Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 0

Before you begin...

........................... Suicide bombing is one of the trickiest and least understood methods of
modern warfare. The tactic has existed in various forms since the 17th century, when Dutch
soldiers used gunpowder to blow themselves and their enemies up to avoid being taken
prisoner in Taiwan. Since then, suicide attacks have steadily been on the rise, surging more
than 300% since 2001, leaving defence experts and government officials struggling to
effectively counter their devastating spread. We’ll describe the religious, social and
psychological motivations behind this disturbing phenomenon, the frightening ways it could
affect the future of nuclear warfare and some surprising tactics to curb its growing influence.

The Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has unleashed a campaign of attacks in Pakistan in
recent weeks in retaliation for a major offensive by security forces in the TTP stronghold of
South Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan. Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP) comprised
about 40 militant commanders with a collective strength of about 25,000 and is considered as
the most lethal of the Taliban outfits in Pakistan’s wily regions bordering Afghanistan. The
following table shows the annual fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan since 2003,

Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan, 2003-2009

Year Civilians Security Terrorists/Insurgents Total

Force
Personnel

140 24 25 189
2003

435 184 244 863

2004

2005 430 81 137 648

2006 608 325 538 1471

2007 1523 597 1479 3599

2008 2155 654 3906 6715

2009* 2194 991 7954 11139

Total 7515 2856 14273 24624

Data till December 14, 2009

Among all on-going terrorist violence in Pakistan Suicide Attacks are the most common and
vital weapon of terrorists.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 1

 Factors

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 2

 Factors
First Iraq, then Afghanistan and now Pakistan, have recently become the places where suicide
attacks are commonly seen. Seen from above, there is a surge of these attacks in Pakistan.
Professor Robert Pape argues that the main reason for suicide attacks in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is the US-led NATO occupation. While there were limited numbers of suicide
bombings until 2005 in Afghanistan, these attacks have increased considerably in recent years.
First, NATO forces stayed only in Kabul. Then NATO developed a plan to occupy the country
in stages. "By late 2005, when we started to occupy southern and eastern Afghanistan, we
created this surge in suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Seventy-five percent of all
the Afghan and Pakistani suicide bombings happen in this border zone. The key thing here is to
see that US combat operations are driving suicide terrorism around the world," he says.
In a nutshell, Pape argues that if occupation is lifted, the factors such as "prestige, revenge or
religious motivation" do not produce suicide attacks. Pape's words are particularly significant
as he has access to a databank regarding suicide attacks. He published his book, "Dying to
Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," in 2005 in which he voiced groundbreaking
theses that were in stark contrast to the established views about suicide attacks.
Pape follows a very simple method in understanding under what conditions suicide bombings
emerge: "Most people study suicide terrorism when it does happen, but not when it doesn't. I
do both." He has interesting examples to support this case: "In Lebanon, there was no suicide
terrorism before 1982, when Israel invaded southern Lebanon. In 2000, Israel leaves and
suicide terrorism goes to zero. I mean, the Hezbullah terrorism does not follow Israel to Tel
Aviv. That not only means that this isn't about religious fanatics looking for an excuse to get a
quick trip to heaven, but it also means that revenge alone is not reason enough to become a
suicide bomber. There were a lot of people who had been abused by those 18 years of
occupation, but they didn't run after the Israelis for revenge. It follows that when occupation
ends, religious motivation or feelings for revenge do not lead to suicide bombings."

There are also several other reasons which motivate a person to become a suicide bomber in
Pakistan.

Few factors of these suicide attacks in Pakistan are as following,

1. Pakistan – Front Line State in WoT

2. Terrorist Organization’s Logic
3. Strong Attachment to a Community and Revenge
4. Military Operation
5. Poverty

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 3

 1. Pakistan – Front Line State in WoT:
Since 9/11, Pakistan has arrested more than 500 persons linked to Al-Qaeda and has handed
them over to the US. It has arrested hundreds of Taliban militants as well. Most of these and
Al-Qaeda members are now held at a heavily-fortified prison in the US military base on
Guantanamo Bay.

Pakistan role in WoT provides sound and logical grounds to the terrorists in order to prepare
suicide attackers to attack Pakistan.

In Dying to Win Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago claims
that foreign occupation is the root cause of suicide terrorism. The rise in attacks correlates with
U.S. military occupation of countries whose governments tend to be authoritarian and
unresponsive to popular demands. Analyzing data on 315 suicide attacks from 1980 to 2003,
he asserts that the common thread linking 95 percent of all suicide attacks around the world is
not religion or ideology, but rather a clear, strategic, political objective. They are organized
campaigns to compel a modern democracy, principally the United States, to withdraw military
forces from a group’s perceived homeland. Al Qaeda supposedly fits this model, being driven
primarily by the efforts of Osama bin Laden and those sympathetic to his cause to expel the
United States from the Arab heartland—Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq—and
ultimately from all Muslim countries. On September 11, 2001, for example, 15 of the 19
suicide attackers came from Saudi Arabia, where nearly 5,000 U.S. combat troops were
billeted at the time, with 7,000 more stationed elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula. About the
only point Pape agrees with is that the bombers want to drive the U.S. out of the region. But he
argues that American policies to combat the terrorists are wrong-headed. "The presumed
connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is misleading and may be
encouraging domestic and foreign policies likely to worsen America's situation and to harm
many Muslims needlessly," he writes. Here's a summary of his analysis, which is based on the
315 suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2003:

Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, a Marxist-Leninist Hindu group opposed to religion, committed the
largest number of suicide attacks, 76. The Kurdish PKK, which used the tactic 14 times, is
headed by a secular Marxist-Leninist, Abdulah Ocalan. The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, another Marxist-Leninist group, and the al-Aqsa Brigade, which has ties to the
socialist Fatah movement, account for a third of the attacks against Israel. Communist and
socialist groups account for 75% of the attacks in Lebanon. Islamic fundamentalists, he
concludes, were associated with about only half of the attacks from 1980 to 2003. And such
fundamentalist Islamic countries as Iran and Sudan aren't producing any suicide bombers.

Regarding to Pakistan the Terrorists in their speeches asked and convinced their followers to
destroy Pakistan. They believe that Pakistan is giving more losses to them than any other. They
consider Pakistan government officials as MUNAFIQ, means that Pakistani government
officials are in fact infidels but pretend to be Muslims. They have prepared many audio/video
documentaries in which they present the role of Pakistani government as Anti-Islam
government.

2. Terrorist Organization’s Logic

Understanding the terrorist organization’s logic is more important than understanding
individual motivations in explaining suicide attacks. Furthermore, individual psychology has
almost nothing to do with suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism is all about group dynamics.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 4

Suicide bombings have high symbolic value because the willingness of the perpetrators to die
signals high resolve and dedication to their cause. They serve as symbols of a just struggle,
galvanize popular support, generate financial support for the organization and become a source
of new recruits for future suicide missions.

Suicide bombings serve the interests of the sponsoring organization in two ways: by coercing
an adversary to make concessions, and by giving the organization an advantage over its rival in
terms of support from constituencies. Contrary to the popular image that suicide terrorism is an
outcome of irrational religious fanaticism, suicide bombing attacks are resolutely a politically-
motivated phenomenon.

Humiliation, revenge and altruism appear to play a key role at the organizational and
individual levels in shaping the sub-culture that promotes suicide bombings. Humiliation is an
emotional process that seeks to discipline the target party’s behavior by attacking and lowering
their own and others’ perceptions of whether they deserve respect.

For the individual, participating in a suicide mission is not about dying and killing alone but
has a broader significance for achieving multiple purposes – from personal to communal.
These include gaining community approval and political success; liberating the homeland;
achieving personal redemption or honor; using martyrdom to effect the survival of the
community; refusing to accept subjugation; seeking revenge for personal and collective
humiliation; conveying religious or nationalistic convictions; expressing guilt, shame, material
and religious rewards; escaping from intolerable everyday degradations of life under
occupation, boredom, anxiety and defiance. The configuration of these purposes varies and is
an outcome of specific circumstances of the political conflict behind the rise of suicide attacks
as a tactic and a weapon.

Motivations for Suicide Attacks

The terrorist organization receives both tactical and strategic benefit from the attacks. Careful
balance of the terrorist organization’s need and use of the attack intertwined with the largely
religious motivation of the individual to voluntarily be a suicide attacker that makes such acts
successful.

For suicide attack to be successful, the terrorist organization is crucial for

• Planning
• Acquiring weaponry
• Choosing operatives
• Targeting
• Executing the attack

Remember, suicide attacks are viewed as a strategic weapon by terrorist organizations

First Motivation of the Terrorist Group:

It is difficult for the government to develop a strategic response to a suicide attack
• Traditional counterterrorism approaches – target hardening or interdiction of
operations – will not work
 Virtually no “intelligence chatter”
 No overall doctrine or “order of battle”
 The attacks are unpredictable

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 5

Second Motivation of the Terrorist Group:

Suicide attacks generally result in a larger number of casualties than do other types of
attacks

This increases…
• Physical effects of attack (loss of life and destruction)
• Psychological damage to the target

Third Motivation of the Terrorist Group:

Suicide attacks usually attract more publicity than do other types of attacks
• Suicide attacks tend to focus on soft targets
 Large number of victims ensures public attention
• The attacker is part of the story

Fourth Motivation of the Terrorist Group:

The use of suicide attacks maximizes the effect of the bombing
• If there is no need to provide an escape route for the attacker, the complexity of
the plan is greatly reduced
• Suicide attackers can often get closer to the target at the desired time than can
other attack methods
• The person is a “thinking platform” that can negotiate obstacles, change
locations as needed, focus on and get near specific targets to maximize damage,
and precisely detonate at the point to maximize casualties

Fifth Motivation of the Terrorist Group:

Suicide attacks can be especially intimidating for the target population
• Given the nature of the attack itself and the character of soft targets, it is a
“force multiplier” with respect to the psychological effect it has

Remember: Those who advocate suicide attacks and those who commit the attacks
believe that these actions are morally justified for the greater good of Islam

3. Individual’s Strong Attachment to a Community and Revenge:

Understanding the individual motivation in explaining suicide attacks is secondary to the
Terrorist Organization’s Logic but its occurrence enable a terrorist organization to achieve its
goals.

