Japanes. Monograph No.

157
(Includes Nos.IS7 t 158,159)

� --·r·-;]
Co y _.. __ 1959 I

HOMELAND AIR DEFENSE

OPERATIONS REOORD

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r
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PREPARED BY
HEADQUARTERS, USAF FE
AND EIGH TH U.S. ARMY (REAR)

DISTRIBUTED BY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 PREFACE P.EVlSED EDlTIClf

Japanese Monograph, No. 157, "Homeland Air Defense Oper­

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, ations Record" was originally prepared, in 1952, as a series
12 October 1945, subjec t : Institution tor War Records Investi­ ot three sepa rate studi es :
gation, steps were 101 tiated to exp loi t milltaryhistorical .
records and ot1'icial reports ot: the Japanese War Ministryand No. 157, "Homeland Air Defense Operations Record,
Japanese General Staft. Upon dissolution ot the War l.f1n1atry Kanto Sector."
and t he Japanese General Start, and the transter ot their tor­
mer functions to the De mobillzation Bureau, research �d com­ No. 158, "Homeland Air Detense Operat1ons 1fecord.
pilation continued and developed into a series ot historical Central Sector."
monographs.
no. 159, "Homela.nd Air Detense Operat1ona Record,
The pauci"ty ot original o rders, plans and \Ul.it journal., Western Sector."
which are nonnally essential in the preparations ot this type
of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field The originnl editions, which were developed frolll fragmental")'
ol.)erations or bombing raids rendered the task of cocpilation records and recollections, failed to present the various
o
m st d.1fficultj p:lrticularly distressing has been the complete Sector operations in proper relationship to ench other. This
J.o.ck of official strength reports, nonnal in AG or G3 records. lack of cohesion made i1; virtually impossible to gain an un­
However, while many of the i:nnortD.nt orders, pla ns and esti­ derstandine of the ov.er-all air defense operations in Japan.
rnates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are During the six. years that elapsed between the publicntion of
not textually identical with the Originals, they are believed the Original cd.! tions and this revised edition; a trel:lelldoua
to be generally a c cura te and reliable. 8J:1ount of additionnl infomntion became available, ll'.a.kinC i't
pos�ible to rectify ��y errore of omission and comm1s3ion in
Under the supervision ot the �mobillzation Bureau, the the original. �p and othe r illustrative material has also
basic material contained in the monograph w.s compiled and been expanded and improved.
written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command
and staff units within maJor units during the period of oper­ PR.sic data contained in this monograph vas compiled by
a tions. Translation v.lS effected through the fac ili ties ot the following former ofr1cere of the Japanese Army Air FOrce:
Allied Translator and Interpreter Se rvice, G2, General Head­
quarters, Fo.r EJ.st Comma.nd. Col. Klyoshi Kanzak1 - Operations Off1ccr,
11th Air Division
Thio Japanese Operational Monograph \/a� rewritten in
�gl1sh by the Japanese Hesearch Division, Mill taryII1stol")' MaJ. lI1 ro shi Toga - Start 01"f1cer,
Section, General Headquartercs, far East Commaml Qlld is based 10th Air Division
on the translation or the Japanese origino.l. FAi torinl cor­
rections were limited to those necessary for coherence and MaJ. Munefus a Hamrulo - Sta.tt Officer,
accuracy. 121.h Air Division

Maj. SeiJi Yo..nnmoto - Start Officer,

9 June 1952 12th Air Divis10n

Capt. lIasakicbi Tako.da - Stnt'f Officer,

11th Air Division

111 v

2
 TABLE OF CONTEm'S
The ed1 tor wishes to take this opportunity to express his
thanks for the splendid cooperation and valuable assistance .
Chapter Title
rendered the Foreign Histories Division by Mr. Susumu Nish1ure.
and his statt ot the War Histori es ROO!I1, Key Personnel School, 1 AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAIf
Japan Self' Defense Force.
Basic Concept ot Japan's Air DefenBe • • • • 1
Revriting or the revised edition was accomplished by the
Foreign Histories D1vi�ion, otrice of thP Assistant Chief ot
starr G3, Headquarters, United States Army Japan . Research and
Army Minister ToJo's Comments . · . . . 2
compilation o.f data for the revioed cd1 tioD was pertol'llled by
Homeland Defense Orsanizatlon . . . . . . . 3
fonner LCDR Ryosuke Nomura, now a Mil1 tary Opero.tional �t
with the Foreign Histories D1 vision.
Air Defense Organizatlon . . . . . 6

30 December 1958
Strengthening of Air Defense. • 8

Co.nmand Progrom - 1944 . . . . . . . . 9

Type of Planes . . . . . 11

Special Methods to Combat B-29' s • • 13

Reinforcements tor Air Divislons . · . . 13

Speclal Attack Ubits · . . 14

Ta-Ian Bomblng . . . . 16

Service Unit Operations � . . . . . . . 17

Airfield Battalions • · . . 17

Special Intelligenc e Squadrons · . . . 19

Navigational Aid Units 19

Air Rald Waming . . . . . . . . . . 20

Lookout Posts • • • . . . . . . · . . . 20

Radar Stat10ns . . . . . . . . . . . . - 22

Picket Boats . . . . . . . 24

Early Wandng Net 24

v11
vi
Chapter
� Chapter Title
-

1 AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAN (Coot'd) 2 AIR DEFmSE OF TllE KAN1'O sa=TOll (Cont'd)
Pilot Training • • . . . . . . . • • • 26 Service Uhits • • • • • • . . 47
High Altitude Training . . . . . . . . 26 Airfield Battalions . . . . . . . . . 47

NIght Combat and Bad Weather Training •

27 Special Intelligence Squadrons • . . . 47
Ta-Dan Bombing Training • • • • • •
28 Navigational Aid Units. · . 48

Final Defense Preparations · . . . 28 Air Raid Warning System • . . . • • · . 49

F01"lllation or the 6th Air Army • · . . . 28 Lookout Posts .. . . 49
Hedesignation of Districts and Radar Installations 57
Army Commands • • • • • • • • · . · . 251
Picket Boats 59
Command Reorganizations - 1945 31
60
· .

Antiaircraft Defense of Airfields • · .

Transfers and Reassignments · . . . 31

I-lD.jor Command Changes • • • . . . . 61
2 AIR DEFnlSE OF' THE KANl'O Srl'OR • • • • • · . • • 33
Tactics to Counter the B-29 Bomber · . . . 63
Organization of Defensive Air units · . 33
The Alert SysteQ . . . . 65
Fonnation
• • •

of the lOth Air Division · . 34

Improvement in Attack Techniques • 67
Transfers and Reassignments •
3S
6ij
. . .

First Carrier Plane Attack

Attack units
• •

Special . . . . . . . . . 39
Plans to Combat Future Attacks 71
Activation of the 6th Air � · . . .
39
Night Bombing Attacks 72
Air Training Program . . . . . . . · . lie
Transfer of the 6th Air Array · . 75
High A1titude Training . . . . . . . .

Polley Changes - March 1945 • • • • 7S

Bad Weather Training . . . . . . .
Fonnation or the Air Ceneral Art:!y • • 78
Night Combat Training • • . . . . . . .

The Ketsu-Go Operation • • • • • 80

Ta-Dan Bombing Training • . . . . .

The Air General AnDy Takes Ccmaand · . 81

Reinforcement by Trainin.g tb1ts • • • •

SUIIlI!I8.l",Y of Traini"ft�· Operations

1x
 r
Cho.pter � Chapter Title
2 AIR DEF�SE OF THE KANl'O SIOCTOR (Cont'd)
3 AIR DEFENSE OF THE CENl'RAL S!L'TOH (Cont'd)
End 01' the War • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Study 01' 13-29 Ha1c1s • • • • • · . · . ll3

3 AIR DEFEr-'SE OF THE CENl'RAL 5lCl'OR
B-29 Target SelectiOQ . . . . . . . . 11 3
Organization ot Defensive Air Unito • •

B-29 Flight Fonnations and.

F'onnation 01' the 11th Air Division • • Approach Routes • • • · . . . 113
Forma tion or t.he 23d Air Brigade . . . Plotting ot B-29 Courses • • · . . • • ll4
Transfers and Reas Ri gnments • • • . . . Operations Ago.1nst B-29' s • • · . · . . . . ll5
Formation ot the 6th Air Army • . . Changes in B-29 Tactics · . . . . ll6
Operations Di re ction • • • • • • • • · . . . Carrier-Based Plane Atto.cks • •
• • · . . . ll8
Location of 11th Air Division Preparations for Future Attacks · ll9
88
•
. . . .

Headquartera • • • • • • • • · . • •

Changes in Zones 01' Responsibility · . . . J20

Air Training Program . . . . . · . . .

Air General Arrrry • • • • • • •

. . 121
Emergency Reinforcements • • • • • • •

Air Defense Operations -

Servi ce Uni ts Mly and June 1945 • • • . 123
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
. . . . .

Airfield Conditions Final Air Defense lofeasures . . . 124

• • • • • • • • • •
. . . . .

Specinl Intelligence SquadroDa • • • •

AIR DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN �

Air-Ground Radio Communi ca.ti ons Organization of the 19th Air Brigade 129
• • • •
• • •

Air Raid Warning System • • • • • • • •

Evaluation 01' Pe rsonnel and Equipment 130
Lookout Posts • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Operational Plannin g • • • • • • •
. . . . 131
Radar Installations Coopera tio n with 132
• • • • • • • • • •
Antiaircraft Un1ts

Search Missiona . .
Alert System . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 33
Alert System . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tice Differential Study • • • • • • • • 109

xi
 .',

Chapter Chapter �
�
4 AIR DEFEllSE OF THE WESTERN S!L"TOR (COot' d) 4 AIR DEF.EliSB OF THE WWl'ERN S!X:TOR (Cant' d)

Air add Waming Net • • • • • • . . . . . 13� Raids trom J.arianas Bases • • . . . . .

1.S1
Radar Instal.l.ationa • • · . . 134 Organj,zationoJ. Changes • · . . 151
Lookout Posts • • • • • • . . 136 Improvements in Operational Facil1ties 151
Intelligence tram Ul1ts in China • • l36 Bunso Channel Def'ense . . . . . . l58

TraiDing Program • • • • • • • • • • • • • llt2 Military District Reorganization · . . . . 15 9

Night Operations Training • · . . 143 Change in Open.tioaal PollC7 . . . . . . 160
Navigation Aid Tn.1n1ng • . . . · . . 144 Logistic Support of' Suicide units · . 160
Mo.intenance ot Morale • • • • • • • • 144 Chs.llge in Eoemy Tactic• • . . . . 16J.
First Paid by China-Based U. S . Planes • • 144 Comand Changes . . 1�
Intelligence Reports • • • • • • 145 Air Detense Situation -
june and July 194 5 . . . . . 162
146
. . . . .

The Attack • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Land-Based Fighter Attacks • . 164
147
· . . .

Assessment of Results • . . . . · . .

