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G.R. No.

208170; August 20, 2014; kidnap for ransom and serious illegall detention and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying
down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. mask and introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and
"Susan", Accused-Appellants. loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be
allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony
equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment,
MENDOZA, J.:
private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM
cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I- was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal
IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand
Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board
Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and fee.
serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly
Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.

The Facts
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the
situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information, 3 dated
February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then
wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise,
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, private complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in
Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety
with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and and eventual release.
take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate
115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was
with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a
travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining
day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to
consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St.,
lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days,
which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated; that
ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying
THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the
release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor,
Police. Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at
around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves
along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi,
CONTRARY TO LAW.
after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were
able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the
Version of the Prosecution driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used to
victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the
officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked
In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the
him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could
kidnapping: not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station
for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed
practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his
was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were
hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City
EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.
associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate,
appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses,
would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy

1
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was
police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped
floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam. victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi
he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi
driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his
the mask used by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau. 5 constitutional rights.

Version of the Defense Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the
latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2)
children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street,
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief 6 to substantiate their claim
Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento
of innocence:
Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari
coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. He is a British national.
store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for
He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July
her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At
2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior
around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told
thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the
her to come with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along
afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
Aguinaldo Highway.

On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were
morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He
not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small
parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his
room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers,
hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing
were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were
tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until
released and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.
he became unconscious.

Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he
He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered
felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he
in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had withher Five Thousand Pesos
was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20)
cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport,
seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything,
wedding ring, necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know. 7
thus, someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied
that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his
wife, but to no avail. The Ruling of the RTC

When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of
passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission
(in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their
him by his wife . He lost those personal properties. versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to
rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron
John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day,
proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the
he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.
heinous act.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman
bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for
who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said
personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot
reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he
cannot drive a taxi as an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the
same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she
states:
decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house
(Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.

2
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there was
REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the
and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the
PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not because she served food on the
as accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11
applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution 12 notifying the parties that they could file their
prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,
(1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10)
opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in
MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in
preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.

Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH
The Court’s Ruling
ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty
Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages
of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos The appeal is bereft of merit.
(200,000.00).
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the
SO ORDERED.8 sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity
of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.

Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v.
The Ruling of the CA
Maxion15 that:

The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the
(FIRST)The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the
by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and
crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant
factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
Hence, this appeal. conflicting testimonies.Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe.
Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.16
I
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect.
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17

II In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record,
the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.

In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond
III reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof
the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the commission of the crime is a
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10 ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No.
separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed

3
that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, 5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of
Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a
Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet;
driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of and
crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the
house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched. 23
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was
established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial
five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice
evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the
which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the
author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively
voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
and with whom he had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for
the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent.
There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are
a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of
conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the
credit.20 victim.24

(SECOND)Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
that led tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by
rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.
beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
of all others, as the guilty person.22
(THIRD)Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice
RTC and the CA: to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence
indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence
the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located
woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him
at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;
every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance
with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled bea community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous
2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
Petrus on February 11, 2004; way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were
recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau; In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and
never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and
gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain
countenancedPetrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that
with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus
being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an
black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and
accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to
family footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones;
the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom
notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title
but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband. 27 Moreover, this Court is
for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of
guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of
the OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate
the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather thanthat of a principal.
No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage contract of
Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of their
children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name
and PLDT bills; in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of

4
witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered
anchored entirely on the investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial evidence carries under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the
moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in
sworn statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and
the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which transpired. 31 deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.38
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of
alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of
to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take into
otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the
matters.32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the
can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities
be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. 33 Apart from their bare allegations, no should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should
defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an
importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could accomplice.
have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and
fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the
kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and
amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the
sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.
amount of ₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their
participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants (₱573, 132.00 x 213) or ₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining
questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail. one-third (1/3) or ₱191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P
182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or
₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral damages;
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the
and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless
arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446
pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba
participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00
warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or
curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest ₱273, 132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.35Their warrantless arrests cannot, by
themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00; moral damages
in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests,
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱91,044.00,
illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu, 36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the
moral damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the amount of
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record
₱33,333.33.
point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.37
SO ORDERED.
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in
view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.

The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest
committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the
accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being
reduced to ₱200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and
his family endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and

5
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990 – MUDER/TENANT informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno
continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981;
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
SARMIENTO, J.:
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in cadaveric rigidity.
Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales,
Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused,
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to 1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara,
Iloilo. 2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered
by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew 3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of 5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic
the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
certified this case to us for review.6
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic
The antecedent facts are as follows: cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of 7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. toward the left thoracic cavity.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like
to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to 8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid
the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy
Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman 9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja,
Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing
incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an 10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which palm right.
time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman 11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large
Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further intestine and mysentery coming out.
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain
Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio
Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been

6
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO
right, directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity. GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy,
the medial border of the right scapula. Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and
are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring,
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect
confederating and helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation,
of the right elbow.
with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the
middle 3rd, forearm, right. weapons with which said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown
by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull. caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

INTERNAL FINDINGS: CONTRARY TO LAW.

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart. Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
the lungs. however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the
lungs. basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was
filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the
large intestine, thru and thru.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted
the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla;
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas
lungs (sic). Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and
Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings
TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab
STABBED (sic), INCISED AND wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while
PUNCTURED WOUNDS. admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated
wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of
the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12 relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the
death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as
the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and on other matters.
protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be
taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident.
indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13 According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While
Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries
against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows: for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was
some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana

7
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however,
and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that
after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to
into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
"linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As
to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not immediately
there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00
that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the
should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R.
Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty
to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
imposed being reclusion perpetua.
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one kilometer away from
the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict
him. 32 the appellant of the crime charged.

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria. To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman
Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the
crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial
thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was
court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness,
however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because,
and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
considering that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood
stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there
appellate court held that: would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it.
And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by
Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to
20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal
37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to
deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim. state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he
could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto
never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an
explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As
investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside
stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of
from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held
in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the
in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility
declared not to affect credibility.'" that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy
report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not
at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria
wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the
for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
significance of these wounds later.
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 33 It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence,
a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

8
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable
hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the Court who did the stabbing?
field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20
meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing
and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine
who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even
of them. identify the weapons used because according to you it was
just flashing?
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
A Yes, sir.39
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
(Emphasis supplied)
A Yes, Sir.
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed,
by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the
hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein
accused as identified by you? It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals
which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by
indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
this Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in
constant movement, I could not determine who did the
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
hacking.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
ATTY. GATON:
different from that which he intended.

The interpretation is not clear.


2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
COURT: account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

They were doing it rapidly. (Emphasis supplied.)

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who
was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

ATTY. GATON:
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really
hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking. lack of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

9
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I
must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by was haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was
means of deceit or fault. also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the
victim.46
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed
a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was xxx xxx xxx
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In
(Emphasis ours.)
this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have
inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very
source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or
this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to
who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the
ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness
appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by
and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto
the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal
sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family
principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound.
assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking
1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved
and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at
quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's
that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its
widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him
logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted
employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help
all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it
but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.
is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have
been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there
being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family
conviction can not be sustained. tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible
physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and
at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father,
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to
the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And
testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981.
considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we
While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the
(Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming
of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for
one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly
witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on
volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in
the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present
when he testified. In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is
he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
because the victim was also his landlord.
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the
time you saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada
when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her
husband?

10
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 – DRIVER/ROBBERYAMO This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988
by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
"Enry," accused-appellants. does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

REGALADO, J.: At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp.
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as
8-9).
contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished
by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
committed in the following manner:

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
10).
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry
away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1 they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment
promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof: give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened
PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion
her (Id., p.15).
committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced
to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he
is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages
for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
23).

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the
of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress
offense charged.4
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was
injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts
in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6

11
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a
ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7
A Santo Domingo Exit.

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when
and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their
the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his
liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced
as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that
that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree. you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all
you already received the money and the checks?
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic)
motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct Verde.
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the Verde when she is (sic) already given you the checks?
specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of
rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives
for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my
rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along
the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we
in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already
the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11 stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any
other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the
circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a)
bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of
that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12 which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is
robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the
same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we
can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in
intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The
thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the
even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which
incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention. reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno: punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18

12
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
Article 267 which defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the progress of the people:
pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made.
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage
which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of of all countries;
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and
307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
"highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the
in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or
accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of
early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage
"stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
the subject and are of continuing validity:
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore,
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived
is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No.
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter,
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply under the old Brigandage Law. 25
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements
which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but
adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under form of liability in case of doubt.
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and
strongest in the law. 24
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd,
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far
therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit: motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who
happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking

13
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the
categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject
matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing
the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not
within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated,
the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293
and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy
as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated
against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno,
with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made
with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of
the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple
robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which
has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former
offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property
through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there
was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the
robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly
convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful,
with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping
for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through
intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and
IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay
the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902 is to perform. In a matter so important to the good order of society as that in question, where the
consequences of a mistake are necessarily so serious, nothing less than the highest degree of diligence will
satisfy the standard prescribed by the law. We can not say that the defendant has acted with that diligence
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
in the present case.
vs.
TOMASA DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellee.
Applying the provisions of article 568 of the Penal Code, the act of contracting a second or subsequent
marriage, the prior marriage not having been lawfully dissolved, being one which, if done with malice,
LADD, J.:
would constitute a grave crime, the offense committed by the defendant is punishable by arresto mayor in
its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree. There being no aggravating
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila, taken by the complaining witness, Julian circumstance, and as we think the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal Code may properly
Gonzalez, from a judgment of acquittal, upon a complaint for bigamy under article 471 of the Penal Code. be considered in this case, this penalty should be applied in its minimum degree.

The defendant was married to the complaining witness in Manila, May 27, 1897. After living together in We therefore sentence the defendant to four months and one day of arresto mayor and costs. The judgment
Manila for a time they separated, the defendant remaining in the house where they had been previously of the court below will be modified in accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
living until some time subsequent to July 12, 1900. On that day she was married in Manila by a Protestant
clergyman to Ramon Martinez. Her defense is that she honestly believed her first husband was dead when
she married Martinez.

It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the separation, in the same
house with the defendant. Gonzalez testifies that the separation took place in March, 1900, and that he also
lived for some months in the lower story of the same house, the defendant living in the upper story. He
further testifies that after he left this house and went to live elsewhere he visited his relatives there nearly
every day down to a few days before the trial, which took place in September, 1901. He says that he often
saw his wife at these times, supplying her with means for her support through his relatives, but that he
never spoke with her. A short time after her second marriage the defendant moved away from the house
and has since lived elsewhere.

The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and two months when the
separation took place. That would fix the date of the separation in July, 1898. She testifies that some time
during the year following the separation she was told by the mother of Gonzalez that she had been
informed that her son was dead, that thereupon prayers were said for his soul for nine nights, and that she
put on mourning and wore it a year. She says that she contracted the second marriage with the consent of
the mother of Gonzalez, and believing that the information which she had received from her as to the death
of Gonzalez was true. The mother of Gonzalez died before the trial.

There was some further evidence from other witnesses on both sides, but it was of such a character as to
throw but little light upon the facts of the case. On the whole, we have reached the conclusion, though not
without some hesitation, that the story told by the defendant is in the main more likely to be true than false,
and that she probably did contract the second marriage under a bona fide belief that the first marriage had
been dissolved by the death of Gonzalez.

(FIRST) We have recently held, in the United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided
January 27, 1902, that there can be no conviction under article 475 of the Penal Code, where by reason of a
mistake of fact the intention to commit the crime does not exist, and we think the same principle must
apply to this case. The defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint.

We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal negligence in contracting
the second marriage, and should have been convicted under article 568 of the Penal Code. (See G.O., No.
58, sec. 29.) It does not appear that she made any attempt to ascertain for herself whether the information
received by her mother-in-law as to the death of Gonzalez was to be relied upon. She never even saw or
communicated directly in any way with the persons who gave her mother-in-law this information.
Moreover, viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to her, she waited less than two years after
hearing the death of her husband before contracting the second marriage. The diligence with which the law
requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he
15
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910 officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10
o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one
vs.
of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
the wounded man.

CARSON, J.:
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the defendant's warnings.
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt,
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
correct:

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
right of self-defense.
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were
no other openings of any kind in the room.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or xxx xxx xxx
a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the circumstances:
door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the (1) Illegal aggression.
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept
in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described,
one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced
protection. open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to
be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon
at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at

16
defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant
nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
shall appear.
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to
defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
negligence or bad faith. "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in
the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo
Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex.
Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala.,
213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.) Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with
malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence
acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code,
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in
the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent object of the crime.
in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention,
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1,
s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore,
the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and . . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise
stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
corruption was of one particular form or another.

17
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime. factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the
like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees. Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall does not offend. And —
apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every
the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of
the actor. the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of
what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the
her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because
word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal
great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.) commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question
the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break
that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine: But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake
in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the
contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P.,
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207,

18
209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle.
and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are
wise, upon which he acted.
here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4,
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of
the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially
code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily." because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the
same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and
in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
the case, p.7.) 266.) .

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows: QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part
of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a
distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried,
strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of
It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8,
attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of
considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years
and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from

19
this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of
fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the
darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable.
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals,
one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the
next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from
criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza
finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from
criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed.
Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at
the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of
May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door
of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must
have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself
from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instance de oficio. So ordered.

20
G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000 – Saksakan Simbahan, Insane Murderer In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While
vs.
the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on
the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the
PUNO, J.: rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the
Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what
will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the
court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition. Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went
near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the
guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again
the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads: when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting
him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's
LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7
MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion
stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his
inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red
death shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-
Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised
Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs
his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was
of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife.
PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other.
Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and
placed in jail.
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes
upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound." 9 He
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left
"Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:
Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he
was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his EXTERNAL FINDINGS
arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. 3
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several 1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him
"intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. 4 2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The
edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellant's
behalf. 5 INTERNAL FINDINGS

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left
of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut. 10
Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who
apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The prosecution
established the following facts: After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no
evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim
21
when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have Patient's Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's wife; 28 (6) the Summary and
sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind. 11 Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical case history; 30 (8) the admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's
Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment Form/medication sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34
The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused "pretended
to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he "furiously continued stabbing The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found
and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
religious ceremony was being conducted;" and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by
the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995. 12
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer
the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant
because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and
see his family. 13
P100,000.00 as moral damages.

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He
SO ORDERED. 25
reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless
a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was
not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14 In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-appellant I
moved for reconsideration.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Appellant's SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past
weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that
II
appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting
enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant
took out all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO
among the inmates. Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND
Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-
One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING
the trial court judge informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court CIRCUMSTANCE. 36
order for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant. 17 The second letter,
dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an
association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary and adviser The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by
of said association, informed the jail warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested that immediate him. 37 Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18 human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good
and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been
done voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the "Demurrer to accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 42
Evidence." The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind 43 and that
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence
Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, constitute the normal condition of a person. 45 This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other
and accused-appellant's medical and clinical records at the said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46
appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered
from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and
after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. 23 The The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health
Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from
admission and treatment after "a relapse of his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant criminal liability:
at the BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the

22
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
interval. renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to (b) x x x xxx xxx
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against
the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings
acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he and order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order
may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the
release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is
institution. 47 itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent
plea thereto. 58
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 The accused must be "so The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. 59 And the test to
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He must be deprived of reason and act determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused,
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
deprivation of freedom of the will. 50
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must refer to the time aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 52 suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial,
with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a system of
procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. 60
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. 53 Direct testimony is not
required. 54 Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time of the
be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward court proceedings is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the
acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 56 act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
crime's commission. "Present insanity" is commonly referred to as "competency to stand trial" 61 and
relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant's present
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he
inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. 62 In competency cases, the accused may have been
killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that
sane or insane during the commission of the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However,
appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan 57 attached to the
if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found
Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant
competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63
may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly
unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was
administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to
normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his
the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that
did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, any available defense may be interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a
over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational person would have been statutory recognition of the rule at common law. 65 Thus:
made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and
Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day of [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present
arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and
his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 66
Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides:
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently
coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2)
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. 67 The first requisite is
thereof: the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer

23
coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., of an unsound mental condition that "effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the
that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. 68 charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such
sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made
intelligently. The plea of "not guilty" was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court "because of
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the
his refusal to plead." 80
public. 69It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just
defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him
is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due process of law; 72 and this has several The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not
reasons underlying it. 73 For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand
proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant,
defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness.
own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of
the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of accused-
decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and
appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent
prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of
defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the
accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine
court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the
whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter.
functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the
One year later, accused-appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan
interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible
City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city
object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which
jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not
Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records are barren of any order disposing of the said motion.
realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be
The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence. 82
frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance. 74
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a "lifetime
illness" and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After accused-appellant was
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up. 84
discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a "bona fide doubt" 77 as to defendant's competence to
stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was
history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental illness." 85 This
demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of
particular case. 78 mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of
sentenced him to death!
accused's mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:
Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." 86 The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large
xxx xxx xxx
degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent determination of an accused's
capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court.
born, he answered, in Tayug. By this time, the accused's abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon
him. 88
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served
a dual purpose 89 by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the
instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a
SO ORDERED. 79 medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time of
the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under
the present circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive enable him to participate, in his trial meaningfully.
evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks
24
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair
trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for
this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that
the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper
proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated
murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the
accused's plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in full possession of his
mental faculties when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary
medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission of the crime. 93

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is
vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on
accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

25
G.R. No. 125672 September 27, 1996 – DRUGS, RETROACTIVITY OF AMENDED LAW; All told, the petitioner should now be deemed to have served the maximum period imposable
MARCH DECISION; DECEMBER AMENDMENT TOOK EFFECT for the crime for which she was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5. grams of dried marijuana leaves.
Although her penalty of life imprisonment had already become final, the beneficial effects of
the amendment provided under R.A. 7659 should be extended to petitioner.
JESUSA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN IN MANDALUYONG, respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is hereby ORDERED RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY, unless she is being detained on some other legal charges. No costs.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
SO ORDERED.
After having served five and a half years of her life sentence, may petitioner — who was
convicted of selling 5.5. grams of prohibited drugs, namely, dried marijuana leaves — be now
entitled to the beneficent penalty provisions R.A. 7659 and be now released from
imprisonment?

The Facts

Petitioner Jesusa Cruz, a.k.a. Jesusa Mediavilla, is at present confined at the Correctional
Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City serving the penalty of life imprisonment imposed
upon her as consequence of her conviction on March 31, 1992 for violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Her appeal from
the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, was
dismissed by this Court on March 1, 1993 in G.R. No. 106389, People vs. Jesus Cruz. Hence,
her life sentence has become final and executory.

On August 6, 1996, the present petitioner for habeas corpus was filed by Atty. Mylene T.
Creencia (of the law firm of Fortun and Narvasa) who was appointed by this court on
September 13, 1995 as counsel de oficio to assist the accused in the preparation of the said
pleading. Petitioner alleges that, as of the date of filing of her herein petitioner, she has already
served five and a half year of her life sentence (February 2, 1991 to August 5, 1996). She
argues that the penalty of the life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is "excessive
considering that the marijuana allegedly taken from her was only 5.5 grams or less than 750
grams". The Solicitor General, in his Comment filed with this Court on August 30, 1996,
interposed "no objection to a favorable application of Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly modified the penalties prescribed
by R.A. 6425; that is inter alia, where the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is less than 750
grams, the penalty is reduced to a range of prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
(Ordonez vs. Vinarao, G.R. No. 121424, March 28, 1996). In People vs. Simon (234 SCRA
555, July 29, 1994) and People vs. De Lara (236 SCRA 291, September 5, 1994), this Court
ruled that where the marijuana is less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision correccional. Moreover applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable is further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to the
medium period ofprision correccional as the maximum term, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances (Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 110983, March 8,
1996).

26
G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996 – BARILAN SA SAYAWAN Murder with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice of
the Republic of the Philippines.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Acts committed contrary to the provisions of PD No. 1866. 12
DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant
Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint hearings were had. The
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis,
Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Gregg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis. The defense
presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the
appellant himself.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two
informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the
first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as Appellee as follows:
minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the second crime.1
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later referred to the Court en Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight occurred between
banc in view of the problematical issue of whether to sustain the trial court's judgment in conformity with Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,2 People vs. Tiozon,3 People vs. Caling,4 People and pestering the former's sister Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178 & 1879, June
vs. Jumamoy,5 People vs. Deunida,6People vs. Tiongco,7 People vs. Fernandez,8 and People vs. Somooc9 or 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form pursuant to People vs. Barros, 10 which this Court (Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held in the
same place. This benefit dance was attended by Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora
The informations read as follows: Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178 While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing area,
Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then sitting at the plaza
(the area where they positioned themselves was duly lighted and was approximately
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
four mete's from the dancing hall), decided to just watch the activities in the dance
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
hall directly from the plaza.
the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38
cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the dance
giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while facing the direction of
the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident Diosdado Iroy, Rosita Iroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother
of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy,
and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to
on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while appellant, after shooting
and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased. Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.

Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the
with aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime, Rosita Iroy went home
advantage of by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. 11 and relayed to her parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 &
8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of the preceding paragraphs).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting chief of Police Felipe
Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula Matalinis. The police
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
officer made entries in the police blotter regarding the shooting and
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the appellant. But they were unable to
the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993,
keep, carry and have in his possession, custody and control a firearm (hand gun)
pp. 2-6).
with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess
the said firearm from competent authorities which firearm was carried by the said
accused outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the crime of In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father Teogenes
Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and then, appellant was

27
pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain of the back portion of the
These facts were entered in the police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim Case head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-6).13 government.

The slug was embedded at the midbrain. 14 Diosdado Iroy died of It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive
imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from the term of sentence if he has executed a waiver
Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to massive
otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time he has undergone preventive
intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. left occipital areas,
imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has not executed a
transecting cerebellum up to midbrain. 15
waiver. 19

The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per certifications issued on
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the decision an award of civil
26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly licensed firearm holder as verified from a consolidated list of
indemnity and other damages in Criminal Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order directing the
licensed firearm holders in the province 16 and was not authorized to carry a firearm outside his
appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son
residence. 17
and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses. 20 The order was to form an integral part of the decision.

The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because he was positively
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.21
identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It summarized his testimony in this wise:

The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that the trial court erred
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that in the
afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their house. At 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. I
250 to solicit passengers. They transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the
evening. They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the passenger
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO
boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans Asia Taiwan they had a talk
THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND
with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two passengers for Graham
FELIPE NIGPARANON.
Avenue near La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the
arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk with
Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his auntie scheduled to arrive abroad MV II
Cebu City. They were not able to pick up passengers which, as a consequence, they
went home. They had on their way home passengers for the Agors Public Market.
They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at Bil-isan, Pangalao, Bohol at 3:00 . . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES
EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED ARANSADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE
o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed the night. He went
home to Mariveles, Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.18 PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN
NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and sentenced him accordingly. It appreciated the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering that the appellant shot the victim at the back of the III
head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive portion of the decision dated 30 September
1993 reads as follows: . . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA
IROY AND SPO4 FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY
TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 22
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the accused
Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the killer of Diosdado
of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost. Iroy. To support his stand that the killer was not identified, he attacks the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Rosita Iroy and SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a motive "to put him in
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado, the victim, boxed him
on the night of 25 December 1992 because he allegedly "bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could
crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition punished under
Sec. 1 of RA No. 1866 as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an not have seen the person who shot Diosdado considering their respective positions, particularly Rosita
indeterminate sentence from Seventeen (17) years Four (4) months and One (1) day, who, according to defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and ran towards
the crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the appellant considers it as suppression of evidence
as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum, with the
accessories of the law and to pay the cost. when the prosecution did not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions who were allegedly seated with
Diosdado when he was shot.

28
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said witnesses is a neighbor A More or less four (4) meters distance.
of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for arbitrary detention had already been filed against him by the
appellant. The appellant further claims of alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter.
COURT:

Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, according to him, gained
From the dancing hall?
strength because of the lack of evidence on the identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that his
conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having been informed that he, among many others,
was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of Diosdado Iroy — A Yes, your honor.
specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be believed that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel
Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy.
Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado
Iroy was sitting lighted or illuminated?
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and recommends that we
affirm in toto the challenged decision.
A Yes, sir.

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, we find this
appeal to be absolutely without merit. Q What kind of light illuminated the place?

The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly persuade. The A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.
appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25
December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human experience that it would be the appellant who Q Was it an electric light?
would have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convicting evidence was
shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.

The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as testified to by
defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother only after Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place
the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows beyond cavil that she saw located?
the assailant:
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light
Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing from the house.
place and you went out, about what time did you get out?
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing
A 11:00 o'clock. place was enclosed at that time and there was a gate, an
opening?

Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from


Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the incident happened? A Yes, sir.

A Yes I was standing. Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?

Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or A Bamboo.
the dancing area?
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the
A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching entrance of the dancing place to the place where Diosdado
and getting near going to my brother Diosdado Iroy and while Iroy was sitting?
in the process I saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother Diosdado
Iroy. 23 A Five (5) meters.

xxx xxx xxx Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the
house, now whose house was that?
Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado
Iroy while he was sitting at the plaza to the dancing place? A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the
family name.
29
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was positively identified
Berto an electric light? by a credible witness. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused. 30 Besides, for that defense to prosper it is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was
A Yes, sir.
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 31 As
testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where the appellant said he was, is only
Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the about eight to nine kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about thirty minutes to
house of Fe and Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy was traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle. 32 It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the
sitting? appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

A About six (6) meters distance.24 Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have voluntarily
proceeded to the police station. This argument is plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the
voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. 33 Moreover,
xxx xxx xxx non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.34

Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the appellant had no license
dancing place? to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed. He,
therefore, committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of
A The white bulb.25 Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:

The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared: Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . . maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
observing the attitude and deportment of witnesses while listening to them speak" unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of
(People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266). firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the
declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince the trial court that they were telling the If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of penalty of death shall be imposed.
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an, 35 and reiterated in People vs. Tiozon, 36 People
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; 26 or the furtive glance, the vs. Caling, 37 People vs. Jumamoy, 38 People vs. Deunida, 39 People vs. Tiongco, 40 People
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere of the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, vs. Fernandez, 41 and People vs. Somooc, 42 that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed
the calmness, the yarn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 27 The appellant has miserably failed to convince (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we
us that we must depart from this rule. sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in
Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the non-presentation as
prosecution witnesses any of the companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he was shot. In Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the constitutional
the first place, the said companions could not have seen from their back the person who suddenly shot proscription against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated
Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most, only corroborate that illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these are separate offenses, with
of Rosita Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the said companions were not available to the the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the
appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. We observed in Tac-an:
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness is
merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the accused. 28 It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one
against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the
The alleged improper motive on the part of SPO4 Nigparanon simply because he is a neighbor of the Iroy's subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from
remains purely speculative, as no evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship affected SPO4 the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar,
Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his favor the presumption of regularity in the it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that
performance of his official duty. 29 As to the alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified by SPO4 Nigparanon. while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished
under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2)
offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle,

30
the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having Since the informations were for separate offense[s] — the first against a person and
placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy. the second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the
other under the rule or double jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for
homicide or murder; however, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm under
express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately charged with and convicted of
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:
In Tiozon, we stated:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as
"the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in
Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D.
said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not,
1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. The legal provision invoked,
however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise,
"Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized
in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum
prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the or Possession of Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
In People vs. Doriguez [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held: unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any
offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more firearm . . (or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one the necessary permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is
provision requires proof of an additional act or element which attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now,
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of if "with the use of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the committed," the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital
other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles punishment.
of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is not obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession
both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal
some important act which is not an essential element of the
possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is aggravated if the
other.
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of
In People vs. Bacolod, [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub- possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in the
machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and physical former. There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of . One is unlawful
injuries to one, informations of physical injuries through reckless imprudence and possession of a firearm, which may be either simple or aggravated, defined and
for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted punished respectively by the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD
in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. 1866. The other is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed
We ruled: firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the
crime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by
the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same
distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under the
offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different
Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the
other.

31
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills another with an The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995 in People vs. Barros, 43 we
unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the two separate offenses of violation of the second set aside that portion of the appealed decision convicting the appellant of the offense of murder and
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. Thus: affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. We therein
made the following statement:
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition [A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, possession of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but only that of illegal
under the second paragraph thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be loosely propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to
said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense because both are circumstances which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.
which increase the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder
is absorbed in the offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would
The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred to therein read
result whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
as follows:
Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one which is merely malum
prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may
give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime
and (b) the violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the should properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm
Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to bar the other; stated through the use of which a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an
otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is accused so situated should be liable only for the graver offense of aggravated illegal
punished by a special law while the second — Murder or Homicide — is punished possession of the firearm punished by death under the second paragraph of Section
by the Revised Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from
People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that the the holding which would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in addition to
imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper that for the illegal possession of the firearm used to commit the former.
imposable penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied)
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the
accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the simple possession punished
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an information for with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first
murder and pursuing only the information for "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court paragraph of Section 1. Where, complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to
categorically declared: commit homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will convert the erstwhile
simple illegal possession into the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In
other words, the homicide or murder constitutes the essential element for integrating
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in
into existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal possession of a
withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined in the second
firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical and unjustifiable to use the very
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or
same offenses of homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said
murder under the Revised Penal Code and, therefore, does not bar the simultaneous
capital offense, and then treat the former all over again as independent offenses to be
or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro
separately punished further, with penalties immediately following the death penalty
vs. People, involving the violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor
to boot.
invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions
in People vs. Tac-an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint,
virtually of the nature of the so-called, "special complex crimes," which should
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
more appropriately be called composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297
and Article 335. They are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that on complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single act giving rise
document, although both the Information and the decision of the trial court used the to two or more grave or less grave felonies nor do they involve an offense being a
term "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes necessary means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex crimes
been supposed to connote a "complex crime" as used in the Revised Penal Code. and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single
Such nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or
since there is no complex crime of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The more offenses.
gravamen of the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This offense is
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the
aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed firearm is shown to
conceptual definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes a
have been used in the commission of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under
single definite penalty therefor it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much
the Revised Penal Code. The killing of a human being, whether characterized as
less as separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by law. Thus,
homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession of an unlicensed
even where a single act results in two less grave felonies of serious physical injuries
firearm and is separately punished under the provision of the Revised Penal Code.
and serious slander by deed, the offense will not be punished as a delito

32
compuestounder Article 48 but as less serious physical injuries with ignominy under Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the
the second paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is integrated into homicide or murder could be susceptible of abuse since it entails undue
and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer separately punished. concentration of prosecutorial powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the
killing was committed with a firearm will necessarily be known to the police or
prosecutorial agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as
obtention of evidence to show that the firearm is unlicensed.
the discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when an offense becomes a
component of another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus
aggravated by the integration of the other, the former is not to be further separately Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging
punished as the majority would want to do with the homicide involved in the case at therein that the same was committed by means of an unlicensed firearm, the case
bar. would not fall under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is
alleged therein, but without alleging the lack of a license therefor as where that fact
has not yet been verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if proved in that
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a
case, would not affect the accused either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying
question of classification for purposes of the other provisions of the Code. The
circumstance.
theory in Tac-an that the principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal
possession of firearm and the killing shall merely be included in the particulars or,
better still, as an element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all, the Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution
plurality of crimes here is actually source from the very provisions of Presidential intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but the same is
Decree No. 1866 which sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the "various inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated with the information for illegal
laws and presidential decrees to harmonize their provision" which "must be updated possession, then any conviction that may result from the former would only be for
and revised in order to more effectively deter violators" of said laws. simple illegal possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent
prosecution for homicide or murder prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlaying the provisions of the
will only be for the unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be charged is still
circumstances as may be proved.
carnapping, although the penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The same situation, with escalating
punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-Piracy and In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, the real offense committed by the accused, and for which sole offense he should be
wherein the principal crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. punished, is the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the
Also, in the matter of destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death writer's position that the possible problems projected herein may be minimized or
results as a consequences of the commission of any of the acts punished under said obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one information or that the
article of the Code. trial thereof, if separately charged, be invariably consolidated for joint decision.
Conjointly, this is the course necessarily indicated since only a single composite
crime is actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and dispose
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal
thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
possession of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or, conversely, homicide or
murder through the illegal possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in
the possible application of the provision on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 must have to be
the theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty for aggravated illegal set aside. He should only suffer the penalty for the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal
possession of a firearm is the single indivisible penalty of death, in which case the Case No. 8179.
provision on recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not
established but either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting doctrines
may have some significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof, the accused was
applicable to prosecutions for murder or homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm in
convicted of a crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of
instance where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy deliberation
another crime under the same title of the Code.
thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a dangerous
be imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession are charged in course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
separate informations, from what has been said the appropriate course of action powers through judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's intent or purpose in
would be to consolidate the cases and render a joint decision thereon, imposing a aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an unlicensed firearm is used in the
single penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such possession and the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D.
unlawful taking of life shall have been proved, or for only the proven offense which Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not
may be either simple illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The same enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" or a "speciously camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront
procedural rule and substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense."
each offense was drawn up and these informations were individually assigned to
different courts or branches of the same court.

33
If Tac-an did in fact enunciated such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has reiterated in a Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code 46 as crimes against persons.
convincing number of cases and for a convincing number of years, so must the same verdict be made in They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor. 4 7 On the other hand, the
our decision in People vs. De Gracia, 44 which was promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter case, we held offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special penal law, 48 P.D. No. 1866. It
that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate is a malum prohibitum 49which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his
prosecution for a violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy
of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between that situation and the case where an consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public
unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition,
speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements: and explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or
purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of
firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed is intent to
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from
perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be
November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo,
clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to any other criminal
our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives
or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. 50
and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in
furtherance of rebellion.
A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibitum and their distinctions is an
exercise in futility.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his Concurring and
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayorin its minimum period." The court Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of
Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally
at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the
provides for such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single integrated
explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this
offense which is punished as such. The majority not only created two offenses by
finding of the lower court.
dividing a single offense into two but, worse, it resorted to the unprecedented and
invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by creating another offense by using a component crime which is also an element of the
the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the former.
penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with
the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of
possession with murder punished with a single penalty have been divided into two
rebellion punished under Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. There are
separate offenses of illegal possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is
two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The
consequently a compounded infringement of legislative powers for this Court to
Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson,
now, as it has done, treat that single offense as specifically described by the law and
or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be
impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for that offense is still
committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of murder
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed
in order to be able to impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is
in the course or as part of a rebellion.
beyond cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential
murder (or homicide) is an integrated element or integral component since without
Missing p. 26 the accompanying death, the crime would merely be simple illegal possession of a
firearm under the first paragraph of Section 1.
conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion that it
intended to treat "illegal possession and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single and integrated
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because it has become
offense" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the
hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has always been the obstacle to the virtues of change," as the
occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its unequivocal and explicit
concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly believes that Tac-an laid
language, which we quote to be clearly understood:
down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on doctrinal concepts of
penal laws and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not be laid at the
doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did in Tac-an was to apply the law, for If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
there was nothing in that case that warranted an interpretation or the application of the niceties of legal penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty is a merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction it should
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE
not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation modify, revise, amend, distort,
OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE of an unlicensed firearm,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 45
whose possession is penalized therein. There is a world of difference, which is too obvious,
between (a) the commission of homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the

34
violation of Section 1, and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the use of an a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are used: Provided, that if the
unlicensed firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary explosion results(1) in physical injury to person, the penalty shall be imprisonment
objective of the offender, but a secondary event or circumstance either resulting from or from 12 to 20 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be
perpetrated on the occasion of the commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death;
second, the killing, which requires a mens rea is the primary purpose, and to carry that out
effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm.
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are
used: Provided, that if the use of such substances results (1) in physical injury to any
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also apply the rule enunciated person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of
here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death; . .
Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer Penalties . (emphasis supplied)
Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the lawmaker clearly intended a
single integrated offense or a special complex offense because the death therein occurs as a result or on the
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and preserve
occasion of the commission of the offenses therein penalized or was not the primary purpose of the
homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the
offender, unlike in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No.
penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear language
532 provides:
yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder,
Sec. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are
punished by: palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala
in se under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance
in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. The only
a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 —
periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua — to death, seemingly because of the
result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill
If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
another, but never, at the same time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or
victim.
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with death if either crime
is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifying
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have been the intention of the lawmaker because the
minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of
committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage,
firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
imposed. (emphasis supplied) circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death. . . . The
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the
Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished Code.
by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period
if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying
force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation
circumstance. This would not be without precedent. By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P.
of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured
provides that when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall be
or killed as a result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of the crime and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.

and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:


In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to
decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to
Sec. 3. Penalties. — Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so illegally
mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as follows: possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that intent is to
impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and

35
impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the commission of homicide. Why, then, do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the
homicide or murder. cases at bar since the very same offense was an indispensable component for the
other composite offense of illegal possession of firearm with murder? Why would
the objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a second jeopardy lie in the preceding
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion, create two offenses by
examples and not apply to the cases now before us?
dividing a single offense into two. Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and invalid act of treating the
original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a component crime
which is also an element of the former." The majority has always maintained that the killing of a person We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in this case.
with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder For another, the so-called "same-evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double
under the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which is covered by Section 21,
Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and give to the No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth noting constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
is the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation, 51 leaving the court no room for any
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act. This
extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 52
was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero, 54 from where People vs. Relova 55 quotes the
following:
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated crime or composite
crimes, or into the philosophical domain of integration of the essential elements of one crime to that of
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
another would then be unnecessary in light of the clear language and indubitable purpose and intent of the
sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology, the determination of what should
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (emphasis
be criminalized, the definition of crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of
in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is
the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate, the legislature may even create from a single act or transaction
punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
various offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations set forth by the Constitution. This
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single integrated crime
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second
or composite crimes.
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first
sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts is the rule on double that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not
jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that the included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second
majority view offends the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under the "same-evidence" test sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact
enunciated in People vs. Diaz. 53 He then concludes: that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute.
If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally,
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder
such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
in the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with murder would be
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached
different from the evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder
under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of
alone. In the second charge, the illegal possession is not in issue, except peripherally
in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
and inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying circumstance in the
conviction nor acquittal in either case.
second charge, hence the evidence therefor is immaterial. But, in both prosecutions,
the evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the crime
is only simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because murder is the Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
very subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other requirements under same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
Section 7, Rule 117 are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an
present and can be validly raised to bar the second prosecution for murder? identity as shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. 56 The
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. 57
of the other composite crimes for which a single penalty is imposed, such as the
complex, compound and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive
of how a person convicted of estafa through falsification under Article 48 can be If may be noted that to determine the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or falsification; or how Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America which reads:
the accused convicted of robbery with homicide under Article 294 can be legally
charged again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or homicide; or
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can
life or limb. . .
be duly haled before the court again to face charges of either the same rape or

36
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not." 58

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was brought to the
Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:

[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . .

This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August
1916. 59 Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones Law provision was recast with the
addition of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III
thereof provided as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21,
Article III of the present Constitution.

This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely
bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle.
For undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the
elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under
different laws and the former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that
the majority's construction of the subject provision would violate the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy is unfounded.

The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form must, however, be modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death. Since
Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty next
lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of
Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y
CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty
imposed in the first case, as amended by the Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty
imposed in the second case is changed to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty ranging from
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1)
day, as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

37
G.R. No. 39519 November 21, 1991 – KILLED TARGET, ALSO OTHERS the officers of the patrol division, secret service and the administration of the city police. The Chief of
Police was assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police, in briefing
the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the latter had been identified as the one
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee
who shot Salustiano Botin the night before. At the time of the briefing, no warrant of arrest had yet been
vs.
issued against Bello. 5
DANIEL PINTO, JR. and NARCISO BUENAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.
The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who were also present were assigned to the different
FERNAN, C.J.: teams. 6
Team 3 was placed under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz with a policeman named Luna and
appellants Buenaflor and Pinto as members. Wilfredo Romero was the PC member assigned to the
As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on Christmas day in 1970 a team. 7 Except for Romero and Pinto who were each armed with a carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each
search warrant on Francisco Bello who was allegedly training a private army, patrolmen Daniel Pinto, Jr. carried a .38 caliber pistol. 8
and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then Circuit Criminal Court
in said city, of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and Rosalio Andes and Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon arriving there at around seven o'clock in the evening. The four
seriously wounding Maria Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the decision of June 13, vehicles met at the junction of Homapon and the road to Mariawa. They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when one of the jeeps bogged down because of the
1974. 1 reads: muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the
teams maintaining a distance o around ten meters between them. 9

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Daniel Pinto, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of: Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard someone shout, "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was followed by a shot and
then a burst of gunfire. The team had by then deployed to the right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by shouting the agreed password of "bayawas" for
which the person challenged answered "santol", 10
(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer he found that Buenaflor was 5 meters in front of him "at the bank of the
imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heir road", Pinto was two meters to the right of Buenaflor, Sgt. de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's)
of Rosalie Andes in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, right, Luna who was holding a walkie-talkie was to his left and another policeman was in front of
jointly and severally; and to pay the costs; Luna. 11 When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw "flashes of fire" "just in front" of him or from the place
where Buenaflor was. 12
(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer
The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling of a jeep going towards the direction of Homapon when he heard
imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs
the burst of gunfire and saw the flashes of fire from the direction of Buenaflor. 13
of Francisco Bello in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos,
jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the driver. They had just come
from a lechonada party in the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs. Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello. Fr. Capellan had celebrated mass to commemorate
(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to
the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr. Capellan decided to go back to his parish, the Anduiza's offered their jeep for his transportation. 14
suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the Seated
heirs of Richard Tiongson in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) on the front seat of the "McArthur type" jeep which had only a canvass top but no cover on the sides and
Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs; back, 15 were the driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on her lap and Fr. Capellan. 16 Richard Tiongson was
seated on the steel seat behind the driver while his sister Maria Theresa was beside him. 17 The three other
children were also seated at the back.
(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and hereby sentences
each of them to imprisonment of from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as Minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high gear with a
Temporal as Maximum; to indemnify the victim, Maria Theresa Tiongson, in the dual", 18 Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some 300 yards ahead. 19 Fearing that there might be "people
amount of Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster. 20 Then Fr. Capellan heard
costs. one shot and after a few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid firing with some of the
bullets hitting the jeep. 21 According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel Tiongson of the PC, the
rapid firing sounded "automatic". 22 The firing came from the left rear side of the jeep. 23
In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office.
Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on the left side of the road just ahead of the jeep. 24
Through
the light of the jeep, Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a jacket and a hat and he was on the
According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police secured from the City Court shoulder of the road. 25 After passing the man, the rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the
of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the house and premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa, Legazpi City
floor of the jeep. Maria Theresa was about to hold Richard when she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then
on the ground that the police had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally possessed a garand rifle, a they all screamed. 26
thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols. 2 The police had earlier undertaken a surveillance of
Bello on the basis of information it had received that he was conducting an "obstacle course" or training
The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep came to a full stop. Fr.
men for combat since October, 1970. 3
Capellan saw three men with flashlights but he could not distinguish their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were focused on the ground. 27
Mrs. Tiongson
Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado, 4 saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that one of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia
called his officers to a "confidential conference" at the
Citang, the mother of the mayor, at the same time identifying herself. 28 She must have managed to take
residence of Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at the said conference were the mayor, his secretary, and
38
Richard from the jeep and was cuddling him on the ground near the left rear end of the jeep when she 5. Pat. Daniel Pinto, member
requested Fr. Capellan to administer extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan had no holy oil, he gave
the boy absolution. 29
6. Pat. Celedonio Abordo, member
Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around, nobody listened to her appeal for help. When she approached Chief of
Police Adornado, she hit him and asked him why they shot her and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the shooting was no longer his fault because Mrs. 7. Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, member
Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She requested the Chief of Police for a car in which to take Richard to the hospital or for a driver and even
for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of Police did not heed her pleas. 30
(TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22). Report progress of mission any time of day through the radio system. For strict compliance.

A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduiza arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and her children boarded (Sgd.)
the jeep. At the intersection of the road to Legazpi City proper and the road to Mariawa, the area was
brightly lighted and armed men ordered them to put their hands up. They were told to alight from the jeep
to be searched but Mrs. Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let them pass so they could SOLOMON B. ADORNADO
bring her two children to the hospital. 31 Chief of Police

Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot wound at the "right upper Copy furnished: The Honorable City Mayor, The Patrol Command, LCPD, the OIC and file . 44
quadrant of the right buttocks." 32 33
Her pelvis and abdomen were x-rayed. One of the x-ray plates revealed an oval
spot indicating a foreign body in Maria Theresa's pelvis. The attending physician decided not to extract the The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of Bello. 45
It was not necessary to specify the
foreign body as Maria Theresa was not a "very good surgical risk". 34 The hospital charged P282.90 for mission in the order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close understanding with the squad that went
Theresa's hospitalization. 35 She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station Hospital in Camp to Homapon". 46For a "convenient tactical deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three
Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and hospitalization 36 but the foreign body was never removed groups with patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II. 47
from her pelvic area.
At noontime of December 26, 1970, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando, Talahib, Daraga,

Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar vertebrae. The bullet Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother, Francisco Andes, Francisco's son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son of Francisco, also arrived with the

travelled obliquely to the left kidney, the lesser sac, the liver and the right auricle. 37 Richard was operated group. 48
Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and his group be allowed to spend the night in
at the hospital but he died at 8:45 the following morning due to massive hemorrhage caused by the gunshot Inocencia's house. 49
wound. 38 When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found embedded in his heart. 39 His mother paid
P862.35 40 for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by the church. Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1970. At the sala, on her way from her room to the kitchen, she saw Bello sleeping alone. From
Funeraria Oro for Richard's burial. 41 the kitchen, Inocencia went to the balcony through the sala. On her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello, who was wearing a red shirt and an underwear, had
awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He reentered the sala and saying that it was cold, Bello put on his clothes and pants. He also wore
Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons, the police pursued their mission to serve the search warrant on his jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water. Inocencia's husband gave Bello a glass of water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and
Bello. When they reached Bello's residence in Mariawa, they were met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted and a certain Escober met him. Although ask Inocencia's husband for a cup of coffee. 50
Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police searched the area and found a Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle,
ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an automatic pistol. 42
Thereafter, the Chief of Police Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was the balcony facing the copra kiln ("agonan")
declared the search terminated and the entire searching party left for headquarters. 43 The following day, he with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to
issued Special Order No. 24 which states: the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near the pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and
another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs. 51

December 26, 1970


Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms, 52
was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled her. Just then a
To All Concerned: man, whom Inocencia identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her
husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The man asked them where the gun was. Inocencia told him
The following men mentioned below are hereby assigned at Homapon until their mission is accomplished, that there was no gun in the house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long firearm with its
effective as of today, December 26, 1970: muzzle pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters from where Bello laid flat
on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in its holster tucked on his waist. 53 It was Buenaflor who
took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's holster. 54
1 Sgt. Salvador de la Paz, In-charge
When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead. 55
Inocencia went near the pili tree where Rosalio's
2. Pfc. Carlos Barbin, member body was, knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered
that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not notice any weapon near Rosalio's body. 56
3. Pat. Eduardo Arcinue, member
Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two men, one of them being Francisco Andes, could carry the
cadaver. 57
Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot
4. Pat. Juan Luna, member
wounds". 58 A former pilot and 28 years old at the time of his death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at
39
instructed to "look for evidence specifically . . . for a thompson." He found in the porch two shells and the others found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to
the left temple, an inch above the highest point of the pinna of the left ear. The bullet which entered his
Mariawa and later, to Legazpi City proper. 75
head through the squamous temporal bone travelled towards the occipital region down to the floor of the
left middle cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.
On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He admitted that while they
were instructed patrol the area, they were also told to effect the arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged against him. 76
Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of the right scapular area According to Pinto, of
about the level of the third thoracic vertebrae. The bullet travelled to the right inna in a slightly upward the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine, only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots
direction making its exit at the lateral part of the right supraclavicular fossa above the clavicle. The second during the "Bello incident". 77
gunshot wound was at the left side interscapular area. The bullet travelled upwards and to the right
fracturing the 7th rib, entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the pulmonary conus, went through Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters. Rosalio was "face to face" with him when Pinto shot him. As
the junction of the right auricular appendage and the right auricle, the anteromedial side of the Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto continued shooting him. 78
When he went up the porch he saw the garand "lying on the
pericardium, grazed the medial surface of the middle lobe of the right lung and exited at the right side of
floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's waist was still in its holster. 79
the chest. The third gunshot wound was below the right nipple. The bullet went to the chest cavity, the
lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the diaphragm, the right lobe of the liver, the 8th thoracic
vertebrae and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior interscapular area. 59 On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his
carbine. 80
When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a flashlight being waved. A little
While Bellos corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments were found at the base of his skull and a slug was extracted from later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to stop. Then he heard one shot and immediately after, the volley
the floor of his mouth. 60 of fire as the jeep was going towards his direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's passengers
shriek. 81
Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his right temporal area, macerated the brain, fractured both parietal bones
For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which had been issued to him
and exited at the left parietal bone. Another bullet entered the left scapular area below the level of the 6th rib, travelled to the dome of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of
by the Legazpi City Police Department. He did not fire his gun at the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered his firearm for ballistic examination. 82
the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum below the ramus of the right pubis. The slug was found at the gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches below In
the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A third bullet entered the left knee and exited at the medial side of the leg. 61 the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo issued him a Thompson submachinegun. 83

While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could guide them to where Bello was. At the place which they later found
The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on December 29, 1970
to be Talahib, they went near a pili tree from where they saw a house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be Mostoles. Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles
by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for safekeeping purposes. 62
The empty shells and slugs which both the PC and the Legazpi City because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber firearm with him. He came by another man with a bolo, named "Banteque" and apprehended him also.
police found in Talahib were also turned over to the NBI 63 in the same manner that the four empty carbine Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They waited for a while until another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four
shells 64 found by the PC near the coconut tree a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were also meters of him. Buenaflor pointed his submachinegun at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber firearm. 84
turned over to the NBI. 65 Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve Smith &
Wesson caliber .38 revolvers, two Smith & Wesson "paltik" caliber .22, four Tell caliber revolvers, one
From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a pistol tucked in his holster as well as a garand. He and Pinto then
Bosque automatic pistol caliber .380, four carbine Inland rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles
caliber.30, one Thompson submachine gun caliber .45 and one Colt automatic pistol caliber.45. 66 tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he saw a person in the balcony of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice: "Paquito, mag-surrender ka!" Then Buenaflor heard a
"a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive shots." He sought cover behind the pili tree and, while in a crouching position, fired his
submachinegun towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto shifted his position while firing his carbine, Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going
Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family. 67
Pinto, who admitted carrying a caliber .30 down to the nipa shack" until he was near the coconut tree. There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was the son of Francisco
carbine during the incident, 68 testified that the shooting occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going Andes. 85
towards" them. 69
After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor went back to the pili tree, untied the four persons they had
According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air. 70
After the search had been conducted in Bello's captured, and told them to do something so they could carry the bodies of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes. 86
premises, Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace and order in (the)
vicinity including Mariawa". 71 While he and Buenaflor were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they
Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying the Tiongsons. 87
"chanced upon a house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's While admitting that the
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives. 72 person who led them to Bello had told them that the latter was in Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that
Talahib was a barrio of Daraga, Albay and not of Legazpi City. 88 He reiterated that he shouted at Bello
At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a single shot coming from the house rang out. It was answered by urging him to surrender 89 but he was not able to fire a warning shot or identify himself as a member of the
a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed" came from Buenaflor. By reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a nearby coconut tree. But before he reached the police force "because after the secondshot there was already a burst of gunfire". 90
coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the man was menacingly near him, Pinto shot him. 73
Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talalib which was around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came from a "high caliber
firearm". 91
After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bello's other companions. He saw the body of Bello on the porch and "near" it was a garand which he took. He After they had found out that Bello was dead, Pinto went up the house. Later, Pinto gave him
also got Bello's short firearm "from a holster." He turned over both the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of the captured persons kicked Bello's body saying Bello's 380 automatic pistol and garand. 92 Although he looked at those firearms, he did not determine
that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter, the two dead persons were carried by the captured bodyguards to Mariawa. 74 whether they had been fired. 93 He noticed, however, that the magazine of the garand was "intact". 94 Aside
from Bello's firearms, Buenaflor and Pinto confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos found on
Bello's bodyguards. 95
In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps arrived. When they reached the junction in Homapon, Major Molo,
who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told Pinto to go back with him to Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it would be dangerous to go back because one of
Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other policemen, they arrived there between eight and nine in the morning where they were

40
Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets. When he gave back the firearm to Major Molo, only four bullets
was shot by Bello in the presence of the police force who were converging at the junction of Homapon and
were left of the one clip he had used. 96
He remembered having squeezed twice the trigger of his Thompson Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable to arrest Bello. Besides the fact that no other eyewitness
submachinegun or automatic rifle in Talahib. 97 His service revolver was still with him then. 98 corroborated Botin's testimony even in the face of his own admission that Bello had no reason to shoot
him, no complaint was ever lodged against Bello for the alleged shooting. 102
As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor. The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor for the murder of
Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971 reads: On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during said shooting incident the police were looking for Bello at the store
of a certain Serrano. 103
Unable to find Bello, the police, specifically Pinto, mauled Escober while asking him to
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga, Albay and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the testify against Bello for allegedly shooting Botin. 104 The police had focused their vehicles' headlights near
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, did, then the bodega of ex-Mayor Los Baños in their effort to flush out Bello who, unknown to the police, had
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Pat. Daniel Pinto, Jr., earlier left the vicinity. It was when the police fired at the said bodega that Botin must have been
and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, SN-213436 and a US Carbin Inland, Cal. 30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by said accused, accidentally shot. 105 This story was uncorroborated but if true, would show the police's dangerous
shoot one Rosalio Andes, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the attached Autopsy Report marked as Annex "A" and being made an propensity for using otherwise official operations in an unlawful manner.
integral part of this Information, thereby causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous death.

A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving the Tiongson children.
Contrary to law. Since the jeep coming towards them was owned by the Anduizas, the appellants acted obviously in the
belief that Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even without any inquiry as to the
identity of its passengers. 106Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot, sound discretion and
The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same allegations as the above and it was filed on the same date. On restraint dictated that, there being no responding shots from its passengers after the alleged warning shot
August 24, 1971 two other informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and another for the frustrated murder of Maria
and considering the condition of the road which was not only muddy but uphill, instead of directing
Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that they could have done was to render the jeep immobile by
shooting its tires. That way, they could have verified the identity of the passengers. As it were, they riddled
After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello and Andes, the trial court appreciated evident premeditation as a the jeep with bullets injuring in the process innocent passengers who were completely unaware of what
qualifying circilmstance and treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the incident involving the Tiongson children, it considered they were up against.
the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of public position.

Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the face of various
Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their claim that the killings were perpetrated in the course of the circumstantial evidence which point to their culpability. There is the unflinching testimony of Sgt. Romero
performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors. that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the Tiongsons passed by.
Said testimony was corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of team 2, that while no one in
his team fired his gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the first of fire which occurred while
In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that the jeep was "abreast of team 2". 107 Even defense witness Mariano Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was
these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due "sure" that he heard gunshots at the moment when "the jeep had just passed team 2". 108
performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. 99 Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where, according to Romero, Pinto was deployed. While he himself carried
a carbine, Romero did not fire it and his testimony was never contradicted. The four empty shells were compared with the test shells which were fired from the US carbine,
caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the aforequoted information charging appellant with having killed Andes, was used by Pinto, they were
Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on Bello. In the process,
found to have "significant similar individual characteristics". 109
however, appellants abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a search warrant and the oral order to
apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons of their lives.

While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm 110
and
While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds ranging from taking the harvest of their hacienda without the Buenaflor was proven to be carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver, the findings of expert witnesses or, in this
permission of his parents to assaulting his stepfather, and that he was "dangerous while under the influence of liquor", 100 case, the ballistic report pointing to another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound
there was no proof that he had
only serves as a guide for the courts after considering all the facts of the case. 111 The undisputed fact is
been convicted of any offense or that he was a dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a that Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his firearm as the Anduiza jeep
"shoot to-kill" order from police authorities. Proof of bad moral character of the victim only establishes a bearing the Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin
probability that he committed a crime but it certainly cannot be the reason for annihilating him nor may it responsibility on Buenaflor was ever presented, there is, therefore, no reason to discredit his testimony. 112
prevail over facts proven showing that the same victim had been cold-bloodedly killed. 101 As such, the
suspicion that Bello was maintaining a private army was not a sufficient justification for his being rubbed In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such motive provided a circumstantial evidence leading to the
out without due process of law. inference that indeed he fired his gun. 113
According to the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the
Napal hacienda and constant companion of Bello, on November 1, 1970, Buenaflor and another policeman
The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on Christmas eve is neither a named Santos Urbana, Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep on the pretext that they needed it to transfer Moscoso, the
justification for his arrest without a warrant. It should be observed that while the police had obtained a suspect in the Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it was returned, the jeep had
search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day which was supposed bloodstains. Bello and Escober later learned from a PC officer that the jeep had been used in dumping in
to be a holiday, no such effort was made in securing warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged frustrated killing Guinobatan the body of Moscoso. Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was borrowed
of Botin. The improbability of the defense evidence through the testimony of Botin himself that Bello had by Buenaflor and Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn statement on the matter. Consequently, the PC
shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is bolstered by the same testimony showing that while he authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the Moscoso killing.

41
Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want to give your but conclude that the defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello was answered by a gunshot is but a
statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for thirty minutes. This is a brotherly advice because figment of their imagination designed for their own exoneration.
something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he would do what was right and that was to tell the
truth. Urbina said that it was up to Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly warning that
Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have been clarified had any
something might happen to him 114 (TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were of course denied
of Bello's men whom they had captured been presented in court. These men, Leoncio Mostoles, Francisco
by Buenaflor. However, as between the positive declaration of a prosecution witness and the negative
Andes, Domingo Bantique and Ananias Andes had executed statements before the Legazpi City police to
denial of the accused, the former deserves more credence. 115
the effect that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that Bello fired his gun at the
appellants. However, all four of them later executed statements before the NBI retracting said earlier
All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior officer's order only "to
statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened them to make the statements favorable to the
find the whereabouts" of Bello 116
and to desist from using their weapons "without clearance from the Chief of appellants. 130
Police". 117 Since there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his statement alone. Even
doubt. 118 Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack Pinto. 131
Inocencia swore that she did not see any weapon near the
fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the aggression did occur, Pinto would not have lost time in presenting in court the
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the
bolo which Andes threatened to use on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not justified in
victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with
inflicting the wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening attitude of the victim will not
such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully,
constitute unlawful aggression. 132Moreover, Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached him
unlawfully and feloniously. 119
Neither may the fact that the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of with a bolo after Buenaflor had released a sunburst directed at the house where Bello was, is contrary to
another be considered a mitigating circumstance. 120 human behavior if not totally ridiculous. On the contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing
until he saw Rosalio fell.
It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the presence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each other. 121
Prior agreement between the appellants to lull their An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense must rely on the
intended victim is not essential to prove conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts strength of his own evidence and not only on the weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if weak, the
showing joint purpose and design. 122 In this case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact prosecution evidence gains more credibility. 133 Unfortunately, in this case, inspire of the fact that the
that only the two of them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons passed by. This they prosecution had only one eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants had not presented
did in defiance of the order of their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been sufficiently strong evidence to shore up their claim of self-defense.
proved, the guilt or culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees. 123
We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four crimes in this case. The
The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was shown by the manner by which they killed the two. In this
killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello and Rosalio Andes as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa
incident, however, they invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim. Tiongson were all so sudden that all of them were left defenseless. This is shown not only by the
testimonial evidence on the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location of the wounds of
Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following elements of said exempting circumstance: (a) unlawful aggression, (b)
all the victims. 134 The presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the wounding of Maria
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 124
The Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime, however, may not be appreciated as there is no proof that it was
presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or specifically sought in the commission of the crime and therefore we deem it absorbed by treachery.
incomplete, unless
the victim has committed an unlawful aggression on the person defending himself. 125 Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but we find that the
appellants indeed took advantage of their public position in perpetrating the crime. Under Article 248 of
In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto corroborates his story but the
the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
principal prosecution eyewitness in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender nor a gunshot from Bello's direction before Bello was
There being no mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the aggravating
fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Buenaflor himself and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the truth.
circumstance of taking advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the said Code, the proper
penalty is death. 135 However, in view the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, the penalty
Rafael Señora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to take pictures, found no bullet marks at the crime scene which would
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellants for each of the three murders they committed.
pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik" firearm which Bello's men allegedly used. 126
As no other "paltik" firearms were recovered from the
crime scene other than the two which Buenaflor confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the
For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,
possibility of said firearms or one of its kind having been used by Bello's men against the appellant is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. There being no reason to further lower the
particularly the one who escaped is nil. penalty by one degree pursuant to the provision of Article 250, and there being one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range of prision
Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered gun 127 obviously mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 136 the proper
referring to the firearms recovered from Bello himself. According to Buenaflor however, when he found penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as
the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did not manipulate the rifle to know how many of its bullets had minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of
been used. 128 Moreover, if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster and not the garand eight thousand pesos imposed by the lower court should be respected considering that while there is
which was found a couple of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did not fire any of his two evidence as to the actual amount she spent while confined at the Sacred Heart Hospital in Legazpi City,
firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was smoking with his back towards them when there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she was transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in
he was shot at and that at that moment, he did not see Bello holding a gun. 129 We cannot help, therefore, Quezon City.

42
As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of frustration in everyone.
The crimes committed here ought to have no place in this democratic and civilized society. True it is that a
police officer is sometimes left in a quandary when faced with a situation where a decisive but legal action
is needed. But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals (96 Phil. 216, 225 [1954]),
"(t)he judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be exercised
neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal
provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the
spirit and purpose of the law." Police officers must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with
criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with
human rights. In the words of then Justice Moran in the Oanis case (Supra):

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to
his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this
standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which
places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot see how, as in the
present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness an
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the
precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation—not condonation— should be the rule; otherwise we would offer a premium to
crime in the shelter of official actuation.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that
appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three
murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five months 137 when the crimes
were committed, let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the President for whatever action
may be proper to temper his penalty. 138

SO ORDERED.

43
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having
said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter
was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching
vs.
and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
MORAN, J.:
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are
materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him.
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these
of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at
P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment. once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson
was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.
detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one findings of fact made by the trial court.
of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to
locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case,
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned
wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked below.
by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed
of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again.,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to
Tecson. act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then

44
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making
and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at
sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of
and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using P2,000, with costs.
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of
Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2,
par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of
a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion
alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas
que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo."
(Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants
have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed
is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to
get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or
over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by

45
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992 On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead,
the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent
alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. . . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and
his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding
Old Penal Code where:
him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men,
not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
otherwise, he would also be killed.
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such
criminal tendencies. 9
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom.
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No
one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of
five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by
crime. 13 Thus:
the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this
Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
amount to a crime. 14
incurred:

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.


xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
empty. 17

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.

46
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an
with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out
however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of
Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that: the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent
and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where
reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is
this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the
federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person
time, the criminal attempt is committed.
could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place,
attempted murder. The court explained that:
this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to
from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to
commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act
commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be
is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither
commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the
for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no
impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge
— that is, attempt.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was
nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore,
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The distinguere debemos.
community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime
and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that
the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
convicted the accused of attempted murder.
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent
decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold
made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
SO ORDERED.
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission.

47
G.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far more weight
and credence than the defense of alibi.21 Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.22 The
dispositive portion reads:
EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
SERENO, J.:
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is
hereby ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of ₱34,305.16 for actual damages,
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review of the 10 June 2009 ₱30,000.00 for moral damages.
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration3of the 10 November 2008 CA Decision4 affirming the conviction of Edmundo Escamilla
SO ORDERED.23
(petitioner) for frustrated homicide.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006. 24 In the brief that the CA required him to file,25 he
BACKGROUND
questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.26 On the other hand, the
Appellee’s Brief27posited that the prosecution witnesses were credible, because there were no serious
The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows: discrepancies in their testimonies.28 Petitioner, in his Reply brief,29 said that the prosecution witnesses did
not actually see him fire the gun.30 Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a negative result.31
Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.5 The victim, Virgilio Mendol
(Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose route traverses the road where petitioner's store is located. 6 The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is within the domain of
the trial court, which is in a better position to observe their demeanor. 32 Thus, the CA upheld the RTC’s
appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in the present case. 33 Also, the CA ruled that the
Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada and Arellano Streets,
victim’s positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense of alibi. Hence,
Manila.7 Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this intersection while facing Arellano Street. 8 Petitioner, it found no reason to disbelieve Mendol’s testimony.34 In addition, it said that a paraffin test is not a
who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from Mendol,9 shot the latter four times, hitting him conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and is inconsequential when there is a positive
once in the upper right portion of his chest.10 The victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for
identification of petitioner.35
treatment11 and survived because of timely medical attention.12

A Motion for Reconsideration36 dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner, who asserted that the
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information 13 dated 01 December 1999 charging
defense was able to discredit the testimony of the victim.37
petitioner with frustrated homicide. The Information reads:

In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,38 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for being without
That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill,
merit, because the matters discussed therein had already been resolved in its 10 November 2008
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the Decision.39
person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there shooting the latter with a .9mm Tekarev pistol with
Serial No. 40283 hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have Hence, this Petition40 assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive identification of the
produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes, accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.41 This Court resolved to require the prosecution to
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Mendol comment on the Petition.42 In his Comment43 dated 15 December 2009, the victim said that his positive
which prevented his death. identification of petitioner was a direct evidence that the latter was the author of the crime.44 Furthermore,
what petitioner raised was allegedly a question of fact, which is proscribed by a Rule 45 petition. 45 Thus,
the victim alleged, there being no new or substantial matter or question of law raised, the Petition should
CONTRARY TO LAW.
be denied.46

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.14 During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.47 In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,48 he assigned as an error the
of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all positively identified
application by the CA of the rule that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the
him as the shooter of Mendol.15 The doctor who attended to the victim also testified.16 The documentary defense of alibi.49 He posits that the lower court manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the
evidence presented included a sketch of the crime scene, the Medical Certificate issued by the physician, parties, but if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. 50 This Court, he said, should then
and receipts of the medical expenses of Mendol when the latter was treated for the gunshot wound. 17 In the
admit an exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA are binding upon the Supreme
course of the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, the defense requested an ocular inspection of the Court.51
crime scene, a request that was granted by the court.18 On the other hand, the defense witnesses are
petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado (Asumbrado).19 The defense
offered the results of the paraffin test of petitioner and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the ISSUES
court’s ocular inspection of the crime scene.20
The questions before us are as follows:

48
I. Whether the prosecution established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 52 finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to extract it; its extraction would just have
caused further damage.75 The doctor further said that the victim would have died if the latter were not
brought immediately to the hospital.76 All these facts belie the absence of petitioner’s intent to kill the
II. Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive
victim.
identification by three witnesses.53

II. Denial and alibi were not proven.


COURT’S RULING

In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, first, he was in
We deny the Petition.
another place at the time of the offense; and, second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. 77The appreciation of the defense of alibi is pegged against this standard and nothing
I. The prosecution proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite
conditions. Hence, he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other witnesses, succeeds as
a defense over positive identification.78
A. Petitioner was positively identified by three witnesses.

A. Petitioner was unable to establish that he was at home at the time of the offense.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter. 54 He is wrong. As
correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the identity of the assailant was proved with moral
certainty by the prosecution, which presented three witnesses – the victim Mendol, Velasco, and Garcelazo The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol was shot. 79 To support
– who all positively identified him as the shooter.55 We have held that a categorical and consistently his claim, petitioner presented the testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado. 80
positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
prevails over denial.56 All the three witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies pointing to him as the
1. The wife of petitioner did not know if he was at home when the shooting happened.
shooter. None of them had any ulterior motive to testify against him.

The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened at 3:00
Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and Estrada Streets, when
a.m. by the banging on their door.81 However, she also said that she did not know if petitioner stayed inside
petitioner, who was in front of the former’s store, shot him.57 The first shot hit its target, but petitioner
their house, or if he went somewhere else during the entire time she was asleep. 82 Her testimony does not
continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the latter then started to run away. 58
show that he was indeed at home when the crime happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was at
home before and after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his whereabouts between 1:00 a.m.
Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first shot, looked around, and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of his alibi. Even so, the testimonies of relatives deserve scant
then saw petitioner firing at Mendol three more times.59 consideration, especially when there is positive identification 83by three witnesses.

Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same street corner, he 2. Asumbrano did not see the entire face of the shooter.
heard three shots before he turned his head and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the direction of the victim,
who was bloodied in the right chest.60 Garcelazo was just an arm’s length away from him.61
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the testimony of Asumbrado,
the Barangay Tanod on duty that night.84 Both courts were correct in not giving weight to his testimony.
The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all facing Arellano Street
from its intersection with Estrada Street, which was the locus criminis.62 Although the crime happened in
Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by a big man who was in
the wee hours of the morning, there was a street lamp five meters from where petitioner was standing when
his twenties.85 This assertion was based only on a back view of the man who fired the gun 12 meters away
he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view of the assailant’s face. 63 They all knew petitioner, because
from Asumbrado.86 The latter never saw the shooter’s entire face.87 Neither did the witness see the victim
they either bought from or passed by his store.64
when the latter was hit.88 Asumbrado also affirmed that he was hiding when the riot took place. 89 These
declarations question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not petitioner who fired at
B. The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit. Mendol.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill. 65 He is mistaken. The intent to B. Petitioner's home was just in front of the street where the shooting occurred.
kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the
infliction of injuries.66 The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before,
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two
at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.67
places. 90 Petitioner failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the
time in question.
Petitioner’s intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun, 68 he shot the victim
in the chest. 69 Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask
Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's house or store whenever
for help. 70Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three more times,71 albeit
they testified on the location of the shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house when he shot the victim,
unsuccessfully.72 While running, the victim saw his nephew in front of the house and asked for help. 73 The
according to Velasco's testimony.91 Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado that the gate of the store of the
victim was immediately brought to the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.74 The attending physician,
49
petitioner was closed when the shooting happened92 can only mean that the latter's house and store were
both located in front of the scene of the crime.1âwphi1

Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility of his authorship of
the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that he was the shooter, because it placed him
just a few steps away from the scene of the crime. The charge is further bolstered by the testimony of his
wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at home at 2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the
victim was shot.

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could have justified
a different conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in affirming the R TC 's Decision that petitioner, beyond
reasonable doubt, was the assailant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009 Resolution 93 and 10
November 2008 Decision94 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED

50
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000 As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma.
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor
of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer
vs.
located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to
rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
BELLOSILLO, J.: whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees.
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with frustrated rape 2 and allowed only
attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt at accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled
sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted
danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to
opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any chase the accused. 8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help.
attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the
the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd. barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded
negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on
Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and
nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed
and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his
organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to
lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was
warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and
where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3The inference that may be was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be
consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated stage.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him
and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the
the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead
conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and
considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or
etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation possibly kill him.
to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary
sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of
requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the
statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim
lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
rape.

The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in
her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible
its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was
two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the
truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also in the
difference between life and death for the accused — a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but
room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence
only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another
alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the family compound where a
level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute
call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from
attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree
taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
with this ponencia?
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the
alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his
quo to the extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the innocence.
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6

51
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon
Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetuato death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have said often A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down
enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia victim).
by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. 10 But the
act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered an
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim
would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly reaching Crysthel's
In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that Primo's right hand
existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution
a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive
nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is
repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect,
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved.
the middle part of her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely
appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and
consummated rape. persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught
literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than enough
area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The
mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer
convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the
and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many court —
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the
labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no A: Yes, sir.
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus —
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ," 17but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our mild, the case at bar merely Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of
passion. A: No, sir. 20

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in
that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina,
Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration, 27 obviously induced by a
her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching and
upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child,
vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly

52
sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten
sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the accused (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the prosecution failed
to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel. 22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon even
narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
erection to be able to penetrate his victim.

Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's
own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together; 24 consequently, she did
not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court
had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was
already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in this case.
Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the
Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the
equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony
of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to
death.1âwphi1

Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical
basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. 27

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin
line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in
the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense
charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion
temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in
any of its periods.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is
instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)

53
G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974 holding the hands of his companion, Galvez. He admitted however, that he could not recognize the two
persons who were holding Galvez.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Villacorte who, in the meantime, had been positively identified by Galvez and Libantino as the bag
VIOLETO VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al., defendants. CRISANTO INOFERIO Y snatcher and as the gunman who shot down Ching, when interrogated by the investigators of the Criminal
ALINDAO alias SANTE, and MARCIANO YUSAY alias MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of Investigation Service at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959 admitted that he was the one who snatched
7/10/67), defendants-appellants. the paper bag from Benito Ching and shot him. He identified his companions as "Roque", "Sante" and
"Fred".
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
In the information for robbery with homicide filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on September 12,
1959, Violeto Villacorte was so named therein; "Roque" and "Fred" were already identified as Roque
The charge in this case was for robbery with homicide and the penalty imposed upon the appellant
Guerrero and Alfredo Handig, respectively while "Sante" was not yet identified and was named "John Doe
Crisanto Inoferio and his co-accused Violeto Villacorte and Marciano Yusay was reclusion perpetua and
alias Sante". On September 24 of the same year, the information was amended by changing the name of
the payment of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Benito Ching in the sum of P6,000.00. This case is
the accused John Doe alias Sante to Crisanto Inoferio y Alindao; and another person, Marciano Yusay, was
now before this Court only on the appeal of Inoferio, because although the lower court convicted him and
included among the accused. Before the trial, upon motion, the trial court discharged Roque Guerrero to be
his co-accused Villacorte and Yusay (Alfredo Handig, a fourth accused was acquitted), Villacorte did not
used as a State witness.
appeal, while the appeal of Yusay was withdrawn upon his motion which was granted by this Court on
July 10, 1967.
As already above stated, the trial court, in its decision of May 15, 1963, acquitted Handig, convicted
Villacorte who did not appeal, and Yusay who appealed but who withdrew his appeal, and Inoferio who
In the evening of August 27, 1959, Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-sari store in the public
pursued his appeal.
market of Caloocan1 to go home, bringing with him the proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed
in a paper bag. He was accompanied by his two employees, Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez, who
acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home located at 133 F. Roxas, Grace Park, Caloocan, Upon a careful review of the evidence, We hold that the accused-appellant Crisanto Inoferio should be
Benito Ching and his two companions were accosted by four persons near the corner of an alley at F. acquitted upon the ground that although his defense, in the nature of an alibi, is inherently a weak defense,
Roxas street. At that time, Libantino was some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was it should be considered sufficient as in this case, to tilt the scale of justice in favor of the accused because
walking directly behind the Chinese merchant. the evidence for the prosecution is itself weak and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm around the neck of
Galvez, while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed a pistol at Ching snatched from him the Only Modesto Galvez and the State witness, Roque Guerrero, identified the appellant Inoferio as one of
paper bag containing the money. The fourth got that paper bag from the snatcher. the holduppers. So, let us now review and analyze their testimonies, especially insofar as they refer to
Inoferio, on the one hand, and the evidence of Inoferio, on the other.
Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned around to respond to
his employer's call; but upon seeing the bag snatcher pointing a pistol at Ching, Libantino fled. When At the time he testified in Court, Modesto Galvez was 21 years old, married and unemployed. In synthesis,
Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-holder fired at him. Galvez, Ching's other companion, was able to he declared that: In August, 1957, he was working as a helper in the store of Benito Ching inside the
free himself from two of the holduppers holding him, and he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled on market in Grace Park. Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of August 27 that year, he and another store
the street and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching, notwithstanding his wound, was able to walk, helper, Pedro Libantino accompanied Ching in going home. While they were at F. Roxas Street, they were
staggering towards his home. His common-law wife immediately called for a taxicab, brought Ching to the waylaid by four men.2
North General Hospital in Manila where he died the following day.
He was able to recognize two of them, namely Villacorte and the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio who
Later that evening when Galvez was interrogated by police officers of Caloocan who were investigating were pointed to by him in open court. Villacorte snatched the bag from Benito Ching and fired at him
the incident, the interrogation proved fruitless for Galvez was able to furnish the investigators any once. The bag contained money. Two persons held him. Inoferio was one of them. He did not know the
information on the identities of the holduppers. But when investigated by the CIS, Philippine other one. Inoferio held him, Inoferio was behind and to the right of Galvez, placing his left hand over the
Constabulary, at Camp Crame on September 11, 1959, Galvez declared that Ching was accosted by three nape of the latter. He was able to recognize Inoferio because he looked at his left, removed his hand around
persons, one of them pointing his pistol at the right ribs of his employer. He identified the gunman as the front part of his neck, and he saw tattoo on his forearm. It was the figure of a woman with a bird. The
Violeto Villacorte alias Bonging and even described the shirt and pants the gunman was then wearing. He place where they were waylaid was bright. 3
could not identify the two other companions of Villacorte.
On cross examination, Galvez admitted that he saw accused-appellant Inoferio for the first time only on
Libantino, when examined by the investigators of the Caloocan police department on the same night of that night of August 27, 1959. The place was lighted from two electric posts; one in the alley and the other
August 27, 1959, declared that the holdup and shooting incident took place in a dark "kalyehon" and that east of the alley, corner of the alley and F. Roxas street. He was scared at the time he was held up. When
he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's companions. But, in his written statement taken by the he was held by two persons, one at his back (by appellant Inoferio) and another at his front, he was scared.
CIS at Camp Crame, Quezon City on September 11, 1959, he declared positively that he saw Violeto He did not move nor run away until they released him. Inoferio was holding him with his left arm, held
Villacorte alias Bonging as the person who grabbed the paper bag containing money from Ching and fired him tight around the neck; it was difficult to unloose his hold; the left forearm was so close to his neck that
a pistol at Ching. He further said that aside from Villacorte he saw three other persons, two of them were he could hardly breathe; and immediately after being released, he ran away. 4

54
On further cross examination, the witness testified: The morning following August 27, 1959, he went to Alfredo Handig for the first time also on September 12, 1959 but in the Caloocan Police Department. He
the police station in Caloocan. Three officers interrogated him. He was still scared and was not able to tell came to know the accused who became a State witness, Roque Guerrero, for the first time sometime before
them anything.5 August, 1959 at Caloocan. He used to ride in his tricycle and they often played cara y cruz together. 10

On September 11, 1957, he was brought by some PC officers to the CIS office, Camp Crame. He was He had been to the CIS office at Camp Crame two times. The first was on September 12, 1959. In the
interrogated by agents Rodolfo Estevez and Florencio Suela. They asked him to relate the details of the morning of that date, he was invited by the policemen of Caloocan to go to their headquarters. He was
incident as best as he could. His statement was taken down in writing. He signed that statement under oath made to wait there because some CIS agents would come. They came at about 1 to 2 o'clock in the
before Assistant Fiscal Castillo. The last question asked of him was: "Do you have anything more to say?" afternoon. The Caloocan police officers and the CIS agents talked to each other. After a while, the CIS said
And his answer was: "No more". In that investigation, he said that he saw only three holduppers. In that that they would bring him to their headquarters. The Caloocan police officers answered that they
sworn statement, although he did not mention the name of Inoferio, he stated that he saw a tattoo on the themselves would take him to Camp Crame which they did. They were Pat. Cadoy, Cpl. Mauricio and
arm of the person who held his neck that night. His sworn statement consisting of two pages has been another police lieutenant whom he did not know. He was brought to the CIS headquarters at Camp Crame
marked as Exh. "1-Inoferio". at about 3 o'clock already that afternoon. 11

Reading the sworn statement of Modesto Galvez (Exh. "1-Inoferio"), it appears that it was taken on When he, Inoferio, was brought upstairs, the accused Villacorte was going down. He did not mind him
September 11, 1959 but subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Jose Castillo on September 12, because he did not know him then. Upon reaching the office of Capt. Calderon, he was made to sit down.
1959. It is a fact that in this statement, he mentioned that they were held up only by three persons. But, Later on, Villacorte and his companion came in. His companion asked Villacorte if he knew him (Inoferio)
contrary to his statement in Court, he did not mention in this sworn statement (Exh. "1-Inoferio") that the and Villacorte answered in the negative. He was also asked if he knew Villacorte and his answer was in the
one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm. negative. Then the accused Handig was brought and in the confrontation, both of them stated that they did
not know each other. 12
Let us now go to the testimony of Roque Guerrero. On direct examination, he declared: He knows the
accused Violeto Villacorte. He had known him for a long time already. He knows the accused Alfredo Then he was brought to another room by the CIS agent who said: "You are lucky you don't know those
Handig. He also knows the accused Crisanto Inoferio alias "Sante". He came to know him because they people. "After that, he told them that he was not "Sante" because his nickname was "Santing." 13
used to play cara y cruz in 1959. As far as he knows, Crisanto Inoferio is a Visayan. He also knows the
accused Marciano Yusay.
Towards the afternoon, he was given food to eat. While he was eating, the Caloocan policemen told him
not to finish eating anymore as they were going home. And they left Camp Crame at about past 6 o'clock
In July, 1959, while he was driving a tricycle, Violeto Villacorte called him and asked if he wanted to in the afternoon of September 12, 1959. When they reached Grace Park, Caloocan, the Policemen told him
make some money by waylaying somebody. He did not agree and he continued driving the tricycle. After to go home because he had no case. 14
two weeks, they saw each other again when he was driving a tricycle. Villacorte again asked him if he
wanted to make some money. He did not agree. Then, in the afternoon of August 29, 1959, Villacorte met
The second time he was at Camp Crame was on September 21, 1959. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
him again. His companions then were Alfredo Handig, Marciano Yusay and "Sante". Villacorte asked him
some CIS agents went to his house and upon their invitation, he went with them to Camp Crame. They
if he was not really going with them. His answer was how could he go when "Sante" did not want to tell
arrived there at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. While they were walking at the corridor, they saw Capt.
him the person to be waylaid. Handig told him to go. "Sante" also told him that he go with them. Yusay
Calderon talking with Roque Guerrero. The CIS agent asked him if he knew Guerrero and he said yes.
even pulled out his .45 caliber gun and threatened him, telling him: "Don't be afraid, this is what we are
Guerrero was asked if he knew him and he answered in the affirmative. Then he was brought to a cell at
going to use." Guerrero told them that he could not go with them because "he is my kuya," referring to
the groundfloor. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, CIS agent Morales came and brought him upstairs. He
Benito Ching. When Villacorte told him that they were going to rob Ching, he left them but Alfredo
was asked if he was drinking wine and when he answered in the affirmative, wine was brought. Morales
Handig and "Sante" followed him. They told him that they would kill him if he would approach anybody.
opened the bottle and he was asked to drink. While he was drinking, Morales told him: "I want to help you
He continued driving his tricycle but they followed him. They left already however at about 7 o'clock that
but you also help me." His answer was: "What help can I do?" And the reply was: "I'll make you a witness
evening.6
for the government." He asked Morales what he would testify and the answer was: "At the trial, point to
Violeto Villacorte, Alfredo Handig and Roque Guerrero as the persons who robbed the Chinese and that
On cross examination, Guerrero declared: At the time he met "Sante", he was dressed in long sleeve — he they were inviting you to join them." His answer was: "That is bad Mr. Morales. I do not know anything
was always wearing long sleeve shirt in the same manner that he was dressed while Inoferio was in Court about the case you are talking about. I even do not know Alfredo Handig and Violeto Villacorte." Morales
at the time this witness was cross examined.7 stood up, took him downstairs and told him to think about the matter. He was again brought to his cell. 15

On the night of August 8, 1959, he was arrested in connection with an attempt to rob the store of Benito The following morning, after Inoferio had just taken his breakfast, Morales came and told him: "What
Ching. He was prosecuted for vagrancy and he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to ten days imprisonment. about the matter we talked about last night, have you come to think about it?" He said: "I am sorry, I
Subsequently, he was charged with attempted robbery. When investigated by the CIS agents, he did not cannot do what you are asking me." Then Morales replied: "You might regret, I can also secure another
reveal to them anything. He gave a written statement at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959. In that witness," and he left. At about 11 o'clock that morning, Morales returned with somebody named Galvez
statement, he told "the entire truth of what you (Guerrero) knew about the entire case." 8 In this statement, whom he did not know. Morales then told him to take off his clothes. After he had taken off his shirt,
Guerrero mentioned only "Sante" as among those who talked to him, but did not mention his name Morales saw the tattoo on his arms (anterior portion of his left forearm). Morales then told him to show his
Crisanto Inoferio. arm with the tattoo to Galvez. After a few minutes, Morales and Galvez left. At about 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, Morales came, brought him out of his cell and conducted him upstairs. While they were inside a
room, Morales asked him questions which he, the latter, typed. Whenever he would not be able to answer
The appellant Crisanto Inoferio, testifying in his defense, stated that he was 39 years old, single, house
Morales, Morales would slap him. Morales even tied his belt around his neck and whenever he could not
painter, and a resident of 1691 Alvarez St., Sta. Cruz, Manila.9 He came to know the accused Violeto
answer the questions, Morales would just pull the belt. After the questioning by Morales in that afternoon
Villacorte for the first time only in Camp Crame on September 12, 1959. He came to know the accused

55
of September 22, 1959, he was made to sign his statement. At that time, Capt. Calderon was passing by the the CIS investigators at Camp Crame, again Inoferio's name was never mentioned by both prosecution
corridor. Then he was placed in his cell. 16 witnesses although Villacorte's and Yusay's names were now mentioned and linked to the crime.

The next day, he was brought out his cell, was brought to the stockade and then afterwards, to the When the accused Villacorte was subjected to a thorough investigation by the CIS agents, he admitted his
provincial jail in Pasig. 17 part in the planning and in the commission of the crime and named Marciano Yusay, Alfredo Handig and a
certain "Sante". Again, Inoferio at this stage of the investigation had as yet to be linked to this person
called "Sante" and to the crime.
Inoferio categorically denied the testimony of Roque Guerrero that he was with Handig, Yusay, and
Villacorte on August 27, 1959, and that before that date, he and his companions were inviting him
(Guerrero) to join them to holdup somebody. And the reason why Roque Guerrero testified against him In court, Libantino never identified Inoferio. More than that, he contradicted Galvez, for while the latter
was that Guerrero thought that he was arrested because Inoferio pointed to him when they met at Camp testified that the man who had his arm around his neck was Inoferio, Libantino who was the one face to
Crame. But Inoferio said that he pointed to Guerrero only when he was asked by the CIS where Guerrero face with the man who had his arm around Galvez, said that it was the accused Marciano Yusay. 23 And
was. 18 Libantino declared that the place where the holdup and the shooting incident took place was in a dark
"kalyehon," that was why he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's companions. This contradicts
the testimony of Galvez that the place where the holdup and the shooting took place, was lighted from
Inoferio denied the testimony of Galvez that he (Inoferio) was one of those that embraced him (Galvez)
electric posts. Libantino said that these two electric posts were quite far from the scene of the crime; they
during the holdup. 19 He categorically stated that he had not known Galvez nor have met him prior to
were 10 meters away.
August 27, 1959. He came to know Villacorte for the first time on September 12, 1959 when they met at
the stairway of a building Camp Crame where he was interrogated. It was while he was coming up said
stairway when he met Violeto Villacorte for the first time. Villacorte was then coming down the stairs. He And as we consider the testimony of Modesto Galvez, even by itself, we conclude that he was not able to
admitted that before August, 1959, he already knew Roque Guerrero. 20 see the face of the man who held him around his neck and therefore could not possibly identify him. He
was scared at the time. The one holding him by the neck was at his back. And immediately after he was
released, he ran away.
Violeto Villacorte, the person identified as the bag snatcher and the one who shot Benito Ching, declared:
He came to know Crisanto Inoferio for the first time when he met at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959.
Before August 27, 1959, he had not yet met Inoferio. 21 Let us now go to the telltale tattoo, the figure of a woman with a bird, on the left forearm of Inoferio. Yes,
Inoferio has that tattoo. And according to Galvez, the one who held him around his neck was Inoferio
because he saw the tattoo of Inoferio when he looked at his left and tried to remove the arm of the man
Another co-accused, Alfredo Handig, testified that he came to know Crisanto Inoferio for the first time on
holding him by his neck. But any other person could have that kind of a tattoo, the figure of a woman with
September 12, 1959 in the municipal building of Caloocan. He categorically declared that prior to this
a bird. But it may be asked: How did Galvez come to know that Inoferio had that tattoo? The answer is
date, he did not know said Crisanto Inoferio. 22
furnished by the testimony of Inoferio. We have taken pains to give the synthesis of his entire testimony,
and we are satisfied that he told the truth, particularly on the point that when he was brought to Camp
By way of background to our findings of facts which justify the acquittal of appellant Inoferio, we now Crame for the second time on September 21, 1959, he was told to remove his clothes and show his arm
recapitulate the evidence against the accused Violeto Villacorte, Marciano Yusay, and Alfredo Handig. with the tattoo to Galvez.

Violeto Villacorte was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez. And in an On top of all of these, there is the testimony in open court by Galvez that as early as September 11, 1959,
extrajudicial statement secured from him by CIS investigators and which he signed and swore to before the when he was investigated at the CIS office in Camp Crame, he already stated and specifically in his sworn
Assistant Fiscal of Rizal in Pasig, Villacorte admitted his role as mastermind of the plan to waylay Benito statement given on that date but subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Castillo the following
Ching and his having grabbed the paper bag containing the proceeds of the sales of the sari-sari store of the day, that the one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm. We have gone over this written sworn
Chinaman. He likewise admitted responsibility for firing the pistol that snuffed the life of Benito Ching. statement and we do not see any mention therein by Galvez of a tattoo on the arm of person that held him.

Marciano Yusay was equally identified positively by Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez as one of those And how could Galvez have seen the tattoo on the arm of the man who held him by the neck when
present when Villacorte was planning the holdup and at the time of the holdup. And in the ante according to Guerrero, "Sante" was dressed in long sleeve in the afternoon of the holdup (the prosecution
mortem statement of Benito Ching made to his wife Candida Pasion, he said that Marciano Yusay was one would want to prove that "Sante" is the accused Crisanto Inoferio).
of those who held him up.
Therefore, the authorities cited by the prosecution that written statements of witnesses to police authorities
Alfredo Handig, on the other hand, although mentioned by accused Villacorte as one of his companions in are usually sketchy and incomplete; that as a matter of fact, it is natural for even material matters to be left
the planning and in the execution of the robbery, prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez never out when a person gives a sworn statement during a criminal investigation, do not here apply. The fact is
identified him positively because of which he was acquitted by the trial court. that Galvez told a lie when he said that in his written statement he declared that the man who held him had
a tattoo.
With respect to the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio, the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that he
was one of the holduppers is weak and unconvincing. How about the testimony of Roque Guerrero, the second and the only other witness linking the appellant
Inoferio to the robbery holdup in question? He was not there at the scene of the crime. All that he said was
that he was asked three times before the robbery holdup took place to go with the holduppers. But
In the investigations conducted by the Caloocan Police Department, both Modesto Galvez and Pedro Villacorte, Yusay and Handig denied this testimony of Guerrero. And of course, Inoferio also denied it.
Libantino never mentioned appellant Inoferio as one of those who either planned or executed the robbery
and killing although the name of Villacorte was mentioned by Libantino. In the examination conducted by
56
But what is most significant is the fact that all along, he was referring to "Sante" as the one who was with
the group when he was asked to join them in the robbery holdup. As early as in his written statement given
at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959, he referred to one of the holduppers as "Sante"; he never
mentioned therein the name of Crisanto Inoferio; and yet it is a fact, admitted by both Guerrero and
Inoferio, that they had known each other long before the robbery holdup took place on August 27, 1959.
Therefore, if Inoferio was the "Sante" with the group of the holduppers, Guerrero should have referred to
him as Inoferio in his written statement of September 21, 1959.

And Crisanto Inoferio is not "Sante". He is the best witness to testify on his nickname and he said that his
nickname is "Santing".

Furthermore, this witness Guerrero has very poor credentials as far as his credibility is concerned. He was,
at the time he testified, 18 years old, single and unemployed. And on cross examination, he admitted that
on August 1959, he was arrested in an attempt to rob the store of Benito Ching; he was prosecuted for
vagrancy; pleaded guilty and sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with
attempted robbery.

And assuming that appellant Inoferio was the "Sante" who took part in the planning of the robbery holdup
in question, which is not the fact in this case, that in itself would not make him incur any criminal liability
if later on there is not that sufficient evidence to prove that he actually took part in the robbery holdup. For
after taking part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual commission of the
crime by listening to the call of his conscience. This exempts him from criminal liability whatsoever.

Against the weak and unconvincing evidence of the prosecution regarding appellant Inoferio are his
testimony and those of the witnesses who corroborated him.

At the time he testified, Inoferio was 39 years old, single, and a house painter. The flow of events as
related by him in his testimony, a synopsis of which we have already given earlier, is so natural and
convincing as to set at ease the mind and the conscience of the Court that he was telling the truth. He
denied any participation in the robbery holdup in question. Moreover, that he did not know co-accused
Villacorte and Handig at the time the crime was committed on August 27, 1959. He came to know them
only when these two were already arrested, a fact corroborated by Villacorte and Handig. Even at the
confrontation before police officers and CIS agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused, on the
other, already denied having known each other earlier.

The motive of Guerrero in testifying against Inoferio was explained by the latter, and that is, that Guerrero
thought, when Inoferio pointed to him at Camp Crame that Inoferio was implicating Guerrero in the
robbery holdup. And Galvez, who never implicated Inoferio when investigated by the Caloocan police
officers in the evening of August 27, 1959 and when investigated by the CIS Camp Crame on September
11, 1959, must have based his testimony in court, where he identified Inoferio, on the erroneous
information supplied to him that "Sante" (one of the holduppers) was Inoferio.

This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look with disfavor at the
defense of alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated, the evidence presented by an accused in
support of that defense must be scrutinized with the same care that evidence supporting other defenses
deserves. When an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a mental
prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit
him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting the accused-appellant Crisanto Inoferio is hereby
reversed and he is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. It appearing that he is at present detained at the
New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, his immediate release is hereby ordered. So ordered.

57
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968 7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of
their duties.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of the
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants, accused2for lack of evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case, the charges against six of the
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA, accused3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against them. One of
FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO LARITA, defendants-review. the defendants died4during the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted eight5 of the
remaining defendants.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review. As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa
arrayed themselves into two warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO", the former composed
predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and
PER CURIAM:
Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots resulting
in the death of many of their members and suspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent clashes
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of the present automatic between the contending groups, prison officials segrerated known members of the "Sigue-Sigue" from
review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisoners confined
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants1 charged therein with multiple murder) in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of four brigades, namely, 4-A and
were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao, from whom the
the victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.
pay his corresponding share of the costs.
It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were preparing to
The information recites: attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs
occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled, causing a big commotion. The fight was,
however, quelled, and those involved were led away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to normal when a riot broke
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many
accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final judgments, members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined. The timely arrival of the guards forced the
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident invading inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door and then rampaged from one brigade to another.
unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death
confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them with ice picks, clubs and Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more
other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims
inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.

The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death — before they could be brought to
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
the hospital.
crime in that the crime was committed after the accused have been convicted by final
judgments and while they are serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion and
hematoma of the back of the neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in the chest,
Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances: penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in the chest.

1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;


Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth; (b)
two penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right oxilla,
2. That the crime was committed by a band; 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at the right and left lower extremities. Cause of
death: shock, secondary to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on the
upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds in the chest, two of which were penetrating;
4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds on the left hand. Cause of death: fractured
skull.
5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have been broken;
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that while he was taking his
6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act; breakfast with Jose Carriego, who was at the time the representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the
inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near the door of their brigade; that his fellow prisoners

58
started shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded into 4-B; that the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemies they clubbed and
he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of the passageway; that he saw Carriego stabbed them to death ...
surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away,
Factora clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora turned up the face of his fallen
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta nevertheless claims self-
victim and struck him again in the face; that while Carriego was in this prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta
defense. He testified that on the morning of the riot he was attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella near the
and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora, repeatedly stabbed him.
door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the chapel with some companions; that Carriego
clubbed him on the head; that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then succeeded in
The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith he whipped out an improvised ice pick and
both inmates of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as the stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta) was already dizzy due to the head wound he
assailants of Carriego. sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then became unconscious, and when
he regained consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas,
an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A rushing toward their brigade; that among the invading Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution witnesses who saw him
inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the inside provided by Visayan prisoners actively participate in the killing of the three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved.
confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and Jose Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one of the assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the
Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their companies pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked him, knowing
instructed the Visayans to leave their cell and ordered the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered.
Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Anent the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to offer any explicit defense to rebut the
Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose Halili, not only inculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino who saw him participate in the
corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well added grim details. He declared that while killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as one of the murderers of
Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora Santos Cruz.
and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and
sharp instruments, in readiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defense in exculpation.
confined in 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.
He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-
A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith ensued; that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos
The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the invading "OXO" members Espino, and advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person (Dosal);" that with a sharp
and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him again, he got
testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the latter fell.
knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;" that Luna and
Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of
Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw him
Barbosa, Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cell
participate in the killing of Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense when the
only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he was
latter together with his companions supposedly invaded Dosal's brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of
clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and Espino corroborated
Santos Cruz was found at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first floor of Bldg. 1
the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both mentioned
instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was seen in
Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.
4-C, which he does not deny, since he was an inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect
to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he did not offer any evidence
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus: in his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza identifying him as one of the killers of
Carriego and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino implicating him in the death of Santos Cruz, stand
unrebutted.
"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalry between
the two organizations. All those who were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz,
were Tagalogs and well known as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue Sigue, while the Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-accused
accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if not sympathizers of the Oxo who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did not hit Barbosa anymore because the
organization. These three killings were sparked by the commotion that happened in the plaza latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused who actually killed the three victims. Again, the
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners were preparing to go the mass ... It declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial court, expose the
was evident that the clash that occurred in the plaza produced a chain reaction among the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony was corroborated
members and followers of the two organizations. The inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the mass assault by clubbing Carriego treacherously. Fontillas,
the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells and tried to invade Building No. 4 where a big Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one of the killers of Barbosa, while at least three
number of the Oxo members and their sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora participate in the slaying of
to retreat by the timely arrival of the guards who sent them back to their building. When the Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in the killing, which is clear index of voluntariness, thus
members of the Oxo in Building No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly engendered by his co-accused.
members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who were confined with them in the same
building. As the evidence of the prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi.
4-A of Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories and with the
Parumog testified that he did not participate in the killing of the three inmates because he stayed during
help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door of the different brigades, and once they
that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees for investigation after the fight in the plaza; that he was
succeeded in bolting the doors of the different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate

59
implicated in the killing by the prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their request to specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason,10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The crime of conspiracy
testify against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. 13 An agreement to commit a
he did not know about the killing until he was informed that three inmates had died; that on the day in crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform
question he was brought to the police trustee brigade for investigation after the incident in the plaza; that overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
he was escorted back to his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna likewise disclaims any knowledge of the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme,
killing and asserts that for the entire duration of the riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A). a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal
importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto14 opined that
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the positive testimonies of
prosecution witness identifying them as participants in the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan,
Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the killers of Barbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
that they saw Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they saw Parumog crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of
participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered
killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated
and Santos Cruz. crime and its commission by the conspirators.

The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. The defense of Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
alibi is generally weak since it is easy to concoct. For this reason, courts view it with no small amount of regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the
caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. 6 In the case at bar, if crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one
Parumog and Larita were really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation on the day of the is the act of all.15 The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons
incident, there should have been a record of the alleged investigation. But none was presented. The unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in his cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
even help his cellmates barricade their brigade with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent the entry of the responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."16 Although it is axiomatic that
invading inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner." no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution
case18 where this Court held that
witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact
the resolution of which depends almost entirely on the credibility of witnesses who seek to establish it. In
this respect the relative weight which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless ... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
dismissing the alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail over the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
positive testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate directly in the execution of the conspiracyto of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the
kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz." act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible ...

The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of the presence of treachery as a Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of
qualifying circumstance: Carriego was clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay prostrate and the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. The blow on the nape and the the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
penetrating chest wounds were all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from
qualified the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of murder. The victims, who were attacked the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved
individually were completely overwhelmed by their assailants' superiority in number and weapons and had that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to
absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack. All the attackers were armed with clubs or sharp carry out the conspiracy.
instruments while the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial court. In fact, Halili testified that
Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to hide under a cot, and Santos Cruz was
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply
killed while he was on his knees pleading for his life.
justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is
generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the commission of the murders.
The resolution of this issue is of marked importance because upon it depends the quantity and quality of
The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversation and rape
the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the appellants.
committed in furtherance of a common design.

For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular emphasis on
The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer who misappropriates
the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of the criminal liability
public funds or public property under his trust.19 However, in the classic case of People vs. Ponte20 this
of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandate of applicable law.
Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal policemen, all of whom were not accountable
public officers, who conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the malversation of public funds under
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the the latter's custody, were principally liable with the said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation.
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law By reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable public officer was imputable to his co-

60
conspirators, although the latter were not similarly situated with the former in relation to the object of the unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
crime committed. Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private party does not act independently and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a
from the public officer; rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among to concert means is proved ..." In two recent
latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to cases,31 this Court ruled that where the acts of the accused, collectively and individually, clearly
corruption, and in the officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a conspiracy is evident.
social crime."21 In an earlier case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who conspired
with his superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish
principal in the crime of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the
conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
funds misappropriated were not in his custody but were under the trust of his superior, an accountable
sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
public officer.
objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.
In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but also of the separate
and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal knowledge of the
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is
offended woman only once but his liability includes that pertaining to all the rapes committed in
proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-
furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that
principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy.
The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of
... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at Consolacion's house their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity
to the consummation of the offense of rape on her person by each and everyone of them, it liable.
clearly appears that they conspired together to rape their victim, and therefore each one is
responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also that committed by the
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established
others, because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by each one of the defendants with
that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
the offended was consummated separately and independently from that had by the others, for
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
which each and every one is also responsible because of the conspiracy.
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy. The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three
The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where the appellant Teofilo categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is
Anchita was convicted of forcible abduction with double rape for having conspired and cooperated in the that while the former's criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's
sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although he himself did not actually rape the victim. This Court responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
observed:
In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the
We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual assault ... the accused trial court of robbery with homicide as a conspirator, on the ground that although he may have been
inserted his fingers in the woman's organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out of lewdness or present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and made, "Robles uttered not a word either of approval
to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is immaterial; it was both maybe. Yet, surely, by or disapproval. There are authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even
his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty. approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In a
more recent case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants, said:
With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so much so that "any
member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only
principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision
same."25 In this instance, conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the first
established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the assaults committed by his group is meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the
likewise anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act of all. location of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets and the points thereof
through which entrance and exit should be effected), such participation and involvement,
however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy
Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive
alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
evidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy.27 Since by it nature, conspiracy is planned in
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include robbery.
utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence.28 Consequently, competent and convincing
circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People vs.
Cabrera,29 conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense. Since in conspiracy,
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes
their acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the conspirators commit three separate and
it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were distinct crimes of murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three
engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30the presence of the murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from "proofs of facts and held:
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same

61
... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneously The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex crime under article 48 of the Revised
indeed but successively, inasmuch as there was, at least, solution of continuity between each Penal Code and the special complex crime (like robbery with homicide). Anent an ordinary complex crime
other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said crimes. This court holds falling under article 48, regardless of the multiplicity of offenses committed, there is only one imposable
that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the frequently reiterated penalty — the penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period. Similarly, in special
doctrine that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the conspirators must answer for complex crimes, there is but a single penalty prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of separate
the acts of the others, provided said acts are the result of the common plan or purpose ... it felonies committed. For instance, in the special complex crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible
would seem evident that the penalty that should be imposed upon each of the appellants for penalty is reclusion perpetua to death42 irrespective of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason or
each of their crimes should be the same, and this is the death penalty ... (emphasis supplied). on occasion of the robbery.

In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon each of the In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The accused went to trial without
conspirators for the three murders committed was not carried out due to the lack of the then requisite objection to the said information which charged him with more than one offense. The trial court found the
unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty. accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed only one death penalty. In its review en
consulta, this Court modified the judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the three offenses
committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to the
In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of eleven murders, said
imposition of two death penalties), held:
through Mr. Justice Tuason:

The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the prescribed penalties for the offenses of
Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under the circumstances of
which the accused was convicted should be imposed in accord with the provisions of article 89
the case, but they fall short of the required number for the imposition of this punishment. The
of the Penal Code. That article is only applicable to cases wherein a single act constitutes two
sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each appellant is guilty of as many crimes of
or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (U.S. vs.
murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be sentenced to life imprisonment for each
Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)
crime, although this may be a useless formality for in no case can imprisonment exceed forty
years. (Emphasis supplied.)
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or penalties should have been
imposed upon the accused upon conviction of the accused of three separate felonies charged in
In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life imprisonment for each of the
the information.
accused was modified by this Court on appeal on the ground that "inasmuch as their (the conspirators')
combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons, they should be sentenced to suffer said penalty
(reclusion perpetua) for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.) There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the convict of two separate crimes
of asesinato (murder) marked with the generic aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
decision of the trial judge ... It follows that the death penalty must and should be imposed for
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressed that once
each of these offenses ...
conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is not only solidary (all co-principals) but also
multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It can also be
said that had there been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple death penalties would Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of one or both the asesinatos with
have been imposed upon all the conspirators. which he is charged in the information, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose
separate penalties for each of the offenses of which he was convicted, in view of the nature of
the principal penalty; but having in mind the possibility that the Chief Executive may deem it
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An accused who was
proper to grant a pardon for one or more of the offenses without taking action on the others; and
charged with three distinct crimes of murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties
having in mind also the express provisions of the above cited article 87 of the Penal Code, we
for two murders,39 and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death penalties for the 13 killings he
deem it proper to modify the judgment entered in the court below by substituting for the penalty
perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to
imposed by the trial judge under the provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death penalty
multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they commit in furtherance of a
prescribed by law for each of the two separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted, and the
conspiracy. Since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is
penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of
attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a
homicide) ... these separate penalties to be executed in accord with the provisions of article 87
result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by
of the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
law.

The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a unanimous Court, speaking again thru
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is found guilty of two or more separate
Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm concurring in the result in view of the Balaba ruling),
and distinct crimes charged in one information, the accused not having interposed any objection to the
opined:
multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading case of U.S. vs. Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction
of two or more offenses charged in the complaint or information, the prescribed penalties for each and all
of such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in the court below, the trial judge
Penal Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other words, all the penalties corresponding to imposed the death penalty, that is to say the penalty prescribed for the most serious crime
the several violations of law should be imposed. Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition committed, in its maximum degree, and for this purpose made use of the provisions of article
of multiple penalties. 89 of the Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in the case of
the United States vs. Balaba, recently decided wherein the controlling facts were substantially
similar to those in the case at bar, "all of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of

62
law" should have been imposed under the express provisions of article 87 [now engrafted in and proved is manifest in the opening sentence of article 70: "When the culprit has to serve two or more
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in that case, the trial court erred in penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit ..." (Emphasis
applying the provision of article 89 of the code. supplied.) Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has to serve are those legally imposed by
the proper court. Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is found in the second paragraph of
article 70 which provides that "in the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed, ... and that the
be followed ..." Even without the authority provided by article 70, courts can still impose as many
following separate penalties should be imposed upon him [the accused Jamad], to be executed
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed,
in accordance with article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for the parricide of his
a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which
wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Labonete; (3) the penalty of
the latter, thru the courts ofjustice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
life imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years and one day of cadena
temporal for the frustrated murder of Taclind ...
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no statutory prohibition or
jurisprudential injunction against it. On the contrary, article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presumes that
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which applied the pertinent provisions of the
courts have the power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as to the nature and severity of the
Revised Penal Code, where this Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals because they acted
penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as initially
in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an "information charges the defendants with the commission
advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the accused was sentenced on appeal to
of several crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the multiplicity of the charges
thirteen (13) death penalties. Significantly, the Court in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed
made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced accordingly for as many crimes
multiple penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.
the information charges them, provided that they are duly established and proved by the evidence on
record." (Emphasis supplied.)
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility.
It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And
The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority in Balaba for imposing all the penalties (two
because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple
deaths and one life imprisonment) corresponding to the offense charged and proved was article 87 of the
death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of
old Penal Code which provided:
the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the
multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of
When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or misdemeanors, all the penalties imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
corresponding to the several violations of law shall be imposed, the same to be simultaneously sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it
served, if possible, according to the nature and effects of such penalties. overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read: The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses
charged and, proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty
When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of the law can not be
or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself
simultaneously executed, the following rules shall be observed with regard thereto: with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency
subject to varied factors like successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously.
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the words used by reason of style, of the A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple)
above-cited provisions have been preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which is the product of penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code. Article 70 provides: simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the
nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be observed: The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance.
The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible
they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably
granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out. reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a
deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former article 87 clearly did, that "all the convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency
penalties corresponding to the several violations of law shall be imposed," it is unmistakable, however, that or leniency in his behalf.
article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple penalties, which multiple penal
sanctions should be served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of the existence of
judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of the offenses charged
63
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of determine if the appellants enjoyed "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment
the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 91.)
penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity of reflection and the persistence in the
maximum of forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is criminal intent that characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (People
commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs.
corresponding to a single life sentence. Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)

Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial court correctly ruled that Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of any of the six accused, as they did
conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. We quote with approval the following incisive neither allege nor prove any.
observations of the court a quo in this respect:
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court can safely say that there are accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences 49 in the New Bilibid Prison at
several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. The Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
following circumstances show beyond any doubt the acts of conspiracy: First, all those who maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
were killed, Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many Viada observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of
Tagalogs like them confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and killed thereby his perversity and incorrigibility.50
showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with
improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall,
the same people took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A; that all were from either the
Visayas or Mindanao except Peralta who is from Masbate and Parumog who hails from Nueva Ecija; that
all were either "OXO" members or sympathizers; and that all the victims were members of the "Sigue-
Sigue" gang.

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the moment
they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is
true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-
conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part
which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not
participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and
cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals.45 Hence, all of the six
accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate
and distinct crimes of murder.

We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident premeditation was also present. The facts on
record and the established jurisprudence on the matter do not support the conclusion of the court a quo that
evident premeditation "is always present and inherent in every conspiracy." Evident premeditation is not
inherent in conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the
latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences of his
intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to commit it.47 This view finds added support in People vs.
Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:

Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the
attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, the
existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. In the case before us, however, no
such evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the
perpetration of the crime. There is no proof how and when the plan to kill Melanio Balancio
was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out; we are, therefore, unable to

64
G.R. No. 128966 August 18, 1999 On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera4 and Roderick Garcia5 pleaded not guilty. The other two
accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia. Thereafter, the trial
court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y
and ELMER CASTRO, accused, GARCIA and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant. crime of MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
including all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as
follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:

a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;


When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between the
two?
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
Statement of the Case
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal, which assails the
March 12, 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 57) in Criminal Case No. d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information
until full payment; and,
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged with murder
Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons who were subsequently
f) Costs of suit.16
identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime was allegedly committed as
follows:
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.7
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and there The Facts
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery
and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 Version of the Prosecution
cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo
inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the In its Brief,8 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts:9
mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Frederick Capulong y Dizon.2 As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of
Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City
before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the Information to II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992
include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong. The trial court granted the in the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak branch in
Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows: Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the homeowners
association.1âwphi1.nêt
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and there About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery witness saw a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with
and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of four (4) other passengers. He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the
one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as Kenneth
cal. with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him between his eyes and
striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him,
and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon. 3 but then he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around
Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit were through the same
point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao walked to the
opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already parked. Moments later,

65
he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the
Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo interview, Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and
aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between the eyes, After the black cap. According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With
shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions. the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3 Castro,
together with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to a grassy
portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao
creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14,
attached a sketch of the crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein
September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber revolver, black t-
his relative position at the time of the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao
shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993).While there, SPO3 Guspid
identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect the explanations
and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the identifying marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials "OG" (acronym for his first name
Investigation Division, Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a and family name) between the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the
report about the shooting incident from a security guard of the subdivision. The t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining of the black cap.
officer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando
Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and gather
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where
evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the team to the
SPO3 Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written statements, to
corner of Denver and Doña Justina Streets, site of the shooting, where they
which they assented. Consequently, they were brought to the Integrated Bar of the
discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed them
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. They
that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security
were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal
guards. The policemen then found a color red sports car with plate no. NBZ 869,
Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time were appellant's relatives, including his
with engine still running and its doors opened. They recovered inside the car several
mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
class cards and a license belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as
Frederick Capulong.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty.
Sansano, "a competent lawyer." They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They
conferred with Atty. Sansano.
came upon a person wearing muddled maong pants and white t-shirt "standing and
walking around" near the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked his name, the
person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Explaining the mud Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the
stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious suspects [i]n his office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step
[of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to Station 5 and turned him over outside the building in order to assure that no pressure would be exerted on the
to the desk officer for investigation. suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After they
left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes, informing
them of their rights under the constitution and inquiring from them if they indeed
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989,
wanted to give voluntary statements. To the query, the suspects answered positively.
was assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by
They also affirmed their earlier declaration that they were willing to be assisted by
SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3
the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during the
Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police officers.
investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which they thought would
incriminate them, but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue
Medical Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty.
receiving medical treatment. The victim was unconscious. After conferring with the
Sansano requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to
victim's parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On his arrival, the
determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he then
desk officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was told that appellant
summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators readied two
was picked up near the crime scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked
typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as the
about his participation in the shooting, he was reluctant at first to talk, but later
lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that they did
relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his conscience would bother him less if he
not understand, and to seek . . . a clarification, if needed.
would tell the truth.

According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated
separate room from where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the
the crime, and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a
two tables used by the investigators for typing the questions and answers, involving
group of policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doña
himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the signing of the
Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid
statements. He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with [the]
informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He was then
standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights of suspects during
invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
investigation.

66
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992
informed the suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under the and went home at 7:00 am of June 8th Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by
constitution, specifically, the right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their own Edwin's house to invite him back to [the former's] house that morning and to bring
choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who would assist them; that Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo, who were then
they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The investigators also asked with him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another
him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects. They also asked the friend of Kenneth's.
suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel. They agreed expressly
by saying: "Oho."
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am. Kenneth,
his girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was
conducted the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend. Edwin was
appellant was marked as Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the
statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano. four of them — Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo — later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n
Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was past 12:00 noon.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking
the statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the
appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he reminded four of them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was.
appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4) questions under the Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they were
heading "Paunawa," to which the latter gave positive answers. The statement was going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom
signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him personally before
over appellant to SPO3 Guspid. then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where
Deo stayed.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: "both hands of Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be
Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the test for arguing (". . . . parang nagtatalo sila") The voices came from some twenty-two (22)
gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo gave meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where
negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates." Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not used to
hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His singular
thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the
victim to get her own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared
a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution Office which was signed by Senior Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation Division. During the
inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory questions.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 p.m. when he was already outside of
Filinvest subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4)
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his persons in civilian attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying
other companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought his feet together and binding his hands from his back with handcuffs, and then
to trial. covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water was poured little by
little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his thighs. This maltreatment
lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted him to admit "something"
Version of the Defense
and to name "my companions" but he refused to admit or to name anyone. They
next took him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes.
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had At one point during the torture, a policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a
shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and gun to his temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not
Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after the shooting incident, escape because he could see that they were merely frightening him.
appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him into signing
his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court summarized appellant's evidence in this
None of the policemen told him that he could . . . get a lawyer[;] instead, one of
wise:10
them, whose name he [did] not know, told him that "I should listen only to them and
not to anyone else." He claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in court, and he
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his torture,
already close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's house at No. because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not drunk or under
106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay the influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the influence of drugs when
Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro, his and he took his statement because of his troubled appearance.
Kenneth's friend.

67
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his I
request to contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation
continued (". . . . puro pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin"). After his torture at the
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS BERNARDO
mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he remained until
CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him
once in the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He was not given any
dinner. II

At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A
brought to the IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR;
were Deo Garcia and two other police officers. At the IBP office, the officers talked
with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be Atty. Sansano only
after the lawyer was introduced ("present") to him and Deo. That was the first he III
met and saw Atty. Sansano.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT "O", ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
talk or not. Edwin could not make any comment because "wala po ako sa sarili ko". CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED
Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin substantially that: "Alam n'yo ba na ang FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan," referring to the statement taken
from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 p.m. until 9 p.m. on the day before IV
(June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, and had no
relatives present. Guspid appeared to be "like drunk or tipsy," when he took down
Edwin's statement that night." THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.12
At the IBP office, Edwin's and Deo's statement were taken separately by Guspid and
Selvido, respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from
each other, but he could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked the In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) the
questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were given in admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his liability.
Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was about seven
(7) meters away from where he and Guspid were situated. The office of Atty. The Court's Ruling
Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what Atty. Sansano was
doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he was not able to
read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper. The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as a principal.

xxx xxx xxx First and Third Issues:

On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellant's Liability
sinumpaang salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City,
for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the precinct in the evening of Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were
given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights.
Eyewitness Account

Ruling of the Trial Court


In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera, the trial court
relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the following
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was indeed Kenneth facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the victim's car; the victim was clearly struck with a
Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted appellant as a principal, blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover,
however, because "the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and substantially it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on Roderick.
confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro,
Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia.11
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.13 In
the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
The Issues

Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
68
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter, namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo
he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the victim in the head at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa utang ni
moments later. Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay sumunod po kami ni
Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang tingnan kung
mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at
Cacao's testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was inside
kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni
the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy.14 Indeed, the trial
Deo itong si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at
court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a
kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang
common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As
beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth
the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or
habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si Deo at
conjectures. Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not establish appellant's culpability.
sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng mga
security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina
Appellant's Extrajudicial Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli.16

Statement Appellant an Accomplice,

Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Vera's extrajudicial Not a Conspirator
statement, which established three points.
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention. and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He
was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the
crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag
kang maging kasapakat nito?
The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."17 To prove conspiracy, the
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an
na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.15 agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the
felony [was] decided upon."18 Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan of the the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 19 The Court has held that in most
group. instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. 20
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included
in Article 17,21 cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."22 The Court
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,] has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates
sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed
isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat. just the same."23 To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the
"community" of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself at a certain participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or
distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear from the following portion simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. 24
of his statement:
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on appellant's
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The act of one of them is
ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil deemed the act of all.25 In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a
[mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick principal.
Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na
kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.
po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
[sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and
Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay . . . lalakad na raw po only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating perpetration of the offense.

69
Thus, in People v. Castro,26 the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a principal, had already been agreed upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na." This is clear from his statement,
although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that "their concerted action in going armed and which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
together to their victim's house, and there, while one stayed as a lookout, the other two entered and shot the
mayor and his wife, leaving again together afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag
conspiracy." It may be noted further that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three of them,
kang maging kasapakat nito?
together with some others, had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.

S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan
In People v. Tawat et al.,27 the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for conspiring with two
na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.34
others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their arrest, they disclosed that they had intended
to rob the victim's store and that they did so in accordance with their plan. In that case, it was clear that all Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further that he
three of them, including the lookout, were the authors of the crime. alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat.

In People v. Loreno,28 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they had acted in In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the conspiracy to kill
band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the other conspirators, and he the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made. after the decision to kill was
gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crime of robbery and rape. already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held:

Upon the other hand in People v. Corbes,29 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the criminal [L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as
design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the vehicle to and from the principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their
crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court observed that he was favor the question, by holding . . . that they were guilty of the "milder form of
merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with responsibility," i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.35
the robbers when they resolved to commit a robbery. When his services were requested the decision to
commit the crime had already been made.
Second Issue:

In People v. Tatlonghari,30 the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some appellants who
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
"knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and distracting his attention." The
Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-conspirators, "[i]n the absence of clear proof that the
killing was in fact envisaged by them." Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, provides:
In People v. Suarez et al.,31 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who intended to
perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was merely an accomplice, the Court (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
noted that there was no evidence showing that he "took part in the planning or execution of the crime, or informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
part." provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
In People v. Balili,32 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that "in going with them,
knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went xxx xxx xxx
inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making
him guilty as an accompliance." The Court noted that there was no evidence that he "had conspired with
the malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the crime." (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

In People v. Doble,33 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when he looked for
a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: "Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given
wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than Just freely — without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was
asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the consistent with the normal experience of mankind."36
crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence
of each other, which [was] not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made in the presence
provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery." of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid Committee purportedly
assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial Statements, appellant asserts that the
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time. Appellant adds that he was tortured.
time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong;
that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill Appellant's claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any time.

70
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start? A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against them for
a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they were never
threatened by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements. Casually I
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their statements.
asked the two boys to raise their upper clothes.

Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
xxx xxx xxx

A: I never left the office to attend to anything.


Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper
clothing?
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police insofar as
custodial investigation is concerned?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm
committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal]
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the rights of assurances . . . , verbal assurance that they were never hurt. 38
the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire interrogation. 37
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the use of duress
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera, and Garcia and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. 39 In the present case, the Court is
and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were doing. satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional mandate. Moreover,
appellant's allegations of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to
statements at the mere facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements of the mere allegation of
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room? torture, without any proof whatsoever.

A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself that When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a
no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers during my high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of people brought knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.40 The defense has the burden of
before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing and sight of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. 41 Appellant failed to
any police officer.
overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.

Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to interview Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an accused
the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." In the
present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti: (a) a
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys. certain result has been proven — for example, a man has died; and (b) some person is criminally
responsible.42 It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution
evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused? does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the
company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to the voluntariness
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their own of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be
statements to the police? some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession."43

Q: And what did they say? Criminal and Civil Liability

A: They said yes, sir. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify the
crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower court explained
Q: What was your reaction to that? that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendo's group acted with deliberate forethought
and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven,
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution. because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal
design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers took
advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
xxx xxx xxx

We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because treachery
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired? absorbs abuse of superior strength.44 Hence, there is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two.
Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty,
because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
71
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a principal,
which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

We sustain the trial court's grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as compensatory damages was
duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented, moral damages is also warranted, but only
in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the payment of
interest.45 However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such
indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. 46 In this case, the
trial court merely presumed the amount of Capulong's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present
evidence of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an


accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8
years and 1 day ofprision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory
damages and (c) interest of six percentper annum on these two amounts. The award of moral damages is
however REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

72
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013 Version of the prosecution

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio
vs. Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an,
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant. Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their
house.
CARPIO, J.:
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter.
Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in
The Case
the abdomen. The two other accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already
dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu
(CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while
Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in
Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of frustrated murder.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death was caused by
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound." 5
The Facts

Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy
sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion
Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an
wounds hematoma formation" in his right shoulder.6
Information3 which reads:

Version of the defense


That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000. He claimed,
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He
feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio,
and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter. and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that
gunshot.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14
kilometers away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:
The Ruling of the RTC
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however,
helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by was convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
posterior aspect, middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby
which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay
of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
insolvency and to pay the costs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in both cases ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day
and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided by law and without
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where the victims were admitted. The defense, on
the other hand, presented appellant, Demapanag, and the latter’s brother, Frederick.

73
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused SO ORDERED.
serves his sentence.
SO ORDERED.10
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in both
cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release
Hence, this appeal.
accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.

The Ruling of the Court


SO ORDERED.7

Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is guilty of
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-
1555 for murder, but modify the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in convicting the award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense

The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral and exemplary damages
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected by the RTC and the
in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC
CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:

When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555. It
prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However, appellant’s version of the
did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have awarded both, considering that they
incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive
are two different kinds of damages. For death indemnity, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to
identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution. 12
the current judicial policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the
mental anguish of the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable
moral damages."9 Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing
demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-
defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied by the
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
fact that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10, 2008 of
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged unlawful aggression and
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the
dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
following morning, he did not also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely
accidental.13
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun accidentally fired is
sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to
also implausible.
pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the RTC
found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond
This Court has consistently put much weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to
period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining
sentence. the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged in both
cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release
accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause. Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the witnesses were not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.

74
Attempted and Frustrated Murder Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what was the situation of the
patient when you examined him?
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in which the
victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in distress.
is not solely determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen
to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly
xxxx
appreciated against the accused.18

Court (to the witness)


In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The use of a 12-gauge
shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to
fend off the offender. Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?

We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the anterior aspect
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777. right shoulder.22

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies: Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty
for attempted murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which
Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
will of the perpetrator.
prescribed by the Code for the offense.1âwphi1

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
in its medium period.

In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
Award of damages

1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of damages imposed by the
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely
lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby awards ₱75,000.00 as civil
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts
indemnity23 and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages in the
of execution.
foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages, in relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R.
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own
CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant
spontaneous desistance.20
Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was
admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident:

Prosecutor Con-El:

75
G.R. No. 220598 COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF
MILLIONS OF PESOS.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs. D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE
SHOWS, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR
COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE GUILTY OF MALVERSATION.2
RESOLUTION

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of
BERSAMIN,, J.:
the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival
of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing: against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as
September 10, 2015; GRANTSthe petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL- of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the
ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be
detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit. informed of the accusation against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of
malversation; and that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.
SO ORDERED. 1

Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion for
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of reconsideration.
the decision, submitting that:

In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces
ASSAILING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information
TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.
ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY
APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
Ruling of the Court
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A
VIOLATION OR DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
PROCESS OF LAW.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their
OF PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby
PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080. for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the
proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their
evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of discretion attending the denial, the
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with the stringent
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or adequate
THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE FUND (CIF) remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.
DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF
FUNDSAND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT
BULK OF THE PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S (PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE
ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx

C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY


xxxx
WITH THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A

76
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n) jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved in Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed
the decision, as follows: additional elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore
required, i.e., the identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused
committing the predicate crime of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to
the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the
excess of jurisdiction.
different infirmities of the information despite the issue revolving only around the sufficiency of the
evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond reasonable doubt.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal benefit
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave
on the part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through fraudulent or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of
unlawful means, and such definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of
the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder.
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, The submissions of the State are unfounded.
because to do so -
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that of raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition jurisprudence. This we made clear in the decision, as follows:
or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy
will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and
after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080
established by law.
(Plunder Law) states:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of
State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of
the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.3
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v.
Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail
xxxx
77
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of
within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
means or similar schemes: participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada. 5 [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury; Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the
identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-
any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence,
or position of the public officer concerned;
it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or
himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National ₱50,000,000.00.
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In
order to ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any offenses involving property, like robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not
business enterprise or undertaking; expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so doing,
the Court did not adopt the State's submission that personal benefit on the part of the accused need not be
alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated the clear intent of the law itself,6 which was to
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
interests; or or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of Congress
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and indicated the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public
prejudice
treasury, viz.:

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d)
xxxx
hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any person
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged means or similar schemes:
and duly proven by the Prosecution.
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the treasury;
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation
and acquisition was made, thus:
xxxx

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused
process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the
and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or
correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is
word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always
not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated
78
used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that
restricted by the latter. GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly the
privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any different irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds,
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality,
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, coupled with the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds, showed
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.
thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering
that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
The contention lacks basis.
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering
constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective demurrers
raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit. 7 to evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:

The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain
Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.: the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9

Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the petitioners.
benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly We need not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress that the
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials,
knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would particularly petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment? amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.

Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not engage
of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these in purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of the
questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to... evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to
highlight what would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to
discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the
clarified that in discussing the essential need for the identification of the main plunderer it was not harping
country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to
on the sufficiency of the information, but was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant
the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to
proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the "mastermind" - which was how the
her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the
Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the
plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
information. But the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that averred her
commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment. plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence
against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to
evidence.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee
amendment. But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading
the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.
other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
plunder was not removed.
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

79
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum (b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or
pesos. unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through
irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the (c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at
to reclusion perpetua. the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. CONTRARY TO LAW.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such aforementioned essential elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the information
missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060). of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency
of the allegations. Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is
responsible for the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c) Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the
he/she has custody of and received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10 State can amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their
acquittal under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
prosecution for the same act.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA.
FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of
the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the motion
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows: for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them.
Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, In People v. Tan, 12the Court shows why:
MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS.
VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both
of the Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,, accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
means, described as follows:
xxxx
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal
restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds

80
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated
that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, thus:

... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of
to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. 13

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not
only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had
attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled
for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for
reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it
would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their
acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to
the accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The rationale for the three
protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16

The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not
be subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense.Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has
been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make
repeated attempts to convict him,

"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).

The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the
principle have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable
after appeal, whether requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F.
Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that
a defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar
right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

81
G.R. No. 220598 Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
vs
amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents.
SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through
any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as
x-----------------------x follows:

G.R. No. 220953 (a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal
restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the
vs. guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-
DECISION mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through
BERSAMIN, J.: irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail and annul the resolutions (c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections
issued on April 6, 20151 and September 10, 2015,2 whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at
demurrer to evidence, and their motions for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Philippines.

Antecedents CONTRARY TO LAW.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal- By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over GMA, Valencia,
Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO) from
Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned,
Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained
R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman at large.
Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras
with plunder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail. On June 6, 2013,
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero upon finding that the
evidence of guilt against them was not strong.4 In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas,
The information3 reads: the Sandiganbayan, through the resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.5 The motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014.6 Accordingly, GMA assailed the
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her challenge has remained pending and unresolved todate.
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA.
FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said
the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, accused sought to be granted bail, and their motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows: 31, 20147 and May 9, 2014,8 respectively.

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MA CAP all the accused. The Sandiganbayan rendered the following summary of her testimony and evidence in its
A GAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager resolution dated November 5, 2013 denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L.
MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, then
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of the Philippine Institute of Certified
members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Public Accountants and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA lawyer for 20 years. She has practiced accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of several
B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on
companies. She has also taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon University,
82
Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School. She currently teaches Economics, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008,
Taxation and Land Reform. which was approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato, Domingo, and
attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board appointed her as Chairman
of an Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, adverted
PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D" "E" "F" and "G" respectively), and the annual financial in the 2007 COA report. There was already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or
statements contained therein for the years 2005 to 2009. The reports were given to them by the COA. funds in 2007. But the COA noted that this was not followed. The financial statements show the
These are transmitted to the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit. Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more than
the P10 million that was approved.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was commingling the charity
fund, the prize fund and the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was
only one main account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally approved for P28 million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account
accepted accounting principles. being used for confidential and intelligence expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the
budgeted amount of P28 million. Further, the real disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of
expenditures she had asked the treasurer to prepare.
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential and
Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal
audit department was also merged with the budget and accounting department, which is a violation of In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the
internal audit rules. budget for CIF and expenses was P60 million.

There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10 million in 2002, i.e. In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, despite
P5 million for the Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such the instruction or recommendation of COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA
allocation was based on the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General Manager Golpeo observation in 2007 states that there is juggling or commingling of funds.
(Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million intelligence fund each. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to
then President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should have been the basis for the original
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of Directors in one of
allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent requests made by the General
their executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements
Manager during the time of, and which were approved by, former President Arroyo.
of CIF.

The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO did not have a budget
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of P10 million. He
for this. They were working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as
explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional CIF which were approved by former
operating fund, which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were operating on
President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary.
a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.

It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional funds from the President, but there
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for additional CIF, by letter
should be a budget for it. The CIF should come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more
and President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven
operating fund, the other funds cannot be used.
letters or memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."

The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have a registry of budget
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the disbursements from CIF
utilization. The excess was not taken from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.

In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes of the deficit for 2006
After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked Hinayon to give her the checks or copies
was the CIF expense of P215 million, which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The
thereof. She also asked Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding
net cash provided by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses
vouchers. Only two original checks were given to her, as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to
than what was received.
request certified true copies of the checks.

In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds. The
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then investigating the operation
COA made a recommendation regarding the deposits in one main account. There were also excessive
of PCSO, including the CIF. She was invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman
disbursements of CIF amounting to P77,478,705.
Teofisto Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee Chairman went to the PCSO and
got some documents regarding the subject matter being investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all the
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for the year 2008 in 2010 because she documents needed by the Committee. These documents included the CIF summary of disbursements,
was already a member of its Board of Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.
the actual budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only
P25,480,550. But the financial statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by then

83
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also attended were the incoming The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of Directors designated
members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion
some hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in connection with the past disbursements of withdrawn by Valencia, there was no special disbursing officer designated on record.
PCSO related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the bishops, and the commingling of funds.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the responsibility of the department
The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy of the transcript of stenographic head, as required by Section 3 of Circular 2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and
notes from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. ''EE"), disbursement vouchers submitted to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized
Uriarte testified. The witness was about two to three meters away from Uriarte when the latter testified, officer to sign the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks withdrawn by
and using a microphone. Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory of the checks.

According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds withdrawn by Valencia, he
were approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were approved and signed by was also the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.
the latter personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted
to President Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about the projects.
The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She identified the vouchers and checks
Statements before the Committee are under oath.
pertaining to the disbursements made by Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved to check whether the
The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory. The treasurer who signed depends on
disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee
when the checks were issued
was to verify compliance with the laws.

She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they have their signatures on the records.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI
1282; COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for approval
of disbursements and liquidation of confidential intelligence funds. She made a handwritten flowchart Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity and legality of the vouchers; they also
(Exh. "II") of the allocations/disbursements/liquidation and audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and the signed to approve the same, signify they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and
COA Circulars. A digital presentation of this flowchart was made available. approved as payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as releasing officer, giving the checks to the claimants.

The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be disbursed without the Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and budgetary allotment, that
allocation. This is provided in the second whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying the expenditures were properly certified and supported by documents, and that the previous cash advances
Circular 2003-002, there must be allocation or budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the were liquidated and accounted for. This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released.
corporate operating budget or would be taken from savings authorized by special provisions. This is because the COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance is released, the
previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This certification allowed the requesting party and payee to
get the cash advance from the voucher. Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could not have
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The disbursement for that year was
been able to get the cash advance. Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing
P86,555,060. The CIF budget for that year was only P28 million, and there were no savings because they
Code).
were on deficit. This was also not followed for the year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that year was
P139,420,875. But the CIF budget was only P60 million, and there was also no savings, as they were in
deficit. For the year 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The budget was only The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board Resolutions No. 217, Series of2009
P60 million. (Exh."M"), No. 2356, Series of 2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to
designate Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These resolutions were signed and approved by Valencia, Taruc,
Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The witness is familiar with these persons' signature because their
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval of the President. If the
signatures appear on PCSO official records.
budget is correct, the President will approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the
President approved the release of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the
same in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals and specifications Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor Plaras. There was no
accompanying the request for additional CIF. The requests for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform board resolution for this designation. There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z4").
and just enumerated the purposes, not projects. They did not contain what was required in the LOI. This certification was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself as the SDO since he is personally
taking care of the funds which are to be handled with utmost confidentiality. The witness is familiar with
Valencia's signature because it appears on PCSO official documents. Under COA rules, the Board of
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request for allocations must contain full
Directors has authority to designate the SDO. The chairman could not do this by himself.
details and specific purposes for which the fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid
duplication of expenditures, as what had happened in the past, because of a lack of centralized planning
and organization or intelligence fund. Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter that to substantiate the
liquidation report, Plaras told Valencia to designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing
officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras. Plaras is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA Chairman
There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then President Arroyo.
Villar. Liquidation vouchers and supporting papers were submitted to them, with corresponding fidelity
bond.

84
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a special disbursing officer incurred from the fund can be made available, if required. Aguas, the person who processed the cash
or SDO. All disbursing officers of the government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the advances said he did not have the details or suppmiing details of documents of the expenditures.
government from and answer for misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The bond amount
required is the same as the amount that may be disbursed by the officer. It is based on total accountability
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the agency is necessary. If there were
and not determined by the head of the agency as a matter of discretion. The head determines the
vouchers or receipts involved, then all these should be attached to the liquidation report. There should also
accountability which will be the basis of the bond amount.
be an accomplishment report which should be done on a monthly basis. All of these should be enclosed in
a sealed envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA, although the agency concerned must retain a
The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of Directors, headed by the Chairman. But now, photocopy of the documents. The report should have a cover/transmittal letter itemizing the documents, as
under the Governance of Government Corporation law, it is the general manager. well as liquidation vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher and the supporting
papers are in order, then the COA Chairman or his representative shall issue a credit memorandum.
Supporting papers consist of receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify that
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was no fidelity bond and the
those were all actually incurred and are legal. In this case, there were no supporting documents submitted
disbursing officer was not authorized. There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show that the
with respect to Valencia's cash advances in 2008. Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted.
bond for Uriarte was only for the amount of Pl.5 million. This is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010,
These certifications stated that he has the documents in his custody and they can be made available, if and
to COA Chairman Villar through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the Bureau of
when necessary.
Treasury, dated March 2, 2009. It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF covering the period
February 2009 to February 2010 was only Pl.5 million.
When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the supporting documents which were indicated
in Valencia's certification and Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he also
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24, 2010, late, because
certified that the documents supporting the cash advance were in their possession and that there was proper
under the COA Circulars, it should have been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It
liquidation. Aguas replied that he did not have them.
should have been submitted to COA because a disbursing officer cannot get cash advances if they do not
have a fidelity bond.
She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for
August 1, 2008, a certification and schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA, together with the fidelity
the attachments is Board Resolution 305, a copy of the COB for 2008, a document for the second half of
bond and the signatories for the cash advances.
2008, a document dated April 2, 2009, and a document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified
another letter for P50 million, dated February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal letter. There is a
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its allocation. She thinks the action certification attached to those two letters amounting to P2,295,000. Also attached is the schedule of cash
of the Board was done because there was no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was advances by Aguas and a liquidation report where Aguas certified that the supporting documents are
in excess of the budget that was approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them approval of complete and proper although the supporting documents and papers are not attached to the liquidation
the CIF in excess of the approved corporate operating budget. The Board approval was required for the report, only the general statement. These documents were submitted to them by Aguas.
amount to be released, which amount was approved in excess of the allotted budget for the year. The
President cannot approve an additional amount, unless there is an appropriation or a provision saying a
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M5", "N5", "05" and "P5") attached to the transmittal
particular savings will be used for the CIF. The approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.
letter and was asked whether they were properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were
couched in general terms and the voucher for which the cash advance was liquidated is not indicated and
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash advance, one must state only the voucher number is specified. She adds that the form of the liquidation is correct, but the details are
what the project is as to that cash advance. No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous not there and neither are the supporting papers.
cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation
reports must be given. The difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash advances is that
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and
for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the agency or the GOCC. All of
it supposedly covered the cash advances of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her
the liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given on a monthly basis.
summary of liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no supporting papers stated on or attached to
the liquidation report.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash advance from CIF of the
Chairman or from the GM's office in accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from the CIF for the second semester of
for the cash advance. Also, the requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances
2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal letter of Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry
to be given was not followed. The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances withdrawn by the two
with Aguas, he said that he did not have any of the supporting papers that he supposedly had according to
disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Exh. "D5"). The basis for this summary is the
the certification. According to him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the
record submitted to them by Aguas, which were supposedly submitted to COA. It shows that there were
Senate hearing, that she gave them to President Arroyo.
subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has not yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted
liquidation reports to Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of cash advances, and
liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh. "G5") and another is dated February 13, 2009 (Exh. When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of Valencia, who had
"H5"). designated himself as SDO. However, their designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are
not stated. Among the attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit "P5"), containing
the signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated
When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents, she did not find any supporting
August 13, 2008, indicating the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas on
documents despite the statement in Exhibit "G5" that the supporting details of the expenses that were
April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances, couched in general terms.

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The reasons were donated medicines that were sold and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states that the credit notice is hereby
reasons stated in the memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any accomplishment issued. Thus, it is equivalent to the credit notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely
reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an accomplishment report, but the stated that the credit notice is issued for P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers and for which
accomplishments were not indicated in definite fashion or with specificity. project the credit notice was being given. It merely says "First Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a
"global" credit notice that she issued and it did not state that she made an audit.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that the total cash advance
made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009 Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly covers all the cash advances in 2009,
and April 27, 2009, and then P50 million in May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 but only up to the amount of P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.
million. In October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash advanced by
Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by these two officials were P138,420,875, but
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification issued is not in conformity
all of these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a liquidation voucher and a
with the required certification by COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by
report to COA on April I2, 2010. For the January 22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation
Valencia was not in conformity with the certification required by COA. The required form should specify
voucher was June 30, 2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the
the project for which the certification was being issued, and file code of the specific project. The
transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which was received by the COA only
certification dated July 24, 2008, however, just specified that it was to certify that the P2 million from the
on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents from
2008 CIF Fund was incurred by the undersigned, in the exercise of his functions as PCSO Chairman for
which the witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.
the various projects, projects and activities related to the operation of the office, and there was no specific
project or program or file code of the intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the certification
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. I, Sec. 4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. I445 and par. also did not contain the last paragraph as required by COA. Instead, the following was stated in the
2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385. certification: "He further certifies that the details and supporting documents and papers on these highly
confidential missions and assignments are in our custody and kept in our confidential file which can be
made available if circumstances so demand." No details or supporting documents were reviewed by the
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were disbursed without any
witness, and though she personally asked Aguas, the latter said that he did not have the supporting papers,
appropriation. These cash advances were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of
and they were not in the official files of the PCSO. Two people should have custody of the papers, namely,
COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers
The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or its Special Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because
only indicate the source of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.
Valencia was not there, and also because Aguas was the one who made the certification and was in-charge
of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified by Aguas, as Budget and Accounting Department
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and Valencia is more than Manager, each time cash advances were issued, stated that the supporting documents are complete, so the
P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced PI 3.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte. witness went to him to procure the documents.

The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the PCSO. These problems, A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was incurred by Valencia in the exercise
as stated in each memorandum, included donated medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale, of his function as PCSO Chairman, related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence
unofficial use of ambulances, rise of expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for project. In the same document, there is a certification similar to one in the earlier voucher. No details of
programs of the PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned. this certification were submitted by Aguas.

As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the COA. The credit notice Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did not specify the intelligence and
is a settlement or an action made by the COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF confidential project, and it did not contain any certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that
Fund, finds that the liquidation report and all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting no benefits was given to any person. Similarly, the fourth paragraph of the same document states that
papers and the liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not have been issued. Uriarte certified that details and supporting papers of the cash advance that she made of P27,700,000 are
Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or his representative can: 1) "kept in their confidential" (sic). The same were not in the PCSO official records.
settle the cash advance when everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if there are deficiencies and
then ask for submission of the deficiencies; or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are
The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by
illegal, irregular or unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form, the COA
Aguas. It also did not conform to the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of the cash
issued a document dated January 10, 2011, which stated that there is an irregular use of the price fund and
advance, did not contain any certification that the cash advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no
the charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears an annotation which says, "wait for transmittal, draft"
benefits to other people were paid out of it. Again, no supporting documents were found and none were
among others. The document was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the Confidential and
given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated February 8, 2010 for the amount of P2,394,654 was
Intelligence Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she instructed her staff to "please ask Aguas
presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular, as it only stated that the amount was spent
to submit the supplemental budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General Manager J.M.
or incurred by Valencia for projects covering the period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his
Roxas. They instead received another letter dated January 13, 2011 which was almost identical to the first
function as PCSO Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was stated. As in the other
document, except it was signed by Plaras, and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the
certifications, though it was stated that the details were in the confidential file, it appeared that these were
charity fund was omitted. Instead, the work "various" was substituted and then the amount of
not in the possession of PCSO. Another certification dated October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was
P137,5000,000. Therefore, instead of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the COA issued a credit
examined by the witness in the course of her audit, and found that it also did not conform to the
notice as regards the total of P140,000,000. The credit notice also did not specify that the transaction had
requirements, as it only stated that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and confidential fund dated
been audited, indicating that no audit was made.
January 29, 2009 and April 27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman
and General Manager.

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All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the audit of the financial transactions of must be subject to audit in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the
PCSO. Other documents given by Aguas include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was requirements for audit are the same.
attached to the letter dated July 24, 2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for P2,857,000, there
was also a certification attached dated February 13, 2009. As to Exhibit "J 5", together with the
The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the agency will take it up in the books
certification, there was a letter but no other documents were submitted. Similarly, as to Exhibit "M 6", it
and credit the cash advance. This is the seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the
was attached to a letter dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted to the witness by Aguas. Exhibit "N6"
liability of the officers who obtained the cash advance would be recorded in the books. The credit notice,
was attached to the letter of Valencia dated February 8, 2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was
when received, would indicate that the account was settled. The agency will credit the receivable or the
attached to the October 19, 2009 letter to Chairman Villar.
cash advance, and remove from the books as a liability of the person liable for the cash advance. The effect
of this was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and Valencia were removed from the books, but they
The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the amount of P2,075,000, also does not could still be subject to criminal liability based on Sec. 10 of COA Circular 91-368 (Government
conform with the COA requirement as it only specifies that the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his Accounting and Auditing Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.O. 1445), which states: "The settlement of an
office for various programs in the exercise of his function as Chairman. Though there was a certification account whether or not on appeal has been made within the statutory period is no bar to criminal
that the supporting papers were kept in the office, these papers were not found in the records of the PCSO prosecution against persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual Audited Financial Statements of PCSO, it
and Aguas did not have any of the records. The certification was attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar was seen that the procedure was not followed because the liability of the officers was already credited even
dated June 29, 2010. before the credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was stated that the amount due from
officers and employees, which should include the cash advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were
not included because the amount stated therein was P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and
In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P137 ,500,000, the witness also
Valencia was P86 million.
said that the certification did not conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the amount was
disbursed from a special intelligence fund, authorized and approved by the President under the disposition
of the Office of the Vice Chairman. Despite the statement certifying that there were documents for the The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was no longer stated as a
audit, no documents were provided and the same were not in the official files of PCSO . The certification receivable), and reviewed whether it was recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded
was attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July 1, 2010 addressed to Villar. CIF fund expense, as recorded in the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only
P21,102,000. As such, she confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong amount na to?"
The personnel in the accounting office said that the balance of the P86 million or the additional P21
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P2,500,000, the witness
million was not recorded in the operating fund budget because they used the prize fund and charity fund as
made the same finding that it also did not conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for
instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher No. 8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer
which the cash advance was obtained and there were also no records in the PCSO. It was attached to the
Camba, Aguas (Head of the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the
letter dated October 19, 2009.
Accounting Department), showed that this procedure was done.

Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P73,993,846, the
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:
witness likewise found that it did not conform with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the
amount was used for the exercise of the functions of the PCSO Chairman and General Manager. The
documents related to this were also not in the PCSO records and Aguas did not submit the same. It was (a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the amount of P63,750,000 was
attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010 from Uriarte to Villar. credited as confidential expense from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the
operating fund, and it was passed on to other funds.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and post-audit. Both are
defined in COA Circular 2009-002. Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction, (b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for 424-2-G for
before these are paid for and recorded. The auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for Charity Fund
in compliance with the appropriate law, specific statutory authority or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are Miscellaneous. This means that funds used to release the cash advances to Uriarte and Valencia were from
available to enable payment of the claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal, irregular, extravagant, the prize fund and charity.
unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and duly
supported by authentic underlying evidence. On the other hand, the post-audit requirement is the process
Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads "Allocation of Confidential and
where the COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what was done in the pre-audit, and in addition, the
Intelligence Fund Expenses", and was the basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same
auditor must supplement what she did by tracing the transaction under audit to the books of accounts, and
document, there was a written annotation dated 12-31-2008 which reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF
that the transaction is all recorded in the books of accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final
and IF, beneficiary of the fund is CF and PF and signed by Aguas.
determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular, extravagant, excessive, unconscionable
or unnecessary.
The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording of the credit notice at the end of
2009, and despite the absence of the credit notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009 signed by Plaras, it was stated that a
PCSO the liability of Uriarte and Valencia, corresponding to the cash advances obtained in 2009. She
credit advice was given. However, the letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a credit notice.
based this finding on the COA Annual Audit Report on the PCSO for the year ended December 31, 2009.
Such form was in COA Circular 2003-002, and should specify the liquidation report number, the amount,
It was stated in the Audit Report that the total liability due from officers and employees was only
check numbers, and the action taken by the auditor. The auditor should also include a certification that
P87,747,280 and it was less than the total cash advances of Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million.
these have been audited. In this instance, no certification that the transaction was audited was given by
As a result, the witness checked the corresponding entry for the expenses in the corporate operating budget
Plaras. Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All transactions of the government
and found out that the same was understated. The CIF expenses were only P24,968,300, as against the
actual amount per vouchers, which was P138,420,875. Upon checking with the Accounting Department,

87
the department showed her another Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated December 29, 2009, where Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the latter's approval for allocation.
the personnel removed immediately the expense and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and charity Nonetheless, the release of the CIF must still be approved by the President. 9
fund by the end of December 31.
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming from different law
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due from'', means the accountability of enforcement agencies10 to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not requested
those who had cash advance was instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million. The from their respective offices any intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by
entry was confidential expense for P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was P90,428,780. The Uriarte and Aguas.
explanation for "424" was found in the middle part, stating: "424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was
used in the amount of P58,502,740 and the charity fund was used in the amount of P31, 916,040. The total
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and
amount of the receivables from Uriarte and Valencia that was removed was P106,386,800 and
Department Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence
P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize fund and charity fund.
and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA; and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as
additional witnesses.
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides
for the different funds of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and Villar
receipts), and operating fund (15% ). The proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the
separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
money for these different funds, removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided
plunder against them.
among the three funds mentioned. The prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to pay the prizes for the
winnings in the lotto or sweepstakes draws, whether they are jackpot or consolation prizes. Incentives to
the lotto operators or horse owners are also drawn from this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and
winnings of the draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity programs approved by the Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO
board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and medical assistance to individuals, or to help facilities and Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the
other charities of national character. Operating expenses are charged to the expenses to operate, personnel public treasury by conveying and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from
services, and MOOE. One kind of fund cannot be used for another kind, as they become a trust fund which PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his designation of Plaras had been
should only be used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not even with the approval of the board. tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had signed "by authority" of Villar as the
COA Chairman could not criminally bind him in the absence of any showing of conspiracy.
The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008 was P63,750,000, and in 2009
P90,428,780. The Board of Directors was given a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was
2009. The Board of Directors for both years was composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board Members sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had
Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Valdez. Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. The sufficiently established a case of malversation against Valencia, pertinently saying:
witness did not know whether the Board checked the COA reports, but there was no action on their part,
and neither did they question the correctness of the statements. They also had the Audit Committee (which
Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
was composed of members of the board) at that time, and one of the duties of the Audit Committee was to
verify the balances. which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court then ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by the Board of Directors of PCSO of indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
the CIF. Board Resolution No. 217, approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the
President. It did not state which CIF they were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as the Special
xxxx
Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it did say for what year. The signatories to the same Board Resolution
were Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were the witness's findings for
Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December 9, 2009. As for Board Resolution No. 29, S. Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or
2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board confirmed the fund approved by the President for 2010, amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be
though the approval of the President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the Memorandum considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the
dated January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the requests, and because they ratified the cash precise degree of paiiicipation therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365
advances, they agreed to the act of obtaining the same. [1999]).

Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the President directly dealt xxx xxx xxx
with the PCSO, although the President, by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and
Executive Order No. 455 dated August 22, 2005, transferred the direct control and supervision of the
PCSO to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:
Health (DOH). A project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling Secretary of the
Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct control and supervision, and lost the same. It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We found strong evidence of guilt
The witness said her basis was administrative procedure. In this regard, President Aquino now has against Arroyo and Aguas, only as to the second predicate act charged in the Information, which
transferred the control and supervision of the PCSO back to the Office of the President through Executive reads:
Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.

88
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned and COA Circulars 2003-002 and 92-385. These were thus improper use of the additional Cff funds
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-gotten because Uriarte had encashed the checks and
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and came into possession of the monies, which she had complete freedom to dispose of but was not able to
fictitious expenditures. properly account for.

In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said: These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under
the second predicate act charged in the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in
its November 5, 2013 Resolution that:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible
predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts 2010, but also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and signature on
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF
said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse, funds because the last paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With the
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the raider. Otherwise use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations.
stated, once a "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through improper means and
has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed. x x x
The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it categorically asked for: "The approval on
the use of the fifty percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund will greatly help PCSO in the
xxxx disbursement of funds to immediately address urgent issues."

Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the request for the grant or
amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth. allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation was unqualified and, therefore,
covered also the request to use such funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11
xxxx
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas,
observing that:
xxx It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF
funds during the period 2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate during that period CIF funds in
the total amount of P.352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire
funds from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed real or personal properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is
by her, through her authorized representative. absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more
of government funds and just decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to
benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of
in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person to actually benefit, would that
withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public
not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the
treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to
fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
have not been able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed
it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus, amounting to "misuse" of the same.
Therefore, the additional CIF funds are ill-gotten, as defined by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules, and Republic Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that
v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks, which named her as the "payee," gave Uriarte the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further
material possession of the CIF funds which she disposed of at will. stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the
Prosecution was unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by the prosecution's
approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused
evidence, the Court believes this to have been established. Even if the computation is limited only to the
Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a
cash advances/releases made by accused Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the
coconspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is
PCSO Board approved CIF budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO
not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 12
Chairman and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through accused
Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount surpasses the P50million threshold.
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and Aguas, they have
come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said denial, claiming that the denial was with grave
The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million additional CIF funds, and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Arroyo granted such request and authorized its use. From January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010, Uriarte
made a series of eleven (11) cash advances in the total amount of P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's
testimony before the Senate, the main purpose for these cash advances was for the "roll-out" of the small Issues
town lottery program. However, the accomplishment report submitted by Aguas shows that P137,500,000
was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat, kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and
security relations." All the cash advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282,
89
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic gotten wealth, hence, of a crime that docs not exist in law and consequently a blatant deprivation of
Act No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse liberty without due process of law.
of discretion but rendered without jurisdiction because:
Fourth Ground
First Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174,
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose
to Evidence and considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A.
offense of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the Villar and Nilda B. Plaras" ... all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective
following: offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly,
a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080, and as
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
charged in the Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof,
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the
acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows ... " or each of them, P36,599,791.50 which
Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the offense of plunder;
would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused
together, for which reason the Information docs not charge the offense of plunder and, as a
b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution nor a single consequence, all proceedings thereafter held under the Information arc void.13
testimony of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that
petitioner amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth
On his part, Aguas contends that:
amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount alleged in the Information;

A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and admitted, docs proof
c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused
Arroyo's authorization of the release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
such that there is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer'?
the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the
reason that her release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No.
7080 which reads, as follows: B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the allegations in the
Information'?
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury; PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.14
which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or un.just enrichment with
respect to raids on the public treasury", thereby disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti of
the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080. On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari should be dismissed upon the
following grounds, namely:
Second Ground
A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION
DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with absolutely no justification in
law or in the evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing
any overt act, would impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND
public treasury" and "in every sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT JUDICIALLY
have not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been arrested, was not LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.
arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the case.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF
Third Ground PLUNDER UNDER R.A. No. 7080.

That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer To Evidence 2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSPIRED
for the reasons stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the WITH HER CO-ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX, ILLEGAL SCHEME
basis of a disjointed reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS, WHICH
extirpation in the process of its "corpus delicti" - the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill- CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.

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3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD MEMBERS part of the Sandiganbayan in denying her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary,
AND CANNOT THUS DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBA YAN DISMISS THE PLUNDER the Sandiganbayan only interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of
CASE AGAINST HER. the established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how she had connived
with her co-accused to commit plunder.16
C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION CHARGING
HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
LA TE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING. the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION. The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17 Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave
2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
RELATING TO SB-12-CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN AND
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of
UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HER.
the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE ENJOINED.15 reviewed.18 Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited,19 because to do so –
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to be considered and
resolved, as follows: x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by
Procedural Issue: all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ
will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 20
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence. The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors
of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
Substantive Issues: expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
Uriarte; established by law.

2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not of the Government.
less than P50,000,000.00?

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to
Prosecution? the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
Ruling of the Court notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.21 As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious. grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the
I. factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.22
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
to correct grave abuse of discretion II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
demurrer to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion on the

91
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a being per se illegal or irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration
felony, and decide to commit it.23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that:
to commit a crime.
xxxx accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by Jaw. She further
it.24 The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the
136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article Prosecution was unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving
crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful
community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown. raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte
who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.30
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. 25 Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
the furtherance of the common design and purpose.26 Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence. the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place,
the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was
absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires
approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct
proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies
becomes an overt act of a crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the
are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied
act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary relation
conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts
to the offense.
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.27Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,31the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to
of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. 28
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than
least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:29 spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.32

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators.
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States33 illustrates a wheel conspiracy where
lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
multiple conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub,
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is
assisted 31 independent individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although
so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what
all the defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose or
the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards
overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was
the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not
for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went
constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
through. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies involving
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
Brown rather than one common conspiracy.34
immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her unqualified "OK" on
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 35
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not

92
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. 36 Illustrative of Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
chain conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno,37of the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This
xxxx
case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics
to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew means or similar schemes:
that it had not begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part with which he
was immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This means, therefore, that "every
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by other members of the
conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana."38 treasury;

Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally 2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity
liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the officer concerned;
execution of the criminal act.39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and
independent. 3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte, Valencia and the Members of the their subsidiaries;
PCSO Board of Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras. The Sandiganbayan agreed with the Prosecution as to
the conspirators involved, declaring that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder. 4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the undertaking;
information filed against the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy 5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte. implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy 6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all people and the Republic of the Philippines.
of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution. acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through
(Plunder Law) states:
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires
in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in
series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,40where the Court explained the nature of the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the and acquisition was made, thus:
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)] There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or
93
acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is did not make her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and
not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent
a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of proof thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any
Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to means irregular or illegal.
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the requests failing to provide
"the full detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished."
wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of It posits that the requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far
LOI 1282 reads:
below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION No. 1282


We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan41 to the effect that an information
alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the
word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned
allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused
to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and certain offices have been, as
the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification reports reaching me indicate, spent with less than full regard for secrecy and prudence. On the one hand,
there have been far too many leakages of information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand,
of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder.
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such where secrecy has been observed, the President himself was often left unaware of how these funds had
identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be been utilized.
properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence funds shall indicate in full
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts detail the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving
that constituted the offense charged.42 rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished.

For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of the information on The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President personally.
who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its
resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the
information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in order to avoid such duplication
generalization. of expenditures as has taken place in the past because of the lack of centralized planning and organized
disposition of intelligence funds.

In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against Full compliance herewith is desired.
each of them.
Manila, January 12, 1983.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence
of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. On this (Sgd.) FERDINANDE. MARCOS
score, the Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her President of the Philippines
approval via the marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving Uriaiie's requests in that manner, GMA
violated the following: However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The
requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds
would be spent; (b) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure;
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds and (c) the particular aims to be accomplished.
(CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were laid down as follows:
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if
there was an existing budget to cover the request.
In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a number of fraudulent schemes and
nefarious activities on a continuing basis which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:

94
1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if they were labeled "Donated by In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas
PCSO- Not for Sale"; certified that:

2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiarydonees; CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of P___________ ; expenditure
properly certified; supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back hereof; account codes
proper; previous cash advance liquidated/accounted for.
3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and organizations;

These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.) there were no documents which lent
4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning the jackpot and selling tampered
support to the cash advances on a per project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash
tickets as winning tickets;
advance form the CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager". No particular
purpose or project was specified contrary to the requirement under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash
5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation Project, Endowment Fund advances must be on a per project basis. Without specifics on the project covered by each cash advance.
Program and Individual Medical Assistance Program; Aguas could not certify that supporting documents existed simply because he would not know what project
was being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There were no previous liquidations made of prior cash
advances when Aguas made the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances be
6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad light.43 liquidated within one (1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance was accomplished. If the
completion of the projects mentioned were for more than one month, a monthly progress liquidation report
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO's was necessary. In the case of Uriarte' s cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made was
image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of wholesale, i.e. these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly liquidation or at least a monthly
the requests for not being compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not liquidation progress report. How then could Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were
detail any qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not make any accounted for? Aguas's certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:
other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No. 1282.
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved only when there purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given
was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any budget when has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the
GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.
been maxed out and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the
PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided and abetted Uriarte's being able to
revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85%
draw these irregular CIF funds in contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification,
of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. the disbursement vouchers could not have been processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that
In short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs. there were supporting documents and prior liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten
wealth by raiding the public coffers of the PCSO.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did not rule such co-
mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal. By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances and the staggering amounts involved,
Aguas should have been alerted that something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that GMA Aguas was not into the scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the certification, but he
had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This did not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in the case of Aguas. Moreover, Aguas's attempt
knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO. to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of these CIF funds in his accomplishment report only contributed to
unmasking the actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas' s accomplishment report, which
was conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of allegedly spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats, kidnapping, terrorism, and others. 45
subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA
under those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of
command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied conspiracy when he signed
Macapagal-Arroyo44that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in certifications to the effect that the budgetary allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were
international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human available; that the expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the been liquidated or accounted for.
Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the
actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them. We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers
were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member of the implied Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget available
conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed his participation in this manner: for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to
any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

95
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the conspiracy to commit The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the criminal prosecution
plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the Prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of
failed to properly allege the elements of the crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
commit plunder or any other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to
commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible only for their
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the crime of plunder as no evidence
own respective actions, if any.
was presented that any of the accused, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal
witness of the prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the existence or whereabouts of the
III. alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?
was adduced against GMA and Aguas

A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it or what? We don't know,
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the petitioners for plunder on the
Your Honor.47 [bold emphasis supplied]
basis that the Prosecution established all the elements of plunder.

After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any knowledge of the amassing,
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the
accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the
petitioners.
criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA
and Aguas, and dismissed the criminal action against them.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the following
elements, namely:
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family, predicate act of raiding the public treasury
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act of raiding the public
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of treasury, to wit:
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary benefit" are only mentioned in the
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
predicate acts mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
section where "raids on the public treasury" is mentioned did not mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal
officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
benefit". Lastly, the predicate act covering "raids on the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
misappropriation, conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once public funds, as in the
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To the tune of PSO Million or more,
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment
there will be no need to establish any motive to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually
in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
ended up. As stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be
least P50,000,000.00.46
said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the "raider" gets material
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at possession of a government asset through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or
not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the pillage is completed.
criminal prosecution.
xxxx
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even
the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
xxxx

96
x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
funds during the period 2008 - 2010. Uriarte was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit;50 misuse means "a good, substance,
total amount of P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when
from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed by "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
her, through her authorized representatives. shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." 52 The
common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of
Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use
withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury.
of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property
These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been
taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
other than what these were intended for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. xxx
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or
personal properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for
plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and
plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between
just decide to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not
Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:
be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the
police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely,
in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly
still be evidence-based must fail.48 benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer,
knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would
The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the
he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was
necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to
the records of the deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation. Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part
ofline 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these
questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to ...
We do not share the Sandiganbayan' s contention.

Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to
the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to
Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the
plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
xxxx
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines l to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following amendment. But, as I said, the eamples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading
means or similar schemes: the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the
other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."53

xxxx The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from
the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the
main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process plunder was not removed.
is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that
with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. 49 predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.

97
V.
Summation

In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the
failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and
ignored the lack of evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes.
The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.54 To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.55

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and
September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO
AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners;
and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

98
G.R. No. 123979 December 3, 1998 As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants Sandigan
and Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25, 1994). The two (2) appellants held the victim
between them and thereafter hurriedly, proceeded towards the NARCOM Office
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters away (pp. 7, 38-41, ibid.).
vs.
Upon reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside (pp.
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA PILLUETA and JOSE VICENTE (JOVY)
7-8, ibid.). Once the victim was already inside the NARCOM Office, appellant
CHANCO, accused-appellants.
Sandigan proceeded to and took his place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police
Station (pp. 8-12, ibid.). The victim was made to sit and thereafter mauled by
VITUG, J.: appellant Santiano (pp. 8-11, ibid.). Santiano got hold of a handkerchief, rolled it
around his fists and continued to punch the victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes (p.
16, ibid.). As the victim was being mauled, appellant Pillueta stood by the door of
Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Vicente (Jovy) Chance were
the NARCOM office, her both hands inside her pockets while looking to her right
indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City and left, acting as a lookout (ibid.).
Jail, in an amended Information, docketed Criminal Case No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in front
of the door of the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, TSN, April 25, 1994). Thereafter,
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial thereupon ensued. he proceeded inside the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).

The evidence submitted by the prosecution, disclosing its version of the case, is narrated by the Solicitor After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and started
General in the People's brief. the trimobile (p. 21,ibid.). His co-appellant Santiano and Pillueta followed him.
Inside the trimobile, appellant Pillueta occupied the back seat (p. 21, ibid.). Santiano
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in occupied the reserved seat in front of the passenger seat which was occupied by the
partner, Loida Navidad were arrested by appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia victim (ibid.).
Pillueta and several other NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of
marijuana (p. 32, TSN, April 20, 1994). As appellant Chanco was about to start his trimobile, appellant Sandigan, who was
at Plaza Barlin, transferred to and stationed himself at the Century Fox in front of
After the arrest, they were brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the the GSIS building situated at the corner of General Luna and Arana Streets (p.
compound of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters, Naga City (p. 23, ibid.).
32, ibid.). Thereat, they were at first warned by appellant Pillueta not to contact a
lawyer (p. 35, ibid.). Appellant Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only a The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church (p. 40, TSN,
matter of P10,000.00" (p. 35, ibid.). April 23, 1994). When it passed the Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way
towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was still aboard
When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived accompanied by a lawyer, appellant the trimobile seated at the passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN, May 24,
Pillueta got angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once, the victim and Navidad were dragged to 1994).
the Naga City Jail situated at a distance of six (6) to seven (7) meters from the
NARCOM Office (pp. 10, 38-39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained at the When prosecution witness Rañola heard over the radio that a person was found dead
Naga City Jail (ibid.). at the canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a
policeman Prila of the Pili Police Department that the descriptions of the dead
Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio Santiano was detained at the Naga City Jail person he heard over the radio fit not only the person he saw being hauled to and
(pp. 4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the same cell occupied by the victim (p. 6, ibid.). thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but likewise the same person who was on
When appellant Santiano was mauled by the inmates of Cell 3, the victim was one board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco (p. 13, TSN, May 6, 1994).
of those who participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as
After the release of Santiano, he returned to the City Jail in November 1993 his brother Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.1
accompanied by one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Thereat, the victim was pointed to
by appellant Santiano as the one who mastermind his mauling (ibid.). The defense presented its own account of the facts hereunder expounded by it; viz:

On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the victim asked Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM, Naga
permission from a jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the jail (pp. 7- City, Command. Accused-Appellant Jose Sandigan is a regular member of the PNP
9, ibid.). When he left, the victim was wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p.
but, he was a former organic member of the NARCOM. On the other hand, Accused
9, ibid.). Alipio Santiano and Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the active Civilian
Volunteer/Assists of the NARCOM.

