Dao (2017) 16:53–71

DOI 10.1007/s11712-016-9534-6

Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu: ZHANG

Taiyan’s Parallel Interpretation

Cheng WANG1

Published online: 27 December 2016

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract To avoid the one-sidedness and abuse of the rule of xieju 絜 矩 (principle
of applying a measuring square), ZHANG Taiyan 章 太 炎 redefines zhong-shu 忠 恕 ,
the Confucian golden rule, as two separate yet complementary principles, the idea
of which is most manifestly drawn from Zhuangzi’s 莊 子 “Qiwulun 齊 物 論 ”
(“Discourse on Making All Things Equal”). Zhang’s association of zhong-shu
and qiwu 齊 物 is based upon his vision of equality premised on recognition of and
respect for differences. In Zhang’s reading of the Zhuangzi in light of Yogācāra,
the crucial “concept matching” (geyi 格 義 ) is the explanation of cheng xin 成 心 as
seeds in the ālaya consciousness. Cheng xin in this sense not only refers to the
natural pattern of things and so is the basis for inference and deduction, but also
serves as the means to deal with the diversity of opinions. In moral practice,
Zhang proposes the liang xing 兩 行 approach of his qiwu philosophy: to recognize
the equal worth of all beings on one hand, and to take the particular characteristics
and desires of individuals into account on the other. Thus, it requires the dual
practice of zhong and shu: to acquire firsthand observation through personal
experience, and to imagine oneself in the position of the other.

Keywords Zhong-Shu 忠恕 . Qiwu 齊物 . ZHANGTaiyan 章太炎. Yogācāra . Interpretation

1 Introduction

“Do to others what you wish yourself,” and “do not do to others what you do not
wish yourself” (Fung 1948: 43). This is the principle of zhong-shu 忠 恕 in

* Cheng WANG
wangchengzju@gmail.com

1
Research Institute for Ancient Books, School of Humanities, Zhejiang University, 148 Tianmushan
Road, Hangzhou, People’s Republic of China 310028
54 Cheng WANG

Confucian ethics. It consists of both positive and negative aspects of the practice
of ren 仁 (humanity).1 It is the Confucian formulation of the “Golden Rule.”2
Although the principle and rule worked in a monocultural society of the past, they
are no longer universally applicable, especially in an increasingly interconnected
global village.3 Discussions have been held on problems with the Golden Rule and
efforts have been made to reformulate or reinterpret it to avoid criticisms. 4 The
principle of zhong-shu has also been reinterpreted in various ways. From Zisi 子思,5
Mencius,6 and Xunzi 荀子7; CHENG Yi 程頤, CHENG Hao 程顥,8 and ZHU Xi 朱熹9; to
contemporary scholars,10 the understanding of zhong-shu is always shifting. The history
of interpretation of zhong-shu cannot be separated from the development of
Confucianism, but a full review of it is beyond the scope of this essay. Instead I will
focus on a unique and idiosyncratic interpretation presented by ZHANG Binglin 章炳麟
(Taiyan 太炎, 1868–1936), one of the most prominent thinkers in modern China.
The late 19th century saw an East-West conflict. To take up and respond to the
challenge of Western culture and civilization, Chinese intellectual elites drew
inspiration from traditional resources on one hand and reinterpreted ancient texts
in a modern context on the other. Zhang is known for his inclusiveness and critical
thinking, thanks to his access to European thoughts and later adherence to Yogācāra

1
For a detailed explanation of zhong and shu, see Fung 1948: 43–44.
2
Simon Blackburn notes the connection between Confucius and the Golden Rule (Blackburn 2001: 101).
3
In a multicultural world, the people we interact with might be different from us in terms of ideas and
perspectives, interests and preferences, habits and customs (Huang 2010).
4
For an overview of the criticism on the “Golden Rule” in the West, see Huang 2005.
5
Zhongyong 中 庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean), a classical Confucian text attributed to Zisi, interprets
zhong-shu from the perspective of completing one’s own self and other people: “Sincerity is not only the
completion of one’s own self, it is that by which all things are completed…. [T]hey are the Way in which
the internal and the external are united” (Chan 1963: 108). It suggests that Zisi takes both one’s own self
and other people into consideration and emphasizes the communication between both sides.
6
Mencius observes: “All the ten thousand things are there in me…. Try your best to treat others as you would
wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to humanity” (Mencius 7A4; Lau
1970: 182). Nevertheless, he also brings up the doctrine of “love with distinction,” which means that one
should have a different kind of love toward a different kind of people (Huang 2005).
7
Xunzi discriminates between the standards the gentleman (junzi 君 子 ) applies to himself and to others:
“Because he measures himself with the plumbline, he deserves to be considered the model and paradigm of the
whole world. Because when he comes into contact with others he uses the bow-frame, he is capable of
magnanimity and tolerance” (Xunzi 5; Knoblock 1988: 209).
8
The Cheng brothers interpret zhong-shu with the model of ti-yong 體 用 (substance/application or function)
ontologically and show special concern for the moral patients (objects of moral concern) in its application.
When asked how to overcome oneself, CHENG Yi answered that it is “to treat things according to things
themselves and not according to ourselves” (Cheng and Cheng 1985: 125; Huang 2005: 405). CHENG Hao
states more clearly: “[T]he heart and mind of a sage is not determined by itself but by external things” (Cheng
and Cheng 1985: 460; Huang 2005: 405).
9
ZHU Xi makes the Cheng brothers’ view more explicit and emphasizes that the sage practices zhong-shu
without any conscious or extra efforts. In his comments on xieju 絜 矩 (applying a measuring square), Zhu
points out that inference should be based on similarity (see Zhu 2002: 24), and in addition he has noticed the
difference of recipients in social status and intelligence (see Zhu 2002: 539).
10
For example, WANG Qingjie argues that “the central idea of Confucius’ Golden Rule is interpersonal care
and love, which is expressed mainly in the concept of shu” and “the concept of zhong, which focuses on the
commitment of individuals to their community as a whole… is possible only on the basis of shu or by way of
shu” (Wang 1999: 421). LI Jinglin 李景林 maintains that the positive expression of the Confucian principle of
zhong-shu as “bestow one’s wish to the other” is not compatible with Confucian thought; it is also susceptible
to ignoring its principle of limitation and encouraging egoism which has caused harm in modern society (Li
2003).
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 55

Buddhism.11 In his interpretation, zhong and shu are two separate but complemen-
tary principles with profound ethical implications in historical and cultural contexts;
and the more creative idea is his correlation of Confucius’ zhong-shu with
Zhuangzi’s 莊 子 qiwu 齊 物 (equality of things or equalizing things). Although
Wei-Jin 魏 晉 scholars began to interpret Confucian classics in Daoist terms, they
did not associate zhong-shu with qiwu. In this sense, Zhang’s interpretation is
unconventional and worth examining in closer detail. In order to understand
Zhang’s association of the two apparently unrelated categories and his epistemo-
logical and ethical approaches, it is necessary to steep oneself in in-depth study of
Zhang’s Qiwulun Shi 齊 物 論 釋 (An Interpretation of the Qiwulun), which “attempts
to bring the systematic analysis of Yogācāra philosophy to the cryptic and notori-
ously unsystematic Qiwulun” (Makeham 2012: 119).12 Taking these into account,
we can reveal how he blends together different perspectives and makes use of
resources from various sources, especially Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.
In this essay, I will introduce Zhang’s particular interpretation of zhong-shu as well
as his critical view on the rule of xieju 絜 矩 (principle of applying a measuring square),
which coincides with the contemporary discussion of the Golden Rule. Then through
the reading of the Qiwulun Shi I will focus on the proposed relation between zhong-shu
and qiwu, which has rarely been addressed in a substantive way by scholars.