Release ot the 6th Air A.rtlt.7

Detects in Detense . . . · . . 148 by the Combined Fleet • • • • . . . 164
Rei�orcement of the 19th Air Brigade 149 F1nal tnys of the War • • • • • • • • • • • 165
Revision ot Operatione.l. Plan • • • • 150
Second Raid by China-Based U.S. Pl.aDes • • 152
Organization ot the 12th Air Divisio n • • 153
New Detense Measures • • • • • • • • 155
SUIIIII8. ry ot Attacks trail China Bases • • • 156
 r,

LIST OF "IAl'�, CllAllT3, FIGUHl!:S AND TABLES Chart No. Title

1. Organization c.nd Chain ot CO'IIIIIWld tor

the Defense of the lloweland • · . . . . . 5
Title
2. Organhation of the Air Defense ot Japu.n 10
Military 1937-1945
• •

1. Di st ricts of Japan, • • •

Air Combat Plan

3. 76
2. MaJor �dar Ins lalla tio ns in Eastern,
Centro 1 und Westem DIstricts, March 1945 23 4. Organization Chart, 18th Air Br igade, May 1942 84

Mill tary Districts and Area Army COlMIIld

ll s, Alert Instructions . . . . . . . . 110
April 1945 • • • • • • • • • • • • •
30
6. Time Differential Study · . . . . . 11.2
Airfields in Kanto Sec tor 36

Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters,

:EAstern Army Command • • • • • • • • 51 Figure No. Title Page

Fadar and Comsnunication Netvork in Kanto Area. 58 1- Ta-t'an Bombing Technique · . . 18

Central Distri ct Airfields • • • • • • • • 93 2. Typical Airfield Layout · · . . . . . 62

Padar Net'WOrk Under Central Army Com:uand,

l'.arch 1945 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 91
Table No. Title Page
Disposition Plan of Central Sector Air Units,
Aucust 1945 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1.21 1. Ydlltary and Civllia.n Lookout Posta
Under Eastern Army Command · · . . . . . 52
Padar and COCll!lunicatiOIl Net'WOrk Under
Western Army Command, March 1945 • • • 135 2. Organization and DisposItion ot 10th
Air Division, 6 February 1945 • • · . . . . . . 64
Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters,
Western Army Command • • 131 3. Mill taryand Civillan Lookout Posts
98
• • • •

Under Central Army Cou�d · · . . . . .

Western District Airfields 151
4. Milltary and CIvillan Lookout Posts
Civilian Lookout Post Area Headquarters, Under Western Army Command · . . . . . . 1 38
Central Army C��d • • • • • • • • • • • • • 161

xl.,
 ClIAl"n!R 1

Am DE."'ENSE OF JAPAlf

Basic Concep t of Japan's Air Defense

�le U.S.S.R., long recognized as the primary threat to the

securi ty of Japan, W� known to have the potential of launching air

raids against Japan proper from the Mari t1r.!e Provinces ot ea.stem

Siberia. �e Japanese military planners, hovever, adhered to a po­

sitive policy of defense which contemplated the immediate destruct­

ion or capture of enemy air bases at the outset of any hostilities

that miGht develop.

As a result of this fUndamental concept that a strong offense

constituted the best defense, little effort was devoted to building

a tactical air force to defend the prinCipal islands of Japan. The

planners of the Greater East Asia War saw no reason to change this

defense concept and, after the outbreak of the Pacific War , the in­

itial successes of Japanese arms only strengthened them in their

belief that the defense of the Homeland could best be accomplished

in China, Manchuria and the South Pacific. It wns recognized, of

course, that the enemy might be capable of laWlching some air raids

with carrier-based planes, but it was thought that these would be

minor in nature, conducted primarily for purposes of diversion or

tor their &tfect on morale in the United States and Great Bri tain .

1
 In add! ti on to the 1'1nnly iulplanted conviction that the torce 'be intrequent and would 'be carried out by car­
rier-based planes. It i t should become po88l­
of Japanese anns would keep th e enemy at a distance that would pre­ ble for the eneulY to raid Japan tl'OUl bases in
the Soviet Union we mi�t face considerable
clude air raids by land-based planes, an econo. a1 c conslderation die- danger, but I think that this is not l1lcely in
the early stases ot the var.
tated the degree ot air defense preparation. It was impossible tor
Approximately one month later, Japan entered a state ot 'WI!t.r
Japan, with its limited resources, to organize and equip large tield
with the United States, Great Britain o.nd the Netherlands witb the
torces simultaneously with the organiz1ng ot strong air and ground
assurances ot her Army Minister �lat serious enemy air attacks
defenses tor the Homeland.
would be only a remote possibil1ty.
Arroy Minister Tojo's Comments
Homeland Defense Organization
At a meeting of mil1 tary councillors, held on 4 November 1941,
The General. Defense Command (GDC) vas acti vated on 12 Jul.;y
Army Mi n i ste r Tojo made the following reply to a question asked by
1941, with the mission of providing f'or the def'ense of' the Japanese
Admiral Hyakuta.k.e regarding air def'ense:
Homeland, which included Korea, Fonuosa and Karatuto as vell as the
In milking air defense preparations, the
first consideration m ust be given to invasion Bonin, Ryukyu and Kurtl Islands.
l
The f'our p rin cipal islands ot
operations to be launched by the Army and Navy,
especially their air forces. In other wordG, Japan ( Hol-,ka1do, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu ) were divided into tour
preparati�ns for Homeland air defense must not
interfere with the operations ot our armed forces districts; Northern, !astern, C entral and Western (t4ap No. 1)" with-
overseas. The stre ngth currently available tor
Homeland defense is composed 01'
approximately in each of' vbi ch �s a tactical detense force organized as an army
300 aircraft, of ,..bleb some 100 beloJll; to the
Army and the other 200 to the Navy, and approxI­ cowmand. Commanders of' the di stri cts, in addition to controll1ne
mately 700 500 Army and
antiaircraft ,..eapons,
200 Navy, c cmmitted to the immediate defense the admi ni strati v e functions of the di strict s, aloo cOl:l;."l8Dded the
of strategic points. Though small in nu.lIber,
thes e aircraft and antlaircrai't "Capons bave tactical a:nn1es. For all ad..n1nistrative attaira the district com-
been rec entl y rcadied tor action and tru.1nins
in thei r u:;e is now being conducted. manders were under the control of the War (An.ty) Ministry, whUe as

I do not think the enemy could mid Jap8.D a�1J c��ders they were re s ponsib le to the GDC tor all defense
proper from the air irJIITledia tel y o.fter the out­
break of hostilit1es. Some tim� would elapse preparat10ns and op erations (Chart No. 1).
before t he enemy could attempt such raids. I
belie ve tha.t euemy air attacks against Japan
proper in the early stages of the 'wlllr , would 1. See Japanese Monograph No. 17, Homeland Operations Record
for detailed information on Japan's defense organization.

2
 ".
MAP NO. I

CHART NO.1

MILITARY DI STRICTS
OF JAPAN
1937 -1945
ORGANIZATI ON AND CHAIN OF COMMAND
FOR THE DEFENSE OF T HE HOMELAND

..

\
r------------------------ -------- ----------

: IGHO :
:I (ARMY SECTION) :
I I

: J
I
GENERAL WAR __

:
I
STAFF r- -----
M INISiiJf ----
I
I I
�---------- ----------�

SeA OF

NORTHERN NORTHERN
ARMY COMMAND DISTRICT

EASTERN EASTERN
ARMY COMMAND DISTRICT

CENTRAL CENTRAL
ARMY COMMAND DISTRICT

PACIFIC OCeAN

WESTERN WESTERN
ARMY COMMAND DISTRICT

4
 (b 5 February 1943, the northern Arnty COIIIIIIlUld vas renamed. the AgreeDlente between the Anny and navy General Sta:rts provided. tor c0-
Iforthern Anny and bect\IIIe 8. I118.Jor operat,ional cOllllllaDd charged. With operation in the detenae ot the Homeland, but the mell10n ot hol.41.Da

the respons1bIl1 ty ot supporting operat,ioDu in the Aleutians. St­ and detending Japan' s sbores 'Wall primarily the responslblll t7 ot the
multaneoualy, wit,h the chlUlged t'wlction ot the l'forthem Army, the
A:rmy. The conduct of air detenae vas likewise II. responsibillty ot

ODe w.s relieved from respons1bllIty for the defense of Hokkaido,

the � air and antiaircraft torces.

JCa1'1lf'uto and the lCurll Islands. In spite ot' the tact that army air \mits vere organized. into

In Mareb 1944, in order to etill further loealhe the detense tactical commands with specitic defenae missions assigned, tor the
efforts ot the ODe and to enable It to concentrate OD the detense
first two years ot the Pacific War there vas no real air detense

ot Japan proper, It vas relieved ot responsibillty tor the detense

torce. What actually existed. vas an air training establlabment

ot Formosa and lCorea ae vell as the Ry\Ik;yu, Bonin and Volcano Is­
that vas organized into air regiments and squadrons wich could,

lands. This change narrowed the direct responsibility ot the ODe

theoretically , be pressed into service as II. defensive air torce in

to the main islands of Honsbu, Shikoku and IC;yuIIhu. The Cine ot

the event ot an eDlergency. The planes with whicb the various air

Detense still retained 11mi ted. control over the defense preparations
units were equipped. �re not, for the most part, sui table for air
�
Army activated 32d
un! ts
ot the lCorea and the nevly AJ'"Jly in the Ry\Ik;yua,
detense missions. L'1 addition, many lIhicb were carried On

tormed as a part ot the P'onnosa Army, came under the Western A:rlAy
organizational cbarts as operational air defense \mits, actuall7

Coaunand tl"Olll May to July.

consisted ot instructors who were s�ultaneously engaged in train­

Air Detense Organization

ing student pilots. In general, the individual. &billties or the

than
The responeibillty ot defending Japan against air attack vas
instructor group as pilots and crew members, vas higher the

divided. bet...een the defensive air torce and the antiaircraft units.
average field p�ot, but the effectiveness of the emergency flight.

Although organized as entirely separate commands, subordinate to the

or squadrons vas not necessarily higher tban th.at of the averagot
district army ccwnanda, the two detenelve torces vere normal.ly re­
canbat squadron. J'urthel"lllore, the couwand system, whicb forced in­
terred to as the air defense establishment. Japan did not have a
structors to wear two bats, resulted in reducing their efficiency
separate air t'oree but, 1nstead, bad. both anny and navy air units.
to a po1l1t considerably lOller than bad been anticipated wen the air

defense establlsbll!.e nt was originated.

