories are
distinctive and not others. What is so special about skin colour, sexuality or size
that we proclaim them as different? Different to what? By accepting these
differences and, even more importantly, celebrating these differences, are we not
accepting the status quo? He is black, she is gay, they are thin. So what? Are there
no grounds for mutuality and association? Should we not question these
differences rather than celebrate them?
On the other hand, I can see why, within a fragmented and divided society, those
who are regarded as different see those differences as something that should be
accepted and not a reason for discrimination or marginalisation. Why shouldn’t
black people or gays and lesbians take pride in their blackness or sexuality? Why
shouldn’t they organise themselves to counter discriminatory practices in society?
There is a clear difference here in perspectives. Within the realms of youth and
community work, informal educators need to be able to respond and influence
the dialectic between commonality and difference. Too much emphasis in our
practice on commonality can lead us down the road to ignoring the differences
between individuals and the diversity of cultures that abound in our localities and
in our workplaces. Too much emphasis on difference can lead us down the road
to separation, segregation and exclusion.
Welcoming cultural diversity within our changed society does not mean accepting
cultural practices and beliefs without question. It means understanding them in
context whilst at the same time working ‘not for assimilation but for co-operation
on the basis of difference … being in touch with your cultural identity and pre-
judgements, having a sense of agency, and looking to an acceptance of diversity
and a search for that which is held in common’ (Smith 1994:120/1).
Agency
This brings us to the question of human agency. We cab pose the question as to
whether society was an entity outside of individuals that acts upon them or
whether individuals act upon society. We might turn to the problems that
C.Wright Mills highlighted between personal troubles and public issues and the
need to see the relationship between the two. However, postmodernist writers
have tended to move the argument on somewhat. Some of them are distinctively
uneasy about the ability of human beings to affect the world we live in. They see
us as corks being tossed about in a turbulent sea of change, being pushed one
way then another with no ability to affect the direction we want to go in. The
human subject is not inherently free ‘but hedged in on all sides by social
determinations’ (Layder 1994:95). Michel Foucault, for example, argued at one
point that human societies can be seen as places in which forms of knowledge
(discourses) exercise power over us through the way we think and the way we
behave. The individual is no longer the source of meaning, in line with
Enlightenment thinking, but is ‘decentred’. This can be seen as being extremely
pessimistic from a humanistic perspective and is a view of human agency that
poses important questions for informal educators. Foucault did modify his views
somewhat so that he later saw discourses as foci for struggle and resistance.
However, the idea of the individual subject as a creative autonomous being was
certainly something that Foucault rejected. This is clearly at odds with what many
would see as one of the central tenets of informal education – ‘the belief that
people can take hold of their lives, can make changes, that they are not helpless
in the face of structural forces’ (Smith 1994:119).
Conclusion
In this piece we have looked at the changes that have taken place in society over
the last few decades and briefly examined the idea that we have now entered
into a new postmodern era. This new era has been characterised by a rejection of
absolute truths and grand narratives explaining the progressive evolution of
society. At the same time it has brought to the surface a multitude of different
perspectives on society and an appreciation of different cultures. It has
highlighted globalisation on the one hand and localisation on the other, the
celebration of difference and the search for commonality.
Henry Giroux, in analysing some of the central assumptions that govern the
discourses of modernism and post-modernism together with postmodern
feminism, has summed up what these can mean for educators. In doing this, he
did not set up one against the others but tried to see how and where they
converged. He maintained that within these three traditions,
Further reading
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society. Towards a new modernity, London: Sage. Translation
of Beck's 1986 classic. Argues that western industrial society is moving into a
'post-Enlightenment' / post-Fordist phase and that this involves a different
modernity typified by reflexivity. Industrial society is based on the distribution of
goods, while that of a risk society on the distribution of 'bads' or dangers. Part
one is concerned with 'living on the volcano of civization: the contours of the risk
society; part two looks to the individualization of social inequality: life forms and
the demise of tradition; and part three explores reflexive modernization: the
generalization of science and politics.
Berman, M. (1983) All That is Solid Melts into Air. The experience of modernity,
London: Verso. 320 pages. Very influential reading of modernity (changing social
and economic realities) and modernism in art, literature and architecture.
Jameson, F. (1998) The Cultural Turn. Selected readings on the postmodern 1983 -
1998, London: Verso. 128 pages. Good collection of pieces that provide an
introduction to Jameson's pivotal work around post-modernism.
Lash, S. and Friedman, J. (eds.) (1992) Modernity and Identity, Oxford: Blackwell.
379 pages. Useful collection exploring post-modernity as not the 'end of the
subject' but the transformation and creation of new forms of subjectivity. Part
one deals with cosmopolitan narratives; part two with representation and the
transformation of identity; part three with spaces of self and society; and part
four looks to modernity and the voice of the other.
Usher, R., Bryant, I. and Johnston, R. (1997) Adult Education and the Postmodern
Challenge. Learning beyond the limits, London: Routledge. 248 + xvi pages. Follow
up to Adult Education as Theory, Practice and Research, this book focuses on the
changing contexts of adult learning and the need to go 'beyond the limits' of
certain current adult education orthodoxies. Examines adult learning in post-
modernity; citizenship; governmentality and practice; knowledge-power; self and
experience; theory-practice; and research in adult education.
Also mentioned
Cohen, P. (1997) Rethinking the Youth Question: Education, Labour and Cultural
Studies, London: Macmillan.
Hall, S. (1996) ‘The meaning of New Times’ in D. Morley and K-H Chen (eds) Stuart
Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, London: Routledge.
Science likes to imagine that it has vanquished religious approaches to the world,
but it remains vulnerable to religious criticism precisely because it remains
religious in important respects. The idea that truth is singular, rather than
potentially plural, that it is non-arbitrary, and that it is meaningful – all of these
dogmas amount to a survival, in the heart of science, of an essentially religious,
pre-modern, approach to the world. The silly, post-modern-inspired argument
that science, as one more interpretation of the world, stands on equal footing
with religious interpretations, can thus (for different reasons than it imagines: the
pre-modernism that clings to science is anti-science, not its essence) gain a
foothold. To avoid confusion with religion, science needs to shed its vestigial
religiosity and achieve its modernist potential. As Shakespeare knew, reality is “a
tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing” – divine or otherwise: it is not an allegory
for God – pre-modern science gets that right – but neither is it an allegory for
Nature, or Reason or Progress, for Fitness or Complexity or anything else.
Pre-modern Science: Smith and Coase on Smith
Smith’s concept of The Invisible Hand, many have argued, has roots in theology.
And in general it is easy to find passages in Smith that seem to rely on the notion
of a divinely-ordained harmony in the world. In his essay, “Adam Smith’s View of
Man1,” Ronald Coase argues, contra Jacob Viner, that Smith’s views on psychology
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments do not, despite appearances, have theological
underpinnings. Smith, says Coase, in showing “that particular characteristics of
human beings which were in various ways disagreeable were accompanied by
offsetting social benefits2,” did not typically appeal to a divine harmony as an
explanation. I think he makes a persuasive case in this regard. Smith appeals not
to God but to Nature as the well-designing author of our harmonious-despite-
appearances psychology. Coase goes on to say that, in this respect, Smith was
essentially an evolutionist before his time: “In all these cases nature, as Adam
Smith would say, or natural selection, as we would say, has made sure that man
possesses those properties which would secure the propagation of the species.
(emphasis added).3”
Examine this astonishing statement. To vindicate Smith’s scientific credentials,
Coase assimilates a patent providentialism to modern science! What is the
difference that makes a difference between an evolutionist providentialism and a
divine one? And yet, of course, to this day evolutionary theory is marred by such
providentialism – a thoroughly anti-scientific excrescence. The idea that
evolution promotes the good of the species is more or less gone, thankfully –
though it had a long run. But the idea that evolution promotes the good of the
organism is alive and kicking. The fact that Darwin himself, in his theory of sexual
selection, rejected this more subtle species of providentialism, has not prevented
its remaining intact in biology until fairly recently. But we still have prominent
evolutionists trying to explain the human brain, human art and science, human
morality, by appeal to the survival value of these innovations – and rejecting more
or less out of hand explanations that fail to identify such survival value.
The history of the reception of the theory of sexual selection in biology, recently
well recounted by Geoffrey Miller in his book, The Mating Mind4, is a case study in
the struggle of the pre-modern and the modern in science, and can serve as a
preliminary to a more general discussion of the elements of what I am calling
modernist explanation. This will be followed by an account of the struggles of
modernism in that most pre-modern of sciences, economics, culminating in a
claim that the real scandal that Keynes’ work represented for the discipline was
its modernism.
Sexual selection, especially the idea of runaway sexual selection developed by H.
A. Fisher in 19305, makes clear in a startling way that adaptive traits may hinder
the organism’s chances of survival. The peacock’s tail, famously, reduces the
peacock’s chances of survival but increases the chances that its genes will spread
by making it more attractive to mates. A providentialist may still take solace in the
thought that the female preference for long tails remains unexplained, but here is
where, in its runaway version, sexual selection becomes strikingly modern, in my
terms: the female preference for long tails, so the theory goes, can be self-
justifying. If enough females have a bias toward longer tails in mates, the
preference for longer tails will be adaptive, by leading to offspring with longer
tails who will be preferred as mates! Certain conceptions of science, those I am
calling pre-modern, find this sort of theory prima facie absurd. It opens the door,
patently, to arbitrariness and indeterminacy and unpredictability: why not short
tales? The ground starts to slip out from under the explanation: how can a
“scientific” explanation make something, in effect, its own cause? And
providentialism is obviously shaken to its roots by this sort of thinking, Miller
summarizes the reaction to Fisher of the famous biologist Julian Huxley: “He
defined evolutionary progress as ‘improvement in efficiency of living’ and
‘increased control over and independence of the environment’. Since sexual
ornaments had high costs that undermined survival chances and did not help an
animal cope with a hostile environment, Huxley viewed them as anti-progressive,
degenerate indulgences6.” Huxley was not unique: sexual selection, which Darwin
regarded as equally as important as natural selection, did not enter the
mainstream of biological thinking until more than 100 years after Darwin wrote –
until the 1980's.