The key motivator for a violent actor who seeks to die like a martyr is a strong attachment to a
community, usually a religious community. There are dozens of reasons for killing, but violent
martyrdom is first and foremost about belonging. Strong emotional ties and strong feelings of
mutual obligation often hold religious societies together.

Motivation of the individual

• The individual demonstrates a commitment to his beliefs

• Strong attachment to a community and revenge (e.g. LAL Masjid Operation)
• Shows commitment to the “holy war” by giving up his life
• Seeks a personal reward and/or seeks salvation in exchange for performing the attack

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 6

Islamabad, Pakistan: Friday, November 20, 2009 The master mind of suicide attacks on
World Food Program and Rescue 15 offices has been arrested. In a media briefing, Federal
Police IG said Jamsheed alias Tahir has belonged to Mulla Rahim group and Ghazi force of
Orakzai Agency and also fought in Swat. A suicide jacket recovered from Jamsheed was also
presented in the briefing. IG said Jamsheed used Muhammad alias Ilyas and Haroon as suicide
bombers to attack World Food Program and Rescue 15 offices. Police have also got key clues
about the elements involved in firing incidents on military officials in Islamabad, he added.
Jamshed alias Tahir was a key activist of “Ghazi Force” formed and operated by ex-students of
Lal Majsid (mosque). The Police claimed the “Ghazi Force” was formed essentially to carry
out “reprisal or revenge activities” for the 2007 operation against the Lal Masjid in the heart of
Islamabad city.

IGP Kalim said terrorist Tahir had admitted in his confessional statement before the magistrate
that he was the mastermind of the suicide bombings in Islamabad and Swat.

4. Military Operation:
Some 30,000 Pakistani troops last month launched a massive military offensive against Taliban
militants in the lawless South Waziristan tribal district bordering Afghanistan. The conflict has
displaced about 250,000 people. The army has secured strategic heights in a three-pronged
advance into militant stronghold and killed more than 340 militants.
A majority of Pakistanis support the military operation against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants
in the country's lawless tribal region near the Afghan border, a poll released on Tuesday
showed. Pakistan launched a major assault in the South Waziristan district on October 17
against Islamist insurgents, who have been blamed for dozens of bombing and raids on civilian
and official targets over the last two years, killing thousands of people.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 7

 A poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan, an affiliate of Gallup International, said some 51 per
cent of Pakistanis backed the army action. Only 13 percent opposed it, while 36 per cent were
unsure.

In response to the successful military operation the Terrorists unleashed a campaign of suicide
attacks in Pakistan in recent weeks in retaliation for a major offensive by security forces in the
Terrorists stronghold of South Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan.

5. Poverty:
For many people poverty is not the cause of suicide bombing. According to Professor Alberto
Abadie, of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, “There is no significant
relationship between a country’s wealth and level of terrorism…..”

But if we are discussing Suicide Attacks in Pakistan then we must pay attention to this issue
too. I am discussing Poverty and Terror together under one heading because the terrorists who
are targeting Pakistan use children in attacks mainly belonged to poor families. Their families
even don’t have the courage to ask about their children because of the terror created by these
organizations.

Story No.1

CNN on Tue July 7, 2009 from Nic Robertson Reported as Following,

A top Pakistani Taliban leader in Pakistan is buying and selling children for suicide bombings,
Pakistani and U.S. officials said. Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud has been increasingly using
the children in attacks, the officials said. A video released by Pakistan's military shows the
children training for the task. In the video of a training camp, children can be seen going
through exercises.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 8

Mehsud has been selling the children, once trained, to other Taliban officials for $6,000 to
$12,000, Pakistani military officials said.

Some of the children are as young as 11, the officials said.

“Mehsud has been admitting he holds a training center for young boys, for preparing them for
suicide bombing. So he is on record saying all this, accepting these crimes," said Major
General Akhtar Abbas, spokesman for the Pakistani army.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 9

 Story No.2
Source: BBC

A 14-year-old boy in the tribal region of Bajaur, in north-west Pakistan, says he was
detained by Taliban forces who tried to turn him into a suicide bomber. The boy is now
in army hands.

He provided a detailed account to BBC correspondent Orla Guerin. His story cannot be
independently verified.

"There were five people who came after me from a place in Bajaur. They tricked me. They told
me they were going to behead my father. I went with them but my father wasn't there. They
tied me up.

There were two more guys of my age. They were also training to be suicide bombers. If we
refused they would tie our hands behind our backs, blindfold us and start beating us.

We used to ask them to let us out to pray. They would reply 'you are already on your way to
heaven. You don't need to pray.'

They beat me hard for five days. I wasn't given any food. While they were beating me I agreed
to become a suicide bomber. They separated me from the other boys.