99
That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December 27, 1993, accused-appellant That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the day, the late Ramon John Dy Kow,
Sandigan was in front of the Advent theater; that while thereat, he saw accused- Jr. was neither seen by the accused-appellants nor was he in the NARCOM office
appellant Santiano and he invited the latter for a snack at the Mang Donald's, a more specifically and particularly between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the same date; that
burger house, situated just beside the Advent theater; that after taking their snacks, the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and his (Dy Kow,
they decided to go to the NARCOM office; that while on their way to the Jr.) height and body built is almost the same or similarly the same as that of
NARCOM office, they saw accused-appellant Chanco emerging from the Nehrus accused-appellant Chanco; that she (SPO3 Fernandez) also known William Rañola
Department Store where the latter bought something; that this Nehrus Department whom she usually see drunk/under the influence of liquor;
Store is located in front of the Naga City Police Head Quarters which is also near
the NARCOM office, that the three of them (Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco)
That in the first week of January, 1994, during the investigation of the case
proceeded to the NARCOM office; that when they arrived, accused-appellant
conducted by the PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, SPO3 Fernandez was asked by major
Pillueta, SPO3 Lorna "Onang" Fernandez, Tet Deniega and the NARCOM, District
Ernesto Idian, chief of PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's
Commander P/Insp. Del Socorro were at the NARCOM office while accused-
whereabouts in the night of December 27, 1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez) told
appellant. Chanco's trimobile was parked in front of the NARCOM office; that
Major Idian that accused-appellant Pillueta was with her (SPO3 Fernandez) at the
while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant Santiano and Chanco were joking
Sampaguita Music Lounge; that Major Idian did not ask her (SPO3 Fernandez) to
with each other, like kids, such that accused-appellants Santiano would sling
execute an affidavit of what she told him instead, Major Idian requested her not to
accused-appellant Chanco with his handkerchief; that, as it was intermittently
tell accused-appellant Pillueta about what he asked her.
raining, accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco left the NARCOM
office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the trimobile of accused-appellant Chanco, while
accused-appellant Pillueta together with SPO3 Lorna Fernandez and Tet Deniega That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco, reported
left the NARCOM office at or about 8:00 P.M. and proceeded to the Sampaguita and submitted themselves to their superior officer, Col. Norberto Manaog, Deputy
Music Lounge to watch a lady band performing at the Sampaguita Music Lounge, Director of the NARCOM at Camp Crame, Quezon City, wherein they reported that
leaving behind P/Insp. Nelson Del Socorro at the NARCOM office. they were suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and requested that
they be placed under his custody; that Col. Manaog referred them to the legal officer
of the NARCOM, Major Acpal; that after being informed by accused-appellants
That upon leaving the NARCOM office and while on board the trimobile accused-
Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco that they did not have any idea of whether a warrant
appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco were deciding whether to see a movie or
of arrest was already issued against them, Col. Manaog, in consultation with Major
have a round of drink and, after failing to decide whether to see a movie or a round
Acpal, told them that there is no yet basis for them to be placed under custody, so
of drink, accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco conducted accused-appellant
that, Col. Manaog instructed them just get in touch with him so that if a warrant of
Santiano to the jeepney terminal for Milaor, Camarines Sur and thereupon, accused-
arrest comes out, the same could be served upon them; that Col. Manaog directed
appellant Chanco also conducted accused-appellant Sandigan to the Philtranco
Major Acpal to proceed to Pili, Camarines Sur to determine the status of the
terminal where the latter boarded a bus to Bato, Camarines Sur where he resides.
investigation and to know whether a warrant of arrest was already issued; that on
January 24, 1994, Major Acpal went to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that a
That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same date, accused-appellant warrant of arrest against accused-appellants, Sandigan, who was already arrested,
Santiano was in Milaor, Camarines Sur, a Municipality less than four kilometers Pillueta and Santiano has been issued on January 21, 1994; that on January 25,
away from Naga City, and fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife 1994, Major Acpal, being a lawyer and the Legal officer of the NARCOM filed
(komadrana), from the latter's residence to conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy before the Municipal Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, a motion to quash the warrant
(hilot) upon his (Santiano) pregnant wife; that Ms. Paz and accused-appellant of arrest; that on January 23, 1994 accused-appellant Pillueta informed Col. Manaog
Santiano proceeded to and arrived at the latter's house in Naga City about past 7:00 that she was hospitalized due to a car accident and that she may be placed under his
o'clock in the evening where Ms. Paz conducted a pre-natal therapy upon appellant custody should a warrant for her arrest be issued; on January 26, 1994, she was
Santiano's wife; that Ms. Paz finished the pre-natal therapy at or about 9:00 o'clock placed under the custody of her superior, Col. Manaog of the NARCOM. On the
P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of accused-appellant Santiano and was other hand, accused-appellants, Santiano and Chanco were, from time to time,
accompanied for home by latter at or about 10:00 o'clock of the same evening; that contacting Col. Manaog to determine whether a warrant of arrest was already issued
from past 7:00 o'clock when Paz and Santiano arrived at the latter's house until past but, since Col. Manaog was always out of his office, they were able to contact, via
10:00 o'clock when they left Santiano's house, accused-appellant Santiano was all telephone facility, Col. Manaog only on April 16, 1994; and accused-appellants
the time present at and never left his house; Chanco and Santiano went to the office of NARCOM, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
voluntarily surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed them under the custody of the
NARCOM and were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta,
The records of this case show that no warrant of arrest was issued against accused-
upon leaving the NARCOM office, went directly to the Sampaguita Music Lounge
appellant Chanco (Order dated Sept. 5, 1994), however, he voluntarily surrendered
and watched the lady band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a common
and submitted to the custody of the NARCOM and to the trial court.2
acquaintance of SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, even saw
and approached them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) at their table inside
the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that the three of them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus:
and Pillueta) left the Sampaguita Music Lounge at or about 2:00 A.M. of December
28, 1993, and thereupon, they went to their respective homes.
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered
somewhere in the vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of
Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was

100
later on identified by Robert Dy Kow as that one of his brother, Ramon John Dy and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand
Kow, Jr. 3 Pesos, and to pay the costs; they are credited in full for the preventive
imprisonment.5
Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings revealed that Dy
Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained the following injuries: Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

Eye: Contusion, upper lid extending to Assailing the decision of the court a quo, appellants would insist that the amended information under
the outer canthus, right; which they were arraigned, tried and convicted, although so captioned as an indictment for the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder, was, in reality a mere indictment for murder. According to appellants,
the use of the words "abducted" and "kidnapping" in the amended information was not in itself indicative
Ear: lacerated wound ripping off the
of the crime of kidnapping being charged but that, from the averments of the information, it could be
lowest pole of the lobule, right;
apparent that Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., was "abducted or kidnapped" not for the purpose of detaining but
serrated border
of liquidating him. Hence, the defense theorized, the conviction for kidnapping had no legal ground to
stand on.
Sub-occipital region: lacerated wound,
0.9 cms. in length, centrally located;
Let it not be said that the contention lacks remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal proposition that can
here hardly be accepted. The amended information reads:
Neck: punctured wound, 3-4 mm deep,
semi-circular with serrated border, base
The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur accuses
of neck at the sternomastoid border,
JOSE SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO, ARMIE PILLUETA and JOVY
right;
CHANCO of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, defined and penalized
under Article 267 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
Chest: Gunshot wound
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between
point of entrance: 2nd ICS, sternal 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay
border, right, 12 mm in diameter Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
Bullet route: from the point of entrance
and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with
extending backwards to the left, treachery, superior strength and evident premeditation, did
piercing the heart and left lung and then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct,
lodging on the anterior aspect or
kidnap, and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili,
surface of the sub scapular area, left Camarines Sur, one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while
thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy
Point of exist: None Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the different parts of
his body causing his instantaneous death.
Bullet slug: Recovered
That as a consequence of the death of the victim Ramon John
Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs suffered damages. 6
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE

The information is not so wanting as to render it legally inadequate for the purpose it has been intended by
SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4 the prosecution. It should be sufficient for an information to distinctly state the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions complained of as being constitutive of that offense. 7 A reading of the
Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of amended information readily reveals that the charge is for "kidnapping with murder, defined and
kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code; the court adjudged: penalized under Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention) and Article 248 (Murder) of
the Revised Penal Code" Evidently, appellants have been properly apprised of the charges, the
information did go on to state thus —
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court FINDS FOR THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and finds all of the accused, Jose Sandigan,
Armenia, aka Armie Pillueta, Alipio Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka Jovy, That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING as defined and o'clock in the evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of
penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences each and all of them to suffer Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
imprisonment, RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the penalty, helping one another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and

101
evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously batter him with punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lockout." The
abduct kidnap and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur appellants then took the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Rañola positively
one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while thereat attack and shoot with identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his abduction on 27 December 1993
firearm the said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the and when his lifeless body was found in the morning of 28 December 1993. Don Gumba
different parts of his body causing his instantaneous death. 8 corroborated Rañola's testimony. Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at around eight
o'clock in the evening of 27 December 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board the
trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines
The accused have gone through trial without any objection thereover. Exceptions relative
Sur, where, the following morning the victim was found dead evidently after succumbing to several
to the statement or recital of fact constituting the offense charged ought be presented
gunshot wounds.
before the trial court; if none is taken and the defective or even omitted averments are
supplied by competent proof, it would not be error for an appellate court to reject those
exceptions on appeal.9 Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have
influenced them to declare falsely against appellants; the Court sees no justification to thereby deny
faith and credit to their testimony. 13 The Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor General in
The issue is next posed: When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence
pointing out that —
fails to support the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately
convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United
States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an 1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained at the Naga City
accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee in order to buy viand outside. It was while he was
despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused guilty of the other charge. emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted by appellants Santiano and Sandigan.

Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act 2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first dragged to the
7659, 11 reads: NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This circumstance indicated the intention to deprive him of
his liberty for sometime, an essential element of the crime of kidnapping.
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another; or in any other manner deprive him of his 3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as indicated in the
liberty, shall suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death; autopsy report, thus, belying appellants' claim that none of the circumstances in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code was present.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening of December 27, 1993 with appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim was found dead. 14

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM" and appellant
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
Sandigan a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability for
kidnapping. 15 It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in
officer. fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with
their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention of the
if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants themselves, in fact,
of the offense. all deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus been found to be wanting by
the trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the death of the victim, the Court is
conviced that the court a quo did not err in making them account for kidnapping. The circumstances
The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private individual;
heretofore recited indicate the attendance of conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them
(b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) each liable for the offense.
that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical The claim of appellants that they cannot be held liable for indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) because the prosecution did not present evidence to prove damages is without merit. The indemnity
that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 12 awarded by the trial court clearly refers to the civil indemnity for the offense 16 and not for actual
damages sustained.
Prosecution witness William Rañola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held and
thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the SO ORDERED.
NARCOM office the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued to
102
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983 It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the
assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant. From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take
judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:
MAKASIAR, J.:

Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal
settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He
Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in
established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned
a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement:
then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby
Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in
voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.

Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the
of murder,
survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According to
the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside for
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
of P 12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P
2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represented by a private
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for
prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August
14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days
P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement was later
attorney's fees, the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon, approved the
to pay the costs (p. 48, rec.). same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in
favor of the company.
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:

On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia,
Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to the
were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had
place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination
Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the
on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which
place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the company.
179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he
heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24,
getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, 1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the
saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around
over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The
deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant second house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs.
apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from his former residence to
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of
jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., and copra.
Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).

103
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them
leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims,
injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from
of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he criminal liability.
agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh.
9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised
the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until the
Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:
question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the
milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a
letter with the following tenor: First. Unlawful aggression;

You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
in which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February
21, 1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by
Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
(Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).

In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no
alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date. The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following
words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the deceased
Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229,
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being
pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing
expire on December 31, 1966. and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to
appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I took
the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month
132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
period, the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p.
2, supra).
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot,
Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting
towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that
bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the
if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis
concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with
supplied).
the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have
the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the
door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22, The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however,
1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts. that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they
did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning,
was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons,
the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being nailed
was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The rest of the strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons,
incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it
bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits). was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked just a few steps away, and
in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the sound of the
chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway
by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant- they were doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit'
appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.

Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted
defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his
Brief, p. 145, rec.). house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is no question,
therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was

104
actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
property rights. appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and
talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the
contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and
the highway? Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate
and imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to
resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of
award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties
could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August 22, 1968, Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
between the same parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).
subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970 dismissal also
carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28,
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or
1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on
defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his
the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with
shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was
premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient
whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs. provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no
provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by
the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case
was no provocation at all.
No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was
just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on January 21, 1970, thus:
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place
be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6,
because even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble.
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time, it was
not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear
up and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
Vol.6). appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held
earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is therefore
lacking.
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within
which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to
that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the
highway. aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the
assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation
where the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:

WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez,
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and Company, which
action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
may be summarized as follows:
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should
drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing,
he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the
Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs.
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil
Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told
Code of the Philippines).
him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto
Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be

105
nobody who will break his head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World
Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle threats Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the
designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2). gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually
provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in
the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident
to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez,
premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation
was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of evidence linking her
to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent
to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31,
must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs.
1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of
Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused premeditated the killing;
Criminal Case No. 1815).
that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there was sufficient interval between the
premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the
act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70). Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its
extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the
resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its land
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer,
accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to
neutralizes his credibility.
take advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big
landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his family
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as
to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision
correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced
destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting. by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and
not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of
proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.

WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO


Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant
(2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING
bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY
closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR
at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had
THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT
thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate
plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be credited with this mitigating
circumstance. CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS
IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any
qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of SO ORDERED.
sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant
to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that the
majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two
degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced
by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance.

106
G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013 the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores
was no longer in sight.5
SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,
vs. Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and
children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him. 6
DECISION
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took place,
anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then attending to
MENDOZA, J.:
his problem regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation with his
father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace.7
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the August 2 7, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some members of
Case No. 16946, finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his father talking to each other
of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
from a distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right shoulder.
Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the hurt to have lost his father.8
Sandiganbayan which reads:
Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when she saw
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the terrace, her husband was
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a public already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she and her children
officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in the performance of rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 9
his official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle,
As a consequence of her husband’s untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified that Jesus had
thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, which caused his
an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) before he died at the age of forty-one
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.
(41). He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual damages consisting of
lawyer’s fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00)
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) for the funeral expenses.10

During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial. Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the
Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of the cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought to
visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and him.11
Dr. Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus
Avenido (Jesus).
Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the different
parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companion-members of the rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left
Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo; and Dr. Rene buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim
Bagamasbad, resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital. died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.

The Version of the Prosecution The Version of the Defense

On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.
Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of
Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 o’clock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors only at
Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU and
around 11:00 o’clock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a
Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo
problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was
Alquizar, upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, conducted a ronda in
ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle.4
Barangay San Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta. 13

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the terrace.
At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them
After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace, Duran focused his attention
for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house. Flores asked
back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the table. Right after
the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the shooting practice for the
fiesta celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the house, he was stopped by Latayan
107
and handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap
weapon over his right shoulder, with its barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:
that such posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus. 14
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is considered
Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with four pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this
others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as it Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
was already late at night and to save their shots for the following day’s fiesta procession. Flores claimed
that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay
SO ORDERED.21
chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and
his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and approached
Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the Sandiganbayan committed
reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence. Specifically,
him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked
Flores raises the following
it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus’ right hand,
which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder. 15
ISSUES
With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was able to
instinctively take hold of Jesus’ right hand, which was holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired (I)
his gun, hitting Flores’ left hand.16
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
Twice hit by bullets from Jesus’ magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores, with DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling on his
right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the
floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut groves, bleeding and utterly (II)
bewildered over the unfortunate incident that just transpired between him and his cousin Jesus, he heard
more gunshots. Thus, he continued running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow. He WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT
proceeded to the Mayor’s house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
happened. There, he found his ronda groupmates.17
(III)
The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN
Decision of the Sandiganbayan NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED22

On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed decision 18 finding The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.
Flores guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores’ claim that the shooting was
justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which resulted in his death. According to the Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere
Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and executory
no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads: the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the
evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case
as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate selfdefense on his
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the accused Simon A. part.
Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer the penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4 months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fifty Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido, another Fifty Thousand 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact,
Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) as actual or admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion
compensatory damages. which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is
not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.

SO ORDERED.19
Flores’ argument fails to persuade this Court.

Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration." 20 Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

108
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or misinterpretation
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of of the material facts nor was the defense able to adduce evidence to establish that the factual findings were
the motion. arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that
Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on
the ground.
Section 2, Rule 37 provides:

Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense. According
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be
to him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the entrance of Jesus’ terrace
made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the
merely advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the fiesta when Jesus approached him,
movant on the adverse party.
drew a magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was sudden, unexpected and instantaneous.
The intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun directly at him. As he tried to parry
xxxx Jesus’ hand, which was holding the gun, the latter kept firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use
the baby armalite he was carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on his part as he merely requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their shooting for
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal. the following day as it was already late at night and the neighbors were already asleep.

Section 4, Rule 121 states: In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of self-
defense interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses instead.
SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall
be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or His argument deserves scant consideration.
reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.

The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In appeals to this
As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121
Court, only questions of law may be raised and not issues of fact. The factual findings of the
should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this Court.28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no reason to disturb the
motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon finding of the Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of self-defense.
without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties
and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent." If the accused, however, admits killing the
This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear,
the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To
rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."24
the elements of that justifying circumstance.29

In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16
was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed
armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores,
by the Sandiganbayan. in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the killing was
legally justified under the circumstances.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other members of the First Division who rendered To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements
the assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying as they were not of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person
present during the trial.25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that led to
or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1)
wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction. unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
His contention is likewise devoid of merit.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense, whether
"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat
discretion in the factual findings reached by him."26 to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively
showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger––not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real
"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three Justices and immediate threat to one’s life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression
each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and warranting self-defense."32
ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote."27

109
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with
common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind."34
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
value of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove that Flores
testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility, to was shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan:
wit:
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the same is in the
First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from nature of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbad’s testimony was a mere re-statement of what appeared as
a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he admitted to possess no personal knowledge.
any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accused’s The photocopy of the logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value since it was not established by
shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried to the defense that such evidence falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130, which
make it appear later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones pertain to the rules on the admissibility of evidence.35 x x x
located in that area of his shoulder.
Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the same ceased
Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the perceived threat
anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder at the to Flores’ life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus’ abdomen
time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the preliminary investigation when and buttocks.
it was crucial to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for trial
before finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply stretches credulity.
Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim of self-
defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the different parts of
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder, the his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on
accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital. Such the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks
valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during the to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. According to Dr.
preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter lack of Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal
interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores’ claim that he merely acted in
against the veracity of his version of the incident. self-defense, his first shot on Jesus’ shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the ground, would
have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But Flores continued shooting
Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the Court finds it difficult to
Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such as a
believe that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this regard that the
bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area
location and presence of several wounds on the body of the victim provide physical evidence that
around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 o’clock midnight
eloquently refutes allegations of self-defense."37
when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were
treated, the blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even
definitively shown to be human blood. "When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the
original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original
aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at 11:00 o’clock
injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still
in the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence,
existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. 39
it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense
witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused.
Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
policeman.1âwphi1 In addition, the latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident
happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot
x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about two to three
the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We find it
inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could not have taken place when accused and his
much less acceptable to believe how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled
victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered through the medial portion of the
the gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.
victim's buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the left
hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen. The respective
Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the armalite trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and
rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience handling, while his right Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the ground.
shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted) Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making him fall to
the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that unlawful aggression initially existed, the same had
effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground. There was no more reason for the
The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores’ credibility and reliability, his story being contrary to
accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and continue shooting at the victim. 40 (Emphasis in
ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only
the original)
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to

110
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent
of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.41 In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot wounds were
not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter was
already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. Nos. 109614-15 March 29, 1996 Marcelo was able to run out of the house but Adronico ran after and overtook him. Adronico then hacked
him again. When Ricardo followed the two, the visitors attending the wake scampered out of the house
(TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 44-56; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 66-77).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADRONICO GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO, defendants-appellants. Later, Romeo Catorse together with his sister and younger brother returned to the house of Adronico where
they found their father lying prostrate and dead. Nobody was around. Later on, the family of Jovito
Nicavera arrived and brought the latter to a hospital in Bacolod (TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 8-10).
KAPUNAN, J.:p

Around 9:00 o'clock of the same morning of May 8, 1987, police authorities arrived at Adronico's place to
The instant appeal seeks the reversal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
investigate the killing incident. The bodies of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo were found inside the house
Branch 43, rendered on April 20, 1992, in Criminal Cases Nos. 428 and 6307 finding both appellants
and at the yard of Adronico, respectively (TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 76-78). The investigation
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
revealed that appellants Adronico and Ricardo fled to Sitio Anangge, Barangay Buenavista, Murcia,
Negros Occidental, about 4 kilometers away from the situs of the crime. The authorities pursued and
The facts of the case as established by the evidence for the prosecution are faithfully summarized in the succeeded in apprehending the appellants. Appellants were thereafter brought and investigated at Murcia
People's brief, to wit: Police Headquarters (TSN, April 5, 1991, pp. 9-10).

Around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his fifteen year old son The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims reveals that Carlos Catorse sustained twelve
Romeo Catorse arrived at the house (the house is composed of two storeys) of appellant Adronico hack and four stab wounds while Marcelo Lo sustained six hack wounds. Both victims died of cardio
Gregorio at Sitio Bug-as, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the wake of the latter's respiratory arrest due to multiple wounds (Exhibits "A", "B", "C" & "D"). 1
grandson (TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 3-4).
Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed against Adronico Gregorio and
When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake. Jovito Nicavera, Marcelo Ricardo Gregorio before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch LXII, Bago City. The
Lo and Adronico were conversing downstairs while upstairs, some were playing "pusoy" (russian poker), indictment, docketed as Criminal Case No. 428, reads:
among them were Jerry Nicavera, Renato Calalas, "Tunggak", (son of Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio
(brother and co-appellant of Adronico). Kibitzing and at times betting in the game were John Villarosa,
That on or about the 8th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental,
Remolito Calalas, Carmelo Alubaga and Crispin Calalas (I.D., pp. 5; TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 12-13).
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
"samurai" and a bolo, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
possession for safekeeping so as to avoid trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos Catorse handed over his feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one, CARLOS CATORSE y APELYEDO thereby inflicting
"samurai", John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to Adronico (TSN, May 30, 1989, multiple stab and hack wounds upon the body of the latter, which caused the death of said victim.
pp. 16-19; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 22-23).
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the game of "pusoy" was still in progress,
appellant Ricardo, in a very loud voice, reprimanded "Tunggak" from (sic) peeping at the cards of other
Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of "not guilty." 3
players. In response, "Tunggak" stood up and also in a very loud voice ordered the game stopped (TSN,
May 30, 1989, pp. 25-27; TSN, November 14, 1987, pp. 45-50).
Another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo was instituted against Adronico Gregorio, this time,
before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 43, Bacolod City. Docketed as Criminal
Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered Tunggak downstairs and right there and then, Adronico
Case No. 6307, the accusatory portion of the information reads:
scolded and boxed him (Tunggak) several times (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 27-30; TSN, November 14,
1989, pp. 51-55).
That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
While Adronico was severely beating Tunggak, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill,
further hurting his son so as not to put him to shame before the crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
the matter between the father and son when suddenly appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from
and feloniously attack, assault and hack one MARCELO LO y NICAVERA,
behind with a "samurai" (the same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and thereafter hacked and
thereby inflicting multiple injuries upon the body of the latter which caused the
stabbed him several times more in different parts of his body. Right after Carlos fell to the ground,
death of the said victim.
Adronico, for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim with a bolo. (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 30-31;
November 14, 1989, pp. 57-65).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Terrified, Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house. Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out
of the house but Adronico hacked him instead with a bolo hitting his left shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to On arraignment, Adronico Gregorio entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.5
help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo, with the same "samurai" used against Carlos hacked him on his forearm.
Adronico immediately followed and using a bolo hacked Marcelo on the nape. Although wounded,
112
Later, the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, However, before the Office of the Solicitor General could file its Appellee's Brief, appellant Ricardo
Bacolod City, Branch 43. Gregorio died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his criminal liability as well as his civil liability
based solely thereon is extinguished.8 Evidently, this appeal will proceed only with respect to appellant
Adronico Gregorio.
On April 20, 1992 as aforestated, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
After a careful perusal and evaluation of the case, this Court is not inclined to disturb the findings and
conclusion of the court below, there being no cogent reason therefor. For, aside from the well-settled rule
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds the two (2) accused Adronico Gregorio
that the factual findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
and Ricardo Gregorio "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt as principals of having committed the crime of
witnesses and assess their credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect,9 there appears to be no
Murder in Crim. Case No. 428 and hereby sentences each to life imprisonment and to solidarily indemnify
strong reason to depart from the said doctrine since the decision is fully supported by the evidence on
the heirs of Carlos Catorse the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary
record.
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
In Crim. Case No. 6307 (2292) (sic) the Court finds the same Adronico Gregorio "GUILTY" beyond
However, the trial court, skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same, reasoning that appellant failed to
reasonable doubt of having committed Murder and hereby sentences him to another life imprisonment and
establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. We agree. In numerous cases decided by this
to indemnify the heirs of Marcelo Lo the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no
Court, the guiding jurisprudential principle has always been that when an accused invokes the justifying
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove the elements of that claim;
otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable.10Concomitantly, he must rely on the
Further, the two (2) accused shall be credited with the full term of their preventive confinement. strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.11Having admitted the killing,
appellant has to justify his taking of a life by the exacting standards of the law.
No cost.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
6 unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
SO ORDERED. reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.12
Hence, this appeal.
In the case at bench, appellant's claim of self-defense must fail. For one, the physical evidence tells us a
In their brief, appellants raised the following errors, to wit: different story. Dr. Emmanuel Boado, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers
of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo, submitted the following post-mortem reports and attested to the
veracity and authenticity of the same, thus:
I

Cadaver of Carlos Catorse:


THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND IN
DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE. EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

II 1. Hack wound 5 inches long, left temporal going backward with chip fractured (sic)
of the skull.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANTS'
DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE. 2. Hack wound 8 inches long, from the base of the left Nose going backward below
the left ear.
III
3. Hack wound 7 inches long, neck left side going backward with complete chip
fractured (sic) of the fourth vertebrae cutting blood vessels.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST
CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
4. Stab wound 2 inches wide, 4 inches deep anterior abdomen, below the 10th rib,
left side.
IV

5. Stab wound 1 1/2 inches wide, 4 inches deep at the side of the navel left.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.7
6. Hack wound, base of the palm, 3 inches long posterior side, cutting bones.

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7. Hack wound, cutting left small finger. 4. Hack wound 6 inches long, with chip fracture of the Vertebrae bones.

8. Hack wound, 3 inches long upper 3rd right forearm running anteroposteriorly, 5. Hack wound 4 inches long cutting the 1st thoracic rib; scapular bones.
chip fracture of bones.
6. Hack wound 4 inches long, below the left scapular bones, cutting ribs.
9. Hack wound left shoulder back 4 inches long going downward with chip fracture
of the shoulder joint.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:

10. Hack wound 5 inches long posteriorly left joint with chip fracture of the bones.
1. Cerebral Hemorrhage, Massive

11. Hack wound 3 inches long posteriorly forearm below the elbow joint chip
2. Thoracic Hemorrhage, Massive
fracture of the bones.

CAUSE OF DEATH:
12. Hack wound 3 inches long middle 3rd forearm, posterior surface, with chip
fracture of the bones.
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to multiple hack wounds. 14
13. Stab wound 4 inches wide left back level of the 11th embracio rib, back side
through and through of the level of 12th rib right. If Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo merely to defend
themselves, it certainly defies reason why they had to inflict sixteen stab wounds on Carlos and six on
Marcelo. The location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victims belie the appellant's
14. Hack wound 2 1/2 inches long with chip fracture of the 11th lobar vertebrae.
contention that they acted in self-defense.15 The rule is settled that the nature and extent of the wounds
inflicted on a victim negate an accused's claim of self-defense.16
15. Hack wound middle right arm posterior side 4 inches long with chip fracture of
bone.
The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of accused Ricardo Gregorio
and appellant Adronico Gregorio. Ricardo Gregorio testified that at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
16. Stab wound 1 inch wide hitting the vertebral bones, 5th thoracic vertebrae. May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse suddenly kicked, from the outside, the front door of the house of Adronico,
then ran towards Eduardo (nephew of Ricardo) and boxed the latter; that he intervened to pacify Carlos but
the latter drew his "samurai" and attempted to attack him and Eduardo; that he grappled for possession of
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
the "samurai" and was able to turn its point back to Carlos who was hit in the stomach and then fell on the
ground; and thereafter he left the victim, then went home. 17
1. Stab wound, liver, large intestine, small intestine.
On his part, appellant Adronico Gregorio declared that at the same time his son, Eduardo, and brother,
2. Massive abdominal bleeding. Ricardo, were being attacked by Carlos, he was in the kitchen preparing food for the people attending the
wake of his grandson; that suddenly Marcelo Lo and Jovito Nicavera destroyed the bamboo walls of his
kitchen, entered threat and assaulted him; that Marcelo attacked him with a bolo but he was able to parry
CAUSE OF DEATH:
the latter's hand and the bolo instead landed and struck the wooden rail of the kitchen sink; that Jovito in
turn pointed a gun at him but without wasting time, he dislodged the bolo from the wooden rail of the sink
Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to Multiple hack and Stab wounds. 13 and slashed Jovito's hand; that because of the injury sustained, Jovito dropped the gun and ran out of the
house; that he turned to Marcelo and struck him with a bolo until the latter fell outside of the kitchen; and
that he never knew what happened next to Marcelo until the following morning when he learned that the
Cadaver of Marcelo Lo: latter died.18

EXTERNAL FINDINGS: Not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are innately false and fatuous.

1. Hack wound 6 inches long left temporal area going occiput, chip fracture skull. By making said allegations, appellant and deceased accused would want to impress upon this Court that
both were able to inflict only a single stab wound on deceased Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo. Curiously,
2. Hack wound, left face going backward base of the skull, brain tissue coming out, however, none of their empty claims could explain the physical evidence and findings of the autopsy
with chip fracture of the skull. reports that Carlos Catorse sustained a total of 16 hack and stab wounds while Marcelo Lo, 6 mortal hack
wounds. 19 Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were unanimous in their declaration that it was the
appellant and his brother Ricardo who started the skirmish. There was no unlawful aggression on the part
3. Hack wound, right 4 inches long right back cutting the scapular bones. of Carlos Catorse who only wanted to help pacify Adronico nor on Marcelo Lo's part, who was only trying

114
to flee from the melee when he was attacked and hacked to death. Likewise extant from the records is the Indeed, the use against Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo of the "samurai" and "bolo", both deadly weapons,
absence of any act on the part of the victims giving sufficient provocation for the attack. the traitorous manner in which they were assaulted, and the number of wounds inflicted on them, all
demonstrate a deliberate, determined assault with intent to kill. Appellant is guilty of murder.
Likewise telling is the fact that appellant and his brother fled from their homes soon after the incident
instead of reporting the matter to the police. Their flight negates self-defense and indicates guilt.20 As we Some last notes. The fallo of the assailed decision sentences the appellant to suffer the penalty of "life
have repeatedly held, flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience, the same strongly indicates a guilty imprisonment" and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P30,000.00 each.
mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.21 The correct penalty, however, should be reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. As we have held time and again, life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are different and
distinct from each other. In People v. Ruelan,32 we outlined the distinction thusly:
Appellant also challenges the court a quo's finding that there was conspiracy between his and his brother
Ricardo. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.22 However, direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy,23 as it As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of life
maybe deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts imprisonment for the crime of murder. Evidently, the said court failed to appreciate the substantial
of the accused.24 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a difference between Reclusion Perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and Life Imprisonment when
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and imposed as a penalty by special law. These two penalties are different and distinct from each other. Hence,
regardless of the fact, the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 25 we would like to reiterate our admonition in the case of People v. Penillos, likewise quoted under
Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 amending Administrative Circular No. 6-92 dated October 12, 1992
re: the correct application of the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:
In the case at bench, although there is no proof as to a previous agreement by the assailants to commit the
crime charged, conspiracy is evident from the manner of its perpetration. 26 After Ricardo lunged at Carlos
with a samurai from behind several times, Adronico attacked him in turn with a bolo. Likewise, appellants As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of
successively hacked Marcelo using the weapons they used against Carlos. The incident happened in split "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of
seconds, so to speak. Under the circumstances, it is evident that Adronico and Ricardo acted in unison and the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People
cooperated with each other towards the accomplishment of a common felonious objective. In People v. Baguio, this Court held:
v. Regalario 27 cited in People v. Lopez,28 we held:
The Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that
An indicium of conspiracy is when the acts of the accused are aimed at the same object, one performing penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by
one part and another performing another part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The evidence need not disqualification, etc. It is not the same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not "carry with it
establish the actual agreement which shows the pre-conceived plan, motive, interest, or purpose in the any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."
commission of the crime; conspiracy is shown by the coordinated acts of the assailants. 29
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones, and in the concurring opinion of
Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Adronico and Ricardo, and it was not necessary to Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua, is
prove a previous agreement to commit the crime since from their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction
concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design or common goal which was to kill the victims.30 and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other. 33

We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may be appreciated Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court and pursuant to People v. Sison,34 the civil
against the appellants. Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, indemnity for the death of a victim is increased to P50,000.00. Consequently, the heirs of Carlos Catorse
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure its and Marcelo Lo are entitled to P50,000.00 each.
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 31 In this
case, it was clearly established that Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind, and repeatedly hacked
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that appellant Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty
him in different parts of his body, with a "samurai." As Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico followed suit,
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000.00
repeatedly hacking the victim with a bolo. Though the assault upon Marcelo was preceded by appellants'
each, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. As aforestated, the death of
assault upon Carlos and Jovito, the incident happened in a span of seconds only. Terrified by what he
Ricardo Gregorio extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising from said crime.
witnessed, Jovito Nicavera tried to run out of the house but Adronico hacked him instead. Instinctively,
Marcelo Lo came to help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo followed by Adronico hacked him using the same
samurai and bolo they used against Carlos. Defenseless and severely wounded Marcelo tried to run but SO ORDERED.
Adronico finished him off by more mortal hacks. From all indications; the mode of attack adopted by the
appellant and his brother qualifies the killing to murder as the same rendered the victims who were
unarmed at that time defenseless and helpless, without any opportunity to defend themselves from their
assailants' unreasonable and unexpected assault. The attack was sudden and was specially employed by the
assailants to insure the execution of the said crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990
which the victims might make.

115
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like way of
vs. dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble. Its president, called the "alas" king,
LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN, accused-appellants. was Luis Toring. The group was then outside the dancing area which was ringed by benches.

FERNAN, C.J.: At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks
having been served the parents of the candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel Association which
took charge of the affair, Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's proclamation, he stepped out of the
The appellants herein seek the reversal of the October 28, 1980 decision of the Circuit Criminal Court in
dancing area to answer the call of nature.
Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2170, the dispositive portion of which reads:

At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Luis B. Toring guilty beyond
proceed to a dark area while whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to Luis
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER by direct participation as principal;
Toring, 2 who then approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left hand, and with
Diosdado Berdon as accomplice thereto; and Carmelo Berdin as accessory after the
his right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. 3 Upon seeing Felix running
fact.
towards them, Luis Toring pulled out the knife and, together with Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon,
ran towards the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was not able to catch them. He returned to where
Appreciating in favor of the accused Luis B. Toring the mitigating circumstance of Samuel had slumped and helped others in taking Samuel to the hospital.
voluntary surrender, the said circumstance having been offset by the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, the accused Luis Toring should be, as he is, hereby
According to Maria Catalina Sorono, who was six (6) meters away from Samuel and Luis when the assault
sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties
occurred, Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin were poised to deliver fist blows on Samuel just before
of law.
Luis Toring stabbed him. Diosdado gave the knife to Luis Toring. 4

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances on the part of the
As soon as she saw the stabbing of Samuel, Maria Catalina shouted for help. The three assailants ran
accused Diosdado Berdon, the said accused should as he is hereby sentenced to the
towards the direction of the fields. Jacinto Lobas and Mario Andog responded to her shouts and brought
indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional, as
Samuel to the Opon Emergency Hospital where he died on arrival. According to the necropsy
minimum, to TWELVE (12) and ONE (1) DAY of ReclusionTemporal, as
report, 5 Samuel, who was thirty years old, died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law.
on the abdomen. Said wound is described in the report as follows:

Appreciating in favor of the accused Carmelo Berdin, the privileged mitigating


Stab wound, with herniation of omental issues; elliptical, 3.5 cms. long, running
circumstance of minority, the said accused being only 17 years of age, the accused
vertically downward, edges clean-cut, superior extremity rounded, inferior extremity
Carmelo Berdin should be, as he is, sentenced to the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
sharp, located at the abdominal region, right anterior aspect, 7.5 cms. to the right of
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law.
anterior median line and 107.0 cms. above right heel, directed backward, upward
and medially, involving skin and the underlying soft tissues, penetrating right
The defendants shall jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased peritoneal cavity, incising inferior vena cava, attaining an approximate depth of 15.0
Samuel Augusto for actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P15,000.00 cms.
and for moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle, was recovered
from the house of Luis Toring. According to Patrolman Pantaleon P. Amodia, the police found out during
The instrument of the crime, the knife, Exhibit "B", is confiscated in favor of the the investigation that Luis Toring had left the weapon with "Camilo" Berdin. When the police confronted
government. Berdin, the latter led them to the house of Toring which Berdin entered. When he emerged from the house,
Berdin handed the weapon to the police. 6
Proportionate costs.
An information for murder was filed against Toring. Subsequently, however, the information was amended
1 to include Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin as defendants. The three were charged therein with
SO ORDERED.
conspiracy in killing Samuel Augusto in a treacherous manner. Berdon, it was alleged, "conveniently
supplied the death weapon" which Toring used in stabbing Samuel while Berdin allegedly concealed the
According to the prosecution, the antecedent facts are as follows: weapon to prevent its discovery by the police. 7 The crime was purportedly committed with the attendance
of the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime.
In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the
last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As one of the All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. At the trial, Luis Toring, alias "Lowe,"
candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members of his family attended the affair. testified that he was not the president of the kwaknit gang. He went to the benefit dance in the company of
Venir Ybañez, Joel Escobia, Ely Amion, Abel Pongase, Abe Berdon, Genio Berdin and Alex Augusta.
Toring and his group were standing outside the dancing area when, at around eleven o'clock in the
evening, Samuel, a known tough guy ("maldito"), approached them and held Venir Ybanez by his collar.

116
Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of Joel Escobia, 8 proceeded to another group who It noted that while Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon
were also gangmates of Toring, and again, with the barrel of his shotgun, hit Eli Amion's chest several (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts
times. 9 with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in appreciating
the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the identity of
the stranger defended by the accused." 22
Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached Samuel
from the latter's right side and stabbed him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel. Toring then ran
towards the dark portion of the area and went home. There, he left the knife and proceeded to the hut by The lower court, however, ruled out the existence of conspiracy among the three accused on the ground
the fishpond of one Roman. 10 that there was no proof on what they were whispering about when Felix saw them. Accordingly, it held
that the accused have individual or separate liabilities for the killing of Samuel: Toring, as a principal,
Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice by his act of giving Toring the knife, and Carmelo Berdin as an
Toring was sleeping in the hut with his older brother, Arsenio, when, at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning
accessory for concealing the weapon. It considered treachery as the qualifying circumstance to the killing,
of May 26, 1980, Edgar Augusto, the younger brother of Samuel, shot them. Arsenio was hit on the left leg
found no proof as to allegation of evident premeditation but appreciated nighttime as an aggravating
and he stayed two months in the hospital for the treatment of his wound. 11
circumstance. It meted the accused the penalties mentioned above.

At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, 1980, Toring surrendered to two Philippine Constabulary
All three accused appealed.
soldiers.12 They brought him to the police of Lapu-lapu City on May 28, 1980.13 When the police asked
him about the knife he used in stabbing Samuel, Toring told them to go to Carmelo Berdin because he was
the only person who knew where Toring hid it. 14 Asserting that he was the one who returned the knife to Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in
his own house, Toring testified that Carmelo Berdin used to see him hide his weapons upstairs because defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia. Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides that no criminal
Berdin was a frequent visitor of his. 15 liability is incurred by anyone "who acts in defense of ... his relatives ... by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are
present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one
For his part, Carmelo, a 5 feet tall, asthmatic 17-year-old whom the court described as "lilliputian,"
making defense had no part therein." The first and second requisites referred to are enumerated in
admitted that he witnessed the stabbing incident but he ran away with his group immediately after because
paragraph (b) in the same article on selfdefense as: (a) unlawful aggression, and (b) lack of sufficient
he was afraid he might be shot by Samuel. He was with Toring when the latter hid the still bloodied knife
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
under a trunk in Toring's house. He was familiar with the hiding place of the knife because Toring showed
it to him and there were times when he would get the knife there upon Toring's request. Carmelo
corroborated Toring's testimony that on that fateful night, Toring carried the knife tucked at the back of his Joel Escobia, whose chin was hit with the butt of Samuel's shotgun, is the first cousin of Toring their
waistline. 16 fathers being brothers, 23 although no explanation appears on record why they have different surnames. At
any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution.
In court, Toring testified that he never saw Diosdado at the dance. 17 However, in his sworn statement
dated May 28, 1980 and marked as Exhibit D, Toring stated that he took the knife from Diosdado to stab The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in this case on the
Samuel. Confronted with said statement, Diosdado said that when he asked Toring why he implicated him, presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of Toring that Samuel
Toring allegedly replied that he "included" Diosdado because of the case the barangay brigade had filed was, at the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group must be proven.
against Toring. 18
Understandably, no prosecution witness attested that they saw Samuel with a firearm. The prosecution
According to Diosdado, he did not attend the May 25 dance because of the trouble which erupted during even recalled to the witness stand Samuel's widow who asserted that her husband did not own any
the dance the night before. He did not have anything to do with the stabbing of Samuel. He admitted, firearm. 24 Going along with the prosecution's evidence, the lower court arrived at the rather gratuitous
however, that a week after the incident, his family went to barrio Andaliw Ronda, Cebu, for their yearly conjecture that Samuel could not have had a shotgun with him because no one without a permit would
visit to his father-in-law. He stayed there for fifteen days and would have stayed longer had not his mother carry a firearm without risking arrest by the police or the barangay tanod. At the same time, however, the
informed him of the subpoena addressed to him. 19 lower court described Samuel as the son of the barangay captain who "had the run of the place and had his
compelling presence felt by all and " sundry." 25
On October 28, 1980, a day after the last day of hearing, the lower court 20 rendered a decision discrediting
Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger While matters dealing with the credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the
pursuant to Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court found that Toring was the lower court's province, this Court has the power to determine whether in the performance of its functions,
"aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by reason of a running feud or long-standing grudge" between the lower court overlooked certain matters which may have a substantial effect in the resolution of a
the kwaknit gang and the group of Samuel, who, being the son of the barangay captain, was a "power to be case. 26 Defense witness Joel Escobia was, besides Toring, the only witness whose sworn statement was
reckoned with." It mentioned the fact that a year before the incident in question, Toring was shot by Edgar taken by the police on May 26, 1980, the day after the fatal assault on Samuel.
Augusto (Samuel's brother) and hence, in his desire to avenge himself, Toring, "needed but a little excuse
to do away with the object of his hatred. 21
In his sworn statement, 27 Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him,
pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia and asked him, "Do
The lower court could not believe that Samuel brought along his shotgun to the dance because he was "not you like this, Dong?" to which Escobia replied, "No, Noy I do not like that." Samuel then placed the bullet
reputed to be a public official or functionary entitled to possess a firearm." Otherwise, the police and the in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at Escobia when Toring came from behind Samuel and stabbed the
barangay tanod would have arrested him. The court surmised that if Samuel really carried a shotgun, he latter. Even on cross-examination at the trial, Escobia did not depart from his statement. In fact he added
certainly must have had a permit or license to possess the same. that Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet. 28

117
There is no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression inasmuch as his With regards to Carmelo Berdin, his culpability as an accessory to the murder has not been proven beyond
sworn statement 29 and testimony in court had not been successfully discredited by the prosecution which reasonable doubt. The fact that he knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that he concealed it to
also failed to prove that Joel had reason to prevaricate to favor Toring. prevent its discovery (Article 19 [2]). There simply is no proof to that effect. On the contrary, Luis Toring
in his sworn statement and testimony during the trial testified that after stabbing the victim, he ran away
and went to his house to hide the murder weapon. Being a close friend of Toring and a frequent visitor to
The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the
the latter's house, it is not impossible for Carmelo Berdin to know where Toring hid his knives.
part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative.
Significantly, Carmelo readily acceded to the request of police officers to lead them to the place where
Toring himself admitted in court 30 as well as in his sworn statement 31 that in 1979, he was shot with a .22
Toring kept the knife. He willingly retrieved it and surrendered it to the police, a behavior we find
caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel,
inconsistent with guilt.
Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate
wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive 32 because
of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. As the defense itself claims, after the WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as
incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar principal in the murder of Samuel Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.
Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein
The lower court's decision is modified as follows:
to lawlessness.

(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
The lower court correctly considered the killing as murder in view of the presence of the qualifying
correccional maximum as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum as maximum;
circumstance of treachery. The suddenness of the assault rendered Samuel helpless even to use his
shotgun. We also agree with the lower court that conspiracy and evident premeditation were not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, nighttime cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
There is no proof that it was purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or prevent its mayorminimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
discovery. 33 However, Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of maximum;
incomplete defense of relative and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of Samuel Augusto, and
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion temporal maximum
to death, the imposable penalty is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of relative and voluntary surrender (Art. 64 (d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay the heirs of Samuel Augusto an
[5]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be meted on Toring indemnity of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). Costs against appellants Toring and Berdon.
is prision correctional maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as maximum penalty.
SO ORDERED.
On the culpability of Diosdado Berdon, the Court holds that his defense of alibi cannot be sustained in the
absence of proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. 34 His house was only a kilometer away from the place where he supplied the knife to
Toring. 35 That distance does not preclude the possibility that Diosdado aided Toring in the perpetration of
the crime as it could be negotiated in just a few minutes by merely walking. 36 Moreover, his alibi was
uncorroborated as it was founded only on his own testimony and what appears as a self-exonerating
affidavit. 37

But what pins culpability on Diosdado were the testimonies of at least two prosecution witnesses who
positively identified him as the one who gave Toring the knife. Motive, therefore, has become immaterial
in the face of such positive identification 38 and hence, even if it were true that he was not a member of the
kwaknit gang, his participation in the killing has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Added to this is
the fact that Toring himself in his sworn statement before the police pointed to him as the source of the
knife. 39 Verily, Toting could not have implicated him because of the incomprehensible reason that a case
had been filed against Toring before the barangay brigade.

Pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as an accomplice by his previous act of supplying
Toring the death weapon, Diosdado Berdon should be meted the penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporalmedium which is the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal maximum to
death, the penalty prescribed for murder by Article 248 (Article 6 [3]). There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be in its medium period or reclusion temporal minimum
(Article 64 [1]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from
prision mayor minimum while the maximum penalty should be within the period of reclusion temporal
minimum.

118
G.R. No. L-60159 November 6, 1989 The factual issue hinges on what transpired after the petitioner had wrested the gun from the deceased until
the two (2) shots were fired, which caused the death of Macaraig. The findings of respondent court on this
factual issue are to this effect:
P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The pivotal question is: Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first
aggression, i.e. when deceased shot accused on his knee and the time accused
resorted to force by way of firing the two shots at the deceased? The facts unfolded
PADILLA, J.:
indicate that there was. This is what happened after accused had grabbed the gun:
(1) He asked deceased, "Why did you fire at me?" (2) He even turned bis head
The petitioner, Fausto Andal, a member of the Batangas Integrated National Police, has appealed to this towards his son and instructed him just to stay in the jeep. (3) His son, Domingo
Court the decision * of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2521 which found him guilty of the crime Andal, challenged deceased to a fight "Sportsman like." (4) Deceased moved
of Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional; to indemnify backward — 2 meters away from accused. (5) Pfc. Quinio even thought the trouble
the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P20,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the was over as he started to get his tricycle. 1
costs.
The petitioner contends that after he had taken possession of' the gun from Macaraig, the latter tried to
In his petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his plea of self- grab the gun back and, in the scuffle, the gun went off twice, hitting the deceased. But, this claim was not
defense, on the ground that the initial unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased after the given credence by the respondent court which said:
petitioner had disarmed him.
The theory of the defense that the two shots were fired while accused and deceased
We find no merit in the petition for it raises only factual issues. The record of this case shows that the were grappling for the possession of the gun, is fictitious. When Pat. Perez heard the
herein petitioner, Fausto Andal, then a corporal in the Batangas Integrated National Police, whose duty two shots, deceased was "more or less" two meters from the accused (p 38, TSN
shift was from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 12:00 o'clock midnight, was on patrol aboard a tricycle sess. i.d.) This jibes with the testimony of Pat. Quinio that after accused had wrested
driven by Police Pfc. Casiano Quinio in the evening of 25 September 1980. At about 7:00 o'clock that the gun from deceased, the latter "somewhat backout" (p. 76, TSN sess. i.d.) More
night, he went to the pier located at Sta. Clara, Batangas City, to check on one of his men, Pfc. Maximo important, immediately after the two shots, accused was holding the gun with his
Macaraig, who was stationed there, because the said Macaraig had failed to report to police headquarters right hand and as demonstrated in Court, said "right hand stretched downward" (. p.
for briefing. 77, TSN sess. i.d.). This demonstration is given credence by corroborative physical
evidence. According to Dr. Luis Aclan who examined the body of deceased, the
trajectory of the bullet was downward (see Exh. "B-l") with the right armpit (No. 3)
Upon reaching the police checkpoint at the pier, and upon seeing Macaraig, petitioner asked Macaraig why
as the point of entrance and the back of the body the point of exit (No. 5). The other
he did not pass by police headquarters for briefing before proceeding to his post. Macaraig replied that he slug had its point of entrance at No. 2 in Exhibit "B-l." 2
did not have to report to police headquarters since he already had his orders. Sensing trouble, Quinio drove
away his tricycle. Macaraig, however, followed them and told the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka."
Petitioner kept his cool and did not say anything. But, Quinio went to Macaraig to pacify him. Thereafter, In its resolution, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision, the respondent court
petitioner and Quinio went back to the poblacion of Batangas City. also said:

At about 11:00 o'clock that night, petitioner and Quinio parked their vehicle in front of the Philbanking It cannot be correctly held, to quote the words of accused in his motion, that 'it was
Building at P. Burgos Street, Batangas City. Quinio alighted from the tricycle and joined Pat. Andres Perez precisely when the two protagonists were grappling for the possession of the gun
and Pat. Pedro Banaag who were seated on a bench. The petitioner also alighted from the tricycle and that the two shots were suddenly fired resulting to the fatal wounding of the
stood at the sidewalk near the bench. After a few minutes, Macaraig arrived and went straight to the deceased'. This would be contrary to the testimony of Pat. Perez, a witness whose
petitioner. He was furious this time and demanded why the petitioner had embarrassed him in front of so credibility the defense does not impugn. According to Pat. Perez, deceased was
many people. The petitioner denied the charge and called Quinio to clear up matters with Macaraig. Quinio 'more or less' two meters from the accused when he heard two gun shots.
told Macaraig that the petitioner did not utter defamatory words against him and asked him to forget the Immediately after they were fired, this witness looked at the direction where they
incident. ("Pasensiyahan na kayo, hindi kayo magkakaiba.") Macaraig did not say anything. But, he came from. He saw accused holding a gun with his right hand stretched downward.
returned to the petitioner and challenged him. Quinio again tried to pacify Macaraig and brought him Under such scenario with a distance of two meters apart and the hand of accused
across the street. Still, Macaraig refused to be pacified and went to the petitioner with a drawn gun in his holding the gun stretched downward — it is clear that deceased and accused were
hand. not grappling for the possession of the gun at the time the two shots were fired . 3

Pointing the gun menacingly at the petitioner, Macaraig said: "Bumunot ka bumunot ka." Petitioner, In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 7 of P.D. 1610 creating the
however, refused to fight, saying: "I cannot fight you because we are both policemen" Macaraig, Sandiganbayan, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions
nevertheless, fired his gun pointblank at the petitioner, hitting the latter in the middle aspect, lower right of law may be raised in the Supreme Court. 4
knee. Petitioner then lunged at Macaraig and they grappled for possession of the gun. Petitioner was able
to wrest the gun from Macaraig. Thereafter, two (2) successive shots were fired and Macaraig fell to the
Moreover, well settled is the rule that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the credibility of
ground. He was brought to the hospital but he was dead on arrival.
witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed, unless it has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, mights affect the result of the case. Herein

119
petitioner failed to demonstrate that his case falls under the exception which would justify this Court to against the defenseless person of the deceased. Thus, he exceeded the limits of his
overturn the findings of fact of the trial court, as heretofore cited and summarized thus — authority. 9

Stated briefly, the initial illegal aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion to [sic] the court in lowering
was disarmed by accused. By then, accused a taller and bigger man than deceased the penalty either by one or two degrees whenever incomplete justifying
had the upperhand. He was in possession of the gun of deceased while the latter was circumstance exists in a given case like the case at bar. The laudable patience of
unarmed. In fact, it was probably because of this circumstance that deceased moved accused in not retaliating despite repeated insults by a subordinate, his length of
backward. Aside from accused, his son who dared to fight deceased was there, not to service in the government (since 1957), and most important, his obsession to
say Pat. Perez and Quinio all under his supervision. Patently, there was no further inculcate discipline in his men, to OUR mind, entitle accused to a two-degree
threat to the life and limb of accused. reduction of the penalty prescribed by law. Our attitude is a signal to the men in
uniform that while WE condemn felonious violence WE support efforts to maintain
discipline in the service. 10
Absent the element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense complete (Art.
II, par. 1) or incomplete (Art. 13, par. 1, RPC). 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED. With costs.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised. The
primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And for unlawful aggression to be present,
there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case, there was no imminent and real SO ORDERED.
danger to the life or limb of the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had already been
disarmed. As former Chief Justice Aquino states in his book on Criminal Law:

In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the attack upon defendant be


simultaneous with the killing, or preceded the latter without an appreciable interval
of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),

xxx xxx xxx

The harm caused by one person to another who offended or caused him injury,
sometime after he suffered such offense or such injury, does not constitute an act of
self-defense, but an act of revenge. (Banzuela 31 Phil. 564). 6

In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (11) year of prision correccional, the respondent Court
held (which we here affirm):

In People vs. Oanis and Galanta (74 Phil. 257), the court set forth two requisites in
order that fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right 7 may be considered as
justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acting [sic] in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or in
the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is absent, accused is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of right or office. 8

xxx xxx xxx

It is evident that accused was acting in the performance of his duty as supervisor of
deceased and policemen when the events that led to the shooting occurred. His
attempt to discipline his men was resented by deceased who was one of them. Such
attitude did not diminish with the passage of hours; instead, deceased's rage
heightened to violence. He not merely uttered verbal insults to his superior but
actually drew his gun and shot him. Fortunately, the latter overpowered deceased.
Unfortunately, accused did not stop at that point. He used unnecessary violence

120
G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000 prejudice of the said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount aforementioned and in such
other amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner,
vs. CONTRARY TO LAW.1
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly worded as in Criminal Case
QUISUMBING, J.: No. Q-91-25910, except for the dates, and check numbers2 were consolidated and jointly tried.

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial then proceeded.
No. 15993, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:
Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24, 1989, at the office of the
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation delivered to private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks
(FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite. (among a number of other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay to the order of FRC and
against Francisco's account no. 845515 with Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October
30, 1990 (Exh. C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check No. 813518
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks,
dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516 dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F),
each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
Check No. 813517 dated January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30,
1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of house and lot subject of the written contract executed and entered into by and between FRC as
the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial seller and Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 1989 (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total
notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with stipulated purchase price for the house and lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC
the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board in the sum of P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committing himself
(HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum
dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its already includes interest on successive monthly balance) effective September 30, 1989 and on
townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects. the 30th day of each month thereafter until the stipulated purchase price is paid in full. The said
six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawn, issued, and delivered by
Francisco in favor of FRC as and in partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in
under their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September 1989, the Building
its possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject house — a residential townhouse — was
postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to issued (Exh. N) and Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy of the
avoid paying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to
subject house and lot.1âwphi1.nêt
the closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a
complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to the Citibank for payment on
their respective due dates, they were all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason:
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six account closed as indicated in the drawee bank's stamped notations on the face and back of each
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation check; in fact, as indicated in the corresponding record of Francisco's account no. 815515 with
of B.P. Blg. 22.
Citibank, said account already had a zero balance as early as September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5).
Notwithstanding the fact that FRC, first thru its executive vice president and project manager
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910 reads: and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and in writing, of the checks'
dishonor and demanded from him the payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not
pay or make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K). . . 3
That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a check 813514 The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as
drawn against Citibank, a duly established domestic banking institution in the amount of follows:
P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30, 1990 in payment of an obligation,
knowing fully well at the time of issue that she/he did not have any funds in the drawee bank of
The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking possession and starting in the use
(sic) the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment, and occupancy of the subject townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various
the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. construction defects; that he called the attention of FRC, thru its project manager, requesting
did not have any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and
that appropriate measures be forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not
refused and still fails and refused (sic) to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and
121
acknowledge, much less attend to them; that Francisco thus mailed to FRC a verified letter I
dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum giving notice that effective June 1990, he will cease and
desist "from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of
COURT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY
Unit No. 14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your Office satisfactorily
JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT OF THE
complete(s) the construction, renovation and/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to
SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.
above" and that should FRC "persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5)
days from your receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the [HLURB] for Declaratory
Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief from my obligation to pay my monthly II
amortization to your good Office and allow me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB]
pending your completion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question"; that Francisco thru counsel
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST
wrote FRC, its president, and its counsel notices/letters in sum to the effect that Francisco and
all other complainants in the [HLURB] case against FRC shall cease and desist from paying BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE
their monthly amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.
their units in accordance with the plans and specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURB]
and as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the dishonor of the subject checks was a III
natural consequence of such suspension of payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or
deposit all other postdated checks issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still in
FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that Francisco and the other complainants filed the THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
[HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision was handed down therein and the same is COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS
pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS UPON
presentation of the subject checks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at least PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.
P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco closed his
account no. 845515 with Citibank conformably with the bank's customer service officer's IV
advice to close his said account instead of making a stop-payment order for each of his more
than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's possession at the time, so as to avoid the P600.00-
penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject of a stop-payment order.4 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.7
On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of
the six cases, disposing as follows:
The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-
25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915, the Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
he is hereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay considering that he had cause to stop payment of the checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that
the costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party, Francel Realty under P.D. No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization payments,
Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total sum of fifty-five thousand eight hundred should the subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project in accordance
twenty four pesos (P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of with duly-approved plans and specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of
commencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until full payment thereof. private complainant's townhouse project were incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to
suspend payments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.

SO ORDERED.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22,
the intent and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a worthless check are immaterial. 8 The gravamen
Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR of the offense charged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
No. 15993. But on February 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled: upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. In his view, P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense
On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold that appellant has no basis to against the charges against him.
rely on the provision of PD 957 to justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his
checking account and the notices sent by him to private complainant that he will stop paying his Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), 9 an offense is committed when the
monthly amortizations.6 following elements are present:

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was denied per Resolution dated (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
April 22, 1996.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

122
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have legislature. 20 Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its of legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21 More so, when it will
presentment; and mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due effect.

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such time
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. 22 This exercise of a statutory right to
to stop payment. 10 suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. Blg.
22 that petitioner is charged with.
In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other
units of the subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a
valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequent dishonor
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's
of the check. . . without valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As already stated,
issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment.
the prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that
B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first
presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating the third
and third elements of the offense are present. 11 But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or
element of the crime.1âwphi1
contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. 12 As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed
from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." 13But such presumption cannot hold if there is Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal
evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law. 23 We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which
presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not would prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 of the Revised
merely rely on a rebuttable presumption. Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense
to the charges against him.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date
indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of
only then. 14 The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the
1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for
encashment. 15 On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the
SO ORDERED.
checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.

As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank was
not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty
bank charges each time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated
checks in private respondent's possession. 16 Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time said checks
were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit would be
insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment. He could not have foreseen that he would
be advised by his own bank in the future, to close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that
came with each "stop payment" order issued to prevent private respondent from encashing the 30 or so
checks in its possession. What the prosecution has established is the closure of petitioner's checking
account. But this does not suffice to prove the second element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which
explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or
checks are presented for encashment.

To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to
misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element
of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law,
the punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute. 17

While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 it is difficult to see how
conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection
must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19 A statute must be construed
in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the

123
G.R. No. 105002 July 17, 1997 The prosecution sought to establish that on March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon, Matungao, Lanao del Norte,
appellant, armed with a Garand rifle like his four (4) other companions, fired the fatal shots which caused
the death of Abubakar Alamat, also known as "Abubakar Pangalamatan."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIARANGAN DANSAL, accused-appellant. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Cosain Dowa, Dr. Marilyn Rico, Amina Oticol, Panda
Antalo and Timal Mosa. Their testimonies may be synthesized as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Panda Antalo testified that at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 2, 1990 in Matungao, Lanao del
Norte, he and Timal Mosa were walking through a barrio road on their way to see Mayor Asis.6 They saw
Appellant claims that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Because he admits in effect
Abubakar Alamat, the victim, conversing with five (5) persons, one of whom was appellant. However,
the commission of a punishable act, he must prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing
Antalo did not recognize appellant's companions. When he and Mosa were five (5) meters away from the
evidence.
group, he heard gunshots. He turned his head and noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's rifle
and empty shells were falling therefrom. The Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were pointed
Statement of the Case at the victim who was lying on the ground face upwards. Seven (7) shots were fired. At that time Antalo
was "immobile as he was frightened." Thus, he was unable to run and take cover. After appellant and his
companions ran towards the coffee plantation, Antalo approached the victim and discovered that the latter
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 1990 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan had sustained seven (7) wounds.7
City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case No. 3141 convicting Appellant Diarangan Dansal of the crime of murder.

Timal Mosa corroborated Antalo's account. He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo
A complaint against appellant was filed on March 28, 1990 by INP3 Station Commander Cabsaran C. Azis were on their way to Mayor Asis' house in Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and
of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. After preliminary investigation, Provincial Prosecutor IV Felix Fajardo four (4) other persons talking to one another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When he turned to
charged appellant with murder on September 7, 1990 in an Information which reads: 4 look, he noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's gun and that empty shells were dropping from it
as appellant continued to fire at the victim. Appellant's rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1990, at Matungao, Lanao del Norte, the ground. He heard seven (7) gunshots. Appellant's companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named concluded that these were not fired because he did not notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with 4 John frightened. Neither did he take cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the
Does, who are still at large and whose case is still pending in the lower court, with victim, appellant together with his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis' coffee plantation. He and
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and with Antalo approached the victim, whom they found already dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the
intent to kill, did then & there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault victim's wife.8
and shoot one Abubacar Pagalamatan with a Garand rifle thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his Cosain Dowa, a Rural Sanitarium Inspector of the Health Office of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, testified
death thereafter.
that on March 5, 1990 he prepared the victim's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A"). Although his main duty
was to inspect food establishments, construct barangay toilets, and assist in watershed constructions in the
Upon arraignment, appellant with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded nor guilty. In due course, the municipality, he also helped the health officer in the preparation of death certificates. 9 When the body of
trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:5 the victim was brought in, he observed gunshot wounds on his right foot, right thigh and right breast. The
right knee was distorted. There was a bullet hole at the victim's back which he believed was the entry point
leading to the gaping wound on the breast. 10
WHEREFORE, finding accused DIARANGAN DANSAL guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dr. Marilyn Rico testified that she was the Rural Health Officer of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She signed
Abubakar Alamat, also known as Abubakar Pagalamatan the amount of P30,000.00, Abubakar Alamat's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A-2") 11 which was prepared by Dowa.
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Amina Oticol, the widow of the victim, testified that, around 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, she was at their
Accused is entitled in full for the period of his detention. house in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. Antalo and Mosa came and informed her that appellant
killed her husband. She had her husband's corpse brought to their house. Her husband was buried in Panta-
on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She incurred expenses for the burial in the amount of P15,000.00, but she
Hence, this appeal. asked for P100,000.00 as compensation therefor. 12

The Facts Version of the Defense

Version of the Prosecution Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March 1, 1990, he went to Tagolo-an,
Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister Saramina Dansal. At his sister's house, Mimbalawang Dorado,
together with his sons Macod, Talente and Talente's son Usop, all surnamed Dorado, seized appellant and
brought him to their house at Tongkol, Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte for reasons undisclosed to him. 13

124
The next day, March 2, 1990 at 7:00 a.m., they all left Tagolo-an for Matungao and arrived there at 11:00 Preliminary Issue: Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
a.m. He was given a Garand rifle that was not serviceable. They proceeded to the victim's house at Panta-
on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. They asked the victim to come out and then they fired their guns at him as
Without specifically raising it as an error, appellant nonetheless laced his brief with attacks on the
soon as he appeared. Appellant said that the Dorados killed the victim to avenge the killing of one of
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, we shall dispose of this matter.
Mimbalawag's sons named Ali by a certain "Salonga," the victim's paternal cousin.

Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns appellant and told him to run away. As
credibility of witnesses. 17 Such findings are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any
he was also related to the victim, the latter's mother being his paternal aunt, appellant wanted to shoot the
showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled with the Dorados. Thereafter, they rode a truck
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. 18 We have carefully scrutinized the
to Karomatan. They left their guns at the house of Mimbalawag's sister in Bangko, near Matungao. 14 He
records of this case and the arguments of appellant, and we have found no reason to reverse the findings of
went home and afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an that the Dorados killed his cousin. He was
the trial court.
subsequently summoned and detained by the mayor of Panta-on. 15

The two prosecution eyewitnesses positively and clearly identified appellant as the assailant who alone
Ruling of the Trial Court
fired his rifle at the victim. Their testimonies corroborated each other. Antalo testified thus: 19

As stated earlier, the court a quo convicted appellant of murder. It gave credence to the testimonies of the
PROSECUTOR BADELLES:
prosecution witnesses. It disbelieved appellant in view of the absence of any improper motive on the
witnesses' part to testify wrongly against him.
q Now, in the afternoon of March 2, 1990, around 3:00
o'clock more or less, did (sic) you remember where were you?
The trial court noted that appellant and the four (4) Dorados were all armed with Garand rifles; that they
immediately fired their guns at the victim as he came out of his house; and that the victim was not in a
position to defend himself. From these facts, it concluded that the offenders consciously and deliberately a I can remember, sir.
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by them to ensure the accomplishment of
their purpose with impunity. Thus, treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation were
appreciated in the conviction of the appellant. q Where were you?

Hence, this appeal. a I was on my way to see Mayor Asis that day, sir.

q While on your way to Mayor Asis, were you walking,


Assignment of Errors
riding or what?

Appellant through the Public Attorney's Office ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
a I am walking with Timal, sir.

I
xxx xxx xxx

The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant's presence in the crime
scene was under a compulsion of an irresistable (sic) force. q While on your way to the house of Mayor Asis in that
afternoon of March 2, 1990, with Timal, did you notice
anything along the road?
II
a Yes, there was.
The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength. 16
PROSECUTOR BADELLES:

In a nutshell, appellant invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion under an irresistible force under
q What was that you noticed?
paragraph 5, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Further, he argues that, if at all, he should be convicted
only of homicide because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength. a While we are on our way to the Mayor's house, we saw
Abubacar Alamat that he had 5 companions and I recognized
The Court's Ruling one of them. (Witness pointing to the accused Abubacar
Pagalamatan [sic]).

The appeal is bereft of merit.


q Now what were they doing when you saw them?
125
a They were having conversation, sir. q When you saw Dirangan (sic) Dansal holding a Garand and
when you saw that tip of his gun smoking, to was direct (sic)
that his gun pointing?
q Now, you said you saw them, now how far were you [from]
the groups?
a Pointing to Abubacar Pagalamatan, sir.
a About 5 meters far, sir.
q Now how about Abubacar Pagalamatan at the time when
you saw him holding a gun which was pointed to Abubacar
q Were they in front of you or at the back of you when you
Pagalamatan with smoke coming out from the tip of the gun
saw them first?
and the empty shells falling down, what was the relative
position of Abubacar Pangalamatan to Diarangan Dansal?
a At my back, sir.
a Abubacar Pangalamat was lying down, his face upward, sir.
q And then after that was there any unusual [event] that
happened?
q Now, after you heard those 7 burst of a gun, what did you
do next?
a There was, sir.
a I was immovilized (sic) sir.
q What was that unusual thing that happened?
q How about Diarangan Dansal and his companions, what did
a I heard a shound (sic) of gun burst sir. he do after the 7 burst you heard?

q What did you do when you heard that gun burst? a They were running toward the coffee trees, sir.

a I glanced at them and I noticed that the gun of Diarangan Mosa corroborated Antalo's account in this wise: 20
Dansal the tip of his gun has smoke and I also noticed empty
shells falling down.
PROS. BADELLES:

q Now how far were you when you saw Diarangan Dansal
Q On or about March 2, 1990 at 3:00 in the afternoon, can
with the tip of his gun having smoke and the empty shells
you remember where were you?
falling down from his gun?

xxx xxx xxx


a About 5 meters, sir.

A We were then going to the house of Asis at Pasayano,


q Now, how many burst all in all that you heard?
Matungao.

a Seven burst, sir.


Q You used the word (')we(') who was your companion at that
time?
q Now you said that you saw empty shells falling down from
the gun of Diarangan. Dansal, how many empty shells that
A Panda Andalo.
you saw that fell down from the gund (sic) of Diarangan
Dansal?
Q While on your way to the house of Asis at Pasayano
Matungao, along the way did you see any person?
a I have not seen the others sir.

xxx xxx xxx


q By the way what was gun of Diarangan Dansal hold that
time? (sic)
A I saw Diarangan Dansal and Abubakar Pangalamatan.
a Garand, sir.

126
Q They have compnaion (sic) if any at that time? Q When you look back at them and saw Diarangan Dansal
pointed his firearm to Abubakar Pangalamatan what was then
the position of Abubakar Pangalamatan?
A Yes, sir, I did not recognize him.

A When the firearm exploded, Abubakar Pangalamatan fell


Q How many of them?
down.

A Four (4).
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx


Q By the way how many shots that you hear (sic)?

Q Now waht (sic) was the position of these persons in relation


A Seven shots.
to your position at the time you saw them?

Q The first shots that you hear was immediately, was prior to
A I was ten (10) meters from them and they are talking to
the looking back where Abubakar Pangalamatan and
each other.
Diarangan Dansal were located (sic)?

Q Were they in front of you or back of you?


A Yes, sir.

A They are at my back.


Q How about the second shots, when did you hear it?

Q Now, when you were about ten (10) meters from them, this
A As I look back.
ten (10) meter at your back were there anything happened
unusual (sic)?
Q Did you see who fire (sic) the shot?
xxx xxx xxx
A Diarangan Dansal.
A I heard gun shot and then I looked back.
Q How did you know that it was Diarangan Dansal who fired
the (sic) second shot?
Q Towards what direction after hearing the shot?

A Because there was a smoke coming from his gun and the
A I looked back at them.
empty shells coming from his rifle.

Q Who was (')them(') that you are referring to?


Q In the second shot, was shooting (sic) by Diarangan Dansal
to what direction was the firearm of Diarangan Dansal point
A Abubakar Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal. to? (sic)

Q And when you look back at them what did you see? A It was he who was still pointing his gun to Pangalamatan.

A I saw firearm of iarangan (sic) Dansal and the firearm was Q How about the third shot, when did you hear it?
smoking and the empty shells were coming out from the rifle.
A Well, I suspect that it was still at the gun of Diarangan
Q Towards what direction was the firearm (sic) of Diarangan Dansal and I heard that the same gunshot coming from the
Dansal pointed to when see him at that time? guaran (sic) of Diarangan Dansal.

A The firearm was pointed to at Abubakar Pangalamatan. Q How did you know that the same shot was coming from the
same barrel of Diarangan Dansal?

127
A Because smoke was coming out from the barrel of his gun. Furthermore, appellant has not alleged, much less proven, ill motive on the part of said witnesses to accuse
appellant of such a grave offense. In his brief, appellant admits that he cannot discern any reason for
Antalo and Mosa to testify falsely against him. 21 In this light, we cannot fault the court a quo for holding
Q And the 4th the 5th, the 6th and the seven (7) shots you
that: 22
hear it when?

The court is constrained to believe that the testimonies of witnesses Panda Antalo
A Still from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal.
and Timal Mosa are credible for failure by the defense to show that said witnesses
were prejudiced against the accused or that said witnesses had an existing improper
Q How do you know that it was coming from the firearm of motive in imputing to the accused the crime for which he is charged. When there is
Diarangan Dansal? no evidence showing that the witnesses are prejudiced against the accused, the
witnesses would not have imputed to the accused the commission of such a grave
offense as that of murder if it was not true that he was really guilty thereof (People
A Because the smoke was still coming out from his gun and vs. Ali, 29 SCRA 756). The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating
the empty shell coming from his gun. the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion
that such improper motive did not exist, and that their testimonies are worthy of full
Q How about the companion of Diarangan Dansal was they faith and credit (People vs. Saroah, 5 SCRA 385; People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910).
arm (sic) at that time?
The defense assails the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Antalo and Mosa because their conduct
A Yes, sir. during the commission of the crime was allegedly contrary to common experience. Appellant finds it
unlikely for said eyewitnesses to keep on "standing despite the burst of gunfire as if . . . watching a movie
in the making" and to remain unmoved by the violent shooting incident. Ordinarily, a man in a similar
Q What firearm? situation would either take cover or run for safety. Because the eyewitnesses did not so conduct
themselves, appellant concludes that their testimonies were preposterous and untrue.
A Garand.
We disagree. Antalo said that he was so scared of what was happening that he could not move, while Mosa
Q All the while when you hear the gunshots and all these six admitted that he "was afraid" but he did not take cover, as he knew both the appellant and the victim. Their
(6) successive gun shots and saw Diarangan Dansal shot what reactions, although the exact opposite of each other, are valid and probable. Taking cover or running away
did the companion of Diarangan Dansal do? is not the only natural reaction possible under the circumstances. There is no standard form of human
behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which
witnesses to a crime must react. 23
A They were around Diarangan Daniel holding their gun.

First Issue: Exempting Circumstance Insufficiently Proved


Q Did you notice if they fired their gun?

Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
A No, sir. Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. He allegedly joined the
armed Dorados against his will because of fear for his own safety. He claims in his brief that the Dorados
Q How did you know that they did not shot their firearm? were guarding him so closely that "escape was risky and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was,
at the moment, out of reach." 24
A Because there was no smoke coming from their firearm.
We cannot sustain such defense. A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. 25 He must show that the
Q After the 7th shot, do you know what the group of irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
Drainage Daniel (sic) did? will. 26 The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself
or to escape.
A They Fled (sic).
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such a
Q Towards what direction? nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. 27 A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, 28 even fear of future
injury, 29 is insufficient.
A Towards the coffee plantation.

In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that the
Both testimonies are straightforward, clear and consistent and they point categorically to appellant as the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any attempt to resist.
perpetrator of the crime. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not allow them. No evidence was

128
presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the Dorados in killing the victim. In other SO ORDERED.
words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a real and imminent threat on his life or climb
sufficient to overcome his free will.

Indeed, the Court finds no acceptable basis for appellant's assertion that he was compelled and intimidated
by the Dorados. Even without him, the Dorados could have easily carried out the crime, if such was their
intention. If we believe appellant's story, there was no need for the Dorados to mortally threaten appellant
to join them. Besides, forcing appellant, a relative of the victim, to join them complicated rather than
facilitated their criminal endeavor. With the appellant present among them, they would have had to guard
themselves from possible resistance and double cross in case he did not consent to their plan. Furthermore,
it would have been highly illogical for the Dorados to force appellant to take part in their crime, only to
give him an unserviceable rifle. 30

Moreover, his story does not inspire belief for reasons other than the obvious one that it is uncorroborated.
According to appellant, he was taken against his will from his sister's house in Tagolo-an the day before
the commission of the crime. It is strange why his sister was not presented as witness to corroborate his
account. Even the mayor of Tagolo-an, to whom he reported that he had been forced to participate in a
killing, could have testified in his favor. But said official, who could have injected credence to his defense,
was not presented to corroborate his testimony. The non-presentation of these witnesses tends to show that
they would not have corroborated appellant's allegations had they testified.

Second Issue: Qualifying Circumstances

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength.

The evidence of the prosecution, however, adequately established only treachery. Treachery is appreciated
when a frontal attack is directed at an unarmed victim who is totally unaware of and unprepared for said
assault. 31 There is treachery where the attack on an unarmed victim, who has not given the slightest
provocation, is sudden, unexpected and without warning. 32 According to Prosecution Witness Mosa, the
victim, the appellant and his companions were talking to one another prior to the shooting. It would have
been impossible to hide Garand rifles from someone who was so close. Thus, it is safe to assume that the
victim knew that appellant and his companions were carrying them. If the victim suspected that they would
use those rifles to commit the crime, then he would have avoided them. But instead, the victim stayed and
spoke with them. The victim, therefore, had no idea that he was going to be shot by appellant who, after
all, was his relative. Even if he eventually did come to know that appellant intended to shoot him, he —
being alone and unarmed — could not have defended himself against all five of them.

Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand, was not established, as there was no testimony to the effect
that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength in order to kill the
victim. 33 Witness Mosa even said that only appellant fired at the victim. Mere superiority in number after
all is not necessarily indicative of this aggravating circumstance.

The prosecution also failed to establish evident premeditation. For this qualifying circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be a lapse of sufficient time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection
that would allow the conscience of the actor to attempt to overcome the resolution of his will. 34 But the
prosecution was unable to establish this time element as its evidence dealt merely with the circumstances
of the actual shooting itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as
regards the civil indemnity which is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with
current jurisprudence. 35

129
G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990 Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-
defense. He claims that on September 17, 1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00 o'clock
P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver repaired and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant saw Longno from a
vs.
distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant.
you want to be taught a lesson." 4

REGALADO, J.:
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the same. He,
therefore, parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later amputated. It
For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant and Longno
Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he was
were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, "I stabbed
October 18, 1983.2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since Cornelio Inday, run," and so he and Altejos ran away. 5
Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at large.
Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:
After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was
further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills,
1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in
expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
complete self-defense.
victim.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth as
and in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not
synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and amplified by us
established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy and the presence of
from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. 6
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by
appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his companions were
Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes
engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which caused the latter to fall.
self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped the fallen Romualdez and
defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
pushed appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native dialect said "Andam ka lang
prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."
himself had admitted the killing. 7

Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin, Cornelio
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence
Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by. Thereupon,
of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.
unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. 8

Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete, Samuel
In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to establish
Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by saying, "Upon ako
the primary element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense
dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and appellant
must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for
accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?"). Longno then
the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of their inherent inconsistency and
faced appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")
conflict with each other.

Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete,
Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:
Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun.
It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after which both
appellant and Altejos ran away. Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly
fired a shot at you?
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto." ("Father, I
was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters before he fell. His A One (1) meter.
father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the ground. Rushed to the St. Paul's
Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of death was hemorrhage,
Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to
secondary to stab wound.
recognize what kind of a gun was that allegedly used by
Inday Longno?

130
A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)
not see the body of the gun.
Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which
Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver? was being pointed to him, what hand did Gerardo Sazon used
(sic) in brushing that gun?
A Yes, sir.
A His left hand.
Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a
pistol or a revolver? Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him,
what else if any did he do?
A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you
want to learn a lesson he immediately drew his gun and I was A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,
able to parry.
COURT: (To the witness)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What hand?
Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm
near the elbow, was he still holding that gun he used in
A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot
shooting you hitting you at the left palm?
Inday.

A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.


xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you not pick up the gun?


ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

A No, sir.9
Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside
and who was brushed aside?
On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)
Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).
Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at
Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was Gerardo Sazon doing?
COURT: (To the witness)

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:


Q And, what happened next?

A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the


Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.
gun and the gun fired.

Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?


xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir.
Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun
at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what hand was he holding
that gun when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon? ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA: Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias
Inday, what was Gerardo Sazon and Wilfredo Longno doing
if they were doing anything.?
A His right hand.

131
A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon. Gerardo Sazon. That a part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close range,
according to Dr. Ely Canja strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit his
finger when he and the deceased grappled for the possession of the gun. 16
Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling
(sic) at that time?
In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the
presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or has not fired a
A Inday's weapon.10
gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness Zenaida Sinfuego a forensic
chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this verification:
The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and the
victim supposedly grappled. While appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the ground, witness
Atty. E. Original:
Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter's gun. The latter statement is itself
difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly holding with his right hand
the gun which he used in shooting Longno. Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on
the person of Wilfredo Longno?
It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the homogeneity
of the answers to the inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only a single gun. Had COURT:
this prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered the defense theory that the
victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus establish the element of
Q On the cadaver?
unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.

Atty. E. Original:
Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is
sustained by the evidence:
Q On the cadaver?
The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only
because he admitted that he was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo A Yes, Sir.
Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the truth when he testified that the
deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood come
out just below the right breast of the deceased. The physical evidence in this case Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?
showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on any part
of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left A Yes, Sir.
forearm. Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there during
the incident except the accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the
overwhelming weight of evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No.
incident (this) showed that this witness had small regard for the truth. 11 C-200-83, result of the paraffin test on the cadaver of
Wilfredo Longno, please compare this carbon original to the
original copy in your possession whether it is the same?
Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after Altejos
stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating on direct
examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination that he only walked a short A The same.
distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded. 13 The latter statement is
itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same proceeding that he was brought by a xxx xxx xxx
policeman to the hospital. 14 This irresolution on the part of the appellant was obviously to avoid any
imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight. 15
Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin
casts taken from the left and right hands of the cadaver of one
At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence in the Wilfredo Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left
case. Again, we quote the trial court with approval: forearm of same subject and one piece paraffin last taken
from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of laboratory
The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a examination: to determine the presence of gunpowder
gun and fired at him is not borne out by the physical evidence in this case. The residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned specimens.
paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that the hands of the Findings, cast from hands-negative for the presence of
deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a gun gunpowder residues (nitrates). Cast from forearm-positive for
during the incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm and his abdomen the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in,
bore strong traces of gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the 2 1/2 in, 3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the
accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only one abdomen-positive for the presence of gunpowder residues
gun during the incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the accused (nitrates) in the center and in the 1 and 2 in radius. In the

132
layman's language Mrs. Sinfuego, will you please explain to A Nineteen.
the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?
Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?
A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of
gunpowder residues that means that, no blue specks were
A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.
found in the hands of the cadaver.

Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which


COURT:
left the powder burns, was it possible that he fired a gun on
September 17?
Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding
is negative?
A Yes, Your Honor. 17

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.


On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:

Q Within what time-span?


Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and
could be (sic) positive for nitrates?
A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.
A Yes, Sir.
Q When was this examination conducted?
Q In what instance?
A Last September 18,1983.
A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is
Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has possible that it was carried by the wind.
been marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding the paraffin test
conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon,
Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the
your finding there states, positive for gunpowder residues,
person who has not fired a gun?
what is the implication?

A Also from the fertilizer.


A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a
gun.
Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be
positive for nitrates?
Q Within what time-span?

A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction,


A Within three days.
from contaminance (sic) for the nitrates will take effect
between two to three minutes.
Q Within three days?
COURT:
A Within three days.
Q Can you determine on your examination whether the
Q From the examination? nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by gunpowder
residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?
A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And when was the examination conducted?
Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused,
could you determine where did it (sic) come from?
A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.

A Gunpowder residues. 18
Q September?
133
Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in evidence to Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment, since
establish in any reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the quarrelsome nature of the existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant
the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression. Nonetheless, such evidence, and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter reveal a
seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven by the concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the accused
prosecution during the trial belying such aggression. These observations find application in the instant case shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's gun, Altejos
where the defense presented and now argue on character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared towards a common
minor offenses which had been filed against the deceased, but not one of which resulted in conviction and purpose, that is, to kill the victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely
were in fact dismissed except for one case which was sent to the archives. 20 essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective, 27 as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial
agreement.
Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in
the absence of any showing that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this does not
during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, lies negate the existence of a conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident premeditation, but this
for this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did not act in self-defense. 21 circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense for the accused to meditate
and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time element is not an indispensable
requirement for a conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that there was a conspiracy between
The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not murder.
appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we cannot consider evident premeditation
The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however, ruled that
against appellant.
there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely wanting in evidence to
support the latter conclusion.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required
to sustain a conviction. 29 The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused. Insofar as
The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the deceased
Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him and he can
passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter followed the former and
neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are, therefore, obiter and
inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
with no binding effect on him. 30

To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is
the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
consequences of his act. 22
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident
The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of
of September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under
the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis, and
the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to kill the victim. A homicidal
increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the Court en
premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly
banc on August 30,1990.
announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim passed by
cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the victim. No
evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the deceased. Nor was there any
showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to warrant and explain appellant's
waiting for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a
remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the
victim when confronted by appellant near the public faucet that precipitated assault.

Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was the
result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the
killing to murder. 23The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and
incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense. 24 Thus, for
the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this
case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was
deliberate intent to take advantage of it.25 In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused
purposely sought to use their superior strength to their advantage in the present case, a finding to that effect
by the trial court cannot be sustained.

134
G.R. No. L-39630 November 13, 1933 fact of the court below as to the guilt of the defendant. We further find the presence of the following
extenuating circumstances and direct that they be applied when final sentenced may be pronounced,
namely: First, the age of the accused being under eighteen (article 13, paragraph 2); second, provocation
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
on the part of the deceased (article 13, paragraph 4); third, obfuscation (article 13, paragraph 6); fourth,
vs.
voluntary surrender (article 13, paragraph 7). That part of the judgment which sentences the defendant to
LEONCIO ROXAS, defendant-appellant.
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000 is hereby revoked and it is ordered that the defendant-appellant be placed in the Philippine Training
BUTTE, J.: School for Boys at Welfareville in the custody of the care of the Commissioner of Public Welfare until the
said defendant shall have attained his majority, subject however, to the provisions and conditions of said
article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, convicting the defendant-
appellant of the crime of homicide upon the following information:
It is ordered that the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Mindoro for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision. Costs de oficio.lawphil.net
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1933, at about 9 o'clock in the evening, in the
municipality of Puerto Galera, Province of Mindoro, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, armed with an automatic pocket-knife, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound Felicisimo Garcia with
said weapon inflicting upon the latter two wounds in different parts of the body, to wit: one
incised wound 18 1/2 centimeters long on the lower portion of the right chest, cutting the 6th
and 7th ribs and exposing the 5th rib and lung, and another incised wound, superficial, 1 1/3
centimeters long to the left of the vertebral column; and a result thereof, the aforesaid
Felicisimo Garcia died instantaneously.

