© 2008A.

European Psychologist Efklides:

Hogrefe
2008; Vol.Metacognition
& Huber
13(4):277–287
Publishers

Metacognition
Defining Its Facets and Levels of Functioning
in Relation to Self-Regulation and Co-regulation
Anastasia Efklides
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

Abstract. Research in the field of metacognition, a multifaceted phenomenon, is in the main fragmented without much theoretical
integration of the findings related to its various facets. Moreover, metacognition is usually conceived of as an individual and conscious
process that serves the regulation of cognition. However, there is growing evidence that metacognition also functions at a nonconscious
level, is involved in the co-regulation of cognition in collaborative settings, and interacts with affect in the self-regulation of behavior.
Based on these considerations, a multifaceted and multilevel model of metacognition is proposed that broadens Nelson and Naren’s
conceptualization of metacognition. The implications for theory and measurement of metacognition as well as for interventions involving
metacognition are explored.

Keywords: metacognition, metacognitive experiences, social metacognition, self-regulation, co-regulation

Introduction These diverse phenomena and processes in which

It has been over 30 years since the notion of metacognition
was introduced into the psychological pharetra by Flavell
(1979). Since then it has triggered an impressive amount of
research and has gained a prominent place in psychological
theorizing. There are three main areas of research in which
metacognition has a prominent role: developmental psychol-
ogy, with emphasis on theory of mind; experimental and cog-
nitive psychology, focusing mainly on metamemory; and
educational psychology, with emphasis on self-regulated
learning. However, there is also significant work in neuropsy-
chology that connects metacognition with executive func-
tions (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000) and pre-
frontal brain areas (Shimamura, 2000). Another line of re-
search connects metacognition with social cognition (Lories,
Dardenne, & Yzerbyt, 1998), as well as with co-regulation
and other-regulation of behavior and cognition (Salonen,
Vauras, & Efklides, 2005). More recent developments in-
clude the study of metacognition in clinical psychology
(Cooper, Grocutt, Deepak, & Bailey, 2007), whereas research
in animal metacognition, which started with “theory of mind”
in chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), is now ex-
panding to other species (Foote & Crystal, 2007).
The variety of areas and perspectives through which
metacognition is being studied is due to the fact that meta-
cognition is inextricably woven with awareness of mental
states and with consciousness (Koriat, 2007). In humans, it
is at the roots of everyday memory and of scientific think-
ing, as well as of social interactions that require awareness
of one’s and others’ thinking (King, 1998).
metacognition is involved, and particularly its instrumen-
tal role in the self- and co-regulation of behavior, make
it necessary to reconsider the notion of metacognition
and, particularly, its facets and their interrelations, as
well as the relationship of metacognition with cognition
at the individual and social level, and the relations of
metacognition with affect. Such a reconsideration, being
the aim of this article, has implications for theory and
research as well as for interventions, particularly in edu-
cational settings.
In what follows I shall first discuss the differential
characteristics of the various facets of metacognition;
namely, metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive expe-
riences, and metacognitive skills. The aim is to make ex-
plicit that metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive
control function at a conscious and nonconscious level
and are essential constituents of the self-regulation pro-
cess. Second, the connection of metacognition with self-
regulation will be shown. The claim is that metacognitive
experiences, unlike metacognitive knowledge, are the
link between the cognitive and emotional regulatory
loop. Third, metacognition is seen as a sine-qua-non con-
stituent of social interaction and of co-regulation and oth-
er-regulation of behavior. Finally, a model is proposed
that incorporates both the conscious and nonconscious
levels of the functioning of metacognition, as well as the
social level of it. The implications of the model for future
research are briefly explored emphasizing the dynamic
character of self-regulation and co-regulation of cogni-
tion, emotions, and behavior.

© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
DOI 10.1027/1016-9040.13.4.277
278 A. Efklides: Metacognition
Metacognition
Definition
Flavell (1979) defined metacognition as cognition of cog-
nition that serves two basic functions, namely, the monitor-
ing and control of cognition. Nelson (1996; Nelson & Na-
rens, 1994) defined metacognition as a model of cognition
that functions at a meta level; metacognition represents the
object level, that is, cognition. Metacognition, through the
monitoring function, is informed by cognition and, through
the control function, informs cognition. Both definitions
underscore the functioning of metacognition at a “meta”
level, which means that metacognition is a representation
of cognition, and that metacognition and cognition are con-
nected through the monitoring and control functions.
Implicit in both definitions is the assumption that the per-
son is aware of the outcome of the monitoring process – For
example, through metacognitive experiences, such as feeling
of knowing, feeling of confidence, feeling of satisfaction,
awareness of not understanding, and so forth. Also, the per-
son is aware of the beliefs or ideas she or he has about cogni-
tion (that is, his or her metacognitive knowledge) and can
report them and/or reflect on them (Flavell, 1979; Koriat,
2007; Nelson, Kruglanski, & Jost, 1998). Moreover, the per-
son based on the monitoring of cognition consciously con-
trols it (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1994).
The above definitions of metacognition and the assump-
tions related to it have implications for the conceptualization
of metacognition. First, metacognition is multifaceted. Spe-
cifically, there are metacognitive experiences and metacog-
nitive knowledge, which are related to the monitoring of cog-
nition, and control processes that are distinct from the moni-
toring of cognition (Efklides, 2001, 2006). The control
function involves initiation or termination of cognitive pro-
cessing and use of cognitive strategies such as rehearsal (Nel-
son & Narens, 1994), but also metacognitive strategies such
as planning, evaluating, and others (Veenman & Elshout,
1999), also-called metacognitive skills. Second, metacogni-
tion is a conscious process, in the sense that the person is
consciously aware of the monitoring and control processes.
Third, metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control
are strictly limited to the self-regulation of cognition without
any interaction with affect or the broader self-regulation of
behavior. Fourth, metacognition is a purely individual phe-
nomenon, in which the others play no particular role. How-
ever, recent research is challenging the above conceptualiza-
tion of metacognition and stresses the need for a broader one.
The Facets of Metacognition
The distinction of the three facets of metacognition, name-
ly, metacognitive knowledge (MK), metacognitive experi-
* Such models or representations of cognitive functions are often given with the prefix meta added to the name of the function: Metalanguage,
metamemory, metathinking.
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
ences (ME), and metacognitive skills (MS) has been al-
ready mentioned. However, theory of mind and epistemo-
logical beliefs are also manifestations of metacognition
(Kuhn, 2000) and the question is how they fit into the dis-
tinction between the three facets. Moreover, there are ME
not studied in metamemory research but they are present
in problem solving, such as feeling of difficulty or estimate
of effort. An attempt to provide a categorization of meta-
cognitive phenomena within the framework envisaged by
Flavell (1979) is the one described in what follows.
Metacognitive Knowledge
Metacognitive knowledge (MK) is declarative knowledge
stored in memory and comprises models* of cognitive pro-
cesses, such as language, memory, and so forth (Fabricius
& Schwanenflugel, 1994). It also encompasses information
regarding persons (the self and the others as cognitive be-
ings, that is, how we or other people process various tasks
and how good are on them, what was felt during a specific
task processing), as well as information about tasks, strat-
egies, and goals (Flavell, 1979). More specifically, meta-
cognitive task-knowledge involves task categories and
their features, relations between tasks, as well as the ways
they are processed. Metacognitive strategy-knowledge in-
volves knowledge of multiple strategies as well as the con-
ditions for their use (i.e., when, why, and how a strategy
should be used). Finally, metacognitive goal-knowledge in-
volves knowledge of what sort of goals people pursue when
confronted with specific tasks or situations.
The question is if theory of mind (TOM), in the sense of
a set of beliefs about one’s and other people’s minds
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), can also be considered part of
the person’s MK (Kuhn, 2000). Theory of mind develops
at an early age, about 4 years, and lays the foundations for
communication and social interaction. It comprises beliefs
that people have mind and that mental states differ between
the various people as well as from reality. On the other
hand, MK is declarative knowledge in the form of more or
less well-organized belief systems. In this respect, TOM
marks the child’s ability to form a belief system about hu-
mans as having minds; it does not entail, however, that
young children have developed well-articulated MK about
the various mental functions such as memory, attention,
and so forth. This may explain the finding of moderate cor-
relation (about .50) between TOM and metamemory in
young children (Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Yet, the corre-
lation between the two is quite substantial and can support
the claim that TOM is related to MK or, to put it another
way, plays a foundational role in the development of the
child’s MK. However, TOM presupposes awareness of
one’s subjective experiences (desires, thoughts, or emo-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 A. Efklides: Metacognition
tions) and, from this point of view, is also connected to the
more experiential facet of metacognition, namely, ME. In
fact, one of the controversies in TOM research is whether
TOM is a theory (or set of beliefs) or a simulation of others’
mental states upon one’s own (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995;
Harris, 1989).
Independently of the theoretical controversy over the
processes underlying acquisition of TOM, it can be as-
sumed that as children acquire TOM and become aware
that reality is distinct from the representations of it, and that
representations of reality can differ between people and can
be wrong or inaccurate, the foundations of epistemic think-
ing and epistemological beliefs are also laid (Kitchener,
1983; Kuhn, 2000). Epistemological beliefs regard the na-
ture and the constraints of knowledge, the truth and validity
of knowledge, and the means or methods of knowledge
acquisition. Epistemological beliefs, having as their object
knowledge and cognition, can be also considered part of
MK (Kuhn, 2000). Moreover, they are crucial for the crit-
ical appraisal of one’s and others’ thinking, knowledge, be-
liefs, and theories about the world, and for the regulation
of the person’s and others’ cognition.
