||| NAVALES V. ABAYA, Gambala, Army Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine Capt.
G.R. Nos. 162318 & 162341, [October 25, 2004], 484 PHIL 367-395 Gary Alejano.
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the
General Court-Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with
violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in
connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.
In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this Court a
Petition for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the
Commitment Order 1 dated August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief
of Staff of the AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said
commitment order, all the Major Service Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take c ustodial
responsibility of all the "military personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny"
belonging to their respective commands. This included all the junior officers and
enlisted men (hereinafter referred to as Capt. Reaso, 2 et al.) who are subject of the
instant petition for habeas corpus. The commitment order, however, expressly stated
that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, LtSG. James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt.
Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon
would remain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP. 3
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et
al.), seven of the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the
General Court-Martial from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-
accused for alleged violations of the Articles of War.
Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya who,
as Chief of Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control over all the members and
agencies of the AFP, and Brigadier General Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP and officer in command of the Judge Advocate General
Office (JAGO), the agency of the AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings.
Background 4
At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP — the Philippine Army's Scout
Rangers and the Philippine Navy's Special Warfare Group (SWAG) — quietly entered
the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and
took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives
around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof
deck. aHTEIA
The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led
by a small number of junior officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders
were later identified as including Navy LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo
Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement
through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood
to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Among those grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms
and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, the bombings in Davao City which were
allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain
more military assistance from the United States government, and the "micro-
management" in the AFP by then Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command
and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration.
Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up
their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting
down the rebellion. A few hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating
their grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and later,
indefinitely.
In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and
the Government team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged
between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that
the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and
were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
The Filing of Charges
Under the Information 5 dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those
soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup
d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code. 6 Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt.
Navales, et al. (G.R. No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas
corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (G.R. No. 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo, et al., was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and raffled to
Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza.
On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the
trial court:
1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military
tribunal in accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and
2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable
cause against 316 of the 321 accused and, should the
prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against the
316 other accused. 7
While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution
dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup d'etat 8 against only 31 of the
original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency
of evidence. cCAIaD
Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its
Order 9 dated November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended Information 10 dated
October 30, 2003 charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup
d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. 11 Only the following
were charged under the Amended Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO,
LTSG. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG. JAMES A.
LAYUG, CPT. LAURENCE LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT. GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, CPT. ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO,
JR., CPT. JOHN P. ANDRES, CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT. FLORENTINO B.
SOMERA, 1LT. CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS, 1LT. SONNY S. SARMIENTO, 1LT. AUDIE S.
TOCLOY, 1LT. VON RIO TAYAB, 1LT. REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R. SAN
JUAN, 1LT. WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON, 1LT. NATHANIEL N. RABONZA, 2LT.
KRISTOFFER BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT. JONNEL P. SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S.
PASCUA, 1LT. FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG. MANUEL G. CABOCHAN, LTSG.
EUGENE LOUIE GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G. TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S.
PASCUA, JR., ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, PO3 JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR
GONZALES, and several JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. Further, the said Order
expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt.
Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt.
Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another Order dated November 18, 2003, the RTC
(Branch 61) issued commitment orders against those 31 accused charged under the
Amended Information and set their arraignment.
Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier
dropped as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were charged before the General
Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67
(Mutiny), AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the
President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior
Officer). 12 On the other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained
charged under the Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for
violations of the Articles of War.
Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case
No. 03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the
RTC of Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243
of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch
148) issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the
Orders dated November 14 and 18, 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza,
the Omnibus Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over all charges
filed before the Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and
2) Implement the August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the
prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause are
hereby considered MOOT AND ACADEMIC and, lastly, all
charges before the court-martial against the accused (those
included in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those
former accused (those included in the Order of November 14,
2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. 13
In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court-Martial set
on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles
of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident.
The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the prayer for
the issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in G.R. No.
162318, this Court, in the Resolution dated March 16, 2004, directed the parties to
observe the status quoprevailing before the filing of the petition. 14
The Petitioners' Case
In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the petitioners
advance the following arguments:
I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND
THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY
JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND
THEIR COLLEAGUES BECAUSE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT
THE OFFENSES ARE NOT SERVICE-RELATED AND
ARE PROPERLY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
CIVILIAN COURTS; 15 and
II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER
DETAIN THE JUNIOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN
AS THE CHARGES FOR COUP D'ETAT BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE UPON MOTION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 16
Citing Section 1 17 of Republic Act No. 7055, 18 the petitioners theorize that
since the RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared
that the offenses for which all the accused were charged were not service-connected,
but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat, the General Court-Martial
no longer has jurisdiction over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO
have no authority to constitute the General Court-Martial, to charge and prosecute the
petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with
the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is
no longer any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order dated
August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the charge against them
for coup d'etat had already been dismissed.
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be enjoined from
constituting the General Court-Martial and from further proceeding with the court-
martial of the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in
connection with the Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the
petitioner prays that the respondents be ordered to explain why the detained junior
officers and enlisted men subject of the petition for habeas corpus should not be
released without delay. EHITaS
 The Respondents' Arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court
to dismiss the petitions. The respondents contend that the Order dated February 11,
2004 promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion
and declared that the charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the
Amended Information, were not service-connected, is null and void. They aver that at
the time that the said motion was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784
as the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order
dated November 14, 2003. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer
had any personality to pursue the Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the
petitioners were not "real parties in interest" at the time that their Omnibus Motion was
resolved by the RTC (Branch 148).
The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not given
an opportunity to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion. Worse, they were not
even given a copy of the Order dated February 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be
enforced against the respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.
The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the February 11,
2004 Order as it declared, on one hand, that the charges filed before the court-martial
were not service-connected, but on the other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion
was moot and academic. According to the respondents, these two pronouncements
cannot stand side by side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic,
because the accused who filed the same were no longer being charged with coup
d'etat under the Amended Information, then the trial court did not have any authority to
further resolve and grant the same Omnibus Motion.
The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et
al. were not being charged with coup d'etat under the Amended Information, the trial
court could not make a finding that the charges filed against them before the General
Court-Martial were in furtherance of coup d'etat. For this reason, the declaration
contained in the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2004 Order — that charges filed
against the accused before the court-martial were not service-connected — cannot be
given effect.
Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents vigorously
assert that the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. filed with the
General Court-Martial, i.e., violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are,
in fact, among those declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of
this provision. This means that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the same being properly cognizable by the General Court-Martial. Thus, the
RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its
February 11, 2004 Order that the charges against those accused before the General
Court-Martial were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime
of coup d'etat. Said pronouncement is allegedly null and void.
The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping.
Apparently, a similar petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition with injunction and
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order) had been filed by the petitioners'
co-accused with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case
was resolved against the petitioners therein.
The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue
The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
The Court's Ruling
We rule in the negative. IAETDc
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the
RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that
all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected,
but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat, cannot be given effect. For
reasons which shall be discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The trial court's declaration was
made when the Omnibus Motion
had already been rendered moot
and academic with respect to
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. by reason of the
dismissal of the charge of coup
d'etat against them
The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the
Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, acquire jurisdiction over
all the charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055.
The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original
accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was
subsequently superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under
which only 31 were charged with the crime of coup d'etat. In the November 14, 2003
Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case
against the 290 accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was
dismissed. The said Order became final and executory since no motion for
reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties.
Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion
on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the
November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information
under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against
the other 290. It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them
was dismissed, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., because they
were no longer parties to the case. This was conceded by the RTC (Branch 148) itself
as it stated in the body of its February 11, 2004 Order that:
Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court
is of the view that the movants' first concern in their omnibus
motion, i.e., assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before
 military courts in accordance with R.A. 7055, has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the Order dated November 14,
2003 dismissing the case against TSg. Leonel M. Alnas, TSg.
Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno, et al. and finding
probable cause in the Order dated November 18, 2003 against
accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. Antonio F. Trillanes
IV, et al., issued by Judge Barza.
In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14,
2003 dismissing the case against aforesaid accused, the Court,
therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed
before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse
the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no
motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of
the accused. 19
Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC (Branch 148)
held that the Omnibus Motion was considered "moot and academic." And yet, in the
same dispositive portion, the RTC (Branch 148) still proceeded to declare in the last
clause thereof that "all the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those
included in the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those
included in the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-
connected," on its perception that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles
of War were committed in furtherance of coup d'etat; hence, absorbed by the latter
crime. DECcAS
As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was
dismissed, there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was
considered moot and academic. Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no
further relief could be granted to them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could
be properly considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
And in the same manner that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court, 20 any rulings made by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-
2784 are no longer binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC
(Branch 148) itself recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that "in
view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against
aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all
charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the
Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the
prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused." 21
Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged
with coup d'etat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the
charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-
connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made
by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Such declaration was made by the
RTC (Branch 148) in violation of
Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall
be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
courts. SCcHIE
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the
court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed
therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local
government ordinances.
The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408
(CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-
President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of
National Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
 Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying
Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-
Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil
Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander
to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for
Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned
Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or
Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property. — Willful or Negligent
Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military
Property Issued to Soldiers. EScIAa
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing
Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and
Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the
jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. The following deliberations in the Senate on
Senate Bill No. 1468, which, upon consolidation with House Bill No. 31130,
subsequently became Rep. Act No. 7055, are instructive:
Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to
Section 1, but this will have to be on page 2. This will be in line 5,
which should be another paragraph, but still within Section 1. This
is to propose a definition of what "service-connected" means,
because this appears on line 8. My proposal is the following:
"SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN
THOSE COMMITTED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL PURSUANT
TO THE LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR SUPERIOR OFFICER OR
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY EXERCISE OR
MISSION."
I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion
as to what "service-connected offense" means. Please note that
"service-connected offense,” under this bill, remains within the
jurisdiction of military tribunals.
So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to
propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps,
defining what this service-related offenses would be under the
Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the
following amendment to her amendment which would read as
follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED
CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE
DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75,
ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES
95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.
 This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these
service-related or connected offenses or crimes would be.
The President. What will happen to the definition of
"service-connected offense" already put forward by Senator
Shahani?
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in
the specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of
War.
SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out
between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if
there is no objection. [There was none.]
It was 5:02 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has
graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment, subject to
refinement and style.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the amendment is approved. 22
In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, the principal sponsor of
SB No. 1468, emphasized:
Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes
of offenses committed by persons subject to military law . . . will be
tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related or
connected. And we specified which would be considered service-
related or connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth
Act No. 408. 23
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military
courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to
92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-
connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-
martial. cdphil
Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case. 24 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. 25 It cannot be (1) granted by the
agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or
omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts. 26 Once
vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a
matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may do. Congress has
the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts. 27
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148)
cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with
violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward
Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically
included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant
to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or
offenses.
There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that
violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in
furtherance of coup d'etat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing
that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup
d'etat against the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them.
The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against the
petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the petitioners committed the
violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup
d'etat.
In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not
service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat,
the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in
legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. 28
At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better perspective
the raison d'etre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, jurisdiction over offenses
punishable under CA 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, committed
by "persons subject to military law" was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD)
Nos. 1822, 29 1850 30 and 1852. 31 These presidential decrees transferred from the
civil courts to the military courts jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of
the AFP, the former Philippine Constabulary, the former Integrated National Police,
including firemen, jail guards and all persons subject to military law.
In 1991, after a series of failed coup d' etats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was enacted.
In his sponsorship speech, Senator Tañada explained the intendment of the law, thus:
Senator Tañada. The long and horrible nightmare of the
past continues to haunt us to this present day. Its vestiges remain
instituted in our legal and judicial system. Draconian decrees
which served to prolong the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule
our new-found lives. Two of these decrees, Presidential Decree
No. 1822 and Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, remain
intact as laws, in spite of the fact that four years have passed since
we regained our democratic freedom.
The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated
in the case of Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 that "the
greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human memory."
 PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses
committed by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine Constabulary, the Integrated National Police, including
firemen and jail guards, and all persons subject to military law
exclusively triable by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction
over common crimes rightly belongs to civil courts.
Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
Likewise, Article VIII, Section 1 declares that "the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law."
Reaso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated
August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article
70 35 of the Articles of War.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior
courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or
power with which they have not been vested by law. 36 As earlier discussed, the
General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt.
Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to
prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction. ISTECA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National SO ORDERED.

Defense, (146 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, page 406), the
||| (Navales v. Abaya, G.R. Nos. 162318 & 162341, [October 25, 2004], 484 PHIL
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Gutierrez declared:
367-395)
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over
common crimes at a time when all civil courts were fully
operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the
saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine Judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by
the glorification of military tribunals . . . the many judicial
problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence and self-respect
will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.

The immediate return to civil courts of all cases

which properly belong to them is only a beginning.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open
and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil
courts. . . . 32

Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to
return to the civilian courts the jurisdiction over those offenses that have been
traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over
cases mandated by the Articles of War. ASHECD
Conclusion
The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No.
162341) prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ
of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction
to do so. 33 Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. 34 The
term "court" necessarily includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt.
 CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPE
ALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Ceroferr filed a complaint for damages which also prayed for the peaceful
use and possession of Lot 68 owned by him but which was being used by respondent Santiago
as a terminal for his jeepney. Respondent, however, claimed that the portion of Lot 68 used
by him was within lot 90 owned by him. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because it could not proceed to decide the claim for damages
without determining the validity of respondent's title and the identity of the vacant lot in
question.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a valid cause of action
which was determinable from the face thereof, and that the trial court proceed to try and
decide the case before it since respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to question
the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in the case. It was only when a
second survey report showed results adverse to his case that he submitted a motion to dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of the court.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT, SUFFICIENCY THEREOF;
CASE AT BAR. — The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise
statement of the ultimate facts of the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when
it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In this case,
petitioner Ceroferr's cause of action has been sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were
admitted that the right of ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the peaceful use and
possession of Lot 68 was violated by respondent Santiago's act of encroachment and
fencing of the same, then petitioner Ceroferr would be entitled to damages.
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER, HOW CONFERRED. — On the
issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and
location of the vacant lot in question. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. While the
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party
raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings
which questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent Santiago may be
considered estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in
the case. In his answer, respondent Santiago did not question the jurisdiction of the
trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. His geodetic engineers were present
in the first and second surveys that the LRA conducted. It was only when the second survey
report showed results adverse to his case that he submitted a motion to dismiss.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The Case
This is an appeal via certiorari 1 from the
decision of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
damages and injunction with preliminary injunction, as well as its resolution 4 denying
reconsideration. 5
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 6 are as follows:
"On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation)
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a
complaint 7 against defendant Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago), for
"damages and injunction, with preliminary injunction." In the
complaint, Ceroferr prayed that Santiago and his agents be enjoined
from claiming possession and ownership aver Lot No. 68 of the Tala
Estate Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-90200
(334555); that Santiago and his agents be prevented from making
use of the vacant lot as a jeepney terminal; that Santiago be ordered to
pay Ceroferr P650.00 daily as lost income for the use of the lot until
possession is restored to the latter; and that Santiago be directed to pay
plaintiff Ceroferr moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees, plus expenses of litigation.
"In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot
referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate
Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78110 (3538); that he was not
claiming any portion of Lot No. 68 claimed by Ceroferr; that he had the
legal right to fence Lot No. 90 since this belonged to him, and he had a
permit for the purpose; that Ceroferr had no color of right over Lot No.
90 and, hence, was not entitled to an injunction to prevent Santiago
from exercising acts of ownership thereon; and that the complaint did
not state a cause of action.
"In the course of the proceedings, an important issue
metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over
the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal — the exact identity
and location thereof. There was a verification survey, followed by a
relocation survey, whereby it would appear that the vacant lot is inside
Lot No. 68. The outcome of the survey, however, was vigorously
objected to by defendant who insisted that the area is inside his lot.
Defendant, in his manifestation dated November 2, 1994, adverted to
the report of a geodetic engineer. Mariano V. Flotildes, to the effect
that the disputed portion is inside the boundaries of Lot No. 90 of the
Tala Estate Subdivision which is separate and distinct from Lot No. 68,
and that the two lots are separated by a concrete fence.
"Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties
over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm
centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would
necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the
respective titles of the parties. While both parties have been
brandishing separate certificates of title, defendant asserted a superior
claim as against that of the plaintiff in that, according to defendant, his
title has been confirmed through judicial reconstitution proceedings,
whereas plaintiff's title does not carry any technical description of the
property except only as it is designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the
Tala Estate Subdivision.
"It thus became clear, at least from the
viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer, merely involve
a simple case of collection of damages and injunction — which was the
main objective of the complaint — but a review of the title of defendant
vis-a-vis that of plaintiff. At this point, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention that the
trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing over
the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties over the disputed
portion.
"On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now
subject of this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case
for lack of cause of action and lack ofjurisdiction. The court held that
plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not
be done in the case for damages and injunction before it.
The court cited the hoary rule that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be the subject of collateral attack but can only be challenged through a
direct proceeding. It concluded that it could not proceed to decide
plaintiff's claim for damages and injunction for lack of jurisdiction
because its judgment would depend upon a determination of the
validity of defendant's title and the identity of the land covered by it
"From this ruling, plaintiff appealed to this court insisting that
the complaint stated a valid cause of action which was determinable
from the face thereof, and that, in any event, the trial court could
proceed to try and decide the case before it since, under present law,
there is now no substantial distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in a regional trial court and its limited jurisdiction when acting as
a land registration court, citing Ignacio v. Court of Appeals 246 SCRA
242 (1995)."
On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the
appeal. 8 On May 13, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. 9 On July 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 10
Hence, this appeal. 11
The Issues
The issues are: (1) whether Ceroferr's complaint states a sufficient cause of action
and (2) whether the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the
vacant lot involved in the case.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when
it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. 12 If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. 13
These elements are present in the case at bar.
The complaint 14 alleged that petitioner Ceroferr owned Lot 68 covered by TCT No.
RT-90200 (334555). Petitioner Ceroferr used a portion of Lot 68 as a jeepney terminal.
The complaint further alleged that respondent Santiago claimed the portion of Lot
68 used as a jeepney terminal since he claimed that the jeepney terminal was within Lot 90
owned by him and covered by TCT No. RT-78110 (3538) issued in his name.
Despite clarification from petitioner Ceroferr that the jeepney terminal was within
Lot 68 and not within Lot 90, respondent Santiago persisted in his plans to have the area
fenced. He applied for and was issued a fencing permit by the Building Official, Quezon City.
It was even alleged in the complaint that respondent Santiago was preventing
petitioner Ceroferr and its agents from entering the property under threats of bodily harm IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the
and destroying existing structures thereon. decision of the Court of Appeals 20 and the order of the trial court 21 dismissing the case. We
remand the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, for further
A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the proceedings. TAc
ground of lack of cause of action, as in this case, hypothetically admits all the averments
thereof. The test ofsufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission
extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be assessed by the defendants. 15

In this case, petitioner Ceroferr's cause of action has been sufficiently averred in the
complaint. If it were admitted that the right of ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the
peaceful use and possession of Lot 68 was violated by respondent Santiago's
act of encroachment and fencing of the same, then petitioner Ceroferr would be entitled to
damages.