2 Zhong-Shu as Two Separate but Complementary Principles

In his early years, ZHANG Taiyan won for himself a high reputation for his philological
studies of ancient texts, but “his profound knowledge of the Confucian classics did not
mean that he was a slavish follower of the classics or the interpretations of his
predecessors” (Lee 2013: 348). His understanding of zhong-shu is clearly different
from the traditional interpretations. From Zhang’s attitude toward the principle of xieju
or applying a measuring square, it can be inferred that he agrees with the statement “do
not do to others what you do not want them to do to you” (Analects 15.23; Chan 1963:
44), but disagrees with “do unto others what you would have them do unto you.”13

2.1 Xieju and Zhang’s Criticism

Before we come to Zhang’s criticism, a brief textual analysis of xieju is necessary. The
term xieju (measuring square) appears twice in the Great Learning (Daxue 大學). From
one of the contexts in which it is situated, we can easily discern that it is the negative
form of zhong-shu:
11
Zhang regarded Yogācāra Buddhism “as a sophisticated knowledge system which could serve as an
authoritative alternative to the knowledge systems being introduced from the West” (Makeham 2012: 103).
12
Zhang’s reading of the Zhuangzi in light of Yogācāra brings two distinct traditions together. In this regard, it
may well be said that he is “a comparative philosopher before his time” (Murthy 2014: 124).
13
As Confucius says, “Desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develops
others” (Analects 6.28; see Fung 1948: 43). In traditional China, Confucius’ teachings, including both positive
and negative versions of the “Golden Rule” as stated in the Analects, were perceived as sacred. Zhang’s
acceptance of its negative version and rejection of the positive one demonstrates his independent character and
critical thinking. Obviously the negative version of the “Golden Rule” is not without its problem as discussed
by contemporary scholars.
56 Cheng WANG

What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not show it in dealing with his
inferiors; … what he dislikes in those on the right, let him not apply it to those on
the left; and what he dislikes in those on the left, let him not apply it to those on
the right. This is the principle of the measuring square (xieju zhi dao 絜矩之道).
(Chan 1963: 92)

However, commentators are divided on the meaning of xieju in its positive version:

When the ruler treats the elders with respect, then the people will be aroused
toward filial piety. When the ruler treats the aged with respect, then the people
will be aroused toward brotherly respect.... Therefore the ruler has a principle
with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct (junzi you
xieju zhi dao 君子有絜矩之道). (Chan 1963: 92)

ZHENG Xuan 鄭 玄 , the Han 漢 dynasty authoritative annotator of the Confucian

Classics, interprets xie 絜 to mean “hold or stick to” and ju 矩 to refer to “rule or
law.” Hence, xieju zhi dao 絜 矩 之 道 means: “the superior man should stick to and
not deviate from the rule” (Ruan 1980: 1674–1675).14 According to his comment,
the rule is applied to oneself. 15 However, we find additional yet pivotal change in
the subcommentary by KONG Yingda 孔 穎 達 , the famous Tang 唐 dynasty com-
mentator: “Apply the rule to others and they all will follow” (Ruan 1980: 1676).
In Kong’s mind xieju zhi dao is a way of governing although, as he indicates, the
prerequisite is that the superior man should set an example to others.16 However,
xieju in this sense could be abused or taken advantage of. It might be taken as the
rule or standard to measure, judge, and constrain others. Even worse, ill- intentioned
people could use it as an excuse to force others to obey and submit. Zhang is fully
aware of the potential harm brought by its abusive application. It should be noted
that he considers xieju not only as a method of governing but also the principle for
treating others. He calls attention to its ethical defect: “By adhering to the rule of
xieju, we may give others what they dislike, though we thought they would like it”
(Zhang 2011: 32).
To evaluate Zhang’s criticism on xieju, we should note that Confucian tradition
has always stressed the significance of sociality, showing a collective value
orientation. For instance, Mencius presupposes that human beings are similar to
each other both physiologically and psychologically.17 From the ethical point of
view, the similarity of the human mind, which “cannot bear to see the sufferings of
others,” is emphasized and the “four sprouts” (siduan 四 端 ) theory is proposed to
assume the uniformity of human nature.18 It is on this premise that the Confucians
14
Where quotations are translated, the translations are my own unless otherwise stated or cited.
15
FUNG Yu-lan (FENG Youlan) 馮友蘭 has a comment on the principle of applying a measuring square: “It is a
principle by which one uses oneself as a standard to regulate one’s conduct” (Fung 1948: 43).
16
As WANG Qingjie argues, “[T]he nature of morality in the Confucian tradition should be seen not as
something that is categorical, imperative, or absolutely prescriptive but rather as something exemplary,
pedagogical, and consultative” (Wang 1999: 415–416).
17
As Mencius remarks, “[A]ll palates have the same preference in taste; all ears in sound; all eyes in beauty.
Should hearts prove to be an exception by possessing nothing in common?” (Mencius 6A7; Lau 1970: 164).
18
In Mencius’ own words, “The heart of compassion is possessed by all men alike; likewise the heart of
shame, the heart of respect, and the heart of right and wrong” (Mencius 6A6; Lau 1970: 163).
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 57

try to “infer from oneself and extend it to others” and then establish moral
standards for everyone to follow. In contrast to the Confucians who focus on
“generality” (zong xiang 總 相 ) at the expense of overlooking “particularity” (bie
xiang 别 相 ),19 Zhang pays more attention to individual differences in physiology
and psychology, obviously under the influence of Zhuangzi. 20

2.2 Zhang’s Interpretation of Zhong-Shu

Acknowledging the limitation of xieju, Zhang proposes to apply both zhong and
shu, which in his interpretation are two separate but complementary principles.
Xieju zhi dao, as he sees it, corresponds to the principle of shu, which in Zhang’s
mind means “do to others what you wish yourself” (see Zhang 2011: 32), but
excludes that of zhong.21 He believes that the intended purpose cannot be
achieved by only adhering to the former while failing to apply the latter. What
is zhong in Zhang’s understanding? Though its definition is not found in his
writings, Zhang holds up wealth almsgiving (offerings of material goods) and
almsgiving of fearlessness (bestowing of confidence) in Buddhism as examples
of zhong (see Zhang 2011: 32).22 According to the account of his disciple ZHOU
Zuoren 周作人, these two kinds of almsgiving illustrate that zhong means “do
unto others what others would like you to do unto them” (see Zhou 2002: 13–
14). By providing food and clothing to the needy or giving courage to the
coward, the Buddhists conduct the charitable action catering to the recipients’
particular desires.23
Zhang’s interpretation of zhong-shu as two separate principles is quite unique
compared to the explanations offered by his predecessors. Still more creative and
idiosyncratic is his borrowing of the moral principle to explain the methodology of
learning: “Shu means to infer or estimate while zhong refers to observe carefully. [As is
said in the Analects,] he hears one point and understands the whole thing; from one
corner of a subject he can learn the other three. These are the application of the method
of shu…. The method of zhong requires to put forward evidence or proof and to
investigate the natural structure of specific objects” (Zhang 2011: 32). To further
explain what he means by the two terms, Zhang takes Xunzi’s description of sage as

