G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903
Hontanosas was triggered by a letter-complaint1dated April 15,
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL
from the practice of law.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show
cause in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the
5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as
a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro
Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then
in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes"
during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel,
W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the
same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading
testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the
United States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged
with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf,
and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided
as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D.
Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending
him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and
directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified
copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of
the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached
the conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below
in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro
Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to
warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their
objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against
crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney,
an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or
suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting
of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which
justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case
of the United States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge
of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and
as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in
their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year
from the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from
February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
A.C. No. 5704 May 8, 2009
WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B.
2002 of complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through the
Court Administrator. The Court Administrator referred the letter
to the Bar Confidant on April 25, 2002.2 On May 7, 2002, the
Acting Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to
take cognizance of an administrative case against a lawyer, a
verified complaint must be filed in nineteen (19) copies
together with supporting documents.3 Thus, complainant was
told to submit an additional thirteen (13) copies of his
complaint. On May 25, 2002, complainant complied and
submitted an additional thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.
Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and
notarized contracts that are both invalid and illegal as these
contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing private
lands; (2) served conflicting interests since he performed legal
services for adverse parties; (3) refused to furnish copies of the
contracts he notarized to the parties thereof; (4) notarized
documents without keeping copies thereof and (5) failed to
properly discharge his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly
when respondent allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as
counsel for Novak, failed to turn over Novak’s documents
thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate preparation,
betrayed Novak’s trust and refused to see Novak with a
translator of Novak’s choice.
Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian
Busse, respondent had prepared a memorandum of
agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses Busse
and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national. Under said agreement,
Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy,
Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50)
years.5 Complainant added that respondent had acted despite
conflict of interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and
Hochstrasser were both his clients. Respondent prepared a
similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses
Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another
parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time the lease contract was
for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty
nine (49) years.6 All four (4) documents were notarized by
respondent. It was also averred that respondent drafted two
deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to
Naomie Melchior, a Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German
National.
The Court required respondent to comment on the
charges.7 He answered that if anyone should be penalized, it
should be respondent for meddling in the affairs of his clients
and otherwise making a mockery of the Philippine legal system
by deceitfully passing as material facts opinionated, baseless
and false allegations as well as a falsified
document.8 Respondent also moved that complainant be made
to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he
stated among other things that respondent is like Pontius
Pilatus [sic].9
On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.10
In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the
parties to file their respective memoranda due to the limited
time period given by the Court. The parties did. The
Commissioner found that respondent had prepared and
notarized contracts that violated Presidential Decree No. 471
(P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot
exceed twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty
five (25) years.11 Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the
other charges he had hurled against respondent as the former
was not privy to the agreements between respondent and the
latter’s clients. Moreover, complainant failed to present any
concrete proof of the other charges. The commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two (2) months.
Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the
recommendation of the commissioner and dismissed the
complaint on February 27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors
1
ratiocinated that suspension was not warranted since
respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was
not illegal per se since the lease agreement was likely made to
reflect the agreement among the parties without considering
the legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may
be guilty of ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board
dismissed the complaint out of compassion.
We reject the Board’s recommendation. We stress that much is
demanded from those who engage in the practice of law
because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public.13 The lawyer’s diligence
and dedication to his work and profession ideally should not
only promote the interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty
to attain the ends of justice by maintaining respect for the legal
profession.14
The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors both found that the majority of the charges against
the respondent lack proof. Our own review of the records
confirms that most of the charges are unsupported by
evidence. Such charges are simply the unsubstantiated
accusations in the complaint with nary a whit of concrete proof
such as affidavits of the clients whose trust respondents had
allegedly breached.
However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui
generes and as such the complainant in the case need not be
the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to
the contracts, the charge of drafting and notarizing contracts in
contravention of law holds weight. A plain reading of these
contracts clearly shows that they violate the law limiting lease
of private lands to aliens for a period of twenty five (25) years
renewable for another twenty five (25) years.
In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts
are valid under Republic Act No. 7652 (R.A. No. 7652), entitled
"An Act Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by
Foreign Investors." They add that these contracts should not
be viewed purely as lease contracts since they allow the leasor
to nominate a Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the
subject property within the lease period. Respondent’s
defenses are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly
established that his foreign clients are indeed "foreign
investors" as contemplated under R.A. No. 7652,15 said law
allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years,
renewable for another period of twenty five (25) years, well
below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for another fifty
(50) years, and forty-nine (49) years renewable for another
forty-nine (49) years respectively, stipulated in the two lease
agreements.1avvphi1
Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements,
caused his clients to violate Section 7 of R.A. No. 7652 which
states:
Sec. 7. Penal Provision. — Any contract or agreement made
or executed in violation of any of the following prohibited acts
shall be null and void ab initio and both contracting parties
shall be punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000) nor more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or
both, at the discretion of the court:
(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a
lease period in excess of that provided in paragraph
(1) of Section 4;
(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose
contrary to existing laws of the land, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs;
(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the
lease of land in excess of the area approved by the
DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality
of the area leased is due to the acts of the lessee, the
lessee shall be held solely liable
therefor: Provided, further, That, in the case of
corporations, associations, or partnerships, the
president, manager, director, trustee, or officers
responsible for the violation hereof shall bear the
criminal liability. (Emphasis ours)
In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts,
respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and several canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost
sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the
Philippines." This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s
Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1
states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal
systems."
The other canons of professional responsibility which
respondent transgressed are the following:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxx
Rule 15.07- A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of hairness.
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer’s oath, the acts
of respondents also amount to gross misconduct under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. ― A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x
x
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will
not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.
We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by
the IBP Board of Governors in behalf of respondent. We also
find that the suspension for two (2) months recommended by
the IBP Investigating Commissioner too light. We find six (6)
months suspension to be a sufficient sanction against
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is
found GUILTY of violating the lawyer’s oath and gross
misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent’s
suspension is effective upon notice hereof. Let notice of this
Resolution be spread in respondent’s record as an attorney in
this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts concerned.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court
2
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay
City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of
respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds
for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment
as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was
not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two
accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its
principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise
noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in
the former category being precisely to protect him in his new
position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly
asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de
oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused
that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate
cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What
is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to
comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de
oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in
his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at
present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in
good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without
merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13,
1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de
parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of
respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not
only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to
require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of
work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged
order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted
this certiorari proceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent
motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficiospeaks for
itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly
committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having
started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then
respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964
which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to
the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that
counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case
without the express authority of the Commission on Elections);
and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses
who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When
counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar
on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the
trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to
prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he
is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The
defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13,
1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963,
February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964,
and September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to
another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty.
Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of
the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at
8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times,
and that the government witnesses have to come all the way
from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to
the accused and to the court and the performance of his task
as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and
that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since
the prosecution has already rested its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less
than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He
ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers,
especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such
belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal
of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why
a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so
designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found
in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up
to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or
a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may
be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
services are rendered without remuneration should not
occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is
not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance
since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent
upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles
Lahesa,9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion
penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should
exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence
in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays
in the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez
in People v. Estebia11reiterated such a view in these words: "It
is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that
as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best
efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned
to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest."12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it
was only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of
mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to
counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance
was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v.
Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and;
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
3
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to
reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of
the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration
could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of
enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly.
He did point though to his responsibility as an election
registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be
availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the
immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth
above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform
his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal,
if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of
the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely
for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there
are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to
client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the
Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a
member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous
to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a
deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by
the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your
animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any
kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect
your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in
his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality
written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of
the approaching date for our induction into office as
member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of
next month. Before my induction into office I should
be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in
general and for your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the
Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will
attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will
come back home on the following day here in
Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and
notary public. Despite my election as member of the
Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession
as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also
inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public
even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the
reason that some people are in the belief that my
residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan
and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear that I am free to
exercise my profession as formerly and that I will
have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this
information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be
informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in
my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people
in your locality have not as yet contracted the services
of other lawyers in connection with the registration of
their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work
in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the
applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine
Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No.
2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons
27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The
most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome
of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper.
But solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind,
4
 whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone
of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable
at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in
order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents
or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the
ignorant or others, to seek his professional services.
A duty to the public and to the profession devolves
upon every member of the bar having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law,
and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at
the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not
difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business.
The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L.,
1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly
practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of
the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the
admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon
the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-
General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action
should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward
cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's
is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent
there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at
the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake
in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly
understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively
lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be
taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this
kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of
the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is
hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for
the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,
5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-
Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE
BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL
Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that
5
it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of
the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of
the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on
the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said
bar associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and,
in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of
this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-
vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain
terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the
field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and
that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that
it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that
the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the
advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes
the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s)
of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of
a person being represented as a lawyer from
Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether
respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it.
The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being offered
by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant
to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent
claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of
the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to
Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under
Philippine Law.
6
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family
Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage
is special contract of
permanent union between
a man and woman entered
into accordance with law
for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable
social institution whose
nature, consequences,
and incidents are
governed by law and not
subject to stipulation,
except that marriage
settlements may fix the
property relation during the
marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages,
or serves to induce, violation of Philippine
law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this
is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer
shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point
out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a
cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage,"
if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which
is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from
the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen
that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las
Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the
"legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and
that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing
the performance of acts which are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and the public
good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent
should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing
or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there
can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in
the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such
field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be
doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however,
should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in
the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task
of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some
of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While
7
respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is
not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding
on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise,
advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals
cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in
the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the
public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of
a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged
in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling
the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their
case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural
persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the
scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's
position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice
of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not
only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the
power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized
practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in
the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of
its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2
to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require
the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto,
the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge
and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in
