MERRITT v. GOV’T OF THE PHIL.
ISLANDS Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
March 21, 1916 | Trent,. J. | Vicarious Liability of the State
SUMMARY: Plaintiff was gravely injured following a collision with a General Hospital
ambulance, the chauffeur of whom by his occupation is an employee of the state. An
Act was passed authorizing plaintiff to bring suit against the government. The Court
determines whether or not said statute was a mere waiver of the immunity from suit or
also a concession of liability by the State towards the plaintiff, as well as whether or not
the State is ultimately liable for the tort committed by the chauffeur. The Court ruled
that the statute constituted a mere waiver, and that the State is not liable.
DOCTRINE: The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in
the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
FACTS:
● Plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of 10-12 mph. Upon crossing
Taft Avenue and when he was 10 ft. from the southwestern intersection of said
streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south after passing the center thereof (so that it would be on the
left side of the said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor
Vehicle Act), turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the
center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any
whistle or horn.
● This movement by the ambulance struck the plaintiff.
● Plaintiff was severely injured. The doctor who examined him the ff. day found that
he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same
place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose. He was
entirely unconscious. (SEE Notes for greater detail as to injuries; Court mentioned
them to determine the propriety of the award for damages.)
● Act No. 2457 was passed, effective February 3, 1915. It reads thus:
“An Act Authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government
of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit.
“Whereas a claim has been filed against the Gov’t of the Phil. Islands by Mr.
E. Merritt of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March 25, 1913;
“Whereas, it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible
to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled;
and
“Whereas, the Director of Public Works and the Attorney General
recommend that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
“By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Phil. Legislature, that:
“SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit if the CFI of the city of
Manila against the Gov’t of the Phil. Islands in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Phil. Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the
behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the
same.
xxx
RULING:For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be
REVERSED, without costs in this instance. Whether the government intends to make
itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to
determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Whether the State, in enacting the abovequoted Act, simply waived its immunity
from suit or conceded its liability to the plaintiff – IT SIMPLY WAIVED ITS
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
● The Insular Gov’t cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is
admitted that the instant case is one against the Gov’t. As its consent to be sued
was entirely voluntary, it is the Court’s duty to look carefully into the terms of the
consent.
● The two questions that need to be resolved from the Act are: 1) Who is responsible
for the collision, and 2) What amount of damages ought to be awarded to Merrit.
● The Court decided that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the State. The Court having fixed
the amount of damages (SEE Notes), it is now incumbent upon them to decide if
the Act authorizes them to hold the Gov’t liable for such amount. Since the Gov’t
of the Phil. Islands is modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the US,
the decisions of the high courts of that country may be looked into for aid.
● It is equally well-settled in the US that the state is not liable for torts committed by
its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment. Melvin v. State – No claim arises against any government in
favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized
exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
● And as to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is: “By
consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
 merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful by the law of civil responsibility.
defense.” This rule has been cited and explained in a number of cases. ● The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Whether the State is liable for the negligent act of the ambulance driver – Yes. NOTES:
● Par. 5 of Art. 1903 of the OCC reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts For damages: According to the various merchants who testified that:
through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the 1) Plaintiff’s mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent,
official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the and that after having received the injuries, his physical condition had
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and
● As is explained by the Supreme Court of Spain, the obligation to indemnify for ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
damages which a third person caused to another by his own fault or negligence, constructors of wooden buildings.
takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It 2) He had lost 50% of his efficiency.
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not 3) He could no longer climb up ladders and scaffoldings.
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts 4) As a result of such loss, plaintiff had to dissolve his partnership he had formed
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their with the engineer Wilson, and give up a contract for the construction of the
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of Uy Chaco building.
the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the Court found justified P18 075.
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general
weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter
and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law
can arise except in a case where the state acts as a juridical person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obli’s.
● The legal presumption in Art. 1902 of the OCC (that third persons who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage is just as
at fault or negligent) gives way to proof and ceases when the persons mentioned in
said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.
● Among these third persons is the state, but not always, except when it acts through
the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or
negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed
to lie with the state.
● The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
through a special agent - meaning one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official – so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who is on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.
● Therefore, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical