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CITY CHARTER: SUBPART A

Sec. 3. - Powers.

The City of Miami shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary
powers to enable it to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions and render municipal services and may exercise any power for
municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.

The city shall have the extraterritorial powers granted to the city by general and
special law and including Laws of Florida, ch. 10847 (1925), as amended.

The City of Miami shall have power to:

(a)—(e). [Reserved.]

(f) Acquisition and disposition of property and services:

(i) To acquire by purchase, gift, devise, condemnation or otherwise,


real or personal property or any estate or interest therein, inside or
outside the city, for any of the purposes of the city; and to improve,
sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of such property
or any part thereof.

(ii) To acquire or dispose of services inside or outside the city, by


purchase, gift, or otherwise for any purposes of the city.

(iii) To lease to or contract with entities for the management of any of


the city's waterfront property, but only in compliance with the other
requirements of this charter and on condition that:

(A) the terms of the contract allow reasonable public access to


the water and reasonable public use of the property, and
comply with other charter waterfront setback and view-
corridor requirements; and

(B) the terms of the contract result in a fair return to the city
based on two independent appraisals; and
(C) the use is authorized under the then existing master plan of
the city;

(D) the procurement methods prescribed by ordinances are


observed;

(E) the contract does not exceed five years and does not contain
an automatic renewal or termination penalty.
Any such lease or management agreement or proposed
extension or modification of an existing such lease or
management agreement which does not comply with each of
the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first
been approved by a majority of the voters of the city.
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or apply
to any project the financing of which has been provided by
the authorization of bonds to be issued by the city.

(g)—(l). [Reserved.]

(m) Harbor and shipping facilities: To establish, construct, maintain,


and operate, both inside and outside the city, public landings,
wharves, docks, and warehouses; to dredge or deepen harbors
and rivers, or any branch or portion thereof; to install turning
basins, build jetties, and otherwise improve the harbor and
shipping facilities of the city, inside and outside the city and inside
and outside harbor lines where such improvements outside of
harbor lines are approved by the United States Government or its
proper agencies; to acquire by condemnation or otherwise all
lands, riparian, and other rights and easements [necessary for the
purposes aforesaid; to lay and collect] reasonable duties or fees
on vessels coming through or using said landings, wharves, docks
or warehouses; to regulate the manner of using other landings,
wharves, docks, and warehouses within the city; to prescribe and
enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the protection and
use of said property; to advance to the Government of the United
States, with or without interest, funds to be expended in harbor
improvements to be made by the government in or near the city, or
directly affecting the city within Miami Harbor and the approaches
thereto, if such work has been duly authorized by laws of the
United States; and to issue bonds or notes to obtain funds for such
advances.

(n)—(ll). [Reserved.]

(mm) Building and zoning:

(i) To provide by ordinance building, planning, and zoning regulations


and restrictions governing the height, number of stories, method of
construction, type, and size of buildings and other structures; the
percentage and portion of the lot or site that may be occupied; the
size of the front, rear, and side yards, courts, and other open
spaces; the location, use of buildings, structures, and land for trade,
industry, residences, apartment houses, and other purposes; and
the widening and future widening of streets in zoned street areas
that the city may establish. Such regulations may provide that a
board of appeals or the city commission may determine and vary
the application of building, planning, or zoning ordinances in
harmony with their general purpose and intent.

(ii) In order to preserve the city's natural scenic beauty, to guarantee


open spaces, and to protect the waterfront, anything in this Charter
or the ordinances of the city to the contrary notwithstanding, neither
the city nor any of its agencies shall issue building permits for any
surface parking or enclosed structures located on Biscayne Bay or
the Miami River from its mouth to the N.W. 5th Street Bridge,

(A) which are not set back at least 50 feet from the seawall
(where the depth of the lot is less than 200 feet, the setback
shall be at least 25 percent of the lot depth), and

(B) which do not have average side yards equal in aggregate to


at least 25 percent of the water frontage of each lot based on
average lot width.

(iii) The above setback and side-yard requirements may be modified by


the city commission after design and site-plan review and public
hearing only if the city commission determines that the
modifications requested provide public benefits such as direct
public access, public walkways, plaza dedications, covered parking
up to the floodplain level, or comparable benefits which promote a
better urban environment and public advantages, or which preserve
natural features. Wherever setback, side-yard, or site-plan review
requirements of zoning ordinances are greater than the foregoing
requirements, such greater requirements shall govern.

(iv) These requirements shall not apply to docks and appurtenant


structures, single-family residences and appurtenant structures,
and waterfront industrial uses along the Miami River and at the Port
of Miami. Nothing herein contained shall in any manner affect or
apply to: the City of Miami/University of Miami James L. Knight
International Center and hotel facility, including all improvements
thereon, or to lands and projects which the city commission has
approved prior to September 18, 1979, by development order
pursuant to F.S. ch. 380 of a planned area development pursuant
to article XXI-1, City of Miami Comprehensive Zoning ordinance or
which have received site and development plan approval, including
Plaza Venetia, Phase II, Resolution No. 72-113, April 20, 1972;
Resolution No. 72-114, April 20, 1972; and Resolution No. 72-416,
July 20, 1972.