6
7
 The cCllllll8Jld organization tor air defense vas extreme17 cClllpl1.. the 11th Air Brigade vas organized under the 1st Air Army and placed

cated. The 1st Air Am:h unde r vh1ch the various air units 'Were under the operational c OllldlllSJl ot the Eastern A:rmy C ommand. In May,

orpn1sed, vas not a tactical c OIIId,

IIWl but functioned rather as a the 18th Air Brigade WIlS sil.o.1lArly established and placed under the

replacement tra1n1ng command. 70r tactical. purposes the air unit. central Army CocWlWld and in June, the newly tormed 19th Air Brigade

were under the operat1onal. control of the a:nny c omanda, vh1ch 'Were, became a part of the tactical defense forces ot the Western A:rmy

in tum, under the GDC tor all detense operat1ons. In add1ticm, command. As the detense planners continued to consider air a ttack s

since the primary w.ss1on ot the air units vas the tra1n1.J:l& ot zoe- against the Japanese mainland as a minor threat and believed that

placement personnel for the air units in the combat areas, the In- raids could only be conducted sporadically by carrier-based plAl'lea,

spectorate General of A:rmy Aviation vas vitally concerned and exer- the three air br igad e s constituted Japan's principal air defense

cised considerable Jurisdiction over the activities ot the 1st Air unita unt11 the early part ot 1944.

Army units. Production ot planes and maintenance ot supply depots Co:nmand Progl'8.lB - 1944

vas the responsibil1 ty ot the Army Aeronautical Department which, Following the March reduction of the GDC's zone ot respona1bil­

by controlling the distribution of planes and replacement parts, ity, on 5 May 1944, Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) directed

could also exercise great influence over the training activities the establlsh:nent ot a new command program that would further unity

and the readiness ot the air dcfense force. the detenses of Japan by broadening the c ommand powers of the GDC

(Chart No. 2 ) .
2
While the powers and influences of the several headquarters The new defense concept recognized the possibility

may have been neces�ry to the acc�nplishment ot the trn1n1ng mis- of invasion attempts being made against Japan, but visualized any
sion and its correlation to the combat minion, the lack ot a uni- approaching invasion force being destroyed at sea by combined air
tied air command vas a serious handicap in the building ot an ef- and naval attacks long betore an actual landing could be eftected.

ticient defensive air torce. However, as Japan's defenses in the Southwest Area and the Central
Strengthening of Air Defenses Pacific had begun to crumble, it ws realized that the U.S. Air
Following the Dool1ttle Raid on 18 April 194.2, some attempt
2. See Japanese 1-t:>nogroph No. 11, Homeland Operations Record,
vas l114d e to establish effective tactical air units within the frame- pages 18 - 21 and Appendix I, for deto.lls of new miSSions �d COll­
mand powers of the GDC.
work ot the GOC and the 1st Air Army. In the latter part of April,

8
9

b
•
 CHART NO.2
r

Corps DOW constitutt.>d a S<.:rio us l4ena.ce to Japan proper. Between

MarCh and July of' 1944, the 11th, 18th Wld 19th Air Brigades vere
ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR DEFENSE OF JAPAN
a�en ted Wld reorganized as the 10th, lith and 12th Air DiVisions,

respec tiv ely . TraininS in air defense tactics was int e nsi fi ed and

GENERAL DEFENSE
add! tiona! airfields were constructea. Erforts vere aleo made to
COMMAND
improve the antiaircrnrt de fen se s ot the industrial areas, govern­

By
3
mental ce nter s and ai rfi elds . July, the GDC had. under its con­

trol approximately 150 planes and 600 antiaircraft gun.s, ass i gned

to the three army commands.

Types ot Planes

Because their missions were of a purely def'ensive nature, the

12th AIR DIVISION planes of' the air divisions were all fighter types, with the excep-
10tt! AIR DIVISION I I ttl AIR DIVISION
(400 PLANES) (200 PLANES) ( I SO PLANES I
tion of' the Type-1OO, Headquarters Reconnaissance planes. The prin-

cipal types ot planes available tor the air de tense ot Ja p an are

EASTE"!'! AAA GP CENTRAL AAA GP WESTERN AAA .P deSCribed below:

(300 GUNS) I (ISO ,GUNS) elSo GUNS )
I Type-l Single-seat Fighter (Ki-43)
Si ngl e , 14 cylinder, aj,r cool ed,
I Engine: radial.
I
I Ar.nament: Two 12.7-111111 l\lachJ.ne guns.
I Speed: Maximum, 515 kph. CruiSing, 40,5 kph.
I
EASTERN ARMY AIR CENTItAL ARMY AIR W ESTERN AR..., AIR
I
RAID WARNING UNIT I RAID WARNING UNIT RAID WARNING UNIT
Type-2 Single-seat Fighter (n-44)
I
I Engine: Same as Type-l, with 1mproved horse­
I power and highe r c e il1 na .
I
L------ -------l.--- ___,... _ _ ____J
T I
I I 3. Antiaircraft defense ot airtields vas the responsibility
I I
of the i ndi vidue.J. airfield commander, and vas entirely separate
,.. _ _ _ _ .1. ____ ,
r----J..----,
I ARMY I
fTO!4 the ope ration s of the antir:d.rcrarl; commands which defended
cities and industrial a reas under the direct control ot Ule a�
IINSPECTORATE GENERAL I AERONAUTICAL.

I DEPAftTMENT I
com.'l1ands. The defense or h!:l.rbors and naval in s talla tions vas, in
OF ARMY AVIATION I I

I (TRAINI N G ) I I esup�,,) I
'- - - -- - - -__..a ... - - - ---- -� general, the responsibil1 ty of the Navy •

11

10
'fnle-2 Siug].e-aea.t Figh1.er (cont'cl) Special Methods to eanbat :8-29' s
A1'I\IBIIIE!nt.: Two 12.7-I11III and t.vo 7. 7-rntn dlRch1ne guns.
(S<lIHetiule& f'our l�. 7- 1lIl1I mach1ne guntl) The first B-29 raid ws launched i"rom bases in Cb1na
Speed: Maximum, 605 Iq.h. Cruising, 430 kph. tI.nd struck

',r,YFe-2 'l'vO-l'ellt Fighter (Ki-45)

at the industr1o.1 cOInplex of' Kokwu-Yawata in northe rn
Kyuahu, on 16
Eugillo: 'l'vo engiot?ti each 1lW\lE;: as Type - l June 1944.
AnliHouent. : 'l."A> 12.7-mr.t and one 7.1-mm machines guns. In November, after U.S. basCG had been e Gtabl1shed em
Ont? 37-1Ml carmoll. O1.c bOmb rac� under
Tinian and &lipan, air raids on Japan were i nten sified.
each v.Lng.
Spct.-cl : Maximl.W, 547 kph. Cruising, 400 kph. Reint'orcements tor Air Divi sions

TJpe- 3 Single-seat Fighter (Ki-6l)

In the !Astern and Central Districts, the air tra1n1ng schools
Dlgine: Single, 12 cylinder, liquid cooled, "V"
type.
and similar instal.l.atiolls had each been allotted a l1.Jn1ted num.ber at
Almament: Two 2O-mm and two l2.1-uWl machine guns.
<.ne 1J00ub roel. under eo.eh wing .
t4aXiotll.lLlI, 600 kph.
fighter planes for use in training programs or test fl1Ghts. Since
Speed: Cru1:::inl3, 420 kph.

Type-4 Single-seat Fighter (Ki:84) it was considered necessary to ..Jake f'ull use of' every plane in the
&1e1ne: Single, 18 cylinder, air cooled, rodial.
event of' Class air attacks, it 'oIaS deter.n.ined to man the se tighter
Armament: 'l'vo 2O-11un aIlli two 12.1-nk;! u.achine eU!lS.
O1.c bomb l"aclt under euch v.Lng.
Maximu:n, 624 kph. Cruising, 430 kph.
planes with instructorc and test pilots and orsanize them into pro-
Speed:

Type-91 Single-seat Fighter (Ki-2'()

visional squadrons which would augment the stren� at the 10th and
Engine : Slncle, 9 cylinoer, air cooled , radial.
Two '{. 7-mm machine gun:::.
11th Air Divisions in emergency situations. The reinf'orcins units
Al"ITIl:l.;llCnt:
�p eed : Maxim�., 470 kph. c s ing, 315 k h.
� �
(Obsolete in ea.rly days of war out s till in u"e in
were called TO-Ni-Go Butai, Q. tenu tbat may be tree1y translated as

SecOildary Provisional Unit. �

1944)

Type-lOO 'l.'vO-sea.t Headquarters ReconnuissWlce (Ki-116)

&1g1ne: Two, 14 c ylin der , air cooled, radia.l.
Annalllent: <Xle 7." -lJIn llIachine GUll '
Speed: Maximum, 635 kph. Cruising, 475 kph.

Throughout the war the various types of planes
Note:
were iwproved in many winor respects. Figures
given above indicate ar.n�nent &1d speed us fi­
nally developed.
4. The To-Ni-Go Un! ts shoulcl not be Confused vith the Special
Attack or suiCide units which were known 8S TO-Go Unit!>. The "To"
of the To-Iii-Go Uni ts conveys the meaning of !Ast or Eastern, the
units beinc; oriB1na.lly developed by the Eastem Arr.J.;y COOJIOIIld
ll . The
"To" of the To-Go Units is an abbreviation of Tokubetsu KOSek! Tai,
which i s transluted as Special Attack U1it. The use or the ter.1
To":Ni-Go to dl!signo.te provisional units in other anny co.Jl2.lld s is
attributed to the fact that units similar to those originated by
the lOth Air Division and the Enstem Army CO!1i:lW1d were later estab­
lished wi thin the 11 til Air D1 vI cion and the originn1 term ·cto.1.ned.

12
 In spite ot the superior aIdll ot the inst.ructors and test pi­ vb1ch had ope ra ted effectIvely in the Philippines, it vas suggested

lots who manned the provisional \mits, as a result ot lack ot UD1t. that a plane, even if piloted by an inexperienced pilot, could wreak

tra1n1ng and conf'licts ot duties, performance of' the T�-!fi-ao tb1t. tremendous danllige if' it yere to crash-dive a B-29 or an enemy naval

tell tar below expec tations. In addition, air-ground communicatiOilI vessel. While such tactics would, of course, be extremel,. wasteful

did not function as smoothly as vith the re�rly orgwrl.zed squad_ of Japan's meager supply ot plancs and pilot personnel, it vas re­

rons ot the air dividons. Results verc, in tact, so unsat1etactorr cognized that one tighter plane and its pilot 'WOuld be a cheap price

that t.he 're-I'l1-Go Un1 ts vere finally di:Jbanded on 15 April 1945. to pay tor the e11m1nation ot a B-29 and its crew. It waG also ob­

Special Attack Units vioua that several planes and pilots Inight prot1 tab1y be expended

Slliplilents of oil fl'Ol4 the southern area decreased rapidly on the destructIon of B capital ship.

throughout 1944 and ceased altoge ther in early 1945. As i t become To accomplish the destruction ot the enemy by suicide tactIca,

obvlous tha.t Japan's fuel uupply could not be r eple nished, the air a nunber of units were fonned from the lOth and 12th Air Divisions.

de fe n s e planners ....ere faced with the problem of providine sufficient The name applied to these units ycre "Tokubetsu !Cogek1 Ta1", Yhich

ruel for traininc without handicapping the air defense miasion. 5 may be freely transla.ted as "Special Attack Units." The crash-div-

Japan's air de fens e forces ....ere faced by a dilemma; It vas clear 6

ing planes later becanle known as �kaze" planes.

that although only adequate training would fit pilots to successtu!.