The Modern
The modernism I want to discuss finds its proper antonym not in the post-
modern but in the pre-modern or traditional. The sense I intend is most
adequately delineated in Marshall Berman's All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The
Experience of Modernity7, an enormous and sui generis piece of scholarship. The
hallmarks of modernism I want to focus on are, first, the subsumption of ends by
means, and, second, closely related, the ubiquity of self-reference. An example
will clarify. How does modern art differ from pre-modern art? One important
way, surely is that for a good deal of the former, art is not the transparent means
to an end outside itself, mimesis or representation, but instead becomes its own
subject--art about art, art for its own sake, etc. So art, traditionally the means of
representing the world, now seeks to represent its own activity--the end has been
subsumed by the means in some sense--and self-reference, with its associated
paradoxes invariably moves center stage. An associated idea is that of bootstrap
phenomena. Bootstraps, as in "pulling oneself up by one's own" are self-
generated or self-caused phenomena. Modern thinking spurns foundations: think
of Sartre's notion that man's essence is to have no essence, to be condemned to
be free and forced to create his own meaning, willy-nilly. The absence of external
foundations, theological or otherwise, makes modernity both exhilarating and
terrifying. It would fill reams and reams of paper to do justice to all the ways in
which the theme of means become ends, and the associated themes of self-
reference and bootstrapping, are played out in area after area of modern thought
and thought about the modern.
I don't intend these three elements to capture the richness of Berman's
argument, but I believe they are central to modernism in the sense he uses it,
although in no way exhaustive of that sense. Summing up his argument, he
writes:
To be modern . . . is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to
find one's world and oneself in perpetual disintegration and renewal.
Nor is it necessary that anyone should keep his simple faith in the
conventional basis of valuation having any genuine long-term validity. For
it is so to speak a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical Chairs--a pastime
in which he is victor who says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who
passes the Old Maid to his neighbor before the game is over, who secures a
chair for himself before the music stops. These games can be played with
zest and enjoyment, though all the players know that it is the Old Maid
which is circulating, or that when the music stops some of the players will
find themselves unseated.14
In contemporary terms, Keynes is talking in this passage about "rational
bubbles".15 They are rational because there is no assumption of stupidity on the
part of purchasers of the bubbled asset, stupidity that a canny professional might
profit from--and by doing so burst the bubble. The bubbled asset provides a
normal return in expectation, with the bubble itself growing at the rate of return,
and therefore passes a no-arbitrage or efficient markets test, no matter how
wildly divergent from fundamentals its price becomes, and is destined
increasingly to become.
Only an infinitely-lived agent could undo, via arbitrage, a bubble on an infinitely-
lived asset, which fact puts Keynes' reminder that "in the long run we're all dead"
in a whole new light! It is somewhat ironic that the development of rational
expectations, a development that in its early stages was used as a battering ram
against Keynesian economics, enables us to understand the bootstraps and
bubbles of Chapter 12 Keynes with much greater depth and clarity than we could
before. The determination of the present not by the past but by the unknown
future -- via expectations -- can never be grasped, with all its dramatically
modernist implications for our economic lives, as long as we reduce expectations
about the future, by means of an adaptive expectations scheme, to some
determinate function of the past. Rational expectations -- honestly deployed --
can be a potent generator of modernist outcomes: unfortunately, this is usually
noted, if at all, in the footnotes, where one finds the specious arguments for
ignoring all but the fundamental solutions covered in the main text.
It is important to see that Keynes, despite twinges of pre-modern revulsion which
lead him to propose at one point, half-seriously, that we marry the asset to the
asset-holder for life, to defeat speculation and thus the melting of all that is solid
into air -- ultimately felt that bubbles could not be disposed of so easily: “This is
the inevitable result of investment markets organised with a view to so-called
liquidity.”16
Contemporary thinkers who have carried on and developed Keynes' modernist
views of asset bubbles find the profession scarcely more receptive than it was and
is to Chapter 12. The pre-modernism of the profession lies very deep: Look, for
one example, at the vehemence of the reaction to Robert Shiller's 1981 article on
Stock Market volatility, work directly in the tradition of Chapter 12.17 In a
symposium on bubbles in the Journal of Economic Perspectives of a few years
back, we find one participant arguing quite seriously that the Great Tulip Mania in
17th century Amsterdam--what Sadam Hussein might have called the Mother of
All Bubbles, on previous accounts -- can be parsimoniously explained as a
response to changes in fundamentals!18
But I have argued that modernism is pervasive in Keynes, not a phenomenon
confined to a chapter here or there. Here, I want to suggest that we broaden our
minds about the Keynesian message and remember, above all that his work
stands in two traditions simultaneously, both the mainstream, and the
underground, heretical tradition of underconsumption theorists, numbering
among its members thinkers such as Marx, Hobson, Major Douglas and Malthus19
-- some of whom Keynes explicitly acknowledges as progenitors in his appendices
to the General Theory. The common vision of this latter tradition is the one I have
identified in Marx, of a modern capitalist economy subject to stagnation because
its ability to produce outruns its ability to consume: the modernist possibility of
production for production's sake is here taken very seriously indeed.
Moderns and Pre-Moderns: Keynes, Robertson, and Our Grandchildren
The modernist impulse in Keynes can be observed in the reaction it provoked in
his anti-modernist contemporaries. A small but symptomatic incident provides an
illustration. Keynes' theory of liquidity preference contained the modernist idea
that what determines the interest rate today is speculator's expectations of what
it will be tomorrow. This couldn't be the end of the story, D. H. Robertson20 and
others (Leontief, famously) insisted: Where were the fundamentals of the
process? Robertson's reaction was vehemently anti-modernist:
Thus the rate of interest is what it is because it is expected to become other
than it is; if it is not expected to become other than it is, there is nothing
left to tell us why it is what it is. The organ which secretes it has21been
amputated, and yet it somehow still exists--a grin without a cat.
Robertson is not alone among economists in thinking that to establish the
bootstrap, foundation-less character a theory attributes to an economic
phenomenon is ipso facto to refute that theory. Alice in Wonderland is one
thing; reality cannot have this airy character. If your theory tells you it does, it
must need work. As with under-consumption, I cite this aspect of Keynes as an
instance of his attraction to modernist explanations. I don't mean to condition
my argument on an acceptance of the speculative demand for money any more
than on the acceptance of, say, Alvin Hansen's Keynesian Stagnationism. There
are contemporary theories of the interest rate which inherit from Keynes the
modernist form without the particular content he filled it with.
Keynes himself, like many another great modernist, combines his modernist
description with a deep anti-modernist revulsion at the prima facie absurdity of
the phenomena he is transcribing and, in his weaker moments, with what
amounts to a pious hope for an overcoming of modernism and a return to a pre-
modern golden age where means have been put back in their place as means to
independent ends to which they are transparently related, where bubbles have
burst and social life, as it were, makes sense again. (Berman, by the way finds
some of these same tendencies in the arch-modernist Marx, who seems
sometimes to hold up a vision of socialism as a rest from the ceaseless flux, an
overcoming, indeed, of history, a putting-paid to the ceaseless, permanent
revolution of modern life.)
This modernist/anti-modernist dialectic in Keynes is most apparent in his 1930
essay, "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren"22, where he contrasts the
"purposiveness" of contemporary economic life with its potential overcoming in
the lives of our grandchildren. The former idea represents still another ringing in
Keynes' work of the by now familiar modernist changes. The purposive man, he
says:
is always trying to secure a spurious and delusive immortality for his acts by
pushing his interest in them forward in time. He does not love his cat,
but his cat's kittens; nor, in truth, the kittens but only the kittens' kittens;
and so on forward forever to the end of cat-dom. To him23jam is not jam
unless it is a case of jam tomorrow and never jam today.
But after describing and dissecting this modernist purposiveness--interestingly
named since it seems almost paradigmatically anti-purposive to pre-modern eyes-
-Keynes sounds an almost religious anti-modernism. The purposive era will one
day end ("when science and the power of compound interest " have solved the
economic problem!). And in this future made possible precisely by virtue of the
abundance obtained through centuries of purposiveness:
We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the
useful. We shall honor those who teach us to pluck the day virtuously and
well, the delightful people who are capable of taking direct enjoyment in
things, the lilies of the field, who toil not, neither do they spin.24
But Keynes, unlike the great majority of the economics profession in his day and
our own, did not allow his anti-modern hopes and values -- delusive or not -- to
interfere with his ability to limn the modernist reality in which we live and
breathe. The modernist present is highlighted and set off by the stark contrast
with the imagined anti-modernist future.
Keynes' modernism is, I believe, the most deeply interesting and at the same time
has proven so far the least assimilable dimension of his legacy to the economics
profession.
L’Envoi
Taking the contra-positive formulation of Nietzsche’s famous declaration, if
everything is not permitted, then God is not dead. A determinist science, science
that recoils from arbitrariness and meaninglessness, that doesn’t permit, in
principle, everything, that only counts as explanations the pre-modernist subset –
keeps God alive, and its adherents children.
Notes
From Ron Suskind, "Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush," NY
Times Magazine, Oct. 17, 2004.
'The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based
community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge
from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured
something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's
not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire
now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that
reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities,
which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's
actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."'
I'm not the first person to comment on the PostModernist tendencies of this
Presidency -- see in particular Josh Marshall's 2003 Washington Monthly article,
"The Post-Modern President". However, I think this might be among the first to
systematically dissect the post-modernist aspects of this Administration's
macroeconomic policies. I'll tackle these points in turn.
Do tax cuts increase tax revenues? This topic has recently been in the news, with
Bruce Bartlett's recent op-ed recounting the success of supply side economics,
while disavowing the view that tax revenues would rise in response to a tax rate
decrease (see the debate at Economists View [1], [2], [3], Brad Delong [4], and
Angry Bear [5]). It is nonetheless important to recall that some people -- including
the Vice President -- still believe that the response of tax revenue to decreases in
marginal tax rates is very substantial. This in turn leads to there fervent belief that
dynamic scoring would lead to big changes in how "good" tax cuts would look
from a fiscal perspective. Yet, the CBO's recent analysis of the President's budget
request has a little remarked-upon section (Table 2-1) which examines how CBO's
baseline, and models accounting for supply side effects, would differ from the
OMB forecast.
Table 2-1 from CBO, An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal
Year 2008, March 2008.
What is remarkable is how little the textbook supply side model response, with
high responsiveness to tax changes, differs from the CBO's baseline. The open
economy change is -$496 billion cumulative change (2008-2012), versus the CBO's
standard model estimate of -$507 billion. In other words, it's a cumulative
difference of $11 billion, or roughly $2.2 billion in a projected 2012 economy of
$17.2 trillion (i.e., 0.01% of GDP in 2012).
Some might object, saying these are "just models". Let's look to the surging tax
revenues in FY'06 and FY'07. I'll ignore the declining state tax revenues, and re-
iterate the fact that the surge in revenues is well within the two standard error
bands. In any case, the CBO's estimate of standardized/cyclically adjusted Federal
tax revenues in FY'07 is still 1.4 percentage points of GDP lower than it was in
FY'00.
Figure 1: Standardized Federal government revenues as a proportion of GDP,
fiscal years. Source: CBO, Cyclically Adjusted and Standardized Budget Measures,
February 2007.
By the way, there is even doubt whether tax cuts increase GDP in the long run, a
separate issue from whether tax receipts increase. The answer depends critically
upon how the tax cuts are financed. This is discussed in the Treasury's report,
even though -- as recounted in my post on the subject -- this fact is often omitted
from arguments of the proponents of dynamic scoring.
Is more financial deregulation always better?
Figure 3: Annual growth rate in OFHEO Housing Price Index and in index of
transactions prices. Source: OFHEO March 1st release.
Most economists would agree that when markets are competitive (in the
textbook sense) and information is perfect (so that agents on both sides of the
transaction have the same information set), regulation is usually
counterproductive. However, when information is asymmetric -- so that for
instance lenders and borrowers have access to different information sets
regarding motives, assets and liabilities -- then regulation may be a second best
way of managing what would otherwise be disappearing markets, or situations
where the government is forced to enter in to bail-out systemically important
sectors.
What was the role of the Bush Administration's ideology in this lack of regulatory
fervor? Apparently, it was to some extent important:
Yet even where federal regulators have jurisdiction, they sometimes have been
slow to grapple with the explosive growth in especially risky practices and quick to
shield federally regulated banks from states and private litigants. The underlying
belief, shared by the Bush Administration, is that too much regulation would stifle
credit for low-income families, and that capital markets and well-educated
consumers are the best way to curb unscrupulous lending.
Public disciplinary actions by federal bank regulators are rare. In the past two
years, the FDIC has issued four cease-and-desist orders against subprime lenders
that required the companies to change their practices. The Fed has issued just
one and the OTS none, the FDIC said. The OCC said it has sanctioned one
subprime lender in that time. Federal regulators say they spot and correct
problems quietly during the examination process before they reach the point
where public enforcement action is needed.
Now it would be irresponsible to place the entire blame for the subprime collapse
at the feet of the Bush Administration. Financial innovation -- partly to avoid
regulation -- is a recurring theme in American economic history (see for instance
Mishkin's money & banking textbook). In addition, divided responsibility between
state and Federal authorities is part of the problem. But certainly the
deregulatory zeal could not have been helpful. It is against this backdrop (and the
ongoing discoveries of further financial irregularities in accounting and the
granting of stock options) that I find the current attempt to "reform" Sarbanes-
Oxley puzzling.
Were these financial sector issues restricted in effect to the financial sector, then
my concerns would not have macroeconomic implications. But exactly because
the financial sector plays a central role in allocating capital and monitoring
projects, it's not just another sector. Indeed, as one economist wrote in 1983:
That economist was Ben Bernanke ("Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in
the propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review 73(3)).
Let me lend a personal note to this discussion. As one of the professional staff of
the CEA held over from the Clinton Administration, I had the opportunity to sit in
on some of the meetings of the (staff level) working group of Vice President
Cheney's National Energy Policy Development. While we were admonished to
"think outside the box", one will find absolutely zero mentions of gasoline tax in
that report, as well as the 2006 Economic Report of the President (by the way, this
is why I'm wary of arguments of the sort that assert "the world is different now").
This is true despite the fact that when there are negative externalities, the
standard (neoclassical) economists' response to internalize the externality by way
of taxes. As Jim Hamilton has argued, the way not to go, at least as a first resort, is
via command-and-control means such as CAFE standards. And, to further critique
the Administration's approach to energy policy, it seems foolhardy to subsidize
ethanol production when current oil prices make ethanol production profitable
The impact of the budget deficit on the current account deficit. I've written a lot
on this, so much will be redundant. But it must be said that the White House's
dogged determination that deficits don’t matter is indicative of a general
disregard for empirics. Exhibit one in this regard is internal inconsistencies within
a single chapter of the 2006 Economic Report of the President. As I noted slightly
over a year ago on page 146, it states:
"The interdependence of the global financial system implies that no one country
can reduce its external imbalance through policy action on its own. Instead,
reducing external imbalances requires action by several countries. Specifically, at
least four steps may help to reduce these imbalances."
And yet in Box 6-3 assessing "the link between fiscal and trade deficits", the ERP
authors cite favorably the Fed's estimate of an elasticity between fiscal and trade
deficits of 0.20, directly contradicting the previous statement. I might further
observe that the quote from the 2006 ERP does not jibe with the Treasury's (more
nuanced) Occasional Paper on the topic, entitled The Limits of Fiscal Policy in
Current Account Adjustment. Then the question is how big is the effect; there
reasonable people can differ. My empirical work suggests something between
0.15-0.44. For those skeptical of econometrics, well, between 2000 and 2005,
there was approximately a 4.3 percentage point swing in the Federal budget
balance, and a 2.2 percentage point swing in the current account balance. This
outcome is consistent with a 0.5 coefficient. See also Figure 2 below.
So, confronted with this evidence, will the reign of PoMo Macro be ended? It
should, but there will always be those who will choose ideology over data. For
them, they will continue to construct their own "reality", and so, like in other
dimensions, we have not yet seen the last throes.
1
The History of Political Economy and Post-Modernism
Stavros D. MavroudeasUniversity of MacedoniaDepartment of Economic
Studies156 Egnatia St.P.O.Box 159154006 ThessalonikiGREECEtel.: +30 +31 -
891779fax: +30 +31 - 891750e-mail: smavro@uom.gr
ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
In a similar vein, Wood (1995: 5-6) states that post-modernism studies ‘historic
change without history’:There is no such thing as a social system (e.g. the
capitalist system) with itsown systemic unity and ‘laws of motion’. There are only
many different kindsof power, oppression, identity and ‘discourse’. Not only do
we have to rejectthe old ‘grand narratives’, like Enlightenment concepts of
progress, we haveto give up any idea of intelligible historical process and
causality, and with it,evidently, any idea of ‘making history’. There are no
structured processesaccessible to human knowledge (or, it must be supposed, to
human action).
2
Derrida (1981: 219), following Godel, defines as undecidable ‘a proposition
which,given a set of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor
deductive There are only anarchic, disconnected and inexplicable
Differences . For thefirst time, we have what appears to be a contradiction in
terms: a theory of epochal change based on a denial of history.Callinicos (1985),
taking as criterion their method of theorizing discourse,distinguishes two major
post-modernist strands. The first, associated with Lyotard,draws heavily on a
version of analytical philosophy of language (speech-act theory).The second
strand is post-structuralism, which is itself divided into two sub-strands.On the
one hand, there is Derrida's textualism (a true heir of German classicalidealism)
which denies the possibility of ever escaping the discursive; discourse hasno
extra-discursive referents and encompasses all the aspects of reality. On theother
hand, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari propose a version of ‘worldly post-
structuralism’, which, in contrast to Derrida's idealist theory, proposes an
articulationof the discursive and the non-discursive.It is basically ‘worldly post-
structuralism’ that operates as the springboard for the invasion of post-
modernism in the social sciences (economics included).‘Worldly post-
structuralism’ meets the post-structuralist and post-marxisttheories
3
of another strand deriving from Althusserian structuralism and amistreatment of
Gramsci’s work. The typical and most representative exemplificationof this strand
is provided by Laclau-Mouffe (1985). Wood (1986) and Geras (1987)have offered
accurate and scathing critiques of their theses. However, it is necessaryto point
out certain aspects of these theories that operate as their discrete links withpost-
modernism.To start with, the scapegoat of ‘essentialism’, especially in the form of
thesupposed Marxist economism, is once again ceremoniously thrown in the
fire.Consequently, structural relations, and especially class relations, are
purged,downgraded or relativized and, instead, discourse assumes explanatory
primacy.There are no such things as material and class positions and actions, but
onlydiscursively constructed ideas about them. As Wood (1986: 62) remarks:In
this, Laclau and Mouffe have followed the now familiar trajectory
fromstructuralism to post-structuralism - though they seem uncertain whether
thepost-structuralist dissolution of reality into discourse can be regarded as
ageneral law of history (as it were) or whether it is only in the modern age,
consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor
false withrespect to those axioms’.