They took me to a dark room and started giving me pills. I was handed over to Maulvi Fakir
[the Bajaur Taliban commander]. After all this preparation they said I was to go and do the job
in a mosque.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 10

 Indicators

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 11

 Indicators
In Pakistan Suicide bombs are delivered by multiple means, complicating security
measures
1. Individual-borne bombs
2. Suicide Vehicle bombs
3. Group suicide attack

Terrorists will choose whichever method is most likely to succeed against a particular
target
We’ll discuss only individual-born bombs,
1. Individual-borne bombs:
Following are basic external, behavioral indicators of a individual suicide attacker:

The wearing of new clothes with a secular, western appearance and also heavy
clothing, no matter what the season. Long coats may be used to conceal explosive belts
and devices.

An unusual gait, especially a robotic walk. This could indicate someone forcing or
willing him to go through with a mission.

Tunnel vision. The bomber often will be fixated on the target and for that reason will
look straight ahead. He or she also may show signs of irritability, sweating, tics, and
other nervous behavior.

Signs of drug use – including, for example, enlarged pupils, a fixed stare, and erratic
behavior.

Bags or backpacks (used to carry explosives, nails, and other shrapnel). The bomber
generally holds his/her bag or backpack tightly, sometimes gingerly, and may refuse to
be separated from it.

A fresh shave and short hair – a male with a fresh shave and lighter skin on his lower
face may be a religious Muslim zealot who has just shaved his beard so as not to attract
attention, and to blend in better with other people in the vicinity.

A hand in the pocket and/or tightly gripping something – this could be someone
clutching a detonator or a trigger for an explosive device. Such triggers, which may be
designed in the form of a button, usually are rather stiff so that they will not be set off
accidentally.

Evasive movements. It seems obvious that anyone who tries to avoid eye contact, or to
evade security cameras and guards, or who appears to be surreptitiously conducting
surveillance of a possible target location, may be a bomber.

Even if you manage to detect a suicide bomber, what do you do next? By investigating the
physics of a belt-bomb blast experts reached to some unexpected conclusions. It turns out that
very few people are killed by the concussive force of a suicide explosion; the deadly weapon is
in fact the shrapnel - the ball bearings, nails or pieces of metal that the attacker attaches to the
outside of his bomb. The explosions, though, are usually not powerful enough to send these
projectiles all the way through a human body, which means that if your view of a suicide
bomber is entirely obscured by other people at the moment of detonation, you are much more

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 12

likely to escape serious injury. Because of the geometry of crowds, a belt bomb set off in a
heavily populated room will actually yield fewer casualties than one set off in a more sparsely
populated area; the unlucky few nearest to the bomb will absorb all of its force.

We can use these calculations to question some assumptions about what authorities should do
if they detect a bomber. These physics create an unusual moral dilemma. If you suddenly find
yourself next to a suicide bomber about to set off his charge, there is "a huge conflict between
what's best for you as an individual and what's best for the group." The heroic thing to do in
that situation would be to approach the bomber and hug him, sacrificing yourself but saving the
lives of many people behind you.

Not surprisingly, security experts are still looking for other neutralization techniques, ones that
don't involve hugging. And here there is another divide in the field. The association of police
chiefs recommended this year that police on the scene simply shoot suspected bombers in the
head - "specifically, at the tip of the nose when facing the bomber . . .or about one inch below
the base of the skull from behind." The London officers who two weeks after the July
bombings killed an innocent Brazilian man whom they suspected of being a suicide bomber
were operating on similar instructions, a shoot-to-kill policy known as Operation Kratos.

There are other techniques to disarm a bomber, though, that don't involve guns. It is extremely
difficult to shoot someone in the head perfectly, and adds that a shot to the head could in fact
set off a suicide bomb. An array of moves would disarm but not kill a potential bomber. If
you're behind a bomber, the best thing to do is grab him around the shins, lift up and push
forward. The bomber will instinctively use his hands to block his fall. Once his hands are away
from the trigger of his bomb, you grab them. If you are facing a bomber head-on, you use a
different move, one that basically amounts to punching the bomber in the face and grabbing his
hands. It must be violent but certainly not deadly. And if you get the wrong person, as the
London police did, you don't have a corpse on your hands. Instead, “you brush his coat off and
say you're sorry.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 13

 Prevention

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 14

 Prevention
Prevention of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan other than political/economic solutions requires
addressing the following issues,

1. Madrassa Issues
2. Educating general public and Government officials

1. Madrassa Issues
The madrassas in today’s Pakistan, as in India, represent the legacy of the spectacular
resurgence of Islamic religious education in India during the late nineteenth century, beginning
with the establishment of the Deoband Madrassa in 1867. Since then, the madrassa system has
played an important historical role by preserving the orthodox tradition of Islam in the wake of
the downfall of Muslim political power; by training generations of Islamic religious scholars
and functionaries; by providing vigorous religio-political leadership; and, more importantly, by
reawakening the consciousness of Islamic solidarity and the Islamic way of life among the
Muslims of South Asia.

In 1947 there were only 189 madrassas in Pakistan. In 2002 the country had 10,000-13,000
unregistered madrassas with an estimated 1.7 to 1.9 million students. A 2008 estimate puts this
figure at "over 40,000".
Out of which most cater to the dominant Sunni sect. There are, however, some madrassas for
the minority (estimated at from 14 to 20 per cent) Shias.