Metacognitive knowledge gets continuously enriched,
updated, and differentiated by integrating information
coming from the monitoring of cognition at a conscious
level through observation of one’s and others’ behavior/ac-
tions and their outcomes when dealing with specific tasks
in various contexts (Fabricius & Schwanenflugel, 1994),
through awareness of our ME (Flavell, 1979), as well as
through communication and interaction with others (Ruff-
man, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Language-use also allows
individuals to communicate the content of their awareness
to the others, to reflect, to draw inferences, and to make
attributions about the relations between inner states and ob-
servable behaviors and action outcomes. In fact, there are
strong relations between children’s language abilities and
TOM, as well as with MK (Brown, Donelan-McCall, &
Dunn, 1996; Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Finally, language
and reflection allow people to analyze and compare their
subjective mental states and knowledge with those of other
people and to form explicit theories about knowledge and
cognition. This leads to the building of a socially shared
and socially negotiated model of cognition, as well as of
one’s self and others as cognitive beings (King, 1998; Lo-
ries et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 1998). Because the processes
involved in the formation of MK are not connected to the
monitoring of cognitive processing, one would say that MK
represents the offline monitoring of cognition, unlike ME,
which are manifestations of the online monitoring of cog-
nition.
Metacognitive Experiences
Metacognitive experiences (ME) are what the person is
aware of and what she or he feels when coming across a
task and processing the information related to it (Efklides,
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
279
2001, 2006). They are the interface between the person and
the task, the awareness the person has of task features, of
the fluency of cognitive processing, of the progress toward
the goal set, of the effort exerted on cognitive processing,
and of the outcome of processing (Efklides, 2002a; Efkli-
des, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & Ziliaskopoulou, 2006). They
take the form of metacognitive feelings, metacognitive
judgments/estimates, and online task-specific knowledge
(Efklides, 2001, 2006).
Feeling of knowing, feeling of familiarity, and feeling
of confidence are some indicative metacognitive feelings
extensively studied in metamemory research. Also, there
are feelings studied in the context of problem solving, such
as feeling of difficulty (Efklides, 2001), that are crucial for
the self-regulation of effort (Efklides, 2002a; Efklides et
al., 2006). Metacognitive judgments/estimates include
judgment of learning, estimate of effort expenditure, esti-
mate of time needed or spent, but also estimate of solution
correctness, and so forth, that make clusters with feelings
of difficulty and confidence (Efklides, 2002a). The online
task-specific knowledge comprises task information that
we are attending to, and ideas or thoughts that we are aware
of as we deal with a task (e.g., cognitive procedures we are
applying). It also comprises MK that we retrieve from
memory in order to process the task; for example, MK
about tasks and procedures that we used in the past, com-
parison of the current with other tasks about their similar-
ities or differences, and so forth.
What distinguishes online task-specific knowledge from
the other ME is that it is analytic in nature, unlike the other
ME. Specifically, metacognitive judgments can be prod-
ucts of either analytic or nonanalytic processes, that is, heu-
ristic, inferential, and attributional processes (Kahneman,
2003; Koriat, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). Social
cognition processes, such as judgment formation and judg-
ment correction processes, may also play a role (Yzerbyt,
Dardenne, & Leyens, 1998). For example, we may use sta-
tistical inferences based on normative information and in-
dividualized information regarding one’s self or other per-
sons (Nelson, 1996), or on cues from one’s ME – For ex-
ample, use of feeling of confidence as a cue to infer ability
(Efklides & Tsiora, 2002; Metallidou & Efklides, 2001).
Social comparison processes or stereotypic knowledge can
also be used to make judgments about one’s own or others’
cognition (Lories et al., 1998; Salonen et al., 2005).
Metacognitive feelings, on the contrary, are nonanalytic
in nature (Koriat, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). The
mechanism underlying the formation of metacognitive
feelings, particularly of feeling of knowing, has been de-
bated for very long and, although their experiential and
cognitive (informational) nature is fully accepted and rec-
ognized (Koriat, 2007), their affective character has re-
ceived very little attention. Yet, following Frijda (1986),
feelings have an affective character with positive or nega-
tive valence. This is clear in feeling of difficulty which is
associated with negative affect (Efklides & Petkaki, 2005).
Such an association of metacognitive feelings with affect
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
280 A. Efklides: Metacognition
is corroborated by neuropsychological evidence that lo-
cates metacognitive monitoring in the anterior cingulate
cortex, which is an area connected to both the affective and
the cognitive regulatory loops (Fernandez-Duque et al.,
2000). If we accept that metacognitive feelings are both
affective and cognitive in nature, then we can place them
within the context of the broader mechanism of self-regu-
lation of behavior.
In this respect, the affective character of ME can be ex-
plained by two feedback loops (Carver, 2003; Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Efklides, 2006). The first one is related to
the outcome of cognitive processing and detects the dis-
crepancy from the goal set. The higher the discrepancy
from the goal, the more the negative affect experienced; for
example, error detection is associated with negative affect
(Efklides & Petkaki, 2005). The second feedback loop,
which is called metaloop, monitors the rate of discrepancy
reduction, that is, the rate with which one progresses to-
ward one’s goal. The metaloop gives rise to affect (positive
or negative) and a hazy expectancy about the effect of the
rate of progress on one’s goal (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
From the point of view of metacognitive feelings (e.g.,
feeling of familiarity and feeling of knowing), processing
fluency is a critical cue for their formation (Koriat, 2007).