3
It should be noted that both Lyotard (explicitly) and more recently Derrida (with
his Spectres of Marx ) have advanced variants of post-marxism which however
have not asignificant impact in social sciences in general and in economics in
particular.and particularly with the advent of ‘industrial society’, that social reality
hasdematerialized and become susceptible to discursive construction. Anderson
(1988: 40-55) has given a very lucid and accurate account of thelinks between
structuralism and post-structuralism. He delineates three major themesthat
established, in successive stages, the trajectory from structuralism to post-
structuralism. Firstly, the originating discipline from which structuralism drew
virtuallyall of its concepts, and then projected them to all areas of society, was
linguistics;leading, thus, to what Anderson terms as the exhortation of language
. Secondly,this absolutization of language led to the attenuation of truth
. The precariousbalance between the signifier and the signified, inherent in
structuralist linguistics,severed any possibility of truth as a correspondence of
propositions to reality. This, inreturn, implied a critical weakening of the status of
causality. ‘Causality, even whengranted admission, never acquires cogent
centrality on the terrain of structuralistanalysis’ (Anderson (1988: 50). The result
of this process was the randomization of history. Since causality is weakened, an
unbridgeable gulf exists between thegeneral laws and causes and the actual
events. So, there is the paradoxical resultthat a total initial determinism ends in
the reinstatement of an absolute finalcontingency. All these three major themes,
described by Anderson, lay at the heart of the notorious structure-subject riddle
and paved the way to post-structuralism. Ittakes only the unavoidable
questioning of the validity and the weight of the distinctionbetween signifier and
signified in order to detonate a chain reaction leading to post-structuralism. In a
nutshell, the way that structuralism formulated, and believed that ithad solved,
this riddle contained the seeds for a subsequent capsize into itsantithesis; post-
structuralism proper is born. As Wood (1985) has shown, this trajectory from
structuralism to post-structuralism has assumed flesh and bones in the journey of
certain intellectuals from Althusserianism to post-marxism. She accurately
identified Poulantzas as their forerunner. For these intellectuals the explanatory
primacy of discourse is based on the autonomization of ideology and politics from
the economy
. This issupplemented with the randomization of history and politics
. The first implies thatthe discursive elements cease to be determined, even in the
last instance (accordingto the Althusserian past of these writers), by the economy.
This is part and parcel of their anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist drive and
their quest for ‘openness’ and an‘unsutured’ theory. On the other hand, the
randomization of history and politics leadsto historicism. The result is an awkward
hybrid of (implicit) absolute determinism andabsolute contingency, with the
emphasis on the latter. Following their Althusserian
methodological
or
institutional individualism
. Post-modernist inroads in economics may be grouped in three broad
theoreticalcategories:
5
For a critique of Regulation’s theory of periodization see Mavroudeas (1999b).
6
For an analysis of Regulation’s relation to post-modernism see Mavroudeas
(1999a).
Rethinking Marxism
U.S. journal. It hascertain links with the British Althusserian branch around the
Economy & Society
journal, although the latter is closely associated with the Flexible
Specializationthesis (see Hirst-Zeitlin’s (1991) critique of Regulation and their
exclamation of thesuperiority of Flexible Specialization). For example, Amariglio-
Ruccio (1994) maintainthat their rejection of the ‘essentialism of the market’ -
that, according to them, can befound in both Marxism and Hayekian liberalism (and
indeed of many other types of essentialism as well) - is similar to that of Hindess
(1987).This current does not accept the notion of a post-modern epoch (contrary
toLaclau & Mouffe, who also stem from the Althusserian tradition). Amariglio-
Ruccio(1994) reject the identification of the character of the economic theory
with anycontemporary economic process
7
. Instead, they try to propose a version of post-modern Marxism as a general
theory. They criticize neo-classical, Keynesian andMarxist theories for their
common foundational axes, namely (a) order (strict causaldeterminism leading
ultimately to stability), (b) centering (assuming that the economicsubject is
rational), (c) certainty (closed theories with no room for uncertainty). Their post-
modern Marxism ascribes to the opposite poles (disorder, decentering
anduncertainty). They also reject Marx’s analysis of systemic laws and necessity
andsubstitute it with the indeterminacy of historical contingencies. This is coupled
withthe Althusserian theory of ideology and its methodology of
overdetermination. It is
7
Amariglio-Ruccio (1994: 9) dispute as unfounded and simplistic the
supposedemergence of ‘consumerism’.
ideology and, in the end, discourse (not material conditions) that provide the
socialdimension of agents. Then, overdetermination and the process-without-a-
subject isused to weaken any systemic causality and make socio-economic
processescontingent and uncertain. Particularly their use of overdetermination is
very similar toPlatt’s ‘recursion’: independent systems sit the one upon the other
and are mutuallyinfluenced without any causal primacy.This post-Althusserian
project of a post-modern Marxism is inherentlycontradictory. First, post-
modernism rejects general theory in principle and thiscannot be salvaged by
preaching that others can have their (post-modernist)theories. Additionally, its
Marxist character is rather a matter of personal aestheticpreferences than a
serious proposition. What kind of Marxism is this without areferential primacy to
material conditions and a dialectical materialist methodology?But its Althusserian
character is not also without problems. For example, it is notanswered
convincingly how can post-structuralism be truly reconciled with Althusserian
structuralist approach of a process without subject. It is true - as it hasalready
been explained - that latent links exist between the prima facie oppositetrends of
structuralism and post-structuralism. But this does not make the trajectoryfrom
the one to the other less contradictory. Finally, the Althusserian theory
of ideology was based on the theory of theoretical practice. According to the
latter thescientificity or truth of thought is judged by the purely internal criteria of
theoreticalpractice, not by its dialectical relationship to the concrete reality. The
result of thisthesis is the crude counterposition of an empiricistically understood
reality and atheory riddled with scientism. In a way, the Althusserian purge of
dialectics and itssubstitution with a structuralist formalism ended up with a
version of the relationbetween reality and theory on the same lines with the
positivist dichotomy ‘model-realworld’. It is true, on the other hand, that at the
same time it opened the floodgates for subsequent positions which - while keeping the
separation between model and realworld - they questioned the objectivity of the
former and relativized even more itscontent. In the post-Althusserian post-
modernism not only theory is separated fromreality but also there are no
‘internal’ criteria for the judgment of scientific truth. But,although
Althusserianism opened these gates a lot of work is needed in order to passthem.
This was not Althusser’s doing but that of his epigones. Consequently,
theinvocation of Althusser as a ‘post-modern’ thinker (Ruccio (1991: 500)) is
rather exaggerated.Heterodox, Keynesian and Institutionalist post-modernists
Finally, there is a large host of writers stemming from traditions of theEconomics
who begin by questioning the objectivity of economic theory. In contrast,they
stress the social construction of theory as discourse, the decentering of
thesubject (i.e. multiple subject-positions exist) and that subjectivity is not prior
to butconstituted by systems of language, power and other social factors.
Therefore,scientific objects are always preinterpreted and science cannot be
separated fromrhetoric. Hence, value judgments cannot be purged from theory in
the way orthodoxEconomics - via the normative/positive economics distinction -
do. Finally, theyquestion the traditional scientific boundaries in the social
sciences.It seems that this diverse host of writers is quite close - although
withoutexplicit reference - to textualist post-modernism, in the sense that they
concentrateon discursive elements. Extra-discursive referents are not employed
or appear tohave almost no consequence.Their starting point is the social
construction of economic subjects. Assaultingneo-classical orthodoxy, they
maintain that economic theories are sociallyconstructed and non-value free. In
this way the purported neo-classical monopoly of truthfulness, impartiality and
objectivity is negated. On the contrary, many differenttheoretical perspectives
can exist within economic science, depending upon differentethical (value)
judgments. However, there are no specific criteria for judging thetruthfulness of
each theory. Additionally, the social construction of the subjects isequally
relativized and understood in mere political terms. Whereas Marxismrecognizes
the social construction of subjects but bases this construction upon thesocial
division of labor and the class structure, for post-modernists this ‘imperialism’of
the economic - and even more of the sphere of production - is
unacceptable.Instead, they choose more fluid, short-term and relativist referents
which enable theacclaimed openendedness and indeterminacy of their theory.
Post-modernistsoverride the scientific boundaries but without transforming their
interrelationship.‘Politics’ are added rather than organically linked to ‘economics’.
The only major change is that both are discursively understood. In the cases
where an extra-discursive is employed, this is usual a theory of power not
generated by materialsocio-economic relations (as in Marxism) but by the
inherent nature and desires of mankind (e.g. Foucault).Samuels (1996) provides a
representative account of this perspective. Although he does not reject the
importance of truth (o.p.p.114), he posits that thesocial construction of truth
leads to a multiplicity rather than homogeneity of truth(o.p.p.115). Therefore, all
epistemological, ontological and theoretical positions arefunctional with regard to
the reconstruction of extant reality. This reconstruction is
institutional individualism
(Agassi(1975), Boland (1982)). The institutionalist inclination of most of them
certainlyfacilitates this adoption. This version of individualism departs from
typicalmethodological individualism who claimed that all social phenomena are simply
thesum of the actions of the individual agents that operate in the society. It
recognizesthat institutions and society also affect an individual’s actions.
Individuals are thebasic analytical unit. On the other hand, institutions do have
something more thanbeing simply the sum of the actions of their constituent
individuals. However, there isno structural hierarchy in this interrelationship. It
cannot be, in principle, definedwhether individuals or institutions come first. In
each specific case there is a specialprocess of interaction that gives rise to it. To
put it in a different terminology, structureand agency affect each other
reciprocally without one being prior to the other – atleast in principle.Toboso
(2001), offering it as a truly middle way of explanation that can uniteboth
traditional and neoclassical institutionalists, summarizes it as follows:(1)
individuals are the main agents.