On the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the identity and location of the vacant lot in question.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some ofthe claims asserted therein. 16 The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. 17

While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction
because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. 18

In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to question the

jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in the case. In his answer, respondent
Santiago did not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint. His geodetic engineers were present in the first and second surveys that the LRA
conducted. It was only when the second survey report showed results adverse to his case that
he submitted a motion to dismiss.

Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their property. This is an
issue that can be best resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.

After the land has been originally registered, the Court of Land Registration ceases
to have jurisdiction over contests concerning the location of boundary lines. In such case, the
action in personam has to be instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction. 19

The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the precise identity and
location of the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal.

The Fallo
 DHS
JOSE LEE and FELIX LIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGAZPI CITY, BRANCH I, HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and SPOUSES ROY PO LAM
and JOSEFA PO LAM, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF
RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT OVER EJECTMENT CASE CANNOT BE QUESTIONED;
COURTS OF COORDINATE AUTHORITY CANNOT INTERFERE WITH ACTION OF COURT
ACQUIRING FIRST JURISDICTION; REASONS. — When the complaint for ejectment was filed
before the respondent trial court on September 2, 1981, said court, as City Court of Legaspi
City, had concurrent jurisdiction with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) in ejectment cases where the question of ownership is involved. This is expressly
provided for in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 which took effect on June 21, 1969.
Evidently, when the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 2, 1981, R.A. 5967 was
the governing law; hence, the respondent trial court had jurisdiction over the case and had
validly rendered the December 19, 1983 decision, For, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is
determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
(Laperal vs. Cruz, 63 SCRA 329, 330 [1975]; Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717 [1967]. It is true
that intervenor Felix Lim, petitioner herein, filed Civil Case No. 6696 on November 3, 1981
with the then Court of First Instance of Albay against spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam,
private respondents herein, questioning the ownership and possession of the property in
question, and on February 9, 1982, he filed Civil Case No. 6767 also before the Court of First
Instance of Albay, for the recovery and annulment of the sale and title of the property in
question. However, at that time when the aforesaid civil cases were filed before the Court of
First Instance of Albay, the City Court of Legaspi had long acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 2687 to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It has been held that "even in
cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction
excludes the other courts" (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552, 556 [1970], please see cases
cited therein).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUISITION BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION,
CONTINUOUS, SUBJECT TO APPELLATE AUTHORITY. — In addition, it is a familiar principle
that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally
and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere
with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts
martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and
while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does
not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive,
and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process. (14 Am. Jur. 435-436, cited in Francisco,
Vicente, Revised Rules of Court, pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING QUESTION OF JURISDICTION;
CASE AT BAR. — Assuming that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the
ejectment case, petitioners are already estopped to raise the question of jurisdiction. As found
by the City Court (now Municipal Trial Court) the issue of ownership was formulated and
raised not only in the September 2, 1981 complaint of plaintiffs Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po
Lam but also in the answer and rejoinder of defendant Jose Lee which were filed on
September 7, 1981 and September 23, 1981, respectively, as well as in the answer in
intervention of Felix Lim which was filed on November 12, 1981. Likewise confirmatory is
defendant's admission that "the issue of ownership over the property in question is an integral
part of the main issue in the instant case as well as the intervenor's submission that the
question of possession is intimately linked with that of ownership. (Decision, Civil Case No.
2687; Rollo pp. 108-109). Surely, petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2687, submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed their answer to the complaint and sought
reliefs therefor. While generally, jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be conferred by
consent of the parties or by their failure to object to the lack of it, the Supreme Court,
however, in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, (23 SCRA 20, 35 [1968], has declared that ". . . party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79)." Therefore, the respondent trial court has not acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision dated December 19, 1983).
4. ID.; RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE CASE ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT ON APPEAL; CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CERTIFIED TO THE PROPER COURT. — The appropriate procedure should have been to
certify the case to the proper court, which is the Regional Trial Court, instead of dismissing
the appeal. While it is true that under Section 5 of R.A. 5967, decisions of the City Courts are
directly appealable to the Court of Appeals, the said law, however, can be said to have been
repealed when Batas Pambansa 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, took effect on August 14, 1981. Under Section 22 BP 129 the "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions."
Therefore, Civil Case 2687 was erroneously brought on appeal before the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court. And Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, states
that: "Where appealed case erroneously brought. — Where the appealed case has been
erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify
the case to the proper court, with specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." Under
Sec. 22, B.P. 129 which was already in force and effect when petitioners appealed from the
decision of the City Court, the appeal should have been brought to the Regional Trial Court.
(See Bello vs. Court of Appeals, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509). Hence, respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court erred in failing to certify the case to the Regional Trial Court.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to set aside and annul (1) the decision
dated December 19, 1983 of the respondent Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi, Branch I, in Civil
Case No. 2687, entitled "Spouses ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA PO LAM, plaintiff, versus JOSE
LEE, defendant; FELIX LIM, Intervenor," which declared the plaintiffs as lawful owners of the
property in question and ordered the defendant to vacate said property; (2) the Resolution of
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 9, 1984 which dismissed the appeal
of herein petitioner Jose Lee from the decision in Civil Case No. 2687; and (3) the Resolution
dated September 5, 1984 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration; or in the
alternative to order the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court to give due course to the
appeal or to certify and remand the case to the proper court for determination on the merits
(Rollo, pp. 2-13).
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 2, 1981, herein private respondents Spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam
filed a complaint for ejectment and or unlawful detainer against herein petitioner Jose Lee
with the then City Court of Legazpi, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2687, on the ground
that the oral contract of lease entered into between the private respondents and said
petitioner, over a commercial lot and building owned by the private respondents, had already
expired and the said petitioner refused to vacate said property despite demands from private
respondents. The private respondents accordingly prayed that judgment be rendered
requiring the defendant Jose Lee, one of the petitioners herein, to vacate the premises of the
property in question as well as ordering said defendant to pay accrued monthly rentals,
attorney's fees and expenses, and exemplary damages (Rollo, pp. 14-16).
In his answer filed on September 7, 1981 to the complaint, herein petitioner Jose Lee,
specifically denied the allegation of private respondents of ownership over the property, on
the basis of a final decision rendered by the then Court of Appeals on March 11, 1981 in CA-
G.R. No. 44770, wherein a certain Felix Lim intervenor therein, was declared as owner of a
portion of the property in question as well as entitled to exercise the right of redemption over
the remaining portion of said property from the subsequent buyer thereof who is the
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents (Rollo, pp. 19-23).
On November 12, 1981, herein petitioner Felix Lim, filed an answer in intervention in Civil Case
No. 2687, which was admitted by the respondent trial court, wherein he, as the declared
owner of a portion of the property in question and redemptioner of the rest thereof by virtue
of the March 11, 1981 decision of the then Court of Appeals, questioned the right of the private
respondents to receive rentals thereon (Rollo, pp. 32-33).
It appears that on November 3, 1981, or previous to the filing of the answer in intervention,
petitioner Felix Lim filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Albay against
private respondents spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam, docketed as Civil Case No. 6696,
where he questioned the right of ownership and possession by the private respondents of the
property subject of Civil Case No. 2687.
It appears further that on February 9, 1982, petitioner Felix Lim filed another complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Albay against the private respondents for the reconveyance and
annulment of the sale and title involving the same property, docketed as Civil Case No. 6767.
Subsequently, the presiding judge of the City Court of Legazpi, Branch III, in which Civil Case
No. 2687 was pending, inhibited himself from hearing the case, for which reason the same
was transferred to Branch I of the City Court of Legazpi, which is now Branch I of the Municipal
Trial Court of Legazpi City, presided by the respondent trial judge.
Before the hearing of the merits of Civil Case No. 2687 commenced, petitioner Jose Lee
moved for the suspension of the proceedings in said case until final decision in Civil Cases Nos.
6697 and 6767 pending before the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial-court denied the
motion of said petitioner in an order dated June 29, 1982 (Rollo, p. 34).
The intervenor, petitioner Felix Lim, on his part, moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 2687 on the
ground that the City Court of Legazpi (now the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City) has no
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the complaint. The trial court denied the
motion of the intervenor in an order also dated June 29, 1982 (Rollo, p. 35).
On August 29, 1982, the intervenor reiterated his motion for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the land in question pertains to
the Court of First Instance of Albay in Civil Cases No. 6696 and 6767, resolution of which was
reserved while the case proceeded to trial. llcd
On December 19, 1983, the respondent trial judge rendered his decision where he ruled that
the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the
property in question. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring the plaintiffs
as lawful owners of, and rightfully entitled to the immediate possession
of the leased commercial building and lot 1557, covered by TCT No.
8102 (formerly TCT 2530), as described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
(2) directing the defendant his agent, or anyone acting in his behalf, to
vacate said leased building and lot, and to restore the actual possession
thereof, to the plaintiffs; (3) ordering the defendant to pay directly the
plaintiffs the whole rentals which accrued, from October, 1982 up to the
time he shall have vacated the leased premises, at the rate of P2,500.00
a month, minus the amounts already deposited with the City
Treasurer's Office of Legazpi, which amounts are hereby retained to be
withdrawn by the plaintiffs, their counsel or representative; (4)
directing the defendant to also pay the plaintiffs the amounts of (a)
P2,500.00, and P1,200.00, as exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
respectively; and (b) the costs of the suit.
"The intervenor's claim and prayer are denied for lack of merit."
Thereafter, petitioner Jose Lee filed a notice of appeal of the aforesaid decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and the case was docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 3397-UDK.
On July 9, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated a resolution in the case, copy
of which was received by petitioner on July 12, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court RESOLVED to dismiss the present appeal,
which should have beer brought to the Regional Trial Court (Sec. BP
129).
 SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 59).
On July 12, 1984, petitioner Jose Lee filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution (Rollo, p. 60).
On September 5, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated a resolution, copy of
which was received by petitioner on September 20, 1984, which denied the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 63).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on October 4, 1984.
Private respondents filed their comment on the petition on December 7, 1984 (Rollo, p. 79) in
compliance with the resolution of this Court, First Division, dated October 15, 1984.
On January 9, 1985, the Supreme Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 130).
On February 15, 1986, petitioners filed their memorandum (Rollo, p. 134) while that of private
respondents was filed on March 7, 1986 (Rollo, p. 142). LLjur
The issues raised in the instant petition are:
I. Whether or not the respondent trial judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch I, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated its decision dated December 19, 1983
declaring private respondents as lawful owners of the property subject of Civil Case No. 2687.
II. Whether or not the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated its resolutions dated July 9, 1984 and September 5, 1984 dismissing the appeal
sought by herein petitioners.
I In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
Petitioners contend that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
ejectment in Civil Case No. 2687 because the issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings,
hence, when the court resolved the issue of ownership over the property in question, it acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The contention is without merit.
When the complaint for ejectment was filed before the respondent trial court on September
2, 1981, said court, as City Court of Legazpi City, had concurrent jurisdiction with the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in ejectment cases where the question of
ownership is involved. This is expressly provided for in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
5967 which took effect on June 21, 1969, and which reads:
"SEC. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have
jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two
hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the following:
(a) Petition for change of name of naturalized citizens after the
judgment has become final and executory;
(b) Cancellation or correction of entries in the City Civil Registry where
the corrections refer to typographical errors only; and
(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue
in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in
conjunction with the issue of possession." (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, when the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 2, 1981, R.A. 5967 was
the governing law; hence, the respondent trial court had jurisdiction over the case and had
validly rendered the December 19, 1983 decision. For, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is
determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. (Laperal vs.
Cruz, 63 SCRA 329, 330 [1975]; Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 21 SCRA 717 [1967].
It is true that intervenor Felix Lim, petitioner herein, filed Civil Case No. 6696 on November 3,
1981 with the then Court of First Instance of Albay against spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po
Lam, private respondents herein, questioning the ownership and possession of the property
in question, and on February 9, 1982, he filed Civil Case No. 6767 also before the Court of First
Instance of Albay, for the recovery and annulment of the sale and title of the property in
question.
However, at that time when the aforesaid civil cases were filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay, the City Court of Legazpi had long acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
2687 to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the
court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts" (Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552,
556 [1970], please see cases cited therein).
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the
appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court
of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to
civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the
proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on
the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations
exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of
jurisdiction and of process. (14 Am. Jur. 435-436, cited in Francisco, Vicente, Revised Rules of
Court, pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.). LexLib
Furthermore, assuming that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment
case, petitioners are already estopped to raise the question of jurisdiction. As found by the
City Court (now Municipal Trial Court) the issue of ownership was formulated and raised not
only in the September 2, 1981 complaint of plaintiffs Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam but also
in the answer and rejoinder of defendant Jose Lee which were filed on September 7, 1981 and
September 23, 1981, respectively, as well as in the answer in intervention of Felix Lim which
was filed on November 12, 1981. Likewise confirmatory is defendant's admission that "the
issue of ownership over the property in question is an integral part of the main issue in the
instant case as well as the intervenor's submission that the question of possession is intimately
linked with that of ownership. (Decision, Civil Case No. 2687; Rollo, pp. 108-109). Surely, SO ORDERED.
petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2687, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when they filed their answer to the complaint and sought reliefs therefor; participated in the ||| (Lee v. Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch I, G.R. No. L-68789,
trial of the aforesaid case; examined private respondent's witnesses; and adduced testimonial [November 10, 1986], 229 PHIL 405-416)
and documentary evidence. They cannot now be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court to which they submitted
their cause voluntarily. While generally, jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be
conferred by consent of the parties or by their failure to object to the lack of it, the Supreme
Court, however, in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA 20, 35 [1968], has declared that " . . . a
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79)." Therefore, the respondent trial court
has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision dated
December 19, 1983.

II
Petitioners likewise contend that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court has acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or without or in excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal from the decision of the respondent trial court dated
December 19, 1983 in Civil Case 2687 instead of certifying the case to the proper court.

The contention is impressed with merit.

The appropriate procedure should have been to certify the case to the proper court, which is
the Regional Trial Court, instead of dismissing the appeal. While it is true that under Section
5 of R.A. 5967, decisions of the City Courts are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals, the
said law, however, can be said to have been repealed when Batas Pambansa 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect on August 14, 1981.' Under
Section 22 of BP 129 the "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions." Therefore, Civil Case 2687 was erroneously
brought on appeal before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. And Section 3 of Rule
50 of the Revised Rules of Court, states that:

"Where appealed case erroneously brought. — Where the appealed

case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not
dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor."