In conducting their raIds, the B-29's came over Japan at nlti-

ly combat B-29's and other U.S. planes, if' large quantities of' ruel
tudes of' approximately 10,000 meters, a height which Japanese f'18bt­
Yere expended in training there would not be sufficient tuel to u:se
er planes had difficulty attainiIlG. By using tighter planes Yhich
in interception I1l1ssions and in a.ttacks on carrier task torces.
had been stripped of all armor and weapons, except a nose bomb, the
Neanwile, losses of combat pilots continued to mount and the qual-
special attack planes could achieve o.n altitude above the ene:!lY
ity ot replacementa continued to deteriorate due to lack of' tra1n1n8.
6. "Kamikaze", 1itera.lJ.y translated as "God Wind" vas tirst
In late 1944, rccal1ing the example of a n1Dber of' suicide unit.
used in connection with a typhoon which drove ott and destroyed a
l-Pnsol tleet which soU8ht to invade Japan in 1281. In pozt World
War II yetlTS, the tenn has been used as a derogatory description
5. See page 46, Japanese Mono graph !fo. 23, Air Defense of the ot Tokyo's taxi drivers wo crash-dive their vehicles in and out
aviation ruel
H041eland, for description of efforts cade to develop of' Tokyo's traffic Jams.
substitutes.

15

I
b
'bombers and crash-dive them. thf ortunate ly, the crasb -diving method great hopes were plnned on the emplo)'ll1ent of the nev bombing tech­

did not prove o.l.together oa:t1sfactory as the plane bad difficulty 1D. nique, the method. proved ineftective because of the inability ot

o.pproac:b1ng the beavily o.nned U.S. bombers. Tbe rear &nII8IIl ent at the bomb carrying plWles tu reach W1 aJ:tItude a.bove the B-29 tor­

the B-29 made 1t ncceaso.ry to attack at a steep angle and the mo.x1- mat.1ona (ngure fto. 1).
m\llll cenings 01' the ,Tapaneatl planes wtde It extremely difficult to Service Unit eperationa

gain a pooltl00 sufficiently above the bombers to attack from the Al.thougb there were oorce slight d.11'1'erencelJ in the operat1ng

required angle. Shallov angled frontal. a.ttacks appeared to offer procedures and Illethods 01' IService units within the various aIr d1T-

the best cbance of success although this Illaneuver could onl1 be ae- Isions, in general, their organi�ation and operating methods Yere

compl1shed by an experienced pilot. This drawback tended to negate lSimilar.

the value of the special attack tactics because experienced pilots Airfield Battal10ne

were in short supply and one of the principal arguments advanced in Airfield battalions were 01' two t)'Ile5: A and B. Each 'Va" can-

favor 01' the plan had been that the suicIde a.tto.ck3 could be accOlll- posed 01' a headquarters, a maintenance and a guArd c oaxp any. In the

plished by inexperienced pilots. Type A batto.l.10ns the iIIlUntenance cocpany bad tvo sectlOOIS, one 01'

In sIlite of the fact that saaething less than complete success Which specialized in maintenance and minor repairs on tiGhters and

crowned the efforts 01' the To-Go Units, the suicide method of attack- the other pertonned similar duties in connection vi th all other

ing heavy bcmbers and naval vessels 'WaS continued throughout the war. types ot planes. In the Type B battalions, the IlIAintenance company

Ta-J)m :BombID§ provided mainten3llce and minor repair service tor all types at

Another method that 'Was oric1na1ly thoUGht to ofter some chance planes. M41ntenance companies yere also responsible tor tuel1�

of succesd'ul.l.y cOlllbatting enemy raiding planes, was the "ra-Dan BaIb­ loading or amh1un1tlon and tlight control operations. '!'he guard

ing Technique." J'lying above an enemy bOlnber fo:rmat1on, a light bomb- I

cO;lIpanies were responsible for protectinS airfield installations

er or fighter equipped vith banb racks would release a large n\llllber and equip!lIent, including the manning 01' antiaircraft weapons in­

of small conto.ct-�ed bombs in the path ot the 1"ormation. 7 Although stalled at the airtieldo.

7. See page 39, Japanese Monograpb lfo. 17, Hom eland Opel'S.t10ns
Record, for nescrlption 01' the San-Go bomblng procedure, a similar
tactic.

16 17

t
 FIGU R E 1

�ecial Intelligence Squadrons

Organized in ate 1944, one Special Intelligence Squadron "..
TA - DAN BOMBING
located in each air division headquarters. Personnel. assigned to
TECHN IQUE
the squadrons were capable ot pertorming cr)'Ptanalysis and vere pro­

fic ient in !llgl1 sh. Tbe units obtained �orme.tion on enemy oper-

ations by intercepting and deCiphering radio communications ot eD-

erny torces, especially those on Tinian and Saipan. In most cases,

� advance notice ot large-scale air raids �s determined at the time

�
�
I the B-2$l's took ott trolll their bases. '!'he enell1Y weather report tor
I
I the Saipan area ....as also intercepted, making it possible to e.timate
I
I the enemy's probable course. This intormation was also used in plan-
I
I ning Japanese air attacks on the U.S. bases. Through interception
JI
ot cOll1lllunications bet....een the retUl'ning B-29' s and their basee, the

, z.
�
s:l amount of damage sustained by the raiding planes could also be de­

, ",1 /-" V'\

�t-<::-
tennined.
, I I I 'I I 1 \ \
" " '11'"
, , , I, , ' , ' I Navigational Aid Units
• I , , ; '
•
• • In November 1944, personnel drawn from the air-ground radio
'N'''Y .0 .. 1'" I I. • •• •
'0 " ..... TI ON ,. , " ..
. ," . un1ts and the air signal regiments were tonned into navigational
," , '
I
,
,
" " , " , ,
1 " ' 1 ' , aid unitsi one ot which 'Wtl.S established at each airtield. 1'he1r
//',' 1111, "

�I II "
, prlncipo.l duty was the operotion ot radio direction tinders to u-
I I "
I I-
� .IOON .. 'TI" THI 10.. 1 W... . list interceptors in maintaining their alert position patterns. Aa
"IL' ... . IO..... OUT eo TO 100
L.GHT 10 .. 1. WI"E "'UTO­
.. AT'C;... LLY "IL-'... . ED TO a secondary duty, they cooperated in the bad weather and nisht
,.0"" .. OI''''''''ON ZONE
IN THI ....TH 0' THI
fighting training program. In Jauuary 1945, these units were re-
ENIMY ,.OltM ...T I ON

intorced and placed on an around-tile-clack watch on two 12-hour

shifts.

19

18

2
 Air Raid Waming 18ilure to recognize enemy planes, identitication ot trieDdl7

'l'hree diff'erent types ot inste.lle.tions vere used in the air planes as enea1,Y, errors in estimation of' altitude and duplication

raid varning net: lookout posts, radar stations and picket boats. of' reports were 8lIIong the many flaws in the operation. In Jul;y

Units ot all three types were organi sed vithin ee.ch ot the m1l1 Uu7 1945, special training vas g1 vea to army lookout personnel and the

dintricts and vere unde r the direction of' the three anllY cOlllllllUlda. nUll1ber, st rength and equipmeDt of' the anDY posts was increased. The

posts vere also assigned the additional duties of' vatching tor ene­
lDokout Posts

ed by the Army: the m.t11n my naval craft and confi mi ng the res ults of the air battles. Im­
Two types of' lookout posts wre operat

I�ed by 1 otficer or senior �CO and 18

nco's or portant lookout posts vere equipped with poveri'ul binoculars and
posts Which vere

lookout posts which were 1IIOJl­ T'JPe-95 telephoto cameras.

other enlisted men; and the ordinary

ned by 1 rIco and 12 enlisted men. Honn.ally telephone communieation A t rainiDg program tor civi11 an lookout personnel vas also un­

with the centrnl intelligence dertaken in order to increase their proficiency. As a result ot the
vns used to connect the lookout posts

not available, radio co�u­ training and increased experience, their reports became more accu­
headquarters, but where telephones vere

'or this purpose, a radio squsd con sisting rate.

nication vas provided.

of' 1 lfCO and 6 enlisted hlen W':l.D added to the normal. complement of Lookout posts �ere orig1nally located and installed by the ar­

my co��ds and were later taken over by the area armies. At the
the lookout post.

posts, civilians operated a time of the formation of the Air General Army, in April 1945, it was
In addition to the Army lookout

large number ot such installations. Such posts were manned by vol- desired to have th e lookout posts come under the direct control ot

unteers and the nallber at each location varied considerably. For that organization. Since, hovever, all communications systems and

each 8 or 10 civilian posts there was generally a central headquar­ manni ng personnel vere controlled by the area arc1es, it vas recog­

ters which vas connected by telephone with the neare::;t al'T!lY or air nized that a changeover vouJ.d require core time than vas available.

In addition , the army would not l"el1quish control of the cCllllllunic:a-

unit headquarters.

Although a tremendous number of lookout posts were establish- tions systems. L�fonaation developed by the lookout posts ¥.as,

ed throughout Japan, their operation vas not completely successful. therefore, passed directly to the army and then transmitted to the

2l
 M A P N O. 2

appropriate air units, causing considernbl.e delay and being general­

ly unsatisfactory to the Air General. An.ry and its component units .

Radar Stations

T'olO types of radar syste.tns were utilized in establishing the

air rai d warn1ne net : the Type A, or f'lanld.ng type, lIhich scanned

verticaJ.ly and employed radio waves transmitted benreen two points

to detect planes by means of the Doppler Effect; and. Type B, or

frontal screen type, which scann ed horizontally and could cove r a

c:lJ 0 arc with an effective radius of' 200 to 250 kilometers . Approx­

i.-nate1y 59 of the frontal screen type and 40 of the fl.a.nkins type

radar stations vere in use by the end of' the war (Map No. 2 ) .

Although c on s tantly improved throughout the war, neither type

of radar was comp le te ly sati s fac tory . Planes approaching at ex-

trernely hig.lJ. or very low alt it'\1d.e s could not be dete�ted end it was

also di fficult to detect single plane s . Later, as the B-29' s began

to be accompanied by fighter escorts, i t 't4\S not 1>osoib1e to deter-

.dne by rndar whether QJl incOlldng f'onuation c onsi sted enUrely ot

bouIbers or wao being given fighter protection . Ruclar installo.tions z (

oc:::::::;'

o.lso failed to accurately dc te n ai ne enemy plnne altitudes - infor-

1;lation wich was l-equired as a guide for the antia1rera1't un1to in

the establishment of range c on t rol s . In many cases, the pe rsonnel

of' the radar stations performed doub le duty, actin! a.s visual look-

out post observers a.s well.