18(2) institutions exist and influence individuals.(3) change takes place via
individuals.The reciprocity-without-causality between structure and individual is
certainlysomething that sounds pleasantly to post-modernists. However, this
conception of institutions, habits and collective relations is at least ambiguous
and problematic. Itcannot define properly how all these arise since it cannot
propose a line of causality.In the last instance, everything hinges upon the
individual. Therefore, it is a versionof individualism and the classical critique of
this approach applies to it as well.Concluding, post-modernist economics –
instead of confronting neo-classicalorthodoxy – they actually abut on it in many
ways. It could be said that their rise is aside-effect of neo-classicism’s imperialism.
V. A political genealogy of Political Economy?
Meuret’s (1988) ‘Political genealogy of political economy’ is an
interestingattempt to propose a post-modernist interpretation of the birth and
the establishmentof Political Economy. Meuret's framework is based on a
combination of Foucault'stheory of knowledge (as a program of truth but without
calling into question its actualtruthfulness) and Annales’ economic historiography.
His main thesis is that PoliticalEconomy became the dominant discourse because
it constructed a better politicalframework for the co-existence of capital, state
and those trying to protectthemselves from their power. Thus, the reasons for the
emergence of PoliticalEconomy are to be found in the field of the political rather
than that of the economic.It is indicative that, for Meuret, the final crisis of the
ancien regime (the last stage of the feudal system) is caused mainly by political
reasons; and particularly politicalideological and discursive factors.Meuret begins his
essay by adopting Foucault’s ‘savoir’ and Veyne’s ‘programof truth’ perspective, within
which a theory is posited as a discourse autonomizedfrom and non-determined
by other spheres of social activities. Therefore, a particular theoretical discourse
should not lay claim to truthfulness. The very term genealogy,employed by
Meuret, denotes that his account of the construction and establishmentof
Political Economy does not pose the claim of truthfulness. Then the habitual post-
modernist jargon of discourse, representations, utterances, rhetoric (op.p.241)
etc. isemployed in his study. A major element of his analysis is the way in which
politicaltheories and economic representations are linked. He argues that
economic andpolitical representations stand on an equal par and they reciprocally
determine how
23the same coin. Most notably, by overemphasizing the social dimension simply
asdiscourse and neglecting material conditions they help the neo-classical
bandwagonto establish further its dominance. In a sense, they assist neo-classical
domination inorder to act as its querulous critic; but there is no possibility of
overturning thisdomination. Moreover, the particular way in which post-
modernist economics theorizethe social – through their recourse to
institutionalist individualism – has significantaffinities with neo-classicism’s
imperialism. In the end, it is individuals – either from apost-modernist discursive
social subjectivity or form neo-classical institutionalistsocial subjectivity – that are
the primary agents.Consequently, post-modernist attempts to rewrite the history
of economictheory in general and the history of Political Economy in particular
are erroneous. Asit has been shown in the critique of Meuret’s political genealogy
of Political Economy,even ‘worldly post-structuralist’ approaches – let alone pure
textualism – cannotexplain satisfactorily Political Economy’s process of creation.
But also, moregenerally, contrary to Screpanti’s claim post-modernism does not
represent a radicalrupture in the evolution of economic theory. The big divide is
not between post-modernism and modernist economics but between Political
Economy (Classical andespecially Marxist) and neo-classical economics. Post-
modernist economics stand,at best, in the middle.
REFERENCES
Anderson, P. 1988.
In the tracks of Historical Materialism
, London: Verso. Agassi, J. 1975. Institutional Individualism.
British Journal of Sociology
vol.26. Aglietta, M. 1979.
A Theory of Capitalist Regulation
, London: Verso. Amariglio, J. and Ruccio, D. 1994. Postmodernism, Marxism, and
the Critique of Modern Economic Thought.
Rethinking Marxism
vol.7 no.3.Blaug, M. 1970.
Economic Theory in retrospect
. Cambridge : Cambridge UniversityPress.Boland, L.A. 1982.
The Foundations of Economic Method
. London: Allen & Unwin.Braudel, F. 1985.
Civilisation and Capitalism.
London: Collins.Callari, A., Cullenberg, S. and Biewener, C. 1994.
Marxism in the Postmodern Age
,New York: Guilford Press.Callinicos, A. 1985. Postmodernism, Post-structuralism,
Post-Marxism.
Theory,Culture and Society
vol.2 no.11.Dosse, F. 1986. History in pieces: from the militant to the triumphant
Annales.
Telos
no.67.Eagleton, T. 2003.
After Theory
. New York: Basic Books.Fine, B. 2000.Economics Imperialism and Intellectual
Progress: The Present asHistory of Economic Thought?
History of Economics Review
no.32.Foucault, M. 1970.
The order of things.
London: Routledge.
The workforce in society today is different to the ones of the past, where different
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Frug (1992) recognises that gender is not naturally given but socially constructed,
and suggests one "principle" of postmodernism is that human experience is
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always open to re-interpretation, it can also be used to resist the shaping and
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Inshore
You never thought when you entered your business that you would need to think
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Go back and dust off your company's vision or mission statement. Then go
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The P2M Masters Program™ has one overarching objective: Making managers
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Emigration and immigration provide other driving forces that contribute to the
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illegal (the term for the latter is ‘undocumented’). The European Union has served
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Increased communication speed and its constantly decreasing costs, coupled with
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The management of just about any entity, whether public or private, now affects
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(ii) In a global and multitudinal society, demand should drive supply, where the
former is the result of social interaction.
(iii) Production costs will continue to be critical, with differences in cost levels
around the world remaining a concern to many.
Future managers therefore must need good abilities to see different societies in
different lights. It once took an almost nationwide boycott of McDonalds'
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Managers who understand what makes 'other people tick' will be more successful
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For managers with social or political ambitions, such cultural sensitivity is already
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when looking at the curricula offered by most business institutions. In those
curricula, often more usually politically correct views and opinions are stated as
facts, and power-struggles of the past are highlighted as key explanations for the
world we live in today.
This program emphasizes the post-modern need for a global horizon. The P2M
comprises 30 credits and consists of the following courses:
Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam are the six major
religions that historically, as well as in terms of current affairs, have a global
impact. Metaphysics, Ethnocentrism, Relativism, Socio-biology, Individualism,
Collectivism, Utilitarianism and Pacifism are some philosophies that also, with
varying success influenced, or tried to influence, our societies over time. Analyze
at least three different accounts of each one of these religions and philosophies.
Then add to this a similar analysis of any religion and philosophy that you yourself
consider more or equally important (if any).
Identify in what way each one of them has influenced, and/or is influencing, the
world of today, striving to give a balanced assessment in terms of positive and
negative impact. Primary literature references are:
Author Title
Edgar &
Key Concepts in Cultural Theory
Sedgwick
In addition to these references you are requested to add at least two additional
sources for each religion and philosophy, out of which at least one shall be written
by an author from either:
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language).
Many ideas have grown so strong over time so they developed into social and/or
political systems, entirely governing the societies over which they wrestled
control. The most influential ones, here identified as "-isms", are listed below -
together with two examples of literature / sources arguing for or against their
more significant characteristics.
Couple each set of readings listed above with at least one source from either:
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language)
Complete this course by writing a 6.000-word paper on how each -ism can be,
and/or has been, viewed, how different -isms link to each other and how (if at all)
you think they continue to retain impact on today's world.
The analytical aspect of this paper is seen as more important than references to
names, years and specific events leading to the current status. Source-
identification required.
Climate-change is only the most recent of many pressing issues showing how
interlinked are the studies and impacts of ecology, anthropology, demography
and economic geography. When the UN's Security Council finally took this issue
on in 2007, it simply confirmed what was already well known: migration - whether
caused by war, economic inequality or climate-change - is a serious cause for
concern, whereas millions of people are moving, and will continue to move, to
new localities, in turn affecting those millions of people who already live there.
And as there is little we can do to stop it in the short term, we must learn how to
adapt to it, and make good from the situation it creates. This requires leaders and
managers with the right abilities and a strong social sensitivity.
Townsend, Begon,
Ecology From Individuals to Ecosystems
Harper
Economic
Dicken Global Shift: Reshaping the
Geography Global Economic Map in the
21st Century
In addition you are requested to add at least one source in each field, by an
author from either:
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language)
The analytical aspect of this paper is seen as more important than references to
names, years and specific events leading to the current status. Source-
identification required.
Complete this course by writing a 6,000-word paper on how future studies related
to cross-cultural issues can help not only predict and prevent problems, but also
to pave the way for more positive developments, based on positive assumptions
about the future, as well as how relevant social research methodologies are
required to validate such studies. The list of primary course-literature includes:
Author Title
In addition you are requested to add at least two sources in each field, by an
author from either:
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language)
The analytical aspect of this paper is seen as more important than references to
names, years and specific events leading to the current status. Source-
identification required.
With globalization follows cultural interaction. There is very little evidence to say
that a homogeneous global culture will develop. It is more likely that the concept
of glocal - a mix of the two words global and local - will best describe the future
world order.
Primary literature reference for this course is "Traffic - A Book About Culture
(Olsen).
Author Title
You are also requested to add a minimum of two sources of your own choice on
social research methodology, by authors from either:
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language)
The analytical aspect of this paper is seen as more important than references to
names, years and specific events leading to the current status. Source-
identification required.
We recommend that you write this paper in a way so it can be taken onboard by
the target group you wish to influence with your ideas, in case you would like to
publish parts of it in the future.