19
An example given by HUANG Yong may make the statement clear: the need for food is common to all
human beings; it is the universal characteristic. Nevertheless, vegetarians like eating vegetables while
nonvegetarians prefer meat; it is the specific characteristic (Huang 2005: 402).
20
For example, Zhang cites Zhuangzi’s remark that “men eat grains and cereals, deer eat tender grass,
centipedes enjoy snakes, and owls and crows like mice” and further argues that “human beings also vary in
their preferences” (Zhang 2011: 32).
21
To make a rough distinction, it could be loosely said that the principle of xieju (giving everyone his or her
due by applying the same standards to others that one applies to oneself) is more oriented toward external
behavior, while that of shu (being compassionate by putting oneself in the other’s place) is toward internal
experience.
22
On the other hand, Zhang holds up Dharma almsgiving (the almsgiving of Buddha-truth) as an example of
shu. In practicing the almsgiving of dharma (introducing others to Buddhism) the Buddhists assume that what
is good for oneself must be good for anyone else, and thus are apt to impose their religious belief on others
through preaching regardless of whether the recipients need it or not.
23
In Zhang’s explanation, the word zhong literary means “thoughtful” and “considerate” (see Zhang 2014a:
433).
58 Cheng WANG

an example. The sage in Xunzi’s ideal uses himself or herself as the model or standard
for measurement:

Hence, the sage uses men to measure men, circumstances to gauge circumstances,
each class of thing to measure that class, the persuasion to measure the achieve-
ment, and the Way to observe the totality, so that for him the ancient and modern
are one and the same. Things of the same class do not become contradictory even
though a long time has elapsed because they share an identical principle of order.
(Xunzi 5; Knoblock 1988: 207)

On the analogy of Western logic, Zhang derives the method of deduction (infer-
ence by reasoning from generals to particulars) from the above paragraph and
identifies it with the method of shu, which emphasizes similarity, regarding “the
Way” or “identical principle of order” as the premise of deduction. In the mean-
time, he points out the limitation of this method: “Not everything can be inferred.
The exclusive use of the method of shu without firsthand observation and personal
experience will lead to misconstruing the phenomenon and principle” (Zhang
2011: 32). To observe and experience personally, in Zhang’s terms, is the method
of zhong, which is equivalent to induction and explained as “to find the center of
the circle (refers to general rules) by observing particular phenomena closely and
thoroughly” (Zhang 2011: 32). He makes a general statement on the two methods:
“The method of shu is to infer or measure things according to principles while the
method of zhong is to induce or conclude principles by observing things” (Zhang
2011: 32), and “they are like two wings of a bird or two wheels of a cart (for
learning)” (Zhang 2014a: 434). In light of this epistemic perspective a methodo-
logical reading of the following paragraph from the Xunzi is plausible:

By penetrating into and inspecting the myriad things, he knows their essential
qualities. By examining and testing order and disorder, he is fully conversant with
their inner laws. By laying out the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth, he tailors
the functions of the myriad things. By regulating and distinguishing according to
the Great Ordering Principle, he encompasses everything in space and time.
(Xunzi 21; Knoblock 1994: 105)

The first two sentences describe the process of reasoning from the particular to the
general, whereas the latter two sentences reasons from the general to the particular, as it
is read by Zhang (see Zhang 2014a: 434).
To summarize, Zhang reinterpreted the Confucian moral principle of zhong-shu
with two complementary dimensions and associates zhong-shu with epistemolog-
ical status. As a result, a parallel between epistemic methodology and moral
practice is developed.24 The analogy implies that both dimensions are of equal
importance and shu cannot do without zhong. In dealing with mundane affairs of
human beings, peculiarities should be taken into full consideration, since “it is

24
ZHANG Xuecheng 章學誠, a historian and thinker in the late Qing 清 dynasty, interpreted the principle of shu
(sympathetic concern) in the epistemological perspective (Ivanhoe 2009). I think ZHANG Taiyan might have
taken hints from ZHANG Xuecheng, for whom he showed considerable respect.
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 59

difficult to find a uniform standard to judge right and wrong” (Zhang 2014a: 433).
When it comes to human likes and dislikes, “things are too complex to be
measured with a single item as we measure a square or a circle” (Zhang 2014a:
433). In such cases, one is more likely to regard one’s own parochial standard as
the universal standard. To provide an example, Zhang contends that Mozi 墨 子 and
Xunzi “only apply the principle of shu and fail to practice zhong” in the political
sphere: “Mozi advocates the Will of Heaven and identification with the Superior,
both of which lead to the abuse of the few by the many,” and “Xunzi emphasizes
constraints in governing, which has little difference from Mozi” (Zhang 2014a:
434). In Zhang’s view, only Zhuangzi perfectly practices and only the “Qiwulun”
perfectly illustrates zhong and shu.

3 Qiwu through the Lens of Yogācāra Buddhism

The parallel between Confucius’ zhong-shu and Zhuangzi’s qiwu was made explicit in
ZHANG Taiyan’s Investigative Essays (Jianlun 檢 論 ) and his Subtle Words (Zhuohan
Weiyan 菿漢微言).25 However, a detailed and thorough discussion specialized on this
“concept matching”26 is not available in his writings. Why does he say “qiwu is the
dual practice of zhong and shu”? How does he knit together zhong-shu and qiwu?
These questions may be addressed by a close reading of the Qiwulun Shi, a Yogācāra
Buddhist interpretation of the second chapter of the Zhuangzi.27 As a Buddhist
interpretation of Zhuangzi, the Qiwulun Shi does not refer to the Confucian concepts
directly, but, as I will argue, it embraces the very thought that Zhang later expressed in
Confucian terms.28

3.1 Equality as the Base for Zhong-Shu

At the beginning of the interpretation, Zhang claims that the title “Qiwulun” means the
discussion on the equality of all things.29 Equality, the central theme of Zhang’s qiwu

25
As the revised version of the Book of Urgency (Qiushu 訄書), a collection of political and cultural essays, the
Jianlun, was compiled approximately in 1914 during Zhang’s house arrest by YUAN Shikai 袁 世 凱 and
completed in early 1915. The Zhuohan Weiyan is a collection of Zhang’s academic thoughts and ideas
recorded from 1915 to early 1916 by his disciple WU Chengshi 吳承仕.
26
Concept matching (geyi 格義) originally refers to employing terminology mainly from philosophical Daoist
texts to translate Buddhist texts during the early period of Buddhist history in China.
27
This piece of work, written approximately between 1905 and 1911, is extremely treasured by Zhang. He
even exclaimed that in this work “each character is worth one thousand gold pieces” (see Tang 1979: 346) and
there are “no comparable rivals in the past one thousand and six hundred years [since GUO Xiang 郭象
appended a philosophical commentary to the text of the Zhuangzi]” (Zhang 1977: 702).
28
According to the common view, Zhang revised the Qiwulun Shi in 1912. I believe that the inherent idea
behind the parallel between zhong-shu and qiwu had already formed in Zhang’s mind during this period.
However, TAKADA Atsushi 高田淳 favors the opinion that the revision was carried out between 1914 and 1915
(Takada 1984: 79–85). If we accept his assumption, then the time period when Zhang was revising his
Qiwulun Shi roughly coincides with the period when he was working on the Jianlun and preparing for the
Zhuohan Weiyan.
29
Zhang disagrees with another explanation of the title “Qiwulun” as “equalizing discourses (or theories, or
perspectives) on things” (qi wulun), which was initially put forward by WANG Anshi 王安石 and LÜ Huiqing 呂惠
卿 in the Song 宋 dynasty. For the discussion of the two different interpretations of the title, see Huang 2008.
60 Cheng WANG