22

23
Picket IIoats located in the Ryukyu, Bonin W'ld Kurl.l Islands as well as on the

A\.Ig1Qenting the lookout poats along the c oast and, to a. certa1n many smalle r inlands u.dJa.ccnt to Jupan . Un1 ts located in China. and

extent, the early warn1n8 net, were about 50 Navy picket boats 01' Korea were helpful in detecting luids launched by U . S . planes based

100 to 300 tons . nlese were stationed about 1000 kilometers ott in China Wld some success was achieved in meeting and CO!:lbatt1ng at-

shore, along an ea.st-vest line through the Bonin Islands as vell as tacks rrOlll that direction.

in the waters east of Japan. Originally their purpose was to detect Air raid. warnings i ssued by picket boats und the nearer isl.anda

ene::.y surface c rai't but they were later u.ced to give wanl10gs 01' could have been valuable in alertinc the air defense units, but de-

approaching aircraf't . ntei r usefulness V3.S sozcewhat impaired when lays in the transmitting or warninc;s and in getting planes to their

constant attacks by enemy naval ves sels made it necessary to with- combat positions were rre�uently so great as to make the warnings

draw the picket bo�ts much closcr to the shore . valueles s . A typical example o f the time lag i n Getting defense

Early Warning Net planes into the air i s shown in connection with the radar unit 10-

nte location and geography of Japan made the establishment 01' cated on Hachijojima (i sland) , a.bout 300 kilometers south 01' Tokyo .

an early varning net virtually impossible. The great majority 01'

Action Elapsed T1!:le
Japan ' a vi tal indu&trle.l and gove mrne ntal install.ations vere locat­
Hostile aircraft detected 200 to 250
ed along the east coast and vere particularly vulnerable to attacks kilometers south of HachiJoJima
3 mins .
from the south and east. In addition, at its widest part Japan meas- Exi stence or hostile planes co�i:nued

ure& only about 250 kilOlneters from the Sea or Japan to the Pacific, Air derense units aJ.erted

so that even lookout pOints and re.dar irlsta.llat ions located along Report reaches air division headquar-
ters �d interceptors ordered to take 7 Idns.
the west coast were unable to pick up approaching planes in surfi- ott
. --

cient time to penni t air defense planes to reach t.'l eir assigned a- Lead planes o f air regiments take ott 15 mns.

lert areas and al ti tudes berore the arrl val. of the :5-29' s over east All planes take alert sta.tions and
gain required altitude ( 10, 000 Lleters ) 50 - 60 mine .
coast target areas .

Air raid warning units, both radar e q uipped and visual, were Total 75 - 85 mi.r: .. .

24 25

1
 A B-29 could cover the 500 to 550 ldlometers between its posi­ meters, experiments were conducted to determine the possib1l1ty ot

tion at time of detection and the Tokyo area in about 60 minutes. extending the performance capabilities ot Japanese planes. Average

Therefore, there 'WIlS no pOBcibl11ty of intercepting the incaa1ng climbing time to reach 10, 000 lIleters 'Was treD 50 to 60 m1.nutes tor

bombers and even the pursuit of planes 'Which bLl.d o.lready accomplish_ a single plane and would be somewhat longer for un1 t tozmations to

ed their bombing mi ssions was often impossIble . reach such height s . Descent required approximately 30 m1nutes, vh1eh

Pilot Tra1n1ng J:1eant that only 30 minutes ot tlying t1:ne was possible tor the aver­

Training of pilots was under the control of the Inspectorate age plane. In addition, it vas dete:nn1ned that at the 10, 000 meter

General of Air Training and the chief of the Army Aeronautical De­ level, it was extremely difficult to oaintain altItude and plane bal­

part..nent . The air defense tro.inina program emphasized high alti­ ance . Even a sUght bank resulted in a loss ot altitude that might

tude, night and bad weather flying. Training in Ta-Dan tactics vas take 10 to 20 minutes to regain . tmder such conditions, only one

o.lso included. \olhen U . S . forces cnptured Saipan in July 1944, at­ pass at an enemy bomber would be possible .

tempts were Ll8.de to intensify t raining but the effort was handicap­ !fight Combat and Bad Weather Tra1n1ng

ped by shortages of planes and fuel. Although it vas recognized In training for night combat, the prinCipal emphasis 'Was placed

that bases in Saipan and Tinian would enable the U.S. to launch on achIeving and maintaining a fl1ght patte:rn to cover established

raids against Japan with the newly developed B-29 bo�ber, the de­ interception zones . Time was also spent in tra1n1ng pilots in methods

fense requirements of the Philippines had first priority and train­ ot attacking targets illuminated by searchlights .

ing for the air defense ot Japan suttered. Tra.1n1ng in cethods of intercepting raiding planes in bad weath­

High Altitude Training er or in overcast skies 'Was begun in md-Augu.st 1944. Delay in start­

High altitude, in the Japanese anny ai r torce, meant heights ing this type ot training was due to the necessIty ot first torming

up to 8, 000 meters and engines had been desIgned to operate at max­ ground support units . Navigation Aid Units, one ot which was assIgn­

l.'tlum efficIency at about 5, 000 meters . When it vas tound, 10 Oc­ ed to each a1 rt1e�d, used radio direction finders to essist inter­

tober 1944, that the B-29 ' s gas turbine engines and pressurized ceptors in l!I&1nta1n1ns their alert patte:rns by establiShing the re­

compa�Qents permitted operation at altitudes in excess ot 10, 000 latIve positions ot other Japanese planes . One ot the pr"-ncipa1

results ot the operations of Navigation Aid Units was t'J reduce the

26
 ["
amount at training necessary tor bad weather tlying operatiODs. The GDC, however, determined that the threetold msdon vas too

Ta-Dan Bombing Tra1n1ng d1fflcult to accOiilplish and relieved the 6th Air A.rmy ot the mission

Tra1n1ng in the tactic at counter-bombing B-29 tormations traa ot conducting the current air detense at Japan.

pod tions above the attacking pJ.anes vas carned. out b,. multi-seat In early February, concluding that the attacks on the l.far1anas

t'1ghters vitb special bomb carrying equipment. As a part or tlie bases could not be carried out in sufficient strength to be at value,

training, live bombs were used. Since the bombs were act1vated b:y that operation, too, was discontinued. The 6th Air A:rIrJ.y vas then

contact fuzes, it vas necessary to conduct such training over the designated as a strategic reserve to be employed against enemy in­
vasion torces and it vas exempted trom all c urrent air detense re­
ocean.

Final Det'ense Preparations sponsibilities.

M 1944 drew to a close, it became obvious that the U.S. vould.

Redes1gnat1on of Districts and Anny Commands
On 6 February 1945, the three districts ot Japan were increased
attempt an invasion o� Japan during the following :year and. derenBe
to tive and redeSignated as military districts . The two new districts
preparations were intens1%'1ed.
were the northeastern Military District, which encompassed all ot
Foroation ot the 6th" Air Army
Decembe r 1944, the Air Training Arm7 (sometimes reterred
Honshu north ot the Kanto Plain area, and the East Coast M1lita.ry
On 20

to as the Air Instruction Army) was reorganized as the 6th Air ArtIly
District, lIhich vas established between the old Eastern and Central

Districts and included a portion ot both. The Central Hilitary Dis­

and a number ot' Air Tra1ning Divisions were tormed under the Inspec­
trict was extended to include the western tip ot Honshu and the is­
torate General. ot Army Aviation. The missions ot the newl,. tormed
land ot Shikoku, formerly parts ot the Western District. Suultane­
Air Army were announced b,. IGHQ as :
oud,. with the redes1gnatlon and increase in the number of military
1. To carry on the attacks on U�S. bases
in the Marianas, presently beins undertaken b:y
the Air Training Arm:y.
districts, the amy commands within the districts were inactivated
and ti ve area annies were establ1shed (Map No. 3 ) . 8
2. To conduct the air det'ense ot Japan.

3 . To plAn ano. ll\Bke preparations tor the 8 . See pages 40 - 43, Japanese Monograph Ito . 11, Homeland Op­
t� defense ot Japan against invasion, in­ erations Record. t:or more cOiilplete int'onnat10n on the mill tary dis­
cluding the attacking of' invasion 'task torce. tricts and area armie s .
at sea.
MI L I TARY DISTR ICTS AND
M AP NO. 3

r
I C�d Reorganizntion - 1945

ARE A ARMY COMMANDS On 8 April 1945, the Ketsu-Go Operation, outlining the t1nal,

APRIL 1945 all-out defense of Japan w.s announced by IGllQ . 9 en the same date,

0 -0 KETSU -GO AREAS

drastic command changes were also announced - all to be effective
o 100 _ aoo
,
KIL.OWCT'C". 15 April. The General Defense Command 'Was inactlvated and the

First and Second General Anll1e s as well as the Air General Army

were established. The 1st Air A:rm.y 'Was relieved of responB1bll1t7

for replac�nent traininS and reorganized as a tactlcal command un-

der the newly fonned Air General Army.

The effects ot the changes In the nUlnber of milltary districts

and the formatlon of the general armies on the three air div1sions

JAPAN
will be discussed In subsequent chapters ot thls study.
S EA OF
Transfers and Reassignments

On 2 !-18.y, the 6th Air Anny 'Was augtllented by the addition of

some 100 planes trom To-Go Un!ts as well as a number of f'lghter and
GA
heavy bomber regiments . Following the aU8mentatlon the Army was

placed under the operational control of the Combined Fleet for uti-

11zatlon In the Okinawa battle . At the concluslon of that engage­

ment, the 6th Air A.rmy 'Was returned to the control of the Air Gen-

era! Army and the operatlonal boundaries of the 1st and 6th Air Ar-

mea were changed to conform with those of' the First and Second

9. See page 62, Ibld. and po.ee 73, Japanese Hono�raph No. 23,
Air Def'ense of' the Homerand for details of the Ketsu-Go Operatlon.
PA C I F I C OCEAN

30

�,
General Armies, respectively. OIl 1 July the air divisions vare re­ CHAPTER 2

moved t'rom the operational control ot the First and Second General AIR DEFENSE OF THE KANTO :m::TOR

Aluies and placed directly WIder t.he lot. and 6th Air Andes with

over-all direct.ion vellted in the Air Genero.l Arrrty . S1multaneoua17 Tbe Knoto Air Defense Sector encOIIlp assed the Kanto Pla1.n area,

wi th thi s eotnblisru4cnt ot the Air General Army as the tactical CQIl­ in which is located Tokyo and the great industrial centers ot' Yoko-

mand tor all defendve air power in Jo.po.n, the Sei-Go Operat.ion was hama and Kawasaki . In addition to its indust.rial and governmental

activat.ed. This operation divided the defensive air torce into stat­ importance, the Kanto area i s also one ot the important. rice produc­

ic and mobile air group s and established a pat.tern ot mutual support ing areas ot the CO\.Ultry. Occupying the southern port1on ot' the
10 Eastern DistriCt., the Kanto Air Defense Sector vas considered to be
bet.ween areas .

the most vital ot all Jap3ll and its defense had the highest priori-

ty. AlthoUGh all the rest of Japan miGht fall, the Japanese were

firmly determined to defend the Kanto area to the end.

