International African Institute

The Political Function of the Poro. Part II

Author(s): Kenneth Little
Source: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1966), pp.
62-72
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International African Institute
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 L[62

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO

KENNETH LITTLE
PART II

The Relation of the Chief to the Poro

(a) Evidenceof Poro supremacy

TN the concluding paragraphs of Part I of this article it was pointed out that in
addition to its judicial functions the Poro society possessed some important powers
of administration. On the other hand, there was also evidence to suggest that the
society carried on this wide range of activities, amounting almost to government of
the country, as an instrument of the chiefs.
Clearly, this raises a difficult problem, because far from describing the Poro as
subordinate, most earlier writers seem to have regarded it as a law unto itself. Accord-
ing to them, it overrode all other forms of authority as well as being the principal
means of arbitration. Nicholas Owen, for example, had a poor opinion of native
methods of justice because a rich man could buy his way out of any crime. He added,
however, that this was impossible when Poro was concerned with the case (p. 48).
Matthew's account also illustrates the limited nature of the Sherbro chieftaincy.
Although the executive power and final decision in all cases were vested in the ' king',
yet every head, or principal man of a village, considered himself sole authority in his
own' town '. The' king ' had no power to issue orders without the council's consent;
he could only entreat people to carry out his wishes. His family ranked no differently
from any one else who had wealth, and there was very little competition for the royal
office (pp. 77-79). As already noted, both Matthews (p. 83) and Winterbottom men-
tioned that witchcraft and murder were punishable by Poro; and according to the
latter author, it also composed family feuds (p. 36). Laing's impression of the political
power of Poro was similar. He adds that' palavers of great weight ', such as disputes
between rival towns and capital offences are always settled by the society-' the head-
men of towns not having, at the present ... the lives of their subjects or dependents
in keeping' (pp. 98-99).
Laing also points out that at stated periods Poro held conventions or assemblies,
'placing the country in the greatest state of confusion and alarm '. No public pro-
clamation was made, but a communication from the head of the society by signs hung
up announced the meeting. Chiefs, apparently, were completely without say in the
matter. In fact, according to Laing, no chief or headman would dare to bring a palaver
against a Poro man for fear of retribution, and his conclusion is that' the purrah may
be therefore said to possess the general government of the country ' (pp. 98-99). In
addition, there is also supporting evidence in the ChalmersReport. For example,
Captain Carr, who was a District Commissioner at Bandajuma for two years before
the Rising, gave it as his opinion that a chief's authority depended much on his
character, and on the position he held in Poro (pt. ii, p. 3).
The limited amount of ethnographic information available about this particular

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 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO 63
matter also seems to support the historical data. Hall says that in former times Poro
was practically supreme in the government of a chiefdom. Decisions affecting both
its internal affairs and relations with other chiefdoms were made in the Poro council.
The chief was a member of that council, but its authority could override him, and
the Poro's ascendancy over the chief was also asserted at his installation through the
institution known as kungh( 938). Harley's more detailed remarks are to a similar
effect. He stresses that although the chief was the nominal centre of civil life, the real
power lay in the hands of the Poro ' inner circle ', who could act through the council
of elders or even depose a chief. A chief could not declare war without their consent
and that of the ' old women's cult' (1941, p. 7 and p. 3I). Harley's own explanation of
this paradox, developed in his later paper (I950, viii), is that indigenous government
functioned at two levels, not mutually exclusive, but overlapping. The first, which
might be termed the civil phase, was concerned with the management of the town and
its citizens, common laws governing conduct, etc. It included what Harley terms the
external organization of chiefs and minor officials. This was perfectly evident to
casual observers, being known and understood by all members of the group, includ-
ing women and children. On the second level, which may be thought of as religious,
were the mechanisms for handling the crises and emergencies of life. ' It was in this
second level of government, calculated to deal with the powerful, hidden, spiritual
forces, that the (Poro) masks found their special place' (ibid.).

(b) Chiefsandhighchiefsin traditional

society
Harley's suggestion explains, no doubt, the general division of authority between
Poro and secular administration. However, it should also be noted that according to
his own description of the Mano there was usually one chief in the community who
was a peer of the Poro elders. 'He was something of a king and had power of life
and death over his subjects provided he worked through the Poro, never against it'
(1941, p. 7). Taken in conjunction with the references of Chalmers's witnesses to the
'
high chief', as cited above, the latter observation seems significant. It raises a ques-
tion that has not so far been considered-that of relative status and of the meaning
attached to the term 'chief' in the political context of indigenous society as distinct
from the form that it subsequently took in colonial times. Let us, therefore, examine
this matter in the light of pre-colonial Sierra Leone.
When the Protectorate was originally organized little was known about the extent
of local authority. The Government simply consolidated what they believed to be
the existing political boundaries between the various rulers with whom treaties had
already been signed or other forms of contract made. In a number of cases, persons
were recognized as chiefs whose position and standing in the chiefdom concerned
was of a very minor and subordinate character. The status of other native rulers was
misrepresented or misunderstood through mistakes, deliberate or otherwise, on the
part of interpreters; and, in some instances, too, the chiefly staff of office was awarded
to individuals whose only claim to the territory concerned lay in the fact that they
had managed to bring in House Tax for it. Again, in the early days, the Frontier
Police virtually created chiefs out of persons, including women, who won their favour
or were useful to them. Finally, in adopting what was believed to represent the native
hierarchy, for administrative purposes, the Government limited itself to individual

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64 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO
chiefdoms, putting all the native rulers whom they recognized as ' paramount chiefs '
on the same footing (Little, 195 , pp. 176-7).
Needless to say, quite apart from the question of Poro, the indigenous system was
much more complex than this. True, a number of individual chiefdoms existed, each
relatively independent and under the control of its own chief, sub-chiefs, and head-
men. But, according both to tradition and the earliest written accounts of conditions
in the Guinea Coast, the underlying situation involved an intricate network of political
ties and affiliations corresponding, in some ways, to quite large hegemonies or con-
federacies. The impression gained is that these arose out of the exigencies of tribal
warfare, which seems to have been almost continuous in certain areas, prompting
a constant need for military alliance and for protection on the part of weaker chief-
doms. For this reason, but also as a result of conquest, there was often a single chief,
or ' high chief ', whose general leadership over a group of chiefdoms was recognized
by his neighbours. Each of the latter kept his own administration, but the arbitration
of the high chief was accepted in important cases, including disputes between fellow
members of the ' confederacy '. Fealty was displayed, sometimes, in the shape of
periodical payments of tribute, and it might also involve the provision of military
assistance, if the high chief were attacked. He, in return, would go to the aid of chiefs
whose towns lay within his sphere of influence when war threatened them. The
alliance was also symbolized by the periodical exchange of customary presents (Little,
op. cit.; Kup, I96I, ch. iv).
In this connexion, Astley's eighteenth-century Collectionof Voyagesand Travelscon-
tains a passage from Barbot's description of Guinea, which, if the latter is to be trusted,
points to another important prerogative of the high chief, namely, that of crowning
each new chief who succeeded to office in the tributary state. This right probably
derived from the original conquest of the chiefdom concerned, it being the custom
of the victor to leave one of his warriors in charge. It was then the duty of this
'
viceroy to look after the country ' on his own chief's behalf. Alternatively, a weaker
chiefdom might invite a well-known warrior from outside to serve as its leader. The
fact that this political affiliation was continuously confirmed by the high chief's cere-
monial right of coronation probably explains the following further complication in
the system. It was quite possible for a tributary state situated geographically on the
borders of the confederacy to undertake military conquests of its own. This would give
rise to an additional pattern of overlordship, but without altering the original relation-
ship of the chiefdom concerned to its own high chief. Finally, a tributary member of
the second hegemony might, in its turn, carve out yet a further ' empire ', while con-
tinuing fealty to its own overlord. It was also possible for a given people to pay
homage to more than one high chief at the same time (vol. ii, 1745-7, pp. 529-42).
Evidence of the kind of hegemony described above was given to the Chalmers
Commission. It was claimed, for example, that Chief Bai Forki had under him all the
Temne, Loko, and Limba peoples living in the Port Loko District. In addition to
seven sub-chiefs of his own, he had jurisdiction over the Alikarli of Port Loko to
whom about a hundred villages belonged, all of them under headmen (Chalmers
Report, pt. ii, p. 555). It is said that the same kind of paramount role was played by
the chiefs of such towns as Panguma, Bumpe, Mongeri, and Tikonko. Conditions,
however, were unstable and it is difficult, in any case, to describe the Sierra Leone