philosophy, is also the prerequisite and foundation for the principles of zhong-shu. It
needs to be clear that Zhang’s conception of equality is far from a general or abstract
concept.30 He explains, “Equality does not simply mean to regard sentient beings with
equal vision and not to differentiate the superior and the inferior. (As it is said in the
Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna,) all things in their fundamental
nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form
of language. They are without the range of apperception. They have no signs of
distinction. This is the ultimate equality, which accords with the qiwu philosophy”
(Zhang 2014b: 73). By quoting the Buddhist sayings, Zhang differentiates equality
in his sense from that of common sense. It should merit special attention that just
because things in their fundamental nature have no signs of distinction does not
mean they have no difference in their phenomenal character. To treat all creatures
equally, without distinction of high and low or noble and mean, simply shows an
ignorance of differences. Rather than espousing the empty concept that all human
beings are equal, Zhang admits the distinction between civilized and uncivilized peo-
ples, who “have different preferences and various ways of life” (Zhang 2014b: 118). He
alerts us to the abuse of equality which requires others to comply and follow, in which
case equality leads to assimilation or homogenization that only exacerbates inequality.
Most typical is the case of tyrants who efface distinctions in the name of equality to root
out dissidents: “When others have different opinions or violate the fixed rules, the tyrant
would put them to death in the name of Heaven” (Zhang 2014b: 73). Both ancient and
modern times saw the abusive application of xieju which Zhang strongly opposes. For
this reason, he suggests that people be content with their respective ways of life: “The
barbaric is content with its simplicity while the civilized with its elegance; they do no
harm to each other. Such is equality” (Zhang 2014b: 76).31 This instance reveals that
Zhang’s view of equality is founded upon differences rather than eradication of differ-
ences: “To equalize that which is not equal is the superficial view of lowly persons; (to
realize) the equality of inequalities (or differences) is the profound discourse of the most
exalted wisdom” (Zhang 2014b: 73; translation adapted from Makeham 2012: 120).32
How does such equality come into being? Yogācāra Buddhism, at the epistemological
level, allows Zhang to develop his idea and provide the metaphysical foundation for
social and political equality.33
For Zhang, real equality is derived from breaking free from opinions of good and
evil or right and wrong. At first glance, it seems he is advocating relativism. With

30
Viren Murthy has mentioned that Zhang goes beyond the empty universality of abstract equality (Murthy
2014).
31
Zhang’s statement on the barbaric and the civilized should be understood through its historical background.
In the early twentieth century China, as a backward country, was invaded by Western countries. Therefore, the
barbarian and the civilized here have specific referents. By this, Zhang means that every nation has the right to
develop in its own way. For discussion on the political implications of Zhang’s qiwu philosophy, see Murthy
2011.
32
Viren Murthy has another translation: “To equalize the unequal is the position of the lowly scholar, but to
see the equal in the unequal is the theory of the elevated philosopher” (Murthy 2014: 140–141).
33
HUANG Yong has raised a question: “[F]rom ‘things are different,’ how can you draw the conclusion that
they are therefore of equal value?” He says, “The Zhuangzi in general and the chapter on equality of things in
particular does not provide any philosophical argument for that,” and he believes “equality of things for the
Zhuangzi is a simple ‘fact’” (Huang 2010: 73). As I see it, Zhang’s interpretation, by drawing on the Yogācāra
theory, gives us a perspective for addressing this question.
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 61

the implication of Yogācāra, however, we may find Zhang has gone far beyond that.
He asserts, “Three things are generated by the human mind: appearances/attributes
(xiang 相 ), names/concepts (ming 名 ), and discrimination (fenbie 分 別 )” (Zhang
2014b: 73). The mind observes names and assembles appearances. It is continually
making differentiations. Accordingly, in order to achieve the equality of differ-
ences, namely true equality, names and attributes must be abandoned. 34
According to the Consciousness-only (weishi 唯 識 ) doctrine, there are eight con-
sciousnesses, enumerating the five senses, supplemented by the mind, defilements of
the mind, and finally the fundamental store-house consciousness, which is the basis of
the other seven. It is the sixth, “mind consciousness,” that conjectures and differentiates
attributes and concepts. The seventh consciousness, the basis for our sense of individual
identity, is characterized by its attachment to store-house consciousness as self-distinct
and separate from others.35 It is worth mentioning that this mode of consciousness is
defiled by a dualistic outlook. Whatever it experiences, it interprets dualistically in
terms of a subject and an object.36 Things are seen in terms of pairs of opposites, such
as good and bad, true and false, right and wrong, existence and nonexistence. 37 The
eighth consciousness, also called ālaya, contains various types of “seeds,”38 which are
created by our previous thoughts and deeds and have the potential to manifest all kinds
of things in the universe.39
In the Qiwulun Shi 齊 物 論 釋 (Interpretation of Discourse on Making All Things
Equal), Zhang applies the Consciousness-only doctrine to interpret the text of the
Zhuangzi.40 For instance, he makes the point that “the passage about the wind blowing
on the ten thousand things in the piping of heaven serves a metaphor for the ālaya
consciousness” (Zhang 2014b: 78). In his hermeneutics, the saying “let each be itself”
means “the root of mind41 attaches to the ālaya consciousness and perceives it as the
self” while “each comes from itself” means “the subjective and the objective arise
through dependent origination” (Zhang 2014b: 78).42 Therefore, those concepts and

34
As Makeham explains, “By equal Zhang was not advocating some form of relativism or treating all things
as having equal value; rather he is proposing that when images/attributes and names/concepts are abandoned,
all that remains is the undifferentiated state of zhenru 真 如 (tathatā)” (Makeham 2012: 120). For detailed
introduction of Yogācāra teaching and discussion of Zhang’s ontology and cognitive epistemology, see
Makeham 2012: 104–115.
35
It is called “defilements of the mind” because the seventh consciousness is the source of self-love, self-
delusion, view of self, and self-conceit.
36
The subject refers to the self and the object refers to the world or universe. Thus, subjective view (jianfen 見
分) and objective aspect (xiangfen 相分) are two aspects of perception in Consciousness-only theory.
37
Such a dualistic outlook, I think, inspires Zhang’s interpretation of chengxin 成 心 , as I will discuss below.
38
In Consciousness-only theory, as a metaphor, “seeds” refer to the potential energy for the mental and
physical manifestation of one’s existence.
39
Zhang makes an analogy between ālaya and “numinous storehouse (lingfu 靈 府 )” in the “Dechongfu 德 充
符” (“The Sign of Virtue Complete”) chapter of the Zhuangzi. The seventh consciousness is also called ādāna-
vijñāna (clinging consciousness), which is analogized with “numinous tower (lingtai 靈臺)” in the “Gengsang
Chu 庚桑楚” chapter because in old Chinese tai 臺 (tower) is glossed as chi 持 (cling) (Zhang 2014b: 78).
40
We need to be clear that it is not merely a kind of “concept matching.” By demonstrating the consistency
between the key insight of Zhuangzi and the core theory of Yogācāra, as Makeham argues, Zhang tries to
show that Zhuangzi “bore witness” to “insights into fundamental truths that transcend individual cultures but
which are most fully and systematically articulated in Yogācāra systems of learning” (Makeham 2012: 123).
41
The seventh consciousness is the mind-organ and as such is the basis of the sixth consciousness, so it is also
called the “root of mind (yigen 意根).”
42
For detailed explanation of Zhang’s interpretation of Zhuangzi, see Makeham 2012: 120.
62 Cheng WANG