However, it is also a cue for feeling of difficulty because,
in this case, there is lack of processing fluency (Efklides,
2002a). At the same time, processing fluency is a cue for
the formation of affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998). This can
explain why feeling of difficulty is associated with negative
affect (Efklides & Petkaki, 2005).
Monitoring of processing fluency is probably also im-
plicated in feeling of confidence (Koriat, 2007) as a cue of
the correctness of response. When people are asked to
make a judgment about their confidence, there are two
sources of information on which they rely: their estimate
of solution/response correctness and their feeling of diffi-
culty (Efklides, 2002b). Estimate of solution correctness
informs on the discrepancy of the response from the goal.
Feeling of difficulty, on the other hand, alerts the individual
on the need for decision making because there is conflict
of response and increased error probability (Van Veen &
Carter, 2002). Consequently, awareness of feeling of diffi-
culty becomes a cue that the solution/response might not
be correct, and confidence decreases even if the outcome
of processing is objectively correct. In contrast, the person
can feel highly confident, even if the outcome of cognitive
processing is not correct, just because the solution/response
was produced fluently. This is particularly true for persons
who are not aware of their ignorance (Kruger & Dunning,
1999). Thus, metacognitive feelings, although they are
products of nonconscious, nonanalytic inferential process-
es, once they appear in consciousness they provide the
database for analytic judgments/estimates or control deci-
sions (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999).
As regards the differentiation of ME from MK, there is
empirical evidence supporting that self-reports of ME, in
the form of metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judg-
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
ments, are differentiated from self-reports of MK, and that
both of them are explained by a higher-order factor, pre-
sumably metacognition (Metallidou & Efklides, 2000).
This study also showed that self-reports of metacognitive
feelings and MK were differentiated from cognition (in
terms of task performance), as well as that self-reports of
metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments/esti-
mates were differentiated from self-reports of emotions and
motivation. Therefore, the distinction of ME and MK, at
least as regards self-reports, from cognition and emotion
can be maintained, although in the self-regulation process
they are closely interacting.
Metacognitive Skills
Metacognitive skills (MS) refer to the deliberate use of
strategies (i.e., procedural knowledge) in order to control
cognition. Brown (1987) identified the control of cognition
with executive control. Executive control involves selec-
tive attention and working memory, as well as planning,
conflict resolution, error detection, and inhibitory control
(Shimamura, 2000) and, therefore, is related to metacogni-
tive regulation; that is, to both monitoring and control.
However, MS have characteristics that are distinct from
MK and ME, which are products of different processes in
the monitoring of cognition, as already discussed.
Metacognitive skills comprise orientation strategies,
planning strategies, strategies for regulation of cognitive
processing, strategies for monitoring the execution of
planned action, and strategies for the evaluation of the out-
come of task processing (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). Such
a conceptualization of MS implies that they are operating
on cognition through the cognitive regulatory loop, and that
they can call in cognitive strategies – such as rehearsal,
elaboration, and so forth – to regulate cognition, as well as
strategies to analyze task requirements and evaluate the re-
sponse. In this direction, MS make use of online task-spe-
cific knowledge, as well as of MK. Moreover, for MS to
be activated, there needs to be awareness of the fluency of
cognitive processing and awareness that a conflict or error
has occurred. The latter information is conveyed by ME,
such as feelings of familiarity, of difficulty, or of confi-
dence. Thus, ME provide the input that triggers control de-
cisions (e.g., regulation of effort) or MS, either directly or
indirectly through MK (Efklides, Samara, & Petropoulou,
1999).
In conclusion, there is evidence as well as theoretical
reasons to support the claim that metacognition is a mul-
tifaceted phenomenon and that ME, MK, and MS are
three distinct facets of metacognition, despite their close
interrelations. These facets serve different functions in
the self-regulation process, with ME and MK involved in
the monitoring function that informs self-awareness as
well as awareness of cognition, and MS involved in strat-
egy use for the control of cognition. Also, MK (being
declarative knowledge of self and others) along with
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 A. Efklides: Metacognition
metacognitive judgments about other persons’ current
cognitive processing, are instrumental for the co regula-
tion and other-regulation of cognition and behavior. Fi-
nally, MS can also contribute to the co-regulation and
other-regulation of cognition, possibly through the con-
trol of one’s own cognition following feedback from the
other person(s), or through the guidance given to the oth-
er person (other-regulation).
The Conscious and Nonconscious Character
of Metacognition
Defining the facets of metacognition does not explicitly
answer the question of whether metacognition is only a
conscious process or not. There is no doubt that the asso-
ciation of metacognition with consciousness is absolutely
necessary when we want to understand how people get in
charge of their cognitive processing when automatic pro-
cessing fails or when they come across new and demanding
situations. However, if we look at metacognition as moni-
toring and control of ongoing cognitive activity, with feed-
back systems operating to regulate cognitive processing,
then the assumption of metacognition functioning only at
a conscious level is no longer tenable.