the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law."7
8
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one
to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass
the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in
many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines.
In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without
being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public
should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising
of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements
of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity
of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The
Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent
will or can cure the legal problems brought to
them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there
are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical
clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied
by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are
clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in
that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could
work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral
in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public
for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do
so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA,
Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from
qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify
an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements
that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this
clinic about how they could go about having
a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to
be able to do that which by our laws cannot
be done (and) by our Code of Morals should
not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in
the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law.
In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of
law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one .
. . . acting as a consultant
can render effective
9
service unless he is
familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems . .
. .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of
the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in
determining what
measures he shall
recommend, do not
constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a
fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the
law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law — accurate or
inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we
are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen
generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the
laws touching their
particular business or
profession. A good
example is the architect,
who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory
and tenement house
statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This
is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect,
asked by his client to omit
a fire tower, replies that it
is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of
some measure that he
recommends, a decision of
the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee
is charged for the legal
advice or information, and
the legal question is
subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of
degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one
intending to erect a
building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in
respect to the building
code and the like, then an
architect who performed
this function would
probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the
case. The most important
body of the industrial
relations experts are the
officers and business
agents of the labor unions
and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it
has been the practice for
some years to delegate
special responsibility in
employee matters to a
management group
chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or
lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the
defendants have the same
service that the larger
employers get from their
own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for
which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading
universities. The court
should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-
established method of
conducting business is
unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men
who customarily perform a
certain function have no
right to do so, or that the
technical education given
by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a
man is practicing law, we
should consider his work
for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law
defining his client's
obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client along the path
charted by law. This, of
course, would be the
practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the
case before me.
Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic
and psychological lines.
The law only provides the
frame within which he
must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind
of building the limits the
kind of building the
architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or
information defendant may
give, does not transform
his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add
10
that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he
performed services which
are customarily reserved
to members of the bar, he
would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part
of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of
defendant's work is the
representations of the
employer in the
adjustment of grievances
and in collective
bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per
se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept
the employment whether
or not he is a member of
the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception
where the business turns
on a question of law. Most
real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade
the opposite party to the
same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between
an employer and his men
grows from differing
interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it
is quite likely that
defendant should not
handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is
not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to
represent the employer
before administrative
agencies of the federal
government, especially
before trial examiners of
the National Labor
Relations Board. An
agency of the federal
government, acting by
virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress,
may regulate the
representation of parties
before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere
with such determination or
to forbid representation
before the agency by one
whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and
Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may
lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited
in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a
person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not
customarily reserved to members of the bar;
.
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to
the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and
non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic
appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case,
then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the
Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and
"B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action
to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that
aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
11
It cannot be claimed that
the publication of a legal
text which publication of a
legal text which purports to
say what the law is
amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in
the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that
the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as
to how the forms should
be filled out, constitutes
the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the
situation with many
approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold
to the public at
large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with
a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that
relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON
IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer
general advice on
common problems, and
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily
identified person in a
particular situation — in
their publication and sale
of the kits, such
publication and sale did
not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . .
. . There being no legal
impediment under the
statute to the sale of the
kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction
against defendant
maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or
separation agreement any
printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law
or the prohibition in the
memorandum of
modification of the
judgment against
defendant having an
interest in any publishing
house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and
against his having any
personal contact with any
prospective purchaser.
The record does fully
support, however, the
finding that for the change
of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of
personal contacts
concerning particular
problems which might
arise in the preparation
and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and
assistance in the
preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving
of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to
specific problems of
particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of
separation agreement
sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder,
348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at
p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family
Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice
of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that
the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning
and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind
of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
12
of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law,
in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of
law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself
as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers
with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on
court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in
the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right
under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters or estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions
consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that
part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing
In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities
in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.
Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of
giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through
the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by
laymen or lawyers; document search;
13
 evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies,
like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for
the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify
an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on
the seventh floor of the Victoria Building
along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his
staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of
it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery
of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in
1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in
clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors
do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of
our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical
terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you
had a rich relative who died and named you
her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it
has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law
is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have
been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
14
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities
of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding
from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's
position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as
an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in
this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service.
As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by
the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue
to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation
of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are
involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions
to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only
a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
15
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in
any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for
such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American
Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of
the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials,
it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to
14%
Professional from 71% to
14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of
our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only
serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently
been under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality
or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off
from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
x---------------------------------------
--x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro
Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their
claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
16
To support his allegations, complainant presented the We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical

sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended

Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer- penalty.

client relations with complainant and utilize respondents The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged

services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. intrusion by respondent into complainants professional

Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6] practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the

Front means employed by respondent in furtherance of the

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE violations of ethical rules.

Fe Marie L. Labiano Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719 services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the

CPR provides:

Back CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING

SERVICES OFFERED: KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH FACTS.
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the

(emphasis supplied)
practice of law is a profession and not a business;

Hence, this complaint.

lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and

advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise

authorizing the printing and circulation of the said

his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,

calling card.[7]
degrade the profession in the publics estimation and

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar

impair its ability to efficiently render that high character

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]

(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO
CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
respondent had encroached on the professional practice LEGAL BUSINESS.

of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10]and other

canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for

(CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid

soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes

agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that
Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

17
 RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR
ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS
CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation
of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community
from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial
evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals
suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing
Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law
practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word
that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the
CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his
client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He
cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with
his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to
his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as
filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers
independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling
as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or
an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation
constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of
the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public
18
from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3
profession.
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section

Considering the myriad infractions of 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is

respondent (including violation of the prohibition on hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by period of one year effective immediately from receipt of

the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a

wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall

to its findings. be dealt with more severely.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records

evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the

well-merited reputation for professional capacity and Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of

fidelity to trust based on his character and the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator

conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to to be circulated to all courts.

announce their services by publication in reputable law

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
lists or use of simple professional cards. Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, respondent.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following

details:
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is
connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28] COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, respondents.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with
RESOLUTION
financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability,
the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labianos calling cards.
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four
to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her
husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable
at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator
and the Public Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.[2]

19
 On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition
on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered
by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.[5] On
June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this
Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution
No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were
required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading
or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution
on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June
20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306
and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is
not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [13] The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish
the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised
his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy &
Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage
Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines
not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it
is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple
signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
20
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for
respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his
1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr.
and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of
Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A.
Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which
contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International,
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979,
denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he
be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any
reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm,
cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules
of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership
organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside
from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of
Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the
firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that
being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben
E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising
law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL
PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. –
The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson,
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the
Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in
the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the
Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable,
for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation."
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for
the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha
Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for
damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued an
Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order
reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical
actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to
his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench
and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a
malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a
member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar
Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the
Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and
sanction.2
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Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge
Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty.
Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for
investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and
Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate
Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of
the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No.
1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores
appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty.
Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a
Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance
hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to
the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required
MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to
submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August
11, September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to
appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his
MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders
dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent
Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with
stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver
on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in
Court dated September 14, 2010 stating among others, the
following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar,
you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do
you think you are being truthful, just and fair by
serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which
reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer
who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie.
Again the Philippine Constitution commands: Give
every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human
laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing
an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without
indicating the date and place of compliance. During the
preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent
Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance
of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit
the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead,
respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as
follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro
plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which
you may once more assign to the waste basket of
nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the
defendant to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am
no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do
anything right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to
give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by
failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating
Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial
court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance
notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court
orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue
them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of
the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government
is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must
be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to
judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government
to which they belong, as well as to the State which has
instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his
pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to
be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client
full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his
c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After
all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and
common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not
commensurate with the infractions committed by the
respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed
by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the
respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this
Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering
the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the
amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more
circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court
processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in
the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
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