Under Sec. 22, B.P. 129 which was already n force and effect when petitioners appealed from
the decision of the City Court, the appeal should have been brought to the Regional Trial
Court. (See Bello vs. Court of Appeals, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509). Hence, respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court erred in failing to certify the case to the Regional Trial Court.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolutions of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in

AC-GR 3397 dated July 9, 1984 and September 5, 1984 are SET ASIDE, and the decision dated
December 19, 1983 of the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City in Civil Case 2687 is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Albay.
 LORENZO IGNACIO and MAGDALENA DELA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN and FELIZARDO LIPANA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS; JURISDICTION OVER CASES WHERE TENANCY IS
REAL ISSUE; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT NOT BINDING ON CO-DEFENDANT NOT A
PARTY THERETO; CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that the jurisdiction of the Court in a suit
for ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where
tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court
should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The decision of the CAR, it should be
remembered, was rendered upon a compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and
Felizardo Lipana. The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case
No. 895, was not touched upon in said agreement. It was therefor incorrect for respondent
court to conclude from the decision and writ of execution in the CAR cases that Lipana had
actual possession, as against Magdalena dela Cruz, over the landholding prior to the alleged
unlawful detainer and/or forcible entry. Since the tenancy dispute remained unresolved with
respect to Magdalena dela Cruz and was actually the subject of the ejectment case was an
intrusion upon the jurisdiction of said court.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition in forma pauperis questioning the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan, in an ejectment case against petitioners which case was
subsequently appealed to the Court of First Instance, where it was shown that another case
had been filed ahead in the Court of Agrarian Relations wherein petitioners asked that they
be declared the lawful tenants of the disputed landholding. Upon motion of petitioners ,
alleging that private respondent had moved in the Court of First Instance for the execution
of its decision affirming an order of the Municipal Court which found them guilty of
contempt of court and ordering them to vacate the landholding in question, We ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P200.00.
The said landholding consists of two hectares, more or less, included in a larger tract owned
by Felizardo Lipana and tenanted by Alipio Marcelo until his death on December 3, 1962.
Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations at the time of
his death, namely: CAR Case No. 750-Bulacan '62, entitled "Alipio Marcelo vs. Felizardo
Lipana;" and CAR Case No. 827-Bulacan '62, entitled "Felizardo Lipana vs. Alipio
Marcelo." 1 In both cases the deceased was subsequently substituted by Maximo Marcelo
and Emilia Tabor Vda. de Marcelo, surviving son and wife, respectively. A third Case — CAR
Case No. 895 — was filed on December 20, 1932 by Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo
Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz (the latter having been the alleged common-law wife of
Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as entitled to succeed to the tenancy
right and status of the deceased. One of the allegations of Lipana in his answer to the
complaint was that he "signified his intention to recognize as his tenant Magdalena dela
Cruz, who is the widow of Alipio Marcelo." This is an admission that as far as Lipana was
concerned it was Magdalena who had the right to succeed the deceased Alipio as tenant.
On July 23, 1963, acting on a motion of Maximo Marcelo to enjoin Magdalena dela Cruz from
interfering with his peaceful cultivation of the landholding, as well as on an urgent motion of
Felizardo Lipana for leave to cultivate the same land, the CAR issued the following order:
"For this Court to be able to resolve the above prayer and motion
intelligently and judiciously, there is necessity for formal hearing to
determine the following questions of fact:
(1) Since the demise of the former tenant, Alipio Marcelo who has
been and is in actual possession and cultivation of the holding in
question?
(2) Did the deceased voluntarily surrender the holding to respondent
in November 1962?
(3) Is Maximo Marcelo the natural son of the late Alipio Marcelo?
It appears, however, that these are the factual issues directly involved
in CAR Case No. 895-Bulacan '62 where petitioner therein has already
presented three (3) witnesses and several exhibits. Respondents have
not yet presented any evidence. The cause of action indicated,
therefore, is for this Court to withhold action on Maximo Marcelo's
prayer for interlocutory order and Felizardo Lipana's urgent motion for
leave to cultivate the holding.
In the meanwhile, to forestall any untoward incidents and in order not
to disturb the productivity of the land, this Court shall undertake the
cultivation thereof by administration through an impartial third-party.
All the parties in the above-entitled cases shall be restricted from
doing any act of cultivation or planting on the land and reaping,
harvesting or threshing of crops thereon.
WHEREFORE, Maximo Marcelo, Emilia Tabol de Marcelo, Magdalena
dela Cruz, Felizardo Lipana and/or their agents are directed to desist
from performing any act of cultivation or planting on the landholding
formerly tenanted by Alipio Marcelo at Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan,
with a seedling capacity of 30 gantas of palay, or from reaping,
harvesting or threshing any crops thereon until final orders from the
court.
Pursuant to: Section 9, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended, Mr. Severino
Madronio, Agricultural Extension Officer, Bureau of Agricultural
Extension, Bulacan, is hereby directed to repair to the landholding in
question, take possession of the same and undertake the cultivation
thereof and/or planting thereon according to his best judgment and to
 proven farm practices. If the hiring of laborers for the purpose of
complying with this Order is called for, the afore-named Agricultural
Extension Officer shall give preference of employment to Maximo
Marcelo and Magdalena dela Cruz at the prevailing wage for
agricultural laborers in the locality but in no case shall the wage be less
than P2.50 per day, with no allowance for board and lodging."
Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases was entered into by Maximo
Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana, wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the
landholding in favor of the latter. A judgment in accordance with the terms and conditions of
said compromise was thereupon rendered by the trial Judge on November 5, 1964, declaring
that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 895 and 827 were deemed closed and terminated as between
Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.
On January 27, 1965 the CAR ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in the three cases.
On the same date another order was issued, discharging the administration of the
landholding by the Agricultural Extension Officer. On February 5, 1965 the corresponding
writ of execution was issued, commanding the provincial sheriff of Bulacan to place
Felizardo Lipana in possession; and on the following February 25 the provincial sheriff
submitted to the court his return of service.
On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint against Lipana (Case No. 1221),
asking the CAR to declare her the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual rentals
thereof during the past three years and to award damages in her favor by way of attorney's
fees and consequential expenses. In her complaint she alleged that Alipio Marcelo, the
former tenant, surrendered the landholding to Lipana on November 21, 1962, whereupon
she succeeded as such tenant upon agreement with the latter; that on November 13, 1964
the CAR issued an order stating that the dismissal of CAR Case No. 895 was without
prejudice to her right to file an independent action to assert her claim against Lipana, her co-
defendant therein; that together with her husband 2 she continued to work on the land
during the agricultural year 1964-65, but that after they had plowed the land in preparation
for the agricultural year 1965-66 defendant's henchmen created some disturbance at the
place for the purpose of ejecting her forcibly therefrom. Plaintiff was allowed to litigate as
pauper, and notice of the filing of the complaint was served upon Lipana on July 31, 1965.
On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on an action
for "Ejectment and Forcible Entry" (Civil Case No. 235), with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Magdalena dela Cruz and her husband Lorenzo
Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had been placed in possession of the landholding by the
provincial sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated January 27, 1965 in CAR
Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim on August 11, 1965, denying the substantial
averments of the complaint and alleging as affirmative defense the pendency of CAR Case
No. 1221. In their counterclaim for damages, defendants alleged that Magdalena dela Cruz
was the tenant of Felizardo Lipana but that the latter wanted to eject her because she
married her co-defendant Lorenzo Ignacio, who was a member of a farmers' organization in
the locality.
On August 2, 1965 the Municipal Court of Plaridel ordered defendants, pending the hearing
of the case on the merits, to desist from plowing, harrowing, and/or planting the land in
question upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond of P2,000.00.
On October 7, 1965 plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in contempt of court for
having plowed, harrowed and planted the land in question in spite of the existence of the
injunctive order. In their opposition dated October 18, 1965 defendants pointed out that
they did so as tenants of the land subject of CAR Case No. 1221 and that if they observed the
injunctive order of the Municipal Court they would in effect be violating their rights and
obligations in said CAR case.
On November 25, 1965 the Municipal Court found defendants guilty of contempt and
sentenced them to pay fine of P50.00 each or suffer imprisonment for ten days. This order
was appealed by defendants, in forma pauperis, to the Court of First Instance, where the case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3280-M.
On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering
defendants to vacate the land and to remove their house therefrom. decision was likewise
appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3363-
M. Again, defendants were allowed to appeal as paupers.
In due time the trial in CAR Case No. 1221 was terminated and the trial Judge, in an order
dated September 13, 1966, gave both parties fifteen days from notice that the stenographic
notes had been transcribed within which to submit their memoranda, after which period the
case would be deemed submitted for decision. The CAR, however, held its decision in
abeyance for the reason that "it is powerless to modify or set aside the decision rendered by
the Municipal Court in Civil Case No. 235. now on appeal with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan."
In Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M before the Court of First Instance, defendants
(petitioners herein), in a motion dated April 28, 1967, asked for the postponement of the
hearing scheduled on May 2, 1967. The court denied the motion on May 2, 1967 and allowed
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court.
On May 16, 1967 defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, pleading that the evidence
presented by plaintiff be disregarded and the hearing of the case reset for another date. This
motion was also denied.
On July 27, 1967 the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in Civil Cases Nos. 3Z80-M
and 3363-M, which reads as follows:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. With respect to Civil Case No. 3280, finding the defendants guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing them each to pay a fine in the sum
of P50.00 or to suffer an imprisonment of 10 days;
2. With respect to Civil Case No, 3363, ordering the defendants and/or
anybody acting under them, to vacate the premises in question and
remove their house therefrom within 30 days from notice hereof."
The facts show clearly that these cases proceed from and involve essentially a tenancy
dispute. Before Civil Case No. 235 was filed in the Municipal Court of Plaridel, three cases
involving the same landholding had already been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The issue as to who had been in actual possession of the land since the death of the tenant
Alipio Marcelo was before the CAR in Case No. 895, a suit brought by Maximo Marcelo
against Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz, wherein he sought to be declared as the tenant by
right of succession to Alipio Marcelo. The case, however, was dismissed together with CAR
Cases Nos. 725 and 827 originally brought by Alipio Marcelo, without the issue of actual
possession having been resolved, by virtue of the compromise agreement entered into
between Maximo and Lipana. Magdalena dela Cruz thereafter filed her complaint — CAR
Case No. 1221 — to have herself declared the lawful tenant of the landholding.

While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense
and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want
of jurisdiction. 3 The decision of the CAR, it should be remembered, was rendered upon a
compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana. The right of
Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon
in said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 all 895
were "deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;"
and the writ of execution was limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo Lipana immediately in
possession of the landholding formerly cultivated by Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent,
and/or representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo."

It was therefore incorrect for respondent court to include from the decision and writ of
execution in the CAR cases that Lipana had actual possession, as against Magdalena dela
Cruz, over the landholding prior to the alleged unlawful detainer and/or forcible entry. While
both Maximo and Magdalena asserted the right to succeed to the tenancy of the same
landholding after the death of Alipio Marcelo, the CAR did not adjudicate that right to either
of them nor did it resolve the question as to who had actual possession of the landholding
after the death of Alipio. What it did, in order to prevent further trouble between Maximo
and Magdalena was to place the landholding under the administration of the Agricultural
Extension Officer, with instruction that Maximo and Magdalena should be given preference
in working on the land as laborers. The allegations in the complaint in CAR Case No. 1221
reveal that they worked on different portions of the land in accordance with the CAR's order.
This was how things stood when Maximo entered into a compromise agreement with Lipana
surrendering his rights over the landholding in favor of the latter. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, the decision and writ of execution affected only the claim of Maximo
Marcelo as tenant and his actual possession of the portion of the land on which he was
working by virtue of the provisional arrangement ordered by the CAR. Since the tenancy
dispute remained unresolved with respect to Magdalena dela Cruz and was actually the
subject of litigation in CAR Case No. 1221, the filing of the ejectment case was an intrusion
upon the jurisdiction of said court.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the decision of respondent court in Civil
Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M is set aside. No costs.

||| (Spouses Ignacio v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, G.R. Nos. L-27897-98, [October 29,
1971], 149 PHIL 137-145)
 MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FIDEL and
EVELYN BENOLIRAO, MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IS
DETERMINED FROM THE NATURE OF ACTION PLEADED AS APPEARING FROM THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. — A reading of the averments of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the absolute owner of the disputed
premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be
ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of
the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court; nor is there any assertion of defendant's possession which was originally
lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It does not
characterize petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or
illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig pens
thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private respondents
and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should vacate. The action
therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly encroached upon by
petitioner and its adjoining right of way. It is noted that at the time of the filing of said
complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for annulment of the sale between UCRTC and
private respondents. Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated by petitioner was likewise pending in
another court. This case puts in issue the validity of private respondents' acquisition of the
subject lots and ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H. Thus, what is noticeable in the
complaint is that private respondents definitely gave petitioner notice of their claim of
exclusive and absolute ownership, including their right to possess which is an elemental
attribute of ownership. It is immaterial whether or not private respondents instituted their
complaint one month from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of paramount
importance is that the allegations in the complaint are of the nature of wither an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR;
NO IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO. 5456 AND CIVIL CASE
NO. 7785. — For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and, (4) there must be between the first and second actions; (a)
identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of action. There is
no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and the identity of the
subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 5456 and
Civil Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456
to bar the institution of Civil Case No. 7785. There is identity of parties. The record shows
that the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are petitioner as plaintiff while the defendants were
UCRTC, the spouses Meliton and Efremia Carisima and Rosario de Jesus. Private
respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC-and are
therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by title subsequent to the commencement
and termination of the first action. As such, private respondents merely stepped into the
shoes of UCRTC and acquired whatever capacity and title the former had over the same
property or subject matter of the action. Indeed, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of
parties between the two actions. There is however, no identity of causes of action in both
cases. In the case of Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the test of identity of
causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would
support and establish the former and the present causes of action. Petitioner's complaint in
Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation of rentals while Civil Case No. 7785 is an
action for recovery of possession. In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether
or not consignation of rentals is proper under the circumstances obtaining in that case.
Private respondents action for recovery of possession requires them to present evidence of
their claim or title to the subject premises and their right to possess the same from
petitioner. Stated conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is entirely different to that
in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way affect
nor bar Civil Case No. 7785. aIDHET
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J p:
This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
14, 1994 in CA G.R. CV No. 39251 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing
herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal structures which she constructed in
front of the subject lots, to vacate the said property and right of way, and return
possession thereof to the respondents. cdasia
The antecedent facts:
The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako,
comprising of 1,806 square meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil and N.
Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United
Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided the property into
fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for sale
with first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents and
petitioner. 2 Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square meters, consisting of two (2) parts.
One part is the residential portion with an area of 112 square meters purchased by
private respondents-spouses Benolirao 3 while the second part is the right of way for
Lot 666-I and the aforesaid residential portion. 4 Private respondent Carisima
purchased Lot 666-I. Petitioner, who was occupying the western end and front portions
of the aforesaid lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale by
UCRTC. 5
 Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako's wife, Mrs. Rosario de
Jesus. Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on
June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for
consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The
consignation was granted by the trial court and was eventually affirmed on appeal by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25, 1989. 6
On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private
respondents-spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. 7 This sale was annotated at the back of
UCRTC's title on Lot 666-H. 8
On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made
upon petitioner, UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of
the subject premises before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed
as Civil Case No. 6652. 9 On July 15, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint of UCRTC, stating in part, to wit: aisadc
"It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been
authorized in writing for the purpose, may not validly bring an action
to enforce a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the
owners of Lots 666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima families,
while Benjamin Ongsiako possessed the authority to institute the case
(Exhibit "G"), plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Furthermore, the
situation obtaining does not call for the enforcement of an easement
of right of way. Defendant Serdoncillo is not the owner of and has
never claimed ownership over the portion of Lot 666-H on which her
house is erected. A servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner (Article 613, New Civil Code). In the present case, the
ejectment of defendant Serdoncillo from the portion of Lot 666-H
occupied by the house at the instance of the proper party (Renato
Bolinarao's family) would remove the obstruction."
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
the complaint against the defendant Marciana Serdoncillo, as well as
defendant's counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 10
UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court,
hence, the same became final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the
Exercise of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-
spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot
666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or conveyance is
illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the said property and that
the same was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null
and void. UCRTC and private respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992. 11
On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on
petitioner reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property. 12 On December
13, 1990, private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the
subject premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785, which complaint alleges these material
facts:
"5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the
properties designated as lot 666-H and 666-I, are likewise the
owners/grantees of the right of way granted by United Complex
Realty and Trading Corporation which was correspondingly annotated
in its title (Annex "B-3") under Entry No. 205154/T-172291 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City;
"6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed
a residence and pig pen on the plaintiff's right of way as well as on the
front portions of the latter's properties leaving them virtually
obstructed with no ingress or egress from the main road;
"7. That verbal and written demands made upon the
defendant by the plaintiffs to remove and demolish her structures had
been ignored, the last of which was on November 20, 1990, xerox copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex "C" and taken as an integral part
hereof, but despite such demands, the defendant failed and refused
and still fails and refuses to remove and vacate her illegal structures on
the portion of the properties as well as on the right of way of plaintiffs;
"8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law lodged a complaint before the Barangay Captain,
Barangay 84, Zone 10 of Pasay City, which certified filing of the same
in court, xerox copy of said certification is hereto attached as Annex
"D" and taken as integral part hereof;
"9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the
plaintiffs are suffering the unnecessary inconvenience of the absence
of decent and sufficient ingress and egress on their properties, and will
continue to suffer the same unless the illegal structures are finally
demolished and/or removed by the defendants;" 13
Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant
of said lots in question since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder,
thus:
"13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the
complaint are formerly portions of a big track(sic) of land consisting of
1,806 square meters then owned by H.V. Ongsiako;
 "14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of
lot owned by H.V. Ongsiako was subdivided into fourteen (14) lots in
1982, defendant is (sic) already a legitimate tenant and occupant
family of around 400 square meters of the 1,806 square meters of the
said land then owned by H.V. Ongsiako by erecting her residential
house thereon at the agreed monthly rental of P15.00 and increased to
P100.00;
"15. That upon the death of H. V. Ongsiako his heirs
continued collecting the monthly rental of the premises from the
defendants;
"16. That the heirs of H. V. Ongsiako formed a corporation
known as UNITED COMPLEX REALTY AND TRADING CORPORATION
and the big parcel of land consisting of 1,806 square meters was
transferred to the said corporation and subdivided in 1982 into
fourteen (14) lots, two (2) of which lots are the very same lots leased
by the defendant from H.V. Ongsiako and later from his heirs and then
from United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation as alleged in the
preceding pars. 13, 14, and 15; 14
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992,
the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding
preponderance of evidence in plaintiffs' favor, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
"1) Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all
illegal structures she constructed on the front portions of the subject
lots and on the right of way of the plaintiffs; cdati
"2) Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and right
of way and return possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
"3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.
"As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In
the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith by defendants, the latter
are(sic) not liable for damages (Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 577).
"Actual and compensatory damages require substantial
proof. In the absence of malice and bad faith, moral damages cannot
be awarded (Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561).
"As to the attorney's fees, each party should shoulder his/her
expenses.
SO ORDERED." 15
Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals alleging that: 1) the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private
respondents considering that based on the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990,
the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and not an action for recovery of
possession; 2) the action filed by private respondents is barred by res
judicata considering that the present action is identical with that of Civil Case No. 6652;
3) the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of course of action with
respect to enforcement of right of way vis a vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred
in ordering that defendants vacate the properties in question since the lease of
defendants thereon was still in existence and had not yet been terminated. 16
On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision
sustaining the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner, stating
in part as follows:
"The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the
respondent court, to wit:
'The defense that what should have been filed is an
ejectment case and not recovery of possession, is not also
correct. The filing of this case for recovery of possession,
instead of an ejectment case, is not altogether unjustified.
The Benoliraos and Carisima became the owners as early as
May, 1989. Verbal and written demands had been ignored.
There is an immediate need for plaintiffs to use the right of
way, which up to the present time is obstructed. At most,
what surfaced is a technicality which should be abandoned.'
"A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-
appellees cause of action is for recovery or possession of their property
which was encroached upon by defendant-appellant." 17
A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on
August 8, 1994 18 was denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994. 19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to
wit:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS (Sp. Fifteenth Division) COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA
AN EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE
JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS TO THE INFERIOR
COURT), A CASE BASICALLY INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT
OF WAY.
Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial
court's finding that the complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of
possession of the subject premises is an accion publiciana notwithstanding the fact that
the action was filed within one (1) year from demand. Petitioner contends that private
respondents should have filed an action for unlawful detainer and not an action for
recovery of possession against petitioner. Consequently, the trial court is without
jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil Case No. 7785. In support of her contention,
petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs. Luna 20 and Medina vs. Court of
Appeals, 21 which she states is strikingly similar to the facts of this case. Consequently,
the rulings of this Court in these two cases are squarely applicable and controlling in the
case at bar.
Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-
interest of UCRTC and therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that the
demand to vacate required by law should at the very least be reckoned from June 2,
1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6652 considering that their
demands are simply a reiteration of UCRTC's demands against petitioner. Private
respondents further contend that the allegations in the complaint determine the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 specifically alleged
that private respondents are the owners of lots 666-I and 666-H as evidence by transfer
certificates of title and prayed for recovery of possession of a portion thereof including
its right of way illegally and unlawfully possessed by petitioner.
Petitioner's position is without merit.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up on the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. 22 What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 23 Accordingly, the
issues in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and
evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785. 24
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently
show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. 25 In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on
the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria. 26
In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II 27 this Court held that the doctrine
in Emilia v. Bado, 28 decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It
preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to
recover possession of real property, namely: (1) accion interdictal, which is the summary
action for either forcible entry or detentacion, where the defendant's possession of the
property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer or desahucio, where the defendant's
possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to
possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry
on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted
for more than one year; and, (3) accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacionwhich
seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi brought in the proper
regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty,
Inc., 29 this Court held that:
"We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible
entry, as distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in order to vest
jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior physical
possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of
such possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and
stealth, "for if the dispossession did not take place by any of these
means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdiction."
xxx xxx xxx
"The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the
cases of dispossession of lands. Thus, "whenever the owner is
dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may
maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not
necessary for him to wait until the expiration of twelve months before
commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be owner of
the land." Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to
recover possession of real property illegally detained, together with
rents due and damages, even though one (1) year has not expired from
the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of
ownership of such property is alsoinvolved. In other words, if the party
illegally dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal
dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property, he
may commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately
or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he decides to raise the
question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is filed more than
one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, then
the Court of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case.
The former is an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recover of
ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers to an accion
publiciana, which is the recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary
action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance."
A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785
undisputably show that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to
themselves as being the absolute owner of the dispute premises by virtue of their
transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom.
There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the means of
dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, nor is there any assertion of defendant's possession which was originally
lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It does not
characterize petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal
or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig
pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private
respondents and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should
vacate. The action therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but
essentially involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land
allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of way. Indeed, the
Ocular Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of Court, states that:
". . . (T)he right of way hit directly the
defendant Serdoncillo's property consisting of a two-storey residential
house made of wood and GI sheets and occupying the entire width of
the rear portion of the right of way. A coconut tree stands on the
middle of the road, at the back of which is a shanty made of rotten G.I.
sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of washing clothes
extended from defendant's house. To gain access to plaintiff's
property, the group turned right and passed between an "aratiris" tree
and cemented firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino making only one
person at a time to pass. This passageway has only a width of 0.5
meter which is being used by the defendant and her members of the
family aside from the plaintiffs.
". . . Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiff's
property are existing, but he rest are nowhere to be found. According
to Mrs. Benolirao, they are located within the premises of the
defendant's house. At the back of Benolirao is a private property
gutted by fire."
". . . Upon request, the group was granted permission by the
relatives of the defendant to inspect the place. The group further
notice that defendant's improvements were even encroaching on the
plaintiff's lot by approximately 4.1 meters, more or less. The house of
the defendant is facing the plaintiff's property; there is a small chicken
house and there is also a dog house standing near it." 30
It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749,
an action for annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents Benolirao
of Lot 666-H initiated by petitioner was likewise pending in another court. This case
puts in issue the validity of private respondent's acquisition of the subject lots and
ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.
Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents
definitely gave petitioner notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute ownership,
including their right to possess which is an elemental attribute of ownership. 31 It is
immaterial whether or not private respondents instituted their complaint one month
from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of paramount importance is that
the allegations in the complaint are of the nature of either an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioner's reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to be
squarely applicable under the circumstances herein, is entirely misplaced. While it is
true that in these two cases the complaints were filed before the one-year period had
expired from date of last demand, the allegations in the complaint failed to state
material facts which are indicative of a case of either an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court in Bernabe stated that:
"In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that
they are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 199.4 square
meters more or less, located in Tondo, Manila, that defendant (private
respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot without plaintiff's
permission; that on November 14, 1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a
written demand for the removal of said house as well as for the
recovery of damages for the reasonable use and occupation thereof;
and that defendant refused and failed to comply despite repeated
demands. cdasia
xxx xxx xxx
"We have noted that while petitioners allege in their
complaint that they are the owners of the lot on which the house of
the private respondent is constructed, their attached TCT shows that
the lot is still in the name of Fejosera Investment Incorporated. Private
respondent and said company entered into a contract of lease in 1950
for the use and occupation of said lot. Petitioners allegedly bought the
lot in question in 1973, and they must have been fully aware of the
occupancy of the private respondent of the premises in question. Yet,
they did not take any action to remove the house of the private
respondent or to inform the respondent that they had become the
new owners of the lot in question. It is clear therefore that the lease
was allowed to continue.
xxx xxx xxx
"Consequently, the possession of private respondent over
the lot in question became illegal only on November 14, 1980, when
the formal demand to pay and vacate the premises was sent to
him." 32
The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the
owners of the property when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot
without their permission. That despite formal demand defendant failed to vacate and
surrender possession of the property to them. Indeed, the averments in plaintiffs'
complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs' action as either
an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, pertinent portion
of which is quoted hereunder:
 "It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the
filing of this case on February 19, 1981, the defendant was in
possession, as tenant, of the premises. When plaintiff's counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on November 4, 1980 requiring
defendant to vacate the premises when this action was brought, the
one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is an ejectment case
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila."
SO ORDERED. 33
We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be
inappropriate. The facts distinctly show that the complaint filed by the owners of the
property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful
detainer. It was the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after advising the defendant (the
lessee of the premises in question) that a member of the family, Dr. Igama, urgently
needed the house and after repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee proved to
be unsuccessful. All these incidents, from notification to the filing of the complaint
dated May 16, 1985, transpired within a period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual
background of this case is a classic illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily,
the facts are therefore diametrically opposite to the facts of the case at bar.
Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is similar
to the Bernabe and Medina cases and from which this Court should base its findings and
conclusions. The doctrine laid down in Tenorio vs. Gomba is still controlling. In that case
the Court ruled that courts of first instance have jurisdiction over all actions involving
possession of land except forcible entry and illegal detainer, and therefor the lower
court has jurisdiction over the action alleged in the appellant's complaint because it is
neither of illegal detainer nor of forcible entry. 34
Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject
premises had been settled in Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation, which she
won before the Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court ruled that the latter is a tenant of the site or
premises in question and that she cannot be ejected therefrom, even on the
assumption that her house and pig pen are allegedly standing on a right of way. She
claims that pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the
issue of tenancy in said case is now conclusive between her and private respondents
with respect to the subject premises in question.
Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.
Section 49 (now Section 47), provides that:
Section 49. Effects of Judgments. — the effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
"(a) . . .
"(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;"
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when
the right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. 35
Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the
following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4) there must be between the first and
second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter; and (c) identity of
cause of action. 36
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and
the identity of the subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between
Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of
action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar the institution of Civil Case No. 7785.
There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case No.
5456 are petitioner as plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the spouses Meliton
and Efremia Carisima and Rosario de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and
Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC and are therefore the successors-in-
interest of UCRTC by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the
first action. As such, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC and
acquired whatever capacity and title the former had over the same property or subject
matter of the action. Indeed, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of parties
between the two actions. 37
There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case
of Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 38 this Court held that the test of identity of causes of
action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would
support and establish the former and the present causes of action. Petitioner's
complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation of rentals while Civil Case
No. 7785 is an action for recovery of possession.
In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not consignation
of rentals is proper under the circumstances obtaining in that case. Private respondents
action for recovery of possession requires them to present evidence of their claim or
title to the subject premises and their right to possess the same from petitioner. Stated
conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is entirely different to that in Civil Case
No. 7785. Thus, the decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not in any way affect nor bar
Civil Case No. 7785.
Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when
petitioner initiated Civil Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private
respondents' predecessor UCRTC likewise initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present
case under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of the use of a right of way and an
 encroachment of only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some point in time, all
these squabbles must end. thus, the respondent court stated that:
"It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that
courts should decide all questions submitted to them 'as truth and
justice require', and that it is greatly to be desired that all judgments
should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgment of the courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law." 39

