Zaldy Ampatuan vs Ronaldo Puno
Calling Out Power, Emergency Powers, Local Autonomy
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the
Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state
of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three
days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring”
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President
to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which
amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO
273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Claiming that the President’s issuances
encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the
ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the
DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to
seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed
that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state
of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents
occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking
over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that
Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be
declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A
violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her
actions
Held:
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG
Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in
the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor,
petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec.
2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12
Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named
the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.
The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the
administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only
a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x
x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual
bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President
that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and
suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity
of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable
and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In
many instances, the evidence upon which the President
might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief
has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a
state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no
factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas
under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency,
it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the
DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both
high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the
two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize
the situation, the President had to take preventive
action. She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and
security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the
proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places
and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual
bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.
Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch –
Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take
Over Power – Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order
No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded
to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions
against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the
state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of
the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP
1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the
alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in
the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly
in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of
the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to
refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations,
the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to
simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the
President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail
the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather
it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out
a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial
Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration
and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.
SANLAKAS vs. Executive Secretary
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the
Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec.
18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise
of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation
of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al,
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issues:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state
or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-
in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit
as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken
over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment
since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a
valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on
the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
ATTY. RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that
he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that
he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does
not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be
limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
x x x x
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions
that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it
can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that
“(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if
we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada
under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not
operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not
explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon,
and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It
is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation
much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a
public office again, the former ought to have explicitly
stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part
of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to
rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted
as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.
Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon – Admission Not Needed in
Amnesty
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the
killings they made during the war. The case was proceeded
against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be
found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the
defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he
surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission
refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused
because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged.
Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino
was the one who committed the crime being charged to
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in
amnesty.
HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is
a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President
with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution
of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does “nor work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is
charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or
the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is
not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts
or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses
having committed the offense with which he is charged,
the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the
witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is
entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a
patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to
the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is
a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted
therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said
benefits.
Gaudencio Vera et al vs People of the Philippines
Amnesty – Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto
Case
Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime
of kidnapping with murder done against a certain Lozaňes.
The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the
Japanese occupation. During the hearing, none of the
petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the
crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant
who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing
of the deceased Lozañes, categorically denied it. Hence, the
Amnesty Commission held that it could not take
cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of
the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by
defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the
commission of the crime, plead that said commission was
in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese
occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that
the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty
sans admission of guilt.
HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an
act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him,
he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains
that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use
for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes
certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the
accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The
invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader
admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a
previous admission of guilt since a person would not need
the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty
of the offense covered by the proclamation.
Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo Santos
Pardon – Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given
pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he
was already holding the position as the municipality
president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction.
Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be
excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he
was already convicted of final judgment “for any crime
against property”. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New
Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled
that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by
virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his “full
civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are
clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as
an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations
upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the
Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised
after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend
cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and
must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is
entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result
of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who
violate its command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all
that is left of the consequences f conviction. In the present
case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual
in nature involving no money or property responsibility,”
it is absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full
civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion
that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA
357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning
power of the president, would lead to the impairment of
the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in
the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result
that there would be no way of restoring the political
privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative
action.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera
65 Phil. 56 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of
Rights – Equal Protection – Probation Law
Separation of Powers – Undue Delegation of Powers – Power
to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws – May the State Question Its Own
Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal
case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for
probation. The matter was referred to the Insular
Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing was set by
Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The
Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to
delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like
the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided
over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law
(Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;
that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila,
even if construed as a province, has no designated
probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant
probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter
alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of
provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no
probation officer will be appointed – hence, that makes it
violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue
delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation
law – however, the legislature did not provide guidelines
to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executive’s power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation
law, had in effect encroached upon the executive’s power
to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC – ironic because their main
stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only
in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that,
the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the
People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a
law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further,
Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself
had used the Probation Law in the past without question
but is now questioning the validity of the said law
(estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly
authorized representative, from questioning the validity of
a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it
had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is
unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken
on this note. There is violation of the equal protection
clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to
apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer.
So if a province decides not to install a probation officer,
then the accused within said province will be unduly
deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the
probation law in their province. This only creates a roving
commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not
pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix
penalties while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.
Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino
Absolute Pardon
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque.
Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that
Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he
was already convicted before and was even imprisoned.
Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello
averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and
being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of
the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by
the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an
absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the
Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election
but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that
since there is an absolute pardon, all the former
disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction
had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible
for the public office in question.
People of the Philippines vs Eugenio Pasilan
Amnesty – when cannot be invoked – new trial
Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese.
In 1944, while cleaning his gun outside the house of one
Justina Miguel, a certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan
ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra waited and after
cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra. Abarra was
alleged to be supporting the Japanese cause and he was
one of the persons who accompanied the Japanese troops
in raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived. After
interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds
on Abarra’s chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten
days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About
10 years after the incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to
the barrio to investigate crimes committed during the war.
He conducted some investigation and was also able to have
Miguel testify against Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to
be guilty for the murder of Abarra. On July 29, 1964,
Pasilan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse the
decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly discovered
evidence are sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguel’s
recantation. Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation
No. 8 by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who
during the war committed any act penalized under the RPC
in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy or
against person aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for
amnesty.
HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the
accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the power to grant a
new trial would rest not in the courts but in the witnesses
who have testified against the accused. Recanting
testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since
Justina Miguel’s alleged recantation has already been
passed upon by the trial court, new trial is uncalled for.
Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle
appellant to a new trial. In the first place, Proclamation No.
8 of President Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence,
for it was already known when the case was tried.
Secondly, availing of the benefits granted by the amnesty
proclamation would be inconsistent with the plea of not
guilty which appellant entered upon his arraignment.
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and
when the accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot avail of amnesty.
Legaspi vs Minister of Finance
Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the
President Acts Pursuant to His Power to Legislate
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then
incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,
petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting
tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities
and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued
that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that
under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be
vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and
the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of
the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no
concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer
arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred
that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers
to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after
the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax
amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that
PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of
the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the
Constitution which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the
President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In
the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power
to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be
indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in
the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the
Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested
by the Constitution.”
Other Options Available to the President Aside from
Declaring Martial Law – Amendment No. 6
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then
incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,
petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting
tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities
and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued
that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that
under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be
vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and
the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of
the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no
concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer
arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred
that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers
to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after
the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: What are the possible options available to the
president other than declaring martial law.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must
be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that
Amendment No. 6 vests upon the “President (Prime
Minister)” are to be exercised only on two specified
occasions, namely, (1) “when in (his judgment) a grave
emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence
thereof” and (2) “whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular
Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action.” The power is to “issue necessary
decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form
part of the law of the land.” As the tenor of the amendment
readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when
the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power
that is in the nature of the other powers which the
Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows
to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and
emergencies.
The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen
by the president to avoid declaring another martial law.
There are also other options that the president can even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized
recourse to; they are: and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall
continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under
(a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan;
the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the
(b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed President and the Prime Minister under this
to be in the barracks; Constitution.’Parenthetically, the term “Incumbent
President’ employed in the transitory provisions could
(c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs.
corpus; and
Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275). “After the April 7
(d) martial law [being the last] amendments there exists no longer ‘a President (Prime
Minister)’ but ‘A President’ and ‘A Prime Minister.’ They
President must first exercise emergency powers as may be
are now two different offices which cannot be held by a
provided by the legislature. When it fails, it cannot be
single person – not a transitory one but a regular one
adequate when lawless violence becomes generalized and
provided for and governed by the main provisions of the
public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the
newly amended Constitution. Subsequent events accept
armed forces. And when such situation still aggravates to
the reality that we are no longer governed by the
the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or
transitory provisions of the Constitution.” This form of
detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it
government is essentially parliamentary with presidential
becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of
features.
habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even
after the putting into effect of the measures Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio
aforementioned, under the constitution, without Factoran
Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim
martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is
measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive Prospective
elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She
minded sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it
was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
only as a very last resort. Again, this is to avoid the
Public Documents. She was found guilty and was
necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law
sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by
that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing
Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance
President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun,
for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was
that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the
still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The
government by the military. Thus, the virtue of
Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the
Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of
President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s request
martial law do not have to accompany the exercise of the
averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the
that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
calling out of the armed forces and the suspension of the
Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are
should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil
concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be
liabilities brought about by her acts.
resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such
power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to
to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than her former post.
disguised martial law.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.
Political Law – Forms of Government It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang
upon the government any obligation to make reparation
Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
“granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why
be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of
backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand,
the Batasang Pambansa.
civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It
ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can issue such subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
decrees. reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may
HELD: It is to be observed that the original text mentions
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
President (Prime Minister). This is so because ‘. . . The
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers
debtor, compensation and novation.
Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo
III
Pardon – Applicable to Administrative Cases
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas
together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found
guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his
vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30
days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing
that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to
administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to
Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid
and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.