Organization of Defensive Air Unit.s

Prior to April 191!2, the 244th Air Res1.:nent ot the 1st Air Ax-

my, UDder the operational control ot the Eastern Army COl:lZII8.Dd, vas

charged vi th the air defense ot the Kanto Sector. To protect the

Imperial Palace, the Tokyo-Yokohama. area, Tachikaw. and other vital

pOints, the 244th Air Regiment was to intercept and dest.roy enemy

planes over the ocean before they could penetrate the strategic ar-

eas on the mainland. To accomplisb this mission, the Regiment vas

equipped vith 50 Type-97, single- seat, tighter planes.

As a result of the Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942, 'When the

10. See page 68, � t'or a canplete explanat.ion ot' the Sei­ air defense un1ts failed to prevent the enemy trom bombing the st.ra-
Go Operat.1on.
teg1.c Kanto area, it was detcr.n1ned to strengthen the det'ensive air

)2 ))
strength ot the Sector. To this end, the 17th Air Brigade vas tom­ lOth Air Division

ed on 30 April# with the following canponenta and equipment : 1st Ai r Regill1ent Type-l Fighters Matsudo

17th Air Brigade 18th Air Regiment Type-3 Fighters Chotu

244th Air Regiment Type-3 Fighters 47th Air Regiment Typc-2# Sins!e-
Type-97 Fighter. seat Fighters Nar1...aasu

Type-l Fighters 53d Air Regiment Type-:2, Two-

5th Air Regilllent
Type 97 Fighters
-
s eat Fighters Toltorozawa

Type-2 Single-seat Fighter. 70th Air Regiment Type-2# Single-

4th Independent Air
seat Ficbtera Kasbiwa
Squadron

Type-l00 Reconnaissance 244th Air Regiment Type-3 Fighters Cbotu

Headquarters Recon­
naissance Squadron Planes
17th Independent Type-l00 Recon
Air Squadron Planes Cbotu
Like the 244th Air Regiment, the 17th Air Brigade \/as organic
Transfers and Reassigomenta
to the 1st Air Anuy but 'Was under the operational control ot the
In July# in order to cOlQbat B-29 attacks on the Anshan area ot
Eastern Army Command.
Manchuria, the 70th Air ReGiment was moved fX'OCl Ka shi wa to lI.ancburia
Fomation of the 10th Air Division
were it ca.:lle W1der the Kwuntung AImy. B-29 ' s had also intensified
In early 1944# wi th the u . S . achiev1.ng major successes in the
Soutp Pacific# the strength ening of the air deten se s ot Japan aga1D
their atta ck s OIl Kyushu and at the end of August, the 1st Air Regi­

went \/as di spatched to Gann osu Airfield to operate under the 12th
appeared necessary. en 10 March 1944# the 17th Air Brigade \/as aug-

Ai r Division 1n defense of the Western Di strict . To replace the 1st

mented e.nd reorganized as the lOth Air D1 vis i on, under the te:Dporar,y
Air Regiment, the 53d was transferred to l-!atsudo tran Tokorozawa.
cOl1llll8lld ot I�J . Gen . Shoichi Sato. Two months later# as a result ot

The newly orca.n1zed 23d Air Regiment (Type-l Fighters ) was subse­
the new cOlnmand p rogra.u# the Division \/as reonoved tran the organ1-
quently added to the 10th Air Division e.nd based at !1uba Airfield
zational chart of the 1st Air Army and placed directly under th e
(Pap No . 4) .
co:n..-,and of the C in C of the GOC# with operational control continu-
By October 1944, the
ing to be vested in the Eastern AxuIy Com:nand.
composition of the lOth Air Division ap­

peared to be fairly well stabilized with a strength of appro�tely

By 1 July 1941., the 10th Air Division had attained a strength

ot six air re giments and one independent air squadron located at the

airfields indicated:
35
MAP NO. 4

200 plane s , about halt" ot vhicb were c a.pable ot night flying. Ap_
prox1lllate strength and qua.llty ot uni ts va.s as folloW8 :

10th Air Division

18th Air Regiment Newly organized. Combat

( 30 Type-3 Fighte rs ) ability belov required
sUuldard

2 3<1 Air Regiment Newly organi zed. Barely

( 12 Typ e -l Fi ght e rs ) operational

47th Air Reg1J11cnt Best in Division . Many

( 40 Type-2 Single- seat skilled pilots
Fi ghte rs )

53d Air Regircent Nevly organi zed. Combat

( 25 Typc-2 Two-seat abili ty belov required
Fighters ) standard.

244th Air RegL�ent Adequat e . Second to 47th

( 40 Type-3 Fighters ) in quality

17th Independent Ai r Averdge ability

Squadron
( 50 Typ e -100 Hq RecoD
Plane s plus a fev fighters)

Note : About one-hlllf ot the Type-1OO planes of the

lIth Independent Air Squadron ve re capable of
conduc ting Ta-Dan Bombing .

Sp o radi c raids by B-29 ' s on the Kanto Sector began in November

1944, and, althoug..� large - scale raids appeared 1lnm1nent they had not

yet developed. In spite of the threat of intensified enemy air ac-

tivity, the lOth Air Division underwent seve ral changes in organ i -

zation and sufi'ered from unit and individuel personnel levies.

On 6 November, thc strength of the Divi sion vas reduced by Ule

te:lporary transfer of the 18th Air Regiment to the Philipp ines, from
AIRFIELDS
IN KANTO SECTOR

37

36
1
 r
which area it did not return until 21 Jo.nual")' 19lt 5 . In an eftort to
I the majority ot its planes , the rema1.neder ot the force vas ordered

restore the strengtil of the lOth, the 70th Air Regiment was ordered to rejoin the Reg1.tnent.

back to Japo.n from Manchuria on 6 November 19� 4 . Th e newly assigned §?ecinl Attack Ubits

regiment vas not, however, cOUlbat ready and some t1Jne was needed tor During the battles in the PhilippineS in October 1944, the sui­

lII.Q.intenance units to bring the planes up to reQ.uired otandardB . cide tactic s of Special Attack l.b1ts produced a deep impression on

into the both Japan and its enemi e s . I n November, a Special Attack Ubit,
On 15 November, the 28th Air Regilllcnt vas transferred

organized by the 10th Air Division and sent to the Philippines to

lOth Ai r Divi sion fl"Oln the 2d Air Anay in J.lD.nchuria and the fi ghter
operate from Clark Field, was particularly successful. As a conse-
::oections of the 17th Independcnt Ai r Squadron were incorporated into
1 quence, in reviewing the failures of the air defenses in the first
the Ree;1ment.

On 13, 18 and 22 of December, the Central Di strict was subject- large-scale bow.bing raids on the Kanto Sector, the lOth Air D1vi-

ed to large- scale air raids . Thi s shift in target areas apparently sion c orumander determined that suicide tactics offered a means to

indicating a telTlporary respite tor the Ko.nto Sector, the 244th Air successfully operate against 13-29 ' s . All air regjJ:1ents, vi th the

Regiment was sent to H&lmmatsu Airfield to assist in the defense ot exception of the 18th Air Reg1alent and the 17th Independent Air

the Central District. Squadron, were ordered to organize Special Attack Units co:nposed ot

On 1 December 1944, the Hioki Squadron or the 23d Air Regiment three or four plane s . These units, generalJ.y knO'WIl as To-Go Units,

was dispatched to Iwo Jima to provide fighter escort tor convoys . were also designated as Shinten (Heaven Shaking) Obits.

By 26 December all planes ot the Squadron had been damaged and the Activation of the 6th Air Army

surviving pilots were returned to Japan aboard a Navy plane . On 17 On 26 December 1944, the Air Training � 'WaS reorganized as

January 1945, an addi tiona! 12 planes from the 23d Air Regiment were the 6th Air A:rmy and assigned to the GOC . The C in C of Detenae

�ent to Iva J1ma on the same mi ssion, but by 8 February, having lost established the 6th Ai r Array as a strategic reserve to be employed

against enemy invasion attempts and exempted it fl'Olll all c urrent.

tva sec­
1 . The 17th Independent Ai r Squadron vas divided into
: Fi ghter and Reconna issance . The Fighter Section , because air defense responsibilit ie s . The 10th Ai r Division, although made
tions
planes,
of the superio r high altitude per1'o nnance of its Type-1OO
vas a::osigned interception lni ssions using
the Ta-lhn 13ombine; Tech- organiC to the newly established Ai r Art!lj', remained under the con­
niQ.ue .
trol of the Eastezn Army Command for air defense operat1.:ms.

)8
 Air Training Program a lOth Air D1vioion pilot W8 11, 000 meters o.nd. thi s had been ac­

In the Kanto Sector, the training progl"Wll was \Ulder the cOIltl'Ol. complished by one of' the best pilots in the Division. With aU

and direction of the Inspectorate General at Amy Aviation and the units bnv1ng pilots ot varying degrees of' qualification, it �

Chief of the Anrty Aeronautical Department. At M1to, the Hitachi Air JIIllll1 f' estly impossible tor an air l'Cgilnent to achieve the 10, 000

Un! t which was a pert of the Akeno Air School, specialized in the �eter level as a unit. Besides weaknesses in pilot qual1t'1catioo,

training of pilots for fighters . The let Advanced Training lh1t at a number ot maintenance problems developed and frequent trouble.

Se.gam1 provided advanced tra1n1ng for non-comm1 s sioned officer t'1ght­ vere experienced with oxygen regulators.

er and light bomber pilots. Other air training schools in the !Canto The best perf'ol'lnance in reaching high altitudes ws achieved

Sector were the Army Air Academy at Shubuda1 and the Army Air Schools by the Type-1OO Headquarters Reconnaissance planes, tollowed by

at Utsunomi ya and KUIIItlgaya. tJle Type-3 Fighters, the Type-2 Single-seat Fighters, the Type-l

The training progrwn of the lOth Air D1 vision was hampered by Fighters and the Type-2 Two-seat Fighters in that order.

shortages of planes and fuel. Repeated requests for more plane. It was concluded, 1'rom the difficultie s exper1enced. in tn.1n­

and fuel were not honored due to the priori ties established for the ing, that it would be virtually impos sible to intercept a t'lJ.ght

cce:1ng Philippines cwnpaign. After the fall of Sa1pan, in July 1944, of B-29' s with the present equipt!lent and levels of pilot qualifi­

the Division was convi.nced that the Japanese mainla.rld would be the cation. The accuracy of this conclusion was demonstrated during

next lnajor target of U . S . bombers and insisted on supply priorities. the several B-29 reconnaissance flights �ch vere flown over the

This insistence resulted in a portion of the planes and ruel which Kanto Sector between 1 and 23 November 1944. en each occasion,

had been earmarked for the Philippines being given to the Division. the 10th Air Division attempted to intercept the ene:ny in strength

High Altitude Trainiag but the combination o� speed and altitude or �e B-29 ' 8 prevented

In experiments to develop methods of successt'ully combattiDg the interceptors 1'rom even approaching the enemy ba:.bers . Added

the B-29' s which were known to fly at altitudes at 10,000 meters or to the d11'r1culties caused by the super1or1ty 01' the B-29 Bociber

more, the lOth Air Division discovered that only Class A pilots were was the time lag between the sighting and identification of en.ecy

able to clill1b to that level. The highest altitude eYer reached by planes and the taking 01." positions by the derendins fighter units.