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 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO 65
situation in its indigenous form becausepolitical relationsup-countrywere affected
by Colony interventionlong before the Governmentarrivedto take actualcontrol.
For a clearerillustrationof the traditionalsystemwe must returnto the coast where,
duringthe seventeenthcentury,tribalwarfare,althoughstimulatedby the SlaveTrade,
was carriedon without interferenceby Europeans,exceptoccasionallyas participants.

(c) Thekingdomof Quoja

In this regardBarbot says that all the local rulersbetween what is now the north
bank of the SierraLeone river and the western cornerof Liberiawere subjectto the
King of Quoja (Astley, op. cit., pp. 529-30). Quoja was situated about two days
journeyinto the interiorfrom CapeMount, presumablyin countrybelonging to the
Vai people. This meant,in other words, that Quoja controlledthe coastalpart of the
SierraLeone peninsular,both banks of the SierraLeone river, Sherbro,Krim, and
Gallinascountry. Towns in most of these placeshad viceroys appointedby the king
of Quoja, although the office of king was hereditaryin Burrebefore its subjugation.
Burre (or Bureh) was a town on the south bank of the SierraLeone river, about
twenty miles from its mouth, which had some 600 adult male inhabitants(ibid.,
pp. 322-33). What is now Sherbrowas known as Massaquoi,this being the name of
its viceroy. The king of Quojawas a descendantof a Carow(Kru?) general,who had
conquered that country in former times on behalf of a neighbouring people, the
Folgians.For this reasonQuojaitself paidhomage to the Folgianswho, in turn, were
subjectto the king of Manu,the head of a furtherhegemony.' The latter'stributaries
paid homage to him in the shape of slaves, iron-bars,bugles, cloth, etc. In acknow-
ledgementof theirfealtyhe presentedthem with a gift of Qua-Qua2cloths. The same
procedurewas followed in relationsbetween Folgia and Quoja, and between Quoja
and her tributaries.The people of Folgia called the subjectsof the king of Manow
by a term signifying 'lord', although the king of Folgia had complete jurisdiction
over his own towns and was entitled to make war or peace without the consent of
his overlord.Kings of Quojawere crownedby the king of Folgia and those of Bulme
Berre(SierraLeone) by the king of Quoja.In the ceremonythe personto be crowned
prostratedhimselfon the ground, earthwas scatteredover his back,and he was asked
what name he desiredto take. The title of' king ' and the name of his countrywere
then addedto it and proclaimedaloud. The new king was then told to rise, and a bow
and quiver of arrowswere presentedto him, signifying his duty as defender of the
country. He then did homage, giving his overlord a present of linen, sheets, brass
kettles, basins, etc. Another way in which the tributaryking showed respectwas by
allowing an envoy from his overlordcertainprivilegesnot permittedto other visitors
(ibid., pp. 529-35 and pp. 538-40).
It is hardly necessaryto repeat that under the warlike conditions obtaining, the
system of political relationshipsjust described was largely the result of military
factors. Fighting being on a limited scale, personalqualitiesof leadership,including
audacity and skill in ambush, were more important than the number of a man's
followers or the ethnicand kin relationsbetween groups. It was quite possible, there-
' Johnston (I906) suggests that Quoja may have to Gora stock; and that the king of Manu is possibly
been the name of the dominant caste of the Vai at a Mandingo chieftain.
the time; that the Folgians may be people belonging 2 Qua-Qua is an old name for the Ivory Coast.
F