Indeed, the conscious character of metacognition was
challenged by early research on metamemory showing
that people monitor and control their cognition without
being consciously aware that they do so. This is evident
in the case of a rapid feeling of knowing that triggers
strategy use without the person being aware of it (Reder
& Schunn, 1996), or in children who very often ask ques-
tions to support their comprehension without being con-
sciously aware that their comprehension has failed (Rob-
inson, 1983). The formation of metacognitive feelings,
according to Koriat and Levy-Sadot (1999), is also based
on nonconscious, heuristic, inferential processes. Implic-
it, nonconscious monitoring and control may also explain
the contradictory findings regarding the relations of MK,
strategies, and actual use of them (Kuyper, van der Werf,
& Lubbers, 2000; Schneider & Pressley, 1997).
Yet, the issue regarding the nonconscious character of
metacognition is not easy to resolve, because implicit and
explicit awareness are not necessarily functioning on a
continuum. There is evidence for implicit nonconscious
awareness that is dissociated from explicit conscious
awareness in some pathological cases (Shimamura,
1994), as well as for a dissociation between cognitive
processing (such as associational or retrieval processes)
and explicit conscious awareness of these processes (Ko-
riat, 2007). This dissociation between conscious and non-
conscious processes, however, does not mean that there
is no regulation of cognition at an implicit level. For ex-
ample, there is neuropsychological evidence that in the
anterior cingulate cortex there is monitoring of conflict
of response, before the response is produced and irre-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
281
spective of the correctness of the response, as well as
monitoring of error after the response has been produced
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Van Veen & Carter, 2002).
Moreover, there is evidence that error detection is taking
place in the same brain area when there is external feed-
back regarding one’s response and, consequently, there is
explicit awareness of error, as well as when there is no
such feedback (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000).
Indeed, if metacognition is instrumental to the regula-
tion of attention or effort – for example, to new stimuli
or to difficult tasks (Metcalfe, 1994) – then there needs
to be continuous monitoring of the incoming informa-
tion, as well as of the current processing and its outcome
for the detection of discrepancies, the resolution of which
demands attention or effort. This kind of nonconscious
implicit monitoring can lead to implicit control, such as
increase of effort, slowing down of processing, and reit-
eration of processing; if, however, the discrepancy is
such that cannot be remedied by implicit regulation, then
the product of the monitoring process reaches conscious
awareness in the form of metacognitive feelings that
draw our attention to the (possible) failure of processing.
This is a bottom-up process of metacognition that leads
to metacognitive feelings and, through them, to reloca-
tion of attentional resources based on analysis of infor-
mation they convey.
A top-down process of metacognition, however, that
is associated with explicit awareness, is also possible.
This happens when the task or the situation itself requires
that some information is maintained in working memory
and is monitored until the response is found (Petrides,
1995). Another case is when external feedback draws our
attention to an error that went undetected by implicit
monitoring, as well as when we or others are questioning
our thinking or evaluate the accuracy of our memory, as
in the case of eyewitness testimony. In a similar vein,
explicit awareness is required when we have to judge a
piece of knowledge or an argument put forth by others or
ourselves, from an epistemological point of view, as in
everyday or scientific discourse. Explicit metacognitive
awareness, therefore, is associated with information ac-
tive in working memory and with social interaction and
the need to communicate our thoughts to others or to un-
derstand and judge the thinking of others. In all these
cases, monitoring is based on analytic processes that
make use of online ME and extant MK.
Following the above line of reasoning, we can assume
that the social level of metacognition is based on con-
scious metacognitive awareness (see also Lories et al.,
1998). Moreover, we can assume that the social level of
metacognition presupposes and refers to the level of per-
sonal awareness, which comprises both ME (products of
implicit monitoring) and online explicit awareness. This
entails that the social level is a meta level of the person-
al-awareness level that, in turn, has as object the cogni-
tive level at which metacognition is implicit.
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
282 A. Efklides: Metacognition
Metacognition and Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is a volitional process aiming at securing
action for the attainment of self goals (Carver & Scheier,
1998). To successfully self-regulate, people need to be
aware of their goals and monitor and control their cogni-
tion, emotions, behavior, and environment (Kuhl & Fuhr-
mann, 1998). Metacognition is instrumental in this process
as self-regulated learning theories have shown (Boekaerts,
1999).
Specifically, the importance of ME is that they make
the person aware of the state of his or her cognition and
trigger control processes that serve the pursued goal of
the self-regulation process (Koriat, 2007; Nelson & Na-
rens, 1994). However, metacognitive feelings, being cog-
nitive and affective in nature, have access to both the af-
fective and cognitive regulatory loops. The affective reg-
ulatory loop is involved in emotion and effort regulation,
whereas the cognitive regulatory loop to the sequencing
of cognitive processing (Stuss & Benson, 1986). Both
regulatory loops function at nonconscious and conscious
level and employ strategy use. Conscious self-regulation
is based on awareness of affect and cognition, that is, on
self-awareness, as well as on volitional control (Posner,
2005). Self-awareness facilitates the interaction of cog-
nition and emotion as well as the cognitive regulation of
both cognition and emotion. Moreover, self-regulation of
emotion, in its turn, affects cognitive processing; for ex-
ample, reappraisal strategies that are used to down- or
upregulate affect can facilitate or impede cognitive pro-
cessing (Kuhl, 2001), and use of cognitive strategies fa-
cilitates cognitive processing with implications for affect
– For example, mood absorption (Erber, 1996). There-
fore, ME contribute to the self-regulation of cognition
through MS and MK, that is, through the cognitive reg-
ulatory loop; metacognitive feelings also contribute
through the affective regulatory loop and indirectly
through the interaction of affect with cognition. More-
over, by activating MK and MS, ME can affect reapprais-
als of the situation and, as a consequence, they contribute
to the cognitive self-regulation of affect.