(i) the society where you are yourself born or raised, written in your native
tongue, or
(ii) the society where you wish to apply the management abilities you are
currently working to develop, written in the native tongue of that society
(translated if you do not master that language)
6.1 Capacity Building for Diverse Cultures, focusing on managing human capacity
creation and development, as well as evolutionary processes and technology
transfer on a micro as well as macro level. Discuss how to develop capacity
building over time, and how technology transfer can be facilitated in a world of
social and cultural differences.
6.2 Structures and Systems, analyzing how institution-building processes take
place; how they are managed and influenced, including not only the processes
aimed at developing a State's administrative and juridical bodies, but also those
developing capital markets and political - as well as multilateral - institutions.
Discuss how the concept of governance is affected not only by these processes
and their outcomes, but also by other and seemingly unrelated political, cultural
and social events taking place on a parallel.
(vi) The concept of 'Corporate Culture', including the RED TRAIL for corporate
professionals, and the ADD FIRE approach for their managers
This elective's thesis would typically focus on similarities and differences between
your own cultural setting and the type of cultural setting that the western-styled
corporate philosophy (discussed under this elective) would assume. Discuss also
how your own cultural tradition can serve as a platform not only for a local
enterprise, but for an internationally viable business model. Further, identify
steps for how western MNEs can adapt to local conditions, not only in order to
respect cultural diversity, but also to better tap into markets that are culturally
sensitive.
The three 'orientations' to choose from as the overall setting for your thesis are:
Contents
History
The term 'Post Modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT)' was created in 1991 by software
entrepreneurs Brian M. Rom and Kathleen Ferguson to differentiate the portfolio-
construction software developed by their company,Investment Technologies,
from those provided by the traditional Modern Portfolio Theory'. It first appeared
in the literature in1993 in an article by Rom and Ferguson in The Journal of
Performance Measurement. It combines the theoretical research of many authors
and has expanded over several decades as academics at universities in many
countries tested these theories to determine whether or not they had merit. The
essential difference between PMPT and the modern portfolio theory of
Markowitz and Sharpe (MPT) is that PMPT focuses on the return that must be
earned on the assets in a portfolio in order to meet some future payout. This
internal rate of return (IRR) is the link between assets and liabilities. PMPT
measures risk and reward relative to this IRR while MPT ignores this IRR and
measures risk as dispersion about the mean or average return. The result is
substantially different portfolio constructions.
• Atchison & Brown at Cambridge University who developed the three parameter
lognormal distribution which was a more robust model of the pattern of returns
than the bell shaped distribution of MPT.
• Bradley Efron, Stanford University, who developed the bootstrap procedure for
better describing the nature of uncertainty in financial markets.
• Daniel Kahneman at Princeton & Amos Tversky at Stanford who pioneered the
field of Behavioral Finance which contests many of the findings of MPT.
Overview
Harry Markowitz laid the foundations of MPT, the greatest contribution of which
is the establishment of a formal risk/return framework for investment decision-
making. By defining investment risk in quantitative terms, Markowitz gave
investors a mathematical approach to asset-selection and portfolio management.
But there are important limitations to the original MPT formulation.
Two major limitations of MPT are its assumptions that
Stated another way, MPT is limited by measures of risk and return that do not
always represent the realities of the investment markets.
It has long been recognized that investors typically do not view as risky those
returns above the minimum they must earn in order to achieve their investment
objectives. They believe that risk has to do with the bad outcomes (i.e., returns
below a required target), not the good outcomes (i.e., returns in excess of the
target) and that losses weigh more heavily than gains. This view has been noted
by researchers in finance, economics and psychology, including Sharpe (1964).
"Under certain conditions the MVA can be shown to lead to unsatisfactory
predictions of (investor) behavior. Markowitz suggests that a model based on the
semi variance would be preferable; in light of the formidable computational
problems, however, he bases his (MV) analysis on the mean and the standard
deviation[3]."
Recent advances in portfolio and financial theory, coupled with today’s increased
electronic computing power, have overcome these limitations. The resulting
expanded risk/return paradigm is known as Post-Modern Portfolio Theory, or
PMPT. Thus, MPT becomes nothing more than a special (symmetrical) case of
PMPT.
Downside risk
where
t = the annual target return, originally termed the minimum acceptable return, or
MAR.
r = the random variable representing the return for the distribution of annual
returns f(r),
f(r) = the three-parameter lognormal distribution
For the reasons provided below, this continuous formula is preferred over a
simpler discrete version that determines the standard deviation of below-target
periodic returns taken from the return series.
2. A second reason for strongly preferring the continuous form to the discrete
form has been proposed by Sortino & Forsey (1996):
"Before we make an investment, we don't know what the outcome will be... After
the investment is made, and we want to measure its performance, all we know is
what the outcome was, not what it could have been. To cope with this
uncertainty, we assume that a reasonable estimate of the range of possible
returns, as well as the probabilities associated with estimation of those
returns...In statistical terms, the shape of [this] uncertainty is called a probability
distribution. In other words, looking at just the discrete monthly or annual values
does not tell the whole story."
Sortino ratio
The Sortino ratio measures returns adjusted for the target and downside risk. It is
defined as:
where
d = downside risk.
The following table shows that this ratio is demonstrably superior to the
traditional Sharpe ratio as a means for ranking investment results. The table
shows risk-adjusted ratios for several major indexes using both Sortino and
Sharpe ratios. The data cover the five years 1992-1996 and are based on monthly
total returns. The Sortino ratio is calculated against a 9.0% target.
As an example of the different conclusions that can be drawn using these two
ratios, notice how the Lehman Aggregate and MSCI EAFE compare - the Lehman
ranks higher using the Sharpe ratio whereas EAFE ranks higher using the Sortino
ratio. In many cases, manager or index rankings will be different, depending on
the risk-adjusted measure used. These patterns will change again for different
values of t. For example, when t is close to the risk-free rate, the Sortino Ratio for
T-Bill’s will be higher than that for the S&P 500, while the Sharpe ratio remains
unchanged.
Volatility skewness
The importance of skewness lies in the fact that the more non-normal (i.e.,
skewed) a return series is, the more its true risk will be distorted by traditional
MPT measures such as the Sharpe ratio. Thus, with the recent advent of hedging
and derivative strategies, which are asymmetrical by design, MPT measures are
essentially useless, while PMPT is able to capture significantly more of the true
information contained in the returns under consideration. Many of the common
market indices and the returns of stock and bond mutual funds cannot
themselves always be assumed to be accurately represented by the normal
distribution.
Lehman
32.35 67.65 0.48
Aggregate
Endnotes
solved rationally by the application of scientific and social theory, and thus
synergy between the two paradigms. Management science does not have to
One conclusion that can be drawn from the postmodern perspective is that
individual's perceptions and views of reality (and self). If this is true of the
feasible and effective solutions for control of the workforce. We would see
perspective. Hassard (1993) argues that the essence of theory is not its
database but its intelligibility: we should feel free to draw from the entire
with the potential for theories to offer new possibilities for our culture.
58.
59. What Hassard seems to suggest is a synergy of modernist and
postmodernist view of 'knowing the world', basing his view on the
assumption that both modernist and postmodern views have things to offer
in terms of ways of finding the 'truth'. Montuori and Purser (1996) similarly
argue for a need to think differently about the future and engage in an
ongoing process of learning/action that recognises the incomplete nature
of our knowledge. How then can a synergy of both modernist and
postmodern assumptions assist managers in today's and future
organisations in managing the workforce?
60.
61. We can summarise the discussion so far by recalling that modernist
organisational theory tends to seek a singular or best universal model of
effectiveness based on science, and that postmodern organisational theory
seeks a practical and ecologically viable set of images of effectiveness that
incorporates a range of views and concerns of different groups and
individuals (Boje, Gephart, Thatchenkery, 1996:1). These two views are not
necessarily conflicting, which shall be shown in the following section.
62.
63. The expectancy theory can be chosen as a good representation of the break
between modernist and postmodern theories. Expectancy theory states
that motivation is a function of individuals' desire for a particular outcome
and the perception of how likely a particular course of action is to achieve
that outcome (Carter and Jackson, 1993). A rationalist (modernist)
explanation of management would see it as a resource possessed of certain
techniques for the efficient achievement of particular goals. However, this
can not be achieved under a modernist assumption, as workers would have
to desire outcomes that managers could provide, and believe that they
were achievable by doing whatever management is willing to provide. This
is clearly impossible. Therefore, the expectancy theory signifies the
emergence of the pre-eminence of relativity over rationality, of the
subjective over the objective, and of the subjective order over objective
order (Carter and Jackson, 1993). It is a problematic theory for modernists,
as it explains motivation on a macro-level, but does not provide any
information on how to deal with motivation on a micro-level, that is, on the
individual level. Thus, modernism provides the basis of how to deal with
motivation but cannot actually use the model in practice. Here,
postmodern thinking can elaborate on the macro-theory to make it more
valuable by incorporating micro-level issues such as influencing cultural
factors and the need to consider power relations and individual network
interactions that determine the individual's actual expectations.
Postmodernism also realise that expectations and desires of outcomes
continually changes through these interactions and individual
conceptualisations of 'reality'. Thus, expectancy theory, as a modernist
invention, can provide a general understanding of motivation, but is not
complete if postmodern focus on the individual, continuous 'chaos', and
patterns of language and symbols are not taken into account.
64.
65. Sinclair and Hogan (1996) also realise that there are questions for which the
standardised empirical methods of organisational science are not
appropriate and for which the postmodernist paradigm is appropriate, but
they carefully point out that the point is not which paradigm is the "winner"
of the debate. They argue that the effort ought not to be to reach
consensus on method or theory but on the set of relevant problems that
organisational science can solve. Although Feldman (1999) argues that
postmodernists assume all knowledge is power laden, and thus he distrust
all commitments to knowledge, it is not a valid interpretation of the
underlying assumptions of postmodernism. As has been discussed,
postmodernists criticises the assumption that scientific research reveals
some universal 'truth', but this does not mean that they are obliged to
reject some basic fundamental truth gained from empirical studies. The
option is always open for evaluation and discussion of scientific findings,
but they need to be carefully interpreted and not generalised to serve as a
universal 'truth'.