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66 THE POLITICALFUNCTIONOF THE PORO
fore, for a warriorchief of resource,backed by a competent band of mercenaries,
to win one or two quick victories and thus to overawe a whole chiefdom within
a short spaceof time. To keepit permanentlyundercontrolby militarymethodsalone
was anothermatter.Should war breakout afresh,his communicationswith the area
affectedwere likely to be impedednot only by forests and rivers,but by the presence
of fortifiedtowns on the route. He had also to reckon on the possibilityof treachery
at home should he move his personalbodyguardof trainedwarriorstoo far from the
capitaltown. Additionalmeans, therefore,had to be found. They consistedpartlyin
the diplomaticand other measuresdescribedabove. However, the extent to which
a puppet ruler could be used was obviously limited, and there was the constant
dangerof a viceroy'sauthoritybeing locallyusurped,or of his loyaltybeingweakened
through intermarriageor his associationwith the people under his charge. In other
words, some sanction was necessarywhich could operate more widely and more
effectively than mere physical force or even traditionallyingrained attitudes of
allegiance.
(d) The Poro as an instrumentof Government
It is possible that this sanction was supplied by the Poro. A belief in the super-
naturalpower of spiritsand of medicinewas common to all the peoples of the region,
and according to Dapper, the relationshipof Belli-the Vai version of the Poro
society-to government was very close indeed. We have alreadycited Quoja as an
example of 'high chieftainship'. In that country the king was head of the society
andboys were collectedby his ordersfor initiation.As alreadymentioned,the session
of the Belli lasted from four to five years.The king himself stayeda few days in the
camp,but he appointedeldersto look afterthe training.Membershipof Belli, accord-
ing to the account in Astley (p. 541), was a qualificationfor various offices and
appointmentsin the king's service, and it also conferredcertainprivileges denied to
non-memberswho were known as Quolga-' Idiots '. The society investigatedcases
of murder,theft, and perjury,and had its own magicalmethods of trying such cases.
It also dealtwith infidelityin women. A woman accusedof adulteryhad to swear to
tell the truth on Belli medicine, and was threatenedwith the direst consequencesif
she did not mend her ways. If she repeatedthe offenceshe was carriedaway by the
officialsof the society, disguised as spirits, to the sacred grove of Belli, and (pre-
sumably)put to death.
A further basis of the society's power over the people was a certain dough-like
substancemanufacturedby its chief priestat the orderof the king. It was supposedly
capableof inflictingfrightfulpunishment,but only with his consent (ibid., pp. 539,
542).
As explainedearlier,it was also the king who gave the commandfor initiation.
Given, therefore,as much control over Belli as the king of Quoja seemingly pos-
sessed, he would have a powerful instrumentof governmentat his disposal.' There
was the bait of prefermentand special privileges to attractpeople in the tributary
According to Butt-Thomspon (1929) Belli or ments of their district, and its council formed a
Belli-Paaro, was founded by an old-time king of recognized court of justice. Unfortunately, Butt-
Gbandi, whose trained and disciplined bodyguard Thompson does not particularize the source of his
became its first members. The supreme grades of information.
Belli were in close affiliation with the civil govern-

