QUAMTO Cases – Law on Public Officers;
Court of Appeals
Administrative Law; Election Law.
1. Summers v. Ozaeta
a. Ad interim appointments are
permanent.
b. By accepting an ad interim
appointment, the appointee waives
his right to hold his old position.
2. Sevilla v. CA
a. An acting appointment is merely
temporary.
3. Marohombsar v. Alonto
a. A temporary appointment cannot
become a permanent appointment,
unless a new appointment, which
is permanent, is made. This holds
true unless the acting
appointment was made because of
a temporary vacancy. In such a
case, the temporary appointee
holds office until the assumption of
office by the permanent appointee
4. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 1991
a. The prohibition against the
holding of multiple positions by
Cabinet Members in Article VII,
Section 13 of the Constitution does
not apply to positions occupied in
an ex officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office.
b. A Cabinet Member holding an ex-
officio position has no right to
receive additional compensation,
for his services in that position are
already paid for by the
compensation attached to his
principal office.
5. Gamboa v. Aguirre, 1991
a. Under the Local Government
Code, the Vice-Municipal Mayor
was deprived of the power to
preside over the Sangguniang
Bayan and is no longer a member
of it. The temporary vacancy in the
office of the Municipal Mayor
creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the Office of the
Municipal Vice-Mayor when he
acts as Municipal Mayor. This
constitutes inability on his part to
preside over the sessions of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
6. Gloria v.
a. Under Section 52 of the Civil
Service Law, the provision for
payment of salaries during the
period of preventive suspension
during the pendency of the
investigation has been deleted.
The preventive suspension was not
a penalty. Its imposition was
lawful, since it was authorized by
law.
b. If the penalty was modified
because he was exonerated of the
charge that was the basis for the
decision ordering his dismissal, he
is entitled to back wages,
otherwise, this would be
tantamount to punishing him after
exoneration from the charge which
caused his dismissal.
c. He is entitled to back wages from
the time of his dismissal until his
reinstatement. The enforcement of
the dismissal pending appeal was
punitive, and he was exonerated.
7. Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals
a. If he was reprimanded for the
same charge, which was the basis
of the decision ordering his
dismissal, the public officer is not
entitled to back wages, because he
was found guilty, and the penalty
was merely commuted.
8. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
a. The suspension contemplated in
Article VI, Section 16(3) of the
Constitution is a punishment that
is imposed by the Senate or House
of Representatives upon an erring
member, it is distinct from the
suspension under Section 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which is not a penalty but a
preventive measure. Since Section
13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act does not
state that the public officer must
be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have
committed the acts, which he has
been charged, it applies to any
office, which he may be holding.
9. National Appellate Board of the National
Police Commission v. Mamauag, 2005
 a. The Disciplining Authority is not
the proper party to seek a review of
the decision of the Court of
Appeals, because he is the one who
heard the case and imposed the
penalty. Being the disciplinary
authority, the Secretary of
Education should be impartial and
should not actively participate in
prosecuting Maximino.
10. In re: Laureta v. Court of Appeals 148
SCRA 382
a. Pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers, the
correctness of the decisions of the
Supreme Court as final arbiter of
all justiciable disputes is
conclusive upon all other
departments of the government;
the Ombudsman has no power to
review the decisions of the
Supreme Court by entertaining a
complaint against the Justices of
the Supreme Court for knowingly
rendering an unjust decision.
11. Noblejas v. Teehankee
a. Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act
vests the Office of the Ombudsman
with disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of
the government, except officials
who may be removed only by
impeachment, Members of
Congress and the Judiciary. While
a Commissioner of the National
Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) has the rank of a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, he does not
belong to the Judiciary but to the
Executive Department. This
simply means that he has the same
compensation and privileges as a
Justice of the Court of Appeals. If
the Supreme Court were to
investigate a Commissioner of the
National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), it would be
performing a non-judicial function.
This will violate the principle of
separation of powers.
12. Garcia v. Mojica
a. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770
grants the Ombudsman the power
to impose preventive suspension
up to six months. Preventive
suspension maybe imposed
without any notice or hearing. It is
merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation and
is not the final determination of
the guilt of the officer concerned.
The suspension is preventive and
not punitive.
13. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
does not apply when:
a. Irreparable injury due to
immediately executory suspension
order. (University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v.
Rasul)
b. The question involved is purely
legal. (Azarcon v. Bunagan)
14. Maceda v. Vasquez
a. When the complaint refers to the
performance of the duties of Judge,
Ombudsman should not act on it
and should refer it to the Supreme
Court. His investigation will
encroach upon the exclusive power
of administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court over all courts.
15. Deloso v. Domingo
a. The Ombudsman can investigate
crimes or offenses committed by
public officers which are not
connected with the performance of
their duties. Under Section 13(1),
Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman can investigate any
act or omission of a public official
which is illegal.
16. Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
a. A violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act prescribes. Article
XI, Section 15 of the Constitution
does not apply to criminal cases for
violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Article XI,
Section 15 of the Constitution
provides that the right of the State
to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or
employees, or from them or from
their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription.
17. Feeder International Line, Pts, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals
 a. The assistance of counsel is not
indispensable to due process in
forfeiture proceedings since such
proceedings are not criminal in
nature. Moreover, the strict rules
of evidence and procedure will not
apply in administrative
proceedings like seizure and
forfeiture proceedings. What is
important is that the parties are
afforded the opportunity to be
heard and the decision of the
administrative authority is based
on substantial evidence.
18. Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores
a. Administrative due process does
not require that the actual taking
of testimony or the presentation of
evidence before the same officer
who will decide the case.
19. American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents
a. The Supreme Court has ruled that
so long as the actual decision on
the merits of the cases is made by
the officer authorized by law to
decide, the power to hold a hearing
on the basis of which his decision
will be made can be delegated and
is not offensive to due process. The
Court noted that: “As long as a
party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof, and
the decision is supported by the
evidence in the record, there is no
question that the requirements of
due process and fair trial are fully
met. In short, there is no
abrogation of responsibility on the
part of the officer concerned as the
actual decision remains with and
is made by said officer. It is,
however, required that to give the
substance of a hearing, which is for
the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the
officer who makes the
determinations must consider and
appraise the evidence which
justifies them."
20. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations
a. The findings of the subordinates
are not conclusive upon the
Commissioners, who have the
discretion to accept or reject them.
What is important is that Stevie
was not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof, the
decision is supported by
substantial evidence, and the
commissioners acted on their own
independent consideration of the
law and facts of the case, and did
not simply accept the views of their
subordinates in arriving at a
decision.
21. Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649,
April 16, 2013
a. The rule is that “an ineligible
candidate who receives the highest
number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate,
he could not even have been a
candidate in the first place, but by
virtue of the lack of material time
or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility
might not have been passed upon
prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had
the opportunity to hold himself out
to the electorate as a legitimate
and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate
remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold
public office. The number of ballots
cast in his favor cannot cure the
defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.”
b. Accordingly, “being anon-
candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been
counted.” This leaves the second
placer as “the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number
of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.”
22. Pimentel v. COMELEC, 2008
a. Under Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, no pre-proclamation
controversies regarding the
appreciation of election returns
and certificates of canvass maybe
entertained in elections for
members of the House of
Representatives. The canvassing
body may correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass. His
recourse is to file a regular election
protest before the HRET.