Some recognized Wafaq/Tanzeem ul Madaris/Rabit ul Madaris:

• Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia
• Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Alhe Sunnat
• Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Salfia

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 15

 • Rabita-ul-Madaris Al Islamia

Some recognized individual Madaris:

• Jamia Munawwar-ul-islam
• Jamia Islamia Minhaj-ul-Quran
• Jamia Taleemat-e-Islamia
• Jamia Ashrafia
• Jamia Uloom-i-Sharia Sahiwal
• Darul Uloom Mohammadia Ghousia
• Darual Uloom, Karachi
• Jamia Rashidia Sahiwal
• Jamia Naeemia, Lahore

Ittehad Tanzimat Madaris-e-Deeniya

Ittehad Tanzimat Madaris-e-Deeniya, a federation of the five Waqfs (seminary boards) in
Pakistan, represents Deobandi, Sunni, Ahl-e Hadith, Shia and Jamaat-e-Islami schools of
thought.

Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi school of thought) is the governing body of all

Deobandi madaris in Pakistan and the largest of all the five boards. Its madaris include:

• Dar ul Uloom, Karachi

• Jamia Khir ul Madaris, Multan
• Jamia Ashrafia, Lahore
• Jamia Uloom-i-Sharia Jamia Uloom-i-Sharia, Sahiwal
• Jamia Binoria, Karachi
• Jamia Imdadiya, Faisalabad
• Jamia rashidia;sahiwal
• Jamia farooqia karachi
• Jamia banoria
• Jamia Uloom ul Islamia, Banori Town, Karachi
• Jamia Islamia Clifton
• Jamia Tur Rasheed Karachi
• Jamia Karimiya
• Jamia Rozatul Fatiya
• Jamia Manzoor Ul Islamia Lahore
Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (Berailvi school of thought) represents the greatest number of
madrasas. Mufti Munib-ur Rehman of Jamia Naeemia is the current President. Several
education systems are being run under this school of thought:
• Jamia Munawwar-ul-islam Dr.Syed Abbas Ali Shah Bukhari
• Darul Uloom Naeemia Karachi, Juctice Mufti Syed Shujaat Ali Qadri
• Darul Uloom Amjadia Karachi, Mufti Zafar Ali Naumani
• Jamia Naeemia Lahore, Mufti Hussain Ahmed Naeemi
• Jamia Islamia Anwar-ul-Uloom Multan, Allama Ahmed Saeed Kazmi
• Darul Uloom Ghausia Naeemia, Mufti Ahmed Yar Khan Naeemi
• Darul Uloom Ahsan-ul-Barakaat
• Jamia Nizamiya Rizviya, Lahore
• Jamia Mohammadia Ghausia Bhera
• Dawat-e-Islami
• Jamia Faridia Sahiwal

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 16

Wafaqul Madaris Al-Shia (Shia school of thought). About 400 Madaris.

Rabita-ul-Madaris Al Islamia (Jamaat-e-Islami school of thought founded by Syed Maudoodi)

Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Salfia (Ahl-e Hadith school of thought)

The madrassas in Muslim South Asia teach a curriculum known as Dars-i-Nizami, first
introduced by Mullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d.1747) who was a scholar of some repute in
Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy in Lucknow. This curriculum is not the same as that
associated with the name of Mullah Nasiruddin Tusi (d. 1064) and the Madrassa Nizamia,
which he established in eleventh-century Baghdad. Almost all Sunni madrassas, irrespective of
whether they are of Deobandi, Barelvi, or Ahl-i-Hadith persuasion, follow the same standard
Nizami course of studies adopted by the Deoband seminary in 1867. It consists of about twenty
subjects broadly divided into two categories:

• Al-ulum an-naqliya (the transmitted sciences),

• Al-ulum al-aqliya (the rational sciences).

The subject areas include grammar, rhetoric, prosody, logic, philosophy, Arabic literature,
dialectical theology, life of the Prophet, medicine, mathematics, polemics, Islamic law,
jurisprudence, Hadith, and Tafsir (exegesis of the Quran).

It is important to note that out of the twenty subjects, only eight can be considered as solely
religious. The remaining subjects are otherwise secular and were included in Nizami
curriculum both to equip the students for civil service jobs and as an aid to understanding
religious texts. Also, facilities for teaching all of the subjects and books are not usually
available in all madrassas. This is particularly true in the case of subjects such as medicine,
mathematics, history, philosophy, prosody, and polemics. The result is that the students often
have to move from one madrassa to another to complete their curriculum. This also results in
the failure of many madrassas to institutionalize their grading and promotion procedures.

As is well known, most of the books taught in this curriculum are very old. Books used in
philosophy and logic, for example, were written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Medicine is taught through an eleventh-century text that is still considered an authentic study
of human anatomy and pathology. In what we have described as purely religious subjects, the
books used date back to the seventeenth century at the latest and the eleventh century at the
earliest.

Books prescribed for astronomy, mathematics, and grammar are more than five- to seven-
hundred-year-old texts. In most of the madrassas there are no formal admission procedures,
and academic schedules are often flexible. Some major madrassas have, however,
institutionalized their admission, grading, and promotion procedures and have established
some degree of rigor in their academic schedules.