To understand the role of ME in self-regulation, we
can look at the case of self-regulated learning. When a
student feels difficulty or detects an error, negative affect
is also experienced. However, it is often the case that the
student cannot readily identify the source of this feeling
(Efklides, 2002a), because it is the student who deter-
mines whether the source is the task demands, or lack of
relevant declarative/procedural knowledge, or lack of
ability, or conflict with previous knowledge, or response,
or coming to a dead-end during processing. The search
of the source of affect experienced requires the student
to make attributions. Usually, feeling of difficulty is trig-
gering attributions of task difficulty (Metallidou & Efkli-
des, 2001). In this case, the cognitive regulatory loop is
activated, and metacognitive task-knowledge or online
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
task-specific knowledge is used to figure out the exact
reason that caused the feeling of difficulty. However,
feeling of difficulty is affected not only by task features
but also by self-concept of ability (Efklides & Tsiora,
2002). Therefore, if feeling of difficulty is strong and the
attribution is lack of ability, then the reappraisal of the
situation suggests that cognitive processing is not possi-
ble and, therefore, the task should be abandoned. More-
over, feeling of difficulty, estimate of effort (expended),
and feeling of confidence feed back on the person’s self-
concept and update it (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002). In this
way, ME contribute to self-awareness not only at the task
or situational level, but at a more general level through
self-concept affecting the person’s future interaction with
similar tasks.
Therefore, the role of ME in the self-regulation pro-
cess is distinctive and is different from this of the other
facets of metacognition that do not have access to the
affective regulatory loop, such as MK. Moreover, meta-
cognitive feelings function only at the personal level of
awareness and serve one’s self-regulation but not the reg-
ulation of others’ cognition, which is based on the social
level of metacognition.
A Multifaceted and Multilevel Model
of Metacognition
Up to now three issues that depart from the early concep-
tions of metacognition were discussed: The facets of meta-
cognition, the conscious/nonconscious character of it, and
its relations with the self-regulation process as well as co-
regulation and other-regulation of cognition. The model of
metacognition that emerges is a multifaceted and multilev-
el one, as shown in Figure 1.
This tentative model posits that the object level (Nel-
son & Narens, 1994) comprises processes involved in
cognition as well as in emotions/affect. It functions at a
nonconscious level and involves two separate regulatory
systems based on nonconscious monitoring and control
processes. Products of each of the two regulatory sys-
tems, as well as of their interactions, along with percep-
tions of their behavioral outcomes, are represented at the
personal-awareness level. Emotions, thoughts, ideas, de-
sires, perceptions, and so forth – as well as ME, MK, and
MS – are the components of self-awareness at this level.
Also, at this level, integration of the person’s explicit rep-
resentation of the situation and of its demands with the
action/behavior ensued is accomplished. What is worth
noting is that at the personal-awareness level, metacog-
nition is not cold (i.e., purely cognitive) as the nature of
MK would suggest; it is hot, because affect is integrated
with the monitoring of cognition in the case of metacog-
nitive feelings. Moreover, having represented at the same
forum – that is, in conscious awareness – cognition, af-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 A. Efklides: Metacognition
fect, and metacognition, the self-regulation process is fa-
cilitated because the person is informed of what is sub-
jectively significant and of the progress toward one’s
goal. In the case of control being needed, then ME and
MK can activate MS, and through them the cognitive reg-
ulatory loop. However, metacognitive feelings can also
activate the affective regulatory loop, directly through
their affective quality, or indirectly through MK and MS;
in the latter case, there is cognitive control of emotion.
At the same time, the personal-awareness level in-
forms the meta-meta level that represents the social level
of metacognition. This level comprises only metacogni-
tive judgments about the one’s and others’ ME, MK, and
MS; it is informed by self-awareness at the personal lev-
el, as well as by information received from the ongoing
interaction with others. Monitoring at this level is explicit
and can take the form of reflection. It leads to a socially-
shared and negotiated representation of the person-in-
context. Control at this level is exercised in a conscious
analytic mode and its access to one’s own and others’
cognition and affect at the object level is through the per-
sonal-awareness level of the interacting persons.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
283
Figure 1. The multifaceted and multi-
level model of metacognition.
Implications of the Model for Theory
The multifaceted and multilevel model of metacognition
proposed here provides a framework that can accommo-
date the variability of metacognitive phenomena as identi-
fied in previous research. The most important contribution
is that it extends the relevant theorizing in the direction of
self-regulation, co-regulation, and other-regulation. It can
also lead to hypotheses regarding the relations of the three
levels of metacognition between them as well as between
the various facets of metacognition within each level and
across levels. Such hypotheses can throw light on the con-
ditions that make metacognition successful in the self-reg-
ulation process, as well as why metacognition often fails to
control cognition, or why metacognition can be flawed, to-
tally dissociated from action, or even detrimental to it.