66.
67. Schultz and Hatch (1996) argue that postmodernism inspires interplay
between paradigms, discussing the importance of recognising patterns and
orders within different cultures. They see users of both the modernist and
postmodernist paradigm conceive of culture as a set of ordered and
continuous relations between the visible and audible cultural
representations and underlying patterns of assumptions or meanings.
According to both paradigms, the organisational surface is never what it
seems but is always hiding a cultural essence, located at the invisible
depths of the organisation. The difference is that the modernist paradigm
studies the culture in a predefined and universal framework, while the
postmodernist paradigm studies considers culture as contextuality,
continually changing and evolving. Schultz and Hatch (1996) argue that it is
necessary to develop an empirical recognition of contrasts and connections
within the issue of culture, but that it is equally important to include
postmodernism's ability to "break the habits of organised routine and see
the world as though for the first time". Thus as interplay between
paradigms permits a more sophisticated approach to the analysis and
interpretation of empirical data.
68.
69. It would be difficult to see a future of postmodern organisations where
empirical research is completely discredited, and the argument that the
human agent is merely an agent responding to external influences is just as
inconceivable. This would probably lead to even more chaos in our society,
especially within large organisations. Giving management no instruments of
control would effectively lead to the elimination of any rational power
structures that would leave management as a "fleeting image of order and
control" and "a transparent myth" (Gephart, 1996: 41). Any hierarchies
would be dissolved and individuals are left within their sub-cultures or
networks to form an image of reality for themselves and act upon that
image. One (out of many) paradoxes of postmodern thought is that it
predicts the organisational system to be "anarchistically out of control by
humans" as well as the "death of the belief that individuals have power"
(Gephart, 1996: 41). At the same time, postmodernists foresee a future
where each individual is given more freedom to act and develop, no longer
bound by rules and regulations, hierarchical relationships and other
traditional bureaucratic features.
70.
71. According to postmodernists, the 'future' postmodern organisation is
global, multi-cultural, network oriented, reactive, decentralised, and thrives
on a strong culture, information, knowledge and political (power)
relationships (Thompson, 1993). This is not a postmodern desire, but simply
a description of reality, of how organisations are moving away from the
modernist 'ideal' structure of an effective organisation. The postmodernist
paradigm acknowledges this change of nature, and proposes various
solutions for how to best understand the change, providing answers to
problems that modernism failed to consider. This does not mean that the
modernist paradigm should be rejected, nor does it mean that the
postmodernist paradigm should be accepted. What it does mean, is that
managers should recognise that there is 'no best way' to manage the
workforce, and changes in the society and environment necessitate them
to look for solutions from different perspectives.
72.
73. Thus, a synergy between the modernist and postmodernist paradigm is
possible, and this is what has been proposed in this paper. Management
can still rely on empirical methods for a broad understanding of the human
and organisational behaviour, but cannot simply rely on a universal 'truth'
for effective management. What the future holds for management and
management research is unclear, but it is evident that some transition
away from the modernist paradigm is going on. The postmodernist ideas
are still very ambiguous and controversial, and may not yet provide any real
answers to managerial issues. Until they do (if they do), managers are left
to 'cut and paste' from the different paradigms to ensure their
organisation's continued success and survival, and leave the 'big' issues for
sociologists to ponder about.
74.
75.
76. Any reproduction or distribution of this text is prohibited without express
permission by the author.
77.
78. REFERENCES:
79. Björkegren, D. (1993). "What can organization and management theory
learn from art?", in J. Hassard and M. Parker (Eds.) Postmodernism and
Organizations, London: Sage Publications: Ch.6.
80. Boje, D.M., Gephart Jr, R.P., Thatchenkery, T.J. (1996:1). Postmodern
Management and Organization Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
81. Boje, D.M., Gephart Jr, R.P., Thatchenkery, T.J. (1996:2). "Postmodern
management and the coming crisis of organizational analysis", in D.M. Boje,
R.P. Gephart Jr. and T.J. Thatchenkery (Eds.) Postmodern Management and
Organization Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications: Ch.1.
82. Burrell. G. (1993). "Eco and the bunnymen", in J, Hassard and M. Parker
(Eds.) Postmodernism and Organizations, London: Sage Publications: Ch.4.
83. Burrell, G. and Cooper, R. (1988). "Modernism, postmodernism and
organizational analysis: An introduction", Organization Studies, Vol 9 No 1:
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84. Carter, P. and Jackson, N. (1993). "Modernism, postmodernism and
motivation, or why expectancy theory failed to come up to expectation", in
J. Hassard and M. Parker (Eds.) Postmodernism and Organizations. London:
Sage Publications: Ch.5.
85. Dunn, R.G. (1998). Identity Crises: A Social Critique of Postmodernity,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
86. Feldman, S.P. (1999). "The leveling of organizational culture: Egalitarianism
in critical postmodern organization theory", The Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science, Vol 35 No 2: 228-244.
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era", in D.M. Boje, R.P. Gephart Jr. and T.J. Thatchenkery (Eds.) Postmodern
Management and Organization Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications:
Ch.2.
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Hassard and M. Parker (Eds.) Postmodernism and Organizations, London:
Sage Publications: Ch.1.
89. Hassard, J. (1996). "Exploring the terrain of modernism and postmodernism
in organisation in organization theory", in D.M. Boje, R.P. Gephart Jr. and
T.J. Thatchenkery (Eds.) Postmodern Management and Organization
Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications: Ch.3.
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resolution of the debate on relativism", Journal of Economic Issues, Vol 28
No 3: 679-.
91. Hollinger, R. (1994). Postmodernism and the Social Sciences, Vol 4,
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
92. Montuori, A. and Purser, R.E. (1996). "Systems theory, postmodernism and
participative learning in an age of uncertainty", in D.M. Boje, R.P. Gephart
Jr. and T.J. Thatchenkery (Eds.) Postmodern Management and Organization
Theory, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications: Ch.9.
93. Rudolph, S.H. (1996). "The role of theory in comparative politics: A
symposium", World Politics, Vol 48 No 1: 1-49.
94. Schultz, M. and Hatch, M.J. (1996). "Living with multiple paradigms: The
case of paradigm in organizational culture studies", Academy of
Management, Vol 21 No 2: 529-557.
95. Sinclair, R. and Hogan, R. (1996). "The answer is yes: But what was the
question?", The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol 32 No 4:
434-440.
96. Smart, B. (2000). "Postmodern social theory", in B. S. Turner (Ed.) The
Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, 2nd Ed., Malden: Blackwell
Publishers.
97. Thompson, P. (1993). "Postmodernism: Fatal distraction" in J. Hassard and
M. Parker (Eds.) Postmodernism and Organizations. London: Sage
Publications: Ch 11.
98. Welge, M.K. and Holtbrugge, D. (1999). "International management under
postmodern conditions", Management International Review, Vol 39 No 4:
305-322.
Directionless Volatility
The two most noteworthy characteristics of markets in 2011 are these: first, they
have been more volatile for a longer stretch of time than ever before; and second,
they have gone essentially nowhere. The general pattern has been – up 1% one
day, down 2% the next, up 1.5% the next day and so on ad infinitum. The only
extended directional moves this year have largely cancelled each other out. In the
space of about eight trading days in late July and early August the S&P 500 fell
from 1345 to 1120, a drop of about 16%. In early October the index rallied from
1100 to 1285, an upsurge of over 14%. We would argue that both those events –
the August plunge and the October rally, were based on vapors rather than
substance – subjective mood rather than objective reasoning. The August plunge
came on the heels of the debt ceiling debacle, a self-inflicted problem on the part
of politicians for whom the art of governance is clearly a bar too high. Conversely,
the October rally was based on…what exactly? That Europe still exists? For the
moment, in any case, that rally appears to have been short-lived; a general
negative trend has characterized most of November thus far. Of course that could
always change again before year-end. Looking at the bar chart of the S&P 500 for
the past four months is like nothing as much as it is the path of a drunkard’s walk
– lurching from side to side but going nowhere.
Are volatility and directionlessness merely two sides of the same coin? We would
argue yes, and furthermore that they represent a – dare we even say the word –
rational pattern of trading for a capital market that seems to have completely lost
its bearings. Let’s start with directionlessness, which is perhaps the easier of the
two to explain. We can posit the question: what fundamental assumptions would
a directional trend be based on? The global economic picture is mixed. The
economy is not growing by much, but it is still growing. US GDP, although it was
again revised downward recently, is still around 2% based on the 3rd quarter
reading. That is not much to get excited about, and it does nothing to solve the
problem of persistent high unemployment and underemployment, but it is still
better than zero percent growth or a fall back into technical recession territory
(for those who are on the wrong end of that employment measure, of course, the
last recession never actually ended).
Tepid growth by itself might be enough to sustain a rally to the upside. Corporate
earnings, after all, have continued to do much better than top-line GDP numbers
because companies have figured out how to make more with less – lower labor
costs, higher investments of productive technology, access to growth markets in
Asia and elsewhere, and borrowing costs of next to nothing. Look at the
valuations for many blue chip stocks and you could convince yourself that they
are quite undervalued on an historical comparison. Why not take a little
directional position on an earnings-led path back to moderate growth?