The complete Nizami curriculum runs from seven to nine years after the completion of the
elementary level. The entire system has been traditionally supported by the community through
trusts, endowments, charitable donations, and zakat contributions. However, since the
introduction of the compulsory collection of zakat and ushr by the Zia ul-Haq government in
1980, a large number of madrassas receive regular financial assistance from the publicly
administered zakat funds. Not only do the students not pay any tuition, they are provided with
free textbooks, board and lodging, and a modest stipend.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 17

In terms of levels of education, the madrassas in Pakistan are categorized as:

1) Ibtedai (elementary), where only the Quran is memorized and taught;

2) Vustani (middle level), where selected books from Dars-i-Nizami are taught; and
3) Fauquani (higher level), where the entire Dars-i-Nizami is taught. In some madrassas
where competent ulema are available, students after their graduation take up post-
graduate courses of study in tafsir, hadith, or fiqh.

Madrassa Main Concerns and Functions:

The madrassa education is critical for all of the following concerns and functions.
1) The preservation and integrity of orthodox beliefs and practices of Islam
2) The preservation of the shari’a, especially in matters pertaining to family laws and religious
rituals
3) The dissemination of the Islamic religious knowledge under Ulema supervision and
guidance. They resolve religious disputes and issue fatwas, providing the faithful with religious
guidance on all kinds of issues. As religious functionaries, they organize and lead
congregational prayers, supervise the celebration of Islamic religious occasions, and conduct
marriage ceremonies and burial rituals.

Madrassas and Terrorism:

There has been considerable disagreement among analysts about the role of educational
institutions, such as madrassas, in terrorism. In 2005, Peter Bergen and Swaty Pandey, in an
influential series of articles, stated that concern over Islamic education was all a ‘madrassa
myth.’ Basing their analysis on a controversial World Bank study about the actual number of
madrassas in Pakistan, Bergen and Pandey had argued that “while madrassas are an important
issue in education and development in the Muslim world, they are not and should not be
considered a threat to the United States.” This is because of their relatively small number and
since terrorists who attacked the West had largely not been educated in madrassas.

In their article “The Madrassa Myth” PETER BERGEN and SWATI PANDEY wrote

“We examined the educational backgrounds of 75 terrorists behind some of the most
significant recent terrorist attacks against Westerners. We found that a majority of them are
college-educated, often in technical subjects like engineering. In the four attacks for which the
most complete information about the perpetrators' educational levels is available - the World
Trade Center bombing in 1993, the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
in 1998, the 9/11 attacks, and the Bali bombings in 2002 - 53 percent of the terrorists had
either attended college or had received a college degree. As a point of reference, only 52
percent of Americans have been to college. The terrorists in our study thus appear, on average,
to be as well educated as many Americans.”

They further wrote,

“Of the 75 terrorists we investigated, only nine had attended madrassas, and all of those
played a role in one attack - the Bali bombing. Even in this instance, however, five college-
educated "masterminds" - including two university lecturers - helped to shape the Bali plot.”

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 18

In the end they concluded,
“While madrassas are an important issue in education and development in the Muslim world,
they are not and should not be considered a threat to the United States.”

Registration Issues:
On August 24, Government of Pakistan ordered the country’s madrassas to register by
December 31, 2005 or face closure. It also ordered the estimated 1,400 foreigners studying in
Pakistan’s madrassas to leave or face deportation. The Islamist forces decided to oppose the
registration process. The Wafaq-ul-Madaris, lead this opposition, along with the Tanzeemat
Madaris Deeniya and Tanzimul Madaris Ahle Sunnat. The ulema (religious leaders) claim that
the registration process is intended to curb the ‘independence and sovereignty’ of madrassas
and is, consequently, not acceptable. Two days before the registration process began, the
Wafaq-ul-Madaris terminated the July 2005 agreement it had signed with the Government to
reform the madrassa syllabus and repatriate foreign students. Terming the registration move a
ploy to control the seminaries, Islamist leaders met in Islamabad to unanimously reject
amendments to the Societies Registration Act 1860, requiring all religious schools to be
registered.

The Ulema rejected Government attempts at interference in their institutions. The past few
years has seen the Musharraf regime introduce two ordinances to control militancy in the
seminaries but the clergy ensured that both were unsuccessful. The first ordinance, called
'Pakistan Madrassa Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini Madaris) Board
Ordinance 2001' was promulgated on August 18, 2001 and endeavored to reform existing
curriculum by introducing secular subjects. Another mechanism, the Voluntary Registration
and Regulation Ordinance 2002, was introduced to control the enrollment of foreigners and to
monitor them. Although exact figures are not available, a negligible number is reported to have
registered and not a single seminary was closed for disregarding the ordinance.

There is a big mistake in understanding the issue of Madrassas that majority of analysts and
policy makers compare Madrassa education with School education. Some what both are same
but the ultimate end of both is totally opposite to each other. It is evident that Most of
Madrassas are, in essence, established for After-Life gains not for the worldly gains. So they
are reluctant to accept secular subjects e.g. computers. They consider it a threat to beliefs and
practices.