(Res. No. 01-841, § 2, 8-9-01; Res. No. 01-843, § 2, 8-9-01)

Editor's note—

The department of neighborhood rehabilitation of the city and all functions


involved therein were abolished pursuant to Ord. No. 7576, § 1, adopted July 17,
1967, and effective on the date of transfer of said department to Dade County. At
the direction of the city, § 3(vv), added to the charter by Char. Amend. No. 2,
effective Jan. 1, 1963, is not set forth herein.
Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

procedures before conveying lease to company.


828 So.2d 411
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District. 1 Cases that cite this headnote

HOMESTEAD–MIAMI SPEEDWAY, LLC.,


Appellant,
v. [2]
CITY OF MIAMI, etc., et al., Appellees. Licenses
Transfer of rights
Nos. 3D02–1506, 3D02–811, 3D02–814. Licenses
| Licenses Revocable
Sept. 30, 2002.
A license is revocable at will and cannot be
assigned.
Synopsis
Competitor brought action against city, alleging city could 1 Cases that cite this headnote
not enter into agreement with company planning to build
racetrack on waterfront property without following
competitive bid procedures applicable to leases and
alleging city violated the Sunshine Law. Company
[3]
intervened. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County, Injunction
Michael Genden, J., entered summary final judgment in Issues, proof, and variance
favor of competitor as to competitive bidding claim, but
found city did not violate Sunshine Law. All parties In competitor’s action against city alleging city
appealed in consolidated appeal. The District Court of could not enter into agreement with company
Appeal, Ramirez, J., held that: (1) agreement was lease, planning to build racetrack on waterfront
not license and city was obligated to follow competitive property without following competitive bid
bid procedures applicable to leases, but (2) city complied procedures applicable to leases, trial court could
with Sunshine Law. not order city to comply with all applicable
competitive bid procedures and give competitor
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. full and equal opportunity to submit competing
bid, since such relief was neither pled nor
requested by competitor.

West Headnotes (4) 2 Cases that cite this headnote

[1]
Licenses
Lease [4]
Municipal Corporations Municipal Corporations
Requisites and validity of conveyance or Rules of procedure and conduct of business
disposition
City did not violate Sunshine Law, requiring
Agreement between city and company, allowing public meetings of any board or commission of
company to use waterfront property for motor any municipal corporation at which official acts
car races, was a lease, not a license, as it was were taken, when it negotiated contract to allow
assignable and could not be revoked without races at waterfront park, because there were
notice of default and the opportunity to cure, and several publicly-noticed meetings regarding
gave company exclusive use of property for at proposed agreement in which there was public
least three days each year for 15 years, and thus participation and debate; Sunshine Law did not
city was obligated to follow competitive bid require that all negotiations about contract be

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1


Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

open to the public. West’s F.S.A. § 286.011(1). (license agreement which gave taxi company exclusive
use of airport parking spaces was a lease which required
competitive bidding). The agreement at issue here was
Cases that cite this headnote assignable and could not be revoked without notice of
default and the opportunity to cure. Additionally,
Raceworks was given the exclusive use of Bayfront Park
for at least three days each year for fifteen years.