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 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO 67
countries into the society and, once initiated, these groups would be under oath to
do whatever the Belli, in effect, the king, commanded. In this way he would be able
to organize a body of secret agents, already trained through Belli, to police the parti-
cular territory to which they belonged. These agents would keep the king continuously
informed, in his role as head of the society, about what was going on and he would
be able to use them, if the need arose, to stamp out disaffection or civil unrest.
Admittedly, these suggestions are somewhat conjectural so far as Quoja is con-
cerned. Nevertheless, the employment of the Poro as a striking force under chiefly
control seems to be fully vouched for and it could be employed to regulate economic
affairs in the same way as it was used to mobilize the country for purposes of military
aggression or defence. The method of bringing down a ' porro bed' in the latter
connexion has also been described above and we are told that the Poro's 'police'
was ' by no means contemptible' (Newton, p. 26). In other words, the suggestion is
-following Hutton Webster-that with growing political centralization, the judicial
and executive function of a secret society may be retained and its members as the
personal agents of the ruling chief may constitute the effective police of the state
(1908).
The latter kind of political adaptation involving the use of men's secret associations
is known in other parts of West Africa. For example, in southern and western Yoruba
kingdoms there were the Oro and Egungun cults whose members wore masks. As
well as punishing witches and sorcerers in the name of supernatural powers, these
cults were also used to threaten or even to make away with those who, while lacking
a titled office, were by wealth or following in a position to challenge the instituted
authorities (Morton-Williams, 964, p. 256). It may also be noted that several impor-
tant functions similar to those of Poro were performed by another Yoruba secret
association, the Ogboni. Thus, since Ogboni members worship and control the sanc-
tions of the Earth as a Spirit,' this cult was called in to judge the dispute and to
perform rites of purification whenever human blood was shed upon the ground in
a fight. In addition to this judicial and ritual function Ogboni is thought of by the
Yoruba generally as supporting the power of the ruler2 (Morton-Williams, I960,
pp. 362-74).
The comparative evidence does not permit us to say that in Sierra Leone the more
powerful chiefs had the Poro directly under control. It may, however, help us to
explain the unification of different districts which seemed to be, in many respects,
independent of each other, and how it was possible for peace to be forced upon
warring tribes by a third party. Matthews, writing in 1788 when indigenous methods
of government were still in full swing, says:
When two tribes, or nations, are at war, and begin to be tired, or wish to put an end to it,
but are too haughty and proud to make overtures to each other, they apply to the ruler of
a neighbouringstatefor his interferenceas a mediator:if the offerbe accepted,he immediately
sends to the contending parties,to inform them he will act as umpire if they choose to refer
their disputes to him: and that if they do not agree to terminatetheir differencesamicably,
I Note in this connexion Schwab's conclusion, there once said to Morton-Williams: 'Every Oba
mentioned in Part I, page 354, that Poro is an ela- must have Ogboni so that the people may fear him'
borate modification of earth-mother worship. (op. cit., p. 364).
2 In
Oyo, one of the leading officials of the cult