40

•
Nonus.l.ly, tram the time a bomber vas first sighted and reported 1'\ Ni ght Co;nbat Training

required onJ..y 60 minutes to reach its obJective, lIb1l.e the elapsed During Decembe r 1944 and January 1945, there vas an increase in

t.ime between the 1n1 ti&1 report by the radar installation or look­ the trequency ot night raids by 81118.l.l groups ot enemy bombers, indi­

out post and the reaching ot the required 10, 000 meter level by the cating a possib1li ty that large -scale raids might be 1mm1nent. Act­

inte rcep tor un1 ts vas approximate ly 70 to 80 minutes. ing on this assunption, the lOth Air Division emphasized night train­

ing and took steps to reorganize tor more etticient night �ght1ng
Bad Weathe r orra1.n1ng

Flying in bad weathe r or heavi:Q' overcast sky conditions pr0Ye4 operation a . On 19 January 1945, the 53d Air Regiment vas designated

to be a problem. which the lOth Ai r Divi sion had. not cOIIlplete:Q' solve4 as a pe:nuancnt night tighter unit . The advanc ed nicht training tor

by the end ot the war. The navigation aid units which were establi sh. the Regiment was m03t intensive and so strict the.t, atter a tew !:lonths,

ed in August 1944 were not comp le te ly effective in assisting 1n oper­ morale deteriorated within the organiza.tion. In addition, a number

ational. tlying and in most cases served only to aid planes, which had 01' ne rvoua breo.kdo\/Ils we re suffered by the p1lots . An investi gati on

lost their bearings in bad weather or at night, to return to their indicated that this reaction had come as a result of keeping the men

base s . Their assi stance in aiding combat op e rati ons never achieved training all night, every night, and having them attempt to get their

any real success. OIl 30 Novembe r 1944, when B-29' s made the first re s t during the day. Rooms occupied by the trainees were ke p t dark

night raid on Tokyo and started tires in the Kanda distriCt., the at­ and the men were required to wenr dark glasses when going out during

tack was not only carried out at night but also in bad. weather. The the day. Because or the deleterious affect of the intensive training

lOth Ai.r Divi sion cOlJlmt!.Dde r and his atai'f' became greatly conc e rned and duty, the 53d Ai r Regiment was relieved or its mi s sion ot e xclu­

because the Divi sion vas unable to take any defensive action due to sive night opel�tioDS on 20 May 1945 .

the �_ouble handi cap of bad. we athe r and darkness. While the 10th Ai.r Ta-Dan Bornbing T rai ni ng

Division, unable to operate under the adverse conditions, stood belp­ The 10th Air Divioion had been highly confident that the Ta-Dan

lessly by, the enemy clearly demonstrated its superior equipment, Bombing Technique would prove to be a highly efficacious way ot dis-

tra1n1ng and coordination. ruptin� enemy bomber formations and infl1ctins heavy losses. With

this end in View, the Divi sion conducted intensive train1ng in the

specialized b��bing technique, using the fighter section of the l1th

42 43
Independent Air Squadron with its Type-1OO Reconnai ssance planes as Light BoiIlber Training School at Hokod.a; the 1st Advanced Air Train­

the principal Ta-Dan th1t. However, the first attempts to employ ing Ul1 t at So.gami and the Army Air Testing Station at Fussa. en

this tactic proved unsucce sstul becQ.uoe ot the 1nabil1t7 ot the 1 November 1944, however, when the Kanto Sector vas subjected to

plane s to gain suft'ic1 ent altitude to get above the enemy

banbera . its first B-29 raid, the To Units p roved ineffectual. and, although

was dropped by th e Division SQlle etforts ve re made to improve their ope rating e:rficiency, there vas
Th e maneuver, p roving ineffective,

disbanding at the Ta-Dan Units. no .narked 1;lIprovement in pe rl'o :n:l8Jlce and the ass1stance they ren­
time preT10us to the otficial

de red in subsequent attacks was negligible . In addit1on, the tre­

Re1nforce:nent by Training th1ts

Furt.her interl'ering vi th training vaG the establ1l1htnent ot an mendously increased responsibilities and heavier work load laid on

emergency reinforcing program which placed a beavy burden on the the inst ructor group re sulted in a. deCl�ase in the effect1vene s s of

instructors and test pilots ot the various air training schools and the training mi ssion.

testinS agenc i e s . A series of units called �-Iii-Go Butai, or Sec­ In early December 1944, addi tiona! strength vas added to the

ondary provi sional Units, using the fighter plane s assiGJled to the lOth Ai r Division when the 22d Air Ree:iu.ent. located at Sagam1, and

schools a..od Ll81lIled by instructors and test pilots, vere activated the 16th Ai r Bri gade (51st and 52d Air Regiments ) , stationed at

on 10 !lay 1944. Tbe To Units cQll1e under the coc;nand of the lOth Air Shimodate. ve re delliGll ated a s To Units . Although the addition at

Divi sion only during air alerts a..od were used to ausment the defen­ these regiments appeared to add considerably to the strength of the

Division, they actually were of little assi stance as they were all
s1 ve strength of the Division. The newly 1'or:ned un1 ts provided a­

bout 90 e.dd1 tional planes which the lOth could call on in emergen­
involved in a general reorganization and had few serviceable planes .

cies . To Units were as signed a.reas in the defensive alert pattern

Ai r-ground co:nmunication with these added un1ts, as vell a s wi th the

original To Units, did not operate with the e fficiency that it did
and it vas expected that the a.dd1 tional strength co:nbined with the
with the organic units ot' the Il1vision. Since all efforts to improve
high que.ll ty of the veteran pilots would result in greatly increas­

control and perfol'..lance appeared \JlUI.VIlillnG, the To Un1 ts were cal­

ins the effectivene s s at the 10th Air Div1siou.

The princ ipal installations from which the TO Un!ts vere dxavn
led on less and less and the To-Ni-Go BUtai concept of �ergency

reint'oTCl!lJlent VQ.S offic1ally discarded on 15 April 1945 .

vere : the Advanced Fighter Training School at Hitach!; the Mvanced

45

L
 vi th planes that 'Were unable to illatch the enemy bombers I
Operations
speed and
ma
sumry ot Training
aa to altitude was demonstrated in the first large-scale B-29 raid on 24
In January 1945, combat. operations were so eont.1nuoua

mission s. In Novembe r 1944. It was then reaJ.ized that the only hope tor sUlCcess­
l preclude the carrying out. or pilOt. training
virtualy

addi tion, shor1;.a.Ges ot ruel made it. ill-advised to expend large

t:ulJ.y c(X.Ubatting the B-29 was to develop f'1e;hter planes capable at

operating at high altitude s . This problem va s the Llll.J or di tficulty

quanti ties for t.ro1n1 ng. The only way in which pilot. t.ra1D1ng

ng unit.s in combat. encountered in th e air def'ense of' the Homeland and persisted until
could be accomplished was by includ1nc t.raini
trail a the end at the war.
patrols . Re:;Jults ot thi s system 'Were tar t'rom satistactory

co.rry out the ordor ot Service UnIts

combat standpoint, o.lthouCh it did serve to
on : to conduct train. Service units assigned to the lOth Air Division consisted of'
the COllunandina General ot the lOth Air D1visi
airfield battali on s , zpecial i ntelli genc e zquadroos, navigation aid
iog through the use of fuel reserved for air COll1bat operations .
un i t s , ai r si6l1ul uni ts and a i r- cround couuunicutions �"lits.
The almost continuous B-29 raids caused great emphasis to be
Ai rfield Battalions
placed on training for attu.cks on bombers. As a consequence, in
Ai rfield battalions of the 10th Air Di vi s i on perf'o:ced mainte.
February 1945, when enemy t&slt torces began launching f'iGhter raids,
n:l.tlc e duties and were o re;ll.1l i z ed as de sc ri bed in Chap te r 1. IDeations
the lOth Air Division pilots f'ound theluselves inadequately trained
of uni ts at the tiroe of the organiza tion of the 10th Ai r D1 vision
tor action against this type at' aircraft.
were a s follows :
Problems encountered by the lOth Air Division included inabll·
3d Ai rfield Battalion Chot'u
6th Ai rfield Battalion
• • • • • •

i ty to conduct hie;h 0.1ti tude training because of' physical l1m1 ta­
Matsudo
7�1 Ai rfie ld Battalion Ke.shiwa
too 43d Ai rfield Battali on
• • • • •

tions of plo.nes, f'ew planes tor training purposes, critical • • • • • Nari.masu

244th Ai rfi eld :&I.t.tulion • • • Chofu
shortages of' av1�tion ruel and lack ot technical skill on the part 65th Ai rfi eld Company 'l'okoroz.awa
Oshima ( i sland )
• • • • • •

71st Ai rfield Company

72d Ai rfi eld Company �i18hima ( i sland )
• • • • • •

of navigation aid units . The training program was consistently be· • • • • • • •

hind in counterinG the technical p rogress of' the enemy in develop- Stlecia1 Intelligence Squadrons

iog new types of aircraft and equipment. On 12 November tile 10t.h Air Divi s i on Special Intelligenc e Squad­

The rutili ty of' conducting an intensified training program ron vas formed and located in Division headquarters . PersonLel levies

46 47
were n;ade on suOordJ.na.te eleillents ot the DivisiOD in order to obtain Ai r Raid Warning System
bleD capable of c l")'iltaDalysis o.nd who were proficient in D:lgll sh . The Organized under the Eastern Anly Conmand, were three �terent

duty ot the UA1t was to obtain inrormation on ene-v operations by types of air raid warning un1 ts : lookout posts, radar sta.tions and

J:\Ooitor1.n3 and deciphering radio comm unications, particularly those pi cket boats .

err.anatinc f'ro..'l Tinian ond Sa1pan . 30ce excellent resu1ts were 0.- LoOkout Posts

chieved by the Special. Int.c111(;ence Squadron, pl"1ncipa.lly in pre­ Both military and civilian lookout posts were iI\Il1.!l.tained throUBh­

dictinG large- scale a.ir raids . It was found that such raids were out the Kanto Sector. The o.my posts were organized under the 32d

generally preceded by the b roadcasting of a continuous signal ap- Air Raid Warnin.::; Unit ot the lOth Air Division \/bich also exercised

parently used as a GUide in establishing the patt.ern ot the tllgbt so:ae control over the civilian posts.

tOl'lll&tion . Civilian lookout post.s were manne d by volunteers who varied

Navieation Aid thits widely in ability. Civilian urea headquarters were established at

Experience in combatt.ing air raids in Kyushu had indi cated the key points and all lookout posts were connected to the headquarters

necessit.y for organizinB navigation aid units to aid interceptor by telephone. The area headquarters, actinc as central clearing

plnne s in :nainta1oing their alert patterns. On 11 November 1944, stations, were in direct telephone c�nun1cation with the nearest

one each of such units was a.ssigned to each airfield in the lOth appropriate air base or ar.ny hea.dquarters.