He was sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and required to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000. The appellant makes the following assignments of error:

1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en el caso de autos la existencia de la circunstancia


eximente de legitima defensa a favor del acusado, y al condenarle a este a doce años y un dia
de reclusion temporal con las accesorias de la ley, al pago de las costas del juico y a indemnizar
a los herederos del occiso en la suma de P1,000 en vez de absolverle libremente.

2. Que en todo el Juzgado a quo erro al no imponer al acusado en la causa de autos la pena
de prision mayor, en lugar de la reclusion temporal impuesta.

We have carefully considered the excellent brief for the appellant filed by Antonio Fuentecilla who was
appointed as attorney de oficio on this appeal, in which a careful and thorough analysis of the evidence was
made in support of the first assignment of error. But we have come to the conclusion that the findings of
fact made by the court below are amply supported by the evidence. Even though the deceased was the
aggressor, the defendant himself admits that the aggressor was not armed. There being no rational
necessity shown for the means which the accused used to repel the attack of his aggressor, article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked here to exempt the defendant from the responsibility.

Counsel for the appellant maintains that the accused was a minor below eighteen when the offense was
committed and asked that this be considered as an additional mitigating circumstance under the provisions
of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code
is as follows:

That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor,
he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.

Exhibit A, offered by the prosecution, states that the age of the accused at the time of the commission of
the offense was seventeen years and eight months. We accept this as the best evidence in the record as to
the true age of the accused. It is necessary, therefore, to reform the judgment of the court below and to
enter one in conformity with article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. We accept and affirm the findings of
135
G.R. No. L-162 April 30, 1947 P. ¿Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del cuerpo? — R. En la cabeza, en sus
brazos, en sus manos, en la mandibula inferior, en la parte frente de su cuello, en su pecho
derecho, y tambien en el pecho izquierdo, y su dedo meñique habia volado, se habia cortado, y
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
otras perqueñas heridas mas.
vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO
ALCONGA, appellant. P. ¿En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? — R. Si, señor.

HILADO, J.: P. ¿Cuantas heridas? — R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha y una contusion en la
corona de la cabeza.
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San Dionisio,
Province of Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased P. ¿Vio usted el craneo? — R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en quel el craneo se ha roto.
Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the
prosecution, was one of those playing the game (t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo,
P. ¿En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? — R. Debajo de la tetilla derecha, una herida
the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of them contributing the sum of P5 to a
causada por una bala.
common fund (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). Maria de Raposo played the game while the said accused posted himself
behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating by signs to his partner
(t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The deceased appears to have suffered losses in the game because of the team work P. ¿Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de heridas? — R. Heridas causadas
between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). Upon discovering what the said por bolo.
accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at the former (t.s.n., pp.
96, 126). An exchange of words followed, and the two would have come to blows but for the intervention
of the maintainer of the games (t.s.n., p. 96). In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house but not before P. ¿Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? — R. No recuerdo la dimension de las
telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which heridas en el pecho.
expression would seem to signify an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such circumstances.
P. ¿Pero en la cabeza? — R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida causada por el bolo. (T.s.n., p.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943, when 25.)
the latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard"
(t.s.n., pp. 98-100). While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. The initial
along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on the part of the
his "pingahan" (t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with latter. Resisting the aggression, appellant managed to have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several
the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101). A second blow was given but failed to hit wounds upon the deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment there was no
the accused, hitting the bench instead (t.s.n., p. 101). The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually unscathed, could have chosen to remain
crawling on his abdomen (t.s.n., p. 101). While the deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the where he was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor, and considering that in the first stage the deceased was
accused, while still in a crawling position (t.s.n., p. 119), fired at him with his revolver, causing him to the unlawful aggressor and defendant had not given sufficient provocation, and considering further that
stagger and to fall to the ground (t.s.n., p. 101). Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and when the deceased was about to deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling position and, on
directed a blow at the accused who, however, was able to parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). that account, could not have effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to use his "paltik" revolver —
A hand-to-hand fight ensued (t.s.n., p. 102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but his only remaining weapon — ; we hold that said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
was followed by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6). After running a distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108),
the deceased was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one
which slashed the cranium — was delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more
besides many other blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6, 28). At this instant, the other accused, Adolfo aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels.
Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of the "home guards" of San Dionisio, placed under his custody During the second stage of the fight appellant inflicted many additional wounds upon the deceased. That
the accused Alconga with a view to turning him over to the proper authorities (t.s.n., pp. 102-105). the deceased was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was still
able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken by appellant. Under such circumstances,
appellant's plea of self-defense in the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a guerrilla soldier (t.s.n., pp. defense where there is no aggression.
80, 104). Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters
(t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). In the afternoon of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio Barredo, a
municipal policeman of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in the fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the
dagger (t.s.n., pp. 81, 104). reason that it is shown that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the
necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then in retreat. Therefore one of
the essential ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police sergeant Gil G. Estaniel as follows: wanting (now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil.,
475, 476; words in parenthesis supplied.)
P. ¿Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio Barion? — R. Examine sus heridas.
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants were assaulted by the four
(offended parties), the right to kill in self-defense ceased when the aggression ceased; and when
136
Toledo and his brothers turned and ran, without having inflicted so much as a scratch upon a immediately following them, would certainly not have been considered a sufficient provocation to mitigate
single one of the defendants, the right of the defendants to inflict injury upon them ceased appellant's liability in killing or injuring the deceased. For provocation in order to be a mitigating
absolutely. They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A fleeing man is not circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. (Revised Penal Code, article 13, No.
dangerous to the one from whom he flees. When danger ceases, the right to injure ceases. When 4.)
the aggressor turns and flees, the one assaulted must stay his hand. (United States vs. Vitug, 17
Phil., 1, 19; emphasis supplied.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without having
inflicted so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been established one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict injury upon
beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating circumstances: him, ceased absolutely — appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said deceased — for
voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The first was properly appreciated; the the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees." If the law, as interpreted
second was not, since it is very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to the and applied by this Court in the Vitug case, enjoins the victorious contender from pursuing his opponent
moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue much less further to on the score of self-defense, it is because this Court considered that the requisites of self-defense had
attack him. ceased to exist, principal and indispensable among these being the unlawful aggression of the opponent
(Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the aggression with which he
started the first stage of the fight. The evidence, as weighed and appreciated by the learned trial judge, who Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of said aggression the provocation thus
had heard, seen and observed the witnesses testify, clearly shows that said stage ended with the flight of involved therein still persisted, and to a degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal responsibility for
the deceased after receiving a bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him to stagger and fall to the his acts during the second stage of the fight? Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that
ground, and several bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their hand-to-hand fight after both had when he pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the effects of what provocation, be
gotten up. The learned trial judge said: it anger, obfuscation or the like. The Revised Penal Code provides:

The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in support of their respective theories ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
of the case vary materially on certain points. Some of these facts have to be admitted and some
have to be rejected with the end in view of arriving at the truth. To the mind of the Court, what
xxx xxx xxx
really happened in the case at bar, as can de disclosed by the records, which lead to the killing
of the deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945 (should be 1943), is as follows:
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded
the act.
xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore apparent that the Code requires for provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance that it
In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the guardhouse
not only immediately precede the act but that it also be sufficient. In the Spanish Penal Code, the adjective
performing his duties as guard or "ronda" in Barrio Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion passed
modifying said noun is "adecuada" and the Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of June 27, 2883,
by with a "pingahan". That was the first time the deceased and the accused Alconga had met
interpreted the equivalent provision of the Penal Code of that country, which was the source of our own
since that eventful night of May 27th in the gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing the accused
existing Revised Penal Code, that "adecuada" means proportionate to the damage caused by the act. Viada
Alconga, who was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased cried: "Coroy, this is now the
(Vol. 11, 5th ed., p. 51) gives the ruling of that Supreme Court as follows:
breakfast!" These words of warning were immediately followed by two formidable swings of
the "pingahan" directed at the accused Alconga which failed to hit him. Alconga was able to
avoid the blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen until he was outside the El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la provocacion o amenaza que de parte del ofendido ha
guardhouse. The deceased followed him and while in the act of delivering the third blow, de preceder para la disminucion de la responsabilidad criminal debe ser proporcionada al daño
Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with his revolver thereby stopping the blow in mid-air. The que se cause, lo cual no concurre a favor del reo si resulta que la unica cuestion que hubo fue si
deceased fell to the ground momentarily and upon rising to his feet, he drew forth a dagger. The en un monton de yeso habia mas omenos cantidad, y como perdiera la apuesta y bromeando
accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being armed, a hand-to-hand fight dijera el que la gano que beberia vino de balde, esa pequeña cuestion de amor propio no
followed. The deceased having sustained several wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran away justificaba en modo alguno la ira que le impelio a herir y matar a su contrario. (S. de 27 de
with the latter close to his heels. junio de 1883, Gaceta de 27 de septiembre.)

The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial judge is in substantial agreement with Justice Albert, in his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 edition, page 94, says: "The
those found by us and narrated in the first paragraphs of this decision. Upon those facts the question arises provocation or threat must be sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to the act committed
whether when the deceased started to run and flee, or thereafter until he died, there was any provocation and adequate to stir one to its commission" (emphasis supplied).
given by him from appellant to pursue and further to attack him. It will be recalled, to be given with, that
the first stage of the fight was provoked when the deceased said to appellant "Cory, this is now the
Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by the
breakfast," or "This is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing or two of his "pingahan." These
words without the immediately following attack with the "pingahan" would not have been uttered, we can accused. This the instant appellant has utterly failed to do. Any way, it would seem self-evident that
safely assume, since such an utterance alone would have been entirely meaningless. It was appellant could never have succeeded in showing that whatever remained of the effects of the deceased's
aggression, by way of provocation after the latter was already in fight, was proportionate to his killing his
the attack, therefore, that effectively constituted the provocation, the utterance being, at best, merely a
preclude to the attack. At any rate, the quoted words by themselves, without the deceased's act already defeated adversary.

137
That provocation gave rise to a fight between the two men, and may be said, not without reason, to have
spent itself after appellant had shot the deceased in his right breast and caused the latter to fall to the
ground; or — making a concession in appellant's favor — after the latter had inflicted several bolo wounds
upon the deceased, without the deceased so much as having scratched his body, in their hand-to-hand fight
when both were on their feet again. But if we are to grant appellant a further concession, under the view
most favorable to him, that aggression must be deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased —
upon the end of the first stage of the fight. In so affirming, we had to strain the concept in no small degree.
But to further strain it so as to find that said aggression or provocation persisted even when the deceased
was already in flight, clearly accepting defeat and no less clearly running for his life rather than evincing
an intention of returning to the fight, is more than we can sanction. It should always be remembered that
"illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent
kind.

Agresion ilegitima. — Agresion vale tanto como acometimiento. Para que exista el derecho de
defensa es preciso que se nos acometa, que se nos ataque, o cuando menos, que se nos amenace
de atacarnos de un modo inmediato e inminente; v. gr., desenvainando el puñal para herirnos
con el o apuntando la pistola para dispararla contra nosotros. (Viada, 5. a edicion, 173.)

After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened assault of the remotest
kind. It has been suggested that when pursuing his fleeing opponent, appellant might have thought or
believed that said opponent was going to his house to fetch some other weapon. But whether we consider
this as a part or continuation of the self-defense alleged by appellant, or as a separate circumstance, the
burden of proof to establish such a defense was, of course, upon appellant, and he has not so much as
attempted to introduce evidence for this purpose. If he really thought so, or believed so, he should have
positively proven it, as any other defense. We can not now gratuitously assume it in his behalf.

It is true that in the case of United States vs. Rivera (41 Phil., 472, 474), this Court held that one defending
himself or his property from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not obliged to retreat
but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from danger. But that is not this case. Here from
the very start appellant was the holder of the stronger and more deadly weapons — a revolver and a bolo,
as against a piece of bamboo called "pingahan" and a dagger in the possession of the deceased. In actual
performance appellant, from the very beginning, demonstrated his superior fighting ability; and he
confirmed it when after the deceased was first felled down by the revolver shot in right breast, and after
both combatants had gotten up and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the deceased using his dagger and
appellant his bolo, the former received several bolo wounds while the latter got through completely
unscathed. And when the deceased thereupon turned and fled, the circumstances were such that it would be
unduly stretching the imagination to consider that appellant was still in danger from his defeated and
fleeing opponent. Appellant preserved his revolver and his bolo, and if he could theretofore so easily
overpower the deceased, when the latter had not yet received any injury, it would need, indeed, an
unusually strong positive showing — which is completely absent from the record — to persuade us that he
had not yet "secured himself from danger" after shooting his weakly armed adversary in the right breast
and giving him several bolo slashes in different other parts of his body. To so hold would, we believe, be
unjustifiably extending the doctrine of the Rivera case to an extreme not therein contemplated.

Under article 249, in relation with article 64, No. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the crime committed by
appellant is punishable by reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which would be from 12 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months. However, in imposing the penalty, we take into consideration the provisions
of section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), as amended by Act No. 4225.
Accordingly, we find appellant guilty of the aforesaid crime of homicide and sentence him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.

As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

138
G.R. No. L-26240 October 31, 1969 with which he was poised to stab Piol then lying down on his stomach, under Benjamin; that Aquino
thereupon wrested from him the dagger, which was stained with blood; and that Benjamin then said it was
he who had wounded Piol.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", ET AL., defendants, Upon the other hand, Benjamin Gondayao testified that his remark, about the failure to give a blow-out on
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", and ANOY GONDAYAO, defendants-appellants. the part of the winner in the elections, was addressed to his nephew, Rudy Natividad; that, when Piol
resented said remark, Benjamin replied that the same was not aimed at him, and that, perhaps, he (Piol) is a
"nacionalista"; that after another exchange of unfriendly remarks, Piol drew out his dagger and said "I am
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
going to kill you"; that Benjamin then tried to run away and went up the "papag", with the intention of
jumping over the wooden fence beside it; that he was unable to do so because Piol followed him on top of
Appeal, taken by defendants Benjamin Gondayao and Anoy Gondayao, from a decision of the Court of the "papag"; that he, therefore, faced Piol, who thrust his dagger at him (Benjamin), but he parried the
First Instance of Pangasinan, convicting them of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, and thrust with the left arm, which was then wounded slightly; that, by pressing the hand with which Piol held
sentencing them to life imprisonment and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased, the dagger, Benjamin succeeded in disarming him; that, as Piol grappled with and embraced him, they fell
Orlando Piol, in the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay two-fifths of the costs. to the ground, with Piol under him; that Piol landed over the dagger — then held by Benjamin — which
pierced his (Piol's) back; that, as they kept on wrestling with each other, Piol managed to roll over and
place himself on top of Benjamin; that Piol then picked up a stone and with it struck Benjamin on the face,
After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, near the market place, in the Barrio of Paitan, Municipality of thereby causing thereon a lacerated wound; that Piol tried to hit him a second time with the stone, but
Sual, Province of Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., Orlando Piol Benjamin warded off the blow; that he was then able to get another stone, with which he, in turn, hit Piol
appeared to have — in addition to several lacerations on the head — two (2) stab wounds on the back, 4 to on the head several times; that Piol, however, squeezed the neck of Benjamin, who let loose the stone and,
4-1/2 inches deep, in consequence of which he died that same afternoon, due to a massive internal
pulling Piol down with his (Benjamin's) right hand, stabbed him (Piol) with his (Benjamin's) left hand, by
hemorrhage. Immediately after the occurrence, Benjamin assumed full responsibility for said injuries, thrusting the dagger into his back; and that the Chief of Police then came and separated them.
which he claimed to have inflicted in self-defense. On November 17, 1965, Macario Aquino, Chief of
Police of Sual, filed, with the Municipal Court thereof, a complaint charging Benjamin Gondayao with
homicide. Twelve (12) days later, Aquino filed an amended complaint charging murder, allegedly Benjamin's co-defendants set up their respective alibis, but We are not concerned with the three (3)
committed, not only by Benjamin Gondayao, but, also, by his brother, Anoy Gondayao, and Eduardo defendants who were acquitted by the lower court. As regards appellant Anoy Gondayao, We note that the
Bersamina, Eto Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday. Soon thereafter, the corresponding information for Chief of Police did not even see him at the scene of the occurrence, although said officer admitted that he
murder was filed, with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, against said five defendants. After due had not paid any attention to the persons who were near the combatants. Again, it is difficult to see how
trial, under a plea of not guilty, said court rendered the appealed decision convicting Benjamin Gondayao Anoy Gondayao could have stabbed Piol without being noticed by said peace officer. In this connection, it
and Anoy Gondayao as charged and sentencing them as stated at the beginning of this decision, as well as is well to remember that, according to Macario Pascua — the only witness who testified to the alleged
acquitting their three (3) co-defendants, for insufficiency of the evidence, with three-fifths (3/5) of the participation of Anoy Gondayao in the commission of the crime charged — this appellant stabbed Piol
cost de officio. Hence, this appeal by the Gondayaos. after the latter and Benjamin had fallen from the "papag" in the course of their fight. The Chief of Police
was only three (3) meters away, looking at them, even before they had thus fallen. Hence, he would have,
in all probability, seen Anoy, had he done what Pascua imputed to him (Anoy). There was, of course, the
The main eyewitnesses for the prosecution were Macario Pascua and Police Chief Macario Aquino. The possibility that Anoy's intervention may have taken place as the Chief of Police went around the fence that
first testified that, while he was reading a newspaper, in front of the house of the Vice-Mayor, in Barrio separated him from the combatants and his attention was momentarily diverted from them. In a way,
Paitan, Sual, Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, between 10:00 and 11:30 a.m., he saw Benjamin
however, this circumstance is offset by the fact that, as soon as the Chief of Police approached the
Gondayao and his co-defendants, a few meters away, drinking gin in front of the store of Segundo combatants and bade them to stop, Benjamin owned his responsibility for the injuries of Piol. This
Sevillena, which was alongside the house and store of the Vice-Mayor; that, after consuming a bottle of statement was made before Benjamin had time to reflect, and thus forms part of the res gestae, as well as
gin, Benjamin Gondayao, repeatedly cursed the "Nacionalistas" for not offering a drink despite their
carries much weight. All things being considered, We find that the prosecution has not established, beyond
victory in the polls; that, as Orlando Piol who was nearby, replied by cursing the losers in the elections, an reasonable doubt, the guilt of Anoy Gondayao, who should, accordingly, be acquitted, for insufficiency of
exchange of unfriendly utterances followed; that, eventually, the group headed by Benjamin picked up the evidence.
stones and threw them at Piol, who was hit several times on the head; that, as the same began to bleed, Piol
drew out a dagger and approached Benjamin, who, forthwith, embraced him; that, grappling with each
other, they both fell down, with Piol on top of Benjamin; that, at this juncture, Anoy Gondayao picked up a With respect to appellant Benjamin Gondayao, his Honor, the trial Judge, found his testimony unworthy of
stone and hit Piol with it on the head, and then wrestled the dagger from him; that, upon a signal given by credence and the record before Us fully justifies such finding. Indeed, Benjamin testified that, as he
Benjamin, who had meanwhile managed to get away from under Piol, Anoy stabbed Piol on the back and, grappled with Piol on top of a "papag", they fell together therefrom, with him on top of Piol who landed on
then, leaving the dagger imbedded therein, retreated; that thereupon Benjamin pulled out the dagger and his back, over the dagger held by Benjamin, who had wrested it from Piol, and that this was how Piol
sank it again on the back of Piol who was still facing downward, in a stooping position; and that Eduardo sustained the first stab wound on the back. This cannot possibly be true, for the Chief of Police testified
Bersamina, Eto Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday were then about 5 meters away. that Piol was holding the dagger when he and Benjamin fell down from the "papag". Besides, had Piol's
back been pressed against the dagger, which was allegedly held by Benjamin, the resulting wound would
have taken a markedly slanting direction instead of being almost at right angle with, or perpendicular to,
Macario Aquino did not witness the beginning of the incident. He was about 25 meters from the place of
the body, as it turned out to be. Then, too, Piol was on top of Benjamin, when they fell from the "papag",
the occurrence, when he noticed a commotion. Rushing to the scene thereof, he saw Benjamin and Piol, according to Macario Pascua.
about 3 meters away from him, rush at each other and grapple with one another, until they fell together
from a bamboo bed, locally known as "papag", on which they were standing; that, inasmuch as the same
and a wooden fence between him and the combatants prevented him from going to them directly and Again, Benjamin's version is that, after this accidental injury on the back of Piol, the latter succeeded in
seeing what was going on after said fall, he walked about 10 meters, in order to go around the fence and rolling over and being on top of him (Benjamin); that Piol then struck him on the face with a stone; that,
approach the fighting men; that, bidding them to stop, he seized the hand of Benjamin which held a dagger, after fending off another attempt of Piol to similarly hit him again, he (Benjamin) picked up another stone

139
and, in turn, struck him with it on the head; that, as Benjamin squeezed him by the neck, he let the stone With the foregoing modifications, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
loose and, pulling Piol down with his (Benjamin's) right hand, he (Benjamin) stabbed Piol on the back — other respects, with one-fifth (1/5) of the costs against appellant Benjamin Gondayao. It is so ordered.
on which, according to Benjamin, Piol was lying — by thrusting the dagger with his left hand; and that, at
this juncture, the Chief of Police came and took the weapon from him.

This story is manifestly artificious and unworthy of credence. It should be noted that, according to
Benjamin, he held the dagger, even before they fell from the "papag"; that the dagger was still in his hand
when Piol allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he (Benjamin), in turn, took another piece of
stone, and hit Piol with it. This would have been impossible, however, unless Benjamin first released the
dagger, which he then held; but, We cannot believe that he, or anybody for that matter, would have done so
under the circumstances.

Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin, the latter threw the stone away and picked up
the dagger once more. He would thus have Us believe that, in order to get the stone with which he claimed
to have hit Piol on the head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from which, at the opportune moment,
he got it back to inflict the second stab wound. The context of Benjamin's story does not convey the idea
that he had such a control of the situation as to be able to choose the place where he would put the dagger
and the time he would retrieve it.

But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach, for, by this time, he was again lying down on
his back — according to the defense — with Benjamin on top of him, he (Benjamin) thrust the dagger,
with his left hand, into the back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound almost at right angle with his
body, like the first. Just why, being in the precarious condition he depicted himself, Benjamin chose to stab
Piol in such an awkward, inconvenient and unbelievable manner, the defense has not even tried to explain.
Regardless of the foregoing, an injury inflicted in this fashion on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed
against the ground, would have necessarily been much more slanting than the first, instead of being
almost perpendicular to the body. The fact of the matter — and this has been established by the testimony
of the Chief of Police, whose impartiality and veracity are not contested — is that Piol was then lying
down, not on his back, but on his stomach with Benjamin on top of him. This explains why and how he
(Benjamin) managed to stab Piol on the back. It, likewise, shows that Piol could not have struck Benjamin
on the face with a stone, much less squeezed his neck. .

It is clear, from the foregoing, that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming
him.1 Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling uncomplimentary
remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol;2 that such remarks led to an altercation with
Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him on the head; that when, owing to the
impact of said stone, which could have rendered him groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by
him, Piol prepared himself to fight by drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting
from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin
cannot be given the benefit of either complete or incomplete self-defense.3 Although Piol was stabbed
from behind, Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of their struggle, which
had begun with both contenders facing each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued. 4

The crime committed by Benjamin Gondayao is, therefore, that of homicide, and no modifying
circumstance having attended its perpetration, the penalty therefor (reclusion temporal) should be imposed
in its medium period. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should, accordingly, be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory penalties.
Moreover, the indemnity due from him to the heirs of Orlando Piol should be increased from P3,000.00 to
P12,000.00, pursuant to People v. Pantoja5 and subsequent cases,6 apart from the fact that Anoy Gondayao
should be acquitted, for insufficiency of the evidence against him, with the proportional part of the costs de
officio.

140
G.R. No. L-28129 October 31, 1969 THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE FACTS IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. The facts found by the Court of Appeals — which must be deemed conclusive for the purpose of this
appeal — are as follows:
DIZON, J.:
The deceased, Roberto Pimentel, was confined an June 4, 1960 in the municipal jail of
Maramag, Bukidnon, as a detention prisoner to answer a charge of stealing a chicken. At about
Elias Valcorza was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon where, after trial, he
1:00 p.m. when appellant was the police guard on duty, Roberto Pimentel escaped. The
was found guilty thereof, with the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a
following day a police patrol team composed of Police Sgt. Federico Daiton and Patrolmen
wrong as the one committed and voluntary surrender, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
Melquiades Cañas, Pablo Lubido and the appellant himself went to a place called Poultry Area
not less than two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, nor more than eight years and
in barrio Cuya, Maramag, Bukidnon, where the accused had been reported to be hiding, for the
one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto Pimentel in the amount of 6,000, but without
purpose of bringing him back to jail. Their efforts to locate and apprehend Roberto Pimentel
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals
having been fruitless, they decided to pass the night in the house of one Gavino Tirayosa
where, on August 16, 1967, judgment was rendered modifying the decision of the trial court, as follows:
intending to return to town the following morning.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is modified as to the prison term and appellant Elias Valcorza is
At about five o'clock in the morning of the next day, June 6, 1960, Sgt. Daiton went down from
declared guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
the house of Gavino Tirayosa to answer a call of nature. He went to a nearby bridge and
passion and obfuscation and, accordingly, he is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of
squatted thereon to defecate. While he was in that position, he saw a person approaching slowly
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4)
and he ordered him to halt. The latter instead of doing so, jumped down into the creek spanned
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessories of the law;
by the bridge. He yelled for his companions, saying that the person who jumped into the creek
to pay the heirs of the deceased, Roberto Pimentel, in the sum of six thousand pesos
could be their quarry. Patrolmen Cañas, Lubido and the appellant rushed out of the house of
(P6,000.00), together with the costs.
Gavino Tirayosa, Cañas and appellant going to the place at the creek where the person had
jumped down.
In all other respects, the appealed judgment is affirmed.
Sgt. Daiton stationed himself near the bridge and Patrolman Lubido went to the other side of
From the above decision the present appeal by certiorari was taken, it being petitioner's claim that the the creek. Appellant and Cañas followed the course of the creek and after covering a distance of
Court of Appeals committed the following errors: 100 meters they came across footprints which they examined separately. While they were doing
so, Roberto Pimentel emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at the appellant, hitting
him with a stone at the right cheek and causing him to fall to the ground. When appellant
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Valcorza was on the ground, Roberto Pimentel again struck him with a stone on the right arm.
Fearing that Pimentel might grab his service revolver, appellant Valcorza summoned Patrolman
I Cañas who dashed towards the place but Pimentel ran away. Appellant Valcorza regained his
composure and immediately chased the deceased, firing a shot into the air and ordering him to
stop. As the deceased did not heed his order, appellant fired four times into the air, at the same
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN time pursuing the prisoner for a distance of about 100 meters. At that point, fearing that the
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ALTHOUGH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY AS patrol team might fail in apprehending the deceased, appellant Valcorza fired a fifth shot at
PEACE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SHOOTING THE DECEASED BECAUSE Pimentel as the latter was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the creek and
THERE WAS NO DANGER TO HIS LIFE OR LIMB, A RULING WHICH IS BEYOND when the distance between the two was only three meters. Patrolman Ca_¤_as could not be of
THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE much help in the chase because his revolver got entangled with some vines and he dropped it.
AND CONTRARY TO THE RULING LAID BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT After recovering his revolver he joined Valcorza but Pimentel had already jumped down into
IN PEOPLE VERSUS DELIMA, 46 PHIL. 738; the water of the creek.

II The members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate Pimentel and they saw him
floating, with a wound on his back. As Pimentel was still alive, he was placed in the police jeep
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (MAJORITY DECISION) ERRED IN and taken to the poblacion of Maramag for treatment, but he died a few minutes after arrival in
LIKING PETITIONER TO A TRIGGER-HAPPY POLICEMAN AND IN HOLDING THAT the municipal building.
THE DECEASED HAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A DANGEROUS PERSON, A RULING
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO ITS FINDING OF FACTS; The physician who examined the cadaver of the victim gave the opinion that the missile from
the gun fired against the victim entered at the right side of the back but the slug was lodged
III inside the body. The gray discoloration at the edge or rim of the wound of entry showed the
presence of powder burns which, in the opinion of the physician, indicates that the gun was
fired at close range.

141
Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and his firearm to the Chief of Police upon arrival in the ground he was struck again with a stone by the escaping detainee; thereafter the latter ran away pursued by
municipal building of Maramag. petitioner and his companion; in the course of the pursuit the former fired a warning shot into the air, and
as the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, petitioner fired into the air four times more and kept on
pursuing him; as the latter was apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing that he might
Appellant seeks to justify his firing the shot against the deceased by stating that he tried to hit
finally be able to elude arrest, petitioner fired directly at him while he was in the act of jumping again into
him only at the leg, after he had disregarded his several warning shots and orders to stop
another part of the creek, the shot having hit him on the back; as a result of the wound thus inflicted upon
running away. He claims that he did so at the spur of the moment probably because he feared
him, Pimentel died a few minutes after arrival at the municipal building to which he was taken.
that his patrol team might not succeed in apprehending the deceased and bringing him back to
jail. Furthermore, he also claims that he only fired at the deceased when the latter was in the act
of jumping down into the creek which had water of 8 feet deep, and if the deceased succeeded While We have not lost sight of the fact that the deceased Pimentel was charged with a relatively minor
in crossing the creek the patrol team might not be able to apprehend him. In brief the appellant offense, namely, stealing a chicken; and while We do not in any way wish to encourage law enforcing
conveys idea that he had to fire at the deceased in order that he may not continue escaping. officers to be trigger-happy nor to employ force and violence upon persons under their custody, We
cannot, in the consideration of this case, disregard the following facts: the said deceased, in violation of the
law, had escaped from detention; when ordered to stop by Sgt. Daiton — whom he must have recognized
The above version of the appellant was given in open court when he testified on October 4,
as a peace officer in his pursuit — he ran away and then threw himself into a creek to elude his pursuer;
1962 (t.s.n. — pp. 9, 76). However, he claims that he aimed only at the leg of the deceased is
after sometime he suddenly emerged from bushes near which petitioner and a fellow policeman were and
not consistent with what he said in his sworn statement, Exhibit A. 'Question and Answer No. 7'
assaulted the former twice with a stone and then ran away again pursued by petitioner and his companion;
(p. 1, Criminal Case Record), given to the Constabulary soldiers on the afternoon of the day of
that petitioner does not appear to be a trigger-happy policeman as shown by the fact that he had fired five
the incident, or at 3:15 p.m. of June 6, 1960. In narrating how the deceased was shot, appellant
cautionary shots into the air and decided to aim directly at the escaping detainee only when he had already
Valcorza stated in part as follows:
reasons to fear that the latter would be able to elude him and his companions. These facts and
circumstances constrain Us to hold that the act thus performed by petitioner — and which unfortunately
"But said Roberto Pimentel tried his very best to make another escape then he ran resulted in the death of the escaping detainee — was committed in the performance of his official duty and
away cause I was fell down on the ground during the time I wrestled him, Roberto was more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully eluding the officers of the
Pimentel. Then I still follow him and fire my revolver four (4) times up in the sky to law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police officers discharging
stop him but still he continue running, so what I did I fired him one direct hit shot on official functions identical or similar to those in the performance of which petitioner was engaged at the
his back then he tried dive escape into the water, and because he could not do time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that thereafter We would have half-hearted and
anything cause he was already suffering from a gunshot wound we pick him up and dispirited efforts on their part to comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to the great
bring him to our headquarters in the Office of the Chief of Police of Maramag, detriment of public interest.
Bukidnon, for the necessary treatment of the gunshot wound on his right side back
... ."
CONSEQUENTLY, in the spirit of our decision in People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and, as a consequence, petitioner is acquitted, with costs de officio.
What the appellant said on June 6, 1960 in his statement, Exhibit A, which he subscribed and
sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of Maramag, Bukidnon, on June 7, 1960, is an
unadulterated narration of what happened on the day of the incident more than two years before
he took the witness stand. This first narration is more reliable because it was made when there
was yet no time for reflection so as to make his story fit into the facts of the incident. After the
lapse of two years during which he could deliberate and analyze the occurrence and prepare his
defense, his testimony in court no longer jibed with what he said shortly after the event. This
inconsistency affects his credibility and wrecks his theory that he had no intention to kill the
deceased but only meant to disable him from further escaping. It also seriously impairs his
defense as it shows that there was no reasonable necessity for appellant to shoot the deceased at
the time he was running away with no weapon in his hands which he could use for aggression
against the appellant in case he desired to turn back and face the latter. (pp. 3-7, Annex "A",
Petitioner's brief.)

There is no question, therefore, that: on June 4, 1960, the deceased Roberto Pimentel was a detention
prisoner confined in the municipal jail of Maramag, Bukidnon, from which he escaped at about one o'clock
p.m. that day when petitioner was on guard duty; the following day four members of the police force of the
municipality, petitioner included, went after him to a place called Poultry Area in barrio Cuya, their first
efforts to locate him there being unsuccessful; early the following morning, while Sgt. Daiton, who led the
patrol, was squatting on a bridge to answer a call of nature, he saw a man approaching slowly and he
ordered him to stop; the latter, who happened to be the escaped detainee, instead of doing so, jumped into
the creek spanned by the bridge, whereupon Sgt. Daiton summoned his three companions who all rushed
out of the house where they had spent the night, and went after the escaping prisoner; petitioner and
policeman Ca_¤_as, while following the course of the creek and examining certain footprints they had
found, saw their quarry suddenly emerging from nearby bushes; the latter lunged at petitioner hitting him
with a stone on the right cheek, as a consequence of which he fell down, and while in that position on the

142
G.R. No. L-23514 February 17, 1970 In its decision rendered on August 14, 1964 the trial court sustained the prosecution's version of the
incident and found both accused guilty of murder. However, the court credited Avelino with the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim, and imposed upon him a lesser
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
penalty than that imposed on his uncle.
vs.
AVELINO MANANSALA, JR., ET AL., defendants, AVELINO MANANSALA, JR. and JOSE
MANANSALA, defendants-appellants. Appellants' plea is self-defense. This is predicated on the theory that the deceased was himself armed with
a knife with which he tried to stab Avelino, as declared by the two witnesses for the defense. Several
circumstances, however, belie this claim. First, Avelino sustained no knife wound at all. Second, although
MAKALINTAL, J.:
several policemen arrived at the scene of the incident almost immediately after it happened, not one of
them saw the knife allegedly used by Rodrigo. Nor was it shown to them, or at least brought to their
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its Criminal Case No. 3285 attention, by either of the appellants. Indeed, when Avelino surrendered to the policemen he declined to
convicting Avelino Manansala, Jr. and Jose Manansala of murder and sentencing the first to an give any statement, which in the natural course of things he would have done if he had acted merely to
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years 4 months and 1 day defend himself. A protestation of innocence or justification is the logical and spontaneous reaction of a
of reclusion temporal, and the second to reclusion perpetua; both of them to indemnify jointly and man who finds himself in such an inculpatory predicament as that in which the policemen came upon the
severally the heirs of Rodrigo Aringo in the sum of P6,000.00; and each to pay ¹/ 3 of the costs. appellants, with Avelino still clutching the death weapon and his victim dying before him.

The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimony of two eyewitnesses — Celestino Atun and Percival But while it is clear that Avelino did not act in legitimate self-defense, the trial court correctly held that
Amador — and of the policemen who went to the scene of the crime upon noticing the commotion it there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim. The evidence given by the witnesses for the
produced, sought to establish the following: Between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 27, defense as to how and why the fight started, and as to the fact that the deceased hit Avelino with his fist, is
1962, some persons had a quarrel inside the New Bicol Carinderia, an eatery located near the Legaspi Port not controverted by the witnesses for the prosecution, who did not see the incident from the very
Market, Legaspi City. After a short while the protagonists came out through the backdoor of beginning. And one fist blow at least is confirmed by the doctor who treated Avelino for a contusion
the carinderia. Jose Manansala had Rodrigo in a tight embrace from behind, with his arms under the around one eye.
latter's armpits. While Rodrigo was in that position of apparent helplessness, Avelino stabbed him with
a balisong, or Batangas knife. The stabbing continued while Rodrigo was led, or dragged, by Jose to a
On the other hand, the fact that when Avelino stabbed the victim the latter was practically helpless and
bamboo bed (papag) nearby, and even after Rodrigo had been forced down on it in a prone position. When
unable to put up any defense being in the tight embrace of Jose Manansala, was correctly appreciated by
the policemen who responded to the commotion arrived they found Avelino still holding the fatal weapon,
the trial court as treachery, and qualifies the offense as murder.
and Rodrigo's limp body, bathed in his own blood, stretched on the papag. A taxicab was commandeered
to take the wounded man to a hospital, but he expired even before the vehicle could start. The autopsy later
conducted by Dr. Antolin Lotivio, a resident physician of the Albay Provincial Hospital, revealed that the Jose Manansala was found guilty as co-principal on the ground that there was concert of action between
victim died from massive hemorrhage and shock as a result of the multiple wounds (thirteen in all) him and his nephew. The evidence does not justify this finding beyond reasonable doubt. There is no
sustained by him in the chest, abdomen, back and the extremities. showing that the killing was agreed upon between them beforehand. No motive for it has been shown other
than the provocation given by the deceased; and such motive was true only insofar as Avelino was
concerned. The circumstances indicate that if Jose embraced Rodrigo and rendered him helpless, it was to
The accused did not take the witness stand. However, they presented two witnesses, Domingo Daria and
stop him from further hitting Avelino with his fists. However, Jose is not entirely free from liability, for it
Salvador Petilos, who said that they saw the whole incident. The substance of their testimony is as follows:
has been established that even after the first knife thrust had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino,
Early in the afternoon of March 27, 1962 Avelino, a small-time peddler of textiles in the Legaspi Port
either by word or overt act. Instead Jose continued to hold Rodrigo, even forced him down on the bamboo
Market, was eating his lunch inside one of the eateries dotting the market site, when Rodrigo
bed with Avelino still pressing the attack. Withal it cannot be said that Jose's cooperation was such that
Aringo alias Diego, a baggage boy in the same market, approached him and demanded his fee for having
without it the offense would not have been accomplished. But although not indispensable, it was a
carried Avelino's baggage. Avelino said he was willing to pay for the services rendered at noon, but not for
contributing factor. If Jose's initial intent was free from guilt, it became tainted after he saw the first knife
those rendered earlier in the morning. He then took some money from his pocket and proferred it to
thrust delivered. The thirteen wounds must have taken an appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose's
Rodrigo. Obviously peeved at having been thus publicly rebuffed, Rodrigo brusquely brushed Avelino's
cooperation facilitated their infliction. He must therefore be held liable as an accomplice.
hand aside and instantly gave him a fist blow in the face. Avelino fell from his seat; he tried to get up, but
was given another blow, and then a third. As he reeled from the force of the last blow a batangasknife he
was carrying fell from his trousers pocket. Avelino picked up the knife, and Rodrigo, seeing that he was The slaying of the deceased having been qualified by treachery, Avelino Manansala is liable for murder,
armed, rushed to the carinderia's kitchen and returned almost immediately with a 10-inch knife in his the penalty of which is reclusion temporal maximum to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code).
hand. With it he swung at his antagonist, but the latter evaded the blow. Appreciating in favor of Avelino the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation by the deceased
without any generic aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty imposable upon him is the
minimum period of the penalty for murder (see par. 3, Art. 63, Revised Penal Code), which is reclusion
Meanwhile, appellant Jose Manansala, an uncle of Avelino, noticed the commotion from outside
temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Since the resulting penalty is neither death
the carinderia, where he was loading baggage on a parked truck some six meters away. He shouted at
nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103 as amended).
Rodrigo to stop. Rodrigo paid no heed and instead delivered another thrust at Avelino, who again evaded
Avelino Manansala is therefore entitled to an indeterminate sentence, the upper range of which is reclusion
it. At the third attempt, Jose embraced Rodrigo from behind, and it was at that moment that Avelino
temporal maximum and the lower range — which is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by the
stabbed Rodrigo and inflicted the numerous wounds which proved fatal. Jose took the kitchen knife from
Revised Penal Code for murder — is anywhere within prision mayor maximum (10 years and 1 day)
Rodrigo and threw it away, and then released his limp body on the papag nearby. When the policemen
to reclusion temporal medium (17 years and 4 months). The penalty meted out by the trial court on
arrived Avelino was still clutching the knife he had used. Both appellants were apprehended.
Avelino Manansala, Jr. — "from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years 4 mouths and 1 day
of reclusion temporal" — is within the range allowed by law and is therefore correctly imposed.

143
As regards appellant Jose Manansala, the penalty prescribed by law, he being an accomplice, is one degree
lower than that prescribed for the principal, or prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium (10)
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering that
under paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, "(W)hen there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, (the court) shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period," the
decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified as follows:

Appellant Jose Manansala, as accomplice to the offense of murder, is sentenced to an indeterminate


penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal; the amount of the indemnity is raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 to be paid the heirs of the
deceased by Avelino Manansala, Jr. as principal; in case of the insolvency of the principal, Jose
Manansala, as accomplice, is subsidiarily liable for the indemnity due from said principal; and in all other
respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

144
G.R. No. L-32390 December 28, 1973 the dry river bed had been constructed by Leoncio de Guzman's laborers. While he was negotiating that
passageway, however, he accidentally rammed three or four bamboo posts which were stuck into the
ground. He proceeded on the dry river bed, stopped to unload the soldier and his family near their hut, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
then continued on his way. He had covered a short distance when he saw a jeep speeding in his direction,
vs.
with Pedro Cruz at the wheel and a companion, called "Moro," beside him. Cruz blocked his way with the
CLEMENTE AQUINO, defendant-appellant.
jeep, got off and walked towards the left side of the truck. About two meters away Cruz stopped and asked
him, "Why do you insist passing here when I am stopping you?' Aquino answered, "Why should you stop
MAKALINTAL, C.J.: me here when I am already on the river?" Cruz did not answer, but gave a meaningful glance at "Moro,"
who was still inside the jeep, and touched something bulging at his waist. When he pulled the thing out,
Aquino saw it was a "balisong" knife. Cruz stepped on the left running board of the truck, and hauled
In Criminal Case No. 6404-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Clemente Aquino was charged himself up with his left hand holding on to the windshield frame. Aquino moved towards the right side of
with and found guilty of murder for the death of Pedro Cruz in the afternoon of April 29, 1967 at barrio
the driver's seat but was not able to go to the extreme end because his thigh got wedged under the gear
Sibul, San Miguel, Bulacan. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay an indemnity of P12,000.00 shift. Cruz thrust forward with his knife at him, but he leaned far to the right and at the same time parried
and P10,000.00 for actual expenses and damages suffered by the heirs of the victim. The case thereafter the knife hand. Cruz switched his knife to a stabbing position and at that moment Aquino, who was already
elevated to this Court on appeal. leaning almost prone on the driver's seat, got his gun from the tool box and fired at his antagonist. The first
shot hit Cruz on the right side of the throat, the second on the right arm. Aquino fired four times in all and
There is no dispute as to the fact of the killing. Aquino did it with a revolver, caliber .22, which he fired then jumped out of the truck on the right side, leaving Cruz slumped over the driver's seat. Aquino sought
four times in succession. His plea is self-defense. cover near the right front tire of the truck. "Moro," gun in hand, got off the jeep but ran away when he saw
Aquino's gun trained on him. When Aquino again looked in the direction of his antagonist, he saw the
latter already lying beneath the truck. There was a small army contingent nearby and he went to one of the
Cruz was an employee of the Farmont Mines and Aquino was working as truck driver for a certain huts of the soldiers and surrendered his gun to one of them.
Leoncio de Guzman owner of a white clay mine adjacent to the Farmont property. It seems that there was
some kind of rivalry between the two mining establishments, which somehow involved their respective
personnel. The appellant's version was corroborated by Teofilo de Guzman, former employee of Leoncio de Guzman.
He was one of those who rode with Aquino from Leoncio de Guzman's stockpile of white clay in Bo.
Akle. Besides himself there were other persons who were given a lift in the same truck, including an army
The case for the prosecution consists of the testimony of three principal witnesses, all employees of the soldier with his wife and two children. They drove on a public road, and upon reaching a spot where there
Farmont Mines namely, Priscila Corpuz, Jorge Cruz and Dominador Cruz. In the morning of April 29, was a signboard marked "Farmont Property," Aquino made a detour toward Akle river. In negotiating the
1967 they rode together with Pedro Cruz in the latter's jeep to go to the Farmont Mines site at Akle, San bend down to the river bed, the truck accidentally rammed and destroyed four bamboo posts. They stopped
Ildefonso, Bulacan. On their way they passed Bo. Pinaod where they saw a truck parked by the roadside briefly to allow the soldier and his family to get off. Suddenly a jeep, which was running very fast,
and a jeep behind. Clemente Aquino was at the driver's seat of the truck and Leoncio de Guzman was overtook them and stopped in front of the truck. Pedro Cruz, who was at the wheel, got down, leaving his
inside the jeep. Priscila Corpuz said she afterwards noticed the two vehicles following her group at a companion named "Moro" inside. Cruz walked toward the truck and there was an exchange of words
distance of about 100 meters. A half hour after she and her companions reached the mine site Clemente between him and Aquino. He pulled out a bladed weapon, stepped on the running board of the truck and
Aquino arrived in his truck and "passed thru the fence of the Farmont Mines. Pedro Cruz was then inside lunged at his opponent, who evaded the attack by leaning down to his right. Both Aquino and Teofilo de
the Farmont property, repairing his own jeep, and after Aquino rammed the truck through the fence, Cruz Guzman testified that the blood from the bullet wounds Pedro Cruz received spilled on the driver's seat of
went directly to his jeep and drove it to intercept the other vehicle. When Cruz caught up he alighted from the truck. De Guzman also testified that during the shooting the other passengers who were still inside the
the jeep and without any previous exchange of words between them Aquino immediately shot him. truck jumped out and that he saw Cruz slide down slowly from the running board, with his two legs finally
going directly under the truck.
Jorge Cruz related substantially the same story as that given by Priscila Corpuz, except that while the latter
said she joined her companions before reaching Bo. Pinaod, where she got off the jeep for a while to buy In view of the conflicting versions of the witnesses for the prosecution on one hand and the witnesses for
some foodstuffs, Jorge Cruz said that it was in the said barrio that they picked up Priscilla, he himself the defense on the other, a number of physical and objective circumstances assume decisive importance.
having joined Pedro Cruz in the latter's jeep much earlier in the day.

First is the testimony of patrolman Ernesto Salazar of the San Miguel police. He was listed in the
The third witness for the prosecution was Dominador Cruz, who was also in the group which rode in the information as one of the witnesses of the prosecution but was not called to testify although he was present
jeep of the deceased Pedro Cruz in going to the mine site. The version of all three is that after alighting in court all the time that the State was adducing its evidence. Presented instead by the defense, he said that
from his jeep, which he used to intercept Clemente Aquino's truck, catching up with the latter on the dry in the afternoon of April 29, 1967, a policeman from San Ildefonso reported the death of Pedro Cruz to the
bed of the river near the Farmont property, Pedro Cruz walked to where the truck had stopped. He was Chief of Police of San Miguel. The Chief then ordered him and patrolman Sta. Maria to proceed to the
standing some two or three meters from the truck, to the left of the driver's seat, when Clemente Aquino scene of the incident. He could not recall how many persons were there when they arrived, but did
shot him four times, killing him on the spot. remember a certain Victor Intacto and several army soldiers, headed by Sgt. Oscariz, standing near the
dead body. It was then about 8 o'clock in the evening. He saw Pedro Cruz lying on his back by the left side
Aquino's version as to the circumstances which led to the shooting contradicts that of the prosecution. He of the truck, and had photographs of the body taken from different angles; he found blood stains on the
did not drive thru or ram the fence of the Farmont Mines. He was a truck driver for Leoncio de Guzman, driver's seat and had them also photographed; and then afterwards he found a dagger on the floor of the
his shift of duty being in the afternoon, while another driver, Melencio Guevarra, drove the truck in the truck near the driver's seat, the scabbard of which he had previously seen tucked at Pedro Cruz' right hip.
morning. At 11:30 on April 29, 1967, he took over as driver at the clay stockpile in Bo. Akle and left for In the course of his testimony Salazar identified the eight photographs which had been taken, his on-the-
the mine site, together with Guevarra and Teofilo de Guzman. On the way he gave a lift to several persons, spot report and the sketched of the scene which he prepared, the dagger and the scabbard. In particular the
including an army soldier by the name of Conrado Ferma the latter's wife and two children. To go to the photographs of the body show that where he lay Pedro Cruz' two legs were directly under the truck.
mine site he did not have to pass thru the Farmont property because some distance from it a passageway to
145
Another significant piece of evidence is the biology report and testimony of Mercedes Bautista, Chief of Involvement — skin, soft tissue and muscle of the forearm.
Forensic Chemistry of the National Bureau of Investigation, to the effect that she analyzed the blood stains
on the driver's seat of the truck in question upon request by the Chief of Police of San Miguel and found
Exit — located at the proximal 3rd of the forearm medially, measuring 0.5 by 0.5
them to be of human blood.
cm. with averted edges.

Similarly significant is the necropsy report of Dr. Aris Tantoco, Municipal Health Officer of Angat,
The physical, objective facts enumerated above are not only consistent with but indeed confirm strongly
Bulacan, which shows the locations of the wounds and trajectories of the bullets in the body of the
the plea of self-defense raised by the appellant. The direction of three of the four bullets which hit the
deceased, as follows:
deceased shows that he must have been in a forward stooping position at the time, with his left forearm
raised somewhat in front of him, as would be the case if he was holding the windshield frame with his left
1. Located at occipital region of the head, left measuring 0.3 cm. with a length of 1.1 hand. Thus the slug which entered the base of the neck, in front and to the right, plowed downward
cm. through the upper lung and the muscle of the lumbar region, where it was recovered just beneath the skin.
The slug which entered the body at the left upper chest also followed a downward direction and was
recovered beneath the skin at the back. And the slug which hit the left forearm near the palm of the hand
2. Entrance — located at the base of the neck anterior right, 2 inches from the
took both an upward and posteriorly direction and exited "at the proximal 3rd of the forearm medially."
anterior median line 54 inches from the right heel.
The bullets could not have had these trajectories if the deceased had been standing upright two or three
meters to the left of the truck, as the witnesses for the prosecution testified.
Size — 0.4 by 0.3 cm.
The evidence of the dagger or knife, which was retrieved patrolman Salazar from the floor of the truck
Description — Ovaloid with inverted edges with an abrasion collar measuring 0.1 below the driver's seat, and the evidence of the blood stains on the seat itself, not only find no explanation
cm at its upper part. in but directly contradicts the version of the prosecution. It should be noted that although the chemical
examination of the stains was done eleven days after the incident, they were photographed shortly after
happened and the driver's seat itself was placed in the custody of the chief of Police of San Miguel.
Direction — Downward posteriorly and to the right.

The trial court took a cavalier attitude toward these evidences, hinting that they might have been planted.
Involvement — Skin, soft tissues, and muscles of the neck, upper lung, right, muscle But one who found the knife and had photographs of the blood stains taken was the police officer assigned
of the lumbar region, right, a lead bullet was recovered just beneath the skin on the
to conduct official investigation. And he did so in the presence of several persons. The appellant himself
lumbar region. surrendered to an army soldier and was taken away immediately after the shooting; and the premises where
it happened, including the truck and the body of the deceased, were under guard by army soldiers before
3. Entrance — located at the upper chest left, 3.5 inches from the anterior median patrolman Salazar arrived to conduct the investigation. The very position of the body as testified to by the
line, 48 inches from the left heel. same patrolman and confirmed by the photographs shows that after being shot Cruz must have slid down
the running board of the truck when he was said to be standing, thus accounting for the fact that he was
found lying on his back with his two legs under the truck. Such a position could hardly have been possible
Size — 0.4 by 0.3 cm. if he had been shot while standing two or three meters away from the vehicle.

Description — ovaloid with inverted edges, with an abrasion collar measuring 0.1 The three elements of self-defense are here present. The was unlawful aggression on the part of the
cm. at its upper part. deceased when he attacked the appellant with a deadly weapon, especially in the rather cramped quarters
of the driver's compartment of the truck, where the space was too limited for effective maneuvering. The
Direction — downward posteriorly and to the left. means employed to repel that aggression was reasonable. As repeatedly held by this Court, "(I)n
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon process of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self- preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon his instinct, it
Involvement — Skin soft tissues, muscles of the chest, grazing the third rib piercing is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the
the thoracic wall, the lungs left posterior wall of the chest. Slug was recovered just consequences."1 And upon a review of the evidence we find that the appellant did not give any sufficient
beneath the skin of the posterior chest. provocation for the attack against him.

4. Entrance — located at the palmar region of the left forearm anteriorly. In ruling that there was such provocation the court a quo relied on the testimony of Priscila Corpuz to the
effect that the appellant rammed the closed gate of the Farmont compound. However, this testimony is of
Size — 0.4 by 0.3 cm. doubtful credibility: Corpuz gave conflicting versions on this point which she failed to explain
satisfactorily. In her affidavit (Exhibit 4) which she executed before a certain Atty. Ernesto Catimbang, she
stated:
Description — Ovaloid with inverted edges with an abrasion collar measuring 0.1
cm. at its lower part.
6. That we saw the actual shooting incident, when without any warning the accused
driver of the cargo truck upon arriving at the gate ordered Mr. Pedro Cruz to move
Direction — Upward and posteriorly. his jeep away from the road in order to pass by and the deceased Pedro Cruz
answered that the truck can pass because he is parked by the side of the road but

146
instead of passing by the cargo truck driver suddenly and without warning pulled a Atty. Hill:
gun hidden in the compartment, of the truck and shot at Pedro Cruz, who because
was hit had to climb the truck but was repulsed by the succeeding shot fired at him
Q. What was that post which was smashed by the truck?
and fell to the ground dead.

A. It was behind the Farmont Mines' laborers, sir.


In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, Priscila Corpuz
gave another version. On direct examination, she testified as follows:
Q. What was that post?
Q. What happened when the truck arrived at the site?
A. To serve as fence, sir.
A. He went to the post.
Q. Was that fence destroyed?
Q. What post are you referring to?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Post behind our laborers in the mine site.
(Exhibit 24, pp. 27-28)
Q. Now, what happened after that?
In her two versions quoted above Priscila Corpuz did not say that the appellant forced his way through the
closed gate of the Farmont Mines or that he went inside its premises in going down the river bed.
A. Then he maneuvered and went down the river where Mr.
Pedro Cruz was standing.
On the other hand, the appellant clearly testified, with the aid of sketch (Exhibit 1) and with corroboration
from Teofilo Guzman, that before reaching the gate of the Farmont Mines he made a detour to the river
Q. What happened when the truck went down the river where
bed by using the passageway which had been constructed by the men of Leoncio de Guzman and that
Mr. Pedro Cruz standing.?
while negotiating the descent he accidentally bumped three or four bamboo posts stuck into the ground.
The existence of the passageway, which according to the defendant was constructed purposely to avoid
A. He fired without notice. passing through the contested road, was not controverted by the prosecution.

Q. To whom did he fire? In view of the foregoing considerations We find the plea of complete self-defense sufficiently established.
The judgment of the Court a quo is reversed and the appellant is acquitted, with costs de officio.
A. Pedro Cruz.

Q. What happened with Pedro Cruz when he was fired at?

A. He fell down and he was dead.

Q. How many times did you hear the shot rang out?

A. There were plenty, sir. It continued the shots. (Exhibits 24-


C and 24-D, pp. 21-23 of Exhibit 24)

Atty. Hill:

Q. You were referring to a post, is that part of the gate which


was smashed by the truck of the respondent?

Atty. Castillo:

Objection. Leading question.

147
G.R. No. L-26750 August 18, 1972 The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of Cuyapo health officer Pio Alberto,
policeman Esmenino Delo and police inspector Casimiro Aguinaldo.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Patrolman Esmenino Delo declared that about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of May 30, 1965, he was with
JOSEEN COMIENDA Y NAVARRO, defendant-appellant. policeman Federico Olog at police outpost No. 2 in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, when one Franklin Ancheta
reported that Severino Cabaral was wounded in the yard of the accused Jose Encomienda. He proceeded to
the defendant's yard where he saw Severino mortally wounded in a kneeling position about two or three
MAKASIAR, J.:p
meters in front of the stairs of the house of the accused and could not raise his head. Severino was
unconscious but still breathing (pp. 13-14, t.s.n.), On his query, the wounded Severino told him in the
The accused Jose Encomienda y Navarro appealed on September 22, 1966 from the decision dated presence of policemen Eufemio Delo and Mateo Castillo, that the accused Jose Encomienda stabbed him
September 12, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija [Branch IV Guimba] (p. 97, Vol. I, rec.) (pp. 9-10, t.s.n.), which statement he wrote down in Ilocano on a piece of ruled paper (Exhibit "C", p. 4,
sentencing him for murder aggravated by recidivism but mitigated by voluntary surrender, to life Vol. II, rec.), on which the deceased affixed his right thumbmark and duly signed by patrolmen Mateo
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Severino Cabaral in the sum of Castillo and Eufemio Delo as witnesses (p. 11, t.s.n.). Said alleged ante mortem statement of the victim,
P6,000.00, to suffer the accessories provided for by law, and to pay the costs (pp. 84-96, Vol. 1, rec.). Exhibit "C", was translated into English by police inspector Casimiro Aguinaldo (Exh "C-1", pp. 14 & 19,
t.s.n.).
The record of the case was received on October 25, 1966 by the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court (p. 1,
Vol. 11, rec.) from the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, who received the same on October 20, Exhibit "C-1" shows that the same was taken down at 4:45 P.M. of May 30, 1965 and contains the
1966, without the transcript of stenographic notes, which transcript was submitted to the Supreme Court on following conversation between partrolman Esmenino Delo and the victim:
November 11, 1966 (p. 1, t.s.n., Vol. III), from the deputy clerk of the trial court (p. 2, Vol. II, rec.).
Q — Who boloed you?
After the briefs of appellant and appellee were filed respectively on January 18, 1967 (pp 26-48, Vol. II,
rec.) and July 2, 1967 (p. 67, Vol. II, rec.), the case was submitted for decision on August 14, 1967 (p. 73,
A — Jose Encomienda.
Vol. ll rec.).

Q — Is this true?
On January 14, 1970, one AFP T/Sgt Venancio B. Bañaga, through counsel, filed a petition for an order
directing the clerk of court of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to deliver to him the
.32 caliber revolver with serial No. 154646, Exhibit "E", alleging that after the appealed decision was A — Yes.
rendered by the trial court, the ownership of said revolver was transferred to him by reason of which he
was issued by the Philippine Constabulary Special Permit No. 369246 authorizing him to possess the said
Q — You thumbmark.
revolver while he is in the active service (AFP), attaching the said special permit as Annex "A" to his
petition (pp. 74-75, 76, Vol. II, rec.), and that his motion to withdraw the said revolver was denied by the
trial court due to the pendency of this case before the Supreme Court (Annex "A", p. 78, Vol. II, rec.). Said A — Yes. (p. 5, Vol. I, rec.).
petition was deemed submitted for resolution on March 18, 1970 after the Solicitor General failed to
comment thereon within the period allowed him (pp. 79, 80, 82, Vol. II, rec.).
Assisted by policemen Mateo Castillo, Eufemio Delo and Federico Olog, patrolman Esmenino Delo
brought the victim to the private clinic of Dr. Potenciano Garcia, after which he looked for the accused in
Arraigned on the following information for murder: the premises of the scene of the incident. Failing to locate the accused thereat, patrolman Esmenino Delo,
together with lieutenant Gamboa, proceeded to the municipal building to report the incident after which
they conducted an investigation in the premises of the incident, where they found blood stains in the yard
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1965, in the munipality of Cuyapo, province
and in front of the stairway of the house of the accused (pp. 11-12, t.s.n.). About 5:30 in the afternoon of
of Nueva Ecija, Republic of Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
that same day, May 30, 1965, they returned to the municipal building where they saw police inspector
Honorable Court the above-named accused conspiring together and mutually aiding
Casimiro Aguinaldo interrogating the accused. According to police inspector Aguinaldo (p 13, t.s.n.), the
one another, armed with a bolo and blunt instrument, with intent to kill and with
accused went to the municipal building alone at about 4:55 p.m. of May 30, 1965, surrendering a bolo and
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
a .32 caliber revolver (Exhs. "D" & "E") together wit two live bullets (Exhs. "E-I" & "E-2") and four
feloniously attack and hacked one Severino Cabaral, inflicting upon him multiple
empty shells contained in an envelope. The bolo (Exh. "D") is about 13 inches long with a wooden handle
wounds which caused his instantaneous death.
about 18 centimeters long. He placed the bolo and the revolver in seperate wrappers (Exhs. "D-1" & "E-3",
pp. 15-17, 19 t.s.n.). After entrusting the accused to the guard, he and policeman Esmenino Delo went to
That the accused Jose Encomienda y Navarro is a recidivist having been convicted the scene of the incident, saw blood stains on the stairs of the house of the accused and a box of water
of the crime of Murder on April 30, 1958, in Criminal Case No. 4382 by the Court mixed with blood. Thereafter, they repaired to the clinic of Dr. Garcia where they saw the victim about
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. (p. 47, Vol. I, rec.). 6:30 that evening and stayed there for about five minutes, after which they returned to the municipal
building (pp. 16-17, t.s.n.). When he asked the accused whether he was willing to give any statement, the
accused replied in the negative and stressed that he would wait for his lawyer (pp. 17, 19, t.s.n.). He
accused appellant who waived the presence of his counsel at said arraignment (p. 53, Vol. I, rec.), pleaded
translated into English the alleged dying declaration, Exhibit "C", of the victim (Exh. "C-1", p. 15, Vol. I,
not guilty on June 2, 1966 (p. 54, Vol. I, rec.).
rec.; p. 19, t.s.n.). When he asked the accused why he boloed the victim, the accused replied that he would
not talk and he would await for his lawyer. He did not examine the hands of the accused for powder burns
as he did not know the procedure therefor. Neither did he request the Philippine Constabulary to conduct
148
such examination of the victim for powder burns. He did not know who fired the revolver. The victim bore work on the land; that the second time the victim went to his house was on a Friday or Saturday, but only
no gunshot wounds. The accused did not tell him that the victim fired at him. But, the victim's son told him his little child was home then as he was out and his wife was in the market; that the third time the victim
that the revolver was licensed in the name of the victim (pp 19-20, t.s.n.). went to his house was about 4:30 in the afternoon of May 30, 1965 telling him that he was sent by the
hacienda owner to tell him that he cannot work in the hacienda and that he will be removed as tenant; that
he was then cutting wood beside the stairway with a bolo (Exh. "D"), while the victim was standing also
Dr. Pio Alberto, the Cuyapo health officer, recounted that about 6: 00 P.M. of May 30, 1965, he examined
beside the stairs; that when he asked why he was being removed as tenant when it was his means of
the victim in the clinic of Dr. Potenciano Garcia, executed the medical certificate Exhibit "A" (p. 2, Vol. I,
livelihood, the victim replied that he had no right to work on the land because it was not in his name, to
rec.), and issued the death certificate showing that the victim was born in 1898 and was 67 years old when
which he countered that the victim had no right to remove him for he (the victim) was only a messenger
he died on May 30, 1965 (Exh. "B", p. 3, Vol. I, rec.).
and also a tenant like him in the hacienda, which alone has the right to remove him (pp. 23, 30, t.s.n.); that
the victim became angry and with his right hand drew his revolver tucked in his left side when they were
The medical certificate, which states that the victim died about 10 o'clock in the evening of May 30, 1965 about one meter apart (p. 23, t.s.n.); that with his left hand he immediately grabbed the victim's right hand
from shock and hemorrhage, describes the injuries sustained by the victim Severino Cabaral, thus: holding the revolver, forcing the victim to lean on the stairway, pinned the victim's right hand also on the
stairs; that during their struggle, the revolver fired four times continuously that with the bolo in his right
hand he struck the victim's right forearm; that when the victim wanted to get the gun with his left hand, he
1. — A clean cut horizontal wound about 1 inch above both eyebrows extending boloed the victim's left arm about one inch from the left wrist; that he shook the victim's right arm
from the outer tip of the left to the outer tip of the right eyebrow; cutting the frontal downward causing the gun to fall to the ground; that when the victim tried to pick up the gun, he stepped
bone and exposing the brain tissue. Fragments of the frontal bone were extracted backward and hacked the victim's forehead causing the victim to fall backward on the stairway, as he
during the operation. (appellant) retrieved the gun to prevent the victim from picking it up again and then stepped about two
meters backward for the victim might grab him (pp. 24, 25, 31, 32, 34, t.s.n.); that thereafter the victim
2. — A clean cut almost horizontal wound about 2 inches long from inwards slowly got up and washed his forehead with the water from the box nearby while sitting in front of said
downwards and outwards at the latero-posterior aspect of the left wrist exposing the box, after which he went to the municipal building with the bolo and the gun which he surrendered to
ligaments which were found to be intact. police inspector Casimiro Aguinaldo; that the ecchymosis on the lower and right scapula of the victim
might be due to his having violently pushed the victim against the bamboo stairway with two wooden
lower steps (pp. 26, 27, t.s.n.); that he was alone in the house that afternoon of May 30, 1965 when the
3. — An oblique clean cut wound about 1 ½, inch long on the postero-medial aspect incident happened as his wife was then out selling meat and his children were with his father-in-law (p. 20,
of right forearm about 3 inches above the wrist joint from outwards downwards and t.s.n.); that the victim was taller and slightly bigger than he is; that the victim's son, Guillermo, is taller
inwards. than his deceased father (p. 32, t.s.n.); and that he is right-handed (p. 33, t.s.n.).

4. — Swelling and ecchymosis about 2-½ inches by 3-½ inches on lower angle of By actual measurement, Guillermo Cabaral is 5'6" tall; while the accused has a height of 5'3" (p. 33, t.s.n.).
right scapula.

The prosecution did not offer any rebuttal evidence and relied mainly on the alleged ante mortem
5. — Swelling and ecchymosis about 2-½ inches by 3-½ inches just above the brim statement Exhibits "C" & "C-1" of the deceased and on the medical testimony of Dr. Pio Alberto, the town
of the right hip bone at the back. (Exh. "A", p. 2, Vol. I, rec.). health officer. There is therefore no testimonial evidence for the state as to how and why the incident
occurred for no eyewitness was presented.
Dr. Alberto opined that wound no. 1 on the forehead was mortal and was caused by a sharp instrument like
a bolo, with the assailant on the side of and higher than the victim or the victim was stooping at the time It is most unfortunate that the police authorities did no cause the immediate examination of the trigger of
said wound was inflicted (pp. 3, 4, 7, t.s.n.); that wound no. 2, about 2 inches long on the left wrist of the the revolver for finger prints and of the stairs, the hands and clothing of both the accused and the victim for
victim, was also caused by a sharp instrument like a bolo, was not fatal and could have been inflicted when powder burns, to determine whose fingers were actually on trigger of the revolver.
the victim raised his hands in self defense with the right hand a little higher than the left, adding that the
victim could still move his hands (pp. 3, & 8, t.s.n.); that wound no. 3 on the right forearm and about 3 or 4
inches above the wrist could have been inflicted with a sharp instrument like a bolo when the victim raised If the four slugs had been recovered, the same would have been helpful in ascertaining the trajectory and
his hands in self-defense (pp. 3, 4, & 8, t.s.n.); that wound no. 4, the swelling and ecchymosis about 2 ½ direction of the bullets and whether they could have been fired from the stairs or not.
inches by 3 ½ inches on the lower angle of the right scapula and about 8 inches below the right armpit,
could have been caused by a rod or a bat or a fall or a bolo's handle, but not by the narrow back of a bolo The unrebutted fact that the incident happened inside the yard and just beside the stairway of the house of
(p. 5, t.s.n.); that wound no. 5 the swelling and ecchymosis about 2 ½ inches by 3 ½ inches on the right
the accused and that the victim was armed with a revolver licensed in his name, confirms appellant's story
pelvic bone just above the waistline could have been caused by a rod with the assailant on the side of the that the deceased, as the hacienda overseer, went to the residence who the accused, informed the latter that
victim (pp. 5-6, t.s.n.); that the victim was in a state of shock at the time he examined him; that he left the the hacienda owner had removed him as tenant, and directed him to vacate the land tilled by him as it was
victim at about 8:30 that evening of May 30, 1965 sleeping in Dr. Garcia's clinic; and that the next day, he
not recorded in his name. When the accused questioned the victim's authority to remove him, the victim
saw the victim already dead due to shock and hemorrhage (pp. 6-7, t.s.n.). became furious and drew his gun.

Appellant narrated that since 1947 he was a tenant of hacienda Doña Nena in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; that
While it is true that the victim was taller and slightly bigger than the accused, the latter could match the
the victim Severino Cabaral was the hacienda overseer (pp. 22, 27, t.s.n.); that the land he was working strength of the right hand of the victim with his left hand since he was then a 37-year old farmer and the
was recorded in the name of his late father, who died in 1963 (p. 28, t.s.n.); that about one week before victim was 67 year of age or 30 years his senior. In his excitement and apprehension of the peril to his life,
May 30, 1965, the victim went to his house and invited him to go to his (victim's) house telling him that he
appellant was not expected nor had the time, to determine whether he could save himself by just kicking
could no longer work on the land for the land is not in his name; that he did not go with the victim to the the gun away from the victim or stepping on it or pushing the victim away from the latter when the victim
latter's house then; that he was not mad when the victim told him for the first time that he can no longer
149
tried to pick up the gun after he was already wounded on both forearms; or whether the victim, if able to right hand also on the stair. During the struggle, the revolver fired four times continously and he hacked
pick up the gun, could have fired the remaining two bullets at appellant who was just about a meter away. the victim's right forearm. When the victim tried to get the gun with his left hand, appellant boloed the
victim's left arm and then shook the victim right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the ground and
the victim tried to pick up the gun, appellant stepped backward and hacked the victim's forehead, after
The alleged dying declaration of the deceased which consists only of three brief, mostly monosyllabic,
which he himself picked up the gun so as to prevent the victim, from retrieving the same.
answers to equally brief questions of partrolman Esmenino Delo, to wit:

If the deceased had no intention to use his gun on the appellant, he would not have drawn it or resisted
Q — Who boloed you?
appellant's attempt to prevent him from using it. There was therefore real danger to the life or personal
safety of the appellant.5
A — Jose Encomienda.
The instant case is quite analogous to the case of People vs. Pangan, et al wherein the accused, also an
Q — Is this true? agricultural share tenant, killed with a penknife the superintendent of the hacienda. When the accused
therein denied the charge of the superintendent that he was letting his carabaos run loose to destroy the
tender sugar cane shoots, the deceased while berating him, struck him twice with a whip hitting him (the
A — Yes.
accused) on the left temporal and occipital regions causing his ear to bleed, against which the accused
offered no resistance but only tried to evade the blows. After they were separated by a third party, the
Q — You thumbmark. accused sat down on an acacia trunk, but the deceased approached him again and insultingly asked him
whether he wanted to fight, to which accused replied he would not fight. Thereafter, the accused retired to
his home. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, accused went to the house of the
A — Yes. (Exhs. "C" & "C-1", pp. 4-5, Vol. 1, rec.). deceased to ask him to return his two cows that had been caught but the deceased kicked him and struck
him with a cane, causing a welt on this left shoulder. As the accused stepped back to avoid the second
uncorroborated as it is bereft of essential details as to the motive and circumstances surrounding the blow aimed at him, the deceased placed his right hand upon the handle of the revolver he carried by his
incident, does not generate the moral certainty as to the culpability of appellant. The evidence of the waist. When the accused saw this intention of the deceased, he drew his knife and opened it with his teeth.
prosecution lacks the requisite sufficiency to persuade the human mind to agree with the conclusion of the The deceased then drew his revolver; but before he could fire it, the accused wrestled with him and caught
trial court, whose decision cannot as a consequence be sustained. the hand holding the gun. During the ensuing struggle, both fell to the ground, the deceased upon his back,
while the accused upon him, with one hand griping the deceased's hand holding the revolver and with the
other stabbing the deceased on the abdomen and other parts of the body including the right arm compelling
It is also doubtful whether the victim could hear or understand the three questions propounded to him or the deceased to drop the revolver. Then the accused took hold of the revolver and threw it to one side.
could clearly mumble his three answers thereto or could nod his head; because policeman Esmenino Delo Thereafter, he ran to the municipal building and surrendered to the
himself admitted that the victim was unconcious although still breathing, and could not raise his head authorities.7 The defense of the accused in said case was sustained by the Court.
when they found him in the yard of the defendant (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Vol. III).

In U.S. vs. Domens,8 the theory of self-defense was likewise upheld. There the deceased and the accused
On the other hand, the plausibility and credibility of the unrebutted narration of the appellant as to the quarreled about a carabao which had gotten into the corn patch of the deceased, who, by reason thereof,
motive and circumstances surrounding and leading to the incident, is enhanced by its detail and by the fact struck the accused four orfive times with a piece of wood about one yard long and about the size of one's
that appellant immediately surrendered that same afternoon to the police authorities with his bolo and the wrist. The accused did not retreat but struck back wounding the deceased on the forehead.
revolver of the deceased,1 despite the fact that he was already laboring under a handicap by virtue of his
previous conviction as an accomplice to the crime of murder, which ordinarily would impair his
trustworthiness. In U.S. vs. Mojica,9 the deceased, a constabulary soldier resisted arrest, struck the arresting policeman with
a fist, drew a mess kit knife and brandished it at the accused, another policeman, who retreated a step or
two, drew his revolver and fired, killing the soldier. WE ruled that the policeman acted in self-defense.
Under the circumstances, the version of the appellant appears to meet the required clear and convincing
evidence to establish self-defense,2 or weakens all the more and therefore neutralizes the effect of the proof
of the prosecution. The story of the appellant is partly corroborated by Aurelio Encomienda, his second That there is reasonable necessity of the means employed by herein appellant to prevent or repel the
cousin (p. 41, t.s.n., Vol. II) and nearest neighbor just about four meters away (p. 37, t.s.n. Vol. III), who unlawful aggression cannot seriously be disputed. "Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not
testified to his having heard several shots while he was lying down that afternoon and thereafter his having imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. When the law requires is
seen through a hole in his kitchen the victim sitting under the shed of the stairs of appellant house, who rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the
was also sitting in front of the victim and holding a bolo and a revolver, which Aurelio Encomienda related imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed and the instinct, more than the reason, that
the next morning to the barrio captain, who called for him. (pp. 37-40, t.s.n., Vol. III). moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury ... ." 10 As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to
Three essential elements must concur for legitimate self-defense to exist, namely; (1) unlawful aggression the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this
on part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means, employed to prevent or repel the attack; and instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the
(3) lack ofsufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 3 consequences."

Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent In the case at bar, appellant did not immediately hack the deceased to completely disable him, much less to
kind.4 Here when the deceased drew his gun with his right hand, appellant grabbed with his free left hand kill him. When the deceased drew his gun with his right hand, the appellant merely grabbed the right hand
the victim's right hand holding the revolver, forced the victim to lean on the stairs and pinned the victim's
150
of the deceased holding the gun, pinning said right hand on the stairs without striking the deceased with In view of the uncontradicted testimony of the appellant that the victim drew his revolver to assault the
the bolo in his right hand. After the gun fired four times continuously as they struggled, it was only then appellant, which is not a lawful purpose, the victim lost thereby the privilege to possess the same.
that appellant struck the right forearm of the victim with his bolo. Appellant could have continued hacking
the deceased right then and there. But he did not. He boloed the victim's left forearm because the victim
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed, the accused-appellant is hereby acquitted, and
tried to get the gun from his right hand. And then he just shook the right arm of the victim downward,
his immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered.
forcing the latter to release the gun which fell to the ground. It was only when the deceased tried to pick up
the gun that the appellant boloed him on the forehead. As heretofore stated, appellant had no time to coolly
deliberate on whether he could save himself by just kicking the gun away or by just pushing or boxing the The .32 caliber revolver with serial No. 15446 (Exh. "E") is hereby ordered forfeited to the government
victim or stepping on the hands of the deceased to prevent him from getting the gun and firing the same at and the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver the same for record purposes to the official
him. The immediate danger to his life precluded such serene rationalization on his part. headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The bolo (Exhibit "D") is
ordered returned to appellant.
It should be stressed that the victim did not sustain any gunshot wounds. After taking possession of the
victim's revolver, appellant did-not use it against the victim to finish him off, nor did he continue hacking With costs de officio.
the deceased with his bolo. He was free to do either as the victim was completely rendered hors de combat.
Instead the appellant allowed the disabled and defenseless victim to wash his wounds with water in
appellant's own wooden box.

In U . S. vs. Molina, 11 the accused was unarmed while the deceased attacked him with a bolo. After
overpowering the deceased and wresting the bolo from him, the accused struck the deceased several times
with the bolo thereby killing him almost instantaneously as the deceased tried to seize a hatchet. Under the
circumstances, WE held that the accused employed reasonable means to repel the assault against his life.

In People vs. Rabandaban, 12 one night appellant found his wife lying in bed with another man, who
escaped through the window. He scolded his wife and ordered her to leave the house. Calling him names,
the wife gathered her clothes and picked up a bolo in the kitchen. When the accused husband followed her
there, she attacked him with the bolo, wounding him twice on the abdomen. Wresting the bolo from his
wife, appellant stabbed her with it in the breast, causing her death that same night. WE ruled that the
appellant acted in self-defense and that there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by him to
repel the attack. WE overruled the opinion of the trial court wherein it stated that appellant could have
saved himself by throwing away the bolo after wresting it from his wife and that there was no need for him
to stab her once she was disarmed; because she struggled to regain possession of the bolo, justifying
appellant's belief that his wife wanted to finish him off. Considering that he must have been losing strength
due to loss of blood, with his wife armed to fight to the finish, it would have been sheer folly or stupidity
on his part to throw away the bolo so that his wife may again use it against him.

In People vs. Sumikat, 13 a bolo was considered a reasonable means of repelling an attack by a bully of
known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than the accused and who was trying to wrest the
bolo from him.

In People vs. Lara, supra, the use of a pistol in shooting to death the deceased who was much stronger
than the appellant and who in the darkness and from behind suddenly threw his arms around appellant and
attempted to wrest the pistol from him, was considered reasonably necessary; because by reason of the
darkness as well as the superior strength of the deceased, there was probability that the deceased would
seize control of the pistol and use it against appellant.

There certainly was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant. On the contrary, he was the one
provoked by the deceased. He was in his own yard cutting wood when the deceased arrived ordering him
to vacate the land he was then tilling, which was his livelihood. Ejecting him from the land he was farming
and which his father farmed before him, was, to this simple farmer, like depriving him of his life. Yet, with
all that provocation, appellant merely told the deceased that the latter had no right to eject him from the
land because he was also a tenant like him in the hacienda. Certainly, this retort was no justification for the
victim to draw his gun.

151
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946 Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was
doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the
following morning. Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as
vs.
he might not be able to control himself.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting
in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope
DE JOYA, J.:
with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina again received
information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the
crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the
guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and
chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the
one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
provincial road from his house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of
the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was
P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive
quite bright as there were electric lights.
imprisonment suffered by her.

Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door.
Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina
Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and,
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her
defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility; right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue,
conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B,
which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances
seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once
that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was
and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding
and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not
by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place. endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro
Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina
surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me,"
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio
following facts: lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to
close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio father and daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant,
of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at
deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually
snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and
her cousin, Josefa Tapay. went with said policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which
were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and
spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It
touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave has been entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.
him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she
informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents
evidently for self-protection. the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in
the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have
surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention entertained and upheld this view.
of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her
side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of
Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat
152
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to
chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident,
public gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland. and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio
lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that
she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own
before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and
person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of
self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil.,
our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).
331; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to
legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single
more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the
wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a
vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage
(1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the
defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the
to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and
defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in
appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by
an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing his identity,
nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of
and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by
our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many others have
means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what
hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of
defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil.,
344). The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and
so is the first assignment of error to a certain degree.
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a
bolo which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina,
heard by people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant
going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three
and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249). mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the
provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in
the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm,
and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs.
and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving
Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
no reply, attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the
woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her
completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced
against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant
turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate
be considered as an attempt against her honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391).. Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently,
with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as
house late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the
minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the
purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help,
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of
she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..
P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal
penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So
the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio ordered..
chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was
lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel,
including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado
Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches
deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability..

153
G.R. No. L-33304 December 13, 1930 riding crop, which the other local authorities found hanging from the right arm of the deceased,
and for the other reasons.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. II. The trial court erred in finding the following facts: that Dominador Sotelo hit the deceased
CONSTANTE SOTELO, ET AL., defendants. across the mouth with the crop Exhibit B, Vicente Sotelo stabbed him on the right shoulder
CONSTANTE SOTELO, appellant. with the penknife Exhibit D, and Constante Sotelo stabbed him under the nipple.

VILLAMOR, J.: III. The trial court erred in refusing to consider the plea of self-defense alleged and proved by
the defendant-appellant, Constante Sotelo, notwithstanding the fact that said defense is strongly
corroborated by Exhibits O, 5, and 4, which form a part of the res gestae.
The Sotelo brothers, namely, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente, were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur for the crime of homicide under the following information:
IV. The lower court erred in refusing to consider the motion of February 1, 1930, declaring
afterwards that, as the defendant has shown graphically, the latter could not have touched the
That on or about the night of December 24, 1929, in the municipality of Narvacan, Province of
victim's left breast in stabbing him, or the wound would not have been in the direction
Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, the said accused Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo,
described in Dr. Nolasco's certificate; in spite of the fact that it had made contrary declarations
armed with a penknife, a stick, and an iron bar, respectively, acting together and helping one
during the trial, which estop it from making the subsequent holdings.
another, did willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and feloniously with treachery and evident
premeditation attack, beat up, and commit assault upon the person of Ignacio Cambaliza,
inflicting a mortal wound upon him on the level of the left nipple, which penetrated the left V. The trial judge erred in convicting the defendant appellant, Constante Sotelo.
lung and the left ventricle of the heart, another on the outward surface of the right arm, a bruise
on the nose and another on the upper lip: as a result of which said Ignacio Cambaliza died after
The record shows that at about 8 o'clock in the evening of the 24th of December, 1929, Ignacio Cambaliza
a few minutes.
started for the barrio of Ravadabia, in the municipality of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, accompanied by Baltazar
Capistrano. They took the provincial road leading to said barrio and as they approached the Sotelo house,
Contrary to law; with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. they bid the time of day, asking whether they might pass by, according to the custom of the place. They
were barely 20 meters away from the house, when the defendant Constante Sotelo, who had just finished
his supper, descended from the house towards the road, and, from the entrance of his yard, turned his
After the trial, the court below found the defendant Constante Sotelo guilty of the crime of homicide, and
flashlight on the passers-by to see who they were. When Ignacio Cambaliza saw this, he walked back to
the defendants Vicente and Dominador Sotelo of slight physical injuries, sentencing the former to suffer
where Constante Sotelo stood and inquired why he turned his flashlight on them, and what it was he
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum P1,000,
wanted, winding up with a vulgar remark. When Constante's brothers, who were then in the yard on the
with the accessories of law, and to pay one-third of the costs; and ordering the release of Vicente and
side of the road, saw Cambaliza's attitude, they approached their brother to separate or defend him,
Dominador Sotelo in view of the fact that they had already been imprisoned since December 24, 1929,
whereupon Cambaliza's commenced beating them with his iron crop, once striking Constante's arm. The
with two-thirds of the costs de oficio.
brothers, in turn, fell upon Cambaliza, Dominador striking him across the face with the stick he carried,
and Vicente wounding him in the right shoulder with a penknife. At this juncture, Capistrano attempted to
The defendant Constante Sotelo appealed from this judgment, and his counsel has made the following intervene, but he was warned by Vicente and probably by Dominador also, for which reason he withdrew
assignments of error: from the scene, and the fight then continued between Cambaliza and Constante. In the course of this fight,
Constante thrust a penknife into Cambaliza at about the level of the left nipple, producing a wound which
penetrated the left lung into the left ventricle of the heart, resulting in his death a few minute later.
I. The trial court erred in accepting the whole theory of the prosecution:

Witness Baltazar Capistrano, who was with the deceased, says that after Ignacio Cambaliza had fallen
Despite the obvious incongruity between the information and the evidence adduced at the lifeless, he went over to the municipal building to ask for help, and at once the chief of police, the justice
trial;lawphi1>net of the peace, and the municipal president repaired to the place where the incident had occurred, placing the
brothers under arrest that same night: Constante with a penknife, Vicente with another penknife, and
Despite the proof that the iron bar, Exhibit B of the prosecution and Exhibit 1 of the defense, Dominador with a cane.
belong to the principal witness, Baltazar Capistrano, and not to any of the defendants;
Doctor Antonio Nolasco examined Ignacio Cambaliza's body, and found a knife wound at about the level
Despite the fact that it has been proved that the incident took place in the yard of the of the left nipple, 2 1/2 centimeters long, and 2 1/2 inches deep; a knife wound on the outward surface of
defendants' house and not on the public road; the right arm, 4 centimeters deep; and bruises at the base of the nose and on the upper lip, produced by a
blunt instrument. According to the doctor the breast wound which pierced the left lung and the left
ventricle of the heart was the cause of Ignacio Cambaliza's death.
Despite the fact that Baltazar Capistrano deliberately concealed the place where the deceased
expired, fearing his participation in the tragedy should come to light; and
The appellant admits he inflicted the injury which resulted in Ignacio Cambaliza's death, but maintains he
did so in self-defense. In support of this allegation it is insisted that the fight took place in the yard of the
Despite the fact that the chief of police acted with evident partiality towards Cambaliza and defendants' house; that Vicente and Dominador went to help their brother Constante when they saw
Capistrano, in intervening immediately after the incident had occurred, hiding the whip or Cambaliza attack him, but ran behind some sugar cane near by in order to conceal themselves when

154
pursued by Cambaliza; that the latter fought hand to hand with Constante, choked him and threw himself While they were wrestling Constante was under Ignacio during which time, I saw Constante
upon him, and at that instant Constante thrust a penknife into his ribs below the left nipple; that Capistrano bring out his knife.
answered Cambaliza's call, saying that Constante had stabbed him, and, with the assistance of Capistrano,
Cambaliza succeeded in leaving the Sotelo yard and after a few steps fell lifeless on the roadside, where
The same witness testified before the trial court as follows:
his body was later found.