In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of

the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the court
will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are
palpably unsupported by the evidence or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts. 40 In this case, We find the said decision to be totally
supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, [October 8, 1998], 358 PHIL 83-104)
 TINITIGAN V. TINITIGAN, SR.,
G.R. No. L-45418, L-45574, [October 30, 1980], 188 PHIL 597-614
MAKASIAR, J p:
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP docketed as L-45418 and L-45574 respectively,
affirming the order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Pasig, Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975. On March 25,
1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista Payuran
Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a contract of lease of a residential house whereby
for a term of four years Payuran shall lease to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per month
with option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00 (pp. 13-16, rec.].
On April 22, 1975, Payuran and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and Severino Jr., all surnamed
Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics Corporation a factory building together with the
portion of land on which it is erected covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998
situated in Baliwag, Parañaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for short), husband of
Payuran and private respondent herein, was not secured. Consequently, on May 22, 1975,
Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner and shareholder of Molave Development
Corporation which is a family corporation, filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of
Ownership and Contract of Lease with Pre-Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 21277 and
which was assigned to Branch II presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro
principally sought to annul the contract of lease executed by Payuran in favor of United
Electronics Corporation. The property involved in this contract is entirely different from that
leased to Pentel with option to buy.
The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted by order of August
20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following:
". . . 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave
Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan
Sr. and Teofista Payuran; . . . ."
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioners from doing any "act to
dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the properties described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of
the complaint" and set the case for hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
September 5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the factory building and the land on which
it is erected covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.).
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction, the issue of the contract of lease of lot covered
by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the complaint was settled amicably. Severino
Tinitigan Sr., however, on September 17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of
sale of a two storey residential house and a lot which are conjugal properties located at 205
Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-34, rec.). The house is tenanted by
Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for short) who is President and General Manager of
Pentel. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to Quintin
Lim, who was given priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal
obligations that were overdue in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure
of mortgaged conjugal properties. Earlier, the same property had been leased by Payuran to
Pentel with an option to buy for P350,000.00.
On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order granting Tinitigan
"authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by TCT No.
15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.).
An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payuran and children alleging among
others that the sale would result in substantial and tremendous losses because the property
sought to be sold is a suitable condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore,
command a higher price (pp. 56-57, rec.).
On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration of the September
29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, the wife Payuran filed against her
husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
at Pasay City presided by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21, rec.).
On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had agreed to the
continuation of the administration of said conjugal properties by plaintiff (wife) Teofista P.
Tinitigan," appointed her administratrix of the conjugal properties subject to the following
conditions:
"1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the real estate
belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be subject to the approval
of the court;
"2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles City shall be
collected by the defendant Severino Tinitigan for his subsistence and
support; and
"3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring St., Pasay
City, shall be subject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [p. 22, rec.].
In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, presided by respondent Judge
issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 1975
order for lack of merit, Further, the court stated that "the defendants (petitioners) have not
even shown that there are offers from other sources willing to buy the property for more
than P300.000.00" (p. 92, rec.).
On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by petitioners Payuran and children
appealing the order of November 3, 1975, it being allegedly final in nature in so far as the
disposition of the Pasay property is concerned and there being no further issue left between
the parties (pp. 72-73, rec.). Cdpr
By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp. 38-44, rec.), the husband Tinitigan
apparently sold for P315,000.00 the Pasay property not to Quintin Lim as contained in the
order of the court in Civil Case No. 21277, but to herein private respondent Chiu Chin Siong
(Chiu for short) who obtained a title thereto. Pursuantly, TCT No. 20031 was issued
cancelling TCT No. 15923.
On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the sale to Chiu was filed by respondent
Tinitigan in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II (pp. 203-205, rec.).
On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order approving the sale executed by Severino
Tinitigan Sr. in favor of Chiu covering the parcel of land at 205 Loring St., San Rafael District,
Pasay City, for and in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.].
In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied the appeal filed by petitioners
Payuran and children on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory
and cannot, therefore, be the subject of appeal. Furthermore, it stated that "the sale in favor
of Chiu Chin Siong is a right pertaining to the plaintiff under Article 171 of the Civil Code and
the exercise of said right is justifiable to relieve the rest of the conjugal properties from
mortgage obligations which are in danger of foreclosure" (p. 90, rec.).
On May 17, 1976, Payuran and children filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction against respondents Tinitigan and the Honorable Pedro C. Navarro in the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387 assailing the orders of respondent Judge and praying
that a restraining order be issued immediately enjoining respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr.
from selling or disposing of the disputed property and if already sold to declare the sale null
and void. Petitioners likewise prayed that the order of the lower court dismissing the appeal
based on the grounds aforestated be declared a nullity and that the appeal be given due
course (pp. 45-49, rec.).
On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the orders of
respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of September 29, 1975 approving the sale of the
conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote:
"The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the property is a
'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its potentials for a hotel or
condominium site is very promising' (Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but
too abstruse to meet the immediate need for the liquidation of a big
conjugal liability and to avoid foreclosure and loss of the properties
mortgaged. Besides the sale to liquidate the conjugal liability finds
support from the provisions of Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code.
We also see from the record before us that petitioner Teofista P.
Tinitigan has filed a complaint for legal separation and dissolution of
the conjugal partnership in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXVIII in Pasay City, under Civil Case No. 4459-P. Private respondent
agreed to the appointment of petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan
as administratrix on certain conditions, which was approved by the
Court (Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the disposition of the property
in question shall be subject to the decision of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II
in Pasig (Ibid., p. 30). As stated above, respondent Judge, presiding
over Branch II of the CFI of Rizal approved the sale of the conjugal
property in question to liquidate certain conjugal obligations (Ibid., pp.
17-19). . . . .
"But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to allow their
appeal from the order dated September 29, 1975 approving the sale of
the conjugal property in Pasay City in order to liquidate certain
conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 17) on the ground that the order dated
November 3, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
dated September 29, 1975 is already final (Ibid., p. 4, par. 14). But the
respondent Judge hold the questioned order as merely Interlocutory
(Ibid., p. 57). We sustain the respondent Judge. . . . The fact that what
was resolved by the respondent Court was a mere motion for judicial
authority to sell conjugal property to liquidate certain conjugal
obligations (Ibid., p. 8) indicates that the order granting the motion
(Ibid., p. 17) is interlocutory. The rationale underlying the rule that an
interlocutory order is not appealable is basically the avoidance of
multiplicity of appeals in a single case which could considerably delay
the final disposition of the case (People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163,
167)" [pp. 93-97, rec.).
Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu filed before the City Court, Branch III,
at Pasay City, presided by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, a complaint for unlawful detainer seeking
an order to compel defendant therein, Quintin C. Lim to vacate the premises in question (pp.
331-335, rec.).
On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with motion to dismiss denying that he was
the lessee of the property and moving to dismiss the detainer action for lack of jurisdiction,
the issue of ownership not being capable of decision without resolving the issue of
ownership pending in other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.). LexLib
On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed with this Court by
Payuran and her three children praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to the
Court of Appeals, and commanding it to send to this Court for review and determination the
records and proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig, Branch
II, presided by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of the petition are: lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the lower court since it did not have judicial authority to authorize
the sale of the conjugal property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in the
said case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to be sold; and
abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order authorizing the sale of the Loring
property was not merely interlocutory but one that was final and appealable.
On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time by Pentel and
Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals, Honorable Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin
Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr.. The petition, docketed as L-45574, seeks to review
on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976
and order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on the
ground that the said decision and order are void.
Petitioners assign the following errors as grounds for the allowance of writ, to wit:
 (1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan Sr., to sell the
property in question is void because.
(a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the
premises they being under the administration of Payuran;
(b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction
over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan authority to
sell them;
(c) The sale of the property was expressly
authorized in favor in Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu;
(d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager
is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises; and
(2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying Payuran's
petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the property here involved.
On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on the petition filed in case G.R. No. L-
45574 resolved without giving due course thereto to require the respondents to comment
and to take up L-45574 with L-45418 since both involve the same Court of Appeals decision
(p. 107, rec.).
During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court in the legal separation case (Civil
Case No. 4459-P), issued an order dated August 29, 1977 dissolving the conjugal partnership
between Tinitigan and Payuran and approving the partition of their properties pursuant to
an agreement (pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property was adjudicated in favor of the wife
Payuran.
In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to exclude TCT 15923 from the list of
properties that should belong to Payuran (pp. 208-210, rec.). An amended motion was
subsequently filed on October 25, 1977 praying that the order of August 29, 1977 be
amended in such a way that the award of the Loring property be conditioned upon the final
outcome of the cases pending before this Court (pp. 326-328, rec.).
Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City issued an order dated
November 22, 1977 in part stating that the "award of the Loring St., Pasay City property
under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the plaintiff in the order of the court dated August 29, 1977
is understood to the subject to the outcome of the cases now pending before the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-45418 and G.R. No. L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.).
Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of Pasay, Branch III in the unlawful
detainer case, presided by Judge Malvar, issued a decision dated January 18, 1978 ordering
the defendant Quintin Lim and all persons claiming under him to vacate the premises in
question and to pay the corresponding rentals thereof to the plaintiff Chiu at the rate of
P1,500.00 per month from January 16, 1976, until the defendant and all persons claiming
under him actually vacate the said premises (pp. 367-371, rec.).
For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a motion for leave to apply for a writ of
injunction to enjoin execution of the decision of Judge Malvar in the unlawful detainer case
and to prohibit further proceedings therein (pp. 259-273, rec.).
This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Malvar from conducting further proceedings and from executing the decision dated January
18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.).
The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily to the question of validity of the
challenged order dated September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro of the CFI
of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as predicated on grounds raised in the
assignment of errors. Cdpr
Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring property is void;
firstly, because Tinitigan had no authority to sell the premises, they being under the
administration of Payuran. This contention is without legal basis. Article 165 of the New Civil
Code decrees that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership." This is the
general rule. Although Article 168 of the same Code provides that "the wife may by express
authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal
partnership property" and scattered provisions in the Code likewise speak of administration
by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the instant
case. The judicial decree dated October 29, 1975 appointing Payuran as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only after the
CFI of Rizal, Branch II had granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property Besides
the appointment of Payuran as administratrix was not absolute as it was made subject to
certain conditions agreed upon by the parties. Although the claim by Payuran that she was
actually administering their conjugal properties even prior to this controversy may have
some color of truth in it; legally, however, such fact is not enough to make
her administratrix of the conjugal partnership for absent a public instrument or a judicial
decree, administration still pertains to the husband as explicitly set forth in Article 165
(supra).
As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA 1079, 1083 [June 25, 1968]) —
"The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a
right clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole
administrator. The wife is not entitled — as of right — to joint
administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession
against the wife who has taken over the administration without his
consent. And the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to
deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full
and complete accounting of such properties."
Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not ceased being the administrator of
their conjugal properties at the time the motion for judicial approval of sale was granted.
Being administrator, however, does not give him outright authority to alienate or encumber
conjugal assets. This kind of transactions requires the express or implied consent of the wife
subject to certain exceptions. Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code provides —
"Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses
 unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same.
"This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnership before the effective date of this Code" (emphasis
supplied).
This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of
the Loring property. The filing of the said motion was, in fact, directed by a legal provision
since it became almost impossible for private respondent to obtain his wife's consent to the
sale which transaction has not proven to be fraudulent. As the evidence warrants, the sale
was necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might endanger the family's
economic standing. Actually, this is one instance where the wife's consent is not required
and impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the New Civil
Code, "the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes specified in
Articles 161 and 162." In general, these articles deal with the obligations of the conjugal
partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph 1 provides that "the conjugal partnerships
shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
case where she may legally bind the partnership."
It must be noted that Payuran did not dispute the existence of these conjugal liabilities.
What she questioned, in reality, was the propriety of the sale of the disputed properly,
which, according to petitioners, has bright prospects of development and market value
appreciation in the future. It was a 'choice lot' as termed by them. Nevertheless, the sale was
the surest and the most practical means resorted to by respondent Tinitigan Sr. to save
them from a serious financial setback. This consideration cannot be sidestepped by
speculative allegations. Moreover, petitioners offer no acceptable and practical solution to
remedy this contingency.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because respondent Judge
had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and could not grant Tinitigan Sr. authority to
sell them. They would seem to capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No.
21277 particularly mentioned only the lot covered by TCT No. 160998 leased to United
Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to note, however, that in the amended complaint,
respondents prayed among others "to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation
or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect, brings
the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the
order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper. Furthermore, it is worth
repeating that the said motion to seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent
amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance
of the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly acquired
jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that "jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be
properly involve or called into activity by the filing of a petition, complaint or other
appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall
be removed. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature
may change" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1970 ed., pp. 37-38).
In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation and dissolution of
conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the order of September 29, 1975 in Civil
Case No. 21277 was issued. As can be gleaned from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No.
4459-P was apparently a tactical maneuver intended to frustrate the order of September 29,
1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro granting Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring
property. Aptly, however, the order of October 29, 1975 made the appointment of Payuran
as administratrix subject to the condition "that the disposition of the property located at
Loring St., Pasay City shall be subject to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be no clearer indication of the validity of the questioned
order, as far as jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's own recognition of the
jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it. The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction
once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs.
Central Surety and Ins. Co., 25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon
the state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the
person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although
they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached" (Ramos vs. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]).
Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioners that it is the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should have assumed jurisdiction over
the disputed property upon the filing of the complaint for legal separation and dissolution of
conjugal partnership. To permit this would result in the disregard of the order of September
29, 1975 issued by the Court of First In stance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not even the court
whose jurisdiction is being invoked sanctions this seeming attempt to contravene sound
doctrines and long-standing principles.
Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order approving the sale of the Loring
property on the ground that the sale was expressly authorized in favor of Quintin Lim and
not respondent Chiu. Obviously, this is but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion
was filed in order to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent as Payuran
would not grant the same. The order, therefore, was not intended to vest Quintin Lim
exclusive right to purchase the Loring property but rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan
Sr. authority to sell the same. To construe otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the
motion was filed. The fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely incidental, it
having been made pursuant to the desire of respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the
former's interest over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin Lim, however, did not
manifest his ability and willingness to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity
prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his pre-emptive right but he failed to exercise the
same for one reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle pressing conjugal
obligations prompted respondent Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could
immediately pay for the property. Chiu, to whom the property was subsequently offered,
immediately paid the full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of the sale in his
favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3, 1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September
29, 1975.

Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely circumstantial ground — that
Pentel, whose President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the
premises. While this may be so, petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of
lease between Payuran and Pentel with option to buy has been entered into in violation of
Civil Code provisions. A close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payuran has
contravened the law by encumbering the disputed property as well as other conjugal
properties without her husband's consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code provides that
"the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in
cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the administratrix, still her act of
leasing the lots covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being violative
of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states that "the wife who is appointed as
an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property or that of the conjugal partnership without judicial authority." Consequently,
Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as a source of right or valid defense.
True, the contract may bind persons parties to the same but it cannot bind another not a
party thereto, merely because he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the maxim,
"res inter alios acta nobis nec nocet, nec prodest," which means that a transaction between
two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person. LLpr

Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying
Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the Loring property. This argument,
however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as well as the evidence presented by both parties
leave no other recourse for the respondent Court of Appeals except to apply the pertinent
legal provisions respecting the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale of the Loring
property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no moment in view of the conclusion aforesaid.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE PETITIONS IN THESE TWO CASES ARE
HEREBY DENIED AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 1, 1976
AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY
AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES.

SO ORDERED.
LOLITA AMIGO and ESTELITA VDA. DE SALINAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE AUGUSTO V. BREVA, as Judge, RTC of Davao,
Branch X, THE SHERIFF OF THE RTC represented by Alfonso M. Zamora, Deputy Sheriff
of Branch X, and JESUS WEE ENG, respondents.
Pacifico C . Yadao for petitioners.
Dominguez Paderna & Tan Law Offices Co. for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER;
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT; DISCUSSION AND
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint. It should hardly be of any
consequence that the merits of the case are later found to veer away from the claims
asseverated by the plaintiff. The suit below is aimed at recovering real property, an action
clearly well within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. In this case, by their filing of an answer
and later an amended answer, petitioners must be deemed to have formally and effectively
appeared before the lower court. Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter
which may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however, as has been so held lately in La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in
a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. The records bear out
the fact that petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the
rendition of the judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to assail the
jurisdiction of the lower court over their person, a somersault that neither law nor policy will
sanction. RBR
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Challenged in the petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals
rendered on 12 November 1991 1 dismissing the petition to annul the writs of execution and
demolition issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, 2 in the
implementation of its final judgment of eviction against herein petitioners in Civil Case No.
10363.
Petitioners Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda. de Salinas leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo, a
parcel of land, also known as Lot 502-C-9, Psd-10752, located along Leon Garcia St., Agdao
District, Davao City, registered in the lessor's name under TCT No. T-5454. Petitioners
constructed their houses on the lot. Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her ownership
of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein private respondent Jesus Wee Eng. TCT No. T-5454
was cancelled and another title, TCT No. 13659, was issued on 28 May 1964 jointly in the
names of the two vendees.
On 17 December 1966, Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City
Government of Davao. Bosquit and Wee exchanged a portion of their Lot 502-C-9 for also a
portion of Lot No. 502-C-11 under TCT No. T-5788 in the name of the city. The transaction
was authorized and approved by the City Council of Davao. 3
In order to delineate the portion of Lot 502-C-9 ceded to the city government, Bosquit and
Wee caused the preparation of plan Psd-11-000258 subdividing the property into Lot 502-C-
9-A and Lot 502-C-9-B. For its part, the city government caused the subdivision of Lot 502-
C-11 into Lot 502-C-11-A and Lot 502-C-11-B. In consonance with the agreement, TCT No. T-
13659 held by Bosquit and Wee was cancelled and in lieu thereof, two separate certificates
of title were issued: TCT No. 46656 in the name of the City Government of Davao covering
Lot 502-C-9-A, and TCT No. 46657 in the names of Bosquit and Wee corresponding to Lot
502-C-9- B. In turn, TCT No. T-5788 in the name of the city government, was cancelled and
two separate titles were issued: TCT No. T-51826 in the names of Bosquit and Wee for Lot
502-C-11-A and TCT No. T-51827 in the name of the city government over Lot 502-C-11-B.
On 01 October 1969, Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against
petitioners before the City Court of Davao (Civil Case No. 1561-A). After almost seven years,
or on 19 July 1976, the city court finally dismissed the action on the technicality that the
plaintiffs did not observe the required 15-day period from the sending of the letter of
demand before filing the action, the letter having been sent instead on 19 September 1969
or only twelve days before the filing of the action. 4
On 25 October 1976, Bosquit sold his rights and interests over Lots 502-C-9-B and 502-C-11-
A to Wee. The titles over the property were thereupon cancelled and TCT No. T-53041 and
TCT No. T-53042 were issued solely in the name of Wee.
On 22 July 1977, Wee, herein private respondent, filed a complaint (docketed Civil Case No.
10363) against petitioners in the then Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, for
recovery of the real property in question. On 08 September 1978, after the petitioners had
filed their answer, the court appointed Orville O. Bueno, a duly licensed geodetic engineer,
its commissioner to conduct a relocation survey of the boundaries of the land. In his report,
dated 27 November 1978, Bueno stated that —
". . . portions of about two-thirds (2/3) of the houses of Lolita Amigo and that of Estelita Vda.
de Salinas is inside of Lot 502-C-9-B, Psd-11-000258, covered by TCT No. T-53041, issued in
the name of Jesus Wee Eng; the remaining one-third of it lies on the road widening and the
creek respectively." 5
Whereupon, private respondent sought an amendment of his complaint which was allowed
by the lower court on 13 November 1979. 6 As so amended, the complaint prayed not only
for the recovery of real property and damages but also for an abatement of nuisance 7 over
the portion of the improvements introduced by petitioners that encroached on the sidewalk
of Leon Garcia Street.
In their amended answer, petitioners denied the material allegations of the amended
complaint. Petitioners stressed that their houses stood neither on private respondent's land
nor on the sidewalk or shoulders of Leon Garcia Street but along the banks of the Agdao
Creek.
Parenthetically, in 1982, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 10363, petitioners Amigo and
Salinas were designated census-beneficiaries of their respective areas (Tag No. 82-A-0342
and Tag No. 82-A-0341) 8 under a so-called City of Davao RCDP-NHA Agreement.
After a full reception of the evidence, the trial court, on 23 September 1983, rendered its
decision which held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff:
"UNDER THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
"1. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portions of land occupied by them as appearing in
the Commissioner's Report (Exhibits 'C' and 'D') and to deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
"2. To pay the plaintiff the amount of THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS each per month for the use of
plaintiff's land, to be reckoned from the date of judicial demand on July 22, 1977 until
defendants shall have vacated the premises in question.
"UNDER THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
"1. The defendants are hereby ordered to demolish the portions of their houses constructed
on the road widening of Leon Garcia Street which constitute a nuisance per se;
"2. To pay plaintiff the amount of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for and as
attorney's fees; and
"3. To pay costs.
"All other claims and counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED." 9
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. CV No. 02405). In its
resolution of 29 November 1984, however, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for the
failure of petitioners to file an appeal brief. 10 A petition for relief from the order of dismissal
was denied by the appellate court, in a resolution of 09 July 1985, for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period." 11
In due time, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment. The lower court, in its
order of 28 October 1988, granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the
corresponding writ. 12 An omnibus motion to quash the writ of execution 13 filed by
petitioners was denied by said court on 27 January 1989. 14 Private respondent, forthwith
moved for a special order of demolition which the court granted on 13 March 1989. 15
Meanwhile, on 02 March 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action
(docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 16979) for the annulment of the trial court's decision of 23
September 1983, as well as all orders and proceedings subsequent thereto, including the
various writs of execution and demolition. 16 Petitioners contended that the judgment
rendered by the lower court was void for want of jurisdiction.
On 08 March 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners' prayer for a temporary
restraining order. 17 The restraining order was lifted when, on 12 November 1991, the
appellate court ultimately dismissed the petition. 18
Petitioners instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari raising several questions:
1. Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their
person in the case at bench;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider the badges of fraud
in the exchange of lots between private respondent and the City Government of Davao;
3. Whether or not their status as lessees in the disputed lot was affected by the said
swapping or exchange of lots; and
4. Whether or not they are entitled to the so-called "right of first refusal" under Section 6
of P.D. No. 1417 and as such cannot be evicted from the disputed lot.
We deny the petition.
The Court must remind the parties that the case brought up to the Court of Appeals is an
extraordinary action that has sought to annul the writs of execution and demolition issued
under and by virtue of a final judgment that is alleged to be void for want of jurisdiction. The
petition should not thus be used as a stratagem to once again reopen the entire controversy,
and make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory, such as by allowing matters outside the question of jurisdiction to be here
litigated anew. Accordingly, this ponencia must and shall only deal with the first of the
above-enumerated issues raised in the instant petition.
Petitioners maintain that the judgment of the trial court is void for being coram non judice.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law 19 and determined by the
allegations of the complaint. It should hardly be of any consequence that the merits of the
case are later found to veer away from the claims asseverated by the plaintiff. The suit below
is aimed at recovering real property, an action clearly well within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. 20 Incidentally, petitioners' assertion that the litigated lots belong in
ownership to the city government and not to private respondent is not borne out by the
evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears that private respondent has been, and still is,
the registered owner of both Lot 502-C-9-B and Lot 502-C-11-A, respectively, under TCT No.
T-53041 and TCT No. T-53042. 21
Neither may petitioners feign absence of jurisdiction over their persons. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. 22 In this case, by their
filing of an answer and later an amended answer, petitioners must be deemed to have
formally and effectively appeared before the lower court. As early as 1918, the essence of
voluntary appearance has been explained by this Court; thus, in Flores v. Zurbito, 23 we have
said:
"A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in
whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person,
is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of
entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written
direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an
appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal
method of appearance is not necessary." (Emphasis supplied.)
Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any
stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, however, as has been so held lately in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 24 must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or
by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. The records bear out the fact that petitioners
have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the rendition of the
judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the lower
court over their person, a somersault that neither law nor policy will sanction. 25

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. SDML

SO ORDERED.

||| (Amigo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102833, [February 9, 1996], 323 PHIL 452-461)
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY ALIAS
GAVINO SIBONGHANOY, ET AL., defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO.,
INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding Company and defendant-appellant.
Velasco Law Office for appellant.
F .S. Urot and G . A. Uriarte for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; PARTY GUILTY OF LACHES MAY NOT
INVOKE LACK OF JURISDICTION ON APPEAL AS IN INSTANT CASE. — It is undisputed fact
that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the
action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are
of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
2. ID.; ESTOPPEL; DIFFERENT WAYS A PARTY MAY BE BARRED FROM RAISING
QUESTION. — A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
3. ID.; LACHES; DEFINITION. — Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. cdasia
4. ID.; ID.; BASIS. — The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
5. ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN PARTY MAY BE ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION. — A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO RAISE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT AN EARLIER STAGE BARS
PARTY FROM QUESTIONING IT LATER. — Where from the time the Surety became a quasi-
party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu by reason of the sum of money involved which was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts but failed to do so and instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits, and it was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally raised said question of jurisdiction, to sanction such conduct
on its part would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
DECISION
DIZON, J p:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is
paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred
to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied,
the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on
Appeal pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for
the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed
the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the
following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any,
under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely
that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On
the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to
file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was
issued. llpr
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from
such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its
record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief
raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of
errors:
"I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance
with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court.
"II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-appellant.
"III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution filed by the herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent motion
for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution."
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. dctai
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962,
decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two
days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially
that appellees' action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of
which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where
the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963
the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed
to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
"It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection
of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of
the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect,
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.).
"We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which
merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case
therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse
decision.
"There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of
consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia
de Seguros, et al., G. R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindañgan Agricultural Co.,
Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G. R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo
Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. No. L-15092, September 29,
1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of
appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable,
but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
"Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the 'exclusive' appellate jurisdiction over
'all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue' (Sec. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify; this case
to the Supreme Court.
"ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the
record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court."
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only
— an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with
the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the
date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is
now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. As already stated, the
action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is,
almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses, the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it
filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with Sections 12 and
17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65
Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not
only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon
the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a
quo not being one of them. cdrep
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the
Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc. 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess,
16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G. R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et
al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the
Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil.
p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction. Were We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
"In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection
of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The
attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the
filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. "After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
"The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs
moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's
opposition, denied on the ground that there was 'no showing that a demand had been made
by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under the
judgment'(Record on Appeal, p. 60).
"Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the
judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion
dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion
and notice of hearing. cdasia
"It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel
asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued
in open court, as follows:
'As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr. counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.,
Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this
incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
'SO ORDERED
'Given in open court, this 2nd day of Nov. 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.
'(SGD.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal,
pp. 64-65, emphasis supplied)
"Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him,
the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution
against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was
issued.
"On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the
ground that the same was 'issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court having been complied with,' more specifically, that the same was issued
without the required 'summary hearing'. This motion was denied by order of February 10,
1958.
"On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated
order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.
"From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 — denying the
surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively
— the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.
"The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of
execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17
of Rule 59, which reads:
"It is also argued that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for
a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order
to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p, 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for
discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, 'to secure the payment to the plaintiff
of any judgment he may recover in the action,' and stands 'in place of the property so
released.' Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the
execution is 'returned unsatisfied' (Section. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the
bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the
defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to
enforce the obligation of the bond." cdll
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company,
||| (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, [April 15, 1968], 131 PHIL 556-568)

SECTION 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — if the execution
be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant
to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally
charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due
under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after
notice and summary hearing in the same action.'(Emphasis supplied).

