Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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November 2, 2017
THE FUNCTION AND PURPOSES OF PRIVATE SECURITY 2
In examining the role of James Dunbar and of the Virtual Security Force of which he
is the Operations Director, the private and for-profit nature of this entity is absolutely
critical in reflecting how it interacts with other stakeholders in the criminal justice system.
Indeed, and while the case presents all of the Virtual Security Forces’ officers as holding
special police commissions on the property of their clients, the fact remains that Dunbar
and the Virtual Security Force answer first and primarily to their client – the Virtual
Commercial Merchants Association. As such, their primary role in the case pertains to
protecting the property of the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association, and involves the
interdiction of criminal activity taking place on this property. While incidental interdiction
of the Very Bad Bike Club may occur in this context, both Dunbar and Virtual Security Force
must respond principally to the priorities of the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association
and additionally bring moral hazard into this law enforcement environment because of the
At the baseline, the work of Jones & Newburn (2006) describes private security as
With Jones & Newburn (2006) arguing that private security firms engage in activities
running the gamut from patrolling, to access control, to monitoring and all the way to close
personal protection, this thus brings about a context in which the activities of private
security firms produce a context of plural policing in which both traditional law
enforcement and these private security provides are largely engaged in overlapping tasks.
With this case being one in which the Virtual Security Force has arrest powers on all
property owned by the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association, this presents a context
THE FUNCTION AND PURPOSES OF PRIVATE SECURITY 3
in which the plural policing presented in the case is very significant, and creates a
redundant division of labor between the Virtual Police Department and the Virtual Security
Force. This said, and with Jones & Newburn (2006) making it clear that the principal-agent
relationship is one in which a private security company will prioritize the targets put forth
by their employers, this case is one in which the Virtual Security Force is not likely to focus
upon the Very Bad Bike Gang unless the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association
mandates it to do so in a meaningful way. Rather, and based on the tasks that Jones &
Newburn (2006) associate with private security companies, the Virtual Security Force is
disorder activities which are likely to only incidentally involve the activities of the Very Bad
Biker Club.
In this context however, Garland (2003) argues that private security corporations
are replete with moral hazard. With Garland (2003) defining moral hazard as a
phenomenon in which the security company does not face an incentive to maintain
objective law and order but rather that which has been mandated by its client, this
to protect the public good objectively. Rather, and while incidental civil protection will
occur in areas where a private security mandate exists, Garland (2003) proposes that
private security companies define security in line with the whims and objectives of their
for-profit client. Applied to the current case, it is thus unrealistic to expect the Virtual
Security Force to fully align its priorities with those of the Virtual Police Department.
Rather, maintaining the priorities of the Virtual Commercial Merchants Association will be
THE FUNCTION AND PURPOSES OF PRIVATE SECURITY 4
the principal goal of the Force even though the Very Bad Bike Club engages in activities
In this regard, Gill (2015) argues that public law enforcement agencies at all levels
have also historically been reticent to cooperate with private security forces. With Gill
(2015) arguing that this reflects skepticism about private security competence, a distaste
for work that overlaps with core law enforcement functions as well as a perception that
working with private security companies will decrease the degree to which cases can
effectively be prosecuted, this points to a situation in which neither the Virtual Police
Department nor the Office of the District Attorney are likely to be enthusiastic to cooperate
with the Virtual Security Force. As such, and with Gill (2015) making it clear that this
history of poor cooperation goes back decades, both questions of moral hazard and
professionalism detract from the likelihood that the private security company will be either
willing to play a role in the fight against the Very Bad Biker Gang or provided with the
In the end then, the private security forces led by Mr. Dunbar cannot be counted on
to be a reliable team player in the fight against the Very Bad Bike Club unless they are
Association. Even if this occurs however, it is impossible to determine the degree to which
law enforcement and the court system will welcome the involvement of this private
security force. Additionally, and with Mr. Dunbar seeking to obtain larger contracts in the
future, the prioritization of client priorities is likely to detract from the degree to which the
References
Garland, D. (2003). The rise of risk Risk and morality (pp. 48-86). New York, NY: Routledge.
Jones, T., & Newburn, T. (2006). Plural policing: A comparative perspective. Washington, D.C.
: Psychology Press.