Q. Do you know whether anything extraordinary took place along the road? — A. Yes sir; for
After examining the evidence of record, we believe the defense is, in a measure, supported by the
when we came near the house of Francisco Sotelo, we saw Constante, Dominador, and Vicente
testimony of Baltazar Capistrano given before the justice of the peace of Narvacan. In considering this
Sotelo in the yard of the house. I and my companion said "we are passing, sir," but they did not
proof it is well to remember that the justice of the peace of Narvacan testified in the case that Baltazar
answer, and they focused their flashlight on us. And when we came to within ten meters, they
Capistrano made two statements before him — in the investigation prior to the arrest of the defendants,
still kept the flashlight focused on us, and then my companion said: "Why do you turn your
which is Exhibit 9, and in the course of the preliminary investigation, embodied in Exhibit 10. Counsel for
flashlight on us? Have we not greeted you in passing?"
the defense attempted to examine Capistrano on these two statements, but the fiscal objected, and the court
sustained the objection on the ground that the best evidence would be Capistrano's own statements taken
down in writing. Counsel then required the fiscal to present said documents, and the latter delivered to him Q. What did the Sotelo brothers, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente do when they heard
the aforementioned Exhibits 9 and 10, which were offered in evidence by the defense. The fiscal reiterated Ignacio Cambaliza say this? — A. After Ignacio Cambaliza had said that, they switched off the
his objection to that evidence on the ground that the documents were not identified; but the record shows light, and we continued on.
that they had been delivered by the fiscal himself to counsel for the defense, and he is therefore precluded
from setting up the lack of identification, whereupon the court doubtless ruled them in, and the fiscal failed
to take exception therefrom. Q. What else? — A. After we had proceeded about 20 meters, someone came up behind us with
a flashlight saying: "Wait! your mother's . . .! you cannot say bad words when you pass here."

The record further shows that counsel for the appellant sought to have the witness Capistrano explain the
contradiction between his statement in Exhibit 10 and his testimony at the hearing, but the fiscal objected Q. What else? — A. When they had said this, Ignacio Cambaliza stopped and said: "I have used
no bad word."
and the court sustained the objection. Capistrano has thus failed to explain the contradiction noted between
Exhibit 10 and his testimony before the trial court.
Ignacio Cambaliza interrupted Constante Sotelo saying "I did not say that." And Dominador, in turn, said,
"You didn't say anything, your mother's . . .!"
We believe the trial judge erred in sustaining the fiscal's objection to having witness Capistrano explain the
contradiction between his statement in Exhibit 10, and his testimony before the trial court at the hearing.
But be that as it may, we are of opinion that said documents Exhibits 9 and 10 have been duly introduced Q. And what did Dominador Sotelo do then? — A. Immediately after saying, "you didn't say
into the case as evidence for the defense and must therefore be taken into consideration in rendering anything, your mothers . . .! he struck him across the face with a stick.
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
In said Exhibit 10, witness Capistrano, among other things, affirms the following:
Q. And what else happened? — A. After that blow delivered by Dominador Sotelo, he was
As we passed by Constante was flashlighting us and he was standing by the door of their yard. I stunned. While he was so stunned, Vicente Sotelo stabbed him with a penknife on the right
did not see any body by him. We were then about 20 meters away from him when he rushed to shoulder; and Ignacio Cambaliza, still stunned, turning about; and Constante Sotelo stabbed
us. him in the region of the heart with a penknife.

Ignacio was the first one who uttered bad words against Constante. Ignacio had a whip wrapped Comparing the two statements quoted above, it will be seen that the witness Capistrano affirmed in Exhibit
with lead. 10 that he saw Constante standing at the entrance of his yard, alone; that the deceased was the first to make
vulgar remarks to Constante; and that during the fight Constante was under Cambaliza when he drew his
penknife to stab him. On the other hand, testifying before the trial court, the said witness Capistrano stated
Other than this time I declared before the justice of the peace.
that he and the deceased saw the three brothers, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo in the yard of
the house; that one of these brothers was the first to make insulting remarks to Cambaliza, and that while
As Dominador came he struck Ignacio, but Ignacio defended. Vicente struck and Constante the two brothers were attacking Cambaliza, Constante stabbed him in the chest with a penknife.
rushed in and then they wrestled against each other and I tried to separate them.
We believe Capistrano's testimony appearing in Exhibit 10 as to Constante's position when he wounded
I was only 5 meters away from them when they first wrestled. It was dark at that time but I saw Cambaliza, must be accepted, not only because it was given two days after the incident, but because it has
what happened by the aid of my flashlight. been corroborated by the witnesses for the defense. (U. S. vs. Capisonda, 1 Phil., 575; and U. S. vs. Rafael,
23 Phil., 184.)
I am very sure that Exhibit A was the bar which Vicente was holding and Exhibit B was the
knife that Constante used in stabbing Ignacio. As to who started the aggression, there is an obvious contradiction between the testimony of Capistrano
and that of the witnesses for the defense. But in the light of sound judgment, we are inclined to believe that
the deceased started the aggression, provoked by the offensive language used by Constante and his

155
brothers, imputing to him the utterance of vulgar language against them. In such a situation the deceased
naturally used his whip against those who were in front of him, striking Constante's arm. We therefore
believe this is a case of incomplete self-defense, wherein the appellant was unlawfully attacked by the
deceased and compelled to employ reasonable means to defend himself, but he is responsible for
provoking the attack. (U. S. vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil., 30; U. S. vs. McCray, 2 Phil., 545.) According to article
86 of the Penal Code the penalty next below that provided in article 404 of said Code must be imposed
upon the appellant, that is, prision mayor in its minimum degree, or six years and one day, with the
accessories of law, and to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P500. And with this
modification the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.

156
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964 looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and
spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid
purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June,
vs.
1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the
-----------------------------
said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as
aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained
G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964 the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated
labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as
vs. such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities —
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused, as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants. co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities
of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and
LABRADOR, J.: instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure,
facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V.
Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres Baisa,
15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas
and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and
sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of the
15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and the
Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew
place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the different
his appeal. parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged: (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (HUKS), the latter being the
armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having come to an agreement with
the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, 14344 of the
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the crime of rebellion, and therefore,
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in said criminal cases, acting in
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, together with many others whose
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing of this information, and helping
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote maintain, cause,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the Government or otherwise participate therein
other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly and taken arms against the Government, by
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore committed then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary
and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which and army detachment, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the therewith and in furtherance thereof, by then and there committing wanton acts of murder,
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings, planned destruction of private and public buildings, to
help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya create and spread terrorism in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose,
Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the as follows to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks
Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946,
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950,
laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950).
risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as
innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, appeals.

157
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ (6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at 330 P.
Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to give them
jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only way out was
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1)
to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse Tung, leader
that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or
of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and that Luis Taruc
Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other
was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations;
(4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by (7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the military operations of the Huks; (6) that he expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to the
had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming heroes by
conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the CLO
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of Labor since August, 1948.
Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by Hernandez
in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a Huk
from 1942 to 1950, explained:
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the court.
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship
Testimonial Evidence of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present
government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM,
union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October, 1947, at
Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of Guillermo
Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was given the
pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He made various (2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of
speeches on the following dates and occasions: the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the
TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
Comrade Luis Taruc.
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM Hernandez.
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and the
CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party. 1äwphï1.ñët
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the World propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by the medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he preferred to constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the Government. eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained
in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru
propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated Communist
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the frauds ideas by:
in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement cannot be
made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go to the hills
and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines. (a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and incited
the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four comrades under (b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
the leadership of Luis Taruc. Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the

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Defenders of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today (f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to
magazine and World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V- Victor. (Exh. D-463-64)
907, V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party.
the "Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine (Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
Labor Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with
Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party";
that he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of the
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going
CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and organizers to
underground. (Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951.
different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the union, it will
(Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2) His election as President of CLO until August of following
affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will register said
year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the workers is
continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the Communist
Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under the control of the 2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its aims, they will
begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-Communist
elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will be done (a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)
for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides and made them
come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and sporadic (b) To SOBSI Jakarta — that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the CLO. East. (Exh. V-82)

Important Documents Submitted at Trial (c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.
W-116-120)
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman". (d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 — Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle — "the
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)
of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with
Communists abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor.
(Exh. D-2001-2004) (e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)

(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." — mentions different groups of labor unions of (f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
which Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU
and IRWU (Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-
41) (g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)

(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado (h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like
Hernandez as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL) Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)

(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor. (i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker — condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
(Exh. 1103) corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)

(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not (j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh.
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by V-79)
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.

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(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO — Praises Balgos and The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was fully
Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289) organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National Congress, a
Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National
Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in their respective
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" — Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S.
names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a Military
Army and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950 the SEC organized a special
warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a body known as the National
(m) Letter to Taruc — June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence and, in general, all information
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94) useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance Committee was also organized as a
part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco
comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" — States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
existence of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93) leading the armed struggle for national liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and
coordinate with the HMB on the decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" — (Exh. V-287) that in accordance with such plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the
Party but also of the HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September
1951, the HMB from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" — (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)

Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations for
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38) political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of the HMB
on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in May, 1946; June,
(r) Press statement of Hernandez — opposes acceptance of decorations from Greece 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; October 15 and
by Romulo. (Exh. V-72) 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949;
August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950; March 29, 1950.
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383) The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had taken
a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been committed. It is
not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct participation in the
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases have cooperated, conspired
Huks. (Exh. C-364) and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution and successful accomplishment
of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress of
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Labor Organizations).
Bulosan for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same pattern
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the absence of and in
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A) representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts when the National
Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven permanent Committees, namely, of
Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing,
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist Party dominate the committees of the CLO.
Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A) The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of which Hernandez was the President, is described by the
court below in finding, thus:
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91) Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates was
explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party and the
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362) CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is one of
the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays its role by means of
propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of help to the HMB, which
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh. constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done by lectures, meetings, and the
D-451-451-A) organization of committees of the educational department as well as researches at the CLO Worker's
Institute.
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.

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Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The seditious speeches of Hernandez took place
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party before November, 1949 when the CPP went underground. The court below has not been able to point out,
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and nor have We been able to find among all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the so- which it may be inferred that he took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary
called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to situation, or that he had gone underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party that Hernandez refused to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader, the cause.
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the CLO.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial and
The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It seeks to
which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of
attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions which
Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary
become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant the
situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee, or of
same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate attainment
the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise that he had taken part
of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers in the
in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no evidence, direct or indirect,
factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the CLO a
to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to continue or maintain said
critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist Party, the
uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the uprising being inferred only from the fact that
HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within the city.
he was a communist.

On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for important
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories
members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant leaving the city,
provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.

Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its decision
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, as a
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:
Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently exhorting his hearers to
follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes against capitalism and more
specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a regime of puppets of 11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of Communistic Theory there appears no evidence Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy to overthrow by force the constituted authority. retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as
testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures, meetings And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground forces
and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda, making speeches
Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the CLO members and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him to publish.
into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by
Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by making demands
from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following reasons
(excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of the City of
strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out and a crisis is thereby
developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would intervene and carry the revolution Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the CLO for a term
— it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the preparation of the laborers for the which was to end the year 1951.
Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no function but that of indoctrination and
preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It was only a preparatory organization prior As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels,
to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to want to deal with
considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational procedures."
President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as
having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the
conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field. But
propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p. 49), is to
rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO. the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not been received. It is
true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had come from a crew member
of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to the SEC or
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had declared Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine received by Hernandez from one Rolland
the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground, with the CPP Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him
leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it was decided by the to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.
said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The court implicates the
appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the Communist Party by his mere

161
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a
in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist. membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of propaganda, but
do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the Communist Party in the uprising The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the information. And his refusal to go conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
underground because of his political commitments occasioned by his term of election as president of the active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the
communication or understanding with the Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is
reasonable doubt that it was not his Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade
speeches sympathizing with the Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions.
beyond reasonable doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an
account in this criminal case. actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations.

The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor has any
Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated action or the use
provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision reads: of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the
Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting
to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy
and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing of the
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
help of his own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the chief
act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things,
of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the
mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate
rebellion or the uprising.
and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and
violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of
Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda in
mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to commit
the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring
engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of
actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the
language of the Supreme Court of the United States: overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism. To this effect is
the following comment of Viada:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia que se
concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque fuera preciso
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera responsable de un delito de
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an conspiracion para la sedicion? — El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la negative al casar cierta
organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo contrario: "Considerando que, con
this Court to be such a relationship. ... . areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas
se conciertan para la execution de un delito y resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera
ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
en ella solo se habla de los actos de induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
que la mismo produjo en el animo de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
no lo que se las propuso, resulta evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I,
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
Codigo Penal, p. 152)
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities
on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes
from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these

162
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the crime AMADO RACANDAY
charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of the
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of letters from
Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, with the Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the Regional
Committee of the Communist Party.
Legal Considerations. — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed
useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal
responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion that he
the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced beyond
membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of the Communist
being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto
or evincing the same.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.

On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom.
By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership
he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in Pasay
if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law. City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his membership and his
position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being corroborated by
the witness Guillermo Calayag.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of the
rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy, unless
he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he commits rebellion. His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de la
Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his jurisdiction, and one
time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at Azcarraga signing the
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the "Katipunan",
receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies of the "Titis" magazine. `
the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the defendants on various times
solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held that the defendants were guilty of
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion or insurrection itself. While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party indicate
Thus, the Court ruled that: that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from Communist
Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party
had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk rebellion. Under these
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are guilty,
circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the lack of
not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the crime of
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States
in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each of them, did,
together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the Province of Pampanga, JULIAN LUMANOG
Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy by force the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for the
HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
JUAN J. CRUZ
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is for the
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the CLO Calayag
CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment of the testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber Unions and
dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag. attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.

There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He should Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one Nicasio
therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information. Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the use of the said
unit.

163
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that by the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there cannot be any question
giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government and should, that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the constituted government. We
therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly. hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.
FERMIN RODILLAS
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB, In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house at Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been apprehended at the time of
Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of the court are the trial.
fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court was fully
justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator in
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking aims
the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
BAYANI ESPIRITU Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under Art. 138, Revised
Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against appellants is that of rising up in
arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held guilty of inciting the people to arms
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
under Article 138, which is a different offense.
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a member On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership in any
of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party, when he because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the commission of the
asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc. acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act punishes participation or
membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime district
from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence submitted by
the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the communists; serving
them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted in court and in it he admits CONCLUSION
obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the PKP.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government and that Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as courier, We contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-
believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that not having appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and the
actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-
6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in
Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
TEOPISTA VALERIO
imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under costs. So ordered.
Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella" and "Star";
that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like Alejandrino, Lava
and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.

Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija,
later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the Central Luzon
Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the mountains to
Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are
satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB from
1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and considering that
164
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955 1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the
case is hereby approved.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants. (Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of
murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , (Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Province of Abra. Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as (Exhibit 8, 8-a)
Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an
attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was
appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic
appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the
Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution,
accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following
from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra message:
(which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military
Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a). 15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress,
Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla,
pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file 22 April 1945
complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were
filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman,
and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos,
Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; Msg. No. 398
Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury,
and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served To: Military Mayor Beronilla
as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days upon instructions of
Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on 1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records 2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from
of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Higher Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the
Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions: treasonable acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely
impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent
way of handling the whole case.
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
16 April 1945 Commanding

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.


Msg. No. 337
Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against (Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra. Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

165
(Exhibit 21, 21-a) "Message:

Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA
Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND
Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO
Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO
Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED
Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG
Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, BEGINS CLN"
granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
(EXH. H)
Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted
amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of
the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San
denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits. April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and
received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the
Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18,
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted
1945 can not be justified.
amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally
dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as
state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that
Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it.
The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he
delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered
to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they
did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne,
Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was
but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the
conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of
Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the
insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found message. In the affidavit, he stated:
that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were
not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La
fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation
of La Paz, Abra. Paz, Abra? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you state what is the event? — A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico
appealed to this Court. Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen
came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor
Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late learned of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla,
Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12- asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to
a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I should tie
appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and
noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
12-b).
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified
accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann
more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family,
its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another
commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the
sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the
follows:

166
agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case,
petition to be allowed to hear mass. relied on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the
liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two dates are
not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed
(Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within
Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the
the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done
very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even
in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21,
1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way
of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience? For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit
the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with
Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their
knowledge, duly sentenced to death.

The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already
decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a
liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants,
since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs.
Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does
not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made
upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one
of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was
suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in
Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the
proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of guilty was
rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and
Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with the statement of Arnold that
"whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an
assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really
committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to
be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or
personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).

It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon
orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good
faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say
that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48;
Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25
March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below
should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off.
Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area
from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz,
Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original
accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records;
and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March

167
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004 Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and
Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi
kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
from the roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard
vs.
the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent
and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the
DECISION canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.8

CALLEJO, SR., J.: Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head. Whilcon
retreated and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in a
waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting arrival.
appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to
suffer the death penalty. Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They rushed
to the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be found.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads:
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an autopsy where he made the following findings:
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11)
years of age, by then and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion
collar widest postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and 8.0
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.
cms. behind the left external auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left to right,
Thereafter, trial ensued.
involving the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the left and right
cerebral hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating
Case for the Prosecution3 the scalp, making an Exit wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular edges, 12.0
cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of the right external auditory meatus.
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family
lived at Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.
grade three pupil whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato, an American couple, through an
educational foundation.4
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.

The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management Group
Visceral organs, congested.
(TMG) based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he
could play outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay
Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderiawas a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the
three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
left upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left ear)11 and exited to the right side.12 Dr.
Baluyot signed Vincent's certificate of death.13
Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court.
He was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the appellant.
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the scene
Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them
of the shooting but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City General
for it. His friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof.
168
Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime scene and recovered an gun and examined it. He put the safety latch back on and tucked it at his right waistline. He then told
empty shell from a .45 caliber gun.14 Macario to wait for a while to check if somebody was really hit. He went near the
abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the ground. He picked up the bloodied child, boarded
him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the hospital. 25 On
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the
board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
appellant was assigned on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the appellant
had not reported for duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior Superintendent Alfonso
Nalangan, the Regional Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the Sangandaan The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not
Police Station together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-38701.16 inform her of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103, located
at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an accident; that his gun
fell and fired; and, that the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he might not be able
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice where
to report for work that day and the following day. He assured his superior that he would surrender later. He
he was enrolled under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special Agent
then went to Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a motorcycle unit cop.
Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998.17 On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino wrote the
The appellant stayed there for three days. He also visited friends during that time.
Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination of the .45
caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the
shooting.18 Before noon on September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned over two On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major
witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also turned over the witnesses' sworn statements. 19 On Suyo accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
October 2, 1998, on orders of the police station commander,20 Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene, The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated that the results of the drug test were
including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole as part of the office filing.21 He did not inform the negative. The appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for investigation. 26 The
prosecution that he took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies thereof. However, the appellant's pictures27 of the crime scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in one of the
counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures. pictures pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari materia by Macario
Ortiz.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating
that: Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26,
1998, he was playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road beside the
chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of the carinderia with
FINDINGS:
Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the chapel
near the basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and saw the appellant, about 15
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP" revealed meters away from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot
the same individual characteristics with cartridge cases fired from the above- Vincent. He did not report what he saw to the police authorities. He was ordered by his father to testify for
mentioned firearm. the appellant. He also testified that his mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's brother.

CONCLUSION: On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45
Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number AOC-38701.22
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y
Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized
Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view
P49,174 for the funeral.23 of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his
public position (par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
Case for the Appellant of DEATH.

The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the
Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in- amounts of P49,174.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as
law was drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The appellant's house was exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.
located along a narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away from
Macario's house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the
The accused is to pay the costs.
safety lock in place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the
garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main road. Macario, who was waiting for him
at the main road, called his attention to his revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the custody
appellant got distracted and brought his motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned of the Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and regulations upon
carinderia where he stopped. As he stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the the finality of this decision.28
appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot
and suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted, "Ano yon, ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He picked up his
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
169
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO …
RELEVANT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE
ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COURT AND THE OUTCOME
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
OF THE CASE.
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF


The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused.
JUDGING AND ADVOCACY, AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION,
For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or
PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND PARTIALITY.
negligence.33

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY


The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care;
OF RICARDO SALVO, ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing
TESTIMONY IS WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE
it.34 An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
COMMON EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND.
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." If the
consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING
EXCULPATORY AND INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand without which such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.36 In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. 37 The appellant
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED. 29
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because by
admitting having caused the death of the victim, he can no longer be acquitted.
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the
hole found on the rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant contends
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.
that the picture30taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the principal
witnesses of the prosecution, and the pictures31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a hole on the
roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The appellant maintains that his First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the
service revolver fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was pointed to an oblique pictures showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally.
direction, it fired, hitting the victim who was on the rooftop. The bullet hit the back portion of the victim's However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to
head, before exiting and hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures belie Ricardo's testimony the pictures, the latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the investigating
that he deliberately shot the victim, and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the gunshot prosecutor, thus:
wound came from somewhere behind the victim, somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The
appellant invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado's testimony that if a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be answered.
gun will fire and the bullet will exit in the same position as the gun, that is, also in an oblique position.
This certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations. The defenses set
forth by the respondent are evidentiary in character and best appreciated in a full-blown trial;
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based on and that the same is not sufficient to overcome probable cause.39
speculations and surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent and
credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole shown in the pictures 32 was caused by a
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim. 40 There is no evidence showing that
bullet from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, who was
the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the position of
shown in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any slug was found on the
the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.
rooftop or under the roof which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor
General, the pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot overcome the positive and straightforward
testimony of the young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo. Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber of his
pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline. 41 He also testified
that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is moved backward
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal
with the safety lock in place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger, the gun
liability is a factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his
would not fire:
affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting
the victim without his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads – Q Is this your service firearm?

The following are exempt from criminal liability: A Yes, Your Honor.
170
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house? A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?

Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the gun in (witness did as instructed)
your waistline?
A It will not, Your Honor.
A The hammer was cocked like this.
COURT: (to the parties)
COURT:
Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer did not
Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip. move forward?

ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY: PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:

Admitted, Your Honor. Admitted, Your Honor.

ATTY. PEREZ: COURT: (to the witness)

Yes, Your Honor. Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not come
out from the muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?
COURT: (to the witness)
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the hammer
is moved backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the trigger, the bullet Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?
will fire because the hammer will move forward and then hit the base of the bullet?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and
Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out? therefore it is open but it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which is
found below the hammer, there is a space, is it not?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house?
Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.
A I safety (sic) it, sir.
The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.
Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock?
(to the witness)
A Yes, Your Honor.
You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the
safety lock.
Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards.

(witness did as instructed)


(witness did as instructed)

The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the hammer
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
is cocked.42

171
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense proffered by Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned
the appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court: to the house of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to your 103
Base?
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel of the
accused was holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock put in place, the gun A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo.
accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and
neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City?
move forward. The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it was when it
dropped on the floor.43
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from
the investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that you
Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to another for three days to prevent his arrest: will surrender?

Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998? A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will
have no money to spend.
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit
your family in Barangay Bahay Toro?
A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.

A No, sir.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?

COURT: (to the witness)


A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your Honor.

Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?


ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

A No, Your Honor.


Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)


A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.

Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?


Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days?

A I was not able to do that, sir.


A Yes, sir.

Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro?
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?

A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital.44


A Because I am worried, sir.

The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was accidental
COURT: (to the witness)
and that he was not negligent.

Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter:

A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was
house of PO3 Lam, Your Honor.
accidentally shot was his failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the
incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep himself
out of sight for about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond human
172
comprehension that a policeman, who professes innocence would come out into the open only A: "Nakatalikod po siya."
three (3) days from the incident and claim that the victim was accidentally shot. Human
behavior dictates, especially when the accused is a policeman, that when one is innocent of

some acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but causes injury to another without
fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment, surrender to the authorities and give an
account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite suspicion and whatever account or Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and
statement he would give later on becomes doubtful. his tricycle? Why did you include this drawing?

For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the hospital.
insult to human intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a
reality. It was a deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11)
outside the sway of his will.45

It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle?
witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the trial judge was A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir.
in a better position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified. 46 We have
carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial
court. Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include
the motorcycle?

The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and
straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was subjected A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time.
to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, he never wavered in his testimony. He
positively identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter deliberately aimed COURT: (to the witness)
his gun and shot the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are quoted:
Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving?
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual
incident which took place?
A: It was stationary, your Honor.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him shot the
boy?
Q: What was that unusual incident?

A: When Vincent was shot, sir.
A: He came from their house, Your Honor.
Q: Who shot Vincent?
Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?
A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.
A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor.


Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina?
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.
Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there?
Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14).
Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot him?
173
Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?
where (sic) you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting?
A: No, sir.
COURT:
Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?
Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness is more
or less 7 meters.
A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.


Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him shot
Vincent on September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around the
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) courtroom now and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina?

Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that? CT. INTERPRETER:

COURT: (to the witness) Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a yellow
shirt and maong pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name as Ferdinand Fallorina.
Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was shot?
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
COURT:
Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the
victim?
10 meters more or less?


A: Yes, sir.
Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident?

Q: What was that?


A: More or less two years, sir.

A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!"


Q: Why do you know him?


A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir.

Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof,

what about Fallorina, what did he do?

Q: How many shots did you hear?


A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia
where Vincent fell, Your Honor.
A: Only one, sir.
Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did
Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina? he do?

A: Yes, sir. A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.

Q: What was that gun? Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?

A: .45 cal., sir. A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.

174
Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun? IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 95, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
A: I do not know anymore.47
and, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the
The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act amount of P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and
was deliberate and intentional. P25,000 as exemplary damages.

It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution, only SO ORDERED.
Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of the
Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for the prosecution, despite the fact
that the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was always
crying,48 unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify
against the appellant. It was only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that
justice be done to the victim.49 Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to full faith and credence.

The Crime Committed by the Appellant

We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally while
his back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his kite and was ready to get
down from the roof when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part.50 Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against
the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is not so much as to put emphasis on the age of
the victim, rather it is more of a description of the young victim's state of helplessness.51 Minor children,
who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally
attacks a child, treachery exists.52 The abuse of superior strength as alleged in the Information is already
absorbed by treachery and need not be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.53

We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position
in this case. We reverse the trial court on this score.

There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45 caliber
pistol, in shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of
his position as a policeman when he shot the victim.54 The shooting occurred only when the appellant saw
the victim on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse of public position
against the appellant.

The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused
spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.55

In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and
even moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore to obey
the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate their investigation. It was
only after the lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since G.R. No. L-37908 October 23, 1981
there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

175
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, following manner, to wit: The accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua and
vs. repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if he would write and sign a
BENJAMIN ONG y KHO, and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS y SUMALJAG previously convicted as ransom note for the payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would
affirmed in G.R. No. L-34497, accused, BLDOMERO AMBORSIO, alias "VAL", Defendant- not be killed and would be released upon receipt of the ransom note, he was again
appellant. gagged and tied up by the accused, and thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region,
several times with an ice-pick, inflicting upon him (Henry Chua) mortal wounds on
his vital organs, which directly caused his death.
On the night of April 23, 1971, victim Henry Chua was last seen alive in the company of his friend
Benjamin Ong. As Chua failed to return to his home,his family, alarmed by his mysterious desappearance,
sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Manila Police Department, and the Philippine All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:
Constabulary to locate him. Knowing that Bajamin Ong was the last person with Chua before the
disappearance of the latter, the NBI tried to contact Ong. Ong also disappeared, so the various police
(a) Evident premeditations;
agnecies began a manhunt for the apprehension of Ong.

(b) Grave abuse of confidence;


Banjamin Ong was apprehended on August 29, 1971, in Stio patanda, Barrio Balugo, Oas, albay, Brouth to
Ligao, Albay, Ong denied any knowledge of the desappearance of Chua. When Ong was transferred to
CampVicente Lim in Laguna, he attempted to commit suicide. On September 1, 1971, when Ong was (c) Nighttime;
turned over to the NBI for investigation, he unhesitatingly confessed his responsiblity for the killing of
Henry Chua. Ong implicated Bienvienido Quintos as one of his companions in the cirme. When quintos
was arrested he also admitted his participation in the crime, and pointed to Fernando Tan and Baldomero (d) Use of an motor vehicle ;
Ambrosio as their companions in the perpetration of the crime, stating the details of its execution.
(e) Use of uperior strenght;
Based on the confessions of Ong and Quintos, the NBI and the Manila Police Department were able to
recover the body of Henry Chua in a state of advanced decomposition. The Identity of the body of Chua (f) Cruelty. 8
was confirmed by Siy Giap Chua, brother of Henry. 1 both Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were
tried (CCC-VII-922-Rizal, for "kidnapping with Murder") and convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, Seventh, Judicial District, (Judge Onofre A.Villaluz) in the "Sentence", dated October 11, The accused Baldomero Ambrosio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on August 26, 1972, was tried, and
1971. 2 As both Ong and Quintos were sentenced to death, the criminal case was elevated on automatic the trial court rendered its decision dated October 17, 1973, with dispositive portion, to wit:
review to this Court (G.R. No. L-34497). This Court in its decision dated January 30, 1975, 3 found the two
accused Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the WHEREFORE, finding the accused Baldomero Ambrosio, Guilty, beyond
crime of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidanapping with Murder as defined under Article
evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267 thereto, as charged in the
one analoguous to passion or obfuscation, thereby imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both of Information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; to
them. 4 Said decision became final and executory on February 19, 1975. 5 indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral
damges in the amount of P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damges
At the time Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried and convicted by the trial court, accused jointly and severally with Benjamin Ong and Bienvienido Quintos; and to pay his
Baldomero Ambrosio and Fernando Tan, Alias Oscar Tan, were still at large. 6 proportionable share of the costs.

After the arrest of accused Baldomero Ambrosio sometime in August of 1972, 7 an information was filed So Ordered. 9
by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against him, to wit:
The evidence for the prosecution, essentially the same as presented and reviewed by automatic appeal, by
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Benjamin Ong y Kho, Bienvenido this Court in G.R. No. L,34497, established its version as follows:
Quintos y Sumaljag, Fernando Tan alias "Oscar Tan", and Baldomero Ambrosio
alias "Val" of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder, committed as follows: Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that he
conducted the autopsy of the deceased Henry Chua, and prepared the necropsy report Exh. "M". The body
That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of of the deceased at the time of the autopsy was already in a far advanced state of decomposition. The brains,
Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this lungs. and other soft tissues of the body were already tot:ally decomposed while some of the internal
Honorable court, the above named accused, being then private individuals, organs, like the heart and the liver were already autolized. Dr. Ibarrola located two stab wounds on the
conspiring and confederating totether and mutually helping one another, did then liver, caused by a sharp pointed piercing implement, most probably an ice-pick. He attributed death to
and there wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known premeditation and for these stab wounds, although he gave the considered opinion that death could have been hastened by
the purpose of killing one Henry Chua and thereafter extorting money from his asphyxiation as the probability existed that Henry Chua was by alive. 10
family through the use of a ransom note, kidnapped and carried away said Henry
Chua, initially by means of friendly gestures and later through the use of force, in an The body of Henry Chua was Identified by his brother, Siy Giap who was present when the body was
automobile, and later after having taken him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan exhumed from a shallow grave in Barrio Makatipo Caloocan City. His Identification of the body was based
City, with the use of force detained him (Henry Chua) and killed him in the on the clothes and shoes worn by the deceased, as well as the personal effects found on it, including an
176
expensive Piaget white gold watch, a lighter, a wallet with driver's license, Diner's card and other personal pick to Quintos. However, Quintos returned it to Tan, who said "Hindi ka pa pala puwede " (You are not
papers. 11 capable yet). Whereupon, Tan told Ambrosio to focus a flashlight on the center of the front side of the
body of Henry Chua. Tan stabbed Chua twice on the chest. While Tan lighted their way, Ambrosio carried
the upper portion of the body, while Quintos carrying the lower portion. When Quintos got tired, Tan gave
Agents Enrique Lacanilao and Diego Gutierrez of the National Bureau of Investigation investigated the
him the flashlight while Tan and Ambrosio carried the body to a hole. The hole was covered by Ambrosio
accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos. The original and supplementary extrajudicial confessions
Ong then stepped repeatedly over the covered hole to compress the earth. They, returned to the car. Ong
of Ong and Quintos 12 which led to the successful discovery of the place where Henry Chua was buried
drove the Mustang car together with Tan. Quintos and Ambrosio rode in the Chevrolet car, driven by the
and the subsequent exhumation of the body 13 were Identified by these agents. These witnesses also
latter. They, followed the Mustang to the highway. Later, it was parked and abandoned near a gasoline
revealed the recovery of the rope with which Chua's hands were tied and the flannel cloth with which he
station. Then Ong and Tan joined Quintos and Ambrosio in the Chevrolet and they proceeded to Manila. 21
was gagged when he was killed. 14 Both agents testified on the re-enactment of the crime." 15 In the course
of investigation of accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos, the accused Baldomero Ambrosio was
implicated. When accused Ambrosio was arrested in August of 1972, he was brought to the NBI office by The version of the defense is as follows:
the Chief of Police of Batan, Aklan. Ambrosio voluntarily gave the extrajudicial statement Exhibit "S". 16
Accused Baldomero Ambrosio stated that in 1971, he was a family driver of Roger Chen, and before that
Ceferino Castro of the Baliwag Police Department narrated the discovery of Henry Chua's Mustang car employment, he worked for seven years at the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation. Accused Benjamin Ong
with Plate No. 1602 which was abandoned near a gasoline station at barrio They, Baliwag, Bulacan. The was the manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation while the accused Tan was a supervisor in the
pictures of the car were identified. 17 same company. Ambrosio alleged that Tan was a man of bad reputation, involved in a killing incident and
kidnapping of a woman. 22
Patrolman Marciano Roque of the Caloocan City Police Department, narrated the alleged plan to kin Chua
as initiated by Benjamin Ong. Roque knew Ong for more than five years as the Assistant Manager of the In the evening of April 23, 1971, Ong, with Tan and Quintos, picked up Ambrosio from his place so that
Acme Shoes Rubber and Plastic Corporation, a company situated in Caloocan City, owned by Ong's the latter could drive for Ong. They, went to a restaurant at Balintawak known as Barrio Fiesta. They then
brother-in-law Chua Pak. During the first week of April, 1971, Roque went to the Acme office to get a pair went to the Amihan Night Club at the Dewey Boulevard. Ong, Quintos and Tan alighted from the car
of rubber sandals. Benjamin Ong invited Roque for a ride in Ong's car, where Ong revealed his plan to while Ambrosia remained in the car and he slept. (Barrio trio woke up Ambrosio at about 1:00 a.m. Tan
kidnap a person who allegedly cheated Ong in gambling games. Roque tried to discourage Ong from and Quintos rode with Ambrosio where Ong was riding. They went towards Espana. At the Araneta
carrying out his plan. The latter insisted and asked Roque to assist him during the several meetings that Avenue, the car where Ong was riding stopped. Tan ordered Ambrosio to stop in front of the car. Tan and
followed between Ong and Roque. Roque claimed he was taken by Ong to Barrio Matipo, Caloocan City, Quintos went to the other car. Tan introduced himself as a policeman, then he opened the door of the car
and shown the place where Ong planned to bury the person he planned to kidnap and kill. In one of the and pulled the driver out. 23
meetings between Roque and Ong, the former saw a man seated at the rear of Ong's car and the latter
referred to that man as his godson who will help him in the execution of the crime. That man turned out to
'The narration of Ambrosio as to how the crimes," happened substantially coincided in details to the
be the accused Baldomero Ambrosia Ong tried to persuade Roque to join the plan as the father of the
manner it was described by Quintos. 24 Ambrosia however, claimed that he did not participate voluntarily
intended victim happens to be a very rich man and the ransom money they expected to get would enable
in the crime, but rather he was ordered by Tan as to all the acts he did during the execution of the offense.
Roque to leave the police force and retire. Roque tried to avoid Ong and urged the latter to forget the
matter. 18
Accused Ambrosio admitted that at about 4:00 p.m. of April 24, 1971, he and his wife went to Arayat,
Pampanga. They, stayed two days in Arayat, then he proceeded to his brother's place in Balintawak. He
Bienvenido Quintos who was previously accused and convicted of the crimes," of murder, 19 implicated
then went to Aklan up to the time he. 25 He denied that Ong pointed was arrested in August of 1972. to him
Balintawak. Ambrosio when the former testified in his defense during that trial of CCC-VII-922-Rizal
as a godson in the presence of Patrolman Roque. 26 Ambrosio likewise denied that even before April 23,
against Ong and Quintos. 20Quintos stated that he could recognize his co-accused, then at large, Fernando
1971, he was already with Ong, Quintos and Tan and that Ambrosio already dug that hole in Novaliches
Tan and Baldomero Ambrosia On April 23, 1971, Quintos and Tan met Ong and Ambrosio at the Barrio
where the body of Chua was placed. 27
Fiesta restaurant in Caloocan City. At about 9:00 p.m. they went to the Brown Derby restaurant at Quezon
Boulevard Extension, riding in the Chevrolet car of Ong. They , proceeded afterwards to Roxas Boulevard
where Ong ordered his driver Ambrosio to stop at the Amihan Night Club. While Ambrosio and Quintos He also claimed that the extrajudicial statement Exhibit S " was signed by him because he was
stayed in the car, Ong and Tan went inside the night club. Tan returned to the car and invited Quintos to go maltreated. 28
to the nearby Wigwam Night Club. After a while, Tan and Quintos returned. Tan sat beside the driver
Ambrosio while Quintos sat at the rear seat. They followed another car — a Mustang — from Dewey
The principal thrust of the defense's argument that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Boulevard to Cruelty Hall, then to Quiapo, Espana and Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City. They
passed Sto. Domingo Church, made a U-turn, and turned right to Talayan Village. Quintos saw the car they subject matter of this case (complex crimes," of kidnapping with murder) because its jurisdiction as a
were following stop in a dark place, and Ambrosio alighted from their Chevrolet car. Tan pulled a gun as Circuit Criminal Court is limited to ... (a) crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and
crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
he went to the other parked car — the Mustang. Quintos followed the two and he saw Tan approach and
point a gun at a man while Ambrosio pulled that man out of the Mustang. That man was the victim, Henry complex with other crimes," and kidnapping is not one of the crimes that may be tried and decided by that
Chua. Tan and Ambrosio forced Chua to the rear seat of the Chevrolet car, then compelled him to lie down court, becomes of no moment when this Court in G.R. No. 34497 ruled that Ong and Quintos were guilty
of murder and not kidnapping with murder. 29 The co-accused of Ambrosio were, therefore, tried and
on the floor. Ambrosio took a rope and tied the feet and hands of the victim, while Tan took a flannel cloth
and gagged that man. They took the route going to San Francisco del Monte Avenue. In the meantime, convicted of the crimes," of murder, a crimes," against persons, certainly within the jurisdiction of the
Ong rode in the Mustang car and followed them. They, all went to Novaliches road. At a narrow street circuit criminal court that rendered judgment in this case.
along the way both cars stopped. Tan and Ambrosio took the victim from the car as Ong arrived. That man
was made to walk and then made to lie down face up. Ong gave Tan an ice-pick and ordered "patayin na The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the accused Ambrosio voluntarily participated in
iyan " (kill him already), who in turn gave the ice-pick to Ambrosia For his part, Ambrosio gave the ice- the commission of the crime. That the crimes," of murder was committed has already been established by

177
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt when this Court convicted Ong and Quintos in G.R. No. L- Cruelty (ensañamiento) cannot be considered because there is no evidence that the victim Chua was by
34497. This Court already ruled that "Conspiracy, connivance and unity of purpose and intention among while still alive to make him suffer.
the accused were present throughout in the execution of this crime. The four participated in the planning
and execution of the crimes," and were at the scene in all its stages. They cannot escape the consequences
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused meditated, planned, and
of any of their acts even if they deviated in some detail from what they originally thought of. Conspiracy
tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.
implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of the execution. Thus, treachery should be
considered against all persons participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime." 30
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analogous to passion and
obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened Ong for non-payment of debt arising from gambling,
The defense of the accused Ambrosio that he was an unwilling participant in the killing of Henry Chua
causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34
because of threats made by Fernando Tan, to Our mind, cannot be given credence. Quintos, as shown in
his testimony, (Exh. "1") by narrated how Ambrosio participated in the crime, manifesting voluntariness in
his acts throughout the execution of the same. Ambrosio was the one who pulled Chua from the Mustang Taking into consideration the above aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ong was sentenced
car. Ambrosio provided the rope and tied the hands and feet of Chua. He was the one who drove the car to reclusion perpetua. 35 Accused Quintos, although no mitigating circumstance could be appreciated in his
with the victim inside to that place in Novaliches where they by Chua after killing him. He focused the favor, was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Ong and Quintos were also sentenced "jointly and
flashlight on the chest of the victim when Tan stabbed him. He helped carry the victim to the hole where severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral
he was buried, and Ambrosio covered the hole with earth using a spade. Exhibit "I" for the defense is damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay
certainly binding on it. their proportionate share of the costs. 36

Ambrosio admitted that he went to different places and to Aklan after the crimes," was committed, and he The present case (G.R. No. L-37908) already pending review iii this Court when G.R. No. L-34497 was
was arrested only in August of 1972, nearly two years after the crimes," was committed. He never revealed decided on January 30, 1975, should have been decided together with the latter case, as they arose from the
to the authorities the crimes," that he alleged to be an unwilling participant of in that long span of time. He same crime, involving the same accused.
also admitted that there were at least two times when he could have escaped from the group of Ong when
the crimes," was being executed and yet Ambrosio never did so. During the execution of the felon',
Ambrosio never by act or deed protested to the group regarding its cruel commission. We also cannot fully It is Our considered view that the accused Baidomero Ambrosio stands in this case on a similarly situated
understand why Ambrosio had to join the group of Tan, if according to Ambrosia himself, Tan was a man position as convicted accused Bienvenido Quintos in G.R. No. L-34497, and should, therefore be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and not death.
of bad reputation. 31 Tan has never been apprehended. The defense of Ambrosio that he was threatened by
Tan to participate in the crimes," stands uncorroborated, as contradicted by the testimony of Quintos.The
inevitable conclusion is that Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated October 17, 1973, is hereby, MODIFIED, finding the
accused Baidomero Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him
The trial court did not err in discrediting Ambrosio's claim that he was maltreated by the agents of the law to reclusion perpetual to indemnify jointly and severally with his co-accused, the heirs of the deceased
to extract his extra-judicial statement. (Exhs. "S"). He never did protest the alleged maltreatment before the Henry Chua in the asphyxiation of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00;
and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
Regional Director Nestor Gonzales before whom he signed the statement. Although he had all the chances
to do so, he never filed charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him. 32 The confession of the
accused Exhibits "S" is, therefore, admissible against him. SOORDERED.

As to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, this Court
already ruled in G.R. No. L-34497, that treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing of Chua to murder. Chua's
hands were tied and his mouth was gagged when he was stabbed twice with an ice-pick. Chua was
defenseless and helpless enabling the accused to commit the crimes," without risk to them. The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. The aggravating
circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery because in this crimes," treachery
arose from the defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while nighttime was purposely sought by
the accused to facilitate immunity in the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place (despoblado) is also present, due to the deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio
Makatipo Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim. Abuse of confidence cannot be
considered as an aggravating circumstance present in the crime, because it does not appear that the victim
Chua ever reposed confidence on Ong. Chua knew that he was far stronger in money and influence than
Ong. The fact that Henry Chua invited Ong night clubbing on that fatal evening and accommodated the
latter in his car did not show that Chua had confidence in Ong.

The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes," can be considered
present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the victim's car and to facilitate the commission
of the crimes," and the escape of the accused.

178
G.R. No. 213216 April 20, 2015 vagina. After Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped her. Thereafter, accused-appellants left
AAA at the cottage. An hour later, Cahipe returned and dragged AAA to a store owned by a certain Lino
Ostero7 (Ostero). There Cahipe undressed her again, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Afterwards, AAA was returned to the cottage. The next day, AAA's father found her crying at the cottage. 8
vs.
RICKY ARGUTA alias "JOEL" and WILSON CAHIPE alias "SIWIT," Accused-Appellants.
Further, the prosecution offered the findings of the physical examination by a certain Dr. Eilleen Colaba on
AAA, stating, inter alia, that: (a) AAA's genitalia was grossly normal, which means no abnormality; (b)
DECISION
AAA has complete healed hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions and a partially
healed hymenal laceration at the 12 o'clock position; and (c) AAA's genitalia is negative for the presence
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: of spermatozoa.9

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias "Joel" (Arguta) and In their defense, accused-appellants both denied the accusations leveled against them, and offered their
Wilson Cahipe alias "Siwit" (Cahipe; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated April respective alibis. Cahipe claimed that on the date and time of the alleged incident he was minding Ostero's
24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01462, which affirmed with store. On the other hand, Arguta averred that he was at Ostero' s house watching television during the time
modification the Decision3 dated July 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6 that the incident supposedly occurred. They both asserted that they did not know why AAA would accuse
(RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 97-02-76 and 97-02-77 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable them of raping her.10
doubt of one (1) count of Rape, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The RTC Ruling
The Facts
In a Decision11 dated July 25, 2008, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
On January 30, 1997 two (2) criminal informations were filed before the RTC charging Cahipe with two the crime of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 97-02-76 and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the
(2) counts of Rape, and Arguta of one (1) count of the same crime, viz.: penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Further, the RTC found Cahipe not
guilty of the crime of Rape in Crim. Case No. 97-02-77 and, accordingly, acquitted him due to
Crim. Case No. 97..:02-76 insufficiency of evidence.12

That on or about the 5th day of December 1996 in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte, In finding the guilt of accused-appellants, the RTC held that AAA's testimony, as well as the medico-legal
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused-appellants], report, established that on December 5, 1996, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her with a
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, motivated by lewd design. with the use of a
bladed weapon, dragged her to a nearby cottage, undressed her, bound her, and took turns raping her. The
bladed weapon, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and R TC did not lend credence to accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi, in light of the positive
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],4 without her consent and against her will. assertions made by AAA, and considering that it was not physically impossible for them to have been at
the place of the crime on the date of the incident.13
Contrary to Law.
However, as regards the second count of Rape against Cahipe, the RTC opined that it would be unusual for
Tacloban City, January 30, 1997. AAA, who had just been raped and left alone in the cottage, to not attempt to escape or shout for help
when she was being transported to Ostero' s store and back to the cottage, observing that AAA had to pass
Ostero's house before reaching the latter's store. According to the R TC, these pose serious doubts as to the
Crim. Case No. 97-02-77 existence of the second rape charge, thus, necessitating its dismissal. 14

That on or about the 5th day of December 1996, in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte, Dissatisfied, accused-appellants appealed their conviction to the CA.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Cahipc],
motivated by lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], without her consent and against her will. The CA Ruling

Contrary to Law. In a Decision15 dated April 24, 2014, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction with modification
ordering the accused-appellants to jointly and severally pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in addition to the other amounts already awarded, and imposed interest at the rate of six percent
Tacloban City, January 30, 1997.5 (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of its Decision until fully paid.16

According to the prosecution, at around 8 o'clock6 in the evening of December 5, 1996, AAA was Agreeing with the R TC' s findings, the CA ruled that AAA' s categorical and straightforward testimony
instructed by her father to fetch her sister in school. However, AAA failed to find her sister and decided to prevailed over accused-appellants' denial and alibi. It observed that accused-appellants were in the vicinity
go back home. On her way home, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her with a bladed of the locus criminis at the time of the incident, and that the two could easily reach the cottage where the
weapon, dragged her to a cottage at a nearby beach resort, and bound her hands and feet. Thereafter, they rape occurred.17 Thus, it concluded that accused-appellants' actions fell squarely within the definition of
removed her clothes and placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her
179
Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, noting that accused-appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA, and The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies the
such was attained through force, threat, or intimidation.18 crime.1âwphi1 If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating
circumstance. That was our ruling in People vs. Garcia, [192 Phil. 311, 342] (1981) reading:
Aggrieved, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely. 1. use of a deadly weapon
and 2. that two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while the second was
The Issue Before the Court
proved during trial. In both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying circumstance and the
second as a generic aggravating circumstance, in accordance with settled jurisprudence according to the
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether accused-appellants' conviction for Rape should be upheld. trial court.

The Court's Ruling We do not agree. Under the law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two
circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
The appeal is bereft of merit. enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63,
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.25(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.19 The In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and tied her
appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds that force or
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's objective is
the penal law.20 Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to modify accused- accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not becomes irrelevant.
appellants' conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape, as will be explained hereunder. Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and judgment and it is enough that the
victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist her assailant's advances. 26 In this regard,
In this case, the Court notes that the rape occurred during the effectivity of the old rape provision of the case law provides that the act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at
RPC, i.e., Article 335,21 and, thus, the latter provision is controlling in this case, to wit: least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission. 27

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the courts
under any of the following circumstances: a quo that accused-appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a deadly weapon,
as the same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the assessment and findings of the trial
court are generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with
1. By using force or intimidation; arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, 28 as in this case.
Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein,
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to
Qualified Rape. Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 29 provides
that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, accused-appellants should be
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. 30

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the award of damages in favor of
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. AAA to the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.31
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01462 is hereby AFFIRMED, finding accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias "Joel"
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was and Wilson Cahipe alias "Siwit" (accused-appellants) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with
demented.22 The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or MODIFICATION sentencing accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher eligibility for parole, and ordering them to jointly and severally pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
penalty.23 In People v. Lamberte,24 the Court clarified the legal effect of the presence of both civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest
circumstances, as follows: at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid. SO ORDERED.

180
G.R. No. 137050 July 11, 2001 The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime,
abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the commission of the crime.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
vs.
GEORGE CORTES Y ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attendant found the existence of the aggravating circumstances and appreciated only the mitigating
PARDO, J.:
circumstance of plea of guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances. The trial court then
proceeded to rule on the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the accused. The trial court rendered a
The case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, finding accused George Cortes y Ortega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the
On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur filed with the Regional Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and is hereby sentenced to
Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, an Information for murder against accused George Cortes suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P60,000.00,
y Ortega, which reads as follows: and to pay damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and cost ."5

"That on or about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at P. Lindo Hence, this review.6
Street, Saint Paul District, Nangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and evident
Accused raises the following errors imputed to the trial court:
premeditation, armed with a knife and with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attacked, assault and stabbed one Edlyn S. Gamboa, a 16 year old girl, thereby
inflicting the latter multiple stab wounds on her body which caused her instantaneous death as 1. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime,
certified by the doctor, to the damage and prejudice of the victim's heirs. abuse of superior strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of the crime charged;
and
Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code."2
2. In imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of reclusion perpetua.
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside
her house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While thus According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident
seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuña. Junilla noticed that premeditation and other circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house.
When Edlyn complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to
We agree with the accused that the prosecution did not prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being
premeditation. "The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating
wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for
circumstance: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly
help. At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed after
indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination
walking about five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
and the execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act." 7

Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had
As to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the victim several times, the
an altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very
same could not be considered as cruelty because there was no showing that it was intended to prolong the
drunk and the place was very dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following
suffering of the victim. "For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the
morning through the radio vigilantes program.
accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted
on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing
On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused. 3 He entered a plea of guilty.4 In virtue of his plea the suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and consequently a marked degree of malice and
of guilty, the trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of the plea by propounding perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death,
questions to the accused to find out if he understood his plea and the legal consequence thereof. Accused, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he
assisted by counsel, reiterated his plea of guilty and the extra judicial confession he executed before the had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance
police. into consideration."8

Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence of aggravating As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason
circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the mitigating circumstances that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating
that attended the commission of the crime. circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or

181
capture."9 In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to
perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.

"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another
aggravating circumstance."10 Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.

As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not
shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest
disrespect for her womanhood.11 In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.

"Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty,
if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it
is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading in toxication to
mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that
person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the
intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime."12

Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information and
considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty
imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only aggravating circumstance present was
treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with
Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759.

We also award P50,000.00 as moral damages in keeping with current jurisprudence. Moral damages is
proper considering the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim on account of her untimely and
gruesome death.13

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, in Criminal
Case No. 2026 convicting accused George Cortes y Ortega of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. In lieu of the death penalty, the accused George Cortes y
Ortega is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity, and fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

182
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000 floor. After the rape, appellant and his two companions counted the money they took from the
"aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at
ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant. P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)

GONZAGA-REYES, J.: The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy,
Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report presented by Municipal Health Officer
Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional Trial
o'clock and 7:00 o'clock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the
Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with
victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2
Rape.

The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in the
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial
house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold
Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows:
panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his
defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from
That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Barangay Bangon.
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the said accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused. The
and intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and
granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00
and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando Regala y Abriol
Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the
times sexually abused and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen. cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa Tagala the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 3
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that:


Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a police
line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother.
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy,
APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala the rape-victim, 17 years old, a third
year high school student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the
robbery with rape transpired at Consuelo's house. (2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4
The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy,
Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in identifying him as
sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former's one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. He claims that the complaining witness could not have
house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26, 1996). positively identified him as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the incident which took
place at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only after he
was pinpointed by Nerissa, and made contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the pieces of
appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that accused-appellant removed his
wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked
mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining
an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.

Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter,
The appellee insists that appellant's lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the positive identification
Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the
made by the victim, and avers that the victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed,

183
was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor General also recommends an Dr. Conchita Ulanday's testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that Nerissa
additional award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala. voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings
point to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa
voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
penetration as shown by the two lacerations at 4 o'clock and at 7 o'clock which were fresh wounds. That
the act was involuntary was clearly established by the facts that Nerissa was hogtied when she was
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed
to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant,
who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother in and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter
the latter's house when the accused-appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a
the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both
sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. 15
of them. Regala took of her panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made
sexual intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She
saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could not shout because the gun was pointed at The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of
her, and she was afraid. Two companions of the accused-appellant entered the room as she was being the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof:
raped. Two rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and
money was taken by the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the
accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen,
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
still hogtied, and rape again, 5 On cross-examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no electricity,
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
and the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time
Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money"
and there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala. 6 She remembered the face of Regala because of an The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases 16 holding that
earring on his left ear 7 which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up. 8 the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.
Martinez,17accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged
with the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. Nerissa Regala entered
the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a
the house with two companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual
deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that
intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her aparador, and got a
"(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of
stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala
appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."
because of his earring on his left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She
was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a piece of cloth by Regala. 9 On
cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to see Regala because he used her There are likewise cases 18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an
flashlight, and he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and his aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario 19 where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who
flat top hair cut.10 robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs.
Obtinalia, 20 ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed
simply because there were several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly
account raising the penalty to death."
establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of
robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively identified
Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
accused beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14
Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered the house, they removed their masks of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code
later. 11 regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for
analogous circumstances.
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the
unmeritorious. 12 robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense,
robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. 21 However, the remedy
lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender 22 and no person should
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of Consuelo
be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. 23
Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" 13 or "after" 14 she and Nerissa were
hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The contradiction referred
to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
Regala as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the earring on his left ear, which
he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station.
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
compensatory damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an

184
award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended party in
rape. 24 Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim since it is
recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of
rape to warrant per se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 25

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is
entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

185
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971 4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. 5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.
alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-
appellants.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

PER CURIAM:
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended
complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows: prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances
listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective
pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE"
and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY
PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo
ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
committed as follows: forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed
at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the
complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring
prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the
to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed
undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant
against the aforementioned accused.
to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of
the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a
deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by
will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were
the provisions of the civil code. submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his
testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code,
which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE
crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the
offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating
in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of
aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the
accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single;
Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the
she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at
offense.
St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of
her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per
circumstances: appearance as guest in other shows.

1. Use of a motor vehicle. So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound
from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid
Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to
City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard
make its discovery difficult;
(later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her
brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment
3. Abuse of superior strength; she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva,

186
who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her
jumped out of it and rushed towards her. clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with
which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously.
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the
arm.lâwphî1.ñèt The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of
started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose
out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her
la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs
la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running. tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
complainant. He then left the room.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men
inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss
and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing
appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured
maid was left behind. water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving
Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in
forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time,
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda,
the three other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her
Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants
several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what was
to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and
happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a
threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not
struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the
keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with
complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his
arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors
to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was
at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening
Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their
could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. presence.
She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now
and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told
knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.
her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression
that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without
the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they
Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then
Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she
with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in
lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel. that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They
and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio.
their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known
appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they
however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal
on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already
more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the
the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid.lâwphî1.ñèt They driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another
unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her
efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.
mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the
house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's
feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her

187
daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made
pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and
physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily
Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived
home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on
to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still
different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was
undecided on what to do.
shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the
aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right
taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight
early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and
accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The
Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm
wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's
of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital
Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer. examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been
produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He
explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also
the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of
the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the
headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote
the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the
role played by him.
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail
Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning
Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying
involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much
among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had
come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come
blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant. time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao.
The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo
dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before
the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in
the Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the
another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he
shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Cañal her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she
on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got
July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out.
raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car,
City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle
the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the
the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they
identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and
statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could
them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you
and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a
but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly
condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he

188
said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the
performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of
limited to the four of them. time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity
about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a
weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted
first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover
her face as she went up the Hotel.lâwphî1.ñètThe three followed, and when they saw Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something
the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused
soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her
windows before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is
their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a
Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God
declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis?
promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their
which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she
the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be
wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If
discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that,
Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie
they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just de la Riva consented to do.
come from her work.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police
Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or
did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a
he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.
could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company
complete they invited Cañal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose,
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for
different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached
this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's
himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his
positive identification of Cañal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock,
relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had,
the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their
according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building.
underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of
They later moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse
men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought
found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read
nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them,
in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia
but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to
Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.
argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and
disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's
testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has
trial judge on this point:
not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot
but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which
that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was
complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The
Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the
of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would
following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left
consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not
behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place
even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from
then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three
these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to
after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy

189
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual
suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those basis.
injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining
physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what
established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina
purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture?
disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert,
And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she
declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially
eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have
if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on
gone thru all of these tribulation?
the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and
pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil.,
the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle
redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not
Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva
could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in
Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a
the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ
the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by
those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes
by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This
testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made
declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a
declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing less than the daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva
written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is
stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which
notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a position to reveal
has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the
weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And
credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could
polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant
Besides, it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the
which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture
only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where
eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's
commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks
accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on the
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs. grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details
therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were
involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la
were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon
Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously
City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.
contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent
They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that
consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of
the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was
the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and
presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted
overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the
having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of
witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car
them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and
against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino,
Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the
between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter
complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared
touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile
by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate
being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel.
the affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends
This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than
or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon
suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants'
City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace

190
of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for
and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, three times — and his decision was still the same.
that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the
two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to
than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion
Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the
that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose
maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish
and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the
only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment
conviction of the two.
on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore,
is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground
that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from
Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S.
the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a
478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused
were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a
17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States,
in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to
Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act
them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision.lâwphî1.ñèt There is no doubt at
of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of
all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a
the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of
necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of
the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and
rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed,
defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the
the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding
promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before
(crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction — in other
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112,
words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the
adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion
deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took
in all the three above-cited cases. effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the
penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The
contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of 1. By using force or intimidation;
all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not
that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29,
1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of
discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to
admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings during the or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement
that . When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the
contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

191
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and
shall be death. biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death
penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the
execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed,
The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from
the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital
the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer
penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of
sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served
aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death
penalties.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though
finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following
related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by
aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to
the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of
facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed
sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105,
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not
113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete
concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of
the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose,
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go
Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating
into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be
penalties prescribed by law.
imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result,
appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple
crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.) Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are
only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by
or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple
penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time
capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed
necessitates simultaneous service.
forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends
of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death
penalty were imposed on each of the appellants. The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has
practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an
indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs.
capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of
Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has
the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs.
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused
penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper
prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba
penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending
is different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed
clemency or leniency in his behalf.
three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier
herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference
between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute)
the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum
"since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and
all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of
conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had
occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding
as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.
an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like

192
———— commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent
the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by
delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in
reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the
the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the
appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set
No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the
aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.

————
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the
Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment
of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of
beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on
Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and
annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the
chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose,
Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them
1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes,
preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in
Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its
other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by
confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its
the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the
possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of
sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with
the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2,
1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an
instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17,
1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31,
1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic
elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same
was also denied.

On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car
to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the
intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium
bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute
the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by
the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court,
which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that
the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.

Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence
of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of
the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during
the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor
could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer
to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the
car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of

193
G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966 Pedrito Rapadas and Virgilio Haban were able to run away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on
Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete along the rail
tracks, telling them that they had done something wrong.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants. At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete. After
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE ABERAS Y doing this, they dragged the two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near Vicente
CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA Y BALIDBID, defendants and appellants. Aberas' house. In said place, there were others who joined the group, among them, Jesus Felicia, Loreto
Saberon and Vicente Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete
to dig their graves, but they refused. Arturo Macabebe, who also joined the group, took two sticks of
PER CURIAM:
cigarettes and told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete to smoke. Antonio Maravilla again refused.
Following said refusal, the victims were hit with a piece of wood. Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then
This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court. 1 held Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete, respectively, by the hands and from behind. As they were
thus held, Vicente Aberas delivered fist blows on them, first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico
Cañalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto Saberon also held Federico Cañalete while others gave fist blows to the
On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder2 of Antonio Maravilla and another information for latter.6 At about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly
murder3 of Federico Cañalete, were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said informations were after hearing Loreto Saberon say that the group would cut off the ears of Antonio Maravilla and Federico
directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y Inguito, Jesus Felicia y Balidbid, Vicente Cañalete for appetizer or "pulutan".7
Aberas y Cordero, Cristoto Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos, Protacio Libres y Corona, Loreto
Saberon y Casas and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.
Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by Virgilio Haban, one of those who
were able to run away, that her brother and Federico Cañalete were taken by armed men. She therefore
After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May 1960, the two cases were tried went out with some companions in search of her brother. She asked the help of Patrolman Carlos Pili, who
jointly. Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado, after the was then at the corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6. Patrolmen Amado Santos
prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges against Mario Mustrado, with costs de oficio.
and Fabricante also joined them. As the other policemen took to separate directions, Patrolman Pili and
After the trial, the Court of First Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now under review. Its Elizabeth Maravilla went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a group of men, between Piers 6 and 8,
dispositive portion states: who were hesitant to answer their inquiries. So they proceeded further, entering a small alley. As they went
on, Elizabeth found the shoes of her brother. So they continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the defendants Eduardo Berdida, the waist, with bloodstains on his hands.8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since somebody threatened them
Loreto Saberon, Vicente Aberas and Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime should they proceed any further, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along
of murder. This Court has in previous cases endeavored to avoid the imposition of the capital Vicente Aberas. Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then requested. Accompanied by her neighbors
punishment. In the case at bar, however, where the offenders, pretending to be police officers, and more policemen, Elizabeth, together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to the interior of
kidnapped the victims and mercilessly beat one of them to death, the Court finds no other Mabuhay Street. Finally, they came upon Federico Cañalete and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the
alternative, in pursuance to the mandate of the law, but to impose, as it hereby imposes upon ground, the former face down, the latter flat on his back. Federico Cañalete was found dead. Antonio
the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Federico Maravilla was alive, though his face was swollen, rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio Maravilla
Cañalete in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May God have mercy on their souls. was taken to the North General Hospital.

In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are also hereby found guilty beyond Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw, about 12 meters away from where
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder and considering the aggravating they found the victims, a group drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four men ran
circumstances present, they are sentenced each to suffer a maximum penalty of TEN (10) away, leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla and Protacio
YEARS of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS ofprision correccional, and to Libres, the last mentioned being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed. 9 A Mobile Patrol car thereafter
pay the costs, without prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a separate civil action arrived and apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman Pili next went towards a house near Tagumpay
for the recovery of damages. Street in which direction the others had fled. In said house, which was that of Crisanta Melgar, the
patrolman found some persons who pretended to be sleeping, namely, Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and
Eduardo Berdida. Patrolman Pili brought them outside and they were taken by the Mobile Patrol to the
The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby acquitted, in both cases, with costs de Detective Bureau.
oficio, and their immediate release is hereby ordered.

Furthermore, the body of Federico Cañalete was examined at the scene where it was found by officers of
So ordered. the Mobile Patrol. Detective Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding bloodstains near an a alley
to Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and found Protacio Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed.
The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows: Said detectives took Libres to the headquarters.

At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico Cañalete, Virgilio Haban At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to mingle with other persons. Antonio
and Pedrito Rapadas left the store of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila, Maravilla, who was fetched to point out therefrom the persons who attacked him and Federico Cañalete
and proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met on their way by Eduardo Berdida, Antonio identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia.
Louie, one Tiquio and one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as detectives, told them not to move,
and pointed sharp and long bolos to them.4Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete raised their hands, but
194
An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico Cañalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical CAUSE OF DEATH:
Examiner of the Manila Police Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows: (Exh.
M):
Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic fracture of the skull with maceration of
spleen, contusion of the lungs and extensive subarachnoid hemorrhages in the brain.
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr. Cumalinga Espinosa of the North
Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain. General Hospital (Exh. R), sustained these injuries:

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye right.

Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen. Contusion upper and lower lip.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM: Contusion 2" mental region.

Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral. Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and mandible bilateral.

Congestion, lungs, bilateral. Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.

GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM: Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.

About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with slight alcoholic odor. For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was presented to establish alibi:

Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity. Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960 Crisanta Melgar was filling drums with
water in her house at 1205 Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo Berdida, Loreto
Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband was on night duty and her brother- in-law was ill,
SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.
Crisanta Melgar asked the three to remain and help her fill up the drums with water, intending to sell the
same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for some time helped Crisanta fill the drums with
PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas. water. At about 9 o'clock in the evening, however, said defendants went to sleep in the ground floor of
Crisanta's new house, still under construction, adjacent to the house aforementioned. At about midnight a
policeman and someone in civilian clothes knocked at the door and inquired from Crisanta if there were
BONES AND JOINTS: three persons sleeping in her house. She said yes, and opened the door. The policeman then told Crisanta
that a dead man was found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back of the house.
Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and right fronto-temporal skull. Crisanta told the policeman she knew nothing of any incident and that the three men had been in her house
for some time. She then awoke the defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The policeman told them to
stand up and the man in civilian was asked if they were the ones involved. Said man looked at the
MISCELLANEOUS: defendants and replied in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the defendants went
back to sleep. After a while, Crisanta, who was restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke the
Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region. defendants, and told them that it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants left, but a policeman
stopped them at Tagumpay Street and took them to the police headquarters.
Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital region.
As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:
Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. deep, non-penetrating, left abdomen.
In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don Paulino." At about 10:30 o'clock in
the evening, after unloading their catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him a tulingan fish. Juan, a
Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-occipital, and occipital, scalp, head. co-worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near Pier 8. For some time they stayed there, then he
left for home. On the way he met five men beating up somebody. Approaching them, he asked them to
Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip; left have pity on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the group, armed with a club, warned him not to
lateral neck; posterior neck; left shoulder; left and right posterior chest. interfere, so, becoming afraid, he left. In reaching home, he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with
him in half, lengthwise, and took one of the halves to the house of Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of
his, who did not report for work that day. Retone invited him to drink gin. After drinking, he headed for
Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest and right abdomen.

195
home, but on his way he met two policemen and a woman. After being asked where he came from, which that appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears that to carry
he answered, and whether he had seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3. out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for the death of one
Pabling, they had evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of darkness, at the dead of night,
when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands
Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony identifying them as the assailants, for
were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can
the reason that he lost consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said identification.
be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special
Appellants would further insist on their defense of alibi. Antonio Maravilla, it is true, lost consciousness' at
case therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does no apply. 11
about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that before his sense faded out he
saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on himself as well as on Federico Cañalete. It cannot
therefore be doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein appellants as definitely among their In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out by the record. For the victims were
assailants. This he did, not only at the police station but also in open court during the trial. It is furthermore told at the start, when they were taken captives, that they had done something wrong, that they were the
not disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio Maravilla has no reason or motive to falsely accuse ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this reason they were to go with the group (T.s.n., 10
them of murder and attempted murder. The positive identification he made must therefore be given October 1960, pp. 20, 22; Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then taken to a spot where they were
credence. ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously armed with deadly weapons, and their assault
was a concerted and group action. From the time of apprehension of the victims, About 10 o'clock in the
evening, to the time Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, about 1 o'clock early the following morning, is
It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is settled, to the point of being trite, that
sufficient time for the offenders to meditate and reflect on the consequences of their act.
the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses, pointing to
the accused as participants in the crime. 10
In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
present, in view of the repeated statements of the defendants that the hour of reckoning of the victim would
The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not credible. For, according to said
arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact that they were previously armed with deadly weapons,
court, if defendants Berdida, Felicia and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their provincemate,
and the fact that the aggression was simultaneous and continuous until the deceased was left unconscious
fill drums with water at her house, it is rather unusual that they went to sleep at about 9 o'clock in the
on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil. 525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for
evening. Furthermore, the policeman who inquired about persons sleeping in Crisanta Melgar's house
purposes of the presence of evident premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of time in this regard is
strangely knew their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is unbelievable that said policeman did
not simply a matter of the precise number of hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation
not take them to the headquarters for identification by Antonio Maravilla himself.1äwphï1.ñët
and circumstances, to ponder and reflect upon the consequences. In the present case, we find the facts and
circumstances obtaining sufficient to support the trial court's finding of the attendance of evident
And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial court found it too surprising to premeditation.
believe that he went to such lengths of amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at an
unholy hour, to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No previous agreement, or urgent need for
Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in this case should be increased to
such an act obtained. It could have waited for the next morning, especially since, having allegedly come
P6,000. 12
from work, defendant Aberas must have been tired.

Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record shows that defendants
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964, the defense of alibi is an issue
perfected no appeal from the judgment below. The present automatic review is limited only to the murder
of fact that hinges on credibility; that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the credibility of the
case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only because of the joint trial that the record of the
witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this inspect, the relative weight which the trial judge assigns
attempted murder case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was taken in the attempted murder
to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on
case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It therefore cannot now be reviewed herein, as
record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate contact with those who take to the witness
some of the appellants would ask. And defendants-appellants, who are detained, should accordingly be
chair places him, compared to appellate Justices, in the more competent position to discriminate be
deemed to have started serving their respective sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the
between the true and the false.
decision of the trial court became final as to said case.

And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower court's finding on defendants-
Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is hereby affirmed, and the indemnity to
appellants' defense of alibi.
the heirs of Federico Cañalete is hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs. So ordered.

It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior
strength, and evident premeditation should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants would
argue that nighttime was not purposely sought to facilitate the offense or to afford impunity. At any rate,
they would further argue, nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength are deemed absorbed in treachery.
As to evident premeditation, they aver that the premeditation, if any, is not evident, for lack of sufficient
lapse of time between the execution of the offense and a previous showing of intent to commit it, so as to
show that the offenders clung to their determination to commit the crime.

The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, suffices to fix the penalty for murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no
mitigating circumstance in the present case. From the facts and evidence of record in this case, it is clear

196
G.R. No. 129074 February 28, 2000 down. Later, SALVADOR took off his clothes and went near LEONILA. SALVADOR then
got LEONILA's hands and pinned her down. After taking off her shorts and panty,
SALVADOR placed himself on top of LEONILA and then forcibly inserted his organ in hers
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
for a long time. LEONILA was hurting. All she could do was cry. SALVADOR went back to
vs.
the sala and slept (TSN, Nov. 22, 1994, pp. 5-8).
SALVADOR LOMERIO, defendant-appellant.

Again, at about 12:00 midnight of the same date, Salvador went back to LEONILA and raped
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
her for the second time. SALVADOR threatened LEONILA that he would kill all of them if she
would report the rapes to anybody. Marvie was likewise raped by SALVADOR in the early
Accused-appellant SALVADOR LOMERIO (hereafter SALVADOR) prays for the reversal of the morning of the following day (TSN, Nov. 22, 1994, pp. 8-10; March 13, 1995, pp. 3-5).
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74 dated January 16, 1977 finding him
guilty of the crime of RAPE based on an Information which alleges:
As if nothing untoward happened, Salvador instructed the children to dress up so they could go
to Tuazon in Marikina and join their mother (TSN, Nov. 22, 1994, p. 10).3
That on or about the 23rd day of March, 1993 in the Municipality of Antipolo Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Vilma Bunagan, the mother of LEONILA testified that she learned of the rape on March 25, 1993 from a
accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
"kumare", Anita Fernandez who heard of it from a certain Totoy, who is one of the playmates of Marvie,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a minor ten (10) years old girl, Leonila
sister of LEONILA. When Vilma asked LEONILA, the latter confirmed that SALVADOR abused her.
Bunagan, without her consent and against her will.1âwphi1.nêt
Vilma then brought Marvie and LEONILA to Camp Crame to have the two girls examined after which,
she filed a complaint against SALVADOR with the Cogeo Police Station.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The examination conducted by Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Medico Legal Officer, Camp Crame, Quezon
On August 22, 1994, SALVADOR entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, trial then proceeded with City reveals that LEONILA is in virgin state physically as there was an absence of external signs of recent
the prosecution presenting the following witnesses: Vilma Bunagan, mother of the victim, Leonila application of violence although there are congestions or redness on the genital and sex organ of
Bunagan (hereafter LEONILA), private complainant, Dr. Hesusa Nieves Vergara, Medico Legal Officer, LEONILA which could have been caused by possible penetration on the labia minora. 4
Camp Crame, Quezon City, Dr. Renato Bautista, Medico Legal Officer, NBI Manila, Marvie Bunagan,
Concepcion Bahiwag, Social Worker and Roberto Bunagan. The prosecution offered Exhibits "A" to "G"
SALVADOR as the lone witness for the defense testified that on March 23, 1993, he was at the Bunagan's
as evidence.
house to accompany the children of his sister. There was no bedroom in the house and the children slept on
the floor in the main sala while he slept on one side near the window and was separated from the children.
The defense for its part presented SALVADOR as its lone witness and offered no documentary evidence. When he woke up at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning, he did not remember any unusual incident that
happened on that night except that he accidentally touched the breast of LEONILA when he woke up. He
apologized to her. SALVADOR believes that the accidental touching of LEONILA's breasts triggered the
The version of the People as presented by the Solicitor General narrates the details of the crime, viz:
filing of the complaint for rape.

On May 23, 1993, Vilma Bunagan, together with her eldest son Roberto, went to her parents' On January 16, 1997, the trial court found SALVADOR guilty of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion
house at Tuazon St., Marikina, Metro Manila to bring her two-year-old son who was sick. She
of the judgment reads:
left behind in their Antipolo house her other five children, namely, LEONILA, Marvie, Lotis,
Marichu and Edmar, who were the ages 10, 8, 7, 6 and 1, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Salvador Lomerio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Statutory Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 (c) of the Revised
Worried that something bad could happen to her children while unattended by an adult Penal Code and considering against him two aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse
companion, because her husband Mario was staying in Divisoria and working as a mason, of confidence, accused Salvador Lomerio is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty
Vilma instructed Roberto to fetch his younger brother and sisters from Antipolo. Roberto,
of Reclusion Perpetua (the offense was committed before the effectivity of the Heinous Crimes
however, failed to do so as he went for an interview for a job on the same day (TSN, Nov. 9, law); to pay the offended party P100,000.00 in moral damages, and to pay costs.
pp. 3-9; July 3, 1995, p. 4).

SO ORDERED.5
At about 8:00 p.m., Vilma asked her youngest brother, Salvador Lomerio (SALVADOR), to
fetch the children from Antipolo and bring them to Marikina. SALVADOR agreed and left that
night for Antipolo in the company of Roberto (TSN, Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 7-8; Nov. 22, 1994, p. 5; SALVADOR maintains his innocence and seeks the reversal of the quoted decision on these grounds:
July 3, 1995, p. 3).
I
SALVADOR and Roberto arrived at the house in Antipolo at about 11:00 p.m. Roberto left
behind SALVADOR who stayed for the night. LEONILA was awakened when the two arrived.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR RAPE AS THERE
LEONILA opened the door for SALVADOR and thereafter went back to sleep. SALVADOR
WAS NO RAPE AT ALL.
stayed in the sala smoking cigarettes while LEONILA and her brother and sisters were lying

197
II Q: Do you recall anything that happened that night?

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE A: He was then at the sala and smoking a cigarette while we were on the bedroom and
TESTIMONIES OF THE VICTIM WHICH ARE UNNATURAL TO A PERSON HAVING BEEN already lying down. During the night he took off his pants and went on top of me.
ALLEGEDLY RAPED.
Q: Where did Salvador take off his clothes, in the sala or in your room?
III
A: At the sala, mam.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND REHEARSED
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.6
Q: Where were you sleeping that night?

The overwhelming evidence of the prosecution against SALVADOR clearly establishes his guilt beyond
A: On the floor, mam.
reasonable doubt.

Q: Where is the floor located in the bedroom or in the sala?


In claiming that no rape at all was committed, SALVADOR relies on some portions of the direct
examinations of Vilma Bunigan, LEONILA, Dr. Jesusa Nieves, and Dr. Renato C. Bautista. SALVADOR
also capitalizes on the medico legal finding that "complainant is in virgin state with no signs of injury in A: In the bedroom.
the genitalia" and concludes that "in the absence of these injuries, there is doubt that rape was committed
against the victim".7
Q: Who were with you who were sleeping with you in the bedroom?

Contrary to SALVADOR's claim, the testimonies of Vilma Bunigan, LEONILA, Dr. Jesusa Nieves, and
Dr. Renato C. Bautista, taken in their entirety tell a credible account of the rape of LEONILA by A: Marvie, Lotis and Edmar.
SALVADOR.
Q: You mentioned earlier that Salvador took off his clothes and then what did he do
In a prosecution for rape, courts exercise circumspection in determining the credibility of the victim. If her afterwards?
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.8 The convincing
and credible testimony of LEONILA sealed the conviction of SALVADOR. Moreover, the prosecution A: He took off his clothes but I was then sleeping and he went near me and got my hands
also drew its strength from its other witnesses, particularly from Marvie, LEONILA's sister who saw how and pinned them down and he went on top of me and then he (witness demonstrating pumping
SALVADOR ravished LEONILA that fateful night. Marvie, then eight years old, was also allegedly raped motion).
by SALVADOR the morning after he raped LEONILA.
Q: Did he take off his clothes that night?
We recognize the doctrine that testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible. The
revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit as the willingness of the
complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of public trial is A: Shorts and panty.
eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint.9 In this case, LEONILA was proven to be only ten years
old when SALVADOR raped her. Q: Did he take off your shorts and panty before he went on top of you?

Furthermore, the issue of credibility is best addressed to the trial court judge who observed first hand the A: Yes, mam.
demeanor and deportment of the witnesses. Appellate courts will not disturb the findings on the credibility,
or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the
trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the Q: When you mentioned that he placed himself on top of you and pinned your arms. Did
case.10 he insert his organ in your sex organ?

SALVADOR insists that the inconsistencies in the testimony of LEONILA as to the location of the floor A: Yes, mam.
where she was sleeping on, which brother or sister woke up, or the size of the room, taint the credibility of
LEONILA. We are not persuaded. The so-called lapses in the testimony of LEONILA are trivial and do Q: What did you do feel when he inserted his organ to your sex organ?
not touch upon the material aspects of the crime.
A: It hurt and I cried and cried.
We take note of the fact that the victim in this case is a child. Ample margin of error and understanding
should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to
the novelty of the experience of testifying before a court.11 To LEONILA's credit, she was forthright and Q: How long did he insert his organ to your sex organ?
consistent in describing how SALVADOR raped her, as can be seen from the following:
198
A: For a long time, mam. Q: Did he take off his clothes?

Q: What did you do? A: He took off his shirt, but he did not take off his pants.

A: I cried and cried. Q: When he was on top of you at around 12:00 o'clock, did he take off his short?

Q: Did anyone of your brothers and sisters wake up due to your crying? A: Yes, mam.

A: There was, mam, my younger sister. Q: Did he take off your shorts or panty at around 11:00 o'clock?

Q: What is the name of your younger brother or sister who woke up? A: Yes, mam.

A: Edmar, mam. Q: Did he insert his organ to your sex organ at around 11:00 o'clock?

Q: Did you notice anyone of your brothers and sisters who also woke up that night? A: Yes, mam.

A: Yes, mam. Q: How long did he insert his organ to your sex organ?

Q: Who else woke up that night? A: For a long time, mam.

A: He was the only one. Q: What did you do?

Q: How long did he insert his organ to your sex organ? A: I cried and cried.

A: For a long time. Q: Did Salvador threaten you?

Q: What did he do afterwards? A: Yes, mam.

A: After that he left. Q: What did Salvador tell you?

Q: And then what happened afterwards? A: That he was going to kill us whenever we reported.12

A: He went to lay down in the sala and went to sleep. SALVADOR's defense that the only unusual thing that happened on the night of the rape was his
accidental touching of LEONILA's breast cannot override LEONILA's positive assertion that
SALVADOR defiled her. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong
Q: Do you recall anything else that happened that night?
evidence of non-culpability to merit credence.13 It is an established rule that an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible
A: There was at around 12:00 o'clock. witness.14 Thus, SALVADOR's defense of denial cannot prevail over the unwavering and consistent
testimony of LEONILA.
Q: What happened at around 12:00 o'clock that night?
Moreover, Marvie corroborates LEONILA's testimony when the former testified that:
A: He went back to me.
Q: When you mentioned earlier that Salvador Lomerio pinned down the thighs of your
sister, can you describe how he pinned down your sister?
Q: What did Salvador do to you?

A: He used his two (2) thigh to pinned down the thighs of my ate mam.
A: He again went on top of me.

199
Q: What exactly was he doing while he was pinning down the thighs of your sister? Q: Are you aware of the concept of rape in legal jurisprudence?

A: He was inserting his sex organ on the sex organ of my sister, mam. A: The slightest penetration even only the labia was touched by the male sex organ.

Q: And how did your sister react to this? Q: When you say labia which part of the female genitary is that?

A: She was crying, mam.15 A: It is the outermost part of the upper lip.

In foisting the defense that no rape at all was committed, SALVADOR harps on the findings of the medico Q: Upper lip of?
legal that LEONILA is in virgin state with no signs of injury in the genitalia. SALVADOR directs the
attention of this Court to some portions of the testimonies of Dr. Jesusa Nieves and Dr. Renato C. Bautista
A: Upper lips of the female sex.
to show that another object could have caused the congestion in LEONILA's sex organ. SALVADOR then
impresses upon this Court the possibility that a finger of another person could have caused the redness in
the labia minora of LEONILA. Contrary to SALVADOR's claim. Dr. Nieves and Dr. Bautista did not xxx xxx xxx
absolutely rule out rape as borne out by their testimonies:
COURT:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DR. BAUTISTA:
Q: With the congestion on the vestibule which you found, Doctor, is it your opinion that
Q: Can you say something else about your conclusion is it conclusive, would it definitely there is a possible penetration of the labia minora?
preclude a conclusion that there was rape from this findings?
A: Yes, your honor, a pressure was applied on the area.17
A: Actually mam, our job is only to state whether there was sexual intercourse or not.
The term "carnal knowledge" as used in the Revised Penal Code, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual
Q: So, from your findings could you surmise that there was sexual intercourse? intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. 18 In
fact, rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female
organ, e.g., by "the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual
A: I would say that there was a possibility that there was a sexual intercourse, your
act".19 In the case at bar, the straightforward and credible testimony of LEONILA as to how SALVADOR
honor, but I would like to point out there is no medical evidence to prove that there was such. 16
raped her and the medical finding that LEONILA's hymen suffered congestion due to the forcible entry of
a hard blunt object, convince this Court with clear certainty that SALVADOR had carnal knowledge with
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DR. NIEVES-VERGARA LEONILA.