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68 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO
he will no longer look on with indifference,and see those who ought to be friends destroy
each other and depopulatetheir country (pp. 83-84).
It is therefore particularly pertinent to note, as we know historically, that the
pacification of the Gallinas was completed by a 'peace poro ' inaugurated by Men-
degra, an influential Mende chief. This was just a century later than the year in which
Matthews wrote. The report of T. J. Alldridge, a Government Travelling Commis-
sioner, shows clearly that Mendegra was in a position to use the Poro:
... I will here digress for a moment to offer an explanationas to how Chief Mendingrah
could, while ruling the Goura country, situatedas it is with the Barriand Toncha countries
to the south, the Koya and Damah countries to the south-west, Jowveh-Mano and other
places to the north, undertakesuch obligations as he did when he signed the treaty, until
he had satisfiedhimself that he was certainof the co-operation of the rulers of those and of
other countries which were in proximity to his own. After my first notifying Mendingrah
on the z7th of last Januarythat I would be glad to meet him at Bandasumahon the I 5th of
the following month, February, he had recourse to what is known in the country as a
' Porroh '. This being an ignorant, illiterateand superstitiouscountry, and the Chiefs being
unable to impart their wishes to one another in a written document, when anything of
importanceis undertakenin the country, and it becomes necessary,as in the presentinstance
that the distantChiefs should be notified of what is taking place, the Chief desiring to make
such communicationmakes known his secretsto two or three of his most trusted headmen,
who ' carry' them down to such placesas may be necessary,and the ' Porroh men ' selecting
some very secluded spot in the bush near to a town there, in the utmost privacy, and under
terrible fetich oaths, they administer the ' Porroh ', i.e., they divulge the secrets to such
persons as may be qualifiedto receive the ' Porroh '. Nothing of very great importanceever
takes place in the country until a ' Porroh ' has been sent down.
Chief Mendingrahdid not arrive, as I have had the honour of stating, until the i ith of
March.In this interval his Porroh was going about, and upon my reachingBandasumahall
of the Chiefs whom I met there had alreadyacceptedthe ' Porroh ' which, so far as I could
learn, had referenceto a permanentpeace being maintainedin the country. When passing
through Juring on my returningfrom the interior, I met several Chiefs still engaged in this
same Porroh. Now the town of Juring is over 90 miles distancefrom Chief Mendingrah's
town of Juru, which will, I venture to think, show how an importantChieftainlike Mendin-
grah is able to make known his laws, whether for good or for bad, over a very considerable
area of country.. . . (C.O. 806/325, p. I2).

The observations of Chalmers's witness, Mr. Harris, in a similar connexion have

already been quoted (see Part I, p. 362). We may therefore summarize the hypothesis
that the more powerful chiefs had control of Poro, explaining at the same time the
paradox created by the statements of earlier writers. The latter noted an apparent
subordination of the civil ruler, but they may not have realized that a particular chief's
pusillanimity was a function of his relationship with political authority higher than
his own rather than of his relationship with Poro. In other words, the alleged
supremacy of Poro-its ability to regulate the actions of a lesser chief, or headman-
may have been a purely local phenomenon, constituting merely a segment of a wider
system of government.
There is, of course, the alternative possibility that Poro domination did, in fact,
exist, but was the result of social change in the shape of a general diminution of the
Quoted by Christopher Fyfe, op. cit., pp. 247-8.

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 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO 69
chief's office. This kind of change actually occurred when the Sierra Leone Govern-
ment declared a Protectorate, because one of its first actions was to ban slave-dealing
and to encourage ' legitimate' trade in its place. This, in removing one of the chief's
main sources of wealth, made his followers less dependent upon him. His personal
position and authority were additionally reduced by restrictions on the power of
native courts which limited their jurisdiction to cases of minor importance as well as
providing a right of appeal (Little, 195 , pp. 202-3). Also, as pointed out above, the
Government completely ignored differences in status between individual chiefs and
recognized other individuals who had no indigenous claim to the office. One of the
consequences of this levelling down of authority and prestige was that chiefs were
no longer able to control Poro. As Mr. Harris remarked, ' The power of the chiefs
is entirely gone.... The war boys when once they get on foot, no one can stop them.
. . . Now there are no chiefs who have power to stop them ...' (ChalmersReport,
pt. ii, p. 489).