attributes are nothing but the products of self-mind. Since concepts and attributes rely
on the ground of self-view, they can be abandoned through “losing the self.” Let us take
the concept of time as an example to see Zhang’s point. He argues that “(the illusion of)
time is created by the mind” (Zhang 2014b: 83): on the one hand, “to a person in sleep,
the period of five nights has no difference from that of a second” (Zhang 2014b: 81); on
the other hand, the same period of time may be perceived as having different durations
according to the circumstances and mental states of perceivers. In a word, time is a
phenomenon devoid of intrinsic self-nature. When “there is nothing arising or ceasing
in the mind and the consciousness discontinues functioning,” “the concept of time
disappears and the thought of the continuing self is lost” (Zhang 2014b: 83). In short, as
Zhang notices, after “losing oneself” the discrimination of concepts and attributes no
more takes place, and thus true equality can be realized.
However, if the entity has no self-nature, will it fall into nothing, into nihility? To
respond to this question, Zhang formulates the distinction between the “illusory self”
and the “true self.” The former is the delusional self perceived as the seventh con-
sciousness attached to the ālaya consciousness, while the latter refers to the Tathāgata-
garbha, the original pristine pure ontological Buddha-ness intrinsic in all sentient
beings.43 The “true self,” constant and universal, is said to “exist by itself without
dependence” (Zhang 2014b: 85).
On this theoretical basis, Zhang claims that “all sentient beings are of this universal
consciousness” (Zhang 2014b: 86)44 and takes one step further to make a more
intriguing point, employing Fazang’s 法藏 45 idea of universal causation of
dharmadhātu (interconnected omniverse)46 to explain Zhuangzi’s expression “the ten
thousand things are one with me” (“Qiwulun”). His long interpretation deserves to be
treated in great detail, which this short article can hardly afford to do. However, its
implication for the qiwu philosophy can be directly seen in Zhang’s commentary
elsewhere. There he relates Zhuangzi’s “losing self (sang wo 喪 我 )” with Confucius’
“no egoism (wu wo 毋我)” and YAN Yuan’s 顔 淵 “overcoming oneself (ke ji 克己)” (see
Zhang 2012: 35). The three expressions all convey the idea that “the single self
assimilates into the myriad things,” which, in today’s words, is “the small self merges
into the large self” (Zhang 2012: 35). From this perspective, when cognizant of the
constant mind by getting rid of the delusive one, not only is true equality achieved but
the barriers between oneself and others dissolve, which is the precondition for applying
the principles of zhong-shu.

43
The ontological Buddha nature, true and constant, is also called āmala consciousness, the ninth conscious-
ness free from all defilements and defined as the basis of all of life’s functions. The term tathāgata-garbha
may mean “embryonic tathāgata,” “womb of the tathāgata,” or “containing a tathāgata.” Though temporarily
contaminated by adventitious defilement, it is the cause which eventually leads sentient beings to
enlightenment.
44
This may be better understood by reference to the expression “the three realms are only mind, and the
myriad dharmas are only consciousness (sanjie wei xin, wanfa wei shi 三界唯心, 萬法唯識).” For a detailed and
thorough review of this phrase, see Hammerstrom 2010.
45
Fazang is the third patriarch and systematizer of the Flower Garland (Huayan 華嚴) school of Buddhism.
46
Zhang asserts that universal causation of dharmadhātu (co-arising from realm of the dharma [fa jie yuan qi
法界緣起]) is second-order theory compared to co-arising from tathāgata-garbha (ru lai zang yuan qi 如來藏緣
起 ). In terms of the former, one is dependent on all others; one and the other are mutually dependent.
According to the latter, however, all arise from consciousness and no partition exists between human beings
and the myriad things. I think this assertion helps Zhang’s view avoid collapsing into relativism.
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 63

Zhuangzi’s view of equality explained by incorporating the Consciousness-only

theory of Yogācāra Buddhism as well as the Huayan school’s doctrine of mutual
containment and interpenetration of all phenomena served to provide the philosophical
or analytical framework in which Zhang unfolds his discourse on the qiwu philosophy.

3.2 Interpretation of Cheng Xin and Tian Ni

We shall go into the details of the ālaya consciousness. According to Zhang,

concepts and attributes stem from karmic seeds stored in the ālaya consciousness.
He equates the seed with “archetype (yuanxing guannian 原 型 觀 念 ),” a concept
deeply rooted in the Western philosophical tradition.47 Alongside the twenty-four
dharmas not interactive with the mind48 and Kant’s list of twelve categories, Zhang
enumerates seven basic types of seeds: time, space, appearance, number, function,
causation, and self-attachment.49 To take time as an example again, its perception
has its root in the seed. Even infants and animals are able to discriminate time,
though they do not possess the concept of time. In other words, the distinction of
past, present, and future is “derived from the archetype” (Zhang 2014b: 88).
Likewise, Zhang remarks, “All other attributes of existence and nonexistence, right
and wrong, individuality and commonality stem from the branches or ramifications
of the seven types of seeds” (Zhang 2014b: 88). As we may discern, the assumption
of seven types of seeds is derived by induction: “Though names and attributes are
diversified at the specific level, they belong to the same category at the abstract
level” (Zhang 2011: 49). Meanwhile, the seeds or so-called archetypes, common to
all sentient beings, might be seen as the natural structure or pattern of things. They
provide the basis for inference and deduction, and as a result also for applying the
principle of shu.
We need to be clear, however, that with regard to the seeds in the ālaya conscious-
ness or archetypes Zhang by no means emphasizes the uniformity of the human mind
advocated by the Confucians, but rather aims to tackle the multiplicity of opinions and
perceptions, as shown in his interpretation of cheng xin 成心50 and tian ni 天倪51 in the
Zhuangzi. Zhang makes an analogy between seeds in the ālaya consciousness
(archetypes) and Zhuangzi’s cheng xin. Like other abstruse concepts in the Zhuangzi,
cheng xin has invited a variety of explanations, which may be reduced to two: one is
“heavenly principle” or inherent mind common to all individual persons; the other is
47
The concept is traceable to Plato’s “ideas,” which were pure mental forms imprinted in the soul before birth.
The pure forms embody the fundamental characteristics of a thing rather than its specific peculiarities, and thus
on this point are similar to archetypes. The term “archetype” is also used in modern psychology. Carl Jung
regards archetypes as universal, archaic patterns and images that derive from the collective unconscious and
are the psychic counterpart of instinct.
48
See Dasheng Baifa Mingmen Lun 大乘百法明門論 (Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dharmas).
49
The former six belong to the ālaya consciousness and the self-attachment belongs to the seventh con-
sciousness, or the root of mind.
50
The term cheng xin is translated as “the mind given him” (Watson 1968: 38), “the completed heart”
(Graham 1981: 51), or “prejudices” (Mair 1994: 14). The word cheng means “settled,” “formed,” or
“established.” Hence, to have a cheng xin means to have a “pre-established heart-mind” (Chong 2011: 428).
51
In the Zhuangzi, tian ni is also called tian jun 天 均 (see Zhuangzi 27). The former is translated as “the
Heavenly Equality” (Watson 1968: 48), “the whetstone of Heaven” (Graham 1981: 60), or “the framework of
nature” (Mair 1994: 23); the latter is translated as “Heaven the Equalizer” (Watson 1968: 41), “the potter’s
wheel of Heaven” (Graham 1981: 54), or “the celestial potter’s wheel” (Mair 1994: 279).
64 Cheng WANG

the pre-established mind or subjective prejudice formed from individual perspectives.52