Q: What could have been the cause of this redness? SALVADOR asserts that the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution were inconsistent and
rehearsed. Again, SALVADOR merely relies on the selected portions of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses20 referring to certain details about the rape incident, i.e. whether it happened on the floor of the
A: Forcible entry of a hard blunt object.
sala or the bedroom, whether there were three or five people in the bedroom, or whether she was awakened
only by the cry of Elmer, whether a knife was used during the rape, but these details do not detract from
Q: So, what are usually the causes of a hard blunt object which could cause such the essential import of the testimonial evidence that LEONILA was raped by the accused-appellant on
congestion? March 23, 1993. Although the responses were not perfect, it was reasonably ascertainable from the
testimonies of LEONILA, Marvie and Robert that SALVADOR had a knife with him but was not holding
any object in his hand while raping LEONILA, that when Marvie woke up, the rape was not yet finished.
A: An erect male sex organ, your honor. The other so-called inconsistencies relied upon by SALVADOR relate to minor matters and do not vitiate
the finding that the rape was more than adequately proven. Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident
Q: So, what is your conclusion from your examination? cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating
and so painful as rape.21 Moreover, the minor lapses contradict SALVADOR's claim that the testimonies
were rehearsed. We believe that the lapses serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the
A: Based on my findings my conclusion is that the victim is in virgin state physically. witnesses because they erase any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony. 22 This Court has
consistently held that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
Q: When you said that the victim is in virgin state physically could you state in layman's prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the
term? testimony deserves full faith and credit.23

A: I only mean to say that considering the absence of alteration on the hymen I consider It would be highly improbable for LEONILA, a ten-year-old girl, to cry rape against SALVADOR, her
the victim as virgin. own uncle. By saying that she was raped, LEONILA also embroiled her own sister Marvie into the case

200
when the latter corroborated LEONILA's testimony. Marvie's testimony revealed that SALVADOR also We do not, however agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
raped her the day after he raped LEONILA. These two young and inexperienced girls could not have confidence are present in this case. The elements of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance are: (a)
woven an intricate story of defoliation that will forever mar their lives. Truly, they must have been when it facilitated the commission of the crime; or (b) when especially sought by the offender to insure the
impelled by a desire so strong as to let justice find its way.24 commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity, or (c) when the offender took advantage thereof
also for purposes of impunity.33 There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the
objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense;
SALVADOR cannot also impute any ill motive on the part of the mother of LEONILA in pursuing this
and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
case against him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and
offender.34 These two tests should be applied in the alternative.35 In this case, the subjective test is not
trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by her desire to incarcerate the
passed because there is no showing that SALVADOR purposely sought the cover of nighttime. The mere
person responsible for her child's defilement or if the same is not true. 25 In filing this case, Vilma Bunagan
fact that the rape was committed at nighttime with nothing more does not make nocturnity in this particular
did not only expose her daughter LEONILA but also her other daughter, Marvie, to the ignominy that rape
case an aggravating circumstance.
victims must face. Vilma Bunagan was not daunted by the fact that SALVADOR is her brother and that
she would earn the wrath of their parents who have demanded that she retract the charge against
SALVADOR. To our mind, the mother's zeal in prosecuting this case evinces the truth that she merely As to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, it is essential to show that confidence between
seeks justice for her daughter whose honor has been debased. the parties must be immediate and personal, such as would give the accused some advantage or make it
easier for him to commit the criminal act.36 The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission
of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended parties belief that the former would not abuse
In a feeble attempt to overturn the judgment of conviction, SALVADOR questions the composed behavior
said confidence.37 In this case, the bare allegation that the victim's mother asked SALVADOR to fetch her
of LEONILA after the rape. We have time and again declared that there is no standard form of behavior
children from Antipolo to Marikina does not prove that she reposed such confidence in SALVADOR that
that is expected of rape victims right after they have been defiled because people react differently to
he could have used to his advantage in committing the crime.
emotional stress.26This experience is relative and may be dealt with in many ways by the victim depending
on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. 27
The aggravating circumstance that is present in the case at bar is relationship since LEONILA is the niece
of SALVADOR. In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is aggravating. 38 However; the
Based on the testimonies of LEONILA and Marvie, prior to March 23, 1993, SALVADOR had repeatedly
penalty herein of reclusion perpetua would not be affected because it is an indivisible penalty which must
raped them. According to LEONILA, she was five years old when SALVADOR began to rape her.28
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime of rape.39
The rape that occurred on March 23, 1993 was just the last of the many rapes that SALVADOR committed
against LEONILA. It is therefore not difficult to fathom the psychological trauma that LEONILA
In accordance with current rulings, accused-appellant SALVADOR must pay civil indemnity in the
experienced every time her uncle would sexually abuse her. SALVADOR's threat to kill LEONILA and
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is automatically granted in
her family if she would tell anyone of the rape29 naturally frightened the child-victim. The silence or
rape cases, separate and distinct from the indemnity.40
"composed reaction" of LEONILA as SALVADOR describes it, does not therefore impair her claim that
he raped her.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Criminal Case
No. 93-9893 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay
SALVADOR also faults Marvie for not helping LEONILA if the former truly saw him rape LEONILA.
Leonila Bunagan the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
This reasoning must likewise fail. Marvie, was only eight years old when she witnessed the rape on March
23, 1993. Marvie could have been gripped by fear when she saw the accused rape LEONILA.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court therefore correctly ruled that SALVADOR is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Statutory Rape and should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code applies to this case because the rape was committed prior to the passage of the Heinous Crimes
Law.30 Article 335 states that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The birth certificate31 of LEONILA shows that she was born on November 10, 1982 and this was admitted
by SALVADOR during the formal offer of evidence.32 Since the prosecution established that LEONILA
was only ten years old when the rape occurred on March 23, 1993, the crime SALVADOR committed falls
under the third paragraph of Article 335.

201
G.R. No. 80102 January 22, 1990 In this appeal, appellant raises the following assignments of error, mainly challenging the lower court's
evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies and the evidence:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs. I
JOVENCIO LUCAS y PARCUTELA, accused-appellant.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
CORTES, J.: REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE LACK OF EVIDENCE
SHOWING HE IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME;
Once again this Court is called upon to review a case involving the heinous crime of rape, made even more
so because it was committed by a father against his own flesh and blood. II

On March 10, 1986, Mauricia Lucas filed a complaint accusing appellant, her own natural father, with THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
rape, committed as follows: CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF PRESUMPTIONS AND SELF-SERVING TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES [Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 42].
That on or about the month of September, 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, father of the undersigned complainant, with lewd designs and by means of force, Ultimately, the only issue presented in this case is whether or not the appellant was proven guilty beyond
violence and intimidation, to wit: by tying her legs, undressing her, burning her face with a reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
lighted cigarette, poking a knife at her body and threatening to kill her should she tell the matter
to her mother or anybody else, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
After a careful review of the record, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court finding appellant
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, 13 years of age, against her will and consent.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, aggravated by the circumstances of relationship and
[Record, p. 1.]
cruelty (ensanamiento).

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial ensued, whereupon
The trial court's decision is amply supported by evidence proving to a moral certainty the guilt of the
the lower court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime charged with the aggravating
appellant. We find that the record sufficiently establishes that, indeed, as held by the trial court, appellant
circumstances of relationship and cruelty. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
had carnal knowledge of Mauricia, through force and intimidation, against the latter's will.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that accused JOVENCIO LUCAS y


The prosecution's version of the case as adopted by the lower court is as follows: Sometime in September
PARCUTELA is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and he is hereby
1985, thirteen-year old Mauricia, then working as a housemaid, was fetched by her father from her place of
sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA (Art. 335, RPC); to indemnify Mauricia Lucas the sum
work at 1171 Batanes Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Mauricia asked appellant where they were going, but the
of P30,000 as moral damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
latter simply did not answer. Father and daughter boarded a jeepney and alighted in a dark place which
to pay the costs . . . [RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 14.]
Mauricia found unfamiliar. Mauricia was then brought to a dark room where her father tied both her hands
and feet to a bed, undressed her, lighted a cigarette and burnt her face with it, kissed her, fondled her
The victim testified that this was in fact not the first time she was sexually abused by appellant. The trial private parts, and finally, pointing a knife approximately eight (8) inches long at her neck, consummated
court noted in its decision that — the sexual act. All throughout the forced sexual intercourse, appellant was laughing. He then threatened to
kill Mauricia if she revealed the incident to anyone. Despite such warning, Mauricia told her paternal
grandfather about her terrible experience. Her grandfather, angered, confronted the appellant, but the latter
xxx xxx xxx
only threatened to harm the old man. About six months after the alleged rape took place, Mauricia decided
to report the incident to the police. On March 3, 1986, a physical and genital examination was conducted
Mauricia Lucas testified that she had already been raped by her father, once in Romblon, some on Mauricia by Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Evidence-Laboratory Division of the
three (3) months before September 1985, and again in Manila before the third rape that was Western Police District. The fact of defloration is supported by the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer
committed in September 1985. It was the THIRD act of rape committed in Manila in September [Exhibit "C", Record, p. 35] which reads:
1985 that is the subject-matter of the instant criminal prosecution. After this third two (2) more
rapes were allegedly committed on her person by the accused in Manila sometime in September
1. Breasts are fairly developed, hemispherical in shape and with small brownish nipples and
1985 . . . [T]he evidence will be concentrated on the THIRD RAPE committed in the City of
areolae;
Manila in September 1985, for which the victim made her move and complained to the
authorities on March 3, 1986 . . . .
2. Abdomen is flat, soft and without striae of pregnancy;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Hymen is relatively thin, narrowed with a deep old healed gaping laceration at 6 o'clock
position extending to the base;
[RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 12].

4. Introitus vagina admits two (2) examining fingers with relative ease; and

202
5. Last menstrual period — Menarche has not started as of this date. of alibi which the defense witnesses could corroborate. It was held in the case of People v. Resano [G.R.
No. 57738, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 711, 717-718] that:
OPINION: The above findings is consistent with a girl who is no longer a virgin.
xxx xxx xxx
The Medico-legal officer further testified that the findings are consonant with a woman who has had
"several experience with sexual intercourse" [t.s.n., October 7, 1986, p. 3]. However, because the physical . . . [The witness], of course, has a right not to do so and his failure and/or refusal to testify shall
and genital examination was conducted about six months after the rape, evidence of violence, whether not in any manner prejudice or be taken against him. But where the prosecution has already
external or internal, can no longer be established. Be that as it may, the absence of any evidence of force established a prima faciecase, more so when the offense charged is grave and sufficient enough
does not negate a finding that forcible sexual intercourse actually took place [People v. Domen, G.R. Nos. to send accused behind bars for life . . ., then in order to meet and destroy the effects of
L-47675-76, January 31,1983,120 SCRA 486]. said prima facie case and so as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the
prosecution, the party making the denial must produce evidence tending to negate the blame
asserted to such a point that, if no more evidence is given, his adversary cannot win the case
I.
beyond a reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for the accused to have a
complete destruction of the prosecution's prima facie case, that he take the stand since no
An accusation for rape can easily be made because the nature of the crime is such that it is difficult to hardship will in any way be imposed upon him nor advantage be taken of him. . . . If he fails to
prove or disprove its veracity. In such an offense where it is usually only the accused and his victim who meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things he
can testify as to its occurrence, conviction or acquittal hinges almost solely upon the credibility of the has to do, then he is hardy indeed, if he demands and expects that same full and wide
witnesses [People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705]. In the present consideration which the state voluntarily gives to those who, by reasonable effort seek to help
case, only the complainant herself had testified as to the details of the rape. However, although the themselves. . . .
evidentiary rule in such crimes is that the testimony of the victim should not be received with precipitate
credulity [People v. Estacio, G.R. No. 54221, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 537], nonetheless, even the
xxx xxx xxx
uncorroborated testimony of the offended party in an accusation for rape is sufficient to justify conviction
if said testimony is "credible and positive, and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt" [People v.
Galicia, G.R. No. L-39235, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 550]. Alibi is generally a weak defense, and cannot prevail over positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, in order to establish an alibi, the accused must be able to show that it
was impossible for him to have been present at the time of commission and in the place where the crime
In the case under review, we find no reason to doubt the victim's credibility. The trial court, having had the
was committed [People v. Quidilla, G.R. Nos. 79369-70, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 778; People v.
opportunity of hearing firsthand the witnesses of both prosecution and defense and of observing their
Sambangan, G.R. No. L-44412, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 726]. Where a claim of alibi is supported
demeanor and manner of testifying during the trial, noted that during cross-examination the victim showed
only by testimony of relatives and friends, it deserves scant consideration, more so in the light of positive
"sincerity and conviction" and appeared to be truly "aggrieved" [t.s.n., December 18, 1986, p. 17]. In its
identification [People v. Baniaga, G.R. No. L-14905, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 283]. In the present case,
decision, the trial court further regarded the defense's theory of revenge as "absurd . . . puerile and
there is no showing that appellant never returned to Manila from Romblon since the time he left the city,
childish" [RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 13]. Indeed, scrutinizing the record, we find that there exists no
allegedly in 1984, save for the statements of his wife and friends. It was not impossible for him to have
cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. This Court finds it
made occasional visits to Manila in order to see his daughter. Besides, the fact that Mauricia identified
noteworthy that instead of testifying in open court in order to defend himself against the victim's
appellant as her rapist belies his denial and defense of alibi. It only shows that the appellant had, on at least
accusation, appellant simply chose not to rebut the charges, but remained silent, and relied solely on the
one occasion, left for Manila during the time that he was allegedly in Romblon.
testimonies of his wife and friend, thus inhibiting himself from personal scrutiny of the judge.

To buttress its argument, the appellant contends that the failure of Mauricia to shout for help from
The defense anchors its case mainly on alibi. As stated in the trial court decision, the defense relied only on
bystanders prior to the rape while they were still in public view casts doubt on the prosecution's case. The
the testimonies of Venancia Lucas (wife of appellant and natural mother of the victim) and of Clarita
contention deserves no consideration. The appellant, being the victim's father, had some moral ascendancy
Monsale and on a letter written by the Barangay Captain of Matutuma, San Andres, Romblon, but did not
and influence over his daughter which, in itself, was sufficient to intimidate and force her to submit to his
present the accused himself who "pointedly and purposely did not testify in his behalf" [RTC Decision, p.
desires [People v. Robles, G.R. No. 53569, February 23, 1989; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88,
2; Rollo, p. 12]. Appellant's wife Venancia, mother of the victim, claimed that her husband was with her in
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; U. S. v. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434, (1905)]. Besides, the victim testified
Romblon in September 1985, and that it was only in February 3,1986 that, together, they decided to try to
that she offered resistance to her father's sexual advances [t.s.n., February 20, 1987, p. 2]. It is hard to
make a living in Manila [t.s.n., March 13, 1987, p. 5]. Another witness, Mrs. Clarita Monsale, a friend of
believe that any daughter would simply give in to her father's lascivious designs had not her resistance
the appellant, testified that whenever appellant and his wife visited Manila, they would always stay with
been overpowered [People v. Erardo, G.R. No. 32861, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 250].
her in an old sunken barge which served as her house. The couple, she further alleged, left for Romblon in
1984 and returned to Manila only in February, 1986 when they came to live with her again [t.s.n., May 14,
1987, pp. 7-8]. A note handwritten by the barangay captain, one Pedro Taladtad, Jr., alleging that, as far as Appellant would argue further that "[t]he unexplained silence of complainant for six (6) months despite her
he can remember, appellant left for Manila only in February, 1986, was likewise submitted in evidence. allegations of several rapes committed against her (even before September 1985) renders doubtful the truth
These testimonies, however, are insufficient to establish alibi without the testimony of the appellant. By of her charge," claiming that "such silence on her part could be construed as an implied condonation of
themselves, these testimonies do not convincingly establish that it was impossible for appellant to have what her father had done to her" [Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10]. Again, the contention is unmeritorious. It
been in Manila at the approximate date that the offense was committed. has repeatedly been held that the delay in reporting a rape incident due to death threats, as in this case, can
not be taken against the victim [People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 51034, May 29,1987,150 SCRA 405; People v.
Ibal, G.R. Nos. 66010-12, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 317] nor can the fact of delay alone be taken as
But the appellant himself, the only person who could make a positive and categorical statement of his
implied consent [People v. Seculles, G.R. No. 52348, October 23, 1984,132 SCRA 653]. This Court had
whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime, did not even testify in order to refute the
occasion to note that "it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their
accusations against him and support his defenses. With his silence, there is, strictly speaking, no evidence

203
virtue because of the rapists' threat on their lives" [People v. Oydoc, G.R. No. 61679, October 26, 1983, circumstance, the greater penalty shall be imposed [Art. 63 (1)]. In this case, the commission of the rape
125 SCRA 250]. It should be borne in mind that this case involves a victim of tender age and limited was with the use of an eight-inch long knife, undoubtedly a deadly weapon. Since the crime is a tended by
schooling (Grade V) whose actions under such difficult and trying circumstances are dominated more by two aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, would ordinarily merit the imposition of the death
fear than by reason. She cannot be expected to have such exceptional courage as to disregard a threat on penalty. However, in the light of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the Constitution providing that the death penalty
her life [People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 71462, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 609; People v. Valdez, supra; People shall not be imposed unless Congress for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes provides for capital
v. Ibal, supra], especially where her aggressor was her own father. The fact that the victim was finally able punishment, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed instead.
to muster enough courage to report the incident is, in fact, commendable. As held in the case of People
v. Molero [G.R. No. 67842, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 397, 413], "an intimidated person cowed into
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
submitting to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and finally state that
enough is enough, the depraved malefactor must be punished."

The defense finally alleges that the complaint for rape was filed by Mauricia because of resentment against
her father who scolded and boxed her when he caught her in the embrace of her boyfriend [t.s.n., March
13,1987, p. 3]. These allegations, however, were never substantiated. Even assuming that there existed
some resentment on the part of the victim against appellant, allegedly an irresponsible parent and habitual
drunkard [t.s.n., December 18, 1986, p, 16], it is nevertheless hard to believe that a young and naive lass
could so be motivated by feelings of revenge as to fabricate a story of rape, to have her private parts
examined and to subject herself to the indignity of a public trial, against her very own father, if there be no
truth to the same. In this case, Mauricia, repeatedly apprised by the trial court of the possible consequences
that may befall the appellant if convicted, remained steadfast in her determination to see that the wrong
against her is vindicated, even if it would mean the tragedy of seeing her own father brought to jail [t.s.n.,
Feb. 20, 1987, p. 2].

As correctly held by the court a quo: "No daugther, especially one of tender age, would accuse her own
father of this heinous crime of rape had she really not been aggrieved. No amount of intercession could
batter down her determination that justice be meted to her father. She underwent public trial and admitted
her shame only with the objective that her father be sent to prison, if that be his fate for having repeatedly
assaulted the womanhood of his own flesh and blood, one who he was supposed to defend with his own
life in the first place" [RTC Decision, pp. 3- 4; Rollo, pp. 13-14].

Anent the aggravating circumstances of relationship and cruelty, We find that, as correctly appreciated by
the trial court, both existed in the present case.

The alternative circumstance of relationship is taken into consideration when, as in this case, the victim is
the descendant of the offender [Art. 15, Revised Penal Code]. In crimes against chastity, relationship is
aggravating. The gravity of a crime attended by abuse of relationship was emphasized in the case
of People v. Porras [58 Phil. 578, 579 (1933)], which likewise involved the rape of a daughter by the
father, wherein it was held that: "[t]he crime in this case was so monstrous that no punishment which is in
the power of this or any other human tribunal to decree, could possibly be a sufficient expiation of the
offense." In this case We find that, indeed, appellant abused the filial trust reposed in him by his daughter
in order to carry out the crime to his every advantage. He personally fetched the victim, his daughter, at her
place of work, took her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually.

Likewise, cruelty attended the commission of the crime. There is cruelty when the offender enjoys and
delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary physical pain in the
consummation of the offense [People v. Gatcho, G.R. No. L-27241, February 28, 1981, 103 SCRA 207;
People v. Dayug, 49 Phil. 423 (1926)]. Cruelty is present in this case where appellant tied the victim to a
bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette while raping her and laughed as he did all these.

III.

Under the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death [Art. 335], and where the commission of an offense
punishable by two indivisible penalties is attended by at least one aggravating and no mitigating

204
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981 assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his
lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced
and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite
vs.
(p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired
several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
MAKASIAR, J.: Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an
autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report,
Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of Postmortem findings.
P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.
General:

The information alleges:


Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite, tips are pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied.
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and There are surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
TRUNK:

Contrary to law
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior
midline, 128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts: upwards, passing superficially between muscles and tissues.

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together (2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior
with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix midline, 121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards
Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., and to the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they
saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline,
attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing,
96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the left,
accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the
perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing the
latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license.
liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the
Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to
right lung.
draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and
gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 (4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt.
Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun,
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he
asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they
would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to (5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by
stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several 0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30,
1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up to
205
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
stomach. convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People
vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152;
People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the
REMARKS: killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25
SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs.
Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for
hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.

In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts: unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he refused to
surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a restaurant
near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come from This claim does not merit belief.
Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused
saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt.
Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his and he
served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how
member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the
accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no
table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority,
the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked,
the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be
Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased
which the latter did by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an was unarmed when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in
officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the
accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused
to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not
was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in
the deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in
his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone his death.
of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender
his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with
its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow. This
hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar produced
and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
Court
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to
surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite.
Q Where is that scar?
The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt.
Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody
to accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, (Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal
building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
was brought back by the Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two days
before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC
Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his
15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated. Injuries:

I (1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.


206
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed
and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal
blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief).
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .

In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also
vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing each other. If
that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun with
his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and on his right ear lobe WE find WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony of
that this particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the
location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists
COURT
were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the
blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of
the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same Q What is the truth?
being contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim Guillermo Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's
parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained
edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head. an injury and blood oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan.
20, 1972; emphasis supplied).
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal
building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On
his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. ATTY. MUÑOZ
During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency
that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge
and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case of a table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted correct?
in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only
allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt.
Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the A Yes, sir.
deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on
July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was committed on Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which
cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and
Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he
peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, accidentally bumped his head on the table.
must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, Masana
confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident between the
appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant, A Yes, sir.
whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to
II the extent that he bumped his head on the table?

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault upon A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in
an agent of authority? parrying.

According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the xxx xxx xxx
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest

207
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly
Masana already stabbed? alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it
can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet
information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:
stabbed.

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face
Lian, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the attack was so strong
and feloniously assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school
that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical
bonding of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance
treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the
of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his
attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158,
dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said
167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to
teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating
insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend
circumstances of having committed it inside the school building and during school
himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil.
classes.
738). Neither does it show that the accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the
killing without risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking
distance of his three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation Contrary to law.
between the accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former,
and at the moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and
And the ruling of the Court was:
with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant
on his victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of
evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or or on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Code].
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying
clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex the provisions of article 148." This special classification is obviously intended to
crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their
information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground
victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did attack and that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge
stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex
crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of
her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by
circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law
and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part
XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code). (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether
civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial
(Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or
his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information
for Direct Assault reads:
35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).

208
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of expediency,
Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this policy and necessity.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony
Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
Paulo Coraide conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box
findings as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper
and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio
course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against
Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said
respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a


The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case;
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this
because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter and does not
case."
allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a
person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the
refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations: Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or
is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.' Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458);
or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others
(Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90);
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was
or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in
deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault
reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to
that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the
determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third
person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in
Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36,
No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol.
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].

Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106,
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it
July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission
is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of
by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his
authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then
teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of
engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police by
allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in
the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District
authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644),
the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597,
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently 606607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
alleges that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her
classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of
therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was
high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore,
so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such
whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this
knowledge on `his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's
aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated,
status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of
1946 Ed., p. 109).
fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on
his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all
kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial smuggling unit, is patent.

209
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-
person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance
is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he is
the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance
vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned
officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated: amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police
force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality,
which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged with
area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;

With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore be
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for the
condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.
death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen.
Mariano Castaneda;
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for the
OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT
killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police
Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER
RESPECTS.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was
present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.

As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from
behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And
appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went
to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during
the incident.

While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61
Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority
refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but
merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified
by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the
term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the
phrase public authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily
utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way
that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different
meaning for the term public authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a
person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in
authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil
228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a G.R. No. 132895 March 10, 2004

210
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and
vs. Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Parañaque, Metro
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants. Manila (p. 26, tsn, August 3, 1995). In the morning of said date, Femie, another housemaid of
the Cebreros’ and Baria’s relative, bathed and dressed up Rocky, the couple’s six year old son
and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who was also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch
DECISION
Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived. On board was a woman, whom
Baria pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 26, supra). Baria
assisted Rocky to board the tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky
PER CURIAM: pointed to in court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn, August 3, 1995),
to a nearby "Mcdonald’s". Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra) whom
Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra). The three
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260,
proceeded to a house far from the "Mcdonald’s" (p. 13, supra) where Rocky slept "four times"
National Capital Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo (p. 14, supra).
("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention2 and sentencing them to death.
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When his son DJ
arrived, he informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis Cebrero asked Baria (pp.
The Information3 charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping, reads: 4-5, tsn, August 22, 1995) who told him that Rocky was fetched at home by a woman to attend
a birthday party (p. 5, supra). Informed thereof, Mr. Cebrero then called up his friends and went
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the to the police station to report that his son was missing (p. 9, supra).
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO and
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring together, confederating, and mutually helping one At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman saying,
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, and "Ibigay mo sa akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata" (p. 10, supra). Luis replied, "Kailangan ko
seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ "Rocky", a five years old child (sic), which
ang bata". The woman asked how much money was in his ATM and Luis replied P40,000.00.
kidnapping or serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days thereby depriving him of his Luis then requested to talk to his son but the woman said, "Hindi puwede, malayo dito ang anak
liberty, and which was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of the mo at tatawag na lang uli ako" (p. 10, supra).
victim, to the damage and prejudice of the victim himself and his parents.

Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to his phone. On March 2, 1995, at about 7:20
The said accused IMELDA CASTILLO WENCESLAO, without having participated in the said p.m., his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, "Bigyan mo ako nang isang million",
crime as a principal, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously participated (sic)
to which he replied, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million". The caller told Luis that she
in the execution of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts by allowing and furnishing the will call back later on (pp. 11-12, supra).
use of her residence where victim Horacio Cebrero IV was kept knowing him to have been
taken by principal accused Elizabeth Castillo and Evangeline Padayhag without the consent of
his parents. The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of their maids were hired from an agency, the
General Services, Inc. at Parañaque. Major Ordoyo of the Intelligence Security Group,
Philippine Army (PA) sent Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the agency to verify this. The
CONTRARY TO LAW.
two were furnished by General Services, Inc. with the personal data of the maids named
Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine Nuñez (pp. 13-14, tsn, March 12, 1996).
Upon arraignment on 10 May 1995, both Castillo and Padayhag initially pleaded guilty. However, on 18
May 1995, Castillo and Padayhag withdrew their plea of guilt. They entered a plea of not guilty on 3
When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the following day, March 3, 1995, he instructed
August 1995. Imelda Wenceslao remains at large. his wife to raise some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero withdrew P800,000.00 in
P1,000.00 denomination. The bank provided Mrs. Cebrero a list containing the serial numbers
The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Horacio of the money withdrawn (pp. 15-16, supra).
Cebrero IV ("Rocky"), the victim; (2) Rosanna Baria, the victim’s "yaya"; (3) Luis Cebrero, the victim’s
father; (4) Sandra Cebrero, the victim’s mother; (5) Staff Sgt. Alejandro Delena of the Philippine National On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero received a telephone call. The caller was a
Police ("PNP"); (6) Wivino Demol, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") Intelligence
woman who asked, "Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera"? Luis answered, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay sa
Security Group, army surveillance and search team; (7) Capt. Raniel Ramiro, also of the AFP Intelligence iyo ang halagang iyon, kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay". The caller said, "Sige, puede na
Security Group; (8) and Staff Sgt. Manual Iglesias of the PNP. yan (p. 17, supra) and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone, at about
2:00 a.m.; that at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a "Farmacia Dilag" and beside it is a street which
The defense presented only two witnesses: Castillo and Padayhag themselves. Luis must follow until he reaches the church called "Sabadista" where he should drop the
money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero received another call on that same night instructing him to
stop in front of the Farmacia Dilag and walk on the street beside it going to a chapel and to drop
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") summarized the prosecution’s version of the incident in the the money on the chapel’s terrace (p. 19, supra).
appellee’s brief, as follows:

Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar, Commanding
Officer of the Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine Army, briefed his men on Rocky’s

211
kidnapping and assigned them their respective tasks in the stakeout they will undertake around Prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, Evangeline Padayhag and Elizabeth
the pay-off area (pp. 6-7 tsn, January 30, 1996). At about 11:00 p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Castillo initially pleaded guilty upon arraignment and were each meted the penalty of life
Alejandro Delena and his ISG team, proceeded to Obando, Bulacan for the stakeout. After imprisonment (p. 4, tsn, August 3, 1995). The trial court, however, on motion based on
positioning themselves near the stakeout site, a car arrived and stopped in front of the chapel. improvident plea, ordered the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and directed the re-arraignment
The man alighted and placed a bag in front of the chapel and immediately left (p. 10, supra). of Castillo and Padayhag.
After about forty (40) minutes, two women appeared, proceeded to where the bag was dropped.
On seeing the bag, the women laughed and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two women
After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as charged. 4
returned, picked up the bag and immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG team searched the
area around the drop-off place but the two women were nowhere to be found (p. 17, supra). In
court, Sgt. Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he saw in Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own version of the events in their brief, as follows:
front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by Luis
Cebrero (p. 12, supra).
1. Accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO was a househelper at the Cebrero household from
December 1993 to January 1995. She did the cleaning of the house, laundry of dirty clothes,
Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two women, Sgt. Delena and his team remained at and also took care of Rocky, son of Luis and Sandra Cebrero;
the stake-out area. The team befriended the residents of the place, one of whom was a certain
Joselito Torres who claimed to be the former boyfriend of Elizabeth Castillo whom he
recognized from the picture shown to him by Sgt. Delena. Torres informed the ISG team that 2. Accused Evangeline Padayhag, also a househelper, is a friend of Elizabeth Castillo. The two
Castillo had already left for Mindanao. Sgt. Delena immediately communicated the met sometime in 1994 at Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, when Padayhag worked in the household of
information, including the address of Gigi Padayhag in Navotas, to his commanding officer (p. Julito Lawagon, the latter being the neighbor of Helen Lim, Elizabeth Castillo’s sister;
19, supra).
3. Upon assumption from work, Castillo was promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a monthly
At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle stopped in salary of one thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);
front of his house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero opened it, he saw his
son, Rocky (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 22, 1995). 4. Castillo, however, was never given compensation during her entire employment in the
Cebrero household;
On March 12, 1995, an ISG team headed by Sgt. Manuel Iglesias was dispatched to Navotas to
locate "Gigi" Padayhag at the address furnished by Sgt. Delena. The team found Padayhag who 5. Castillo was also not treated nicely by the Cebrero spouses. When something gets lost in the
upon being apprised of the kidnapping of Rocky Cebrero, voluntarily went with the ISG team house, she was always the one being blamed, although the children were the ones getting the
to Camp Crame to clear her name (p. 14, tsn, May 22, 1996). things. Besides, they say bad words against her. Thus, she has no other choice but to leave her
work;
Upon the instruction of the ISG, Sgts. Delena and Demo were ordered to proceed to Dipolog
City to look for Castillo (pp. 20-21, tsn, January 30, 1996). Sgt. Delena arrived in Dipolog City 6. Castillo had been consistently demanding from the Cebrero spouses her unpaid wages for
on March 13, 1996. He was briefed and shown the area where Castillo could be found (p. one year; but her demands remained unheeded;
23, supra).
7. Having reached only elementary education, Castillo believed that the only effective way for
When Sgt. Demol arrived in Dipolog City, he and Sgt. Delena coordinated with the PNP her to claim back her unpaid wages is to use Rocky, son of the Cebrero Spouses;
stationed at Barangay Tulong, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte (p. 41, tsn, March 12, 1996).
Thereat, Sgt. Demol requested for the assistance of persons from Barangay Mitimos, where
Castillo was believed to be hiding. The PNP assigned them two barangay officials of Mitimos 8. On 1 March 1995 Castillo called Padayhag, telling the latter that her boyfriend is sick. At
who, when shown the picture of Castillo, said that the woman in the picture is in Barangay that time, Padayhag was already working at Jelaya St., B.F. Homes, Parañaque under the
Mitimos (p. 46, supra). employ of Lulu Sablan. Castillo fetched Padayhag. The two, however, did not go to see
Padayhag’s boyfriend but instead they went to a playground;

Upon the request of the police, the two barangay officials conducted a daily surveillance on
Castillo. On March 18, 1995, Sgt. Demol reported to the ISG headquarters that Castillo was in 9. Castillo then instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky from his house at Cesar Virata St., B.F.
Barangay Mitimos. In turn, Sgt. Demol was advised that ISG will be sending him, through JRS Homes, Parañaque, Manila. When Padayhag asked why she wanted to see Rocky, Castillo
Express, copies of the list of serial numbers of the bills used as pay-off and a DOJ subpoena (p. answered that she missed the boy. Padayhag obliged to the request, knowing that the latter
54, supra). Upon receipt of said documents, Sgt. Demol applied for a search warrant (p. would not do any harm to the boy;
58, supra) which was granted by the Dipolog City Regional Trial Court on March 21, 1995 (p.
57, supra). The search warrant was shown to Elizabeth Castillo and her father who signed the 10. It was only the first time that Padayhag saw Rocky;
same (pp. 60-61, supra). The search yielded a black bag placed in a carton inside the house (pp.
61-62) containing money in P1,000.00 bills in the total amount of P277,000.00 (p. 68, supra).
The serial numbers of the recovered money bills appeared in the list furnished to Sgt. Demol by 11. She brought the child to a market at B.F. Parañaque, where Castillo was waiting. The three
ISG (pp. 88-89, supra). Thereafter, the money was deposited with the Regional Trial Court at went on a stroll. Thereafter, they went to the house of Imelda Wenceslao, Castillo’s sister, at
Dipolog City (p. 89, supra). Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Castillo noticed that Rocky had a fever, so she requested Vangie
to buy a medicine;
212
12. Padayhag was not told by Castillo as to when the latter would return the boy. Padayhag did 23. The following day, 12 March 1995, during the custodial investigation, a certain Major
not sense anything wrong with what had happened as she believed that Castillo only took Meneses was exerting pressure on Padayhag to reveal where the P500,000.00 is. She told Major
Rocky for a stroll; Meneses: "Wala akong pera na ganoon kalaki." He said to her: "Pag hindi ka umamin,
papatayin na kita talaga!" Her answer was: "Patayin nyo man ako, hindi ako aamin dahil wala
akong ganoong kalaking pera." Major Meneses then slapped Padayhag and hit her with a stool
13. Imelda Wenceslao asked why they brought a child along with them. Castillo answered that
on her leg;
she just wanted to see the boy. Wenceslao then asked if they asked permission from the parents,
and Castillo answered "no";
24. Major Meneses also threatened Padayhag that if she would not confess to the crime, he
would submerge her on a drum. They forcibly brought her to a toilet room. She saw there two
14. At night, Castillo talked to Mr. Luis Cebrero over the phone to inform him that Rocky was
big drums. Major Meneses then told her: "Iyong mga hindi umamin, nilulublob namin dito sa
with her. Mr. Cebrero told her not to harm the boy. No threat or demand for ransom was ever
drum". Padayhag shouted. Thereafter, someone knocked at the door and said: "Pakawalan n’yo
made by the accused to the Cebrero spouses. She never asked Mr. Cebrero how much money he
na iyan dahil marami nang tao". They brought her out of the room and handcuffed her;
had in the bank;

25. SPO1 Larry Pablo was likewise threatening Padayhag: "Pag hindi ka pa umamin, ihuhulog
15. The following day, 2 March 1995, Castillo called Mr. Cebrero again to tell him that she
na kita sa bintanang ito!" (They were on the third floor of a building) "Alam mo ba kung ilan na
could not yet return Rocky because he still had a slight fever. She also told Mr. Cebrero: "Hindi
ang naihulog namin diyan? Panlabindalawa ka na sa ihuhulog namin diyan!";
nyo ako sinusuwelduhan". He asked her: "Magkano ba ang kailangan mo?" She did not answer.
Then Mr. Cebrero said: "May pera ako rito, kalahating milyon." At that moment, Castillo
hanged-up the phone; 26. During the custodial investigation, Padayhag was not assisted by a counsel, nor has she
waived her right to counsel. She was coerced by the police into signing an extrajudicial
confession without even explaining to her the contents thereof;
16. Castillo denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 25 August 1999, attached as Annex "A"
and made an integral part hereof, that she demanded one million (P1,000,000.00) from the
Cebrero spouses; 27. Atty. Eranio Sedillo only arrived one hour (1 hr.) after Padayhag had already signed the
questioned extrajudicial confession;
17. On the evening of 4 March 1995, when Castillo called Mr. Cebrero, he asked them where
they were. The accused told him that they were in Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, near a Protestant 28. Elizabeth Castillo was arrested at Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte on or about 21
Church. Mr. Cebrero then said: "Pupunta ako riyan bandang 2:00 ng madaling araw (March 5, March 1995. Police officers came to her house, and when they informed her that they were
1999) na may bitbit na pera at ilalapag ko ito sa may simbahan"; looking for the money, she voluntarily gave it to them;

18. On 5 March 1995, at around 4:30 a.m. Castillo and Padayhag went out to buy "pandesal". 29. The approximate amount of money taken by Castillo was only twenty thousand
They noticed that at a post near a Church, a dog was trying to pull a black plastic bag. They (P20,000.00) She returned the rest of the money to the police who arrested, her;
picked it up and brought it home. When they opened it, they found five bundles of money, in
P1,000.00 denomination;
30. Castillo vehemently denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay (par. No. 14) that she returned only
P227,000.00;
19. At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mr. Cebrero heard a tricycle stop in front of their
house. Someone knocked at the door, and when he opened the door, he saw Rocky;
31. Castillo and her escorts were fetched in Manila by a van. Inside the van, they blindfolded
her. They removed her blindfold when they reached Camp Crame;
20. On 11 March 1995, Capt. Raniel Ramiro, Intelligence Security Group of the Philippine
Army, together with his men, after coordinating with Caloocan Police, arrested Evangeline
32. Major Meneses and SPO1 Larry Pablo investigated her. She was slapped by Pablo, forcing
Padayhag at her residence at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City. The military men did not have a
her to admit where the money is;
warrant of arrest at this particular operation;

33. During the investigation, Pablo poked a gun on her, then forced her to write what he would
21. The military were civilian-dressed. They pretended to be Padayhag’s cousins who came
say to her. He instructed her to write: "Na kapag hindi ko isasauli ang lahat ng pera ay pwede
from abroad, and they "invited her to a birthday party". However, they brought her to Fort
n’yo na akong patayin". Castillo followed the instructions because of fear. 5
Bonifacio for interrogation. It was only then that Padayhag learned that her companions were
military men;
In an 11-page Decision, of which nine pages were devoted to the recital of facts, the trial court found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible and gave no weight to Castillo and Padayhag’s
22. At Fort Bonifacio, the police coerced Padayhag to confess to the crime, threatening her:
defenses. The trial court convicted appellants on 17 December 1997 and imposed on them the death
"Pag hindi ka pa umamin, kami na mismo and bibitay sa iyo". Padayhag, however, did not
penalty, thus:
confess to the commission of the crime. She was then brought to Camp Crame at Quezon City
on that same date;

213
Originally, both accused pleaded guilty to the offense and were meted the penalty of life We affirm the trial court’s judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-accused Padayhag.
imprisonment. However, shortly thereafter, they moved to withdraw their plea claiming it was
precipitate, which the court allowed and proceeded with a full-blown trial.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code,8the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
Accused Elizabeth Castillo demanded money from Rocky’s parents for the release of the latter. kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of
She told his father to bring the money to Obando Bulacan. The Court can only imagine the kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following
pain, worry, fear and anxiety of the boy’s parents while their youngest son was under detention. circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed
by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer. 9
Ransom is money, price or consideration demanded for the redemption of a captured person or
persons, a payment that releases from captivity" (Corpus Juris Secundum 458). The testimony
of Elizabeth Castillo that she did not know about the money cannot be given weight. Two Appellant Castillo’s Liability
hundred Seventy Seven Thousand (P277,000.00) Pesos was found among her things, the bills
bearing the same serial number as the money paid to her.
Castillo asserts that the victim’s parents did not pay her wages when she worked as a maid of the victim’s
family.10She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level and her ignorance of the law, which
The court has taken a hard look in determining the liability of Evangeline Padayhag as it seems impelled her to take Rocky. She faults the trial court for refusing to consider this. Castillo is mistaken.
that her only participation in the crime was picking up the boy from his house. Although she Whether or not her employer failed to pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can
did not get part of the ransom the fact is that she fully and directly cooperated and did her part serve as justification for any person to retaliate through the commission of another crime. The trial court
to carry out the resolution of her co-accused. Under these facts there was conspiracy to extort was therefore correct in disregarding Castillo’s claim that Rocky’s parents committed injustice on her.
ransom. People versus Kamad Akiran, 18 SCRA 239.
Castillo’s claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for ransom. Ransom is "money, price or
The Court is convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases
reasonable doubt. from captivity."11 Thus, even if she had a right to demand payment of her unpaid wages, the money she
actually demanded and eventually received, is still ransom.
WHEREFORE, ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG are sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of death. Further, they are hereby ordered to pay jointly and Castillo’s reliance on her low educational level is similarly unavailing. The penalty for kidnapping for
severally the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and Five ransom is the singular and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the application of any alternative,
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages plus costs of litigation. mitigating or aggravating circumstance.12

SO ORDERED.6 Mr. Cebrero admitted that he was unable to identify his son Rocky’s abductors. De Lena and Iglesias, the
police officers who did the stake-out during the "pay-off," testified that the two women suddenly
disappeared after retrieving the plastic bag containing the ransom. The police officers’ inability to explain
Appellants seek the reversal of their conviction by raising the following assignments of error:
how two simple maids managed to give 5 carloads of police officers the slip severely discredits their
account of what happened that day.
I
Rocky’s testimony, however, leaves no room for doubt. Only six years of age when he testified, Rocky
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING (SIC) THE FACTS OF THE CASE. was candid and direct in his recollection, narrating events as a young boy saw them happen, thus:

II COURT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO Alright. Rocky, when Vangie went to fetch you from your house.
EXTORT RANSOM IN THIS CASE.
A Yes.
III
COURT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION
OF EVANGELINE PADAYHAG.
You took a tricycle.

IV
A Yes.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
COURT
CASE AT BAR.7
214
Where did you go? Q Anong sinakyan ninyo?

A I do not know. A Hindi ko alam.

PROS. FONACIER Q Noong dumating kayo doon sa bahay na hindi ninyo, bahay, natulog ka ba doon?

Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule on evidence be not strict on this boy. The A Yes.
witness is of tender age.
Q Ilang beses ka natulog doon?
ATTY. SOLUREN
A 4 sleeps.
There is no strict implementation as to what the Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is no strict
implementation of the rules of court. In fact, we are very lenient but the fact is, the child said he
Q Pinakakain ka ba sa bahay na pinuntahan ninyo?
does not know. But the question is – he was giving the answer to this witness.

A Yes.
COURT

Q Ano ang pinakakain sa iyo?


Ask another question.

A Champorado and fish.


Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle, nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?

Q Sino ang nagpapakain sa iyo?


A Nakita namin si Beth sa McDonalds. Malapit sa amin.

A Vangie.
Q Rocky, nakita ninyo si Beth. Ngayon, tatlo na kayo, ikaw, si Beth at si Vangie?

Q Sino si Vangie. Puede mo bang ituro sa amin?


A Yes.

PROS. FONACIER
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan kayo nagpunta?

The witness is pointing to accused Evangeline Padayhag as the Vangie he was referring to.
A Nasundo namin si Beth.

Q Doon sa 4 sleeps mo sa bahay na iyon, saan ka pa nila dinala?


Q Noong nasundo na ninyo si Beth, saan kayo nagpunta?

A Pinauwi na ako.
A Sa bahay nila.

Q Sinong kasama mo noong pinauwi ka?


Q Kaninong bahay?

A Wala, pero mula sa McDonald, naiwan na ako sa tricycle hanggang sa bahay.13


A Hindi ko alam.

Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rocky’s testimony would have been more than enough to
Q Malayo ba sa McDonald o malapit. Sinabi mo kanina, nagpunta kayo sa bahay nila?
convict Castillo. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.14 But
there is more. The evidence on record amply supports the factual findings of the trial court. Both the
A Yes. evidence of the prosecution and the defense establish the commission of the crime.

Q Iyong bahay na pinuntahan ninyo, malayo sa McDonald? Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1 March 1995:

A Malayo. Q And as a result of sitting at the palaruan, Miss witness, what happened next?

215
A Pinasundo ko si Rocky kay Vangie, mam. T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo?

Q And why did you ask Vangie to fetch Rocky, Miss witness? Your Honor, may we asked (sic) the witness to be more responsive with her answer.

A Kasi po naalala ko pagnamamalengke ako at kasama ko si Rocky, lagi po kaming COURT


pumupunta sa palaruan, mam
What was the question, please?
Q And then what happened next, Miss witness?
Stenographer:
A Sinundo po ni Vangie si Rocky, mam.
(Reading back the question)
Q Whom did Vangie fetch, Miss witness?
T Noong tinanong ni Imelda kung may paalam ang bata sa mga magulang, ano ang
A Si Rocky po, mam. sagot mo?

Q And after Rocky fetched by Vangie, what happened next? S Ang sabi ko po hindi, walang paalam.

A Ipinasyal po namin si Rocky, mam.15 (Emphasis supplied) T Ano ang naging reaction ng iyong kapatid na si Imelda?

She also testified that she had no permission from Rocky’s parents to take the child with her: S Bakit daw hindi nagpaalam.16 (Emphasis supplied)

T Saan kayo nananghalian? Castillo testified that, during the period of Rocky’s detention she called Rocky’s father, Mr. Cebrero, to
wit:
S Doon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
Q What happened next Miss witness?
T Noong dumating kayo doon, ano naman ang sinabi ng kapatid mo sayo?
A Tinawagan ko po ang mga Cebrero.
S Ang sabi niya, bakit daw may kasama kaming bata.
Q Who of the Cebreros did you call up?
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo kay Imelda?
A Si Luis Cebrero po, mam.
S Sabi ko pinasyal lang po namin.
Q What happened next after that?
T Hindi tinanong ni Imelda kung bakit pinasyal nyo ang bata, kung may paalam yong bata
doon sa kanyang magulang? A Pagtawag ko po kay Mr. Luis Cebrero tinanong po niya sa akin kung nasaan si Rocky,
mam.
S Tinanong po.
Q And what is your reply?
T Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?
A Sinabi ko po na nandidito sa amin, mam.
S Sinabi ko gusto ko lang makita si Rocky.
Q After that what happened next?
T Pero, ano ang sinabi mo noong tinanong kung may paalam ang bata sa kanyang
magulang, anong naging sagot mo sa katanungan niya? A Nagalit po si Luis Cebrero sa akin, mam.

S Ang sabi niya baka daw pagalitan kami. Q And what did you do when Luis Cebrero got angry?

216
A Tinanong po niya ako kung magkano ang kailangan ko, mam. S Naghanap po ako ng trabaho.

Q And what else did he say, Miss witness? T Saan ka naghanap ng trabaho?

A Sinabi po niya sa akin na huwag ko raw pong sasaktan si Rocky, mam. S Sa may bandang Bulacan po.

Q And then what else? T Sa may Paco Obando, doon ka ba pumunta?

A Pinipilit po niya ako na kung magkano daw ang kailangan namin na pera, S Hindi po.
pagkatapos hindi ko na po sinagot ang tanong niya, mam.
T Saang parte ka ng Bulacan pumunta?
Q And then what happened next?
S Malapit po sa may – Hindi ko na po matandaan yong pinuntahan namin.
A Binaba ko na po iyong telepono, mam.17 (Emphasis supplied)
T Malapit sa may?
The number and time of these calls coincided with the calls Mr. Cebrero received from Castillo telling him
that she had Rocky and instructing him to pay the ransom for Rocky’s release.
S Papunta na po ng Obando, pero hindi nakarating doon.

Additionally, Castillo by her own admission placed herself at the time and place where the "pay-off"
T Saan ka pumunta doon para maghanap ka ng trabaho?
occurred:

ATTY. SOLUREN
T Sa pangatlong araw naman, nandoon ka pa rin ba at saka si Rocky?

Already answered, Your Honor, that the place papunta ng Obando pero hindi pa nakakarating
S Opo.
sa Obando.

T Sa bahay ni Imelda?
STATE PROSECUTOR FONACIER

S Nagpaalam po ako sa kapatid ko na maghahanap muna ako ng trabaho.


That is why I am asking.

T Si Vangie, saan naman siya noon?


COURT

S Nandoon pa rin sa Dagat-dagatan po.


What place is that? Witness may answer.

T Si Rocky naman?
T Anong detalyadong lugar?

S Andoon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.


S Sa may Julo po.

T Mga anong oras yon na nagpaalam ka na maghanap ng trabaho?


T Ano yong Julo?

S Umaga po ako nagpaalam.


S Malapit po iyan sa Obando

T Kung ganoon umalis ka ng umagang yan?


COURT

S Opo.
Saang bayan ng Bulacan yon?

T Saan ka naman pumunta?


S Yon lang po ang alam ko.18 (Emphasis supplied)

217
Beyond a feeble excuse that she was in Obando in order to look for employment, Castillo provides no Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend time with him. At
other plausible reason why her presence at that place, at such an opportune time should not be taken the same time, in her brief Castillo claims that what spurred her to take Rocky was her desire to get her
against her as additional evidence of her guilt. To attribute this to coincidence, as Castillo would probably unpaid wages from the Cebreros.21
have us do, taxes one’s credulity.
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for
The same can be said of her inability to explain how the ransom money was found in her possession when during his detention. This argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is deprivation of liberty. For
she was caught by policemen in Dipolog. Castillo plainly contradicts herself on this point. In Castillo’s kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him
brief, she admitted going to the "pay-off" site on the day Mr. Cebrero was told to leave the ransom for harshly.22 Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the
Rocky’s release. Castillo admitted she found at the site a black plastic bag filled with money and brought it offender forcibly restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way
home.19 However in her testimony before the trial court, she maintained that the first time she saw the same home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation
plastic bag was when it mysteriously appeared in her luggage when she went to Dipolog: of liberty. For under such a situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.

Q And thereafter, Miss witness, what happened next? Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for ransom but to tell him that Rocky was
with her and unharmed. Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded with her not to harm Rocky. Castillo
failed to explain, however, why she did not inform Mr. Cebrero of their exact whereabouts so that Mr.
A Hinanap ko iyong mga kagamitan ko po, mam.
Cebrero could fetch Rocky. Her failure to inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she kept Rocky in detention
considering she called Mr. Cebrero several times while she had physical control over Rocky.
Q And for what purpose you looked at your things, Miss witness?
Castillo’s explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when he was no longer sick is also
A Para ayusin po iyong mga kagamitan ko para makapagpahinga na po ako, mam. implausible. In the first place, she failed to explain why she did not return the child the moment she found
out he was sick. That would have been the more prudent course of action at that time. However, one day
after the "pay-off" on 4 March 1995, Rocky suddenly appeared by himself at the Cebreros’ home on 5
Q What happened next, Miss witness?
March 1995. Any reasonable person would conclude that the pay-off and the return of the child were
related events. Castillo would have us attribute this to coincidence.
A May nakuha ako na isang plastic bag sa loob ng aking bag, mam.
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her sudden departure for Dipolog, where she was
Q And what is this plastic bag about, Miss witness? eventually captured, was her inability to find employment in Manila. And yet Castillo does not explain
why she tried to bring Padayhag along with her to Dipolog.
A May laman po na pera, mam.
Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rocky’s testimony. True, Rocky admitted he did
not know the contents of the document he signed in front of the fiscal. 23 Rocky also stated that he was told
Q And how much money was there in that plastic bag, Miss witness? to testify that Padayhag forced him to go with her, and finally, that he must accuse both appellants as his
abductors.24 These admissions, damaging as they may sound, are of little use to appellants. The reason is
A Hindi ko po alam. simple. The facts to which Rocky’s testimony pertains to are the very same facts Castillo herself admitted
on the witness stand. Even if we were to discredit Rocky’s testimony entirely, the facts of his kidnapping
stand proven by no less than Castillo’s own admission on the witness stand and in her brief.
Q And what did you observe about the money in the plastic bag?

With the evidence Castillo’s own testimony established, the prosecution’s witnesses did little more than
A Nagulat po ako, mam. corroborate what Castillo herself had admitted. Since Castillo admitted in open court that she instructed
Padayhag to fetch Rocky even without the parents’ permission, we find her explanations futile. Her
Q And why were you surprised? allegations of torture and of signing a sworn statement without counsel are useless. After claiming to have
been tortured into making her sworn statement, logic would have it that Castillo should have debunked the
contents of that statement through her testimony. Instead, she freely and voluntarily recounted events as
A Hindi ko po kasi lubos na maisip na ang bag na aking dala dala ay may laman na she narrated them in her sworn statement. Moreover, there is no allegation that the trial court decided her
isang malaking halaga na pera, mam. guilt based on her sworn statement. The trial court based its decision on the testimonies of all the
witnesses, including Castillo’s.
Q And what did you do after learning that there was money inside your bag, Miss witness?
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt Castillo’s guilt.
A Pinabayaan ko na lang po at inaantay na may kumuha na lang po niyon sa akin
mam.20 (Emphasis supplied) Appellant Padayhag’s Liability

The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on record shows that the prosecution
failed to prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
218
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question Reform your question.
including those not raised by the parties.25 This becomes even more imperative in cases where the penalty
imposed is death.
Q Madam witness, you said that you were informed that your boyfriend was sick. Did you
go and see your boyfriend?
Padayhag’s sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to where
Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling with the two, went to the house of Castillo’s
A Sumama po ako kay Elizabeth Castillo pero hindi na po kami natuloy pumunta doon, sir.
sister together with Castillo and Rocky, and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution
would have us rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that without
Padayhag’s help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky. Q For what reason you did not go?

We are not persuaded. A Hindi po sinabi sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo, sir.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the Q So, you did not come to find out what was the sickness of your boyfriend?
same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and
unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime
without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. 26 Indeed, conspiracy must A Hindi na po sir.
be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.27
Q Are we made to understand, madam witness, when you left your employer on 28
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in February 1995 for the reason that your boyfriend was sick, you did not actually go and see your
execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the boyfriend?
goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor
simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a A Opo, sir.29
common design.28
After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as reason her love
Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s plan, a plan for the child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass from the province who only
Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo finished Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by the more worldly Castillo. Padayhag’s testimony
told Padayhag that Padayhag’s boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit reveals her naiveté:
Padayhag’s boyfriend that the two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
COURT
Q Why? (sic) Elizabeth Castillo fetched you on February 28, 1995 and why did you decide
to leave your employment?
Q Ano ang sinabi sa iyo bakit mo susunduin ang bata?

A Kasi sabi po niya sa akin ang boyfriend ko raw ay maysakit, sir.


A Namimiss na raw po niya iyong bata at nais niyang makita, Your Honor.

Q And could you tell us who is that boyfriend of yours?


COURT

A Si Jessie Mercader po, sir.


Tapos ikaw ang pinasundo niya doon sa bata?

Q And what is the address of Jessie Mercader, at that time, February 28, 1995?
A Opo, Your Honor.

A Sa Caloocan City po, sir.


COURT

Q And you said he was sick. What was his sickness?


Tapos noon dalhin sa Caloocan, ano pa, sinabi pa rin niya namimiss niya ang bata ganoon uli
ang sinabi niya sa iyo?
ATTY. SOLUREN
A Wala na po siyang sinabi sa akin, Your Honor.
Your Honor, that is misleading.
COURT
COURT

219
Hindi ka ba nakahalata na may mali doon sa pangyayaring iyon? ATTY. SOLUREN

A Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay ipapasyal lamang niya ang bata, Your Honor. She only finished Grade II, Your Honor.

Q Sa Caloocan? COURT

A Opo, Your Honor. Yes I know it but she would know that she works for seven (7) months. Alam mo ba na
December 1994 ka nagsimula mangamuhan kay Julito Luwagon?
COURT
A Opo, Your Honor.
Tapos umalis ka na pagkatapos ninyong kumain doon ng kapatid niya?
COURT
A Opo, Your Honor.
Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo at Hulyo tama ba iyon?
COURT
A Opo, Your Honor.
Ipinasyal ba niya ang bata?
COURT
A Hindi ko na po alam kasi umalis nga po pagkatapos namin kumain, Your Honor.
Papaano nangyari noong Enero 1995 ikaw ay nagtratrabaho na kay Lulu Sablan?
COURT
A Itinuro po sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo na mag-apply ng trabaho sa may BF Homes, Your
Honor.
Kailan niya sinabi sa iyo na ibabalik ang bata?

COURT
A Wala po siyang sinabi kung kailan, Your Honor.

Kailan kayo nagkita nitong si Elizabeth Castillo?


COURT

A Noong January lang po, Your Honor.


Ganoon ba ang alam mo sa pamamasyal?

COURT
A Siya naman po ang nagyaya, Your Honor.30

Saan kayo nagkita?


Her ignorance and susceptibility to confusion becomes more evident in the following exchange:

A Pinaalis niya po ako doon sa pinagtratrabahuan ko sa may Dagat Dagatan, Your Honor.
COURT

COURT
Kailan ka ba umalis kay Mr. Julito Luwagon?

Alam mo ba kung ilang buwan mayroon ang isang taon?


A Hindi ko pa matandaan, Your Honor.

A Hindi ko po alam, Your Honor.


COURT

COURT
Pero sabi mo kanina ay pitong buwan ka doon?

Pero alam mo ang mga buwan, Enero, Pebrero.. alam mo iyon?


A Opo pitong buwan ako roon pero hindi ko po matandaan kung anong buwan, Your
Honor.

220
A Opo, Your Honor. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal
COURT
design of the principal by direct participation.

Sige nga sabihin mo nga sa akin kung anu-ano ang mga buwan?
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that this single act was committed to kidnap the
child. The prosecution failed to prove this. Padayhag explained that Castillo coaxed her into fetching
A Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktubre, Rocky through another deception and by playing on her feelings of sympathy and friendship. Castillo
Nobyembre at Disyembre po, Your Honor.31 corroborated this on the witness stand. The prosecution failed to prove otherwise.

Padayhag’s confusion in the way she answered the questions propounded to her only highlights the fact The facts as established show that the only thing Castillo told Padayhag was to fetch Rocky because
that she was not aware of Castillo’s plans and was vulnerable to the latter’s manipulation. Her Castillo missed her former ward. Upon reaching the house of the Cebreros, the boy’s nanny handed over to
straightforward and wide-eyed admission of facts that incriminate her demonstrate a level of honesty that Padayhag the child. There is no allegation or evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan of Castillo.
can only be found in those who do not know the art of deceit. Far from a cold and calculating mind, Neither is there any hint that Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the boy, or to misrepresent herself or use
Padayhag strikes us as one whose innocence often leaves her at the mercy of her more worldly peers. It is means that would have led Padayhag to suspect that Castillo had some criminal design. Nor was there any
clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo was doing nothing wrong. Whatever moved her to do proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no permission from the boy’s parents. The appearance of the
what Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is that her motivation in fetching Rocky was boy itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll, would have led Padayhag to believe whatever story
not to kidnap the boy. To impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be intentional participation Castillo contrived to ask her in fetching the boy.
in the criminal act,32 not the unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.
A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution, and not on
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an individual as a conspirator the weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution should have done more to establish
should focus on all acts before, during and after the commission of the crime.33 We have done precisely Padayhag’s guilt. Instead, the prosecution left a lot of room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt.
that, and it is precisely why we rule for her innocence. After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left This is a fatal error. The presumption of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a degree of proof that
when Castillo brought the boy to her sister’s house in Caloocan.34 She never visited nor contacted Castillo demands no less than total compliance. As we explained in United States v. Reyes:42
afterwards. She remained at her house and refused to go with Castillo when the latter suddenly tried to
coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as ransom was found in her possession. Her
The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
involvement in the "pay-off" was never established. The testimony of two prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De
doubt, which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption
Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo when the latter picked up the ransom in
of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
Obando, is contradicted by Castillo’s admission in open court that she brought along a certain "Mila" and
support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that
not Padayhag.35 In addition, the testimonies of these two police officers suffer from their failure to explain
the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact
how they suddenly lost track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes.
to a reasonable and moral certainty- a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Emphasis supplied)
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We also find that the prosecution
failed to prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Gonzales36 we held:
On the other hand, we find Padayhag’s explanation sufficiently supported by circumstances aside from
Castillo’s testimony. Padayhag’s acts before, during and after the crime all point to the conclusion that she
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or was no more than an unwitting tool of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other her into fetching Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after the day of Rocky’s abduction. Castillo
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not also testified that she did not bring Padayhag along with her when she went to Obando on the day that
sufficient to support a conviction. coincided with the "pay-off." The only circumstance linking Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of
two police officers who admitted that their quarry inexplicably disappeared before their very eyes. Even
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable constitutional presumption of innocence.43 Nothing links Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never
doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal received any part of the ransom, precisely because she did not even know it existed.
law.37 Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. 38 Every vestige
of doubt having a rational basis must be removed.39 The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason
to convict.40 Within this framework, the prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. Penalty and Damages
The defense need not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,44 the penalty of death is imposed upon proof that the
The failure to prove Padayhag’s involvement as a conspirator reveals how tenuous the evidence is linking kidnapping was committed to extort ransom from the victim or any other person. We find that the
her to the crime. Padayhag’s culpability hinges on how her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to prosecution has established Castillo’s guilt for this crime beyond reasonable doubt. However, Castillo’s
Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does pecuniary liability must be modified to conform with jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages
not constitute a criminal offense. By itself, it is not even sufficient to make her an accomplice. For a person must be deleted in the absence of any aggravating circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their family
to be considered an accomplice there must be a community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design suffered serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky again. 45 The pain and anguish they
of the principal, the co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere commission of an act which aids the experienced justifies the award of moral damages. However, we reduce the trial court’s award of moral
perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in People v. Cual:41 damages to P100,000 in line with current jurisprudence. 46

221
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260, National Capital
Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86 convicting appellant Elizabeth Castillo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay
the victim P100,000 as moral damages. The award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal
basis. The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant Evangeline Padayhag is REVERSED. We ACQUIT
Evangeline Padayhag and order her immediate RELEASE from confinement unless held for another lawful
cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to the Court, within five days from
notice, compliance with this Decision.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies of the records of this case be forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

222
G.R. No. 132324 September 28, 1999 The accused Norly Tan and Jose Tan are credited with the full period of their
preventive imprisonment if they agreed in writing to abide with all the terms and
conditions of their provisional detention, otherwise, to only 4/5 thereof. 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORLITO TAN @ "NORLY" and JOSE TAN, accused-appellants. The appellants lodged their appeal with the Court of Appeals which, in view of the penalty imposed,
forwarded it to this Court. 7
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof to show that the killing was justified shifts to
him. Even if the prosecution evidence may be weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission Version of the Prosecution
owning authorship of the killing. However, to implicate a co-accused as a co-principal, conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of conspiracy, the responsibility of the two accused is
In the People's Brief, 8 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts as viewed by the prosecution in
individual, not collective.
this wise:

The Case
On September 6, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., Ramon Nueca was weeding his ricefield
located at Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. At that time, there was still sunlight. (pp.
1
Before us is an appeal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, in Criminal 7-8, TSN, July 3, 1996).
Case No P-2297, which convicted Norlito Tan of murder, and Jose Tan of being an accomplice in such
crime.
At a distance of about twenty (20) meters, Ramon Nueca saw Magalino Olos, (who
was also his brother-in-law), walking along the road going to Gatbo. At that time,
On January 3, 1994, an Information 2 was filed against the appellants, the accusatory portion of which appellant Jose Tan who was then sixteen (16) years old, was also walking infront of
reads as follows: Olos. Appellant Norlito Tan, (brother of appellant Jose Tan), who was holding an
eight-inch knife known as "gatab", suddenly emerged from the grassy portion at the
right side of the road where the grasses [were] "higher than a person." Appellant
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo, Municipality
Norlito Tan stabbed Olos three (3) times. Olos was hit twice at the upper portion of
of Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
his back and once at his abdomen. Thereafter; appellant Jose Tan threw a stone at
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
Olos, hitting him at his neck (pp. 9-16, 35-37, TSN, July 3, 1996).
and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stone and stab with a deadly weapon one Magdaleno Rudy Olos alias Modesto Ramon Nueca decided to go to the place of the incident to pacify appellants.
Olos, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his However, when appellants saw Ramon Nueca coming, they fled. Ramon Nueca and
body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the his brother, Simplicio, brought Olos to the Municipal Hall of Ocampo. From there,
offended party in such amount as may be proven in court. 3 Olos was brought by an ambulance to the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City
where he later died. (pp. 18-20, TSN, July 3, 1996).
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Upon his arraignment on
January 3, 1996, he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Subsequently, Norlito Tan was arrested on April 1, 1996. Olos was examined and treated at the Bicol Regional Hospital by a certain Dr. Jullie
When arraigned on May 23, 1996, he likewise pleaded not guilty. 5 Trial on the merits ensued. On July 2, Sy. However, at the time of the trial of this case, he was no longer connected with
1997, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads: [the] Bicol Regional Hospital, hence, was not available to testify in this case. His
findings as reflected in the medical certificate (Exhibit B) which he issued were
interpreted by Dr. Thomas Gonzales, the incumbent Municipal Health Officer of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
Pili, Camarines Sur (p. 3, Annex A, Appellants' Brief).
accused NORLY aliasNORLITO TAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to Dr. Gonzales testified that the first finding in the medical certificate (Exhibit B)
forty (40) years while the other accused JOSE TAN is also adjudged guilty as an consists of a 1.4 centimeter-wound found at the left portion of the back side of the
accomplice to the offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed an indeterminate victim which would have been inflicted by a sharp-bladed instrument (pp. 11-12,
penalty of PRISON MAYOR in its medium period ranging from eight (8) years and TSN, August 14, 1996); the second finding consists of a 1.6 centimeter wound
one (1) day as minimum to ten years (10) as maximum, together with its accessory located "on the level of the 4th introspect asterior left side of the body of the victim
penalties. As civil liability, both accused are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of below the level of the nipple or left front side of his body below the nipple" (p.
MODESTO OLOS, represented by his widow, Ofelia Nueca Olos, the sum of 13, ibid.); the third finding consists of a fatal injury located "at the umbilical area
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine currency with costs against left side of the liver of the victim with the intestine coming out." (pp. 13-15 ibid).
them.1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx9

223
Version of the Defense 2. The court a quo gravely erred in relying solely [on] and giving full
credence [to] the testimonies of Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos and in
disregarding the testimonies of both accused and their witnesses.
In their Brief, 10 Appellants Norlito Tan and Jose Tan claim self-defense and denial, respectively, alleging
as follows:
3. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that both accused eluded the
apprehending authorities indicating that they are guilty of the crime
B. Evidence for the Defense:
charged.

On September 6, 1993 in Bgy. Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, at about 4:00


4. The court a quo imposed an excessive penalty upon both accused
o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Tan was then watching a basketball game while his
granting but not admitting that accused Norlito Tan is guilty of the crime
brother Norlito Tan was playing basketball. At about 5:30 o'clock PM, they left
charged and accused Jose Tan being a minor below 16 years old is guilty
together to go home but on their way home, they passed the road and dropped by at
as an accomplice;
the house of Wilfredo Bale to chew betel and betelnut. While they were in the yard
of Wilfredo Bale, the latter told accused Norlito Tan to go home as Modesto Olos
might chase him again. Heeding the advice of Wifredo, Norlito left to go home, 5. The court a quo seriously erred in convicting accused Norlito Tan of
while Jose remained on the yard of Wilfredo. While Norlito was on his way home, the crime of murder and accused Jose Tan as an accomplice. 11
Modesto Olos who was then in the ricefield walked fast towards the road and met
the former who evaded the latter by proceeding to the other side of the road as
To resolve the case, the Court believes that the following points should be discussed: (1) credibility of
Modesto had been blocking his way and telling him that Norlito would be buried
witnesses; (2) self-defense and burden of proof; and (3) characterization of the crime and the applicable
alive. Then Modesto drew a knife and stabbed Norlito who was able to parry the
penalty.
thrust and hold the former's hand holding the knife. Norly Tan immediately drew his
knife from his boot and retaliated by stabbing Modesto who was hit and fell to the
ground. Then Ramon Nueca arrived and embraced Norlito, and at this moment, The Court's Ruling
Angel Paular who was holding a stone ran towards him but Norlito was able to
extricate himself from the hold of Ramon and ran away.
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants, but erred in imposing the proper penalty.

When Modesto and Norlito were then fighting, Jose Tan was in front of the house of
Wilfredo Bele. Then, when Norlito was fleeing and passing by the house of First Issue:
Wilfredo, Jose Tan also ran away.
Credibility of Witnesses
At the time of said incident, Jose Tan was then below sixteen (16) years old as he
was born on September 18, 1977 as per birth certificate submitted to the trial court. Well-rooted is the rule that factual findings of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are
not to be disturbed on appeal, unless there are circumstances of weight and substance which have been
The Trial Court's Ruling overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. 12 Because the trial court
is in a better position to examine the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses while testifying on the stand,
its conclusions and findings on their credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
In convicting Appellant Norlito Tan of murder, the trial court ruled that his claim of self-defense was changed except for strong and valid reasons. 13
"negated by the evidence on record." It added that when an accused pleads self-defense, the burden of
proof shifts on him, a burden Norlito Tan failed to discharge. Jose Tan's denial was equally unavailing in
Alleged Irregularities
view of the credible prosecution witnesses' identification of him.

The lower court held that treachery and evident premeditation accompanied the killing and, thus, the crime Appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses
Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos, considering that the defense was not able to cross-examine Nueca
committed was murder. However, the court a quo dismissed the prosecution's claim of conspiracy and
adjudged Jose Tan guilty merely as an accomplice. thoroughly. With regard to Olos, appellants claim that her presentation as a rebuttal witness was irregular
and, as such, should not have been allowed by the court a quo.

The Assigned Errors


There is no merit to appellants' assertion of procedural prejudice. True, Ramon Nueca did not return to
court to finish his cross-examination; however, this does not mean that his testimony should be expunged,
Appellants fault the trial court with the following errors: as appellants insist. It must be noted that his failure to appear before the court was not the fault of
prosecution. More important, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine him, as in fact he was
actually subjected to cross-examination by the appellants' counsel, Atty. Crispo Q. Borja Jr. 14 The cross-
1. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that accused Norlito Tan
examination touched on the material points elicited from Nueca during his direct examination — his
treacherously killed Modesto Olos and that accused Jose Tan helped his
eyewitness description of Norly and Jose Tan's participation in the killing.
brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.

224
Neither can the presentation of Ofelia Olos as a rebuttal witness be deemed irregular. Considering that the 10-97); This is contrary to the testimony of her brother-in-law as according to him,
appellants claimed self-defense only after the prosecution had rested its case, the latter, after being allowed the house of Ofelia is thirty (30) meters away from the road, and between the road
by the trial court, exercised its prerogative to present Olos, so that she could testify that the attack on her and the house of Olos, there are two (2) irrigation canals and a ricefield in between
husband was sudden and unexpected. Furthermore, it is within the sound discretion of a trial judge to allow said canals (P. 30, tsn — 7-3-96). Thus, it is improbable that the house of Ofelia is
a party that has rested its case to introduce rebuttal evidence. 15 only 6 meters away from the road, and she could not see the person on the other side
of the "talahib" grass from her house as the grass is higher than the height of a
person and the distance from the house is 30 meters to the road as testified by
Alleged Inconsistencies
Ramon Nueca (Pp. 34-36, tsn — 7-3-96).

Appellants insist that the testimonies of Nueca and Olos were tainted with contradictions and
4. That her husband was twice stabbed at the back on the left side back shoulder (P.
inconsistencies, viz.:
24. tsn 3-10-97). — This is [contrary] to the testimony of Dr. Tomas Gonzales as
already mention in the foregoing.
The vital and material points of the testimony of Ramon Nueca which require
careful considerations are as follows, to wit:
Considering the foregoing testimony of Ofelia Olos, it is indubitable that she was
telling lies when she testified in court and was not an eye-witness to the incident.
1. He saw [his] brother-in-law Modesto Olos stabbed thrice by Norlito Tan, hitting Taking into consideration both testimonies of Ramon Nueca whose testimony on
him twice at the back and once in front of the body, (pp. 12 & 14, tsn, 7-3-96), cross-examination was not finished for his failure to return to court and of Ofelia
contrary to the testimony of Dr. Gonzales who testified that the victim suffered Olos on rebuttal stage whose testimony is improper for consideration for reason
injuries at the left portion of the backside body (intercostal post line), at the left front already aforestated, we contend that the trial court gravely erred in relying solely
side below the nipple, and on his abdomen. (pp. 11, 12 & 14, tsn, 8-14-96). and giving full credence to the testimonies of said prosecution witnesses and in
finding that accused Norlito Tan treacherously killed Modesto Olos and finding also
that Jose [T]an helped his brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
2. The reason why both accused killed his brother-in-law was that they were
apprehended by the victim in the house of Flores per information given to him by
said victim (p. 21, tsn, 7-3-96), while in his sworn statement marked Exh. 1, he These arguments do not persuade. The prosecution witnesses clearly placed the appellants at the scene of
stated that he [did] not know of any motive why accused Norlito stabbed and Jose the crime and established that Norly Tan stabbed Olos. These facts were admitted by Norly Tan, who
stoned him. claimed self-defense. True, there are some apparent minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nueca and
Olos, but they do not detract from the clarity, the cohesiveness or the consistency of their testimonies on
how Norly Tan killed the victim. Nueca testified thus:
3. Norlito hid and emerged from the "talahib" grass and immediately stabbed his
brother-in-law (pp. 13, 15 & 40, tsn, 7-3-96), while in exhibit 1, he stated that while
he was walking on the road going to Gatbo, he was approached by Norlito and Jose, Q Now, were you able to see the persons responsible for the
and then Modesto was stabbed by Norlito. stabbing of Rudy Olos?

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

With respect to the vital and material; points/parts of the testimony of Ofelia Olos A Yes, sir, there were two (2) persons.
which likewise require careful consideration are as follows:
Q Were you able to recognize them?
1. That before the stabbing incident, she saw Norlito suddenly emerged from the
"talahib" grass and immediately stabbed her husband — this is contrary to her
A Yes, sir.
statement given during the preliminary inquiry conducted by the presiding judge of
MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, which statement is part of the record of this case. In
said statement, she said that when she was out of her house after cooking, she saw Q Can you tell the Honorable Court their names?
her husband being stabbed by Norlito and before her husband was stabbed, he was
standing on the road and about to pick up a stone when attacked by both accused.
A Yes, sir, Norly Tan and Jose Tan.
She did not mention any "talahib" grass in said statement.

Q How is this Norly Tan related to the Norlito Tan impleaded


2. That while Norlito was stabbing her husband, Jose shouted at his brother to stop;
in this case who stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos?
— These allegations of Ofelia are contrary to human experience for the simple
reason that if accused Jose really shouted at his brother to stop stabbing Modesto
Olos, he would not throw stones at the latter. A The same person, sir.

3. That her house is six (6) meters away from the road and in between her house and Q And please tell the Honorable Court . . . what did Norly
the road, there are irrigation canal, ricefield, and a vacant lot (Pp. 16-17, tsn — 3- Tan do?
225
A Norlito Tan stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos. Q And where did Norly Tan emerge or where did he come
from before he stabbed Magdalino Olos?
Q Were you able to see the instrument which was used by
Norly Tan in stabbing Magdalino Rudy Olos? A He came from the "talahib".

A Yes, sir, a kind of knife which is known in our dialect as COURT


"tabak," or "gatab."
Q How many times did he stab the victim?
Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the
weapon otherwise called as "gatab" in your locality?
A Three (3) times your honor.

A Somewhat small knife which is about eight (8) inches long.


xxx xxx xxx

Q Was that eight inches long including the handle?


FISCAL RAMOS

A Yes, sir.
Q And what injury sustained by victim Magdalino Rudy Olos
at his back [—] was that the injury resulting from his death or
Q Now, was Magdalino Rudy Olos hit by the thrusts of Norly which of the stabbing blows made by Norly Tan . . . [h]it
Tan? him?

A Yes, sir. A They all hit him, sir.

Q In what part of the body of Magdalino rudy Olos was hit by Q How about the stabbing blow for the second time?
Norly Tan?
A Still at the back, sir.
A At the back, sir.
Q How about the third time?
COURT
A He was hit on the abdomen.
Q Which part of the back?
Q Now, you mentioned earlier that Norly Tan emerged from
A Upper portion of his back, Your Honor. At this juncture, the grassy portion, will you please tell the Honorable Court
witness is pointing the upper right portion of his back. how tall [was the] grassy portion where Norly Tan emerged?

xxx xxx xxx A It is higher than a person, sir.

FISCAL RAMOS Q How far is that grassy portion where Magdalino Olos came
from?
Q By the way, what was Magdalino Rudy Olos doing in the
road when he was actually assaulted by Norly Tan? A Just beside the road, sir.

A He was on his way home, sir. Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court of your own
knowledge or observation, was Olos able to see Norly Tan
before the latter emerged from the grassy portion?
Q Now, in relation to the victim Magdalino Rudy Olos, where
was Norly Tan when he stabbed Olos?
A He could not have seen Norly Tan because Magdalino Olos
already passed when Norlito Tan emerged from the grassy
A He was on the left side of Magdalino Olos, sir.
portion of the field.

226
Q Now, for how long had time elapsed when Norly Tan xxx xxx xxx
emerged from the grassy portion of the field and stabbed
Olos?
FISCAL RAMOS

A Around one (1) second, sir.


Q What, if any, did Jose Tan do?

Q When the victim Olos was stabbed by Norly Tan for the
A He stoned Olos.
first time at his back, what did Olos do, if any?

Q At what moment did Jose Tan throw [stones at] Magdalino


A When he faced Norly Tan, Norly Tan stabbed him in his
Rudy Olos[?]
abdomen?

A After his brother Norly Tan stabbed Olos, sir.


COURT

Q And was Olos hit by the stone of Jose Tan?


Q So the second stab was also in the abdomen of the victim?

A Yes, sir.
A No, your honor, the two (2) stabs hit his back and the third
stab hit his abdomen.
Q In what part of his body was he hit was Jose Tan?
xxx xxx xxx
A In his neck.
FISCAL RAMOS
Q How many times did he stone Magdalino Rudy Olos?
Q Now, how about Jose Tan, do you know where he was at
the time his brother Norly Tan emerged from the "talahib"? A Only one (1) sir.

A Yes, sir. Q How about you, what did you do while Norly Tan was
stabbing the victim, Magdalino Olos?
Q Where was he?
A I was about to run away to them in order to pacify them,
but when the two (2) brothers saw me, they fled.
A He was at the middle of the road.

Q Towards what direction [did] they [flee?].


Q Now, in relation to where Magdalino Rudy Olos was
walking at the middle of the road where was Jose Tan at that
time? A Towards the direction of their uncle's house. 16

A In front of Olos. The above-quoted testimony jibes with that of Ofelia Olos as to how the incident happened, 17 and with
that of Dr. Gonzales as to the number of wounds sustained by the victim.
Q How far was Jose Tan at that time?
The inconsistencies pointed our by the appellants refer to their alleged motive for killing the victim, the
distance of the witnesses from the locus criminis and the location of the wounds inflicted. However,
A About five (5) meters.
motive is not important when there is no doubt about the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, 18 as in the
present case. True, there was variance in the witnesses' testimonies as to their distance from the stabbing
COURT incident. However, the sketch presented in court showed that they had a clear view of the scene. 19 And
although they could not pinpoint precise locations, they were able to give the correct number of wounds
sustained by the victim. Their perception as to where the victim was struck was likewise
Q So they saw each other?
correct.1âwphi1.nêt

A Yes, your Honor.

227
In any case, the inconsistencies cited by the appellants are not substantial enough to impair the credibility Crime and Its Punishment
of these witnesses. Rather, such minor lapses manifest truthfulness and candor and erase suspicion of a
rehearsed
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was murder.
testimony. 20

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part
In all, we cannot fault the trial court for upholding the relevant portions of the prosecution witnesses'
of the person attacked. 23 Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
testimonies.
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 24 In
Second Issue: the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was
therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the
wounds inflicted on him.
Self-Defense

Culpability of Jose Tan


When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to them to prove that the killing was
justified and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor. They must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter is weak, it could not be We agree with the court a quo that the prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the killing of the
disbelieved after their open admission of responsibility for the killing. 21 victim; thus, Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only as an accomplice. Worth quoting is the trial court's
disquisition on the matter:
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly Tan to prove self-defense. Thus, he must prove
that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to prevent it were However, the evidence of the prosecution regarding the participation of the other accused, Jose Tan is not
reasonable, and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. However, he failed to discharge so satisfactory specially regarding its theory of conspiracy. In fact, according to the widow Ofelio Olos,
this burden. True, he alleges that it was the victim, Magdalino Olos, who was the aggressor who had she even heard Jose Tan telling and pleading with his brother to stop his attack and stabbing of the victim.
started the fracas: The most therefore that said accused could be liable for is merely that of an accomplice, who, not being a
principal cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous and simultaneous acts, that in this case, by
his stoning the victim Modesto Olos and hitting him on the neck. However, the accused Jose Tan's act of
Q When Modesto Olos met you on the left side of the road, what else did he do?
stoning was not a direct participation nor indispensable to the killing of the victim. Also, as held by the
Supreme Court, when doubt exists whether an accused acted as principal or accomplice, the court should
A When we were on the left side of the road, Modesto Olos asked me why I was there and then I told him favor the lesser or milder identity (People vs. Irenea, G.R. No. 44410, August 5, 1988). 25
that I was a resident and then he told me that he will bury me alive and at the same time he thrust his
bladed weapon and stabbed me.
The above-quoted ruling follows legal and jurisprudential precepts. The Revised Penal Code defines
accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, 26 cooperate in the execution of the
COURT offense by previous or simultaneous acts." 27

Q Did he hit you? In the present case, the prosecution was not able to prove that Jose Tan conspired with his brother to
commit the murder. Neither was it shown that he had prior knowledge of the latter's criminal intent.
Absent a conspiracy, the responsibility of the accused is individual, not collective, and each is to be
A I was able to parry the thrust and [hold] his arm with the weapon. When I was able to hold his hand with punished only for his separate acts.
the bolo, I was also able to draw my own bladed weapon and I was able to stab him.

The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of the principal, which
Q From where did you draw that weapon which you used in stabbing Modesto Olos? in murder cases is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. Considering that he is entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, 28 because he was only sixteen years old when the
A I drew it from inside my boot. crime was committed, 29 the trial court should have lowered his penalty by two degrees, i.e. prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
xxx xxx xxx

Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven, the imposable penalty on Norlito Tan
The above-quoted testimony, however, shows some inherent contradictions. If it was the victim who had is reclusion perpetua.
attacked Norly Tan, then why did the former suffer three stab wounds and the latter none? Likewise, the
Court finds it hard to believe that Norly Tan was able to subdue the victim with one hand and at the same
time get his weapon from his boot. Clearly then, his self-serving allegation would not suffice. It pales in WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Norlito
comparison with the positive and categorical declaration of the prosecution witnesses that the attack on the Tan, as principal, is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; while Appellant Jose Tan, as an accomplice and a
victim was sudden and unprovoked. minor, is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.SO ORDERED.
Third Issue:
228
G.R. No. 90185 March 1, 1995 sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. This
Court likewise hereby orders the five accused to indemnify the victim, jointly and
severally, the amount of P20,000.00 as consequential damages; to return the amount
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
of P250.00, the Seiko watch and the Chinese gold necklace, subject matter of the
vs.
robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the value thereof, jointly and severally, in the
ERNESTO ABARRI y BATING, CLEMENTE CAWALING y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA y
amount of P7,250.00; and to pay the costs.
CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO y GONZALES and RONNIE ANDALES y
ROMIROSA, accused-appellants.
The accused shall be credited in the services of their sentences with full time the
accused have undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of
QUIASON, J.:
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Rollo, p. 32).

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Kalookan City in Criminal
Hence, this appeal.
Case No. C-31521, finding accused Ernesto Abarri y Batting, Clemente Cawaling y Cirinio, Conrado
Estrada y Cawaling, Joselito Pajalago y Gonzales and Ronnie Andales y Romirosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion II
perpetua.
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria Gan was walking along 4th Avenue, Kalookan
I City on her way home, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her and each poked a knife at her neck.
Abarri then grabbed Gan's bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag kang sisigaw." Gan was
dragged by the two and brought inside a fenced, vacant lot strewn with garbage and covered with tall
The information filed against the accused reads as follows:
grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago were former employees of Gan.