Recommendation for Registration Issue:

• Registration of madrassas with their respective Wafaqs instead of Government.

Government shall coordinate with the Wafaqs. Government and Wafaqs jointly design the
rules and regulations of the Government Madrassa Coordination Board as well as rules
and regulations of Wafaqs. Wafaqs shall control the Madrassas according to the rules of
Government Madrassa Coordination Board. They shall ensure that Madrassas are working
accordingly in accordance with the very purpose of their existence.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 19

 M M
M
Government
M Shia M
Madrassa Wafaq
Coordination Board M
M
M M

M
M M M M
Salfi
M M
Deobandi M Wafaq M
M M
M Wafaq M Berailvi
M M
M Wafaq M
M M M M
M M M M
M M M=Madrassa

• Wafaqs shall enlist all students while they are studying. After completing their study they
shall need a member’s certificate other than graduate certificate. The member’s
certificate shall be renewed on yearly basis. This strategy shall not only keep the record of
the graduates but it’ll also serve for quality control purposes.

Students registration with Wafaqs:

• Every student in a Madrassa in Pakistan shall submit to the registrar an application
through the Head of Madrassa for registration as a Madrassa student, within three
months following his admission to a Madrassa, failing which he/she shall not be
allowed to continue his/her studies further. It is binding on the Principal and the student
to ensure compliance.

• A student shall be registered as a madrassa student only if he fulfills the admission

criteria of the Wafaq and falls within the seats allowed to the madrassa by the Wafaq
according to the facilities available at the institution as determined by the Wafaq and
Government Madrassa Coordination Board.

• Every madrassa student registered with the Wafaq shall be furnished with a student
registration number and a certificate and an identity card, which shall be prominently
displayed by the student throughout his period of study.

• The Madrassas may issue only provisional enrollment to the students and only once the
student is registered with the Wafaq , he shall be issued a permanent enrollment by the
Madrassa.

• Every recognized Madrassa in Pakistan shall submit to the Wafaq annually, a list of the
names of all students at such a Madrassa and also a list of all registered students who
have either discontinued their studies or migrated to another madrassa during the
preceding 12 months. Such a list shall indicate the full names; the years of studies and
in cases where students have discontinued their studies or migrated e.g. date of
discontinuation or migration of each student, as the case may be.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 20

 • A register shall be maintained by the Wafaqs, session wise and Madrassa-wise.

• The name of a student shall be deleted from the register as soon as he has been
registered as a Member (Molvi/Molana), or as soon as proof is given to the satisfaction
of the registrar that such a student has discontinued his madrassa studies.

• Migration will be allowed from one recognized madrassa to another recognized

madrassa. The Wafaqs shall only entertain applications for no objection certificate for
migration after the applicant has cleared first examination and the written consent of
both the relieving and accepting Head of Madrassas.

Faculty registration with Wafaqs:

• Every member of the teaching faculty of a Wafaq recognized Madrassa in Pakistan

shall submit to the Registrar of Wafaq an application through the Head of the Madrassa
(Mohtamim) for registration as faculty, immediately but not latter than three months
following appointment.

• No faculty shall be registered unless he fulfills the Wafaq’s criteria.

• Every faculty, registered with the Wafaq shall be furnished with a faculty registration
number and a certificate and a identity card, which shall be prominently displayed by
the faculty member while in the institution.

• A record shall be maintained institution-wise.

• An eligible fresh candidate applying for a faculty registration number for the purpose of
recruitment to a job shall be issued a provisional faculty registration number. This
provisional faculty registration number shall be converted to permanent on receipt of an
application endorsed by the Mohtamim confirming that the job has been conferred.

• No teaching job in any Wafaq’s recognized Madrassa shall be confirmed or given by

any Madrassa nor shall be accepted by Wafaq unless the applicant is in possession of a
valid faculty registration certificate and for fresh applicants the procedure of
attainment.

• Faculty registration certificate shall be valid for a maximum of five years only and shall
be renewed after every five years.

• Migration of faculty will not be allowed during an academic session/activity unless

decided otherwise by Wafaq on case to case basis and will only be allowed from one
recognized Madrassa to another. In cases where faculty has resigned, resignation
accepted or not accepted, the faculty shall apply and obtain a no objection certificate
from Wafaq before joining another Madrassa. Upon joining another institution, a fresh
certificate shall be issued in which the name of the institution shall be changed but the
basic faculty registration number shall stay the same.

Wafaqs shall coordinate with Government Madrassa Coordination Board by submitting

their Madrassa registration /students registration/faculty registration/activity
reports/results.

Recommendations regarding to Madrassas:

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 21

 • Inclusion of local community representatives in the management committee of the
madrassa shall be encouraged in order to ensure that the local citizenry are involved in the
workings of the madrassa.
• Career placement of madrassa graduates should be encouraged through apprenticeship
programs in which the madrassa graduates can find a way to teach their religious ideals
while also contributing as productive members of society. Examples of such
apprenticeships could be in the health services sector and disaster relief management. Such
programs can be supported by international donors as they would be independent of the
madrassa itself, but also include the local business community.
• Government shall start Madrassa Students facilitation Programs same like National
Internship Program, where Madrassa students can earn while they are working with the
Wafaqs recognized Madrassas.
• Exchange of possible practices and ideas between schools and madrassas within Pakistan
and abroad shall be facilitated.