Specifically, metacognition is a critical component of
the self-regulation process because at the personal-aware-
ness level it is part of self-awareness. Self-awareness is the
experience of I as agent – Acting, thinking, and feeling at
a specific place and time, in unity with one’s past (experi-
ences, beliefs, and goals) and future goals (Vogeley, Kur-
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
284 A. Efklides: Metacognition
then, Falkai, & Maier, 1999). Metacognitive experiences
have the characteristics of I as agent at a particular place
and time, but also have unity with one’s past and future
through their relation with self-concept (Efklides & Tsiora,
2002). Also, awareness of MK regarding one’s self and its
interactions with cognitive tasks links the self of the present
with the self of the past, again providing coherence and
continuity to the I. Finally, awareness of the self versus the
others as cognitive beings allows not only shaping of one’s
self-awareness, but also allows the prediction of others’
mental states, thus facilitating (or interfering with) social
interaction and co-regulation/other-regulation.
Social cognition processes have been advocated in the past
as contributing to the formation of metacognitive judgments
regarding the person and the others (Martin & Stapel, 1998;
Yzerbyt et al., 1998). However, this line of research has not
been fully incorporated within the metacognition tradition.
By advocating the three levels of metacognition, hypotheses
can be formulated regarding the differentiation of social cog-
nition effects to each level of awareness as well as their inter-
action with other factors that affect metacognition at each
level and each component of it.
With respect to the efficiency of metacognition to suc-
cessfully control cognition, this is an issue we already re-
ferred to. The multifaceted and multilevel model proposes
that the lack of efficient metacognitive control can be due
to various reasons. For example, ME can be noncalibrated
in relation to actual performance (e.g., underconfidence or
overconfidence) and, thus, misinform the person; or they
can be flawed, for example, illusions of familiarity, of
knowing, or of difficulty (Efklides, 2002a; Koriat, 2007;
Whittlesea, 1993). Also, MK can be flawed because it is
inferential in nature or mindlessly adopted from other peo-
ple in social interaction (i.e., at the social level of metacog-
nition) without any connection to the person’s actual think-
ing and feeling. Furthermore, MK of strategies being de-
clarative in nature cannot control cognition unless it
becomes procedural. Finally, MS, being procedural knowl-
edge, can be automatized and performed even in opposition
to one’s MK or ME, or against the requirements of the self-
regulation and co-regulation processes. Needless to say that
practicing of MS in an analytic way based on MK or in-
struction is effortful and, thus, interacting with task-pro-
cessing demands, often at the expense of performance.
Metacognition can also be dissociated from action/be-
havior (Paris, 2002) if the person is ruminating, that is, uses
his/her MK to figure out possible lines of action/behavior
and their implications without the support of affect to make
a decision. It can be also dissociated from action/behavior,
if the person is asked to report on thinking processes or
feelings of which she or he was not aware of, as in auto-
matic use of strategies. Moreover, it can be detrimental for
action/behavior if the person uses MK in self-serving, re-
petitive, associational ways without the constraints im-
posed by the task, by reality, and/or by the social context.
All the above issues are challenges to metacognition the-
ory and research and the model proposed here can provide
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
a framework for understanding the complexity of the inter-
actions between the facets and the levels of metacognition.
Implications of the Model for Measurement
of Metacognition
Besides the theoretical implications of the multifaceted and
multilevel model of metacognition, it is evident that the
methodology, particularly the measures of metacognition,
needs to be enriched. Up to now, the usual measures are
self-report questionnaires for MK (Schraw, 2000), self-re-
port ratings of ME (Efklides, 2002a), and thinking aloud
protocols for MS (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). For theory
of mind, spontaneous speech and children’s responses to
tasks tapping theory of mind are used (Bartsch & Wellman,
1993), whereas in metamemory research, experimental
procedures are favored along with rating scales (Koriat,
2007).
However, most of the self-report measures are static,
prospective, or retrospective, dependent on language or in-
ferential processes. To fully understand how metacognition
functions, behavioral and physiological measures are also
needed, as well as methodologies that can capture the vari-
ability and dynamic nature of ME during task processing
(within task) and between tasks and contexts. Such behav-
ioral data can include verbal and nonverbal behaviors, in-
dicators of facial expressions, body movements, gazes, and
so forth (see Iiskala, Vauras, & Lehtinen, 2004) that can
reveal affective and informational aspects of ME, as well
as the change of ME along with the course of cognitive
processing. For MS, observation of patterns of behaviors
indicative of strategy use is important information that can
reveal their presence, even in cases in which the person is
not aware of their use (Dermitzaki & Kiosseoglou, 2004).