That on or about the 14th day of October 1988, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a "balisong, " tore the upper portion of Gan's blouse.
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
The other accused then started tearing the rest of the blouse and pulling down her pants. The torn blouse
conspiring together and mutually helping one another with intent to gain and by
was used to tie her mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the accused started touching
means of force, threats and intimidation upon the person of GREGORIA GAN y
her private parts.
LIM, that is by poking a knife at the latter, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:
Abarri opened Gan's handbag and took a bunch of keys, which included the key for her store at Carmen
Planas Street in Binondo, Manila. He also got her watch valued P2,000.00, necklace valued at P5,000.00
one (1) Chinese gold ring P5,000.00
and wallet containing P250.00.
one (1) lady's wristwatch 2,000.00
Cash money amount (sic) to 250.00
————— After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales. Before leaving, Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog,
TOTAL P7,250.00 (referring to Andales) bahala ka na, sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim 'yan, makatas pa 'yan."

belonging to said Gregoria Gan y Lim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening the tie on her legs, raped her twice. After
the aforementioned total amount of P7,250.00; and on the occasion thereof, said satisfying his lust, Andales left.
accused with the use of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, have
sexual intercourse with one GREGORIA GAN y LIM, against the latter's will and
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll over to the middle of the lot. In the process, the
without her consent (Rollo, p. 7).
tie on her mouth loosened and she was able to shout for help. Responding to her cries, neighbors came and
untied her hands.
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay Captain Anita Alejo was informed by a
On May 22, 1989, the trial court. rendered its decision convicting all appellants of the crime of robbery resident that somebody was opening the store of Gan. Repairing at the place, Alejo saw Abarri and
with rape, the dispositive portion of which reads: Estrada. She noticed that the door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked the two what they
were doing there, Abarri answered that Gan instructed them to get the latter's pants. Alejo brought them to
the barangay hall for investigation. Upon further questioning, Abarri admitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ERNESTO
vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over the two to the custody of the police detachment
ABARRI Y BATTING, CLEMENTE CAWALING Y CIRINIO, CONRADO
in Binondo.
ESTRADA Y CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO Y GONZALES and
RONNIE ANDALES Y ROMIROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the special complex offense of robbery with rape as described and The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene. However, Gan was no longer there when they
penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. arrived. The police proceeded to Gan's house where the latter positively identified the two as among those
This Court appreciates the presence of the aggravating circumstance of the persons who robbed her.
nocturnity and there being no appreciable mitigating circumstance, this Court
229
The findings of NBI Medico Legal Officer Roberto Garcia were as follows: (1) there were physical However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness committed by him culminated in the raping of
injuries outside the victim's genitals, the age of which was consistent with the alleged time of commission the victim when he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show that the other accused had
of the crime at about 7:30 P.M. of October 14, 1988; (2) the victim's hymen had old healed lacerations; (3) knowledge or were aware of the rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty of robbery
the opening of the hymen was big enough to accommodate or to allow the penetration of an average-sized with rape (People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).
adult male organ in erection without producing any new injury to the hymen.
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to Andales as sufficient to make him a
III principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before a remark can produce such an effect, the same must be
of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime (People v.
Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]). The inducer must have such an overpowering moral ascendency over the
The defense rests on denial and alibi. All of the accused claim that they were not at the scene of the crime
actor (People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 [1993]), as to make the utterance a command from a superior
as each of them was somewhere else.
to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the decision of Andales to rape the victim had been
made before Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was then leaving the place with Abarri, Estrada and
Abarri testified that at around 8:00 P.M. of October 14, 1988, he and Estrada were on their way home from Pajalago while Andales purposely stayed behind with the victim. There is not even a showing that
work. While walking in Pulgueras Street in Binondo, Manila, they were accosted by some barangay tanod Cawaling had any moral influence over Andales.
who accused them of breaking into a store. At first they denied their involvement. But after they were
mauled at the Binondo Police Station, they were forced to admit their involvement in the robbery.
The trial court, therefore, erred in convicting all the appellants of the crime of robbery with rape. In view
of the fact that the charge of rape includes abusos deshonestos, the appellants, other than Andales, can be
Estrada corroborated the version of Abarri as to their whereabouts on the night of the robbery. He further found guilty of committing the crime of robbery with abusos deshonestos.
testified that he and Cawaling were former employees of Gan.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Ernesto Abarri, Clemente Cawaling, Conrado
Cawaling, Pajalego and Andales all claimed that they were at their respected homes that night when the Estrada and Joselito Pajalago are GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes of robbery and
crime was committed. Cawaling claimed that he was coerced by the police to admit his complicity. acts of lasciviousness. This Court sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
Andales claimed that he came to know his co-accused only at the city jail. of arresto mayor as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, and to indemnify Gregoria Gan jointly and severally in the amount of P10,000.00 as
moral damages. For the crime of robbery, they are sentenced to suffer the in de-terminate penalty of FOUR
We have consistently ruled that for alibi to prosper as a defense, two requirements must be satisfied — that
(4) YEARS and 2 MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and that it was physically mayor as maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally Gregoria Gan in the amount of P7,250.00 as
impossible for him to be at that place and time (People v. Gaguban, G.R. No. 96287, April 25, 1994). The actual damages.
requisites of time and place must be strictly met (People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454 [1993]).

Ronnie Andales is FOUND GUILTY of the crime of robbery with rape. He is sentenced to suffer the
In the case at bench, appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Gregoria Gan in the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages,
of the crime when it was committed.
and jointly and severally with the other appellants, the amount of P7,250.00 as actual damages.

The defense posits that no direct evidence on the conspiracy was established by the prosecution. SO ORDERED.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense (People v. Uy, 206 SCRA 270 [1992]); People v. Dela Cruz,
190 SCRA 328 [1990]).

The common intent of robbing the victim and committing the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred from
their behaviors.

Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The other
appellants followed them and watched while Abarri divested the victim of her valuables. After robbing the
victim, Abarri with the use of a "balisong" tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse and all the other
appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and biting her nipples.

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
environmental circumstances (People v. Balbas, 129 Phil. 358[1967]). We find that the acts of appellants
in striping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts constitute lewd designs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, petitioner
230
vs. (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL,
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL
case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
ENRILE, respondents.
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very
simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990 means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder
and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
vs.
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
which, therefore, it should not apply.

NARVASA, J.:
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its
Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of
arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
G.R. No. 92163.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. (a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are
process; presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that
not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution,
saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought
(c) denied his right to bail; and
to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code

231
to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no
crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said
that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such
sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense,
48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case: if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is
deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into,
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity
much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides
with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the
denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
of Rodriguez Navarro:
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez,
the Court said:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons
Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
then in 1932, reading: complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
defendant may be allowed bail. 13
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
separadamente los delitos.

232
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice
by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is,
questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued
to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly
gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too
gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained
without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to
have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
available there.
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non- part of, an ongoing rebellion.
existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not
excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive
brought up there instead of directly to this Court. the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to

233
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

234
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for
the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
and pp. 36-94).

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25,
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation
1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated
Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from
Program (Rollo, p. 36).
proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was
then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in
of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992. the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the
information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992
member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure
order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-
44).
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most
(Rollo, p. 45). perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes
of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff.
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion
The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I
stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of
contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
"aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to
petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly
plead and prepare for trial. The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as
follows:
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First (c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her
Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with
disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of particulars). soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration or before
the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with
the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993,
denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
235
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of
the act constituting the offense charged, thus: issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan
legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the
legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v.
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official
Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).

(1) She was a public officer;


It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The
letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the (2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner
ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his
diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan. (3) Those aliens were disqualified;

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in (4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for
arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the (5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice official functions."
Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
Re: Claim of denial of due process 3019.

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the
committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of
amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14). defense which she can establish at the trial.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to
was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
factual issues involved therein. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the
complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard.
Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to
Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of
assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted
was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of
four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there
draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting may be instances where both elements concur.
vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.
Re: Delito continuado
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
(G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.

236
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors (1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January
filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v.
only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner questioned in her Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different
opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information occasions.
(Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity
of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications
to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution
there should only be one information to be file against her. to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and (3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964
involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and
more difficult to apply. (4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 [1975]).
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim crimes penalized under special laws,
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.). e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for
war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution
(Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54). The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate
offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several
theories that have evolved in theft cases.
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one
accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil.
larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct
320 [1939] ).
larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the
discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v.
De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ). Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85
Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a
shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that
collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be
for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act —
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases: that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege.

237
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of
a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a
single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that
instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file
only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order
dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically
that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of
the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for
availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding
directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on
or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was
embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992
stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to
the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the
violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137953-58 April 11, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant,


vs.
WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.

238
PANGANIBAN, J.: The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded as
follows:
The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase
the penalty imposed in a conviction. "That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust and by means of
The Case
coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision1 and June 3, 1998 Order2 issued by the Regional of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mary Rose de la Torre."5
Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69)3 in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I, 2181-I, 2182-I,
2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two counts of acts of
The other Information6 charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different date,
lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration
October 10, 1996.
filed by plaintiff (now appellant).

On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997, similarly read as
The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder:
follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY beyond
"That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz,
reasonable doubt as follows:
Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design by means of
"1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years
imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter."7
correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of ₱10,000.00
as and by way of civil damages.
The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November
1,8 November 129and December 23,10 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded 11 not
"2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined guilty12 to all six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the challenged Decision.
and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision
Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal13 dated June 9, 1998.
correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of ₱10,000.00
as and by way of civil damages.
The Facts
"3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Appellant’s Version
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
In its Brief,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as
follows:
"4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
"Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre. The
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When Mary
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with Mark Domil,
leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his progeny in a
"5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
"Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School. She
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.1âwphi1.nêt
was the brightest in her class, even though because of their poverty, she had to walk from their
hut to the school everyday.
"6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
"In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at th[at] time. The latter appeared
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages."4
sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by Generosa
Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused repeatedly by appellee.
Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the abuses. They then decided to

239
refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), who took "1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or intimidation in
Mary Rose under its custody. the commission of the acts complained of.

"It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee told xxx xxx xxx
her, ‘anak puwede ba nating subukan?’ She did not understand what that meant and continued
to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing her shorts as well
"2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of Mary
as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who
Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her
just wept. The same incident was repeated in the evening of October 10, 1996.
brother, Mark Anthony.

"In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina of
"3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.
Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached. She started to fear appellee. He also had
sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on November 1 and
12 and December 23, 1996. "4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years,
Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living together as a family and Mary Rose was
never molested by her father.
"A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her vagina admitted one finger with ease. She was
no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 "5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is no
nine o’clock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection."15 (Citations omitted) reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his father considering that both Mary Rose and
Mark Anthony have no one to call as a mother."20
Appellee’s Version
Hence, this appeal.21
On the other hand, appellee’s statement of facts, as contained in his Brief, is reproduced as follows:
16 17

The Issue
"Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely:
Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left her family when Mary Rose was In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration:
about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with her father and
brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
"The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A.
"Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and when No. 7659."22
confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher
informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case to the
DSWD who took her under its custody. The Court’s Ruling

"Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: The appeal has no merit.
September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12,
1996 and December 23, 1996. Lone Issue:

"Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution
daughter and said that the only reason he can think of why the daughter filed the charges is
because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla."18 (Citations omitted)
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death on
the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was
Ruling of the Trial Court below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.23
The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness
against Mary Rose on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of] Mary Rose Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23 December 1996."19 Further, the trial judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.1âwphi1.nêt
give any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of
However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that the accused against double jeopardy.1âwphi1.nêt
there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:

240
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v. Leones,24 it "While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other
Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the
for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy."25 It added: findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated.
Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to
the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on
"This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court did
double jeopardy."39
not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed
by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed."26
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
27
This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States (hereinafter "Kepner"), as follows:
SO ORDERED.
"The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of
the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again upon the merits, even in an appellate
court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense."28

The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.29 Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court
explained that an "appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing
the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy." 30

Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against
multiple punishments for the same offense.31

Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the practice as
equivalent to two separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of
multiple prosecution.32

The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. 33 It also serves the additional purpose of
precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction.34 And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. 35

Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution cannot
prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been
given a more severe penalty.36

Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these cannot be corrected
by this Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Said the Court:

"Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of
error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the
error may be."37

The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for certiorari to G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997
show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling38 as follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
241
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in
company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen,
INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions
cases identically read: were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or
five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north
western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt.
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of
Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the
Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident
arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3)
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several
Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the
wounds which caused his death.
ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3)
meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
Contrary to Law. 1
At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex crime of described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire,
Benito Raquepo: resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run
passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, inside the Octagon cockpit arena.
Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt.
Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the
sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death. accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat.
Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He
tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that happened again Mario."
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain
Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a
peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks,
consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little
independent of his own will.2 while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo
advised Tabaco — "Mario relax ka lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood face to
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan. face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo,
Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the
process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows: happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his
wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under
then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — injured
at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan. on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his
right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and right shoulder. But, the
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards three, did not file their complaints. 3
to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo;
(2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is as
INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to follows:
have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the
presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing
with him his M-14 issued firearm. Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan,
Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon
of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company;
242
arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485,
the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that there were several November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst
persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).
some long, and were seen in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused
did not bother to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely:
firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the authority, the
Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting
guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surly have confiscated the same from
to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the
Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito
government, assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit.
Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3)
Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted
eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt.
bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres
Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated in both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts,
at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the
heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known, position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his
his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive
air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat.
a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution
different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters away from the
rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well lighted at
(accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and that time.
Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused
testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang,
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was
he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was
seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta
nothing to said persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing,
and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused
Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said
Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again Mario," while the latter told him —
gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off,
"Mario relax ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the
hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such
possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to
incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family
stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as
of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused
corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the
surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by,
accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge
not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5
Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury
sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo.4 The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily
loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's
magazine was already empty.
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty as
charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it
found that: The court a quo said further:

From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense ATTY. VILLENA:
cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the
Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject
victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you
who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody remember if it had a magazine that time?
else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the
cockpit arena. A: Yes, sir with magazine.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. "Where Q: Do you have the magazine now?
there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search
for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be
used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial
evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908,

243
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator
the rifle? Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L.
Tamayo).
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the
accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat.
Melin Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).
A: Yes, sir.
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets? for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).

A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses
pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo). namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen
who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear
and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued: deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and
PROSECUTOR ATAL: the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).

Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo,
when you surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the
there were no live ammunitions in the magazine? cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and
automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused
shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir. corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so
as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel,
Q: How many bullets in all? 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances
proved reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147
A: Twenty, sir. SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these
circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused,
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports? as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo
vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the
very nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of under conditions where concealment is highly probable, and to require direct
direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the
Stenographer L. Tamayo). proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt.
were found inside the cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author
157-158, record). of the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence
adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC
ATTY. ARRIOLA: personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule
that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), Rule 131,
Revised Rules of Court).
Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is
this?
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused,
even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.
A: Picture of spent shells.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he
Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this? could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the
cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower

244
elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot aforesaid WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear
victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond
No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola. reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio 1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo
saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted
of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal
bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by
west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito
with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of
where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were P150,000.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate
on the left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered
No. 4, on his left thigh downward. to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of
P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for
payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left
without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited
at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower
abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of 2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused
the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10)
the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the years and one (1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four
victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted. (4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket
Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from
fees in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case
the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on
of insolvency.
the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor
and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets
RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the 3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited with
cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan,
especially as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired at his is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court,
victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law
abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard which and the rules.
was hit by the bullets.
4. The accused to pay the costs.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he
gunshot wounds — inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh.
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily
"K").
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29,
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341;
witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and
positively identified.
SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours)

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present appeal
author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar
on the following grounds:
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

245
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and
Romeo Regunton.
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from
whom those gun reports come from?
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of
Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun,
sir.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant
Tabaco.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when the
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with
respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:
A: He was hit, sir.
In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the kind of weapon did he use if you know?
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in A: M-14, sir.
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or xxx xxx xxx
in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict. 11 Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what
happened to Regunton?

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial
court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on
that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his
companions.
xxx xxx xxx

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:


Q: How many shots did you hear?

COURT:
A: Three (3) shots, sir.

Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?


Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
A: Yes, sir.

ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that
successive or automatic?
Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?

246
A: Successive, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of
was seated on his right side? Arreola, you and your companions?

A: None, sir. A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

xxx xxx xxx Q: Where were you facing?

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a A: We were facing south the arena.
gun when you first heard gun shot, will you please describe
the stands (position) of the accused?
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was


A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
standing on a forth (port) arm position).

Q: From what direction?


xxx xxx xxx

A: Infront of us, sir.


Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?


A: He fired the gun, sir.

A: He was in the first row of seats.


Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?


A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

A: Somebody was killed, sir.


ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: Who was that?


Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit
and returned, when you returned, what did you see?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
COURT:
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A: Many, sir.
A: Less than a meter, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the
nature, was there in succession or automatic?
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you
identify the person passing as you mentioned?
A: Automatic, sir.
A: They have similarity, sir.

247
xxx xxx xxx Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun
that you went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is
that correct?
Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.


A: An army man, sir.

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single


Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?

A: Five (5) years, sir.


A: Yes, sir.

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?


xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes, sir.
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you
prior to the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being with him?
fired?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots
after you run, would you say that these gun shots you heard
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the
were fired from M-14 rifle?
late Mayor Arreola was shot?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.


A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were
made, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic
gun shot?
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12


A: Yes, sir.

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:


Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13

Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr.
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is it not?

ATTY. ARRIOLA
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his
gun, sir.
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit
when you go with Mayor Arreola?
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: Yes, sir.
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

Q: What part of the cockpit?


xxx xxx xxx

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

248
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside A: Yes, sir.
the cockpit?
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor
Q: How were they arranged? Arreola, sir.

A: In rows, step by step, sir. Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the
late Arreola?
COURT:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many rows?
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: Four rows, sir.
A: M-14, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario
Tabaco shot him?
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor
Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th
step, sir. Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

Q: And how about you? A: Because I saw it, sir.

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir. Q: What did you do also?

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover
respective position of the place where you stayed? because I was also wounded.

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
backrest of the fourth step, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
Q: What happened to him?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton? wounded."

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir. Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

xxx xxx xxx A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".

Q: While you were in that position together with your Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
companions, do you remember if there was untoward incident
that happened?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground,
sir.

249
xxx xxx xxx Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was
not directly in front of you?
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who
fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola? A: A little bit west of us, sir.

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14 Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and
your position with the late Arreola on the northwest when you
according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
you mean?

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
A: Yes, sir.

Q: When for the first time when you were already in the
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when
cockpit arena did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?
he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is
that what you mean?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you
see Mario Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the
incident?
direction where you were together with the late Mayor
Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir. arena?

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
accused herein Mario Tabaco?
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming
A: He sat on the first row of the seats. from the accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were
right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in
your direct examination you immediately sought cover?
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part
of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario
Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

xxx xxx xxx


COURT:

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not
Q: How far? come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead already?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he
was already dead.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated
on the western part of the cockpit? Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed
towards Mayor Arreola?
A: A little to the west, sir.
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on
the western part of the cockpit?
xxx xxx xxx

A: We were on the northwest. COURT:

250
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed? A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and
that was the time when I got down, sir.
A: In our place, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came
toward me and told me that he was also hit. Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?

xxx xxx xxx A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one
bench between them, sir.
COURT:
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that
was the time I got down to hide myself, sir. 16
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:


Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

ATTY. CONSIGNA:
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
that you heard gunfire?
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:
A: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR ABAD:
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were
inside the cockpit arena?
xxx xxx xxx

A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to


Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him
the Mayor and the gun went off and that's the time I took
holding that gun?
cover, sir.

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.


xxx xxx xxx

Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?


Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire
inside the cockpit arena?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17
Q: Where were you also?
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the above-named
A: I was at the stairs, sir. eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As
between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of
accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the
Q: When you saw him what happened if any? prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare
denial and explanation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-
251
appellant in the way that they did. Well settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo,
indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not
presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 19 tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.

2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when they Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun from
testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt.
companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola, testified that the Raquepo. 22
trajectory of the bullets that hit the ex-mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the ex-
mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the point of
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal
entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the
wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun,
lowest while the ex-mayor and his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This
which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is equivalent to
contention, however, is untenable.
criminal intent.

Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them. 20
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.
The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-
mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of reclusion
level.
perpetuashould have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the single sentence for
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point four murder charges in this wise:
of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was
inflicted. 21
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings
of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton,
Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of Jorge respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.
Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
The law provides:
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and policeman
Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena,
he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside
the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
"Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles. period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal
Code).
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part the
testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single
was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or
Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessary
one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People
Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused- vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told
accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of
position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle
of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4)
Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused- victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4)
murder victims.
appellant.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst
of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a
lucky.
complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a
252
single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty.
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated
vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748. in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the
ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson
sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths
therein:
of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one
single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
penalty — is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical
offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article.
themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each
longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single Penalty of RECLUSION death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct
PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for
67170-72, December 15, 1989). as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same.
Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the
and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito
fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing
penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious
that would connect one of them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)
offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal,
which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of
be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets
expenses of Benito Raquepo. which actually produced them. 30

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K-2" The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of
— magazine of M-14 and Exh. "L" — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the
used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the
than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized
more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be
wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (emphasis
empty shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23 supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.
There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four
each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:
murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that
the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun
fires, meaning continuous(emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water. Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People
vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine
vs. Pineda. 27 enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the
accused-appellant.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which
killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of
complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex
felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every
the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its

253
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant
guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences
of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940

MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner,


vs.
ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., respondents

LAUREL, J.:

254
This is the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and to
its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment,
remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal. upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be deem proper to
impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National
Assembly.
The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated as
follows:
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by
the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty
does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accesories provided by
pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the amounts P375 and P125,
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain
respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal, this
where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is
court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, he was confined in the
entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting
provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs
from the convictions. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there
of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of the two amounts aforestated, the same was
would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
condoned by the complaints. Not withstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the
registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934
pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has
and 1937, seated as the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934
expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case,
and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act
while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the national Assembly, section 94,
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final
responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
judgment guilty of any crime against the property." In view of this provision, the respondent forth with
(Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24, 1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold
applied to his Excellency, the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15,
that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned
1939. Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December
judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State and
24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that
not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to the contrary
with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
(Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon the other hand, the
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357,
does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and
name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative
the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, action.
the court below rendered it decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised by the
petitioner, the court declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on December
24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification created by
section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The petition for exclusion of the
respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is, denied. Let there be no costs.

Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of the
court below on the several grounds stated in the petition.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondents to the full enjoyment
of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative
prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive G.R. No. 105673 July 26, 1996
of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accesory penalties
imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary
question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Constitution.
ANTONIO MAGANA, accused-appellant.

Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:


PANGANIBAN, J.:p

255
Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more than sufficient to against the latter's will; that on or after the commission of said offense, said accused
convict the accused-appellant of rape with homicide. But beyond affirming the correctness of did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill
the trial court's decision and reiterating familiar legal doctrines, we declare that in this instance, and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength,
the ruthlessness and viciousness exhibited by appellant in carrying out his dastardly design assault, attack, hack and hit said Odette Sta. Maria, thereby inflicting upon the latter
upon a hapless minor most certainly warrants the imposition of the severest punishment serious and mortal wounds which were the proximate cause of the death of said
possible. We also note with considerable frustration and anxiety that this case is only one Odette Sta. Maria, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
among a host of others, constituting a veritable floodtide of crime and immorality which
seemingly signals an unstoppable regression to the law of the jungle, where anyone is free to
All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense
grab and take whatever he pleases.
was committed in uninhabited place being a grassy area and the victim not having
given provocation for the offense.3
This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 38,1 in Criminal Case No. 6919 entitled "People vs. Antonio
On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
Magana". The trial court found the accused (appellant herein) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to "imprisonment for
life (Reclusion Perpetua)".2 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view of
The Facts
the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced (sic) imprisonment
for life (Reclusion Perpetua). And, he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
At about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, 14-year old Odette Sta. Maria left for school, as usual the deceased the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for her
taking the feeder road which is about 2 1/2 km. from Sierra Bros. From there, she would have death, THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (39,000.00) as liquidated damages,
gotten a ride to school. TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as moral damages and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages.4
At about 7:00 a.m. that morning, Danilo De Austria saw accused-appellant "strangling the
victim" with his left arm by the side of the feeder road. De Austria was about to untie his Hence, this appeal.
carabao before reporting the incident to the authorities, but he was immediately accosted by the
appellant who poked a knife at him, threatening to kill him if the family of the victim would
Version of the Prosecution
come to know of the matter.

The prosecution's theory is that on that fatal morning appellant was lying in wait for the victim,
The victim's mother, Lucia Sta. Maria, got worried when at 5:00 p.m., her daughter was not
and when she passed by on her way to school, appellant forced her to go with him by strangling
with the other kids returning from school. She and her husband started to ask around for Odette,
or choking her and threatening her with a bladed weapon, the same one used on De Austria.
and learned that she did not even make it to school that day. Together with De Austria and
Then, he forced himself on her. Afterwards, he hacked her neck, thereby killing her. He
some neighbors, they searched for Odette. At about 9:00 p.m., they found the body of the girl
attempted to hide the body of the victim by covering it with cut grass. He also threatened to kill
sprawled on the ground some twenty meters from the site of that morning's incident. The body
De Austria to prevent the latter from telling on him.
was muddy, the face swollen, with hack wounds on the neck. Half of the victim's body was
covered with cut grass. Her skirt was raised upward; her panty had been removed and was
found near the body. The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr. Marcelito Abas,
Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, Danilo de Austria, Lucia Sta. Maria, Fe
Caramoan Juanson, and Antonio Vasquez.
Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, Municipal Health Officer of
Labo, Camarines Norte, showed that the victim sustained hacking wounds on the neck,
hematomas on the head, body and left arm, and multiple laceration of the hymen. The cause of Dr. Abas testified that the victim sustained a hacking wound on the right side of the neck; an
death was "shock hemorrhagic due to the hacking wound on the neck". The time of death was incised wound above the first wound parallel to each other; multiple hematomas of both eyes,
estimated at approximately 12 to 24 hours prior to the time of autopsy. both cheeks, left forehead, and left chin; "multiple hematomas right chest, both scapular region
(sic) of the back, left upper extremity posterior aspect with fracture of both radius and ulna,
middle portion;" and multiple laceration of the hymen at 4, 6 and 8 o'clock.5 Also, when he
After the burial of the victim, De Austria revealed to the Sta. Marias what he witnessed that
conducted the autopsy, the victim was not wearing underwear. 6 Dr. Abas was of the opinion
fateful morning. Accordingly, on March 7, 1991, an Information was filed charging appellant
that the victim died approximately 12 to 24 hours before the post-mortem examination which
with rape with homicide. It reads:
was conducted at 8:30 a.m. of January 15, 1991, and that death could have occurred at about
7:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991. 7 The hacking wound, he said, was caused by a sharp instrument,
That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at but the hematomas were inflicted with a blunt instrument. He also testified that the multiple
Mahawanhawan, Municipality of Labo, Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, lacerations in the victim's hymen, which were probably inflicted just before the hacking,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, indicated the possibility of rape.8
armed with a bolo and with the use of a piece of wood, and by means of violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
Danilo De Austria, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, Labo, Camarines Norte, was
carnal knowledge with one ODETTE STA. MARIA, a girl of 14 years old (sic),
familiar with both the appellant and the victim. He testified that on that fateful morning, at
256
about 7:00 a.m., while he was walking along the feeder road towards the ricefields in Barangay Jaime Chavez, 42, married, a farmer and likewise a resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that
Mahawanhawan, he espied the appellant and the victim some forty meters ahead of him. 9 He on that day, at about 6:30 a.m., he was in his house situated beside the feeder road, waiting for
was shocked to see appellant strangling the victim with his left arm.10 Before he could make a his co-laborers to arrive, as they were supposed to go gold panning at Jose Panganiban,
move, appellant blocked his way, poked a double-bladed weapon at him and threatened to kill Camarines Norte. He saw the victim (in her school uniform) pass by, followed closely by De
him if he told the Sta. Marias of the incident. He said, "Yes, yes" because he was "over- Austria at about 6:30 a.m.22 After five (5) minutes, Mahipos and her husband passed by, going
frightened" of the appellant. He knew appellant to be abusive whenever he was drunk. 11 the other way. He further testified that appellant came to his house at about 7:00 a.m. and asked
that he be included in the gold panning activity. Appellant stayed in his house for an hour and
left at around 8:00 a.m. together with Kagawad Jovita Paquita to buy cigarettes at Sierra
De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant assaulting the victim was
Bros.23He later saw appellant in Sierra Bros at about 9:00 a.m. He also testified that the place
uninhabited, and that cries for help would go unheard; that the person working the ricefields in
where appellant worked was about half a kilometer from the place where the body of Odette
that area was none other than accused-appellant himself; and that the body of the victim was
was recovered.24
found in a grassy area five meters from the feeder road, and about twenty meters from where
the victim was seen being strangled.12 De Austria also revealed that some ten days after the
killing, both he and the appellant were abducted and interrogated by the NPA, and that he heard Jovita Paquita, 47, married and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that she saw appellant at
appellant admit to the NPAs that he had raped the girl.13 Chavez' house at past 8:00 a.m. that morning. She and appellant walked together to Sierra Bros.
There, they parted ways.25
Lucia Sta. Maria, mother of the victim, testified that about a week before her daughter's death,
they met appellant, and Odette complained that appellant was staring at her in a "bad way". The Appellant testified that on that day, after taking breakfast at about 6:30 a.m., he went to his
victim informed her that appellant would look at her that way everytime they met. 14 mother's house, (which is near the feeder road and about 50 meters from his own house26),
where he stayed for about 15 minutes, then left by about 7:00 a.m. to see Kagawad Jaime
Chavez. 27 Chavez' house is approximately 330 meters from appellant's house.28 After about
Fe Caramoan Juanson, a neighbor, testified that while she was grazing her carabao, she saw
five minutes, he went to the Mahawanhawan Elementary School to buy cigarettes. Unable to
appellant standing on the feeder road at about 6:30 a.m. that day. Appellant, who was wearing a
buy any there, he returned to Chavez' place and thereafter went to Sierra Bros at 8:00 a.m. He
faded jacket, appeared uneasy, looking left and right and towards the hinterland of the
bought cigarettes at Sierra Bros, then returned to his house, arriving there at around 9:30
barangay, seemingly waiting for somebody. 15The place where she saw appellant waiting was
a.m.29Later, he made copra at his parent's land, then spent the rest of the day at his house, which
very near the place where the body of the victim was recovered.16
is only 500 meters from the grassy place where the body of the victim was found.30

Antonio Vasquez, martial arts instructor of the victim's brother-in-law, spent the night of
The Issues
January 13, 1991 at the house of the Sta. Marias, and left at about 6:10 a.m. the following
morning to go back to Labo. He took the feeder road and saw the appellant, whom he met many
times and knew by face and whom he positively identified in court, standing quite near the The appellant charges that the trial court erred:
place where the victim's body was subsequently recovered. Appellant appeared to be uneasy
and was pacing back and forth; he seemed to be looking for something. The witness noticed
1. In failing to give due credence to the accused's defenses;
that appellant wore a faded brown jacket at that time.17

2. In giving undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses;


Version of the Defense

3. . . . (In convicting) the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
The defense's theory consists of establishing an alibi for appellant and implicating Danilo De
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
Austria as the perpetrator of the crime. The following witnesses were presented, viz., Merly
Mahipos, Wilfredo Chavez, Jaime Chavez, Jovita Paquita, and the appellant himself.
4. In convicting the accused of . . . Rape with Homicide although the prosecution
have (sic) only proven a case for Homicide;
Mahipos, 35, married and a resident of Sierra Bros, testified that on January 14, 1991, at about
6:30 a.m., while she and her husband were walking from Sierra Bros to Mahawanhawan, a
distance of two kilometers (about thirty minutes on foot) they met the victim and Danilo De 5. In not considering that based on the evidences (sic) presented (by) both the
Austria.18 The latter were not yet halfway on the road to Sierra Bros and about 50 meters from prosecution and the defense, it is Danilo De Austria and not the accused, who is
the house of Mahipos' parents. The victim was walking ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) probably guilty of the offense charged.31
arms length.19 She asked the victim why she was alone and the victim only smiled. De Austria
walked fast and carried a bolo ("sinampalok") about eighteen inches long. 20 He was wearing a
all of which may be summed up as questioning the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
white T-shirt and black short pants. She did not see appellant, however.
witnesses and its appreciation of the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, vis-a-
vis that of the defense.
Wilfredo Chavez, 31, married, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that at about
6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, while he was at home, he saw De Austria and the victim pass by,
with the victim ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length. 21 He did not see appellant The Solicitor General adds that the trial court erred when it equated life imprisonment
that morning. with reclusion perpetuain the dispositive portion of the decision.

257
The Court's Ruling "kinakapatid",36 while the Chavezes are related to appellant by affinity,3 7 and Paquita admitted
that appellant is the "godson of (her) in-law".38
First Issue: Credibility of Appellant's Defense
Relationship can put the testimony of a witness in doubt, but it cannot adversely affect
credibility by itself.39 It is a familiar rule of law that the assessment of witnesses' credibility by
We cannot agree with appellant's contention to the effect that the defense built a more credible
the trial court is accorded great respect because it is in the best position to observe and evaluate
case than the prosecution, and that its story is consistent with ordinary human experience. In
their demeanor at the time they gave their testimony.40 As will be shown later, this Court sees
essence, the defense's theory is that, although appellant was in Mahawanhawan, he could not
no reason to rule otherwise.
have been at the scene of the crime that fatal morning, and that someone else (De Austria) was
present thereat.
Perhaps from sheer desperation, appellant advances an incredible theory: the spouses Sta.
32 Maria, parents of the victim, were trying to cover up their involvement with the New People's
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant's alibi itself showed that he was at or very
Army by blaming appellant for the crime. Aside from failing to prove such alleged
near the place where witness De Austria said he saw him at the time of the commission of the
involvement, accused could not point to any believable reason why the victim's parents would
felony. By appellant's own admission, he was in the same barangay on the date and time when
supposedly forego seeking justice for the rape and killing of their daughter merely in order to
the crime occurred. the places where appellant claimed to have gone that morning are, as found
allay some vague suspicion about their ideological learnings.
by the trial court, "within walking distance" of each other. Thus, the court a quo held ". . . that
despite (the) variance in testimony as to time and others, it is not physically impossible for
accused to be at the scene of the crime. . . ." Therefore, his alibi is inherently wake and hardly On the other hand, it is not also logical to conclude (as accused-appellant would have us do)
credible. that Juanson was lying because she, and not her husband, happened to be grazing their carabao
that morning when she saw appellant on the feeder road. Likewise, the defense was too
obviously clutching at straws when they tried to fault Vasquez, who happens to be a martial arts
In jurisprudence, alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the facility with which
instructor, for not having accompanied the victim that day on her way to school. He was only a
it can be fabricated.33 Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion and have received
guest of the victim's brother-in-law, not even of the Sta. Marias, and we cannot see how he
it with caution. It is a well-settled rule that in order for an alibi to prevail, the defense must
could have been held responsible in any manner for assuring the safety of the victim.
establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely
that the accused was somewhere else.34 Further, the defense contends that the testimony of De Austria is inconsistent with logic and
human experience. He testified that he saw appellant strangling the victim, but there was no
sign of strangulation according to Dr. Abas. Also, he was threatened by appellant with a
To cite only one example, this Court, in People vs. Cruz,35 computed distances to show that,
double-bladed weapon, but no such weapon was presented in court. And instead of reporting
contrary to the allegation of the accused, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
the strangling incident to the authorities at once, he opted to untie his carabao first.
scene of the crime:

The Court finds that these circumstances do not destroy the credibility of De Austria. On direct
. . . In the case at bar, the distance between his father's farm and the resthouse on the
examination, he testified as follows:
other hand, and the distance between the said boundary and the resthouse, on the
other, which are 2 and 1/2 kilometers, respectively, are not such distances as were
physically impossible for accused to negotiate or traverse; in fact, per his own PROS. VILLAFUERTE
testimony, he was able to travel from his father's farm to the said boundary to play
basketball that same day. Besides, the house of accused's parents where he was
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, do you still recall where were you
living was only 200 to 250 meters away from the resthouse, which distance accused
sometime on January 14, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
could have easily negotiated . . . .
morning?

Aside from its inherent weakness, accused-appellant's alibi cannot overcome the positive
xxx xxx xxx
identification by witness De Austria of appellant as the one straggling the victim that fatal
morning.
A: I was walking towards the ricefield.
Second Issue: Credibility of Persecution Witnesses
Q: Where?
Hewing to the general rule in criminal law that the guilt of an accused is not determined by the
weakness of defense's case but by the strength of that of the prosecution, appellant also tries to A: On the feeder road.
attack the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant points to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution are related to the victim and
one another. But then, such purported "defect" cannot be ascribed solely to the witnesses of the
prosecution. Among the witnesses of the defense, we find that Mahipos is appellant's

258
Q: While walking on the feeder road of Mahawan-hawan on A: Yes, sir.41
that particular date and time, do you remember if you have
seen anybody on that time while walking?
The absence of signs of strangulation does not change in the slightest the fact that the victim
was attacked and killed. Even though the weapon used in the killing was not presented in court,
xxx xxx xxx still it does not disprove the use of force and violence, as the fatal hack wounds on the cadaver
which, according to Dr. Abas, 42 were caused by such a weapon, sufficiently establish this
point.
A: Antonio Magana, sir.

In People vs. Cortes, supra, this Court held that delay in reporting a crime does not detract from
Q: Who else?
the veracity of the testimony as long as it is explained. Such delay could be ascribed to fear of
reprisal or reticence to get involved. In this case, the reason was clearly fear, as appellant
A: And Odette. threatened De Austria with harm unless the latter kept quiet. De Austria knew the accused to be
abusive (even violent) when drunk. Furthermore, their relative ages also provide basis for De
Austria's fear. While the accused is 42 years of age,43 De Austria is a young man of 19
xxx xxx xxx
years.44 On direct examination, De Austria stated:

PROS. VILLAFUERTE Q: And what did you do when you saw this thing that you
have just said?
Q: In what manner did you see this Odette Sta. Maria and this
Antonio Magana? A: I was shocked and I did not do anything.

A: I was behind them. xxx xxx xxx

Q: Behind whom? Q: You said that you were shocked because of what you saw,
what did you do?
A: Behind Odette and Antonio Magana.
A: My plan was to untie the carabao and to report the matter
Q: And what did you see? afterwards, but he blocked my way.

A: I saw Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria. Q: What did you do when you were blocked by him?

Q: In what manner did you see Antonio Magana strangling A: He poked a double bladed weapon on me.
Odette Sta. Maria?
Q: Did he say anything to you?
A: He was ahead of me and I was behind her.
A: That once the Sta. Marias knew about this thing, he was
Q: Do you mean to say that Odette was also walking in that going to kill me. "Don't expect to live!"
feeder road?
Q: How did you receive that message?
A: When I saw the two (2) they were no longer walking.
A: When he poked a bladed weapon.
Q: And you said that Antonio Magana was some sort of
strangling Odette Sta. Maria. How was Antonio Magana Q: When those words were uttered to you, what did you feel?
strangling Odette Sta. Maria?

A: Because I was overfrightened, I said, "Yes, Yes".


A: Using his left arm, sir.

Q: Are you afraid of Antonio Magana?


Q: Add that left arm was wrapped around the neck of Odette
Sta. Maria?
A: Yes, sir.
259
Q: Why? Q: What time on January 14, 1991 have you seen Antonio
Magana?
A: Because when he gets drank (sic), he becomes abusive.
A: I could not tell exactly what time but it was in the morning
of January 14, 1991.
Q: You have personal knowledge on that?

Q: Can you, more or less, approximate the time?


A: Yes, sir.45

A: To my estimate, more or less 6:30 in the morning.


While the reactions of eyewitnesses to a crime may vary, and even if De Austria's reaction may
not be typical or expected of a very credible witness, still, the same cannot be considered
damaging to his credibility. The trial court accepted his testimony and this Court sees no reason Q: Where did you see Antonio Magana on that date and time?
not to.
A: He was standing at the feeder road.50
Third Issue: Case Against De Austria
Q: You said you saw Antonio Magana standing on the feeder
In a facetious attempt to throw the blame on De Austria and to discredit him, the defense road while you were grazing your carabao. What did you
presented witnesses who claimed that they saw De Austria trailing the victim by a few arms' notice from Antonio Magana, if any?
length on the feeder road that morning; one witness added that De Austria had with him a
"sinampalok" (bolo) about eighteen inches long.
A: He was uneasy, looking both sides and looking towards
the interland (sic) of the barangay.51
The Court cannot bring itself to believe such story. While cross-examining De Austria, the
defense tried but failed to elicit an admission that he was courting the victim. 46 Nothing else
Q: Do you know the place where the body of Odette Sta.
was presented to show improper motive on his part. Viewed against De Austria's clear and
Maria was recovered?
categorical testimony that he saw appellant strangling the victim, the testimonies of the defense
witnesses merely ascribe to De Austria a vague and equivocal act which cannot by any stretch
of the imagination be made the basis for imputing to him the authorship of the crime. A: Yes, sir.

Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence Q: Do you know when she was allegedly raped and killed?

The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. This is true of most rape A: Yes, sir.
and rape-cum-homicide cases. The Court, in previous decisions, always took this into
consideration.4 7 In many cases, the victim, usually the sole witness, is killed. In People
vs. Masongsong,48 we held that rape is usually done with the least possibility of being seen by Q: What date was that?
the public, as in fact, the presence of eyewitnesses might even raise serious doubts.
A: January 14.
The present case is no different, built as it is upon circumstantial evidence presented through
the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Abas testified that the victim died from hack wounds on the neck Q: 1991?
and that her hymen sustained lacerations, showing the victim was violated and violently killed.
He opined that the victim was raped before she was hacked to death. Dr. Abas' approximation
of the time of death was corroborated by the testimonies of De Austria, Juanson and A: Yes, sir.
Vasquez.49 Lucia Sta. Maria testified that she found her daughter's body with skirt raised and
without underwear. De Austria positively identified appellant as the person strangling the xxx xxx xxx
victim that morning. Juanson and Vasquez confirmed that they also saw appellant look uneasy,
walking back and forth as if waiting for somebody by the feeder road that morning.
Q: On the same day that you saw Antonio Magana seemingly
waiting for somebody at about 6:30 o'clock in the morning?
Juanson on direct examination said:
ATTY. MAGANA:
Q: On January 14, 1991, do you recall having seen Antonio
Magana?
Misleading, Your Honor. The witness had not testified that
she has seen Antonio Magana waiting for somebody.
A: Yes, sir.
260
FISCAL VILLAFUERTE: Q: Where?

I did not mention any name. A: The place where I saw him on January 14, 1991, Antonio
Magana was quite near the place where we recovered the
body of Odette Sta. Maria.
COURT:

xxx xxx xxx


Witness may answer.

Q: And what did you notice at him when you glanced at him?
WITNESS:

A: I don't understand why he is acting uneasy.54


A: Yes, sir.

Motive was established by Lucia Sta. Maria who testified that her daughter told her one week
FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
prior to the incident that appellant would always look at her in a "bad way" whenever they met.
On direct examination she said:
Q: That place where you saw Antonio Magana in the early
morning of January 14, 1991, do you know how far is it from
Q: During the death, as a result of the death of Odette Sta.
the very place also where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was
Maria, did you have any suspect as to who could have done
found on the night of same day, at more or less 6:30?
this to your daughter?

WITNESS:
A: I am suspecting the accused Antonio Magana because one
week before she died, we met him.
A: I could not give a good estimate but it is only very near
were the cadaver was found.
Q: When you said you met Antonio Magana, what happened
then?
xxx xxx xxx
A: My daughter held my hand, and she was trembling all
Q: And in the place where you said Antonio Magana was over.
looking, was he looking in that direction where a resident at
the house where Odette Sta. Maria is residing will be coming
Q: What was your reaction when you noticed this to Odette?
from?

A: I asked her why she was behaving like that, she told me
A: Yes, sir.52
that Antonio Magana was staring at her in a bad way.

Vasquez on direct examination corroborates. He said:


Q: Did you ask your daughter how she had seen the accused
staring at her?
Q: Mr. Witness, what time did you return to Labo on January
14, 1991?
A: That everytime she went to school and back home, and
whenever she met Antonio Magana, she informed me that
A: About 6:10 in the morning. Antonio Magana stared bad at her.

Q: Did you check your watch? Q: In other words, Odette had that fear over the looks of
Antonio Magana?
A: Yes, sir.53
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In that early morning of January 14, do you recall if you
have seen Antonio Magana? Q: And when she told you that, what did you tell her, if any?

A: Yes, sir. A: I did not mind it, sir, I said it might be natural on his part.
261
Q: This incident happened a week before she died? At the risk of being repetitive, this Court enjoins trial judges to keep the foregoing in mind and
apply the correct penalty. We further caution them against lapsing into the same error.
A: Yes, sir.55
In the instant case, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death
penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. 2632 and
Taken together, these pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to convict the appellant of
R.A. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was
the crime charged, (a) there being more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed. So too, we delete the
inference is derived having been duly proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
award of liquidated damages inasmuch as there was pre-agreement on any such damages.
being such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 56 Considered as a whole, they
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion — that appellant
was the author of the crime. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with modifications the assailed Decision. We
uphold the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape with homicide and the order to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for her
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not
death, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages and ten thousand pesos
mean such a degree of proof, as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
(P10,000.00) as exemplary damages. We herewith modify the sentence imposed to reclusion
Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
perpetua.
unprejudiced mind.57 This was sufficiently established in the case at bar.

SO ORDERED.
Fifth Issue: Rape Despite Absence of Spermatozoa

The defense harps on the absence of spermatozoa during autopsy as proving that no rape was
committed.

The Court disagrees. It has been long settled that absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily
mean that rape was not committed; the slightest penetration of the female organ is
enough.58 The lacerations of the victim's hymen sufficiently established that sexual intercourse
took place. This is further corroborated by Lucia who saw the cadaver without underwear and
with skirt raised.

Again, we find the chain of circumstances unerringly leading to one solitary conclusion:
appellant was the perpetrator of this despicable crime.

Life Imprisonment Is Not Reclusion Perpetua

The Solicitor General points out the error of the trial court in equating reclusion perpetua with
life imprisonment when it sentenced the accused "to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced to imprisonment for life
(Reclusion
perpetua). . . . ."59 RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
This Court distinguished between the two penalties in its previous decisions. Recently,
in People vs.Lascuna,60 the Court noted that such distinction had been made as early as 1948
RESOLUTION
in People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil 167. In People vs. Baguio,61 the Court made the following
differentiations:
ANGELES, J.:
The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment
for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code but by special law. Reclusion Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the body of
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain allegations
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment which, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the
for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of
appear to have any definite extent or duration. sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was rendered by a court without
jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged.
262
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary at confinement. 7Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the
Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of his
(20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the military barracks sentence.
of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the
Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City
of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found
guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law, on
August 3, 1966.

Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we shall
proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the
petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction
of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.

The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with
which he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material and
essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the
court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has — jurisdiction to
try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —

Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes en


sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha de G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009
aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de pesos
plurales resultados.2 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, Appellant.
occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the
law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation 3 and abduction 4 may DECISION
be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention
where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the
libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be CARPIO MORALES, J.:
included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service
of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the conviction by the Regional Trial Court
place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Piñas City of Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping with rape
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be of AAA,2 a minor of six years.
validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue
committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 The Information filed against appellant, together with one "Eljoy Salonga," reads:
of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof,
one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from

263
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, - There are no ext. signs of application of any form of trauma4 (Emphasis supplied)
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and present whereabout is still
Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.
unknown, without legal authority or justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6) year old, minor, of her liberty, against
her will and consent, and the said detention lasted for eight (8) days, and while accused RENATO Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The
TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in custody of AAA and armed with a lower court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant’s plea, and despite
gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that appellant understood his plea and its
inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances against her will and consent thereby consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her physical and psychological development.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAA’s "detailed account of her ordeal is a
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 manifestation of her honesty and forthrightness,"5 convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of June 7,
2004 as follows:
Salonga’s "true identity and . . . whereabout[s]" were, as stated in the Information, unknown.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt by his voluntary and spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding Judge
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to
the law which is his duty to uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school, appellant, who was sitting by PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING
a tree in Las Piñas, pulled her aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they would go to with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible classes. Appellant
brought AAA, however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga and two unidentified
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty because the penalty
individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
imposable is single and indivisible and this is regardless of its presence. x x x

AAA was thereafter under appellant’s control and custody for eight days during which he abused her by
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity
inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
and an additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is automatically
awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x
AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her school to
inquire. As nobody knew her whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las Piñas City Police
SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Station. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant sitting by a tree at the same time that AAA
was on her way to school.
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty imposed. Per People v.
Mateo,7however, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of November 22, 2005
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A former co-worker of
for intermediate disposition.
appellant gave BBB an address in Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22, 2004 to the Imus
Police Station the disappearance of AAA.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification appellant’s conviction,
disposed as follows:
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas City
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban @ Natol @
Crime Laboratory, conducted an initial medico-legal examination which revealed the following
Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without
eligibility for parole and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil
Findings: indemnity; and (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

- Hymen: Deep fresh 3’ & 9’o’clock position Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)

- Vestibule congested SO ORDERED.8

Conclusion: By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
Supplemental Briefs if they so desired within thirty (30) days from notice. 9 In compliance, the parties
submitted their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs they had earlier filed would suffice.
- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity

264
In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an COURT
improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in People
v. Pastor.10
Arraign the accused in Tagalog.

The appeal is bereft of merit.


(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)

In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
COURT
conduct a ‘searching inquiry,’" nevertheless came up with the following guidelines:

What is his plea? He’s pleading guilty?


1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the COURT INTERPRETER
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
Yes, Your Honor.
quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and COURT
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment?
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
ACCUSED
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty
in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.
or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the
judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea Q Do you know how to read and write?
of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
A Yes, Your Honor.

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would Q What is your occupation?
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. A I’m a driver, Your Honor.

6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information.
latter. Did you plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without anyone forcing or intimidating you?

7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The A Yes, Your Honor.
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.11
Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and consequences if you
will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged?
There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as the
voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained,
as was done in the present case, the accused’s plea of guilt is sustained. Consider the following transcript A Yes, Your Honor.
of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken during appellant’s arraignment:
Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you fully your rights
ATTY. CABARDO under the Constitution before you plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?

Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor. A Yes, Your Honor.

265
Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information, this A Yes, Your Honor.
Court will immediately sentence you and confine you at the National Penitentiary?
COURT
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking the responsibilities and I hope that
Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you will plead Guilty to the you will be completely reformed.
Criminal Information?
ACCUSED
A No, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely and of your own
volition?
COURT

A Yes, Your Honor.


Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal
Information, I am directing the Prosecution to present evidence to determine the culpability of
Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you or the accused.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt when arraigned, there is
A No, Your Honor. no compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While the Court has
set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital offenses, which pleas had been the sole
basis of the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the accused
COURT
erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses legal significance for the simple
reason that the conviction is, independently of the plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the
Please speak louder. accused of the offense charged.

ACCUSED In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution
supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt13 of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 14 Thus in People v.
A No, Your Honor.
Larrañaga15 the Court held:

COURT Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called
a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1)
Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you, exert pressure on you so that robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping
you will plead Guilty as charged to the Criminal Information? with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267
A None, Your Honor. of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004, you kidnapped, penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the
detained one AAA, a six (6) year old minor against her will and consent? original; underscoring supplied)1avvphi1

A Yes, Your Honor. A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual confinement, restraint and rape of AAA
were proven.
Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you inserted your finger
inside the vagina of the said minor for several instances against her will? Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and immaturity being generally
badges of truth and sincerity,16 declared:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?
Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given to you by this Court, do
you still insist and reiterate your pleading Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged for A: He forced me, Your Honor.
Kidnapping with Multiple Rape?
266
Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did the accused do to Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?
you?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not true.
Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?
Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to go to Jollibee,
is that the understanding of the Court?
A: I told him that it was painful. 18

A: I did not want to, Your Honor.


AAA’s stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the measures he took in order to
recover her. And the initial medico-legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that AAA
Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused? suffered deep fresh lacerations in her hymen which are "compatible with recent loss of virginity."

A: Nothing, Your Honor. The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the presentation of AAA’s
certificate of live birth, hence, the death penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view, however, of
the enactment in the interim of Republic Act 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
Q: Did you cry?
the Philippines," the appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
Q: How did you cry? the award of civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and the award of moral
damages even without need of proof as it is presumed that the victim suffered moral injuries, 19 are both
increased from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000.
A: I was just crying, Your Honor.17

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals


xxxx is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil indemnity and moral damages
are increased from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your mother and father?
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
A: Yes, sir.
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,
Q: How many nights? vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
A: Eight (8) nights, sir. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN.
GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and at the club, where else CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
were you taken by Kuya Renato?
DECISION
A: At coastal mall, sir.
PERALTA, J.:
Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya Renato inserted his
penis in your vagina, do you recall that? For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, Section
1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence
A: Yes, sir. dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.

Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger? The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

A: His finger, sir. On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col.
Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to
Quarters1 containing the following:
xxxx
267
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters under holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United
guard pending investigation of your case.
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and exhibits
permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP. him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.

3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD
in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard. ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2 SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
allegedly committed by petitioner: knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN
OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed Forces
Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
[thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December
2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the transfer
deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank,
of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention
Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor
Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired from
vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate
military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650, 3 amending Sections
Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda
3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces
Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota
of the Philippines.
RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-
as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed Trial Report5 of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict and
Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred sentence:
[thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December
2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot
peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; 2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following findings. Finds
motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with you:
Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997
Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
Toyota RAV 4 dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military service United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty

268
On Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was
released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the votes
against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay
and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing
authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied) NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case of
People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
recommended action:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification
1 on Charge 1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands,
United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores
except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied
Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General Carlos Flores
Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on
Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably
discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the Eleven.
sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18
October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin,
sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence
in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.

4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National
Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. 11
hereto attached.

In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action: Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus,
alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the petition for
habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 13 dated November 15, 2011, but was
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.

A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses of
violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of
GROUNDS
AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the
Accused.
A.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE
being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President. RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the
attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT." B.

269
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED V.
AMENABLE TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY
OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON
THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
VI.
C.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE. 17
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND
FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due to
PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE the following:
OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR
WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF
SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 15 (A)

In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT,
grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT
WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or POSTULATES.
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
(B)
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following
counter-arguments:
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER
THE PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF
I. THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE
OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM
BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE
OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
(C)
II.
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE
OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS
HAD ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS
RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE
BEFORE THE SENTENCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT
SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO
HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE
PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.
"CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD JURISDICTION
III. WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19

THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to him,
TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of
408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
IV.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS thereto, to wit:
CASE.

270
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is complete, proceedings
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service of charges, — the military
law," whenever used in these articles: jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and
held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list of the
same; Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this citation, petitioners
do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in
their subsequent memorandum.23
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;

It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of
jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of
the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise
discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
subject to these articles;

10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is that
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the Philippines
ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to any offense
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516). committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service.

It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:
when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was
arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time
xxxx
petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule
that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person
Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not
al.,22 this Court ruled that: terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said commission by
reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services under
the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military status, but merely the
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that
accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-
an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for example) committed prior to the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does
terminated. Thus, the Court held:
not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)

The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the
retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of
proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al. 24 and Martin v. Ve r.25 However, this is
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz, 26 military jurisdiction over the officer who
reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the violation involved misappropriation of
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated: public funds committed while he was still in the active military service, while in Martin, 27 military
jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of military property. Both cited
cases centered on the nature of the offenses committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military
against the contention of the petitioners, viz. —
jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory
retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850, 28 as amended, thus:
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in
regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. -
previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National
court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively
applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the
tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if
271
otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under article 2 of the The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial
aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected to apply
their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the discipline of
situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court- military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions
martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared
408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial which tried it, was
National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid entity.
without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further,
that the President may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 31 this Court ruled that a court-martial case is
particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)
a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this
Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 17 32 of the 1935 Constitution
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or
petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:
sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five, General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted
confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is provisions of our Constitution.
carried into execution, namely:
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer; any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because,
in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence
restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the
extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may be carried into
subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American
execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;
Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).

(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold
lieutenant; and
that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is
that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder, "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of
mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as
into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the commanding provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military
general of the Army in the said field. Courts.

When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority no Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon
additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis supplied.) Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:

In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation
directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all,
his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him, the Office of and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it
the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of
OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law
service of his imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between
Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and
deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by
not provide for the same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of
as confirmed by the President in appropriate cases. justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)

On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic in the In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the present
case.
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same
authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it

272
differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the
the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty. finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of
which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double
jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been
committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies exercising authority in that territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammelled an
exercise of their powers.
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the
word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says: those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be
supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to
be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be
procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear
before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
Code.34In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is two (2) years of
character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore, absent any provision as to the application of a
must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial's decision, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of
petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Review, thus:
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles
of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to
in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement
the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year,
Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate. 35 (Emphasis supplied.)
shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."

The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:

In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F.
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award
damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper
function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to
Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.) become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for a
period of two (2) years is also approved.
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and
none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of his
166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year sentence
195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.) of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official
administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the military detention facility.1âwphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the
defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and that
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before said
51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
273
Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in Camp Crame, Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence
Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian authority on this matter. adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the whole or
any part of the sentence.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before the
expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall immediately Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by the
take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining unserved portion military authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and Disciplinary
thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 36 (Emphasis Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which the person under
supplied.) sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same power may be exercised by
superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by the President shall be remitted or
mitigated by any other authority, and no approved sentence of loss of files by an officer shall be remitted
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President, except as provided in Article 52.
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 37 It requires public bodies and institutions to When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the area
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the equal protection clause is to commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without commuting),
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any sentence which under
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly- those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same may be executed. (As amended
constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to by Republic Act No. 242).
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.40 It, however, does not require the universal application
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military personnel is a
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the law
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
(Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the deduction of the period
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an accused
(1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is
provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same
class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In the present case, petitioner
belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court finds
accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses the same to be without merit.
which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered that the No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of
provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature. cases.44However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether or not the right to the speedy
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander- disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of
in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War: (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.46

Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-martial In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by
shall be held to include: petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already been
decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities
without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President. The
(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of
records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was
guilty of a particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when,
promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action
in the opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a
to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of
finding of only the lesser degree of guilt;
Appeals,47 where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the
petitioner could not rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and case, since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.
The Court held, inter alia:
(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis
supplied.) In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in
1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC
of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the
parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving
Articles of War:
towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking
of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on

274
October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and
disposition.

xxxx

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy
disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he
would have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches − had the respondent
judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy
precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all
those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled,
the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution
took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to
be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial,
and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays
not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not
work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the
delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the
accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not
in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the
premises.48
G.R. No. 202124
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. 49 In fact, the delay in the confirmation of
his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the President, his sentence PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
cannot be served. vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the above
discussions.1âwphi1 DECISION

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to PERALTA, J.:
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 50 Thus, applying, the earlier G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did not commit any grave abuse of discretion Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question. Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-
G.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under
Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
SO ORDERED. Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

275
Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of
directed upward toward the left upper abdomen." the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces
which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men
as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Gunshot wound -
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa
amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy,
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to
protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.7
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters
which directly caused their instant death. were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older
daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. 8
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that
Contrary to law.2 he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case
against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter. 9
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged
with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows: On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony,
along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial
attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants,
thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in
the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and
children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify
Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of
the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the
was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, SO ORDERED.11
and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G,
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes reads:
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely,
Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet
wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
of ammunitions were used.6 reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002,
as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their
276
of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
A: Only one.
SO ORDERED.12
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
xxxx
issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively
discussed their positions before the CA.15 Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically
identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
xxxx

The appeal is unmeritorious.


Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings A: All of them.
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence
that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16 Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant having one firearm each?
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at
Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants
with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare A: Yes, sir.
after its walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light
in your house? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

Q: What kind of light was there? A: To the place where we were.

A: A gas lamp. Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time? A: I ordered my children to lie down.

A: In the middle of our house. Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

xxxx A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line
(sic) down face down)
Q: when did they fire a shot?
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
A: Less than five minutes, sir.

277
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house? committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim.
A: Yes, sir.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by
the use of firearms, the words uttered24during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

A: Yes, sir, they were hit.


In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly
stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto
x x x17 Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target,
not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have
died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime
two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
committed.25
Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary
as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is
the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children. that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An
examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As
ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the
is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The
perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle
killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court
children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly honesty and candor x x x.29
overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack
was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x 21 The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to
overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence
v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot
be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the
crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted
was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant
homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in
may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the
the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only
one offense.

278
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37
Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-
armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule
117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the
latter has not given provocation therefor.40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary
and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. 31 aggravating circumstance.

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed
7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
during trial. circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. 41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in
eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed
in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from
kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the
more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts
results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result of attempted murder.
in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a
series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in
committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which
complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of
itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. 42 This award stems from Article 100 of
their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G
and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

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(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered
by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that
there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant –
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies,
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to
in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 55
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling.
Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as
civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.44 The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to
be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one
on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the
been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x. offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code. 56
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered and The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires aggravating
allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order
plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense
of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." 49 that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of
the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively
determine the proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo
information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52
award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also,
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus: in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v.
Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a

280
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a
from sexual abuse. single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite the lack of any
aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
similar conduct. rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the 1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence64 sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary greater penalty shall be applied.
damages.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. 65 Under the
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,66 mutiny on the
high seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death: qualified piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain 4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
purpose;73kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; 74 robbery with violence according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death
results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article; 76 attempted or
frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;77 and Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the
carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty
on the following crimes: perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was of the penalties of the RPC.79
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped,
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua.
Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82
under Article 320, death results.
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,83 that the award of civil
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his
(1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the against chastity."84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was
police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, later increased to ₱100,000.00.85
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when
the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by
any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized
law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant
per se the award of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v.
suffered permanent physical mutilation.
Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single
indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:

281
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be
awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.1avvphi1 robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. 97
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic
ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in
of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x."91 the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:99
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there
being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of
as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present. property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic
aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending
himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when
several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and
alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be
moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs
regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance
but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of
the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code.
exemplary damages. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex
crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it
helps determine the penalty to be imposed.100
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC,
the following doctrines are noteworthy:
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed
93 due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more
moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in
₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite
Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
crime committed.
grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to
commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present
case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the
composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."95 crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true,
however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when
those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide
In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape
where there is more than one victim of rape.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is
crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no
such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those which
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated. are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the

282
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made
will of the perpetrator. atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler,
and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not
only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In summary:

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty
awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the consists of indivisible penalties:
circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and
moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If,
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be
of RA 9346:
awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral
damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the
stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the
crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is
₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except
the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special
complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages a. Frustrated:
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery
with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
robbery,103 which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of
the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, b. Attempted:
an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded
equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage. i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
information. 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award
of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages
may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the
exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

283
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated: 2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Frustrated: a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend
on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the
b. Attempted:
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00


1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:112
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction
with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the
prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above- Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with Homicide119 or
mentioned:
Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with
Homicide,123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death,
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00


284
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although
death did not occur.
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall likewise be
dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not
for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the
robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 for every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other
victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of
rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:


V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 of the offender,127 Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned: b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where
there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
a. Frustrated:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua. ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for b. Attempted:
a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 alleged in the Information,128 in addition to the above mentioned amounts
as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00
exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
285
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: 129 they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which
was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo
Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people
with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two
young daughters.
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the
same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
awarded: competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned.
Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real
participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: (1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses (2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in
the present circumstance warrants it.131 the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of
PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following
damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as (3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six
moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed
two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil
indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are (4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice,
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to
paid.132 immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against
Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of
appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in SO ORDERED.
his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family.
286
G.R. No. 176504 September 3, 2008

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the
Decision1 dated 27 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661 which affirmed the
Decision2 and the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, finding petitioner
Ferdinand A. Cruz (Ferdinand) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.

On 10 July 1997, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati City charging Ferdinand with
Qualified Theft. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 25th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then employed as Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. with office address
located at 3/F ENZO Bldg., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, herein represented by Juanito
M. Tan, Jr. and had access to the funds of the said corporation, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of said corporation, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P15,000.00
belonging to said Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-945. During the arraignment on 22 August 1997,
Ferdinand, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

287
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Juanito M. Tan, Jr., the General receipt of his reimbursements from the company. Since Ferdinand adamantly withheld the collected
Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. (Porta Phone) when the incident in question took place. He testified amount, Juanito issued a demand letter dated 7 November 1996, ordering the former to deliver the amount
that Ferdinand appropriated for himself the amount of P15,000.00, an amount which should have been to the company. Ferdinand answered, this time claiming that he had already remitted the amount to
remitted to the company; (2) Catherine Villamar (Catherine), the Credit and Collection Officer of Porta- Luningning. With this, Juanito issued a memorandum dated 8 November 1996, addressed to Luningning
Phone, who discovered that Ferdinand issued a receipt for P15,000.00 from Hemisphere-Leo Burnett asking her to explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00.
(Hemisphere), and who also testified that Ferdinand misappropriated the amount for his own benefit and, Luningning completely denied having received the amount from Ferdinand. Juanito then issued another
when she confronted him, said he had unpaid reimbursements from the company; (3) Luningning letter to Ferdinand to further explain his side in view of Luningning’s denial that she received the amount.
Morando, the accounting supervisor of Porta-Phone, corroborated the alleged fact that Ferdinand received In the letter, Juanito also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and computation of his claim for
the amount and did not turn over the same to the company; and (4) Wilson J. So, Chief Executive Officer reimbursements. With the conflicting claims of Luningning and Ferdinand, another meeting was set on 14
of Porta-Phone, who testified that meetings were held to demand from Ferdinand the subject sum of November 1996. In that meeting Luningning again denied having received the amount. Ferdinand did not
money. appear in the meeting. Later, a formal demand letter was issued to Ferdinand by Porta-Phone’s legal
counsel, which letter went unheeded. Several attempts to reach Ferdinand proved to be futile. This
prompted the company to file a criminal complaint against Ferdinand.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" - Official Receipt No. 2242,
the receipt in which Ferdinand acknowledged that he received the amount of P15,000.00 from
Hemisphere; Exhibit "B" - the Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 October 1996 attended by Wilson So, The defense alleged that the amount involved was already turned over to the company through
Juanito Tan, Luningning Morando and Ferdinand, wherein Wilson So asked Ferdinand the reason for the Luningning. To substantiate this, the defense presented Ferdinand as its only witness.
former’s refusal to remit the P15,000.00 to the company, and Ferdinand answered that there was no need
to turn over the said amount because he had outstanding reimbursements from the company in the amount
Ferdinand testified that on 25 October 1996, he delivered to Hemisphere several communication gadgets
of P8,518.08; Exhibit "C" - the Resignation Letter of Ferdinand; Exhibit "D" - the Inter-Office Demand
and received from the same the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit (the amount required by
Letter dated 7 November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand from Juanito M. Tan, Jr. requiring the former to
Porta-Phone from its lessor-client to answer for the damage that may befall the items leased) for the
return the amount of P15,000.00; Exhibit "E" - the Handwritten Explanation of Ferdinand dated 8
delivered items. Since he did not bring with him the official receipt of Porta-Phone, he merely
December 1996, that he remitted the amount to Luningning Morando; Exhibit "F"- Inter-Office
acknowledged having received the amount in an Acknowledgement Receipt issued by Hemisphere.
Memorandum dated 8 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan and addressed to Luningning Morando to
Considering that it was already late in the afternoon when he delivered the communication items,
explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00; Exhibit "G"- Inter-
Ferdinand brought the said amount home. The following day, he went to the company’s accounting
Office Memorandum prepared by Luningning Morando dated 9 November 1996, denying the allegation
supervisor, Luningning, to turn over to her the amount. Luningning received the money and instructed
that she received the amount of P15,000.00 from Ferdinand; Exhibit "H"- Inter-Office Memorandum dated
Ferdinand to fill up the details of the transaction in Official Receipt No. 2242. When Ferdinand asked
11 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan for Ferdinand to further explain his side in light of Luningning
Luningning to affix her signature to the official receipt to acknowledge that she received the amount, the
Morando’s denial that she received the amount. It also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and
latter declined and instead asked the former to affix his signature, since it was he who closed the deal.
computation of his claim for reimbursements; Exhibit "I"- Formal Demand Letter dated 25 November
1996, addressed to Ferdinand and issued by the legal counsel of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., asking the
former to return to the company the subject amount; Exhibit "J"- the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Later, on 28 October 1996, Catherine approached him and asked him to affix his signature to the triplicate
Juanito Tan against Ferdinand; Exhibit "K"- the Collection List dated 30 October 1996, showing that copy of Official Receipt No. 2242.
Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00, and the same was not turned over to
Catherine; Exhibit "L"- Reply-Affidavit dated 5 February 1997, executed by Juanito M. Tan, Jr.; Exhibit
Ferdinand admitted that he attended the meeting of 30 October 1996 with Juanito, Luningning and Wilson
"M"- the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of Juanito M. Tan, Jr. dated 21 February 1997.
So. He, however, claimed that the discussion centered on his entitlement to reimbursements from the
company. Thereupon, Wilson So got angry with him and asked him to resign, owing to his persistent claim
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 p.m. of 25 October 1996, in for reimbursement. After this, the company withheld his salary, prompting him to file a labor case against
the City of Makati, Ferdinand, who is a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone, a domestic corporation the same on 4 November 1996.
engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication equipment, went to the office of Porta-
Phone located on the third floor of Enzo Building, Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, and took hold of a pad of
On 30 June 2001, the RTC rendered a decision finding Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
official receipts from the desk of Catherine, Porta-Phone’s collection officer. With the pad of official
receipts in his hands, Ferdinand proceeded to his client, Hemisphere, and delivered articles of crime charged. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
communication equipment. Although he was not an authorized person to receive cash and issue receipts
for Porta-Phone, Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit for WHEREFORE, finding the accused FERDINAND A. CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
the aforesaid equipment. On 26 October 1996, Ferdinand went to Porta-Phone and returned the pad of crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and
receipts, but failed to deliver the cash he received from Hemisphere. On 28 October 1996, the next ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
working day, Catherine checked the booklet of official receipts and found that one of the official receipts ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
was missing. The green duplicate of the missing official receipt, however, showed that Ferdinand received FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS and to pay the costs.8
the amount of P15,000.00 from Hemisphere. Upon learning of Ferdinand’s receipt of the said amount,
Catherine confronted Ferdinand, who answered that he deposited the amount to his personal bank account.
Catherine then instructed Ferdinand to remit the amount the next day. 6 Catherine reported the incident to On 2 August 2001, Ferdinand filed a Motion for New Trial on two grounds: (1) absence of a preliminary
the accounting supervisor, Luningning Morando, who, in turn, reported the same to the General Manager, investigation for the crime of qualified theft; and (2) newly discovered evidence. Anent the first ground, it
Junito Tan. The following day, Ferdinand went to the office but did not deliver the amount to Catherine, must be noted that in the beginning, Ferdinand was being indicted for Estafa/Falsification of Private
reasoning that Porta-Phone still owed him unpaid reimbursements.7 This incident came to the knowledge Document. The prosecutor later found that the proper charge should be for Qualified Theft. Ferdinand
of Chief Executive Officer Wilson So. Thus, on 30 October 1996, Wilson So invited Ferdinand, Juanito argued that since his counter-affidavits were for the charge Estafa/Falsification of Private Document, he
and Luningning to a meeting. In the meeting, Wilson So demanded that Ferdinand return the collection. claimed that preliminary investigation for Qualified Theft was absent. With regard to the second ground,
Ferdinand refused to turn over the amount to the company. He would return the amount only upon his Ferdinand argued that newly discovered evidence, i.e., the testimony of a certain Marilen Viduya, could

288
change the judgment on the case. The RTC granted the motion based on the second ground, and set aside Besides, the prior clearance requirement before taking cognizance of complaints under the cited DOJ
its 30 June 2001 decision. circular is not applicable to the case of Ferdinand. The RTC found that the money claim which the Labor
Arbiter awarded to Ferdinand covered only his salary during the month of November 1996. It must be
noted that the crime attributed to Ferdinand was committed on 25 October 1996 before Ferdinand was
Marilen Viduya, a former employee of Hemisphere, testified that she asked Ferdinand to affix his signature
entitled to the money claim. In other words, the crime was first committed before the accrual of the money
to an acknowledgement receipt for the amount of P15,000.00, which was the refundable deposit of
claim. This being the case, it is not remote that it was Ferdinand who used the labor case, which he filed
Hemisphere for the equipment delivered, because Ferdinand did not bring with him the official receipt of
before the Labor Arbiter, to have leverage against the company in the criminal case.
Porta-Phone. She also averred that Luningning went to Hemisphere and conducted an inventory of the
delivered communication items. Luningning admitted to her that the P15,000.00 was already remitted to
Porta-Phone. It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that preliminary investigation on the charge of qualified theft was
not accorded him. The truth is, Ferdinand was able to answer the initial charge of estafa/falsification of
private documents through his counter-affidavits. Based on the same complaint affidavit and the same sets
In an Order9 dated 15 July 2003, the RTC declared that it did not find the testimony of Marilen Viduya
of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it proper to charge Ferdinand with
persuasive. It revived and reinstated its 30 June 2001 decision convicting Ferdinand of the crime charged.
qualified theft. Since the same allegations and evidence were proffered by the complainant in the qualified
theft, there is no need for Ferdinand to be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he
Dissatisfied, Ferdinand appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals. had already answered said allegations when he submitted counter-affidavits for the original indictment of
estafa/falsification of private documents.
The Court of Appeals, on 27 April 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC, thus:
The RTC correctly convicted Ferdinand of the crime of qualified theft.
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The 30 June 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 140, in Makati City, is hereby AFFIRMED.10 The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done
with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the
Ferdinand filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
person or force upon things.12 Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified when it is,
dated 4 October 2006. among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit:

Hence, the instant petition.


ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed x x x with grave abuse
Ferdinand contends that he was denied due process as his trial was pursued without prior clearance from of confidence x x x.
the Department of Labor pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 16 which allegedly states
that "clearance must be sought from the Ministry of Labor and /or the Office of the President before taking The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen thousand
cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding peso-collection from the company’s client. Although Ferdinand insists he remitted the amount personally
information of cases arising out of, or related to, a labor dispute." He avers that this circular is designed to
to Luningning, this claim is self-serving. If indeed he personally delivered the P15,000.00, he would have
avoid undue harassment that the employer may use to cow employees from pursuing money claims against at least required Luningning to acknowledge the receipt thereof before he parted with the same. The Court
the former. of Appeals incisively pointed out that it was implausible for Ferdinand to have acceded to executing an
acknowledgment receipt in favor of Hemisphere so as to give the latter protection from his company, and
He also argues that due process was not accorded since he was indicted for qualified theft, even as he was yet he did not ask for some kind of receipt when he allegedly turned over the money to Luningning. Quite
initially investigated for estafa/falsification of private documents. It must be noted that the original specious is Ferdinand’s argument that he would not have had in his possession a copy of Official Receipt
indictment was for estafa/falsification of private documents but later the prosecutor found it proper to No. 2242, had he not delivered the amount to Luningning. Ferdinand acquired the receipt, not because he
charge him with qualified theft. According to him although he was given the chance to file counter- remitted the amount, but because he took a sheet from a booklet of receipts containing Official Receipt
affidavits on the charge of estafa/falsification of private documents, he was not given the opportunity to number 2242 and issued the same to Hemisphere despite his lack of authority to do so, to maliciously
answer during the preliminary investigation of the crime of qualified theft. induce the client into believing that he would remit the amount to Porta-Phone.

Finally, Ferdinand maintains that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, absent evidence The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Ferdinand. When he received the same, he was
of the presence of the elements of the crime charged and given the weakness of the evidence proffered by obliged to turn it over to the company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his own benefit,
the prosecution. because the amount was a refundable deposit for the communication items leased out by Porta-Phone to
Hemisphere. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not his, the presence of the
element of unlawful taking is settled.
Ferdinand’s arguments are not meritorious.

Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of
preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.11 In the instant case, asportation.13 In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Ferdinand took the money was that he
Ferdinand did not present evidence that arraignment was forced upon him. On the contrary, he voluntarily intended to gain by it. In the meeting held on 30 October 1996, Ferdinand admitted having received the
pleaded to the charge and actively participated in the trial of the case. amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be released to him. Thus, in the
initial hearing of 23 September 1997, Ferdinand’s counsel made this declaration:

289
Court: By the way pañero, what is the defense of the accused? with the fact that [Juanito] was long been separted from Porta-Phone when he testified. In fact Porta-
Phone’s CEO did not even have kind words for [Juanito] when the former testified. x x x.16
xxxx
In sum, this Court, yields to the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, there being no compelling reason to veer away from the same. This is in line with the precept
Atty. Dizon: Denial your honor. Denial. While it is true that he did not return that P15,000.00 pesos, it is
stating that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
because the company owes the accused more than P20,000.00.14
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.17

In the course of his testimony, Ferdinand claimed that he had remitted the amount to Luningning. This
The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision
insistent claim for reimbursements by Ferdinand would in fact show that he had the intention to take the
mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as
subject money; hence, intent to gain is made more manifest.
maximum. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees
higher than that specified in Article 309. Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if the value of the thing
Ferdinand’s lack of authority to receive the amount is apparent, because he is not one of the collection stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
officers authorized to collect and receive payment, thus: minimum and medium periods. In this case, the amount stolen was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher
than prision mayor minimum and medium is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period
Atty. Salvador: You made mention of collectibles, who is authorized by the company to collect the to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
collectibles? months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the
maximum period of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days
Witness: My accounting group is the only group authorized to make collections for and on behalf of the to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. However, the
company. maximum period imposed by RTC should be increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days.

Atty. Salvador: Can you give the names of this accounting group that you have mentioned? WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 April 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661
finding Ferdinand A. Cruz GUILTY of the crime of Qualified Theft is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Ferdinand A. Cruz is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years
Witness: Yes sir, the group is composed of : Cathy Villamar; Dull Abular; and Evic Besa. and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Atty. Salvador: Is the accused part of the group?
SO ORDERED.
Witness: No sir.15
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone
consistently sought the return of the same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and in the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
various letters issued by the company. vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone, Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the refundable SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
deposit due to Porta-Phone and appropriate it for himself. He could not have taken the amount had he not
been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the taking was done with grave abuse of confidence. PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,
vs.
Ferdinand likewise assails the testimony of prosecution witness Juanito, who retracted his affidavit of HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants.
desistance in favor of the former and explained on the witness stand that he had agreed to execute the same
due to personal favors bestowed on him by Ferdinand. Ferdinand asserts that Juanito’s retraction should AQUINO, J.:
not be given credence. This contention is unconvincing. As aptly discussed by the Court of Appeals:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P.
[W]hile his desistance may cast doubt on his subsequent testimony, We are not unmindful that he was in Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an
fact grilled by the defense regarding his motives in revoking his earlier desistance and he remained employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial
steadfast in his testimony that [Ferdinand] was never authorized by Porta-Phone to collect payments and auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and
that during the meeting of 30 October 1996, [Ferdinand] refused to return the money. Rather than destroy bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
his credibility, the defense’s grilling regarding the reasons for his filing his earlier desistance even
strengthened the value of his testimony for he only executed the same because of some personal favors
from [Ferdinand]. And while [Ferdinand] suggests that subsequent revocation of his desistance in open The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR
court may be due this time to favors extended by Porta-Phone cannot be sustained when taken together SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two
officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.

290
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to (b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged
be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is not relevant
to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the
provincial government
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by
the provincial engineer.
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV)
No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias,
available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer. supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias,
chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signatures in the two
vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969,
reads:
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For and By
Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount
genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or
in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969,
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because,
This is signed by the auditor.
according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 was
issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the Exhibit B is his signature.
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable
as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those
voucher.
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods
sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
point which is disputed by him):
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on the
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in
full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
by Check No. .................................

Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of certain
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in
the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the following:
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81
for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the payment the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials
supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28
along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other
'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban
supporting papers.
bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:


(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60
for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z). bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).

291
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and
for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.
at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic.
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed
for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine
bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S). because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received
signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh.
vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting the said OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson).
vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
in evidence.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the through falsification in three docketed as follows:
lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the
provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February
to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.
28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870,
hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts.
11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of
The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the serial numbers of
P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and
the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the provincial government.
S), now L-33253.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the pro
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29,
treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial
1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm
in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial
treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of
Sendaydiego's brief). malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following
penalties:
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by
Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's (1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD). months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and
to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in
amount;
that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos.
11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand corner of the
said vouchers with the date 4/17/69. (2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in
the same amount; and
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial t r's
office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to
Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the latter's (3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
signature (Exh. WW). months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-
one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to
indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After
Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:

292
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the
personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a
cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of malversation through
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived falsification committed by negligence.
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in
Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings
the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate
case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on
action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability
July 29, 1970.
is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a board resolution
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
designating him as a private prosecutor.
manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors. The
67 SCRA 394). lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583). November 4, 1969.

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control and
money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The
lower court had issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the motion
(155 tsn).
assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the
names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or present together with the private prosecutor.
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to
Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the
Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased). criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised
Administrative Code).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto
the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have been the
result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is
not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the

293
three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather than The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments were
bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction. made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the
anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts
covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of
the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in
these cases because the crimes committed were not complex. Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner office
because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn).
Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion
of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the
that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or,
voucher (12-13 tsn).
specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or fraud and that
there must have been connivance between" the two.
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a crime
which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution show that he
provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of
had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.
the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because the
interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson) had
conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor, then
areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969). the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention because the
evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence against the auditor. For
that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred in
principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six
finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the
vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor
treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in
good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts covered
thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in. instructed by
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on
malversed was duly substantial.
payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.

Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier
disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that
was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial
he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as
court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial
proof of conspiracy.
chore of the cashier.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried
to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the
Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the
preliminary investigation.
signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was blank. The
treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's
residence certificate. Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact
that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted
him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had already prejudged
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been
their guilt.
unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by
means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to the treasurer because
it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary
prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson. investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause and after the
fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule assumes that the Judge,
who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the provincial
and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the
cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the assistant provincial We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would
treasurer. invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.

294
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it),
the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the
of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected
tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs.
the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs.
834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19
crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures. SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).

Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and
have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications
signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20). perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K,
stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the
parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O,
differences between the questioned and authentic signatures. P, Q, R and S).

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court
that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof. made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct.

The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego signed
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego
Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled. and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were
paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision,
Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government
shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and
horizontal strokes.
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he
evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in genuine
documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried Construction
Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six
KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970). vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends
that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts covered thereby were
not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when
(Exh. HH).
necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p.
224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of
Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's
never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).

And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers were
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers
written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to
be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction materials.
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor,
Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego
engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the
admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the
cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
total sum of P57,048.23.

295
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge
shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct. could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a
device to prevent detection of the malversation.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his
belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal
appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed impulse.
that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the
representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the said
amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of
malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the inexpugnable
fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices of the
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of the
provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and denied having received
forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.
from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and
committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an
KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105
honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil.
4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial
government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide or
features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake.
qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or
homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two than P5,000.
grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation is prision mayorminimum and medium.
are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde
52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187
and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer to reclusion temporal minimum.
made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as
laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts covered by the
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact,
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
no such work was done in the said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not
performed any labor.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime
because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification
and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished separately. In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying
circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties
were imposed. WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of
malversation.

296
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: SO ORDERED.

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years
of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.

For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349,
L-33252).

For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81,
and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).

For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
(13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,

For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen vs.
(13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is DAVIDE, JR., J.:
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to
eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad
Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her
van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province
of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
(17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information read:
vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
sum of P57,048.23. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being
then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
Samson should pay one-half of the costs. and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without
297
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE
the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage
amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its
xxx xxx xxx
owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF


That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said
PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
the same period of time. lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996
AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the
TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A
"quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE
sentencing her:
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the SOURCE.
complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V.
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4
AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE
WHERE THE COURT A
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise: QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A
PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight
TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS
physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the
STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT
penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of
OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL
reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p.
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO
718). 5
MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO
MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and THE RESPONDENT COURT TO
medical expenses (P5,000.00). PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN
SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE
PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM
No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to A SECONDARY SOURCE.
Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing
Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file
her brief. 6 B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF
a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision. RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus: PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A
SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE
PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT
298
ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional
MAY 24, 1996. Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and
slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure;
therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees
NOTWITHSTANDING THE with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the Appeals, 14which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to
ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless "complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need
ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor. for two separate informations.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had
there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to
crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v.
six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus: Garcia. 15

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive
damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident,
police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in
joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless
from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations
of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave were filed — one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for
felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime. damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits
that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule
information.
on Summary Procedure.

She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it
maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and
would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
not six months as imposed by the lower courts."