(e) The chieftainshipand Poro as complementary institutions

The implication of the latter remark is that political power was normally balanced
between the Poro and the chieftainship. This is perhaps the best way of summing up
the situation. In ordinary circumstances it was the prerogative of the society in any
given political unit as main custodian of tribal tradition to watch the chief; to ensure
that his actions as ruler conformed with customary practice. Among the Sherbro,
as already mentioned, the Poro supervised his installation. When the new chief was
chosen he was put into kungh,i.e. remained in seclusion, for some weeks, or longer
in a building erected on the outskirts of the Poro bush. During this time he was
under instruction and practically under the control of the elders, who were neces-
sarily Poro men and included those who direct Poro affairs (Hall, 1938). In some
Temne chiefdoms a chief who is not already a member of Poro must receive initiation
and enter the bush, if only for a day. This is so that he may be taught the traditional
lore underlying the country's way of life (Ture, I939). In fact, in those Temne chief-
doms which have the Poro, a clear relationship exists between the chieftainship and
the society. The Poro corresponds in this respect to the Ragbenle or Manyeke society
of other areas, whose function is, among other things, to maintain the chief's authority.
So close is this connexion that chiefs may be spoken of as Poro or as Ragbenle
chiefs' (Thomas, 1916, pp. 143-4). Among the Mende, not only had questions of
succession to the chief's office to be decided in Poro, but all important cases affecting
the chiefdom at large had also, in theory, to be taken there.
The chief, on his part, was expected to hold the Poro in check, and to see that its
officials did not take undue advantage of their special privileges by exploiting the
people. He could, for example, withhold his permission when the society wished to
initiate new members. A session which lasted for three years or more was a serious
drain on the public wealth. Among the Mano, the Poro usually waited until the chief's
I In fact, in Temne country, the ceremonies con- Ragbenle installed chiefs in the southern chiefdom,
nected with the installation of a paramount chief are but Poro took over these functions during the tribal
conducted by one of four agencies: the Ragbenle wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
society in the east, the Poro society in the south, the Vernon R. Dorjohn, ' The Organization and Func-
Ramenasociety in the central region, and by Moslem tions of the Ragbenle society of the Temne ', Africa,
ceremonies in the north and west. Traditionally, vol. xxix, no. 2, 1959.

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70 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO
son was old enough so that he could be the leader of his age-group (Harley, 194I,
p. 8). The chief and other ' big men ' were entitled to the labour of Poro initiates on
their farms.
In general, therefore, the two institutions of chieftaincy and Poro complemented,
rather than opposed, each other in the general management of the state. Harley's
remarks about Liberia have already been quoted in this connexion (page 63) and it
will suffice to offer one or two final examples from Sierra Leone. Thus, where mystical
elements are lacking from the business of administration, as in the purely secular figure
of the Mende chief, the Poro remedies this by appearing publicly at his coronation and
funeral. The Gbeni,its principal and most sacred spirit, proceeds to the grave of the
dead chief and bows over it. The same ritual is performed for all political figures,
including sub-chiefs. Also, the chief, when dying, is taken to the Poro bush, where
his body must be buried unless he is a stranger to the chiefdom. His death is sub-
sequently announced from the roof of his house by an official (Little, I95 I, pp. 184-5).
Both Newland (I9I6) and Migeod (1926) suggest that any important Sherbro chief
was accompanied on ceremonial occasions by the Taso, the head of the local Poro.I
Political control, then, was divided between the two institutions. Also, it was
vested in the hands of relatively few individuals. Principally, there were the officials
of the Poro, and there was the chief, who, as well as directing the civil affairs of the
chiefdom, might also occupy a senior grade in the society. In these terms, positions
of leadership were hereditary or could be achieved by ritual means. In addition,
individual chiefs obtained extra power through military success which they were
able to retain because an interlocking organization of local Poro lodges cut across
kinship lines and the local group. The latter organization kept the scale of political
interaction potentially wider than that encompassed by a single chiefdom. It offered,
despite continuous warfare and inter-chiefdom rivalry, a framework of relationships
upon which political integration could proceed.
By these arrangements-to paraphrase Morton-Williams's analysis of the Yoruba
state-there was produced a system of social control capable of working in a small
community, or in one of several thousands, and adapted to a confederation of petty
chiefdoms.2
1 Again, the functional parallel with Yoruba cult Hutton Webster's theory that the scale of a society
organization is very marked. Like the Poro, the limits the possibility of using the secret association
priests of Ogboni play a part in the ceremonies as an effective agent of social control. It seems that
following the death of a ruler and during the installa- the Yoruba have extended the use of this kind of
tion of his successor. In Oyo they are summoned to social system so that it has at times been effective
the palace as soon as the Alafin has died and they over a society of some millions of people. They
carry out a ritual dissection of the corpse. Also, as limited the categories of social relationship under
part of his installation the succeeding Alafin is taken the control of one organization and, restricting the
to the Ogboni shrine where a rite is performed to size of the membership in each, made the functions
enable his ears always to discriminate between the of each society overlap those of the others in any one
true and the false and to give compelling power to town; by fictions of kinship they linked the leaders
his words. Nor can he be properly installed at all in every town with the leaders of the society in Oro.
without the acceptance and collaboration of the In general, not all the men of one lineage were
Ogboni. Particularlyin the case of Temne chiefs the recruited into any one cult association, with the
ceremonies performed by both the Poro and its result that lineage solidarity was broken into, in the
counterpart, Ragbenle, were very similar to these, political sphere. The balance between the different
and, as has already been mentioned, questions of associations could be arranged so that none became
succession had to be decided in the Poro bush. over-strong. The leaders of the different associations
2 Aforton-Williams
says:'. . I will remind you of were combined into a central council, meeting often