Equating the cheng xin with seeds, though not the original idea of Zhuangzi, embraces
the above two sets of meanings: within the ālaya consciousness of sentient beings are
contained all kinds of seeds, which are the primordial forms or germs of all things; from
these seeds our thoughts and opinions, including preconceived notions and prejudices,
grow. Tian ni, another ambiguous concept, is associated with cheng xin in Zhang’s
interpretation, and thus also with archetypes.53 Zhang holds a dualistic view of cheng
xin and tian ni. As mentioned before, they are the source of prejudices; but they are also
the means to realize enlightenment for oneself and resolve disputes of others. Zhang
explains as follows. Seeds in the mind (especially the attachment to self) create
obstacles that hinder enlightenment. Nonetheless, obstacles and enlightenment are
two sides of the same coin, or two poles of one axis. The ultimate enlightenment is
the state in which all hindrances of ignorance and affliction are fully extinguished.
Hence, in this manner, cheng xin can be transmuted into wisdom (see Zhang 2014b:
88).54 In the meantime, since seeds (archetypes) are the basis for inference and
deduction, disputes and conflicts can be resolved by means of cheng xin or tian ni.
As Zhang says, “The cognitive and affective (or emotional) functions, although with
endless variations, are confined within the sphere of tian ni. We have to rely on cheng
xin to discuss various schools of thoughts. Why? Because all knowledge and thoughts,
whether simple or sophisticated, depend on these seeds to express time, space, appear-
ance, number, function, causation, and even to manifest self-attachment. These seven
categories are the boundaries of cognition and emotion” (Zhang 2014b: 127). With the
establishment and application of these boundaries, Zhang is poised to adopt an
inclusive, all-embracing attitude toward multiple thoughts and ideas.55
We could note by way of comparison that Zhang’s Buddhist-inspired hermeneutics
adds new dimensions to the Daoist perspective. Zhuangzi, as a Daoist, regards cheng
xin as the obstacle to be overcome in spiritual practice. By getting rid of the opinionated
mind, one obtains a mindless mind or a nonattached state of mind. This clear mind is
like a dust-free mirror, which “can reflect other beings as they are without imposing
anything subjective upon them” (Huang 2010: 79). Zhuangzi uses the metaphor of tian
ni to illustrate the dissolution of barriers or debates in the perspective of the Dao 道 or
by merging with the Dao after giving up cheng xin. Such a state can be described by
Zhuangzi’s own word “ming 明 (brilliance or clarity)”56 and can only be achieved by
progressive reduction, the pursuit of “less,” or metaphorically speaking, removing the
dust. In Zhang’s interpretation, however, it involves a subtle shift in the concept of
cheng xin from an unanalyzed phenomenon to its inner constitution or essential
structure. Consequently, the character of cheng xin is neutralized and the approach to
enlightenment is to transform the constitution of the pre-established mind instead of
52
For the former explanation see Lin 1997; for the latter one see Guo 1961. For more discussion on the cheng
xin, see Chong 2011.
53
GUO Xiang explains tian ni as “zi ran zhi fen 自 然 之 分 (natural division),” which in Zhang’s interpretation
coincides with the concept of jie 界 (element) in the Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論 (Discourse on the
Perfection of Consciousness-only). All kinds of elements exist innately and are the supporting basis for all
dharmas. In
this respect, they share similarity with the cheng xin (Zhang 2014b: 127).
54
According to Consciousness-only theory, the ālaya consciousness contains both defiled seeds and pure
seeds. When all the defiled seeds are replaced by pure seeds created by pure deeds, true wisdom is achieved.
55
WONG Young-tsu interprets Zhang’s Qiwulun Shi as an expression of cultural pluralism (Wong 2006).
56
For discussion of Zhuangzi’s “ming,” see Lai and Chiu 2013.
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 65

removing it. In other words, the shapeless and illusive Dao of Daoist philosophy is
concretized and substantiated by the epistemological analysis in Zhang’s approach.
Since the constitution of mind is within the boundary of seven categories, as Zhang
states, “The opinions of different people, whether the intellectuals or the illiterates,
cannot be entirely correct but also not completely wrong, probably containing ‘biased
or extreme views’ which present part of the truth. Similarly, the inverted view, seeing
things upside-down, is diametrically opposite to, yet cannot separate from the correct
view” (Zhang 2014b: 127). This dialectical or dualistic conception can be phrased as:
“The truth and the falsity come from the same source; the delusion and the reality
interact with each other” (Zhang 2014b: 128). Zhang specifies that “the false view
exists depending on the true view and the former can be transmuted into the latter”
(Zhang 2011: 49). He compares their relation to that of water and wave or hemp and
rope. In this point of view, the approach that Zhang indicates bears similarity with that
of GUO Xiang. Guo holds that ming in Zhuangzi’s saying “mo ruo yi ming 莫若以明 (the
best thing to use is clarity)” means to let the debating parties mutually illustrate each
other. In the same vein, Zhang suggests the mutuality of different perspectives and
“their paradoxical dependence on one another” (Fox 2003: 215). By adopting the
perspective of tian ni, the obstruction of phenomena is eliminated. Hence, the highest
or universal truth emerges from the worldly or partial truths through connection and
convergence (hui tong 會 通 ). This process is further illustrated by the metaphor of
seeds: one and many are mutually inclusive, so from one we can see the whole;57 the
one and the other are contradictory, but the obstruction can be overcome by a shift of
perspective (see Zhang 2014b: 127).58
Thus, it is noteworthy that the reinterpretation of cheng xin and tian ni is the key to
switch from the principle of shu to that of zhong, or rather, to integrate the two
principles. As the preceding analysis shows, for Zhang cheng xin or tian ni is not the
fixed standard or rule for measuring or restraining others. We see it more clearly when
considering Zhuangzi’s principle of “harmonizing things with the Heavenly Equality
(he yi tian ni 和以天倪)” in juxtaposition with the Confucian principle of applying a
measuring square. A comparison of the two highlights a striking and illuminating
difference. The former acknowledges the value of each individual and sees them as
different but equal. It settles disputes, debates, or conflicts by perspective alteration. In
contrast, by adopting the latter, one tends to regard his or her own value as the universal
standard and use it to regulate others. In the political realm, the superior governs the
57
Brook Ziporyn’s “omnicentric holism” may help understand this better. This doctrine holds that “each point
in any whole is a center of that whole” and “each one adequately represents, perceives, includes the whole.” In
other words, “any part is the whole itself, and all the parts inherently include each other” (Ziporyn 2003: 35).
58
In this illustration of connection and convergence, Zhang does not imply the unification of the whole
universe, which Zhuangzi describes as “all sorts of things are connected into one by the Dao (dao tong wei yi
道 通 為 一 ).” Nevertheless, in the previous paragraph of the Qiwulun Shi, Zhang does cite WANG Bi’s 王 弼
words: “The most separated will unite; the most discrepant will converge. All sorts of things strange and odd
will be connected into one by the Dao” (Zhang 2014b: 119). As HUANG Yong points out, CHEN Guying 陳鼓應
and YANG Guorong 楊國榮 hold the view that Zhuangzi’s “connecting (tong 通)” “can easily lead to the
ignorance of multiplicity and difference” (Huang 2008: 367). However, for Zhang the paradox might be
solved by the liang xing 兩 行 approach. At the abstract level or in terms of absolute truth, all barriers and
obstacles dissolve into nothingness, and thus all things form a unified whole. Zhang calls this state the
“supreme tian ni (zui sheng tian ni 最勝天倪).” At the concrete level or in terms of worldly truth, everything
still has its distinctive nature. So it is important to respect the differences of things and react according to the
specific situation. This approach will be discussed in detail in the next section of this essay.
66 Cheng WANG