Since the agreement between the City and Raceworks was


Attorneys and Law Firms
a lease, it fell within the purview of section 3(f)(iii) and
*412 Kenny Nachwalter, and Kevin J. Murray, and section 29–A(d) of the City Charter.3 The pre-amendment
Thomas H. Seymour, and Robert D.W. Landon, III, language of section 3(f)(iii) required competitive bidding
Miami, for appellant. for the commercial use of any of the City’s waterfront
property.4 Section 29–A(d) requires competitive bidding
Alejandro Vilarello, City Attorney, and Henry Hunnefeld, for any agreement which conveys any interest the City
Assistant City Attorney, and Myrna D. Bricker, Assistant has in waterfront property. The City leases the waterfront
City Attorney, and Erica Wright, Assistant City Attorney; from the federal government. The agreement at issue here
and Lauri Waldman Ross, and Theresa L. Girten; gave Raceworks in effect a sub-lease for Bayfront Park,
Greenberg Traurig, and Alan T. Dimond, and Elliot H. part of the City’s interest in waterfront property. Thus, the
Scherker, and Paul C. Savage, Miami, for appellees. original agreement to hold races in Bayfront Park should
have been the result of competitive bids.
Before FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ., and NESBITT,
[3]
Senior Judge. The trial court therefore correctly held that the City was
required to follow competitive bid procedures and that
Opinion any contract for the use of the City’s waterfront property
entered into without complying with those procedures
was void. However, we agree with the City that paragraph
RAMIREZ, J. 5 of the March 4, 2002 order must be deleted because it
was neither pled nor requested by Speedway. See
Cardinal Inv. Group, Inc. v. Giles, 813 So.2d 262, 263
In this consolidated appeal, the City of Miami and (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[C]ourts are not authorized to
intervenor Raceworks LLC appeal the entry of summary grant relief not requested in the pleadings.”)
final judgment in favor of Homestead–Miami Speedway
LLC (“Speedway”) in which the trial court held that the [4]
Florida’s Sunshine Law, section 286.011(1), Florida
original agreement between Raceworks and the City of Statutes, provides that:
Miami was void and issued an injunction prohibiting any
races from going forward under that agreement.1 All meetings of any board or
Speedway appeals from a summary final judgment commission of any ... municipal
entered in the City’s favor in which the trial court held corporation, or political
that the City did not violate the Sunshine Law in its subdivision, except as otherwise
negotiations with Speedway. We affirm the trial court’s provided in the Constitution, at
determination that the agreement was a lease, not a which official acts are to be taken
license, and as such should have been competitively bid are declared to be public meetings
as required by the City Charter.2 We also affirm the trial open to the public at all times, and
court’s determination that there were no Sunshine Law no resolution, rule, or formal action
violations. shall be considered binding except
[1] [2] as taken or made at such meeting.
The original agreement between the City and The board or commission must
Raceworks was not a license *413 because a license is provide reasonable notice of all
revocable at will and cannot be assigned. See Outdoor such meetings.
Media of Pensacola, Inc. v. Santa Rosa County, 554
So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (county’s granting
Speedway argues that the City violated the Sunshine Law
exclusive right to use right of way was a lease subject to
because it held no public hearing on the final negotiated
competitive bidding procedures). See also Randall Indus.,
contract *414 before the City voted to approve the
Inc. v. Lee County, 307 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

proposed contract at the August 9, 2001 meeting, and This appeal was further complicated by a subsequent
there was no cure by the City of this violation. The record agreement between the parties negotiated after the trial
reflects, however, that there were meetings regarding the court had entered summary judgment. Despite this new
proposed agreement between the City Manager and agreement, the City and Raceworks continue to argue the
Raceworks in which there was public participation and validity of the old agreement. By our opinion today, we
debate. The publicly noticed meetings were held on May do not address whether the subsequent agreement
24, 2001, July 10, 2001, July 26, 2001, August 9, 2001 between the City and Raceworks was also subject to
and September 25, 2001, and involved a discussion of the competitive bidding because the trial court has never
terms of the proposed agreement. At the July 10 and July ruled on the legality of the new agreement.
26 meetings, there was specific public comment regarding
the proposed agreement. Furthermore, Speedway has not Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
relied upon any case which requires that “all” such
negotiations be open to the public so as not to violate the
Sunshine Law. We thus find that the public was involved All Citations
in the decision making process that resulted in the final
negotiated contract of the parties and Speedway’s 828 So.2d 411, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143
argument lacks merit.

Footnotes
1 Order of March 4, 2002:
1. Speedway has standing to assert its claims and the contract is a lease.
2. Because the contract is a lease, the City was and is required to follow competitive bid procedures applicable to
leases, and the City’s failure to do so renders the contract void as a matter of law.
3. Alternatively, even if the contract were not a lease, the City was required to follow competitive bid procedures
pursuant to the provision of City Charter § 3(f)(iii). The City’s admitted failure to follow any competitive bid
procedures renders the contract void as a matter of law.
4. The contract between the City and Raceworks, which is acknowledged to have been entered into without the City
having complied with any of the applicable competitive bid procedures, is hereby declared null, void and of no further
legal effect.
5. The City is hereby directed to comply with all applicable competitive bid procedures, and thereby to give
Speedway a full and equal opportunity to submit a competing bid, and to have its bid fully and equally considered,
before entering into any lease, or any contract for use of the City’s waterfront property, for motor car races.
6. The City and Raceworks’ cross-motions for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the Second Amended
Complaint are denied.
2 We do, however, reverse the language contained in paragraph 5 of the March 4, 2002 order as it exceeded the relief
requested in the pleadings.
3 Section 29–A(d) of the City Charter states: “[s]ales and leases of real property; prohibition. Except as otherwise
provided in this charter section, there shall be no sale, conveyance, or disposition of any interest, including any
leasehold, in real property owned by the city ... unless there has been prior public notice and a prior opportunity given
to the public to compete for said real property or interest.”
Section § 3(f)(iii) of the City Charter states: “[t]he City of Miami shall have power ... [t]o lease to or contract with
private firms or persons for the commercial use or management of any of the city’s waterfront property, but only in
compliance with the other requirements of this charter and on condition that ... (D) the procurement methods
prescribed by ordinances are observed. Any such lease or management agreement ... which does not comply with
each of the above conditions shall not be valid unless it has first been approved by a majority of the voters of the
city.”
4 The City Charter was amended by referendum on November 6, 2001 to delete the words “commercial use” from
section 3(f)(iii).

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3


Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC v. City of Miami, 828 So.2d 411 (2002)
27 Fla. L. Weekly D2143

End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4