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:


On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two
months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's are light felonies.
criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised
Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash
that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
299
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in period which they may deem proper to apply.
question.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to
questioned for the first time on appeal. 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth
offenses in question.
paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already
prescribed.
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph
of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this
I. The Proper Penalty case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act
committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty. be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher
than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would
apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto
mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26
imposed.
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony —
not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised
Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
300
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be amount thereof."
applied in its maximum period.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus: physical injuries.

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had
The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to
absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not
constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of
People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it
has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable
damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized
police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal
another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure,
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not
day to 4 months.
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this
stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information,
to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of
slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash Makati.
before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or
more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him
the penalty for each of them. 29
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its
Quasi Offenses in Question.
minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled
as to actions pending before its enactment. 30
the running of the prescriptive period.

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
301
complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is
filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus,
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of
the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan
Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section
cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary vs.
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a DECISION
violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations ABAD, J.:
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for
constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
the information in the proper court.
The Facts and the Case
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and
the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.1
mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's
defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he
and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the
in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out.
He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside
SO ORDERED. his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds
on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially
fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

302
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-
that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino
pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in
to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head
killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by
with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able
clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly
to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. On
predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.4
September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the
whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means
incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in
that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending
heated argument with Arnel.
himself did not act with sufficient provocation.5

On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or
homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision
repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful
correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum
aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A
probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual
physical force or with a weapon.6
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction
for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone
The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of
testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No
evidence to support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness,
Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of
their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted Rufino and his companions.7
homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the aggressor.
remand of the case to the trial court.
Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The
witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the prosecution’s version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence. 8
Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the
probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal
homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in
from the judgment of conviction.
death as in fact it did not?

The Issues Presented


The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
The case essentially presents three issues: intent.9And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and
the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 10
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino
out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
homicide; and

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical
the trial court.
assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the
crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
The Court’s Rulings

303
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could not
categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?


Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.


A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that
day?
Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for
attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the
patient preferred to go home at that time.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not
the depth of the wound?
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp. mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e,
qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for
we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.13
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep,
they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to
testified:
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court
finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery? probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant
him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
A: Yes, Madam.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
Q: The injuries are slight? judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the
problem the contusion that occurred in the brain. If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
xxxx because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s
judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake? trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital? dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals16 that the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge
difference between Francisco and this case.
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and
then come back.

304
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be
defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as
prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not
come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No
one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation probationable.
on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by
his conviction."17
the trial court, subject to probation?

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31,
He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded
privilege.
for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He
SO ORDERED.
claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide,
which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to
bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation. G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the vs.
RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the
right to apply for probation.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served
by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state
his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed
criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.19 on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of
Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D.
shows no penitence. 1257 and P.D. 1990?

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to
convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How control his outburst and blurted —
can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit?
He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months. You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.

305
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely
maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after conviction,
upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and conditions and period
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal has been taken . . . . 5
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim.
Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
(l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date
of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties,
Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in
damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim. Case dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as he now argues before us
No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify. that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the
RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to
then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court
the Regional Trial Court.
precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to
qualify for probation." 7
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated in
his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing
his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words complained imposed.
of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing documents . . . as
well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words must have been
uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion
or obfuscation.2 First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included.
Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by
the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special
imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC became
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly,
final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the
warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 10 The Probation Law
MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No,
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives,
84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person
should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition on the
following grounds —
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision, offers any
of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation of the ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the
circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition. case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we
are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had asked
quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed to give the
court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error on the
matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the questioned . . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that appears
failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition (Santos v. Vda. to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal interpretation."
de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372). law" where the words of the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the
spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious, arbitrary,
clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true
despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's application for
legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are
probation . . . .
charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely

306
essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was
be given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms
from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be,
transcending the words of the legislature. added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be
determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are
distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather than a
more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.
"liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No.
The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined
probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it
and principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority projected
says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve
when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly
a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the
visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's
penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if
face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need
petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and
for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a
eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for
process made necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning
"each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four
which shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take
(4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this
different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was
Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will
probationable.
surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more
difficult to achieve:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the
assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge
demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of
words as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory
the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who
are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal
has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it
Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding
so difficult for the public to understand and know what the
who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the
law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable
offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals
not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
with the English language as found in statutes and contracts,
probation.
cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them
fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done
or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen
meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting, (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of mutilation
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years
of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more
some court for its interpretation and construction. perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation.

The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not have
of English is steadily attenuated. 12 availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes
him from applying for probation.
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken
solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the penalties
Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation shall be entertained or imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the Decision rendered
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the
Salvador, 13 we said — RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8)
months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation
Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be
construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
eligible for probation as the total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.
those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced. The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are only
four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is
quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not make
and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on
exception the court should not except.
each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed

307
penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply
reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who although already eligible does not at
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or once apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal.
incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC
should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of Appeals
merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus —
was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides,
the RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against him
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure
favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly
Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
(8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to
pay the costs. 16
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way
beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or absolved in was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months
any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the
conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding
have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —
judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the
penalties.
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in
point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the
totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
the defendant on probation . . . .

Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC,
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one who
but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the
had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for
RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was
probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner
already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is
was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D.
wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3)
No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed "within the period for
statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the
perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed, meaning
guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive identification by the witness for the
to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal
prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite
therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal from
the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently,
the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the
petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his positive identification
judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and
considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was their President and
was, in fact, up for actual execution before the application for probation was
General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further argued that
attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his application for probation
although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private
before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at
complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to
probation was filed too late.
petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of
private complainants. 19
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet be granted
even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence,
warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never
manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to
within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be
therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial

308
court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an
appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were
already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of
the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the
period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for
review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately
prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution
merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There being no
actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.

The Case

The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the
March 31, 1993 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.

In an Information2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo
Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel,3 pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision 4 reads as follows:5

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
309
Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary, When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew
[Muntinlupa]. the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the
group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to
Yvonne's home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed.6
to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave
otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never talked with the family.
The Facts
Evidence for the Defense
Evidence for the Prosecution
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief,8 dated December 10, 1993:
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows:7
The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant himself.
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M.
children of neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December 29,
1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2)
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter and companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished
nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] about the possession of a flashlight until the drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993).
glass got lost. Accused or "Boy" Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane what The house of Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne
happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home. came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left
behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for them, but because
it was already dark. She did not find them. She went back to the house of the accused. (Ibid.,
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused pp. 10-11).
immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder and
covered his [sic] mouth.
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that "at around 1:00
P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends,
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the
Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to
accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused never Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market
went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three proceeded near the
inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter
municipal hall and with some persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red
fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around Horse wine". (Decision, p. 3).
the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.

At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will buy. They were not able to buy
asked him where they were going and accused answered that they were going home. She told because the two stores where they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24,
him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's house is at
1993). He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the
Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. school premises which was about 20 meters away from the second store. They went out of the
Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he thought
his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home.
it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed
Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying. it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they met
several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the he was told that they [sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to
Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. Having met on their opposite direction, the guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He answered that
two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church it was Traya's child, (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was already crying
to see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking she already wanted to go home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne
back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group was being held by the women. They arrived at Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the
decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being child and told her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go away because the
overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)
they were overtaken.
The Trial Court's Ruling
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the
accused where they were bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion:9
something suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an
opposite direction to Binuangan.

310
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads except the
candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided. highway is preposterous.

All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically declared The Issues
that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court:10
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
I
Consider these facts.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated that witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.
II
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions
suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya
noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran
was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them, until they had
overtaken him.
III
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could not
ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer. The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no
motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she did
not smell liquor on the accused. In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal
characterization of the acts imputed to him.
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not able
to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought. The Court's Ruling

It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not
direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum. Accused did not kidnapping.
change course.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of credence
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging, because they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also used psychological
means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that
they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11,
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she
force prevented to go home to her parents. declared that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside their house when [the]
accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She
testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy. She
also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to the house
of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask money from Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a distance
Astorga for candy. of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993)
Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the accused after
chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and
incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction of
Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the person they met that he Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because she
was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared that they

311
were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance of half confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their help in guiding them home,
kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused was running fast.11 and

We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor details f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the
and collateral matters, like the examples cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity case at the Fiscal's Office.
or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken, their
credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the
differently.12 Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be
filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal
uniform to the last detail.
accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is
satisfactorily explained.19 In the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly contradicted victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
Yvonne's statement that the accused did not smell of liquor. This does not detract from the
credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,13 and her Aunt Glenda, then
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall,
twenty-seven years old,14 do not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their
because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which
perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the accused was drunk or not is an
they actually did.20 There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should react upon
insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the testimonies of these witnesses.
seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal reaction
of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men who
chased appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the contrary, such
Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not
discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were
negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used
unrehearsed.16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following them,
physical force and psychological means in restraining her.21 Despite her young age, Yvonne
he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila — a member
was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night.
of the group who chased appellant — that they were able to overtake appellant after chasing
him half a kilometer.17
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the
highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men actually
Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the
noticed and ultimately chased them.
alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following
points:18
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal. 22
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around
the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were already in the
highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they were met by a group Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
of youngster[s].
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused should
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to
were walking casually along the highway when he first saw them; support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more credible
and believable."23
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen or
noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along the highway if it The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive
was true that the accused was dragging her and she was continuously crying from becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some
her residence up to a distance of more than one kilometer; doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed,
motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.24 In this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a
admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;

Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?


d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of
intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be confused on
which way they should take in going home. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping —
the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general counters that deprivation
of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing People
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly rescued
vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall which was just near the
house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only

312
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument against A And while I was not answering the question he
this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her liberty without immediately grabbed me.
placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and punished in our
Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or
xxx xxx xxx
depriving her in any manner of her liberty.26

Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do


We agree with appellant's contention this time.
next?

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic]
my mouth.
1. That the offender is a private individual.
xxx xxx xxx
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty.
Q And after that what did he do next?

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.


A He brought me to the school.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is


Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name
present:
of the school?

5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
A Maco Central Elementary School.

6. That it committed simulating public authority; or


Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your
house?
7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or
A A little bit near.

8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.


Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?

The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup"
A Yes, sir.
(encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term
of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot
leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy
up.28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Astorga bring you?
Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as
provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code.29
A Inside the gate, sir.

A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence
of "locking up." Victim Yvonne Traya testified:30 Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you?

A We were going around the school?


Q And after that what happened next?

A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already xxx xxx xxx
bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo
Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir. Q Do you know why you were going around the school?

Q And after that? A Yes, sir.

Q Why, what did he do?

313
A We were going around and when he saw that there is no A I was crying, sir.
person in the gate we passed at that gate.
Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
Q And where did he go after passing that gate?
A Yes, I told him that we are going home.
A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
Q And what did Boy Astorga say?
xxx xxx xxx
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to
Q What about you, did you talk to him? make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be
lost on our way.
A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we
are going home and I told him that this is not the way to our Q And so, what did you do?
house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a
certain direction).
A I continued crying, sir.

Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when you
Q And after that, what happened?
said that is not the way because our house is towards
Binuangan. . .
A We continued walking and we met a person and he asked
Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you
know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what
place is Lupon-lupon going to? Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga?

A Yes, sir. A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy
Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to
say that this way is going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any
Q Where?
more.

A Going to my place.
Q What else did the man ask, if any?

Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that


A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the
place?
ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me
down because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after
A On the road going to Tagum. he urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more
because there is a ghost.
Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going?
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you
when he urinated, where did you run?
A To Binuangan.

A Towards Binuangan, sir.


Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said
that is not the place going to your house?
Q Towards the direction of your house?
A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my
shoulder and dragged me, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
you?
A Yes, sir.

314
Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Q After that, what happened next?
Astorga?
A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and
A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me he saw that persons were already chasing him and after that
that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] he carried me and ran.
not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming from the
vehicle.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move.
They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was
Q Now, what happened next? at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao.
At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan,
but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on,
A He placed a necklace on me, sir.
the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran,
but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
xxx xxx xxx
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which
A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was is the primary element of kidnapping.31 Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne
dragging me. against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however,
because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted
to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of
Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the
him? person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
A Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.
Q And what did he say? Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his
or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
[sic] the opposite. liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 32 When appellant forcibly dragged and
Q So, what happened next? slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no
justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of
persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. 33 Here,
my mouth and after a few steps he already carried me. Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to buy
candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home, but
appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will. While
xxx xxx xxx it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne, there is no
question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to
told him that I want to go home and he told me that we are consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victim's
heading towards home, but I told him that the way we are neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
going to is not the way to our house.
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the
Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud? latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People
vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by
the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case are those when
A Yes, sir. accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go when the victim asked
to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what was happening. This
Q So, what happened next? happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that
there were a good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed
at the gate, and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as
A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small
they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
315
child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty
that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that
brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim
had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the
inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance
of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was
consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts,
especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are
accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to
substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).

The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations
constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules
on Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof — When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included
in that which is proved. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law for
grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 35 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not DECISION
exceed one year. 36 However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He
has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37 PEREZ, J.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s
only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be
detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus
considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. That criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this
Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and
executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground
SO ORDERED. that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known
as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes."

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the
reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at
barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
316
[Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked the appellant what he did to
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child. AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him. 42 FFF
went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed
him.45
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only
five years old.7
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of
8 9 Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the defense admitted the
what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3
Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation
latter ignored his question.51Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to
of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my
knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt. 53
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of
the story.
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF
also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center. 55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar,
Evidence for the Prosecution M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito] 12 may be summarized Injuries seen are as follows:
in the following manner:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
FFF’s house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also,
appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the
incident.13 3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at the 4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and
appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area

At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF
was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita]. 15
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the store,
he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of 8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
them left the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while
appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or place." 20
Impression

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her
hand while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed
her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while HYMENAL LACERATIONS
her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.26 She
felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight
home crying.29 Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the
provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was without slippers.31 He found her pertinent portion of which reads:
face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked
for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black. 34 She had no underwear
on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA told him that appellant brought her from the P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no
store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
317
Evidence for the Defense WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed
upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at
the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was
actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. 61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was
sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from
revealed.63 death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF’s WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in
house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the
water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by
party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
[Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store to buy imprisonment.90
Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three (3)
minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .68
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday
party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to
store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant’s
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion
white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink to pay the costs.91
with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree
beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal.92 This
black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was wiggling.74 This
Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 93 Both parties
did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen
manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no
when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running
longer file any supplement.94
towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside
the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her. 81 The child did not answer.82
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that
RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed
more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at
with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization
conviction."96
(CVO) member admonished FFF.83

Our Ruling
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching the television along
with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short
pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came We sustain the judgment of conviction.
in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon
Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. 84
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-
entrenched principles:
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him,
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in the
evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter. 85 (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, 86 the dispositive portion of which reads: caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 97

318
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the A Yes.
accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining
physician.99
Q What was that?

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the
A His penis.
crime,100except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101
Q Where did he push his penis?
I
A To my vagina.
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the
absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the Q Was it painful?
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority.102
A Yes.

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the
insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the Q What was painful?
physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
A My vagina.
AAA testified:
Q Did you cry?
PROS. OMANDAM:
A Yes.103
xxxx
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped. When
he do to you? a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was
committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty. 105

A He mounted me.
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at
5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you? of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object
could have been an erect male organ.107
A Yes.
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively
established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?

II
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
crime are now in dispute.

A They were apart.


The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.109
Q Who pushed them apart?
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
A Hermie. assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him
during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and
AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

319
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA. xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie
had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were
watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called
Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by
"kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a
her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said. 120
sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted
to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not
equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.112 Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been
offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as
such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other."121
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to
observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the
realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored, defense of alibi cannot prosper.
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court: the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.122

xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and other location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and
corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime
real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s testimony that he was committed.123
confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."115
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it
alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony
all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony. of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and
returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout. 126
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he
gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he
store. was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in
the following manner:
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and
because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the second co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was
time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a
Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to the store. 119 stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire
afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the
appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters
away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way
statement that her husband was at work. inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as
if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia
recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save
his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering
the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take
Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the
thus, a short-sleeved shirt. farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could
have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s
house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. 130
she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita
at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:

320
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties
and place of the commission of the crime. provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion
perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
reasonable doubt.
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146

III
We differ.

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro,
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before
clarified:
it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. 133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty


Civil Liability

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
We have consistently ruled that:
age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the
appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. 134
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the
We determine discernment in this wise:
penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on
act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. 150 The respective awards of civil
circumstances afforded by the records in each case.136
indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper. 151

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount
shrewdness.138
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to
perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of
indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences
Suspension of Sentence
of his unlawful action.139

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. Thus:
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was
only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old 141 applies.
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; 142 and (2) the privileged mitigating suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. 143 pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

321
xxxx Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated
with the DSWD.
provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
156 appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia, overturning the ruling
in Gubaton. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is
others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
Republic Act No. 9344.
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the SO ORDERED.
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous
crime.157
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous
vs.
crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

DECISION
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection NACHURA, J.:
of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be
the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159 seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in
toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the
Law,which reflected the same position.160
The Facts

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions
thereof respectively state:
on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a Criminal Case No. 98-19083
child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about
What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. 6 years old, against her will.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164

322
Criminal Case No. 98-19084 whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The
following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house.
MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination.18
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will. Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was
molested.20Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson
(Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small
laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 9Thus, trial were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4
on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose. days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the
Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Version of the Prosecution
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
10 Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. Among her siblings CCC, BBB, petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. 23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to
members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and
However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed
three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
the two (2) instant cases.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and
Version of the Defense
son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for
two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. 13 During the
first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is the
and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations
second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left
around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and
inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA
tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal. or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in
the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and
feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of
December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house; 25 they were dancing and
AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and
was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at
the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene
the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; 26 petitioner
lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was
panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister; 27 BBB
penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw
was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other;
pubic hair on the base of his penis.16 petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at
about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the
kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28
their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping
motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the
reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17 incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her
siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter
fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where
ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing
matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB
sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such

323
statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to
verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with
a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance,
Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for I.
examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was
molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted
by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF
petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT
OF THE CASE.
MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek advice from the
Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay
away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But II.
almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for
laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist.
Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29 FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.

The RTC's Ruling III.

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT,
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RTC disposed of this case in this wise: RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as IV.
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET
its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES
for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996. 34
Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we
are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of
30
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal. 31 his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on
the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis.
However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the
The CA's Ruling alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications
that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently,
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense
of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a
that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established
that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of
not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the
instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the
covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC,
particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses. medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson
conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the
alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to

324
deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law
inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it under their custody.
was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by
MMM to fabricate these stories.35
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and
Court Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social
contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the
absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and
organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the
as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape provisions of the Probation Law.
could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine
that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who
directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not.
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
manifested in his covert acts.36
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
system to manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate
procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion,
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of
its implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the
Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and
pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed
strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as
the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A.
rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the
No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43
test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. 44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did
not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide: rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony
that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that
AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother
Title VIII
or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
Transitory Provisions
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's
psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents,
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed against young girls like
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her hymen is not required.46Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having
parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act. Those with full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall pudendum constitutes rape.47
likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime,
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus,
determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention
home.
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action,
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on
The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:

325
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts
(him) from criminal liability."
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the
bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
performing a criminal act.
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
50
In its Comment dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and
propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the
petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851of R.A. No. 9344 providing for RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO
recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such principle DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS
does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application. FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE
AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
We are not persuaded.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are
Act. ready.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be
accordance with this Act. exempt. It is quite confusing.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil Senator Santiago. That is correct.
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that.
That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. 52 sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be
incorporated in the amendment.
retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all
they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. released. Is that the understanding?

326
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . . Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President. Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the
instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment,
subject to style.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides,
address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera.
These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should
who will benefit from this measure. be given the benefit of the law.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment. Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President. Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
amendment is accepted.55 Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

xxxx The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose
and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary
rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute
xxxx when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
Senator Pimentel.
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of
the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest
xxxx manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain meaning of
would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein
provision that would make this law apply also to those who might already have been petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates
convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
they are juveniles.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before
67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer." So
that would be giving retroactive effect.

327
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil
liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner
and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof
other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our
children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major
concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the
Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997
the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the
problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug vs.
syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as couriers or IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.
foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into
custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or PADILLA, J.:
distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under
the new law. 60 Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 157, Metro Manila, in a complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a follows:
heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was
raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed with
Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and against her will.
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. 62
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime attributed to him.
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Thereafter, trial commenced with both prosecution and defendant presenting evidence consisting of
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand testimonies of witnesses and documentary exhibits.
Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following facts:
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC). . . . Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in Barangay
Sumilang Pasig, Metro Manila where she resides with her common-law husband and
SO ORDERED. their minor daughter, Maristel Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a
three-door apartment building, one unit of which was rented and occupied by
accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three children name [sic]
Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992
complainant's daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. "A")

328
and was in grade school. She often played with the accused's children in the vicinity Tadulan. It was during the taking of her statement before the police when Maristel
of their house and the apartment building. Cruz also revealed that Irvin Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992.
She stated that Irvin Tadulan had previously laid on top of her and first attempted to
have intercourse with her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not
In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, Maristel Cruz was playing
consummated because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis into her
with the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the latter's
vagina.
apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on the floor.
Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of Maristel Cruz and his own
pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private parts. Then In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the Pasig Police Station made a
he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her genitals. Maristel Cruz Request For The Medico Legal Examination of Maristel Cruz to the PC Crime
felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away from her and got up, but Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. "F") on the following day,
the latter poked a kitchen knife at her and told her to remain lying down; and April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For Examination (Exh. "G") which was
because of fear, Maristel Cruz lay [sic] down on the floor again. Irvin Tadulan signed by the mother, Estela Santos. A medico-legal officer of the PCCLS examined
placed himself on top of her once more, kissed and fondled her breasts as before, Maristel Cruz and then issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-0708-92 dated April 13,
and finally succeeded in inserting his penis into her sex organ. As he had intercourse 1992 (Exh. "C") finding her "hymen with deep, healed laceration at 4 o'clock", and
with Maristel Cruz, blood oozed out of her vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly with the conclusion that the "Subject is in non-virgin state physically". Thereafter,
thereafter, however, she heard her mother calling her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to the Pasig Police Station forwarded the sworn statements of Maristel Cruz and her
dress up quickly and ordered her to go home. mother, together with all the pertinent papers to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal where the said minor child and her mother signed the Complaint
for Rape (Exh. "D") against Irvin Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the
Upon reaching home, Maristel Cruz did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan
said accused in this case.2
had carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman saw the blood
stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first, Maristel Cruz refused to
talk when her mother asked her about the said blood stains, but when the mother On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and pardon. In support of his defense,
persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that Irvin Tadulan had sexual Tadulan testified that he could not have raped Maristel Cruz in his apartment unit in Sumilang, Pasig,
intercourse with her. The mother (Estela Santos) was shocked. She reported the Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his place of work at the
matter to her godson who immediately confronted Irvin Tadulan relative to what he Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila, where he was employed as a
had done to Maristel Cruz. At first, Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act mobile equipment operator. His testimony was corroborated by his supervisor at the plant who testified
imputed to him by the said girl, but he later on admitted that he had sexual that on 2 April 1992, Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the company plant during the first shift, from 6:00
intercourse with her. a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record (Exhibit "1"), said accused punched in
at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31 p.m.
Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip from
Cagayan de Oro City, and Estela Santos immediately informed her that her husband, Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of accused-appellant, testified that
Irvin Tadulan has raped her (Estela) daughter Maristel Cruz. Estela Santos further when she arrived at their apartment on 7 April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from Estela Santos
informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against the latter's husband and her daughter Maristel Cruz that the latter had been raped by her husband, that she again went to see
if they would vacate the apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with Estela Santos and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang
Estela Santos and told her that she had driven away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that kayo dito, kung and Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also testified that she asked Estela
she and her children be allowed to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos Santos if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she and their children would vacate the
thereafter noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and that pursuant to said agreement,
apartment unit every night despite the promise of his wife that she herself would call Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started packing their belongings and sent their
the police should he ever come back to the place. So, Estela Santos conferred with children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her mother.
her cousin, a lawyer, and later on made up her mind to file a criminal charge against
Irvin Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to the
Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her husband came home and upon
United States to fetch her mother who was ill due to a stroke.
learning that she had sent their children to the province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel. The
noise created by the quarrel was heard by Estela Santos who immediately called the police; and on that
On the night of April 11, 1992, Estela Santos heard a loud noise coming from the same night, Estela Santos and Maristel Cruz lodged a complaint for rape against accused Irvin Tadulan
apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to know that it was despite the previous understanding between Estela Santos and Adefa Tadulan that Estela would not take
Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the apartment action anymore against Irvin Tadulan.
unit occupied by him and his family. So, Estela Santos called up the police because
of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due to the quarrel that
Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion to Plead Guilty to Lesser
was then taking place between him and his wife. Responding policemen soon
Offense 3praying that accused be allowed to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336, Revised Penal
arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because Irvin Tadulan was denounced by
Code, denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been received from the
his wife for having rape [sic] the daughter of Estela Santos, the said police officers
complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the trial proceeded for the
brought Irvin Tadulan to the Pasig Police Station for questioning and also asked
reception of evidence for the defense.
Estela Santos and her daughter to follow them. So, that same evening, Estela Santos
and her daughter went to the Pasig Police Station where they gave their respective
sworn statements (Exhs. "B" & "E") and lodged their complaint against Irvin

329
After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court finding accused-appellant guilty who raped her and described in a clear and straightforward manner how she was
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear showing of ill motive that might
have impelled her to impute the heinous crime of rape against the said accused, there
is no reason to doubt the veracity of the declarations of the said victim in court; for
WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
as held in a case (People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), "it is hard to believe that a
CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN guilty
young unmarried woman would reveal that she was deflowered and allow the
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized by Article
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of
335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty
public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the person who wronged her."
of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law provides therefor.
Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that "alibi is unavailing as a
defense where there is positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime, most
Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended minor girl, specially, when the said identification is made by the victim of the rape herself in
Maristel Cruz in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), with the absence of any motive to implicate the assailant". (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA
interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the filing of the 176, and cases therein cited). Besides, it has been held time and time again, that for
complaint in this case until the same is fully paid. alibi to prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this
SO ORDERED. 4 case, however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so situated on April 2,
1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the Republic-Asahi Glass
In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial court: Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila — which is but a few
kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same municipality where the crime was
committed.
I

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused Irvin


THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when she arrived at
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE. their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she came to know from
both Estela Santos and her daughter, Maristel Cruz, that the latter has been raped by
II her husband; that she again met with Estela Santos and asked for forgiveness, and
that the said mother told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung
ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." The said wife also testified that she asked
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO Estela Santos if her husband could just leave first while she and their children could
THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and
ARE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST that pursuant to the said agreement Irvin Tadulan immediately left their house, after
SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR TRUTHFULNESS. which she also sent their children to Cagayan de Oro City in the company of her
mother and then started packing-up their belongings. She further testified that on the
III night of April 11, 1992, however, her husband came home and quarreled with her
upon knowing that she had sent their children to the province; that because of the
noise their quarrel created, Estela Santos called for the police; and that on that same
ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT IS night, Estela Santos and her daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin
CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT Tadulan, despite the previous understanding between her and Estela Santos that the
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY PARDONED BY latter would not anymore take any action against her husband.
COMPLAINANTS.

It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to Estela
IV Santos, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon the
representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her husband,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED- and her promise that if he would ever return to their apartment unit, she herself
APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.5 would call for the police; that she (Estela Santos) noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan
was still coming home to their apartment unit every night; that she was prompted to
call for police assistance because she saw Irvin Tadulan kicking the door of the
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses. apartment during a violent quarrel with his wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and
that because soon after policemen arrived at the place, Adefa Tadulan herself
In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the following findings and informed them that her husband has raped Maristel Cruz, she (Estela Santos) and her
conclusions to which we agree. said child proceeded with the filing of their complaint for rape against Irvin
Tadulan.

This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused Irvin
Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more convincing testimony of the From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of Estela
rape victim, Maristel Cruz, who positively identified the said accused as the one Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the representation of

330
the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her The same witness testified that he could not remember if a problem arose on that date when the crime was
promise that should he ever come back to their apartment unit she herself would call committed and that he was supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in different sections of the raw
for the police; but that the said representation turn [sic] out to be untrue, and the material department so that he had to go around each section.
promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every
night and, in fact, he and her [sic] wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on
We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo:
the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain
conditions which were not complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos
proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such . . . Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper as a
circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have been
expressly pardoned the said accused. physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA. 266) In this case, however, it is not
so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the Republic
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the
Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila — which
parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as
is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same municipality where the
an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case
crime was committed. 8
of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words:
"Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her behavior after she was
parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that "The allegedly raped by the accused in September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the accused on 2
express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the April 1992 when she was called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the victim was
latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be only a naive nine (9) year old child when the crime was committed on her. She considered the accused as a
accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360) friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore unsuspectingly went
near the accused when called by the latter.
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only
by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended minor, As we have stressed in a recent case —
Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial
desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused, constitutes
pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective . . . it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic
without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself. experience by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature
people. The range of emotion shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by
the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims. 9
In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused
Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him, and that the defenses of alibi
The victim Maristel was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly act inflicted
and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking in merit. 6
on her by the accused-appellant.

We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court on
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts imputed to Estela, the delay of seven
the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point
in the evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious error or irregularity (7) days from the date of her knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the authorities
that otherwise would alter the result of the case. 7 We find no such serious error or irregularity in the case the rape of her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps she would take
considering the delicate nature of the problem they were facing" (citing People v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA
at bar.
98; People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the rape is
not indicative of fabricated charges. 10
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it disregarded the defense of alibi despite
the overwhelming evidence that the accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. According to
the appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he (appellant) reported for work on Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by the victim Maristel
2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical area, and being the only driver at that time a problem would as her rapist. Maristel testified in a clear and straightforward manner that appellant through force and
intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
have ensued had he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant likewise faults the trial court
when it observed that there was no physical impossibility for him to be at Barangay Sumilang, Pasig where her. 11
the crime was committed because the court mainly focused its attention on the fact that Barangay
Pinagbuhatan is but a few kilometers away from Barangay Sumilang, both in Pasig, hence, appellant could As for the defense that Estela Santos, as the mother of the victim Maristel, expressly pardoned him, we
have returned to his place of work after committing the crime at the time and place it occurred. Accused sustain the trial court's finding which reads as follows.
argues that the distance between the two barangays was never an issue; that the question really is whether
or not appellant left or could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in barangay
Pinagbuhatan and gone home to barangay Sumilang in the morning of 2 April 1992. From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of Estela
Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the representation of
the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her husband, and her
We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused could not have left his work as this promise that should he ever come back to their apartment unit she herself would call
would have resulted in a big problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple for comfort. for the police; but that the said representation turned out to be untrue, and the

331
promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every
night and, in fact, he and her wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the
night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain
conditions which were not complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos
proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such
circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not
expressly pardoned the said accused.

Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the
parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as
an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case
of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words:
"Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the
parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that "The
express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the
latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be
accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000
by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended minor,
Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial
desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused, constitutes PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective vs.
without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself. 12 JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN
(10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 92186 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 157 of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the DECISION
indemnity for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence including the recent case of People v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. BUENA, J.:
97425, 24 September 1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie,"
SO ORDERED. appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No.
2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka
Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django,"
"Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the Municipality of
Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns, forcibly
took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja
and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672,
respectively.

332
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not "In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.
guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial
identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
"With cost de-oficio.

Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed
"SO ORDERED."1
companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person
who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Malto
complied. Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly committed by the
trial court:
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he
looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
the dead man.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347,
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have
place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990. or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were
Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:
identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.

"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998. 2
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he
told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only
seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm and he was a member 'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA
of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality. filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.

After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New 'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and
People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was participated in the following armed activities:
informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son
even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days
of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son 'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14
Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr. February 1986;

In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka 'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol,
Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar. Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;

When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to her son 'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol,
by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the Sorsogon in 1987;
waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan, Donsol,
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three
criminal cases filed against him.
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the following penalty:
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Antonio,
Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory provided by Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664
law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim.
Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, 'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio
said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted. Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal
333
Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for
Sorsogon; Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.

'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, "Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."4
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed
against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission,
requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.5
concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20
May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no
motion for reconsideration filed by any party.6
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the
recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17,
1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation No.
724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued
in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the "Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who
Commission by any party within said period.'"3 have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs,
whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the
following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection,
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, wrote the
or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition;
following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault;
indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca" other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms
and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of,
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of RESOLUTION
(desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition),
NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following
94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the
cases:
Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends."1âwphi1
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or
the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach,
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, the law of nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. 8
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the opportunity the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case

334
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article
36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.10

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose
N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N.
Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED unless he is
being detained for some other legal cause.
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision.
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
SO ORDERED. vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21
March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for
certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly
issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3)
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993,
the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson
on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's
personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his
services, he was

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate;
in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had
been falsified.

335
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the
were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution,
adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. 8 attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements
would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
consideration.28
Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a
letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced
checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed
January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State,
August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had
already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
The petition is meritorious.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the
Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not First on the technical issues.
the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with
petitioner.15
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially
complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He
the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16Petitioner filed a points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused
motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ, this time through then or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which
City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On are alleged are true and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, 32 as in the
8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21 instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there
withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ.
We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not
provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a
90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a
also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings grievous mistake.
referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's
office.
Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal
attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court
336
ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-
running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),
of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements
would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52 another special law, is
law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
pertinent provisions read: interrupts the prescriptive period.

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period. petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the
time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the
delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation
as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
offense is halted.40
investigating agencies.

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit
on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for
of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint
the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
signifies the
filing of the information against petitioner.

institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our declaration
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004
in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses
and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9
partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense. 46 Subsequently,
August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE
in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely
the information against the petitioner.
for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed No costs.
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
SO ORDERED.

337
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), represented by


ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, CONCERNED MEMBERS OF
THE PNB BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE
BARQUILLO, JR., LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and NORTHERN
COTABATO SUGAR INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Presidential Commission on Good Government1 (petitioner) filed the herein Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution2 dated May 21, 1999 of
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint
for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 3 against concerned members of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc.
(NOCOSII) officers, namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Jr., Loreto Solsona,
Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the Order4 dated July 23, 1999 which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory
all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued
thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the
Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is
undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by
high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the
338
borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its petition alleges that:
intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of Prescription
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan considering that:
transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee GOTTEN WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION
classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital 15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII
obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155%
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE
loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant
PREJUDICE OF THE BENEFICIARY;
site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue
of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the
public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up 3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING
capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its CRIMES AS THE STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY
obligation. OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of 4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED,
the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED;
the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: PRESCRIPTION;

xxx 6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE


"DISCOVERY RULE" SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of 7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident NATURE OF BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.8
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions. B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by the private respondents
of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and unrebutted
xxx evidence.9

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of prescription, in view of Presidential Ad
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),10 contends that its finding of
or will profit thereby. insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents deserves great weight and respect,
and must be accorded full weight and credit.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft
Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.

In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that:
dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the (a) the offense leveled against respondents has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause exists against
respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on respondents.
May 21, 1999.5
The petition is partly meritorious.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated
July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999. 7

339
Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office
ground of prescription. of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,17 or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing
of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation
of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,11 increased the On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable
prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years. cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 12 as
courts.18 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
amended, which provides:
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise.19 Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate20 and the courts will not
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that
courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.21
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1)
when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3)
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 where the Court held: when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with to quash on that ground has been denied,22 none apply here.
which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of
the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the same not be known' in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 does not mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the crime 'is not reasonably knowable' is
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 23 The exercise of power
is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must
only application.14
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.24
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto(2001),15 thus:
The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint, as approved by Ombudsman
Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions Order No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as behest.
were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct loans released by PNB
the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential but merely credit accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland Bank.
Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as noted that under PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions
amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted against the guilty imposed to NOCOSII was the execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and
person.16 molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a
year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total of P25,000,000.00. In addition
thereto, the stockholders of NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their present and

340
future shares to PNB while the accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant site
which was offered as collateral was estimated to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing
collaterals offered by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.

Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the required
clearances were submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the Office of the
President; and having complied with all the documentary requirements, NOCOSII became
entitled to the release of the loan.

Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its paid up capital
was only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to consider the other assets of
NOCOSII which also form part of its capital. x x x25

The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by the
evidence presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit G.R. No. 158131 August 8, 2007
accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London; secondly,
NOCOSII effectively came under government control since 1975 when PNB acquired a majority of the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
voting rights in NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit vs.
accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S. MARTEL, and SYSTEMS AND
sufficiently secured by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated ENCODING CORPORATION, respondents.
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock, representing 90% of
NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock, and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in favor of
PNB;26 (2) the Deed of Assignment dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of DECISION
sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North
Cotabato in favor of PNB;27 (3) the Joint and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the CARPIO, J.:
NOCOSII officers bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of
NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;28 (4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII
mortgaged various buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar Mill The Case
Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of PNB;29 and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with
Power of Attorney dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, This is a petition for review1 filed by the Social Security System (petitioner) of the Decision 2 dated 17
agricultural and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;30fourthly, PNB imposed other conditions, such as, October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The Decision of 17 October 2002
(1) the submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by affirmed the ruling of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing petitioner’s complaint against
NOCOSII of the required clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and/or respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other individuals3 for violation of Section 22(a) and
Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3) submission by NOCOSII of its milling (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161 (RA 1161), 4 as amended by Republic Act No.
contracts covering a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by NOCOSII of the 8282 (RA 8282),5 for non-remittance of contributions to petitioner. The 5 May 2003 Resolution denied
government permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further increase in NOCOSII's petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30,
1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all cash proceeds of NOCOSII's foreign loans the
disposition of which shall be subject to the bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its own The Facts
representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to
control all disbursements and receipts of funds of NOCOSII.31 Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel (respondent Martels) are directors of respondent Systems
and Encoding Corporation (SENCOR), an information technology firm, with respondent Jose V. Martel
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors. Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled
exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence corporation mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial benefits to private sector employees.
supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned. 32 SENCOR is covered by RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which requires employers like
SENCOR to remit monthly contributions to petitioner representing the share of the employer and its
employees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May
21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No
costs. In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office a complaint against respondent Martels
and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534) for SENCOR’s non-payment of contributions
amounting to P6,936,435.80 covering the period January 1991 to May 1997. To pay this amount,
SO ORDERED. respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a parcel of land in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26340 issued under respondent Martels’ name. Petitioner accepted the offer
"subject to the condition that x x x [respondent Martels] will x x x settle their obligation either by way
of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time x x x."6 Thus, petitioner withdrew

341
its complaint from the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office but reserved its right to revive the same "in the event Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal and with the Municipal Engineer of Laurel,
that no settlement is arrived at." Accordingly, the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L- Batangas. The approval of the said commission to build a 12-storey building had been complied
1534. with. This is not disputed by complainant. Access roads were acquired by respondents from
adjacent owners, ready to be titled in complainant’s name. Papers and permits like ecological
impact certification, site resurvey, soil test and site appraisal were secured from various offices
In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering, in lieu of the Tagaytay City
like the Municipality of Laurel, the Municipal Engineer, the Presidential Commission on
property, computer-related services. The record does not disclose petitioner’s response to this new offer
Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the
but on 7 December 2001, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office another complaint
Department of Agriculture, among others.
against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No. 00-L-7142) for SENCOR’s non-
remittance of contributions, this time from February 1991 to October 2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.
On the part of complainant, it equally shows [sic] adherence to the agreement to compromise.
Records show that on October 1999, one of its officers, Atty. Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino,
In their counter-affidavit, respondent Martels and their co-accused alleged that petitioner is estopped from
assistant vice-president, had expressed in writing his finding to the effect that "(they) are
holding them criminally liable since petitioner had accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay City
satisfied to see the lot that (respondents) have negotiated with Congressman Dumpit that
property as payment of SENCOR’s liability. Thus, according to the accused, the relationship between
(respondents) offered as access road to (respondents[’]) property" (Annex "8" of Petition for
SENCOR and petitioner was "converted" into an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship through novation.
Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En Pago Committee had been created by
complainant SSS precisely to set the mechanism of the settlement in motion. Further,
The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office respondents proposed an alternative mode of settlement through computer-related services,
which proposal was submitted to complainant as late as December 1, 2000.
In the Resolution of 28 February 2001, Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor Artemio Puti (Prosecutor Puti)
found probable cause to indict respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show that the parties had acted with an obvious intention to
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent Martels’ claim of compromise. Hence, respondents’ reliance on the doctrine of incipient criminal liability had
"negation" of criminal liability by novation, holding that (1) SENCOR’s criminal liability was already [sic] factual and legal bases. While the rule provides that novation does not extinguish criminal
"consummated" before respondent Martels offered to pay SENCOR’s liability and (2) the dacion en liability, this rule, however holds true only if a criminal information is already filed in court.
pago involving the Tagaytay City property did not materialize. Prosecutor Puti noted that respondent Before that bench mark point, the criminal liability is only at its incipient stage and the new
Martels did not dispute petitioner’s claim on SENCOR’s non-remittance of contributions.8 Accordingly, relation between the parties forged at such stage had the effect of negating the criminal liability
the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City the corresponding of the offender (People vs. Galsim, People vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x
Information against respondent Martels, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0517.
In fine, the compromise agreement between the parties whereby respondents’ obligation will be
Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ. settled through a "dacion en pago" and the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has
[sic] all the earmarks of novation negating respondents’ criminal liability. Ergo, complainant is
precluded from filing the present criminal complaint against respondents.9
The Ruling of the Department of Justice

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied its motion in the Resolution of 20 September 2001.
In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, the DOJ
granted respondent Martels’ appeal, set aside Prosecutor Puti’s Resolution of 28 February 2001, and
ordered the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The DOJ found that Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
respondent Martels and petitioner entered into a compromise agreement before the filing of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 01-0517 and that such "negated" any criminal liability on respondent
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Martels’ part. The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:

In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJ’s rulings and dismissed
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the dismissal of the first complaint docketed
petitioner’s petition. The appellate court deferred to the DOJ’s power to review rulings of prosecutors and
as I.S. No. 98-L-1534 constituted the compromise agreement between the parties whereby
held that in reversing Prosecutor Puti’s findings, the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion. 10
complainant SSS agreed to respondents’ mode of settling their liability through a "dacion en
pago". Consequently, the original relation between the parties was converted to that of an
ordinary creditor-debtor relationship thereby extinguishing the original obligation by a new Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion in the Resolution of 5 May
one. Complainant, therefore, cannot insist on the original trust it had with respondents existing 2003.
prior to the dismissal of the former complaint (I.S. No. 98-L-1534) by filling [sic] the present
complaint (I.S. No. 00-L-7142 now subject of this appeal). Incidentally, this Office considers
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJ’s rulings
the latter complaint as a mere refilling [sic] of the former already compromised and dismissed
because (1) respondent Martels were charged not with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in
[complaint], because of the similarity of the parties and causes of action.
relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law impressed with public interest; (2)
petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels’ criminal liability; and (3) novation serves only to
After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 and prior to the filing of the negate civil, but not criminal, liability.
complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142, respondents have exerted great effort towards
complying with the terms and conditions of the compromise by way of "dacion en pago". For
example, respondents cite their arrangement for ocular inspection of the Tagaytay land by the
342
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly applied the concept of novation as The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place, there is, between SENCOR and
they had settled SENCOR’s liability. Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of their Comment, petitioner, no original contract that can be replaced by a new contract changing the object or principal
they had already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCOR’s liability. condition of the original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third person in the
rights of the creditor. The original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law – RA
1161, as amended – which requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions to petitioner
In its Reply, petitioner contended that although respondent Martels attempted to pay SENCOR’s overdue
under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law further amending RA 1161 to give
contributions through dacion en pago, no payment took place, as evidenced by respondent Martels’
employers a chance to settle their overdue contributions to prevent prosecution, no amount of agreements
alternative offer to provide computer related services to petitioner instead of assigning the Tagaytay City
between petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent Martels) can change the nature of their
realty. On respondent Martels’ partial payment of SENCOR’s liability, petitioner contended that such does
relationship and the consequence of SENCOR’s non-payment of contributions.
not preclude the resolution of this petition.

The indispensability of a prior contractual relation between the complainant and the accused as requisite
The Issue
for the application of novation in criminal cases was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In that case, the
accused, who was charged with Qualified Theft, invoked People v. Nery to support his claim that the
The issue is whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution of respondent Martels for complainant’s acceptance of partial payment of the stolen funds before the filing of the Information with
violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. the trial court converted his liability into a civil obligation thus rendering baseless his prosecution. The
Court rejected this claim and held that unlike in Nery, there was, in that case, no prior "contractual
relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or altered by the parties," thus:
The Ruling of the Court

Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the contention that the acceptance by
We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition. complainant of payment converted the liability of the accused-appellant into a civil obligation
or else that it estopped said complainant from proceeding with the prosecution of the case, is
The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here misplaced and unwarranted.

Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of obligations, 11 takes place when the parties to [I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there was contractual relationship between
an existing contract execute a new contract which either changes the object or principal condition of the the parties that can be validly novated by the settlement of the obligation of the
original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or subrogates a third person in the rights of the offender. Whatever was said in that case, therefore, cannot be invoked in the present case
creditor.12 The effect is either to modify or extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive form, the new where no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or
obligation replaces the original, extinguishing the obligor’s obligations under the old contract.13 altered by the parties, is involved. There is here merely a taking of the complainant’s
property by one who never acquired juridical possession thereof, qualified by grave abuse
of confidence.21 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to criminal cases in People
v. Nery,14involving a case for Estafa. In that case, the Court observed that although novation is not one of
the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability,15 it may "prevent the rise Similarly, there is here merely an employer’s failure to pay its contributions to a government corporation
of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction," provided the as mandated by that corporation’s charter.
novation takes place before the filing of the Information with the trial court. We held:
Secondly, as Prosecutor Puti correctly noted, the agreement between petitioner and respondent Martels for
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in court the latter to pay SENCOR’s overdue contributions through the assignment to petitioner of a piece of realty
by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be converted by never materialized. Petitioner’s acceptance of respondent Martels’ offer was subject to a suspensive
the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in condition that "x x x [private] respondents will x x x settle their obligation either by way of dacion en
estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time x x x." This condition was not met because three
the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution years after respondent Martels’ offer, petitioner did not receive any payment. In fact, respondent Jose
of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an Martel, at that point, changed the terms of the supposed settlement by offering computer-related services
offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it x x x. instead of assigning the Tagaytay City realty. In their Comment to the petition, respondent Martels
explained that they made such alternative offer because "the processing of the papers for the Tagaytay
property met with some delay."22 In short, respondent Martels failed to make good on their promise in
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the 1998 to settle SENCOR’s liability through dacion en pago. The circumstances the DOJ cited as proof of
Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation the compromise agreement’s alleged implementation were nothing but steps preparatory to the actual
may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true payment of SENCOR’s overdue contributions.
nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would
not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit,
or other similar disguise is resorted to x x x.16(Emphasis supplied) In sum, we hold that any payment respondent Martels would have made to petitioner (and it appears that
pending this petition, respondent Martels partially paid SENCOR’s liability) only affects their civil, if any,
but not their criminal liability for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA
Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an underlying contract initially 1161, as amended. As noted in the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s
defined the relation of the parties such as the contract in sale on commission in Estafa cases 17 or the Office, respondent Martels do not dispute SENCOR’s non-remittance of contributions from February 1991
contract in sale of goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 18 Further, the party invoking
novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect. 19
343
to October 2000. Thus, the existence of probable cause against respondent Martels, SENCOR’s
directors,23 is beyond doubt.

Prosecutors’ Findings Not Conclusive

In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals held:

[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or
not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to the
Department of Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.

In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public Prosecutor by determining
whether probable cause exists or not. Such is a function that this Court should not be called
upon to perform x x x.24

This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review
findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.25 Although policy considerations call for the widest
latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s findings,26 courts should never shirk from exercising their power, G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts,
or as in this case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary, BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and vs.
controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Court’s review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL
criminals are prosecuted27 and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution. 28 COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 17 October 2002 and RESOLUTION
Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28
February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

SO ORDERED.
For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 1 assailing the Decision dated September 23,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were
previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the
presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–
04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted

344
the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. – An
interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)10 of this Rule.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double
docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same facts.
considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that:
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioner’s
charged have already prescribed. subsequent prosecution. x x x.12

Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary investigation Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases was not
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution 5 dated February 10, 2004 which investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which have already been
reads: dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:

Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping.
It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time
of filing a case.
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41,
entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et
al.)" promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the informations in reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were
these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that the herein informations assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13
may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the
said Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these cases are
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred preliminary
considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the archives.
investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared
therein that:
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan6 where
petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the
which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor
reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in
Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.7 In
G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the
annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioner’s
right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our
in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was found directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording
inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the petitioner his right to due process.15
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of whether
and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.8
this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we
have said in the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Quash and directed the against the petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to
dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an unauthorized determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We reconsider our stance and shall rule
party, hence void. in the affirmative.

In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus: Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move
to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal

345
liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well or as:
invoke the defense of prescription.
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have prescribed? the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that: and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)25
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21 thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of
Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto26 this Court
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of already took note that:
Foreign Affairs.
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that: aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg.
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable
Committee on Behest Loans.27
under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15)
years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply
in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented
6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23 the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.

Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall We disagree.
prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the
Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the
computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
3326 provides:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation,
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.28
jeopardy.

The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the
the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989
running of the prescriptive period as follows:
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file
his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment"
may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until."
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when proceedings are
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner
to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;"

346
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or grave He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority Opinion and argues
abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its that –
competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner’s cases in the Sandiganbayan to
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the
take"31declared invalid –
simple expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire
legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably
of said offenses.32
tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State’s ability
to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed with the should not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority
by the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus: opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.

Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by conducting With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis
for criminal proceedings.34
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case
Dissenting Opinion that –
of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the
Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could
Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve
not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of
Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged against the in Jao Yu v. People.
petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April
27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws,
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of prescription should not run when
by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a
the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –


In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless the Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced
latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences provided
returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple
violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies the special law.
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v.
Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal Code to
cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of
define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers
Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although it referred to the same
in Jao Yu v. People.
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
347
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the accused According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act No.
from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No.
3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the accused is
absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No. 3326.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early as
December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code". This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws,
was categorical in ruling that – however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article
10 of the RPC.
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code
for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term "special laws"
applies. mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the
Philippines. Thus –
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 of
period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It is
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as
that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification of
alterius. To elaborate, - that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made
punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the
provisions of said code.43
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the same result
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground for the
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must
expressly mentioned.41 prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal
Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary.
Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a ground for the
general ones.
interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act
No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the legislature made its
intention clear and was thus categorical that – The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling that the absence of the
accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however,
is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – All violations of any
beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained –
provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty persons judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
jeopardy. legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. 44

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of the
(Emphasis supplied) accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or
extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed vis-à-vis the

348
applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act
aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People
prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused is abroad. v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases,
as follows:
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense;
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally provides the
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his
authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine
immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that
still relevant case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind and the
statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
nature of prescription of penal offenses –
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. 47
suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not
construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either party.
interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged
Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary
offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on
presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is
May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985
granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is
not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring
that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal
at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute
are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan
the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal
to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these
Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-
views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be
prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They SO ORDERED.
are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the
State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be implied
nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and expressly
sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused.

The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The exceptions to
the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily
implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may only be tolled for reasons
explicitly provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said

349
G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section 38 in relation to Section
39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of illegal
recruitment was set out in the information in the following terms:

That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused well knowing
that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency (POEA) to
engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto
Maunahan, Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz and Marcelino Desepida as workers
abroad exacted and actually received money from the above-named victims, to their
damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law. 1

The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimony of the following witnesses:
Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies were
summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:

. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused to his
house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was recruiting
workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic) him. Accused
likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct.
1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his birth certificate, an NBI clearance
and medical certificate. He was able to secure an NBI clearance which he showed to
the accused. The latter thereafter told him that he would secure the rest of his papers
like passport, visa and medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to
prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he mortgaged his

350
lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority
gave this amount to the accused who assured him that he would be able to leave form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special
within two months. The accused did not issue a receipt for that amount despite his law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor Code provides, in
request. He did not persist in asking the accused because he trusted him, accused relevant part, that:
coming from an affluent family and a member of a well-known Catholic
organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued
to employ him at Saudi Arabia within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
do so. Thus, he demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he
decided, together with the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused
before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). . . . xxx xxx xxx

Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified to The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of computation of the three-year
the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the house of accused for prescriptive period it established.
work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he was recruiting workers for the
Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to process their papers. Alcaraz was able to
give the accused on 22 February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the accused The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to
failed to issue him a receipt and he did not persist in asking for it because he trusted Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give the accused Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the
on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
did not issue a receipt although he promised to issue one the next day. However, the
following day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying that Section 2: . . .
he (Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused
P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26
Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt despite demand. xxx xxx xxx
She was told by the accused to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to
return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
with the POEA against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
"A"). 2 institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation that he had recruited Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules for determining the beginning
complainants for overseas employment. He also denied that he had received any monies in consideration of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the commission of the violation, if such commission be known;
of promised employment. However, he acknowledged that his house had served as a meeting place for a and (b) if the commission of the violation was not known at the time, then from discovery thereof and
certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who had promised complainants, institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. Appellant Duque contends that the
work abroad. prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced from the time money in consideration of promises for
overseas employment was parted with by complainants. Duque thus contends that the prescriptive period
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of appellant Duque as the person they began to run sometime in January 1986. The information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial
had talked to for placement abroad, the person who had collected fees from them and who had received Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. Duque concludes that the
information from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad, the trial court concluded that offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed by May 1990.
accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising placement and inducing private complainants to
part with their money. The prosecution also submitted a certification from the licensing branch of the We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as follows:
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that no records existed whatsoever of a
grant to the accused of a license or authority to recruit for overseas employment. The dispositive part of the
decision reads: Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, [of] under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
Labor Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended parties: Agustin (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
Ulat the amount of P20,000.00; Marcelino Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
Norma Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz the amount of accordance with Article 39 hereof.
P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of prescription of the criminal offense for three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
which he was convicted. carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under

351
the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-license or non- either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may
holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute be read as:
a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of
job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied) or as:

It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a) recruitment activities as listed Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and (b) the lack of the necessary license or authority from the the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
POEA to engage in such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment is not in itself necessarily and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit that renders such recruitment activities (Emphasis supplied)
unlawful and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit or authority, while certainly known to appellant
Duque back in January 1986, was not known to private complainants at that time. Indeed, private
complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such authority or permit only when they went to the We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from the time
offices of the POEA for the purpose of filing a claim for return of the money they had delivered to the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to
appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the complainants were entitled to assume the have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The discovery by the
complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in character and occurred
appellant Duque was acting in good faith when he presented himself as a recruiter for overseas placement.
Even if it be assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person seeking overseas sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA with the complaint for recovery of
employment ought to check the authority or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to speak for a the placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that
complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that Duque had operated as a recruiter
recruitment or placement agency, the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the
prescriptive period. In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral without the essential government license or authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had
or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and
when the information was filed in court in May 1990.
the special law is not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by giving supplemental effect to provisions of
the Revised Penal Code in the application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the Revised
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal reading of Section 2
appears to suggest that two (2) elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the prescriptive Penal Code reads as follows:
period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special law; and second,
the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is then argued by appellant Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription
that because the co-existence of these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run. offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the POEA and the
complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money therefor, i.e., that Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think
there is any real need for such a literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for
preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks the interruption of the period of prescription. Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the offense of illegal recruitment
Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the began to run on the date of discovery thereof by the private complainants and the authorities concerned
same occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun, (POEA) sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990 when the affidavit-sworn
having been rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990 when the
for prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and constitutes an act of grace criminal information was filed in court by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more, the
by which the State, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute appellant's defense of prescription must fail.
the criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of
the offender. 5 The applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes must be Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life imprisonment is properly imposable
construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to give a where the illegal recruitment is committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three (3) or
sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, 7 departing to more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar, private complainants are more than three (3)

352
in number. Moreover, appellant Duque had represented to the public at large, including private
complainants, that he was a licensed
recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the private complainants to see him in
his house. 12 There, complainants were "briefed" as to the requirements for overseas employment before
their supposed departure and were each required to secure a clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation. 13Considerable sums were collected from each of the complainants supposedly to "facilitate"
the processing of passports, medical certificates and other working papers. 14 Complainants were, in
addition, shown documents which purported to be job placement orders. This organized modus
operandi was repeated in respect of each of the complainants and presumably in respect of other persons
who were similarly victimized by appellant. There is no question that the recruitment activities of Duque
were organized and "large scale" in nature. 15

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013
the solemodification that the penalty properly imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment and
not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SO ORDERED. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the Philippines v. Gary
Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, " finding accused-appellants
Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as
principal and accomplice, respectively.

On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed against
accused-appellants.

On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5 Trial
on the merits ensued.

The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were
causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At
around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street.
Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong
pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from
Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and
Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to
the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.6

The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab
wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal
wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the lower lobe of
the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:

CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.

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The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses in As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond
connection with the death and burial of Alfante: reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven. 17 On March 30,
2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the Decision of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
a) ₱17,000.00 for the coffin

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court
b) ₱3,000.00 for the nicho
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with

c) ₱250.00 for the mass


MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs of the
victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:
d) ₱15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and
a. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
e) ₱16,000.00 for the burial lot.
b. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning ₱500.00 a day. 9
c. ₱51,250.00 as actual damages.18
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10, 2001, at
around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following
Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants’ confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections on
day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go to the 7-11 convenience
April 11, 2007.20
store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to stab him. He was able
to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of the knife and, in the course of their The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.
struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his side for the duration of the
incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police station and was subsequently
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal stating that
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his right palm sustained during the
he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008, granted
tussle.11
the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is concerned. 23

Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination and
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara’s counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a
treatment of Vergara’s injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001. 12
Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing. 24

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC found
We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the award of
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
damages.
the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:

The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y
PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the mitigating following attendant circumstances:
circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court
hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis added.)
(14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay,
jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility
damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.25 People v. Clores26 reminds us that:
damages, plus costs (sic).13
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that
Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court. 14 The appeal (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing
was accepted by this Court in its Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred to that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16 that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial
Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is
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telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.) to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33

The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the
firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a victim’s shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would befall
better position to decide the question of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is far detached from the him. The number and severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered
details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his arm to ward off
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its limitations and acknowledges the the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that the qualifying
advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference. circumstance of treachery is present in the commission of the crime.

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that accused- Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of
appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that it had reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of voluntary
overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC, as affirmed
have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated that: by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.34
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by [appellant
Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for death
and left forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is an overwhelming evidence, and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.
and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and self-defense. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily fail. 28 (Citation omitted.)
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 35
Anent accused-appellant Vergara’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be
proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial court,
to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
actual damages in the amount of ₱51,250.00 based on the receipts36 they submitted to the trial
resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all
court.1âwphi1
the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.30 We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC’s award respecting the indemnity for
the loss of earning capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be duly
injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s
life."31
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the witnesses, current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no
the victim’s actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less
accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk when than the minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any untoward action from him to
warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara’s hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary
evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his
The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants into a common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions mentioned in the
fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim in above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:
actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime, must be
It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused- proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured
appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense. party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support the contention of the
common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning ₱500.00 a day. Hence, this
Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-wife of the victim which lacks
We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara
specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings.38 (Citation omitted.)
constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon,
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as follows:
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Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense
for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 39(Emphasis omitted.)

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence. 40

We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence. 41

Lastly, we sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 even in the absence of
proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs.42 As borne out by human nature and G.R. No. 175781 March 20, 2012
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victim’s family.43 While no amount of damages may totally compensate the sudden and tragic loss PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at least assuage them. vs.
FRANCISCA TALARO,* GREGORIO TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages RAMOS, RODOLFO DUZON,*** RAYMUNDO ZAMORA** and LOLITO AQUINO, Accused.
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 44 NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO AQUINO, Accused-Appellants.

WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is DECISION
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant PERALTA, J.:
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of ₱51 ,250.00 as actual damages,
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o per annum from date of finality of This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December, 15,
this Decision until fully paid. 2005, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court.
The CA affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos and
No pronouncement as to costs. Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to death, but
acquitting accused Rodolfo Duzon.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants were charged before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with the crime of murder
under an Information reading as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Laoac, Province of
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery, and evident premeditation, in
consideration of a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO, with a handgun hitting the latter in the different parts
of his body and the wounds being mortal caused directly the death of said MELVIN ALIPIO, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.2

The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events shortly before and after the killing
of victim Melvin Alipio to be as follows.

Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca Talaro. In the morning of
April 24, 1994, when Zamora went home for breakfast after driving his tricycle, he found Francisca
Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato "Atong" Ramos, and Norberto "Jun" Adviento conversing among
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themselves under a santol tree in front of his (Zamora's) house. He went near the group to find out what Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was confined at the clinic, was sitting at a bench in the
they were talking about and he learned that his aunt, Francisca Talaro, was transacting with the other three garage of the clinic on the morning of April 26, 1994. Two other women who were looking for Atty.
accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. Melvin Alipio. He was merely a meter away from the group so Alipio also sat at the bench with him after he told them that Atty. Alipio was still having his breakfast.
he heard the group's conversation. He learned that Francisca Talaro would give the three accused- After a few minutes, a man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and also sat at the bench. Thereafter, Atty.
appellants an advance payment of ₱30,000.00 and then another ₱30,000.00 after Atty. Melvin Alipio is Alipio came out to the garage and talked to the two women. When Atty. Alipio finished talking to them,
killed, with said last payment to be delivered in Barangay (Brgy.) Bactad. The three accused-appellants the man sitting with them on the bench suddenly stood up and shot Atty. Alipio three times. Atty. Alipio
then nodded their heads in agreement. After learning of the group's plan, Zamora got scared and stayed was merely one meter away from the assailant when the latter shot him. After the shooting, the assailant
away from the group, but three days after that meeting in front of his house, he was asked by Francisca walked away. Hidalgo then saw the helper at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but the latter
Talaro to drive her and her husband Gregorio to Brgy. Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place had whistled to his companion who was waiting on his motorcycle and the two were able to speed away
in Brgy. Bactad, while Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely waited for them. He assumed that the aboard said vehicle. Hidalgo identified the assailant from a picture7 shown to him.8 The picture was that of
couple delivered the payment of ₱30,000.00 to someone in Brgy. Bactad.3 Renato Ramos.9

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary investigation, admitted that he and A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been killed, Zamora was in the parking lot in Sta. Maria Norte
co-accused Renato Ramos conducted a surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon of April 25, 1994. 4 in Binalonan, when accused-appellant Aquino approached him and told him to remind Francisca Talaro
that she still has to pay him (Aquino) ₱10,000.00. Zamora then immediately told his uncle Gregorio Talaro
about Aquino's message and the very next day, Gregorio went to Zamora's house with the ₱10,000.00.
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Duzon was at the parking area
Gregorio could no longer wait for Aquino so he just left the money with Zamora, instructing him to hand it
in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for passengers, when accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached
over to Aquino when the latter arrives. Later that day, Zamora saw Aquino so he told him (Aquino) to just
him. Accused-appellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon ₱200.00 for the latter to drive Ramos'
get the money from his house. About three weeks later, Aquino again went to Zamora's house, this time
motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after bringing
saying he needs another ₱5,000.00 just in case he needs to escape. Zamora then contacted Francisca Talaro
his own tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos' motorcycle to
and conveyed Aquino's message to her. The following day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left
the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos bought a basket where he placed the onions and
the ₱3,000.00 for Aquino. That afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino to just pick up the money from his
turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia Street in
house. Zamora observed that Aquino seemed happy enough with the ₱3,000.00 he received. 10
Urdaneta. At a house along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon
later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that after coming from
Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on Garcia Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the latter was not able to comply
Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a gas station where they fueled up. Ramos alighted from the with his contractual obligations to the Talaros to complete the construction of a building. Dr. Lina Alipio,
motorcycle at the gas station and, taking along the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian the wife of the victim Atty. Melvin Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the victim entered into an agreement
Angel Hospital (the clinic owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted, Duzon heard three with Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for the construction of a building, but the construction was
gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw Ramos, who was coming toward him, being not finished within the agreed one-year period because of the sudden rise of prices for materials. Atty.
chased by another man. When Ramos got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional payment so he could finish construction, but the latter refused to pay
and poked a gun at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take until they more. Dr. Alipio stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and Rodolfo agreed that Atty. Alipio would return all
reached Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to bring the motorcycle to the money he received from Rodolfo and the whole property would, in turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio.
Garcia Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him (Ramos) again at the poblacion where he Atty. Alipio was unable to return the money despite several demands made by Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio
(Duzon) will be paid ₱200.00 for his services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at believes this is the reason why the Talaros had her husband killed. Dr. Alipio further testified on matters
the poblacion and asked for the ₱200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at him. A few days later, regarding expenses for the wake and burial, and the earnings of her husband.11
he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence, threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells
anyone about the killing. Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to
Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on the victim and stated that three slugs were taken from the
anyone whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to keep quiet. Later, however,
body of the victim, and the cause of death was internal hemorrhage.12 Police officers testified on how they
he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who accompanied him to the Criminal
conducted the investigation, stating that accused-appellant Aquino and Zamora's statements were taken in
Investigation Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so he could give his statement. He executed affidavits,
the presence of their respective lawyers. They maintain that no bodily harm was inflicted on the accused-
assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), attesting to what he knew about the crime,
appellants while they were being investigated.13
in his desire to be a state witness.5

On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken by CIS men without a warrant
Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and Dr. Lina Alipio, was cleaning
of arrest; that he was mauled by police authorities while under detention, but could not undergo a medical
the windows at the clinic of Dr. Alipio around 8 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994. He heard three
check-up due to fear from threats that he would be killed by police authorities if he did so; that he was
gunshots coming from the garage of the clinic, which was around ten meters away from where he was.
assisted by a PAO lawyer when he made his confession, but he did not read the contents of the document,
Immediately after the gunshots, he saw a man quickly walking out from the garage, going towards the
Sgt. Tomelden just ordered him to sign the same; that the PAO lawyer is not his own choice; that he does
main gate, but he was not able to clearly see the face of the man. He merely observed that the man was
not know Rodolfo Duzon and Raymundo Zamora; and that he was not present at the meeting held in
around 5'4" to 5'5" in height, medium-built, wearing a blue jacket and faded maong (denim) pants. He ran
Raymundo Zamora's yard. He admitted, however, that the motorcycle used by the gunman belongs to him;
towards the garage and there, he saw Atty. Melvin Alipio lying dead. He then chased after the man so he
and that he first agreed to be a state witness because he was promised to be paid P20,000.00 and that he
could identify him better but he did not succeed in doing so because the driver of the motorcycle that the
would be placed in the witness protection program.14
gunman was boarding was already drawing something out from the rear portion of the motorcycle. After
the assailant sped off, Balanga went to the police station in Laoac to report the crime and give his
statement before the CIS. Sometime later, at the CIS Office, he identified Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He claimed that he was not
the motorcycle used by the gunman to get away.6 present during the April 24, 1994 meeting held to plan the killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said date and
time, he was in the house of Congressman Amadito Perez, for whom he works as driver-messenger, and

357
that morning, he also drove the Congressman's family to church to hear mass. On April 26, 1994, he also The case is now before this Court on automatic review. The prosecution opted not to file a supplemental
reported for work at the house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the brief with this Court. Accused-appellants Lolito Aquino and Renato Ramos jointly filed their supplemental
afternoon. He likewise denied personally knowing any of his co-accused except for Duzon whose face is brief where it is argued that the two should be acquitted because (1) the prosecution evidence is
familiar to him.15 insufficient to prove that Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio; and (2) the
identity of Renato Ramos was never established. Accused-appellant Noberto (Jun) Adviento argued in his
Appellant's Brief filed with the CA, that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to establish conspiracy,
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
and there are no aggravating circumstances to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, this court hereby finds and holds the
The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the evidence on record proves beyond reasonable doubt
accused Francisca Talaro, Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito Aquino,
that accused-appellants Lolito Aquino, Renato Ramos, and Norberto (Jun) Adviento, together with
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under the provisions of
Francisca Talaro, conspired to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto,
pursuant to law, hereby imposes on each of the accused the death penalty and to pay proportionately the
costs of the proceedings. Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the unlawful killing of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a
The court further orders the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the sum
killing as murder.19
of ₱83,000.00 as actual damages; ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity;
₱10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to their private prosecutor and ₱2,400,000.00 as loss in the earning
capacity of the deceased without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In People v. Sanchez,20 the Court held that "[t]he essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor." There can be no
Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years old, the death penalty meted
cavil that the evidence on record shows treachery in the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the crime as
upon her shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of
murder. The assailant, identified as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio
the Revised Penal Code.
at a very close distance, without any provocation from said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing
with some other people.
And considering that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the accused Gregorio Talaro is not
sufficient to sustain his conviction of the offense filed against him, the court hereby declares accused
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a couple of days before the actual
Gregorio Talaro not guilty. The court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora acquitted of the offense filed
shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw and heard accused-appellants Norberto (Jun)
against him.
Adviento, Renato Ramos, and Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and coming to an agreement to
kill Atty. Alipio.
Let an order of arrest be issued against accused Renato Ramos who escaped from jail during the pendency
of this case, to be served by the NBI, CIC and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants' only defense is that the evidence is insufficient
to prove they are part of the conspiracy to commit the murder. Said defense is sorely wanting when pitted
SO ORDERED.16 against the prosecution evidence.

The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty of death imposed on In People v. Bautista,21 the Court reiterated the hornbook principle of conspiracy, to wit:
accused-appellants. However, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,17 and the amendments
made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.
felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of
the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were
On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants
performed specific acts which such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design
to commit the felony.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38 of Lingayen,
Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8239, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and his release is hereby ordered unless he xxxx
is being held for some other legal cause.
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in
Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial court in favor of the heirs of deceased Atty. Melvin Alipio, the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not
accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the following amounts: intended as part of the original design. x x x22 (Emphasis supplied)
(1) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (3) ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (4) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of Raymundo Zamora,
positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting with Francisca
SO ORDERED.18 Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito

358
Aquino as the one who demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had been killed. The Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento,
credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by Lolito Aquino's admission 23 that he Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos. In People v. Tinsay,34 the Court explained that:
and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance on the victim a day before Renato Ramos carried out the
shooting, and that the motorcycle used as a getaway vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed
On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
to Renato Ramos as the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the
Penalty in the Philippines, took effect. Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:
ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about the shooting. All the proven circumstances
point to the conclusion that accused-appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution of
the crime; hence, the existence of a conspiracy is firmly established. Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine
Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of Raymundo Zamora and
(R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and
Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-appellants' mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that
decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness' positive identification of the accused-
appellants.24 Moreover, accused-appellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo Zamora
would testify falsely against them. In People v. Molina,25 the Court expounded, thus: Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of them institute the of the Revised Penal Code; or
case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's
defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being
inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator xxxx
of the crime. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in the crime out of fear of
the police authorities who allegedly manhandled him, however, the trial court did not find his story otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
convincing. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive
on this Court as it is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has retroactive effect, to wit:
witnesses.27 The Court again explained the rationale for this principle in Molina,28 to wit:
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal
As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given
and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their as follows:
testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in
the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its
assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and
case.29 the convict is serving the same.1âwphi1

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule. However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons
convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in open court, and
considering that there are so many persons named "Renato Ramos," then there can be some confusion
regarding his identity. There is no truth to this claim. Ramos was properly identified in open court by Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be sentenced to suffer reclusion
Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of perpetua without eligibility for parole.35
Atty. Alipio.30 Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being convicted for the murder
of Atty. Alipio. The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,36 the
Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable
Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that they escaped from penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages
detention while the case was pending with the trial court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison on December should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages, in view of
20, 1994,31 while Lolito Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.32 It has been repeatedly held that flight betrays a the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be ₱30,000.00.
desire to evade responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of guilt. 33 Thus, this Court finds no
reason to overturn their conviction. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellants is REDUCEDto reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole in accordance with R.A. No.
359
9346; and INCREASING the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, and the award of
exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. The rest of the award of the Court of Appeals is
hereby maintained.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,


vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P.
Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey
Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-
wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell,
registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an
automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with
two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said
Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and
extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer
of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong
and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

360
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage
motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of which was the effect of vehicle 1’s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the
victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus
from the car by the by-standers."7 causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that
caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion
to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal xxxx
and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e., the
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the
had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two
filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an
beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.
xxxx
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of
reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is
allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also
hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.
An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented
by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts
SO ORDERED.13
and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules
of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of
the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that
xxxx
the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime.
The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of
questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if
the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s
indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the
find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person
evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of
responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there
the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no
was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the
longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the
bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state
filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule
the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant
on the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that
was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of
evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie
the decision states:
Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on
the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But
sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s acquittal is
responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on
inception. the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

xxxx SO ORDERED.16

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively show that Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of
the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.
of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked
carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-
logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The
361
Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act
case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of
a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v.
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is
determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious
by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24 Article 48 of the
summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed ₱10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of ₱1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
reads: omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the
penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period
(2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the
merits of the case. Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas
SO ORDERED.19
Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the
jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, 20 arguing that jurisdiction over the imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in
Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTC’s offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction
considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within
the victims.
the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same
pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and
for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, 22 which confers the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He
asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense
withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an
bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
The petition has merit. It should be granted. accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed,
for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. 29 But while the dismissal order consequent
to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon
pertained to the RTC. the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer
to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less judgment void.30
serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision
that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely
abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in
information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial
resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal
trial court had remained unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving
offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.
that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the
MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

362
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of
civil liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based
on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist 32 or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence,
he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of
trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case.35
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants.
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit
the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished by his
acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which DECISION
would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added
that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its CORONA, J.:
witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident.
Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of
the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless
imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son,
the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished his civil liability. Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him
some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be
dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016- punished to the full extent of the law.
04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged
therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a
McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for
SO ORDERED. a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher
followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized
that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the
fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to
the nearest police detachment.

The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no
word about Christopher’s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating
her misery.
363
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting
claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy. ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and
such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo
of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa
went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman CONTRARY TO LAW.
through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to
immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties
They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in
presented their respective evidence.
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw
formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece.
Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took
the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m.,
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.1awphi1
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3
Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur.
Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed
Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this
the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a
point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7,
cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin
2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was
of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak
the boy’s mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the
asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave
PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There were no charges against
Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del
in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy
Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in
be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with
Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia
Christopher.
but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked
to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the
recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members
boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname. suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant for her
arrest.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece
had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on November
parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed
in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and
accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher
child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following
Information: Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of
this case.
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping SO ORDERED.3
themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive

364
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision 4 dated March 31, 2006, the If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped
appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand for and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes
ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances
the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present. 9
perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-
SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
records.6
intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited to
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty. mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints necessary for the common welfare.12
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (RA) 7659: The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after
almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and return
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away
death.
place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty
to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s actions
(e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was
aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not
parents, female or a public officer. knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper
authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to each other?
present in the commission of the offense.
Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap
victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed
otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of
The crime has the following elements: Christopher.

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
who has a duty under the law to detain a person;8 in itself.13The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not
deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.14
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated
the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly,
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public official.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person
that will release him from captivity.15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of

365
kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s
freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his
mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom.

One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned
the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant
to People v.Garalde,20 the award of ₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering the
minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of
example or correction, Christopher is entitled to ₱100,000 exemplary damages. 22

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida
Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
₱200,000 moral damages and ₱100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher Basario.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
Costs against appellants. vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and
Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October
20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would
sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and
pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a
separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of
Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed
with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on
August 25, 2001.

366
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision,
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the dispositive portion of which reads:
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.9
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not
set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil
liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
which reads: adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability
arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline
with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence
said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant
in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20,
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity; 2004.

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages; Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:

4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to
damages; respondents for the payment of damages and other money claims.

5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
payment of damages and other money claims.
6. costs of suit.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED. Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
hence, should be excused from any liability.10
SO ORDERED. 8
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2)
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the
area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article
authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should
217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since
have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should
instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case be exonerated from civil liability.
No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the
ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its
liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary
employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply
showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision
contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
367
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal 16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the
Procedure, as amended, to wit: death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
act or omission of the accused. provisions of this Chapter.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998. The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court
of Appeals,17 we held:
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he
had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
Code. negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case
of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
We do not agree.
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.13
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.15
case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-
The pertinent portions of the complaint read: delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending
to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs. before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:

8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
out of her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already
xxx appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right
to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action
for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the
xxxx ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

368
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's
case x x x. length26he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable
that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him.
Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
xxxx

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce
Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo
the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-
hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi- his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the
delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised
herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and guards inside the bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a
executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank
different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that
correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the
Code.22 entrance door.

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there credible in itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon outside judicial cognizance.31
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of
pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline. contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached
the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset
by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; 32 that
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact,
the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used
which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw
limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the
out of pure self-preservation.34
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. [24]
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed
firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo
factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the
shooting Evangeline. bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as
hold up or robbery.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time
deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same We are not persuaded.
at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
369
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was including documentary evidence.
merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the
bank.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo
since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a
the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which
even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its
the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts
employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director
monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the
for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of
activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post
Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center
and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact
Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established
that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say
during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was
regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules
negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by reason of one
and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions
unfortunate event.
and not necessary to give students copy of the same,42 the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended
such classroom instructions.
We are not convinced.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by
Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
guarded and protection of the life of the employees.43
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further
xxxx
training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business
with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e.,
of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank
xxxx clients and on human psychology.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever
presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious
act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by
the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of
employee. Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as
to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. 36 To establish for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 46

370
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden
causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her
death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third
year high school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the
girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of
one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they
were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of
the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.50

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount
of P30,000.00.
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC
SO ORDERED. ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,

JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT


SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) conviction 2 of
appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding), and Pasot Saloli
(Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).

Factual Antecedents

Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged with
double murder and double frustrated murder in an Amended Information, 3 the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe the
house of Eugenio Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and seriously
wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would have caused their death had there been no
timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.

371
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot
Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows –
Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment, 5 faced
trial. The other accused could not be located and remain at-large to this day. Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty
beyondreasonable doubt of:
Factual Antecedents
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry),
together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenio’s house
in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and saw six b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner. Jerry and Mario reclusion perpetua;
recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum
last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the children of Eugenio’s other son Remegio6 Santander to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained gunshot maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to
wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayoras
dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel was minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas
wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow. maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Crisjoy
Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of ₱100,000.00 and the surviving victims Marissa
Santander and Micel Santander ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the incident, he
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub, Kiblawan, Davao del
Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on October 31, 1998
since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He Costs de officio.
maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches. However,
Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander clan since he believed that they were the ones
SO ORDERED.10
responsible for the massacre of his family in February 1998.

Hence, this appeal.


Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the time of
the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours walk away
from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife at the house of Pablo Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime of
Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed. Bothclaimed total double murder and frustrated murder as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already concedes to the
ignoranceof the incident. same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as follows:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING
THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. 12
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated murder and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally,
the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the surviving victims, It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this appeal.13 "[I]n
Marissa and Micel, the sums of ₱50,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, view of [this] supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Carding’s] appeal. Whether x x
respectively.8 x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally
extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still pending and no final judgment of
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being
civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his death."14
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit in
appellants’ argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and
Appellants’ Arguments
injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and distinctacts of shooting. And as
treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should
be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Thus, in rendering its Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored
Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA disposed ofthe case as follows: against the Santander family. They contend that this motive for committing the crime is not a substitute for
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojo’salibi that it was impossible for him to be at the crime
scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a medical prognosis.

372
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on almost All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous
about everything to beincredulous, still, his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his defense but on identification of the assailants/accused by credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander. 15
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants considering that (1) Jerry was
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery. just six meters away from them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused as
most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-
tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments
Our Ruling
of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary
weight."19
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants’ conviction was based on
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over the
their positive identification by the
positive identification of a credible witness."20
prosecution witnesses.

There was conspiracy among the accused.


True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the crime as
well as Pasot’s incredulous claim of ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that
the said court neither based the appellants’ conviction on the existence of such motive nor on Pasot’s weak "[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses’ identification of appellants as the felony and decide to commit it."21 It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to
assailants, viz: commit a crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest."23
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring hint of
vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry
Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting the crime, Sumilhig stated Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events that
that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with firearms. Second, they
their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family has been established giving credence to surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of the intended
prosecution witnesses’ allegation that after the strafing Jojo Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled
likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family became even more apparent. together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince
their unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery attended the commission of the crime.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any case
against them. It was only after he was arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander. "There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods orforms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without
risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."25
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared
determined to rule out the possibility that he could walk without crutches five months after his discharge,
the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain exception[s], as Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the victims
could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period may vary depending on of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were
the age and physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old. unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their firearms fired at close
range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the
[victims] x x x in such a position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x x
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander of all
x."26
of the accused.

The crime committed is two counts of


The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of almost
murder and two counts of frustrated
anything only served to arouse incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day,
murder.
month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which is of common
knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know what
day [it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed they did not know the As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of Cresjoy
complainants or of the massacre that took place. and Rolly to murder.

xxxx With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of injuries
sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal report of Marissa
shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left wrist 27 while the Certificate of
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three
Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot wounds in the area of the sternum and
accused answered in obvious effort to avoid criminal responsibility. Behind the façade of ignorance and
elbow.28As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if not for the timely medical attention
lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence to the accused when
provided to them. The crimes committed by the appellants against them were thus frustrated murders.
traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.
373
The Penalty For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato (1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
death.1âwphi1With both penalties being indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetua months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of frustrated
was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of murder. 29 However, appellants are not murder; and,
eligible for parole.30
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and exemplary
As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be imposed damages to each of the victims in the reduced amounts of ₱40,000.00 and ₱25,000.00,
on appellants.31 Accordingly, the penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each count of respectively.
frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of modifying
circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty shall be taken
All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing from
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its periods, the range of which is from six (6)
years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal liability
modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) and civil liability ex delicto as found by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges, 32 for each count extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed insofar as Ricardo Sumilhig
of frustrated murder. alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.

Awards of Damages Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.

For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award of civil SO ORDERED.
indemnity, however, the amount of the award must be ₱75,000.00 for each death pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 each and exemplary damages
in the amount of ₱30,000.00 each are proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the victims are entitled to temperate G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual damages.35
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,
vs.
For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by the CA
must be decreased to ₱40,000.00 and ₱20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are likewise entitled COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES
to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 each in lieu of actual damages.37 CUEVAS, respondents.

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of MENDOZA, J.:
thisjudgment until fully paid.38
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which affirmed Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its
withmodification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro
Guaring, Jr.
finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder
and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the
North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer
For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:
car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415,
driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion perpetua was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit
for each count of murder without eligibility for parole; Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the
opposite lane, bound for Manila.
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
₱5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each victim; Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake
Guaring's car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of
(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims ₱25,000.00 as
Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result
temperate damages for each death.
of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.

374
With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court
the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated held that since the basis of petitioners' action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's
beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.
and his nephew Felix Candelaria.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who
was riding in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota
[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE
Cressida.
AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD
OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the
negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle
[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT
ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE
the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the
ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.
collision the Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER


On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION
and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The
FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.
dispositive portion of its decision reads:

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro
the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum
Guaring, Jr. In absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned: 1
of:

Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused
1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;
which does not exist as found by the trial court in the said criminal case, it
necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries with
2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the
fact from which the civil action might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused,
did not exist.
3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the
4. Costs of suit.
proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking
another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.
From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:
Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b)
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Guaring's negligence in attempting to overtake the car in front of him.
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
supervision of its employees. which the civil might arise did not exist.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was
plaintiffs-appellees representing Guaring's loss of earning capacity. instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry
Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private
with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,2 it was held:
respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles
375
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the evidence in the criminal action. The attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule criminal case, which was decided on September 7, 1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this
111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the case was already pending review before it (the Court of Appeals).
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
cite findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was
committed by the accused. . . .
reasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical
finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion
the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was that an action for quasi delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.
not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.
This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the
Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:3 criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable
doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense
witnesses.6 The prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the
Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and
accident he gave a statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus
not culpa criminal, thus precluding the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of
driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez
Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the
who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in Guaring's car. Thus, both
criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable
had full view of the accident
doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal
witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find
application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part
cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for therein. That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the
damages barred. prosecution should have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the
decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will
not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded
only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4 to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised
by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the
Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
Court.
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the Court of Appeals with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.
96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft,
and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
SO ORDERED.
liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused
is hereby acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence resulting to double
homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

376

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