"Summary hearing is 'not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary
actions are prosecuted' (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved 'with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
regular judicial proceedings' (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that 'the defendant is notified
or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties' (Ibid.,
pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon
the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of
the incident up for consideration.

"In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of
the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel,
was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the
court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore,
complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

"It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion 'for the simple
reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same
are not reduced to writing' (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this
pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called,
what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer.
Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel
that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, 'the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution'; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his
instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Eugenio Ramos for petitioners.
Rogelio P. Closa for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, and Lamberto Magali,
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the deceased, upon learning that Domingo's
title over a parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with respondent Court of First
Instance, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 issued in
favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation. Petitioners alleged therein that they are the
true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued
as a result of errors which were not of their own making. The cadastral court, however,
dismissed the petition for lack of merit on the basis only of memoranda of the parties.
Petitioners did not appeal. Two-and-a-half years after said dismissal, petitioners filed Civil
Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been
made with respect to the subject parcel of land previously registered in the name of
Domingo Magali and covered by TCT No. 9138. Private respondent Francisco Ramos who
claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation was named
a defendant in said civil suit. Private respondent moved for dismissal which was granted by
respondent court on the ground of res judicata.
On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the order of dismissal and
ordered respondent court to conduct further proceedings in the case. The Court held that
the defense of res judicata does not obtain to bar the second suit since the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance in the first case was null and void because when
sitting as a land registration court, it had no jurisdiction to pass upon controversial issues
involving ownership or title to real property.
Assailed order reversed and set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; RES JUDICATA OR BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT; THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT THAT THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR ACTION MUST HAVE BEEN
RENDERED BY A COURT WITH THE PROPER JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
THE PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE PRIOR JUDGMENT OR ORDER WAS RENDERED DOES
NOT EXIST IN CASE AT BAR. — It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by
the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT. No. 68568 as a
bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the
defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior
action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Edition, p. 364.) This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment
or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered.
2. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING AS A LAND
REGISTRATION COURT, CANNOT PASS UPON QUESTIONS INVOLVING OWNERSHIP OR
TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INCIDENT WHERE THE ISSUES INVOLVED HAVE
BECOME CONTROVERSIAL. — It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a
court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining
to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
(Bareng vs. Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity Bureau, 83 SCRA 418; Manalo vs. Mariano.
69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T. Santos, 102 SCRA 474.) In Hu Chon Sunpongco vs. Heirs of
Nicolas Ronquillo, L-27040, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 395, we have held that: "Section
112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration court to order the cancellation,
alteration or amendment of a certificate of title but withdraws from the Court the power to
pass upon any question concerning ownership of the registered property, or any incident
where the issues involved have become controversial."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the
petitioners in their petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the
property covered thereby. The said petition presented before the respondent Court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question of who should be
considered the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in said title. The
petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT No.
68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of
their own making. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond
the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW AS A RULE AND MAY
NOT BE WAIVED BY CONSENT OR AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES; LACK OF
JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN ON
APPEAL. — A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A
MERE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE. — This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted
concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of
jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such plea may no longer be raised
for being barred by laches.
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ESTOPPEL BY LACHES; PETITIONERS CANNOT BE FAULTED
WITH LACHES AS THEY IMMEDIATELY FILED A PETITION IN COURT AFTER LEARNING
THAT THEIR TITLE HAD BEEN CANCELLED. — The petitioners in the instant case may not
be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the property owned by them had
erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or
person who had no right to the same. they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is
unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the
respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general
jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile
Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was
"without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked
merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of
memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that
such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a
cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly
controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their
petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by
the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They
can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an
unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No.
SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non- acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had
in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
7. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; WHEN IT MAY BE INVOKED. — It is neither fair nor legal to bind a
party by the suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks
jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable
defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based.
The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is
shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the
facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De
Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not
possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and
intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who
filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as
well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a
favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
8. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; FILING OF PETITION FOR COMPLAINT IN COURT DOES
NOT RESULT IN WAIVER ON LACK OF COURT'S JURISDICTION. — The determination of
the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues
of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in
filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same,
such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the
result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If
any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be
placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing
that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the
court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30,
Rule 132, ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil
Code.)
DECISION
VASQUEZ, J p:
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the respondent
Court against the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set aside by this Petition
For Review On Certiorari.
The antecedent material facts are not disputed. Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of
money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain
Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment
became final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on
September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138
registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that
the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the
defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title." The Certificate of
Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor of
Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to the rights and
interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one of
the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940 and herein petitioner Modesta
Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 26, 1963, it was
erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in
this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel
Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back
of said title.
On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent
Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order
that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation.
Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali
failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. On June
20, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No.
9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the
respondent Court and in its Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of the Independent Mercantile Corporation and the
cancellation of TCT No. 9138. By virtue of said Order, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
issued a new title in the name of the corporation, identified as TCT No. 68568.
On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali,
upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a
petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation
of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile
Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court
issued an Order dated July 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. (Rollo, pp. 31-38.)
The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record
No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the
complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and
sales that had been made with respect to the property covered by TCT No. 9138 previously
registered in the name of Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim. Named as
defendant in said civil case was herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to
have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in
his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the
instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations (Rollo, pp.
42-45). Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971,
dismissed Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. (Ibid,pp. 10-
13.) A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent
Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. (Ibid, pp. 13-15.) A second Motion For
Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September 29, 1971. (Rollo, pp. 16-
17.) Hence, this Petition. cdll
We find merit in this appeal.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record
No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing
of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by s court
with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior
judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the
controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 364.) This essential
element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case
presently considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent
invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court.
Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was apparently placed on Section
112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a
court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining
to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
(Bareng vs. Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity Bureau, 83 SCRA 418; Manalo vs.
Mariano, 69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T. Santos, 102 SCRA 747; Santos vs. Aquino, 101 SCRA
377.) In Hu chon Sunpongco vs. Heirs of Nicolas Ronquillo, L-27040, December 19, 1970, 36
SCRA 395, we have held that:
"Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration court to order the
cancellation, alteration or amendment of a certificate of title but withdraws from the Court
the power to pass upon any question concerning ownership of the registered property, or
any incident where the issues involved have become controversial."
It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their petition to
cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property covered thereby. The
said petition presented before the respondent Court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction
as a cadastral court, the question of who should be considered the true and lawful owner of
the parcel of land embraced in said title. The petitioners alleged therein that they are the
true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued
as a result of the errors which were not of their own making. In short, the petition raised a
highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to
pass upon or to adjudicate.
It may neither be claimed that the parties have mutually agreed to submit the aforesaid
issues for the determination by the court, it being a fact that herein private respondent was
not a party in the petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Incidentally, although the said petition
was filed by the herein petitioners on November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed by
Independent Mercantile Corporation to the said petition made no mention of the alleged
sale of the property in question in favor of private respondent Francisco Ramos on July 5,
1967. This circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of said sale and the claim that the
private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value of the property in question. Cdpr
In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the second motion
for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to uphold the
view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court in having taken cognizance of the petition for cancellation of TCT No.
68568, they being the ones who invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the
affirmative relief prayed for therein. We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down
in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of
the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar.
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned
it or declined to assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that
the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and
registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a
petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their
counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of
its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of
Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court
that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the
petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the
basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility
that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a
cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly
controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their
petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by
the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They
can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an
unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No.
SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in
LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches. llcd
divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party
taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall
entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies
in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
"whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule
9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment
may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid.), within ten (10)
years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in Civil
Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the
property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of
the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in
issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by
herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of
highly doubtful applicability herein. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion
To Dismiss filed by the private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-180 shall be deemed denied
and the respondent Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case. With costs
against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, [November 19, 1982], 204 PHIL 25-38)

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken
cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the came irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of
the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may
be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been
made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the
truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a
court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be
deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to
the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided
affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that
he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a
simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest
tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The
point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that
lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of
FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SYCIP, respondent.
Ernesto M. Tomaneng for petitioner.
Mauricio Law Office for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; LACHES; DEFINED. — Laches is defined
as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; ESTOPPEL BY LACHES; THE RULING IN TIJAM VS.
SIBONGHANOY IS THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. — The ruling in
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches
should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY, A COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY
STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. — Indeed, the general rule remains: a court's lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is
determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.
4. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; ALL DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS MUST BE PLEADED IN A
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN AN ANSWER, OTHERWISE, THEY ARE DEEMED WAIVED;
EXCEPTIONS. — We stress that Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and
objections — except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior
judgment and/or prescription — must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer;
otherwise, they are deemed waived. As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time "when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record"
that any of those grounds exists.
5. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; HOUSING AND
LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB); JURISDICTION; INCLUDES A SUIT TO
COLLECT ON A PROMISSORY NOTE ISSUED BY A SUBDIVISION LOT BUYER. — Because
an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the HLURB against Francel Realty
Corporation for unsound real estate business practices, the Court dismissed petitioner's
cause of action. The reason for the dismissal was that the Complaint should "instead be filed
as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court. . . ." For the same reason, this Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory
note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the "sales of lots in commercial subdivisions";
and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB, not with the courts.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT DEPRIVED OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE A CASE
MERELY ON THE BASIS THAT IT HAS BEEN INITIATED BY THE DEVELOPER. — Petitioner's
strategy, if allowed, would open a convenient gateway for a developer to subvert and
preempt the rights of buyers by the mere expediency of filing an action against them before
the regular courts, as in this case. Fortunately, the CA saw through the ruse. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case
merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; AN ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE OR REGULATION MUST CONFORM, NOT CONTRADICT, THE PROVISIONS OF THE
ENABLING LAW. — To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not
contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void.
8. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957; ACTS COMMITTED
CONTRARY TO SECTION 18 THEREOF ARE VOID. — Section 18 has been held by the Court
to be a prohibitory law; hence, "acts committed contrary to it are void," pursuant to the
intent of PD 957 "to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to
the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed 'unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers.'" The Court stressed that "such construal ensures the attainment of the purpose of
the law: to protect lot buyers, so that they do not end up still homeless despite having fully
paid for their home lots with their hard-earned cash."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; TO REQUIRE THE LOT BUYER TO SECURE THE CLEARANCE FROM THE
HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) BEFORE STOPPING PAYMENT
WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH THE INTENT OF THE LAW. — Apropos, to require
clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent
of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision
developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop
payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or
upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course of
action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and
consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUYER'S RIGHT TO SUSPEND INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS SHALL BE
CONSIDERED A VALID DEFENSE AGAINST THE SUIT FOR THE CONVEYANCE AND
DAMAGES. — Significantly also, the Court has upheld the reliance of a buyer on Section 23
of PD 957 when he ordered his bank to stop payment of the checks he had issued, so that he
could suspend amortization payments until such time as the owner or developer would have
fulfilled its obligations. In Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the
exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments was considered a valid defense
against the purported violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 by the petitioner in that
case. Such right negated the third element — the "subsequent dishonor of the check without
valid cause." With more reason, then, should the buyer's right to suspend installment
payments be considered a valid defense against the suit for reconveyance and damages.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, Acting C.J p:
In general, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal. This defense may be determined from the factual allegations of
the complaint, regardless of the answer or even before the answer is filed.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 2, 2001 Decision 2 and August 14, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 55127. The CA disposed as follows:
"It is not disputed that [petitioner] filed an illegal detainer case against [respondent]
docketed as Civil Case No. 1310 before the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] of Bacoor, Cavite,
which was accordingly dismissed by the MTC (See answer, p. 28, record). The filing of the
instant case is another blatant attempt by [petitioner] to circumvent the law. For it is well-
settled that where a complaint arises from the failure of a buyer [of real property] on
installment basis to pay based on a right to stop monthly amortizations under Presidential
Decree No. 957, as in the case at bench, the determinative question is exclusively cognizable
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 127 [1996]).
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto." 4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
". . . [I]n November, 1989, [petitioner] and [respondent] entered into a contract to sell a
house and lot covered by TCT No. T-281788. Upon execution of the contract to sell,
[respondent] made a down payment of P119,700.00, which was considered as monthly
rentals at the rate of P2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the townhouse subject of the
contract to sell was transferred in the name of [respondent] as evidenced by TCT No. T-
281788. Despite the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], the latter refused to
pay the balance of P250,000.00. By applying the down payment of P119,700.00 to
defendant's monthly rental starting from December 1989, said amount has been reduced to
nothing. Despite several demands made by [petitioner] to [respondent], including the
demand dated December 12, 1991 made by [petitioner's] counsel, the [respondent] refused
to reconvey the subject property to [petitioner]. The [petitioner] suffered actual damages in
the form of repairs amounting to not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. . . . .
"The [respondent] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the
court below denied the motion stating that the ground relied upon by [respondent did not
appear to be] indubitable.
"Denying the material allegations of the complaint, the [respondent] again invoked the
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Further, there is a pending
case between the same parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board for unsound real estate business practices. Likewise, the
[respondent] justified his refusal to pay the amortizations alleging that the [petitioner] sold
and delivered to him a defective townhouse unit under Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No.
[957].
"After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the trial court, the CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and
damages, but also a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of
real estate under PD 957; hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
HLURB. The appellate court observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses
had notified petitioner of their intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective
structures and materials used in the construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also
before the HLURB, against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice.
Noting that petitioner's illegal detainer case against respondent had been dismissed by the
MTC, the appellate court concluded that the filing of the instant case was another blatant
attempt to circumvent the law. EAICTS
Hence this Petition. 6
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2
of the RTC, Imus, Cavite, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
"B. Whether or not the lower court can dismiss this case in spite of the indisputable fact that
respondent never secured HLURB authority or clearance to stop payment of monthly
rentals." 7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
First Issue:
Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
Before going into the jurisdictional question, we must at the outset point out that, contrary
to petitioner's assignment of errors, the trial court's Decision is not the proper subject of this
Rule 45 Petition. Rather, it is the Decision of the CA that is up for review by this Court. This
mistake in stating the issues could have been fatal to petitioner's case, had it not correctly
restated them in its arguments and discussion. 8 That said, we now proceed to the main
issues.
Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was
erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it
contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial
had ensued and ended. DcaECT
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite
successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 9 in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from
questioning a court's jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its
opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the
first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which
it has actively participated. 10
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it." 11
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather
than the rule. 12 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction
only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it. 13 That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, 14 which we quote:
"A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel." 15
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. 16 The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action. 17 Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the
complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer. 18
From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of
the trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the
case. Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the Motion was denied, he
continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his Answer with affirmative defenses, his
subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This consistent and continuing objection
to the trial court's jurisdiction defeats petitioner's contention that raising other grounds in a
Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 19
We stress that Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and objections — except
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or
prescription — must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are
deemed waived. 20 As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a claim or a case at
any time "when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record" that any of those
grounds exists.
In the present case, the trial court at first denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent,
because the grounds he had relied upon did not appear to be indubitable. The ruling was
made under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which then provided that the court, "after
hearing . . . may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the
hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not
appear to be indubitable." 21 Moreover, the factual allegations of the Complaint 22 that
petitioner filed below for reconveyance and damages sufficiently conformed to the
jurisdictional requisites for the exercise of the MTC's authority. Thus, in accord with the
procedures then prescribed, the court conducted trial to allow all arguments and evidence to
surface. DTEHIA
Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondent's brother and co-complainant
before the HLURB over the same subdivision project. In Francel Realty v. Court of Appeals
and Francisco Sycip, 23 petitioner's Complaint for unlawful detainer was premised on the
failure of respondent's brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis of his right to stop
paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court had ruled that the issue involved a
"determinative question . . . exclusively cognizable by the HLURB"; that is, a "determination
of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957." 24
Because an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the HLURB against Francel
Realty Corporation for unsound real estate business practices, the Court dismissed
petitioner's cause of action. The reason for the dismissal was that the Complaint should
"instead be filed as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6, Section
6 of the Rules of Court . . . ." 25 For the same reason, this Court has ruled that a suit to collect
on a promissory note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the "sales of lots in
commercial subdivisions"; and that jurisdiction over such case lies with the HLURB, not with
the courts. 26
Further, the rules governing counterclaims 27 and the prohibition on the splitting of causes
of action (grounded on the policy against a multiplicity of suits) 28 should effectively bar the
Complaint for reconveyance and damages filed by petitioner. Its Complaint came at the
heels of its unlawful detainer suit that had previously been dismissed by the MTC of Imus,
Cavite, and of the litigation filed by respondent against Francel Realty before the HLURB.
Petitioner avers that the present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was
filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD No. 1344. 29 Such
pretension flies in the face of the ruling of the Court in Francel Realty Corp. v. Court of
Appeals and Francisco Sycip, 30 which we quote:
". . . . In the case of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda
Sarte the developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought on
installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of
jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:
'The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to
collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot
under P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344,and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still
pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB
authorizing suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make
good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting
amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint
against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a
subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to
dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint.'" 31
Petitioner's strategy, if allowed, would open a convenient gateway for a developer to
subvert and preempt the rights of buyers by the mere expediency of filing an action against
them before the regular courts, as in this case. Fortunately, the CA saw through the ruse.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and
decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the
buyer.
Petitioner cites Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation 32 and Fajardo Jr.
v. Freedom to Build, Inc., 33 which do not further its cause either. These cases pertain to deed
restrictions and restrictive covenants in the sale of subdivision units; hence, they do not fall
under any of the cases over which the HLURB exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Naturally,
there was every reason for the courts in the said cases to assume and exercise their
jurisdiction.
Second Issue:
Authority to Stop Payment
of Monthly Rentals
The next proposition relates to the absence of a clearance from the HLRUB authorizing
respondent to stop payment of his amortizations. It is petitioner's position that under
Section 23 of Rule VI of the Rules implementing PD 957, clearance must first be secured from
the Board before the buyer of a subdivision lot or a home can lawfully withhold monthly
payments.
This contention is also unmeritorious.
First, Section 23 of PD 957 — the law upon which the Implementing Rule cited was based —
requires only due notice to the owner or developer for stopping further payments by reason
of the latter's failure to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans and within
the time limit. Section 23 provides as follows:
"SECTION 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization interests but excluding [delinquency] interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate." (Italics supplied)
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions
of the enabling law. 34 An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or
subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the
statute itself is null and void. 35 Thus, the Court in People v. Maceren 36 explained as follows:
"Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. . . . .
"The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. . . . ."
Plainly, therefore, Section 23 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules cannot rise higher than
Section 23 of PD 957, which is the source of its authority. For that matter, PD 957would have
expressly required the written approval of the HLURB before any stoppage of amortization
payments if it so intended, in the same manner that the decree specifically mandates
written consent or approval by the NHA (now the HLURB) in Section 18. 37
Section 18 has been held by the Court to be a prohibitory law; hence, "acts committed
contrary to it are void," 38 pursuant to the intent of PD 957 "to provide a protective mantle
over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed
'unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.'" 39 The Court stressed that “such
construal ensures the attainment of the purpose of the law: to protect lot buyers, so that
they do not end up still homeless despite having fully paid for their home lots with their
hard-earned cash." 40
Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in
keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from
scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat
the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner
or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLRUB against the erring developer. Such
course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety
and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found
improper. EAHcCT
Significantly also, the Court has upheld the reliance of a buyer on Section 23 of PD 957 when
he ordered his bank to stop payment of the checks he had issued, so that he could suspend
amortization payments until such time as the owner or developer would have fulfilled its
obligations. 41 In Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 42 the exercise
of a statutory right to suspend installment payments was considered a valid defense against
the purported violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 by the petitioner in that case. Such
right negated the third element — the "subsequent dishonor of the check without valid
cause." With more reason, then, should the buyer's right to suspend installment payments
be considered a valid defense against the suit for reconveyance and damages. CAHaST
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Francel Realty Corp. v. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, [September 8, 2005], 506 PHIL 407-422)
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES, 1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the
paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697. DcCIAa
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information 3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. 4The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. 5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August
19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. 6 In his appeal before the CA,
the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court's jurisdiction. 7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC;
thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction.
Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court's decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner's
conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded. 8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the
following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of
this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court,
constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner's
appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the
petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public
prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is
running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the
crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling
within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and
subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no
evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of
this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide
through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when
the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information
filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect? EcHAaS
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the
victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the
petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged? 9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. 10 In this case, at the time the criminal
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile
Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32 (2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 11 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. 12 The
said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years, 13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC — the trial went on for
4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. aCTADI
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which
continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions
on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. 14 We went on to state
in U.S. v. De La Santa 15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and
subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal
(Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where
the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the
proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496).
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by
law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the
parties. . . . 16
Later, in People v. Casiano, 17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it
had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that
it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction,
for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on
appeal, to assume an inconsistent position — that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not
depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum
says: DcaSIH
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there
may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or
bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction,
accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. . . . (22 C.J.S., sec.
252, pp. 388-389; italics ours).
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of
previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378). 18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans, 19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack
of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-
appellee presents the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No.
2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960.
Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the
adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe
that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment
of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a
conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-
10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel
case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus: DaIACS
. . . that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for
decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein,
should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals
in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
decision be unfavorable: . . . 20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 21 that a party may be barred by laches from
invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the
case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. DCScaT
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. 22 aTcIAS
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in
resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the
principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez, 23 we pointed out
that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. DIcTEC
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being
barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. 24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction
was the one who invoked the court's jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment
therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to
the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to
mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the
exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., 25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that
estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all
stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court's
jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court . .
. in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so
only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received
an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from
the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did
not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question
of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours) cAaDCE
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we
ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR
Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of
titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never
questioned the trial court's jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the
duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively
participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its
evidence. They invoked the trial court's jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief — the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the
issue of jurisdiction by their own actions. cAHIST
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigant's participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the
court's jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA
402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of
Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable
practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then
accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur
Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours) 26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v.
Pastorin, 27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of
jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather
than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal. 28
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was
erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it
contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial
had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite
successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from
questioning a court's jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its
opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the
first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which
it has actively participated. TcEaAS
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather
than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only
in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved inSibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by
the defenses contained in the answer. 30 HScDIC
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively
took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court,
reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel
through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an
exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a
stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go, 33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be
clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus: TAIaHE
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than
the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases
in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have
been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At
several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the
Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted
its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her
guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court's
jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the
appellate court's directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing
a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in
the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is
the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences
that impelled her to comply. 34 cEaTHD
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance
in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La
Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has
always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar
to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging
its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse
party does not suffer any harm. 35 ITScHa
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set
up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be
determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the
nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. . . .The proceedings
before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. 43 cIADaC
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in
the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Figueroa y Cervantes v. People, G.R. No. 147406, [July 14, 2008], 580 PHIL 58-78)