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 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO 71

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together and necessarily reaching (on the surface at society in south-western Yoruba kingdoms',
least) unanimous agreement before their decisions W.A.I.S.E.R. Proceedingsof Third Annual Cotnference,
appeared as " the will of the town " expressed by March 1954, publ. I956, pp. o12-3).
the single voice of the sacred king ' (' The Egungun

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72 THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE PORO

Resume
LE ROLE POLITIQUE DU PORO
(deuxieme
partie)
DANS la premiere partie de cet article avait ete posee la question des rapports entre la societe
Poro et le pouvoir civil. En fait, des preuves aussi bien sociales qu'historiques suggerent
que dans le gouvernement d'une chefferie le Poro detenait pratiquement l'autorite supreme.
Le chef etait un membre de cette societe, mais elle avait sur lui un ascendant qui s'exergait
dans un grand nombre de circonstances. Et, par consequent, bien qu'il fit le centre nominal
de la vie civile, le pouvoir reel reposait entre les mains du comite le plus secret du Poro qui
controlait les evenements sur un plan supranaturel.
Cependant, la complexite du systime politique indigene sur ce point doit etre prise en
consideration. Les fonctions de chef ont toujours varie en importance, atteignant parfois la
plus large hegemonie et le groupement de confederations dirigees par un 'Grand Chef'.
Le royaume de Quoja, dans le Liberia occidental, en est un exemple. Les dirigeants domi-
naient, apparemment, plusieurs Etats tributaires qui, a l'origine, avaient ete tenus en respect
par la force militaire. Entre le roi de Quoja et le Belli (contre partie du Poro chez les Vai)
les rapports etaient tres etroits et l'on suppose que le souverain avait confie a cette societe
la surveillance des contrees environnantes soumises. Un usage policier parallele des associa-
tions secretes masculines est observable dans d'autres regions de l'Afrique occidentale.
I1 est probable que ce fait explique comment certains chefs de la Sierra Leone etaient
a meme, en utilisant les services du Poro, d'intervenir dans les affaires des autres chefs. En
autres termes, la pusillanimite apparente du dirigeant civil etait le resultat de ses relations
avec une autorite politique superieure a la sienne plutot que de ses relations avec le Poro en
tant qu'association religieuse.
L'interpretation de cette situation a ete compliquee par les effets de l'administration
coloniale. Neanmoins, il est quasi certain que la societe Poro et la chefferie constituaient des
institutions complementaires. Ce fait, auquel s'ajoute l'organisation hierarchisee des associa-
tions et cultes secrets, elargissait potentiellement l'echelle des relations politiques. I1 creait
un systeme de controle social capable d'agir dans une petite communaute ou dans un groupe
important de plusieurs milliers de personnes, organise en confdderation de petites chefferies.

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