subordinate by forcing them to comply with his or her own will. As was said before,
Zhang opposes the unilateral application of the measuring square. By separating zhong-
shu as two complimentary principles, he takes real equality into consideration and pays
full attention to individual differences. It is from this stance that Zhang appraises the
value pluralism advocated by the ancients, in whose view both Boyi 伯夷 (known for
his uprightness and aloofness) and Liuxia Hui 柳 下 惠 (an accommodating yet com-
posed person) are considered to be sages despite their completely different behaviors;
and both Jizi 箕子 (who was enslaved by King Zhou 紂, the tyrant of the Shang 商
dynasty) and Bigan 比干 (who admonished King Zhou and was killed) are deemed to
possess the supreme virtue despite their radically different ideals. Even for the most
extreme differences, say, between the enlightened and the unenlightened or the wise
and the fool, Zhang also avoids being biased in favor of one and against another. He
just regards the two extremes as different degrees or levels of realization or intelligence
rather than heresies.

3.3 Liang Xing of Zhang’s Qiwu Philosophy

The subtle shift in the interpretation of cheng xin and tian ni could provide an
epistemological platform to integrate the methods of zhong and shu, which, as
Zhang explains, means the combination of induction and deduction. Moreover, as
the means to realize enlightenment and resolve disputes, the platform provides the
basis for Zhang’s liang xing 兩 行 (double walking or proceeding in two ways)59
approach in applying principles of zhong-shu. At the metaphysical level, the ālaya
consciousness (including the seeds) is the foundation that gives rise to all dharmas
(or all phenomena) in the defiled realm, and thus is regarded to be “a bridge
between the phenomenal world and the ontological underpinning that is zhenru 真
如 ” (Makeham 2012: 113). By dispelling the delusion that identifies “self” with
the ālaya consciousness, the ordinary existence becomes transformed into the
enlightened state (zhuan su cheng zhen 轉 俗 成 真 ). On the empirical level, in order
to enlighten others, the enlightened person should return from the enlightened
state to deal with the secular world (hui zhen xiang su 回 真 向 俗 ).60 The transitions
between the two levels ultimately lead to the realization of real equality. Here I
shall pay attention to basic moral issues as they may contribute to elucidate the
liang xing approach.
First, let us consider disputes about right and wrong, one of the common
themes in the “Qiwulun.” Zhang notes, “Views of right and wrong neither descend

59
With the story of the monkey keeper, Zhuangzi illustrates the idea of “walking two roads”: “[T]he sage
harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer” (Zhuangzi 2; Watson 1968: 41). The
term liang xing may be interpreted as “proceeding along both one’s own way and the other’s, jointly fulfilling
both sides’ values” (Fraser 2015: 52), but meanwhile it may also be interpreted as proceeding with an
awareness both of the integral wholeness and of the individual categories. Zhang ostensibly adopts the latter
one, as I will show below.
60
This liang xing approach shares similarity with W. T. Stace’s “introvertive” and “extrovertive” types of
mystical experience. Harold D. Roth demonstrates the “bimodal mystical experience” in the “Qiwulun” and
other chapters of the Zhuangzi: “[S]ages are not attached to their individual selves because they have gone
through the experience of total self-forgetting or total self-emptying in which they merge with the Way. After
this introvertive experience they return to the world of everyday living, while at the same time retaining their
prior condition of contact with the Way” (Roth 2003: 25–26).
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 67

from the heaven nor arise out of the earth; all of them are produced by the human
mind (or derived from the self-view)” (Zhang 2014b: 90). Insofar as our mental
mind changes under different circumstances, whether the circumstances are favor-
able or not would affect the judgment of right or wrong.61 Furthermore, under the
influence of self-attachment, every person perceives or conceives from his or her
own perspective and is blind to or ignores those of others, which results in barriers
to understanding between people. Thus, disputes arise and arguments ensue. 62 It
implies that views of right and wrong exist in comparison with each other.63 Zhang
suggests the solution to disputes and conflicts in the secular world by citing the saying of
Laozi: “The sage has no fixed mind; she takes the mind of the people as her mind”
(Zhang 2014b: 91; translation adapted from Muller 1991).64 According to this, it is
supposed to go along with, rather than against, either of the disputing parties. For vivid
illustration, Zhang uses the metaphor of a door-hinge: “The hinge rotates accordingly as
the door opens and closes or moves forward and backward” (Zhang 2014b: 91).65
Analogously, it is wise to react accordingly and never posit in opposition to any of the
disputing parties. Only in this way can one preserve the autonomy, and at the same time
dissolve the disputes.66
Second, I would again bring up the issue of like and dislike, a frequently
recurring theme in the Zhuangzi. As discussed before, Zhang highlights the
different preferences of different people. Here is another illustration: “Ant mince,
the delicious food to the ancients, only causes vomit for us; and roasted rat, the
Cantonese delicacy, may disgust the non-natives” (Zhang 2014b: 122). This
suggests that in terms of like and dislike there is no fixed standard and it is up
to the discretion of the experiencer. They all arise, in Zhang’s view, from the
attachment to conditioned phenomena. If we wipe out this kind of attachment, we
will not try to draw distinctions between like and dislike. The experiencers are
different and the conditioned phenomena are inconstant; therefore, no two indi-
viduals have the same perception of the same thing. It is a stereotype to assume