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches
in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his
appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of
"estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought
to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to
loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. 36 In applying the
principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment
creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. 37 The same, however,
does not obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law.
It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. 38 When
misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. 39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over
the subject matter is void. 40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in
attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the
concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction. 41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz, 42

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or

government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it
be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does
not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. . . .
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE; RENDERS NULL
AND VOID AND COMPLAINTS AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WHERETO. — The rule
is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT OF MANDAMUS MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT
ONLY IN THE BODY BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. — All complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in
the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record. The court acquires jurisdiction over any upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J .:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January
28, 1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the
Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is
granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of
the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied by considering the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land with damages, 2 while the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of
the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession
thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual, moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present
case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the
pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of
defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and after
hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial as attorney's fees
and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing
the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature
of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated
as merely ancillary to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and
P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As may be gleaned
from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action
for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the
amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance
where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous.
Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint
yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00
which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. prll
4. When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of
this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the
Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as
co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an
order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the present case
and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed
plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking
for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the
amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as
it did not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or incidental to the action for recovery
of ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff
with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but
also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient,
nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee. 11
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount SO ORDERED.
of damages as alleged in the original complaint. cdtai ||| (Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919 (Resolution), [May 7,
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only 1987], 233 PHIL 579-586)
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." 12 Thus, in
the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that
was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and
void.

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment
of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not
in the amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged
in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel
filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for
in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical
practice. cdrep
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J.
WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. — Private respondent
claims that the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case
No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The
contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF THE
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. — It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED
FILED UNLESS PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. — The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS
CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. — Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction
over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its
nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in
default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. cdasia
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional
defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs
of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent
Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases
assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court
thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-
raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-
10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a
certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On
August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177 was thereafter assigned,
after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring
the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her
difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the
pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-
Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint
however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees
in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the
Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for
the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on
private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said
order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70.
On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof
questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent
Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the
amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent
court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-
payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true
that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above
related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that
the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In
support of their theory, petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows:
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent
with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed."
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there
was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is
applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of
the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he
deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff
deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14)
days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did not
acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby
perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in
1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the filing
of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in
accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year
before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the
filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect
until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956. llcd
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It
was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed
candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within
the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10 However, the
required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this
Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of
aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be
paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is
not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he
is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills
probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for
the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be
declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be
made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is
delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the
docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for
the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and
that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff
to pay P3,140.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as
the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier
sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court
may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant
filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for
the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before
this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and
that if he had to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have
filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the
rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an
honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the
action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct;
and that as the action is also for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional
docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original
complaint. LLjur
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves
an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy
any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annual
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants
be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's
fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase
price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purpose of payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body
of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly suffered by
plaintiff. cdrep
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket
fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is
not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegation of the
complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific
performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee
computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not
spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed a amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating
any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case
and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985 the trial court directed the
plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking
for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages
alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the
prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For
all legal purposes they was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of
docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint,
the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the
amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium
and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only
P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an
amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint
was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of
P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After
the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency
of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee on P62,132.92. Although private respondent
appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total
amount of this claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about
P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.
paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original
complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and ||| (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, [February 13, 1989], 252 PHIL
the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing 280-292)
of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on
the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision
in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid
the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for
stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the
lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,
thereafter, it any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the
same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee. liblex

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a
quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM, Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial
Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and
GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL ACTIONS COMMENCED AND PROSECUTED
WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING CLAIM FOR DAMAGES; WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE,
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. — The actions in the case at
bar are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion
publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature
thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue
of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action
for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de posesion) or the
title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said
real property — in other words, a real action — may be commenced and prosecuted without
an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
2. ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT; SCOPE. — Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be
worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint
involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be
immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases —
e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction — in which the amount claimed, or the value of the personal
property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the
amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT NO. 7; PURPOSE. — Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of
certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the
amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee."
4. ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT AUTHORIZED TO ALLOW PAYMENT OF FILING FEES WITHIN
PRESCRIPTIVE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — The requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
altered by the clarification and additional rules paid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, G.R. No.s 79937-38, February 13, 1989. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS A CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE
PLEADING. — A new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the
pleading — i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading — as to
which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF MONEY OR DAMAGES; AMOUNT CLAIMED MUST
BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. —
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of
this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WHERE NO AMOUNT BEING CLAIMED IS SPECIFIED OR FEES PAID
ARE INSUFFICIENT. — Where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for
money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this
event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or
the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as
aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of
the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is
where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the
meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
8. ID.; COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER ACTION OF ACCOMPANIED BY REQUISITE
FEES ON REAL ACTIONS WITH CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. — Where the action involves real
property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the
basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of
the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime.
9. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO SPECIFY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED NOT FATAL;
PROPER REMEDY THEREFOR. — When — the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral
and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not
divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction
over the accompanying claims or damages because of lack of specification thereof. What
should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of
damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J p:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three (3) actions for recovery of
possession (acciones publicianas 2 ) were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against
three (3) defendants, docketed as follows:
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial Court, presided
over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was assigned to Branch 2, presided over by
Judge Jesus Matas.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts: (1) Pineda was the owner of a parcel of
land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2)
the previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere
tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the
defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands
had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions
of the land usurped by them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:
1) P2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2) "Actual damages, as proven;
3) "Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix;" 4
4) "P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per day of
appearance;"
and
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and remedies . . .just and equitable in the
premises."
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by
plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten
words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire
phrase read, "5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven." 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common
counsel. 6 Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the case
—
". . . for the reason that the . . . complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of
Circular No. 7 of the . . . Supreme Court dated March 24, 1988, by failing to specify all the
amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;" and.
". . . for . . . failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic requirement as to the assessed
value of the subject lot in dispute."
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but ordered the
expunction of the "allegations in paragraph 11 of the . . . complaint regarding moral as well
as nominal damages." 7 On motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered the
striking out, too, of the "handwritten amount of 'P5,000.00 as and for,' including the
typewritten words 'actual damages as proven' . . . in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in the
conclusion and prayer of the complaint . . .." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209 were also denied
in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez. 9 His Order in Case No. 2209
dated March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the "action at bar is for Reivindicatoria,
Damages and Attorney's fees . . . (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b)
that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages "are only one aspect of the cause of
action," and (c) because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral,
nominal and actual damages, they should be "expunged from the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in the rendition of
the Orders above described, the defendants in all three (3) actions have filed with this Court
a "Joint Petition" for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that
said orders be annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints
"without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies
with Circular No. 7." The joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the
complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal
damages, the Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question — indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted the complaints
which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for
damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for 'reivindicatoria' to remain for trial" by
itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 1-88 (effective
January 1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached 11 were not certified
by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative. Certification was made by
the petitioners' counsel, which is not allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important reason. It fails to
demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in
rendering the Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any proper cause for
the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly
applied the law to the admitted facts. cdll
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and
nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery
of sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the
nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions
is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected
with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite
obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de
posesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a
mortgage on, said real property 13 — in other words, a real action — may be commenced
and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary
damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. LexLib
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." 14 The rule applies
regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than
P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also
prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the
question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases — e.g., actions
simply for recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction 16 — in which the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal
property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the
amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner
does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by
the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed.
Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's
subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-
38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their
complaints "any specification of the amount of damages," the omission being "clearly
intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee." The following rules were
therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd v. Asuncion,
supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee."
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is
the rule that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not
specified in the pleading — i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading — as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. cdrep
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum
claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the
estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words, as already above intimated, actions or
proceedings involving real property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the
court's jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and
there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of money
and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive
of the trial court's competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding
docket fees). 19

Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of
this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case."

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim
purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being
claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and
payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The
other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the
meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal
fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total
amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the
filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the
fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the
fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has
set in the meantime. But where — as in the case at bar — the fees prescribed for an action
involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages
(actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be
dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not
have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims or damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages
as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise
amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within
the relevant prescriptive period. cdrep

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

||| (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, G.R. Nos. 88075-77
(Resolution), [December 20, 1989], 259 PHIL 927-939)
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., AND FILIPINAS LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente for petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES; ADDITIONAL FILING FEE
CONSTITUTES A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT WHEN DAMAGES AROSE AFTER THE FILING
OF THE COMPLAINT. — The trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of
this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to
mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for
exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court,
there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. — In
the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had occasion to make
the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only
to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any
claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading
should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary
or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may
make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IN THE AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT. — The amended and
supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in
failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for. As ruled in Tacay the trial
court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the
amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount
of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor
within the relevant prescriptive period.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific
performance with damages is presented by this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private
respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary
damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial
court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition. prcd
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of
P1,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of
the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend
that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in
the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 1 a similar case involving an
action for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the
assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for
specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real
estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be
computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the
amount of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed
in accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the
determination of the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that
it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the
amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case
of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee.

Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court
wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in
the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective
damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to
specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. prLL

In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to
make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers
only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to which
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any
claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading
should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary
or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may
make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the
material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.

As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record
as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a
reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to
state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the
requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period. 4

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from
the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint,
the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable
time to private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying
the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive
period. No costs. Cdpr

SO ORDERED.