2. Educating general public and Government officials

Prevention of suicide attacks requires educating people and personnel of Law enforcement
agencies. In order to educate general public and personnel of Law Enforcement Agencies to
prevent suicide terrorism we can design following two courses,

1. Community Workshop Course

2. Command Training Course

1. Community Workshop Course:

The goal of this course is to provide participants with the knowledge to develop operational
capabilities to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of a suicide bombing.

Target Audience

NGOs

Colleges and Universities

Chamber of Commerce & Industry

Etc.

Course Unit 1:
• Course Introduction
• Administration of a pre-test and pre-course skills evaluation

Course Unit 2:
• Various definitions relating to terrorism, suicide terrorism and terrorist organizations
• Historic overview of suicide bombings
• Evolution of suicide bombings; the types of suicide bombings
• Identify likely targets of suicide bombings
• Phases of a suicide bombing attack
• Characteristics and psychological aspects of suicide bombers

Course Unit 3:
• What is “suspicious”
• What to report

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 22


Type of information needed must be communicated to
• Police
• Community members

Course Unit 4:
• Understanding Suicide Attack methodology
• What's best for an individual and what's best for the group

Course Unit 5:
• Post-blast issues and response

Course Unit 6:
• Administration of final written examination,
• Complete post-course skills evaluation form,
• Complete a course critique,
• Formally graduate from the course.

Time Allocation for Community Workshop Course:

Totals 9 hours over the 3 days period

After completion of instruction, participants will be administered a post-test. The test will
include one or more items designed to assess understanding of each module objective.

Successful performance on the post-test (scoring 70% or better) will be recognized by issuance
of a “Certificate of Satisfactory Completion” that recognizes the capability of a participant to
meet course objectives. Participants who fail to perform satisfactorily (score less than 70%) on
the post-test will be issued a certificate acknowledging their attendance of training

2. Command Training Course:

The goal of this course is to provide participants with the knowledge and skills to return to
their agencies and develop policies, procedures, training, and operational capabilities to
interdict, prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of a suicide bombing.

Target Audience

Police

Frontier Constabulary

Any Law Enforcement Agency

Fire Brigade

Scope of Course
This is an operations level train-the-trainer course designed to provide advanced training in
responding to suicide bombing attacks. The instructional modules include 10 classroom
sessions including one case study, and the final practical exercise.

The following provides a synopsis of each module.

Course Unit 1:
• Course Introduction

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 23

• Administration of a pre-test and pre-course skills evaluation

Course Unit 2:
• Various definitions relating to terrorism, suicide terrorism and terrorist organizations
• Historic overview of suicide bombings and utilization suicide bombing as a tactic
• Evolution of suicide bombings; the types of suicide bombings
• Identify likely targets of suicide bombings
• Phases of a suicide bombing attack
• Characteristics and psychological aspects of suicide bombers
• Catalysts that move a groups to carry out suicide bombings;
• How emergency organizations can disrupt a terrorist cell’s ability to carry out a suicide
bombing.

Course Unit 3:
• Basic concepts, and characteristics of energetic materials,
• Commercial, military, and improvised explosives utilized by suicide bombers.
• Basic terms, concepts, and explosive characteristics
• Explosive & firing system concepts to identify primary intelligence requirements prior to an
attack.

Course Unit 4:
• Introduced to the risk analysis process consistent with supporting national infrastructure
protection

Course Unit 5:
• Case Studies relating to suicide bombings to reinforce course objectives

Course Unit 6:
• Methodology and process for conducting threat assessments

Course Unit 7:
• Familiarized with data relating to techniques and processes for the collection, analysis,
management and dissemination of counter terrorist protective information appropriate to their
organizations and agencies.

Course Unit 8:
• The process for conducting vulnerability assessments for a given asset.

Course Unit 9:
• Information, techniques and practical examples of physical, procedural, staffing and
operational countermeasures that can be implemented as terrorist threat levels rise.

Course Unit 10:

• Identify the need for conducting risk analysis, identify adversary strategies, conduct a risk
analysis, and develop security upgrades and countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate the
suicide bombing threat.

Course Unit 11:

• Focuses on post-blast issues and response

Course Unit 12:

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 24

• Administration of final written examination,
• Complete post-course skills evaluation form,
• Complete a course critique,
• Formally graduate from the course.

Time Allocation
Totals 30 hours over the ten days period

After completion of instruction, participants will be administered a post-test. The test will
include one or more items designed to assess understanding of each module objective.

Successful performance on the post-test (scoring 70% or better) will be recognized by issuance
of a “Certificate of Satisfactory Completion” that recognizes the capability of a participant to
meet course objectives. Participants who fail to perform satisfactorily (score less than 70%) on
the post-test will be issued a certificate acknowledging their attendance of training

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan – Factors, Indicators, Preventions 25