Because of the Eurozone, that’s why. If the absence of negative growth provides a
floor below which equities prices appear reluctant to go, then the interminable
problems on the other side of the Atlantic supply the wet blanket that stifles any
attempt to soar with eagles. It was two years ago that the Athens stock exchange
started to tank while the rest of the world was enjoying the continuation of
recovery from the March 2009 market lows. Two years later and what do we
know? That the European common currency project is in dire straits, that
policymakers are absolutely frozen like so many deer in the headlights, that bond
investors are playing Russian roulette with some of the world’s largest national
economies – and the band plays on. There are policy decisions that could provide
relief from the intensity of the crisis in the short term, but the fact is that
Europeans still do not vote for technocrats – they vote for national politicians
based more on issues of local, regional or occasionally national importance than
on whether the ECB’s mandate should be redrawn to allow for wholesale bailouts
of Eurozone sovereign bondholders. This policy stasis could always change, but
for now it remains deadlocked.
The question does not permit a simple answer – many factors are at play in a
complex ecosystem from which emerge unforeseen properties. But there are
plenty of disturbing data points. Insider trading by politicians and by investors
with access to key policymakers means that information trades into those large
hedge funds with their servers backed up to the floor of the stock exchange, and
the computer algorithms operated by those funds spit out buy and sell orders,
and the rest of the world watches on in bafflement. For some reason this activity
(which has been chronicled by mainstream news sources over the course of this
fall) appears to fall outside the boundaries of illegal insider trading as defined by
the SEC. Why it is less “illegal” to trade on the knowledge of some upcoming
Operation Twist or QE3 (Fed decisions almost certain to move short-term
markets) than it is to trade on a tip by XYZ Company’s CFO about upcoming
earnings guidance is something that is frankly astounding and, given that it
appears to be standard operating procedure, more than just a little alarming. Stay
tuned for more of our thoughts on these developments in the coming weeks.
So much is afoot, and much is at stake. Rest assured that we are in the kayaks,
navigating the twists and turns. In the meantime, as we all prepare for the last-
minute bustle in preparation for the holiday, we wish each and every one of you a
happy Thanksgiving in the company of your loved ones.
It’s the same thing every day. Actually it starts before bedtime the night before.
Japan opens just about when we are sitting down to dinner here on the East
Coast. Hong Kong, Shanghai and other regional markets come on line shortly
after, and you can get a feel for how the next day is going to play out. Risk on or
risk off? You ponder the tea leaves in that final cup of chamomile before retiring
for the night. Up early in the morning, now we’re in the Eurozone. Anything new
on Greece or Italy? What’s with those rumors swirling around the ECB? Markets
all down by more than 2% – is Wall Street going to follow suit in a couple hours?
Maybe, maybe not – Ben Bernanke or China or some random quantum jitter may
alter the present reality. Oh look, Dow futures up by 100, even though FTSE is still
in the red. Of course that could all go into reverse at 3:30 pm when the high
frequency trading algorithms kick into fifth gear.
Trying to make sense of the markets’ daily ups and downs is a bit like viewing a
Salvador Dalí surrealist painting. You can come up with some interpretation based
on what you see, but a deeper objective meaning, such as it may be, is likely to
prove elusive.
The one and only constant is volatility. For the 28 trading days between August 2
and September 9 there were 19 days when the S&P 500 closed up or down by
more than 1% from its previous close. On 13 days – just under 50% of the time –
the change was 2% or more. There were six days in which the price move was 4%
or higher. Think about that. On six out of 28 days some combination of events
caused an instant revaluation of common stock prices by more than 4%. Now,
anyone apart from the most committed believers in the Efficient Market
Hypothesis understands that in the short and even in the intermediate term stock
prices can vary significantly from their fundamental value (which is simply a
present value notion for their prospective future free cash flows). But why so
much volatility, and why for so long? “Wild Market Swings are Becoming New
Standard” reads a headline in the New York Times on September 12. Volatility is
the new normal, it seems, a permanent part of the landscape.
On the face of it this perpetual volatility does not make sense. A reasonable
person can look at one of those 4% days and ask a seemingly straightforward
question. Did something happen today at Apple, or Cisco Systems, or Pfizer, that
makes their shares 4% more or less valuable today than yesterday? Now, once in
a blue moon the answer will be yes – something disastrous happens and becomes
public knowledge, like widespread product contamination or the abrupt
departure of the entire senior management team to a competitor. But mostly the
simple answer is no – the sales contracts are still in place, the factories are
humming along, the distribution channels are working as normal. Okay, fine, says
the reasonable person. Now I know enough about markets not to be surprised by
the odd hiccup – say a 2% move up or down once or twice a year. But if corporate
fundamentals are largely the same as they were earlier in the summer, why are
these no longer occasional hiccups but rather regular features?
In the fall of 1907 J.P. Morgan – the man, not the institution – put up his own
funds to personally prevent a systemic financial collapse following a run on the
Knickerbocker Trust Company that created the Panic of 1907. He succeeded. But
the problems of today are far beyond the capacity of wise men (and women) to
bestride their white horses and rush to save the day. Some try – US Fed Chairman
Bernanke in particular has gone far outside the conventional box of Fed policy
tools to try and stabilize the system when it has approached the edge of the
abyss. Unfortunately with each successive attempt the results of these tools
become less impressive. QE2, the program initiated with much fanfare and
market enthusiasm last fall, did nothing to improve the unemployment rate,
nothing to improve business sentiment, and in fact inspired some collateral
damage by encouraging speculators back into commodities like oil, copper and
agricultural products where soaring prices negatively impacted middle class
household budgets. In a complex ecosystem like today’s markets the emergent
outcomes of specific policy decisions simply cannot be predicted with accuracy.
So what do we do? For one thing, learn to live with higher volatility, because it is
most likely not going away any time soon. For another, broaden our portfolios to
be better hedged against the dominant “risk on / risk off” paradigm, for example
through extending the range of “safe haven” exposures beyond the traditional
classes of high quality government bonds to include certain currencies and other
stores of value. Ironically, the longer this risk on / risk off pattern continues the
less risky the “on” trades will be and the more risky the “off” will be, relative to
each other. But with very low correlation between them they will offer a natural
hedge.
We should be very clear: the permanence of volatility does not necessarily mean
a prolonged bear market. It does not suggest that we pull everything out of the
market and stuff it under our mattresses. We expect there will be opportunities
and perils, as always. But the terrain will be trickier and the need for agility and
discipline more urgent than ever. We will continue exploring facets of this new
terrain in upcoming installments of this “Postmodern Finance” series.
Great economic crises like the one we are currently going through do not come
from just anywhere at any time; they are stuffed with history. They are crises of
the ethos of capitalism.
When Max Weber singled out Calvinism as the origin of modernity, he was wrong
to focus exclusively on the Protestant ethic but right to uncover a collective moral
commitment that stood behind market mechanisms.
With the war of 1914 to 1918, however, the careful, thrifty bourgeois gave way to
the panicking, spendthrift bourgeois. "The war has disclosed the possibility of
consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many," observed John
Maynard Keynes in 1920. "The laboring classes may be no longer willing to forgo
so largely, and the capitalist classes, no longer confident of the future, may seek
to enjoy more fully their liberties of consumption so long as they last."
Later, the rise of totalitarianisms black and red brought about the emergence of a
bourgeoisie conscious of its own finitude. Like the New Deal, the European idea of
a socially regulated market economy was a response to the threat, represented
by Hitler and Stalin, of the extinction of fundamental freedoms.
Then, with the collapse of Communism, a fourth evolution: the bourgeoisie for
whom saying is doing. The Berlin Wall had fallen--long live the new, reconciled
world! The new ethic left all fears and reproaches behind and embraced a
postmodern credo claiming that all devils were dead. The market economy has
always relativized goods by revealing their exchangeability and the "Good" by
tolerating its multiplicity.
But our age is the first to proclaim the power to reduce risk to zero simply by
spreading it around. It is the smiling reign of "positive thinking"--with ultimately
disastrous effects.
What led to the current crisis was not so much a faulty financial technique, but
the general state of mind that allowed its unchecked use. Capitalism, we should
have remembered, involves at once prudent regulation and the imprudent
transgression of old rules, the sharing of risks and the audacity to risk more
successfully than others.
The speculative bubble was based on a bet that served as its own foundation. It
was "performative," in the terminology of the linguistic philosopher John Austin.
"This session is now open," proclaims the president in an assembly. It's true
because he says it. Here reality is based on speech, while in ordinary cases speech
is based on reality--that is, it is not performative but indicative.
Similarly, the financial bubble, piling credit on top of credit, got rich on self-
affirmation. It was contained in its self-relation, which is what made it a bubble. It
gradually eliminated the principle of reality: Nothing counted but the financial
products invented by people's investments.
The fantasy of omnipotence animated not only the trader but also those who let
him go his way; not only the heads of financial institutions, but the political,
academic and media authorities who saw no problem with any of it. Indeed, the
performative ideology--"It is true because we say it is"--has governed the
Westernization of the planet since the end of the Cold War: Because the enemy
camp disintegrated, the future belonged to us and all fundamental dangers
vanished.
Postmodernism, which places itself beyond good and evil, beyond true and false,
inhabits a cosmic bubble. It would be a good thing if fear of a universal crisis
allowed us to burst the mental bubble of postmodernism--if it washed away the
euphoria of our pious wishes and brought us once again to see straight.
That may be no more than another pious wish. But we should not succumb, as so
many did in the 1920s, to a catastrophic sensibility.
Yes, history is tragic, as Aeschylus and Sophocles knew. And yes, it is as stupid as
set forth in Aristophanes or Euripides. No roll of the dice and no act of God or of
mathematically refined finance can abolish chance, corruption or adversity; the
providence of the stock market cannot save us any more than that of the state.
Let these lines from Plato be inscribed at the entryway to future G-20 meetings:
"Is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that
is wisdom."
André Glucksmann is a French philosopher and author, most recently, with his son
Raphaël, of Mai 68 expliqué à Nicolas Sarkozy. This essay is adapted from the
Winter issue of City Journal.