||| (Ayala Corp. v. Madayag, G.R. No. 88421, [January 30, 1990], 260 PHIL 741-746)
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and PARAMOUNT GENERAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. PYRAMID LOGISTICS AND TRUCKING CORPORATION
(formerly PANACOR INTEGRATED WAREHOUSING AND TRUCKING
CORPORATION), respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
The issue, in the main, in the present case is whether respondent, Pyramid Logistics and
Trucking Corporation (Pyramid), which filed on November 7, 2001 a
complaint, 1denominated as one for specific performance and damages, against petitioners
Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. (Philippine First) and Paramount General Insurance
Corporation (Paramount) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-1609, paid the correct docket fee; if in the negative, whether the complaint
should be dismissed or Pyramid can still be ordered to pay the fee.
Pyramid sought to recover the proceeds of two insurance policies issued to it, Policy No. IN-
002904 issued by petitioner Paramount, and Policy No. MN-MCL-HO-00-0000007-00 issued
by petitioner Philippine First. Despite demands, petitioners allegedly failed to settle them,
hence, it filed the complaint subject of the present petition.
In its complaint, Pyramid alleged that on November 8, 2000, its delivery van bearing license
plate number PHL-545 which was loaded with goods belonging to California Manufacturing
Corporation (CMC) valued at PESOS NINE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FORTY NINE AND SEVEN/100 (P907,149.07) left the CMC Bicutan Warehouse but the van,
together with the goods, failed to reach its destination and its driver and helper were
nowhere to be found, to its damage and prejudice; that it filed a criminal complaint against
the driver and the helper for qualified theft, and a claim with herein petitioners as co-
insurers of the lost goods but, in violation of petitioners' undertaking under the insurance
policies, they refused without just and valid reasons to compensate it for the loss; and that
as a direct consequence of petitioners' failure, despite repeated demands, to comply with
their respective undertakings under the Insurance Policies by compensating for the value of
the lost goods, it suffered damages and was constrained to engage the services of counsel to
enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under said policies, for which services
it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of any amount recovered as
and for attorney's fees and legal expenses. 2 ECaSIT
Pyramid thus prayed
. . . that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered, ordering [herein petitioners] to
comply with their obligation under their respective Insurance Policies by paying to [it] jointly
and severally, the claims arising from the subject losses.
THAT, [herein petitioners] be adjudged jointly and severally to pay to [it], in addition to the
foregoing, the following:
1. The sum of PHP50,000.00 plus PHP1,500.00 for each Court session attended by counsel
until the instant [case] is finally terminated, as and for attorney's fees;
2. The costs of suit[;] 3 (Underscoring supplied)
and for other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. 4
Pyramid was assessed P610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of
P50,000 specified in the prayer representing attorney's fees, which it duly paid. 5
Pyramid later filed a 1st Amended Complaint 6 containing minor changes in its body 7 but
bearing the same prayer. 8 Branch 148 of the Makati RTC to which the complaint was raffled
admitted the Amended Complaint. 9
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid
not having paid the docket fees in full, arguing thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In the body of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged that the goods belonging to
California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (CMC) is [sic] "valued at Php907,149.07" and consequently,
"plaintiff incurred expenses, suffered damages and was constrained to engage the services
of counsel to enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under the said policies
and for which services, it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of
any recovery in the instant action, as and for attorney's fees and legal expenses".
On the other hand, in the prayer in the Complaint, plaintiff deliberately omitted to specify
what these damages are. . . . acHITE
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, this deliberate omission by the plaintiff is clearly intended for no other purposes
than to evade the payment of the correct filing fee if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee. In fact, the docket clerk in the instant case charged the plaintiff
a total of Php610.00 only as a filing fee, which she must have based on the amount
of Php50,000.00 [attorney's fees] only. 10 (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners cited 11 Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals 12 which held:
. . . [A]ll complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted or
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. 13 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
They cited too Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion 14 which held that "[i]t is not simply the
filing of the complaint or appropriate pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action." 15
Petitioners thus concluded:
With the above cases as a backdrop, the Supreme Court, in revising the rules of pleading and
practice in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, added a tenth ground to a Motion to Dismiss —
to wit, "[t]hat a condition precedent for filing claim [sic] has not been complied with.["]
On the contrary, if plaintiff would insist that its claim against the defendants is only
Php50,000.00 plus Php1,500.00 as appearance fee per court hearing, then it follows that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over this case, not this Honorable Court.
Such amount is way below the minimum jurisdictional amount prescribed by the rules in
order to confer jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. 16 (Underscoring supplied) CacEIS
To the Motion to Dismiss Pyramid filed its Opposition, 17 alleging that if there was a mistake
in the assessment of the docket fees, the trial court was not precluded from acquiring
jurisdiction over the complaint as "it has the authority to direct the mistaken party to
complete the docket fees in the course of the proceedings . . ." 18 The Opposition merited a
Reply 19 from petitioners.
By Order of June 3, 2002, the trial court 20 denied the Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, a perusal of the Complaint reveals that while plaintiff made mention of the value of
the goods, which were lost, the prayer of plaintiff did not indicate its exact claim from the
defendants. The Complaint merely prayed defendants "to comply with their obligation under
their respective insurance policies by paying to plaintiff jointly and severally, the claims arising
from the subject losses" and did not mention the amount of PHP907,149.07, which is the
value of the goods and which is also the subject of insurance. This resulted to the
assessment and payment of docket fees in the amount of P610 only. The Court, even
without the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, actually noted such omission which is
actually becoming a practice for some lawyers. For whatever purpose it may be, the Court
will not dwell into it. In this instant case, this being for specific performance, it is not
dismissible on that ground but unless proper docket fees are paid, the Court can only grant
what was prayed for in the Complaint.
xxx xxx xxx 21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration 22 of the denial of their Motion to Dismiss having
been denied 23 by Order of August 1, 2002, they filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim ad Cautelam, 24 alleging that they intended to file a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. 25
Petitioners did indeed eventually file before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari (With Preliminary Injunction and Urgent Prayer for Restraining
Order) 26 posing the following two of three queries, viz.:
First. Does [Pyramid's] deliberate omission to pay the required correct docket and filing fee
vest the trial court [with] jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the instant case?
Second. [Is] the instant case an action for specific performance or simply one for damages or
recovery of a sum of money? ACIDTE
xxx xxx xxx 27
By Decision of June 3, 2004, 28 the Court of Appeals partially granted petitioners' petition
for certiorari by setting aside the trial judge's assailed orders and ordering Pyramid to file the
correct docket fees within a reasonable time, it holding that while the complaint was
denominated as one for specific performance, it sought to recover from petitioners
Pyramid's "claims arising from the subject losses." The appellate court ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, it has been held that "it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action." To determine the docket fees, it
is necessary to determine the true nature of the action by examining the allegations of
the complaint. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
While the captions of the complaint and 1st amended complaint denominated the case as
one for "Specific Performance and Damages", the allegations and prayer therein show that
the specific performance sought by private respondent was for petitioners to "comply with
their obligation under their respective Insurance Policies by paying to plaintiff jointly and
severally, the claims arising from the subject losses" as well as the attorney's fees and
costs of suit. Obviously, what constitutes specific performance is the payment itself by
petitioners of private respondent's claims arising from the losses it allegedly incurred. . . . 29
xxx xxx xxx
Public respondent should have ordered private respondent to pay the correct docket
fees on the basis of the allegations of the complaint. . . . aSACED
xxx xxx xxx
While it has been held in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals . . . that
"any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement of specifying the amount of
damages not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record", this rule was relaxed in
subsequent cases, wherein payment of the correct docket fees was allowed within a
reasonable time. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted. The Orders dated June 3, 2002 and August 1,
2002 of public respondent are partially set aside insofar as they dispensed with the payment
of the correct docket fees. Consequently, [Pyramid] is hereby directed to pay the correct
docket fees on the basis of the losses alleged in the body of the complaint, plus the
attorney's fees mentioned in the prayer, within a reasonable time which should not go
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. In all other respects, the said
Orders are affirmed. 31 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 32 of the appellate court's decision. Pyramid
filed its Comment and Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, 33 arguing thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, [Pyramid] thru its Complaint simply sought from petitioners compliance
with their contractual undertaking as insurers of the goods insured which were lost in [its]
custody. Private respondent did not specify the extent of petitioners' obligation as it left the
matter entirely in the judgment of the trial court to consider. Thus, the Complaint was
labeled "Specific Performance" which [Pyramid] submitted to the Clerk of Court for
assessment of the docket fee, after which, it paid the same based on the said assessment.
There was no indication whatsoever that [Pyramid] had refused to pay; rather, it merely
argued against petitioners' submissions as it maintained the correctness of the assessment
made. 34 (Underscoring supplied) DEICTS
By Resolution of August 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration; 35 hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, 36 raising the issues
of whether the appellate court erred:
. . . WHEN IT APPLIED IN THE INSTANT CASE THE LIBERAL RULE ENUNCIATED IN SUN
INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. (SIOL) VS. ASUNCION, 170 SCRA 274 AND NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 302 SCRA 523 (1999) IN RESPECT TO THE
PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED FILING AND DOCKET FEES DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING
OF RESPONDENT'S INTENTION TO EVADE THE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET
FEE WHICH WARRANTS THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 149 SCRA 562.
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT APPLY THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL IN MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION VS. GARCIA, 143 SCRA 178, TAN VS.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 125 SCRA 302, AND CHINA ROAD AND BRIDGE CORPORATION
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 348 SCRA 401. 37 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals 38 that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not
be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. 39
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists, in its Comment on the Petition, 40 on the application
of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion 41 and subsequent rulings relaxing
the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee. 42
In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 43 the Court clarified the effect of
the Sun Insurance ruling on the Manchester ruling as follows: DHcSIT
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on
the Manchester ruling] 44 that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent
"amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or
reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of claims
not specified in the pleading — i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading — as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum
claimed", on the one hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the
estate", on the other. . . cETCID
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of
this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim
purely for money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed. In
this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise
be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed,
or the claims as to which amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as
aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of
the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is
where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the
meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action. 45 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for "specific performance and damages"
even if it was, as the allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its
claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its own admission,
"knew". 46 And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of its
claims/damages.
When Pyramid amended its complaint, it still did not specify, in its prayer, the amount of
claims/damages it was seeking. In fact it has the audacity to inform this Court, in its
Comment on the present Petition, that:
. . . In the natural order of things, when a litigant is given the opportunity to spend less for a
docket fee after submitting his pleading for assessment by the Office of the Clerk of Court,
he would not decline it inasmuch as to request for a higher assessment under the
circumstances [for such] is against his interest and would be senseless. Placed under the
same situation, petitioner[s] would certainly do likewise. To say otherwise would certainly
be dishonest, 47 EaCDAT
which comment drew petitioners to conclude as follows:
[This] only shows respondent's dishonesty and lack of regard of the rules. Following this line
of reasoning, respondent would do everything if only for it to spend less for the filing fee,
even to the extent of circumventing and defying the rule on the payment of the filing fee.
In spite of the fact that the respondent was already caught in the quagmire of its own
cobweb of deception, it further justified its unethical act by ratiocinating that"placed under
the same situation, petitioner would certainly do likewise, to say otherwise would certainly be
dishonest". This attitude of the respondent is very alarming! Having been caught red-
handed, the honorable thing that respondent should have done is admit its own violation
rather than justify an act which it knows is a clear contravention of the rules and
jurisprudence. 48 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Pyramid's following justification for omitting to specify in the prayer of its complaint the
amount of its claims/damages, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . While respondent knew its losses and alleged them in the body of the Complaint, it
was not aware of the extent of petitioners' respective liability under the two insurance
policies. The allegation of respondent's losses, albeit, without repeating them in its prayer
for relief was not motivated by an intention to mislead, cheat or defraud the Court. It just left
the matter of liability arising from two separate and distinct Insurance Policies covering the
same insurable risk for the trial court's determination, hence, respondent came up with an
action for "specific performance[,]" 49 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
fails to impress.
If respondent Pyramid's counsel had only been forthright in drafting the complaint and
taking the cudgels for his client and the trial judge assiduous in applying Circular No. 7 vis a
vis prevailing jurisprudence, the precious time of this Court, as well as of that of the
appellate court, would not have been unnecessarily sapped.
The Court at this juncture thus reminds Pyramid's counsel to observe Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Ethics which enjoins a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice", and Rule 12.04 of the same
Canon which enjoins a lawyer "not [to] unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes." And the Court reminds too the trial judge to bear in
mind that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the pleadings 51 and to
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that
magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence. 52 TcHDIA
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc. v. Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corp., G.R. No. 165147,
[July 9, 2008], 579 PHIL 679-693)

As the salient allegations of Pyramid's complaint show and as priorly stated, they constitute,
in the main, an action for collection of its claims it admittedly "knew". AIHECa

Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which are yet to be
determined by the trial court, the rule established in Manchester which was embodied in this
Court's Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as modified by the Sun Insurance ruling,
still applies. Consider this Court's pronouncement bearing on the matter in Ayala
Corporation v. Madayag: 50

xxx xxx xxx

Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the [Sun Insurance] ruling of this
Court wherein it stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to
mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer . . . the amount of
which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being
sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

. . . While it is true that the determination of certain damages . . . is left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the
amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for
the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exceptioncontemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court
is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ANDRES LAPITAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SCANDIA INC., and GENERAL ENGINEERING
CO., defendants-appellees.
Florido & Florido for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Jesus P. Garcia for defendant-appellee
Scandia, Inc.
Jose R. Limchin for defendant-appellee General Engineering Co.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; ACTION NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY
ESTIMATION; CRITERIA. — If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. Where the
basic issue is something more than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to
have the defendant perform his part of the contract and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such action
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESCISSION OF CONTRACT AND DAMAGES; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE.
— Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance. And no cogent reason appears why an
action for rescission should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart of specific
performance. In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation
into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damage may be had in an
action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the
setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to
make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held
to be so by this Court arising from issues like: the legality or illegality of the conveyance
sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit made; validity of
judgment; validity of mortgage; the relations of the parties, the right to support created by
relation, etc.; in an action for support and validity or nullity of documents upon which claims
are predicated.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for rescission and
damages against appellees Scandia, Inc., of Manila and General Engineering Co. of Cebu.
Lapitan's complaint in the court below averred that in April 17, 1963 he purchased from
Scandia, Inc., through its subdealer in Cebu City, General Engineering Co., one ABC Diesel
Engine, of 16 horse power, for P3,735.00, paid in cash; that he bought the engine for running
a rice and corn mill at Ormoc City, Leyte; that defendants had warranted and assured him
that all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to avoid loss
due to long periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine
that might break within twelve months after delivery. Plaintiff further charged that on June
28, 1963, the arm rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship,
and it stopped functioning; that the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August
29, 1963; that barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty
casting and poor material, so he (Lapitan) notified the sellers and demanded rescission of
the contract of sale; that he sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not
pay. He, therefore, prayed (1) for rescission of the contract; (2) reimbursement of the price;
(3) recovery of P4,000.00 actual damages plus P1,000.00 attorneys fees; (4) recovery of such
moral and exemplary damages as the court deems just and equitable; and (5) costs and
other proper relief.
After filing answers disclaiming liability, Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the municipal court, under Republic Act 3828, amending the Judiciary Act by
increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases involving P10,000.00 or less.
After argument, the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, invoking Cruz vs. Judge B. Tan, 48 O.G. 1320, 87 Phil. 527.
Unable to obtain reconsideration, Lapitan appealed directly to this Court arguing (1) that
rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as he claimed moral and
exemplary damages, besides the price of P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual damages, and
P1,000.00 attorney's fees, the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal
court.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like in suits to have the
defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support,
or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, 1 this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the
Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June
11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816,
February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966.
And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for
rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so
to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to
undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for
damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into
matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts
of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those
raised in Arroz vs. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of the
conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit made);
De Ursua vs. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog vs. Tunas, L-
12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito vs. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25,
1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions
for support); De Rivera, et al. vs. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of
documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a
party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It
is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be
taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation — a
prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what
he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on
precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and
discouraging multiplicity of suits. 2

Of course, where the money claim is prayed for as an alternative relief to specific
performance, an equivalence is implied that permits the jurisdiction to be allocated by the
amount of the money claim (Cruz vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 627). But no such equivalence can be
deduced in the case at bar, where the money award can be considered only if the rescission
is first granted.

We, therefore, rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not
capable of pecuniary estimation, and that the court below erred in declining to entertain
appellant's action for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is reversed and set aside, and the case is
ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.
Costs against appellees.

||| (Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., G.R. No. L-24668, [July 31, 1968], 133 PHIL 526-530)
SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO
ELAYDA, respondents.
Robles Ricafrente and Aguirre Law Firm for petitioners.
Rilloraza Africa De Ocampo and Africa for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondents Elayda filed a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale
of two parcels of land against petitioners De Leon before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because of non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees. On
October 21, 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss but required the private
respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels
of land in litigation as stated in the complaint. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, private respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. On February 26,
1992, a decision was rendered by the respondent court annulling the orders of the trial court
and holding an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari. CAIaDT
The Supreme Court ruled that where the value of the case cannot be estimated, the docket
fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P400.00 as fixed by Section 7 (b) (1), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged that since
the action of respondents against petitioners is solely for annulment or rescission which is
not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be confused and equated with
the value of the property. Although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is
the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. In view thereof,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF
CONTRACT IS ONE WHICH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION AND
THEREFORE THE DOCKET FEE FOR ITS FILING IS THE FLAT AMOUNT OF P200.00 (NOW
P400.00) AS THEN FIXED IN THE FORMER RULE 141, SECTION 5(10) OF THE RULES OF
COURT; CASE AT BAR. — "Where the value of the case cannot be estimated," the Court
in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be
estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as
then fixed in the former Rule 141, Sec 5 (10). . . . Thus, although eventually the result may be
the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is
controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly applied these cases to the present one. As it said:
We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners [private
respondents] against private respondents [petitioner] is solely for annulment or rescission
which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be confused and
equated with the "value of the property" subject of the transaction; that by the very nature
of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans any prayer for
recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages,
the assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be intertwined with the merits of
the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to sustain private respondents'
[petitioners'] position on what the respondent court may decide after all, then the
assessment should be deferred and finally assessed only after the court had finally decided
the case, which cannot be done because the rules requires that filing fees should be based on
what is alleged and prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the
complaint.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of
an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property,
subject matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be
considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee
charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, §7(b)(1) of the Rules of
Court. The trial court held the fees should be based on the value of the property, but the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the flat rate should be charged. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
The facts are as follows: cda
On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against
petitioners, praying for the following reliefs:
1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary
Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private respondents) guaranteed to
them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the
said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and
3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney's fees in
the amount of P100,000.00.
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in the premises are also prayed for. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to pay
docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken down as follows:
P450.00 Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund under Official Receipt No. 1877773
P150.00 Docket fee for the General Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834215
P10.00 for the Legal Research Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834450. 2
On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private
respondents' nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that
in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorney's fees,
private respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the
alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought to
be annulled. 3
On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss,
arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the
alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering that the amount paid
by them was that assessed by the clerk of court. 4 On October 9, 1991, petitioners filed a
reply to which private respondents filed, on October 17, 1991, a rejoinder.
On October 21, 1991, the trial court 5 denied petitioners' motion to dismiss but required
private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the
parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the
trial court. They therefore, brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on February
26, 1992, rendered a decision 6 annulling the orders of the trial court. The appellate court
held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution dated March 25,
1992 of the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. — (a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim
or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical
services in the same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the
property in litigation, is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P120.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but less than
P40,000.00 150.00
3. P40,000.00 or more but less than
P60,000.00 200.00
4. P60,000.00 or more but less than
P80,000.00 250.00
5. P80,000.00 or more but less than
P100,000.00 400.00
6. P100,000.00 or more but less than
P150,000.00 600.00
7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of
P150,000.00 5.00
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject
matter cannot be estimated P400.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial
foreclosure of mortgage which shall be
governed by paragraph (a) above 400.00
3. All other actions not involving
property 400.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. (emphasis
added)
Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real
property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private
respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of
the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph
of §7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of the Court dated September 12, 1990.
Since private respondents alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs,
had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the
estimated value of the land for the purpose of determining the docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or rescission of
a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket
fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, §7(b)(1). In support of their
argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc. 7 and Bautista
v. Lim. 8 In Lapitan this Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held: cdll
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the
defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support,
or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be confused and
Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June equated with the "value of the property" subject of the transaction; that by the very nature
11, 1901). of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans any prayer for
recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages,
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be the assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be intertwined with the merits of
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to sustain private respondents'
February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. [petitioners'] position on what the respondent court may decide after all, then the
And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for assessment should be deferred and finally assessed only after the court had finally decided
rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so the case, which cannot be done because the rules require that filing fees should be based on
to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to what is alleged and prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the
undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for complaint.
damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into
matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those SO ORDERED.
raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of the ||| (Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104796, [March 6, 1998], 350 PHIL 535-543)
conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit made);
De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-
12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25,
1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions |||
for support), De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of
documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a
party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It
is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be
taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation — a
prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what
he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on
precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and
discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Conformably with this discussion of actions "where the value of the case cannot be
estimated," the Court in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is one
which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat
amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, §5(10). Said this Court:

We hold that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as basically one for
rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation (1
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 55; Lapitan vs. Scandia, Inc., L-24668,
July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 481-483).

Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now
respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research fund fee, if she
has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law
Center).

Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the
action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly
applied these cases to the present one. As it said: cdtai

We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners [private
respondents] against private respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or rescission