Measures that can reveal implicit and explicit metacog-
nition are also needed in longitudinal studies of the devel-
opment of MK (Annevirta & Vauras, 2001; Lockl &
Schneider, 2007). Such a developmental design can throw
light on the interaction of the facets of metacognition be-
tween them, as well as with cognition and affect, along with
growing age, knowledge and/or expertise. Neuropsycho-
logical measures and neuroimaging techniques, on the oth-
er hand, are instrumental for understanding the association
of brain functioning with conscious and nonconscious
monitoring and control of cognition (Van Veen & Carter,
2002). Finally, measures of affect are needed in conjunc-
tion with measures of ME in order to capture the interac-
tions of metacognition with affect (Efklides & Petkaki,
2005) and with attributions about subjective inner states as
in social psychology research (Schwarz & Clore, 2003).
Yet, in order to understand the role of metacognition in
the self-regulation process, we also need studies combining
experimental methodology that implicate the self (e.g.,
feedback, social comparison) along with measures of ME
and affect (Efklides & Dina, 2007). To also understand co-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 A. Efklides: Metacognition
regulation and other-regulation, we need studies that in-
volve metacognition in collaborative or group situations
(Salonen et al., 2005). In such studies, measures of meta-
cognition need to be combined with performance measures
and personality measures, such as ability and self-concept
measures (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002). Finally, we need stud-
ies in which the role of ME in specific populations can be
investigated. Such studies may range from mental retarda-
tion to autism and schizophrenia. This line of research can
be extended to include situations in which metacognitive
regulation is used in maladaptive ways.
Implications of the Model for Intervention
Due to the importance of MS for the control of cognition
and learning, a lot of interventions have been developed in
this direction in education. Interventions that focus on
metacognition aim at explicit awareness and, because they
are mediated by other persons, function at the social level
of metacognition. At this level – as the multifaceted and
multilevel model predicts – metacognitive judgments, MK,
and MS are implicated. This has a number of implications:
First, the emphasis of interventions is often on the MK of
strategies and the procedures involved in MS. Moreover,
the design of the intervention is based on metacognitive
judgments of the designer about the level of the trainee’s
ability, MK, or ME. Yet, these judgments do not necessarily
match those of the trainees.
Second, metacognition at the social level cannot con-
trol cognition directly; it does it through the processes
involved at the personal-awareness level of metacogni-
tion. Thus, ME are crucial for the person to realize the
need for control processes and for transforming the so-
cially mediated MK and MS to personally meaningful
knowledge and skills. Also, ME through the affective
loop may, or may not, facilitate the person’s decision to
change his or her initial task-related goal or previous
modes of processing in favor of the socially mediated
MK or MS.
Third, unsuccessful efforts to master a task or unsuc-
cessful use of MS along with feeling of difficulty and
awareness of the effort exerted are also registered as MK
in long-term memory and inform the person’s self-con-
cept. Thus, effortful and unsuccessful training of MS may
undermine future attributions and motivation as regards
the strategies or skills trained, at least in relation to the
particular task at hand. Therefore, metacognitive inter-
ventions that do not help students to self-regulate their
ME and affect during learning run the risk of being inef-
fective or even detrimental to self-regulated learning.
More importantly, metacognitive interventions need to be
able to identify the reasons why metacognitive regulation
is failing, that is, if it is MK (and which aspect of it), MS,
or ME. Then, they can target that particular facet of meta-
cognition and support self-regulation with the restored
component on a new basis.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
285
Conclusion
Despite the fuzziness of the concept of metacognition
(Brown, 1987), differentiating its facets and levels of func-
tioning is of critical importance for both theory develop-
ment and applications related to metacognitive processes
and self-regulation. The multifaceted and multilevel model
of metacognition presented here provides a metatheoretical
framework that favors development of
a) local theories on each of the facets and levels of meta-
cognition and on their interactions,
b) theories on the standing of metacognition in relation to
brain processes involved in self-awareness, and
c) theories on the individual and social metacognitive pro-
cesses involved in knowledge construction. Moreover,
d) it can lead to hypotheses about the ways self-regulation,
co-regulation, and other-regulation function and to pre-
dictions regarding interventions and their outcomes.
Such research can enlighten and extend, for example,
what is already known about parental practices regard-
ing children’s learning at home, teaching practices in the
classroom, or peer interaction during collaborative
learning. Finally,
e) it can provide a basis for understanding metacognition
and its relations with pathological thinking.
Although such an agenda looks ambitious, the fact is that
research on all the above mentioned areas already exists,
but with a loose theory behind it. The presented multifac-
eted and multilevel model of metacognition can provide
some theoretical coherence, but most of all, can inspire new
integrated approaches that can account for complex phe-
nomena such as metacognition and self-regulation.
Acknowledgment
This article is based on the author’s state-of-the-art presen-
tation entitled “Metacognition: Defining its Facets and Ex-
ploring the Implications for Theory, Measurement, and In-
terventions” at the 10th European Congress of Psychology
in Prague, Czech Republic, July 2007.
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About the author
Anastasia Efklides is Professor of Experimental and Cognitive
Psychology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece.
Her research interests regard life-span development of cognitive
functions, motivation, metacognition, and self-regulation, with an
emphasis on metacognitive experiences and the factors involved
in their formation.
Anastasia Efklides
School of Psychology
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
54 124 Thessaloniki
Greece
E-mail efklides@psy.auth.gr
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287