61
To illustrate his point, Zhang cites Zhuangzi’s comments on Confucius in the “Yu Yan 寓 言 ” (“Inputed
Words”) chapter: “Confucius has been going along for sixty years and he has changed sixty times. What at the
beginning he used to call right he has ended up calling wrong. So now there’s no telling whether what he calls
right at the moment is not in fact what he called wrong during the past fifty-nine years” (Zhuangzi 27; Watson
1968: 305). He also admonishes that it is unwise “to disparage the present by praising the past or vice versa
and to disparage foreign countries by praising the motherland or vice versa” (Zhang 2014b: 90).
62
Zhang recognizes the empty nature and dependent origination of right and wrong. Thus, we could say his
view is beyond relativism.
63
As it is said in the “Qiwulun,” “this” and “that” give birth to each other: “Where there is recognition of right
there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right”
(Zhuangzi 2; Watson 1968: 40).
64
It is followed by Zhuangzi’s saying “illuminating all in the light of Heaven” (zhao zhi yu tian 照之於天) from
the “Qiwulun.” “Heaven” may be recognized as the clear mind without self-attachment, which is equivalent to
the elimination of the fixed mind advocated by Laozi. The word “illuminating” again reminds us of the
metaphor of mirror, which “takes the mind of the people as her mind.” In this regard, the two sayings mutually
interpret each other.
65
Compared with the metaphor of mirror as presented before, the metaphor of door-hinge underlines the
autonomy. So it may also be applied to illustrate Chong’s view that “the heart-mind has an imaginative
capacity that allows for the open-endedness and broadening of perspectives” (Chong 2011: 442).
66
In Zhuangzi’s words, “Only the Perfect Man can wander in the world without taking sides, can follow along
with men without losing himself” (Zhuangzi 26; Watson 1968: 300). For the discussion on how to respect and
maintain the autonomy of moral agents, see Huang 2010.
68 Cheng WANG

that others’ feelings are like our own in the same circumstances. Zhang urges us
not only to recognize the equal worth of all beings, but also to take into account
the particular characteristics, desires, and needs of individuals. In other words, we
should refrain from imposing our likes and dislikes on others. In point of fact,
Zhang’s approach is twofold: on the side of the recipients, he proposes “to treat
them appropriately,” which requires one to respect others’ particular interests and
wishes; on the other side, he suggests the agent “should advance or recede and
accept or reject accordingly,” which means one should preserve the autonomy and
not be affected by the likes and dislikes of others (see Zhang 2014b: 122).
Finally, in order to provide further illustration of the liang xing approach and
place more weight on how to “accord with” the secular world as well as enhance
the wellness of others, Zhang praises highly Bodhisattva-Icchantika, the ideal of
which is drawn from the Lankavatara Sutra. It refers to “the disciple who, after
reaching a high state of dynamic knowledge, and following the path of total
selflessness, takes a vow not to enter nirvāṇa until every single sentient being has
obtained enlightenment and secured emancipation” (Verdú 1981: 89).67 In deeming
Zhuangzi an example of Bodhisattva-Icchantika,68 Zhang underlines the
necessity to learn about the plight of others and feel what others feel. It is worth
noting that in his essay, written several years after the Qiwulun Shi, Zhang traces
to Laozi as the source of Zhuangzi’s mercy and compassion for sentient beings. In
Zhang’s view, “Laozi has got rid of attachment to external objects, but still regards
self as important; he has wiped out obstacles in the mind, but still values trials and
tribulations” (Zhang 2014a: 437). However, if we ought to discard self-attachment
(or abandon the self), how can we still regard self as important? The real point of
Zhang’s saying is oriented toward the Hīnayāna practitioners, who seek the perfect
stillness of the mind and are aloof from the concerns of the world. 69 The purpose
of regarding self as important (or loving one’s own body) in Zhang’s understand-
ing is to learn the desires and needs of others.70 Only through trials and tribula-
tions can we really experience the suffering of others. No doubt it accords with the
principle of shu, which requires inferring from oneself to others or imagining
oneself in the other’s place, but it also requires dealing with worldly things
personally and obtaining firsthand observation, which conforms to the principle
of zhong. Zhang believes that only those who have experienced hardships per-
sonally and observed the sufferings of others are able to undertake the responsi-
bility and can be relied upon to govern the country.

67
The term icchantika was originally used by Hīnayānists to designate those who, by remaining unreceptive
to the teachings of the Buddha, never attained ultimate Buddhahood. This sense, however, was reversed by the
Mahāyānists (Verdú 1981: 89).
68
Zhang indicates that “inner sageliness and outer kingliness (neisheng waiwang 内 聖 外 王 )” is the ultimate
pursuit of Zhuangzi (see Zhang 2014b: 141).
69
Kenneth Dorter’s explanation of “our body is the source of all our troubles” serves to illustrate this point:
“[O]ur body is the seat of desires, and the pursuit of desires leads to fear and frustration far more often than to
even transitory contentment, so the key to happiness is to reduce our desires by overcoming our attachment to
things of the body” (Dorter 2014: 74).
70
In his interpretation of Laozi’s saying, Dorter proposes “a shift of perspective from the individual body to
the body of the whole” and points out “the goal is to recognize our inseparability from other things” (Dorter
2014: 74). As I see it, his understanding coincides with and illustrates Zhang’s view.
Confucius’ Zhong-Shu and Zhuangzi’s Qiwu 69

4 Conclusion

Zhong-shu is Confucius’ moral principle and qiwu is Zhuangzi’s key concept.

Being aware of the one-sidedness of xieju (applying a measuring square), ZHANG
Taiyan redefines zhong-shu as two separate but complementary principles and
draws a parallel between zhong-shu and qiwu. In his association of the two, Zhang
uses Buddhist (or more specifically, Yogācāra) terminology and doctrine to eluci-
date his ideas and thoughts. From the perspective of the Consciousness-only
doctrine, Zhang describes his vision of equality premised on recognition of and
respect for difference, which is the main theme of qiwu and the required base for
zhong-shu. In developing the Yogācāra reading of the “Qiwulun,” the most crucial
“concept matching” is Zhang’s interpretation of cheng xin (also the tian ni) as
seeds in the ālaya consciousness or archetypes. By this means he places the focus
upon the composition of the pre-established mind, rather than the preconceived
opinion or prejudice, and thus neutralizes the character of cheng xin. With such a
shift of perspective, cheng xin, in Zhang’s interpretation, not only refers to the
natural structure or pattern of things, and so is the basis for inference and
deduction, but also serves as the effective means to deal with the variety of views
and opinions through perspective alteration. In this sense, the way to enlighten-
ment is to transform the constitution of the opinionated mind rather than to get rid
of it. Therefore, it is clear that Zhang’s approach follows the Buddhist way of
thinking, which is termed as “transforming worldly consciousness into wisdom,”
and adds new dimensions to the Daoist perspective. At the same time, the
enlightened person still exists in the phenomenal world and has to tackle worldly
affairs. It requires inferring from oneself to others or imagining oneself in the
position of others on the one hand, and acquiring firsthand observation through
personal experience on the other. Such is the dual exercise of zhong and shu.
Zhang’s criticism on the way of xieju and his reinterpretation of the principles
of zhong-shu coincide with the discussion of the Golden Rule in the West. The
idea to integrate the two complementary principles is revealing and illuminating.
In our multicultural world, the principle of zhong, to acquire firsthand observation
through personal experience and do unto others what others prefer, as he proposes,
is of particular importance.71 Another implication of Zhang’s interpretation is his
adoption of Buddhist Yogācāra to help elucidate Zhuangzi’s thought, which,
although attempted by predecessors such as Han-Shan Deqing 憨 ft 德 清 ,72 dem-
onstrates an insightful approach to comparative philosophy.

Acknowledgments I would like to express my genuine gratitude to Professor HUANG Yong, editor of
Dao, and the three anonymous reviewers for their careful comments, constructive criticisms, and
valuable suggestions. This work is supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central
Universities, China.

71
HUANG Yong draws on the resources of Daoism and Confucianism to develop what he calls the “Copper
Rule”: “Do unto others what they would have us do unto them” or “Do not do unto others what they would not
have us do unto them” (Huang 2005: 394). He believes that “in this radically diverse and increasingly global
world, the Copper Rule … should be substituted for the Golden Rule” (Huang 2005: 416).
72
For the discussion of Han-Shan’s Buddhist interpretation of Daoism, see Hsu 1975.
70 Cheng WANG

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