Air Division ' s zonc of' responsibility. Necessary personnel were Initially, the operation of lookout posts was far tro� satis­

drawn f'rom the air-eround radio un1 t of eo.ch airfield and trom the factory as personnel, both military and Civilian, lacked experience

13th Air SignaJ. Regiment o.t Chofu. In addition to a.::;sisting in the and training in techniques of observation and identification ot

maint.eno.nce o r the a.l.ert pattern during air raid alerts, the nav1- planes . To re:ledy thi s detect, training progre.:uB were established

Gation a.id wU. ts vere o.ssigned the secondary duty of cooperatinS to train observers in plane identification and altitude estimation.

end assi sting in ba.d weo.ther and night flying training. In Jo.nuar)' By the end of 1944, as e. resu1t of training and experience, reports

1945, in order to increase efficiency and eliminate any possibility were generally �ucb more reliable and accurate.

of' a tue laC, the un1 ts were aueuented and establi shed on tully Begin.!ling 7 June 1945, the 10th Air Division issued a series of

me.nne d 24-hour watches.

I 49

I
L
 MAP NO. !5

orders and directives desl6Ded to further improve the operation and

(
organization of the army 1ookout. post.s. St.rength of post.a vas set
OTAWAItA
•
at. one off1cer or senior non-commi ssioned offlcer and 18 enl.1at.ed
'JL..
_
.
� r
men for the l.e.rger lnstul.l..nt.iona, while the smaller post.a were 1IIaD-

:.:.�
T O

ned by one non c�nm1s s ioned officer and 12 enl.i st.ed men. Improved • U • • • •• ••• , ••

(
equip!lleIlt, such as more powerful binoculars and Type-95 t.elephot.o

cameras, was issued to the lIlore important. posts. COlIDunicat.ion be-

MAEBASHI J'
tween posts and headquarters vas no:nnall.y by telephone, but. were
:
•T ICASAKI \
.�
SA,.O
f'" "...,-/'-
· SHIIIOQATE
•

vire com.:nunico.tion was not

m1ssioned officer and

possible, a

six enl.isted men

radio squad of one

was adde d to the

noD-CClll-l

st.rength of
. �f'.--..r-... . �.
.

CH'CH'8U
.KUWAOAYA

KUK
�\ '
I . A It A • I

•
the lookout. post. To auglnent personnel required for the lookout. S A I T A M A

posts, levies were IlUlde on Ground unit s . In addition to increasing

• . KA...OOE · '
strength and improving

ground and observation tovers vere to be

training, all po st s vere to be placed

built. Posts vere

under.

to be \�'2:: '�:- ' .-=�..

.�.J "�' '-
strongly fortified to enable t.hem to vi thsto.nd int.ense air or naval

bombard:nent . The duties of the coastal. 1ookout. post. s vere al.so in- ATSUG '
•

creased to include the ob servation of enemy vessels, the recording j • A N A G

of veathe r data, and t.he reporting of re sults of attacks by special

IC ATlUUlt A
at.tack unit s _ since the l.e.tter, afte r accanpli shinc suicide mia- •

sions, could not return to make thcir ova reports .

�cat.ions of both military and civilian lookout. post.a are liat.-

ed in Table No. 1. �ation of civilian area headquarters are shovn

on Map No. 5 . CI VI LIAN LOOKOUT POST

ARE A H E ADQ UARTER S
E A STE RN ARMY COM MAND

o 10 20 30 40 $0
ICIl.OMETEItS

51
 Table No. 1 Table No. 1 (Cont.' d)

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LOCKOUl P08.rS GUMMA PREFFL"l't.l'It

UNDER F..ASTERN ARMY COMwm
C1 villan Posts

CHIBA PREFB:'l'URB Area Sq. - Maebash1

Area Bq. - 'l'akuak1
As\D& Gonda
C1villan Post.. Ise salti Kodama
K11")'U
Area Sq. - Chibe. Area Sq. - Choshi Area JIq. - lCat.wura
'l'ateba1a1lh1
Mamba
Anegasak1 .A8ah1 As� M:1.now
FUnabe.sh1 FuDak1 ChjMch1 Murota
Malcubarl lCyoko CbOJa Ozawa
Owada Sh1ranwa. Ich1nclm17& Sa1moku
So.tom1 KBae1U& Sh1.mon1ta
Sh1sa1 Area Sq. - Kiaarazu (klt..u Ueno
Sb1to Akimoto OnJuk\l
Ush1h1sa Kwueyama 0tak1 Milltary Posts

Yawata Kana.;yua oso

Kururi Area Hq. - 8akuzoa
Ota
An1 Mka
SeJta:i.
Fuj10ka Matsuida
Area Sq. - Mo.tsudo Nakaga..... AJ1kl 7Om1oka
Ab1ko Sanuk1 Kioro.hi
Kazaha:ya Sek1toyo Narlta
!BARAGI PRE�
Ich1k&wa ltIkU(lO
Urayasu Yo.ch1ll\ata
Clvi 11 an Posts
Yatom1

Area Bq. - Tate)'BmA

Area Hq. - Kashima Area Hq. - M1to Area Bq. - Chta
Area Sq. - Saw.ra Area. Hq. - '1'op.De
Su1Ia lwama
lino Alllatsu Futekava. Da.1go
Tsuswli lwa.se
Kozak1 Chikura Baruto Nakaaato
Ku.r1moto Funakata BallunUlll& Kam1nakazU1I8. Qn1:ya
Area Hq. - 'l'akahag1. f.Be\/8.tarl
Nakaw. Begur! Katat;u1 Osato
Hanakawa Og:lw.
N::unek.ava Kamoga:wn Mobara Suga:ya
Hatsuzak1 Tematsukurl
Qnigava Katsuyama 0am1 Yamagata
H1raltata
Tako lIJ.nalld hara Sh1rato
Isohara Area Hq. - Shimodate Area Sq. - Tsuch1ura
NUltary Posts· Kurosaki »taw. Akioka
'l'akaoka Ishise Mi ts uka1do
Chosh1 I10ka Kyako ToyoUr& Sakal Mori:ya
lloda Toyooka Yoka1chiba Tsukuba Yatabe
Ichinom1ya Obara Cldt.u Yuki
cnjuku Taito SUk1
Toyosato Am:ltsu »n1 mil tag Post.s
l-tinam1han. Sh1rahama Susald
Tateya.llla Basunuma Bonno AlIa DUgo
Bakata Fukashlba
Shlrakata Sh1rato ltako Kaah1ma
• Al.tho UGh both milltary nnd c1villan lookout posts are :rrequentl1
KaniJima O)'a Suva
Wakamatsu 111 ra1 so
shown in the same tovn or city, they vere separate po sts , otten Isohama
some distance apart.
53
52
 Table No. 1 (Cont ' d) Table No. 1 (Cont' d)

Millta2 posta C1 villan Posta

Katakura Maewa:t&ri Nagaoka Area Hq. - Kumagaya Area Hq. - Urawa

Koga Makabe ShimOtauma BonJo
Hatoba,a
Sh1moyukl Hitachi KuJ1 Kavanata Kosh1ga,a
Arakawaokl Fujlsawa I&b1oka K1 taltawara owada
Kihara Ryugasaki Shibazald Konosu Tokorozawa
Toride Ushiku Takekawa Yo shikawa
Yoril
KANAGAWA PREFrruRB
Mill ta2 Poats
Civilian posta
ChIch1bu Ogawa Sakato
Area Bq. - Atsugi Area Hq. - Odawara Area Hq. - Yokohama Ki shi Kurlhasbi Kon08u
Aone Hatano Chigasald Qn1shl �eo Ivatsuld
Iehara Koz u FuJ1sawa Qn1ya Uruva
Nakano �\a.nazuru FutatsUlll&Ch1
Oyama 1/.1ho KamBkura SHIZUOKA PREFD:'l'URE
Sh1.mom1zo Motohakone Kavaseld
Yose Ninomiya Kava.. CIvillan Posta
Sengokubara I,agano
Area Hq. - Yokosuka Yemaki ta Nagatauda Area Hq. - FuJ1m1)'8.
Nage.1 Sh1mokaw.1 Inogasbira
TakeshIta Shinosald.
Yoshill8.ra
}'!111ta� Poats
Mill ta� Posta
Hiratsuka }.b.oazuru N1no:IIi)'8.
Bayama M1sak1 Kof'll Otsuld
Fuji sawa U1t1J1ma
Nagal Tsurue;1zakl
TOCHIGI PREFECTURE
SAITAMA P�
Ci villan Posta
CIvilIan Poata
Area Hq. - Otawara Area Hq. - Utsunomi)'8.
Area Hq. - ChIeh1bu Area Hq. - Kavagoe Area Bq. - Kuki Funyu ABbio Kugeta
ABh1ge.kubo Hara1ch1ba Ogot Boki.ne Awano Malta
Kunibe.mi Irumagawa SUgito lono Bato Nikko
Oyamada
Matauyama Mataugo FujIwara
Ogano
Otaki Ogose Shiobara Ishibashi YUIDOto
Ubaga1
Urayama Tsukikawa Takaba)'8.sbi Kanuma
Yatsuo Yalta Karaa� UJ11e
Ki tsuregava

54
 Table Ho. 1 (Coot' d.) Radar Installatlons

TClCYO-TO At the start ot World War II, the only radar in use in the

ctvUian Posts Kanto Sector was the Type-A, a vertical scanne r which ut1l1zed. the

Aretl. Hq. - Oc:bsnomi&u Doppler Effect to identity objects. This radar vas manufactured. in
Aretl. Hq. - Hach1oJ1
Altabe.ne
3, 10, 100 and lIQO vat.t. units which wre strateg1call.y located with­
Aome
Asakava Cbotu
Denenchotu
in the zone of the �stern Army Comma.n� to to:nl1 an air raid wanUns
Higashiakiru
Hinobara Faogava
Itsultaido Fucbu
KaJaata net.. The Type-A radar speedily beca.'lle obsolete because it could.
Kaucbi
lo'Achida Keto
11.1 zonokuch1 only detect objects 'which passed directly through its fixed be8l!l,
M1takesan
Murayema Nerima
Og1kubo which could riot be established beyond t.he coastline .
Onkata
Yamada Setagaya
S'ninagava After the first air raid on Tokyo, in April 1942, Type-A radar
Tachikava
Tanash1 stations were supplecented by Type-B installations . The Type-B vas

an improved type of scanne r which covered a ryJ0 sector with a radius

ot 125 to 150 r'l1le s . Type-B radar unite developed b y the Tam& Army

Technical Research Station were clas sitied as "Tachi " ( ground) or

"Taki" (air) and were developed in severol models : Tach! 6, 7, 18,

20 and 35, as wll as Tak1 1, 13 and 15 . Taehl 6, 7 and 18 were

mob1le units. Locations ot Type-A radar installatlons are shown on

Map No. 6.

Operational ability in the use ot Typ e B radar improved rapid­

-

ly with experience and, by late November 1944, it vas possible to

identity B-29' s and predict altitude and speed. Cc 24 Januar,y 1945,

additiona1 Type-B radar vas installed at Matsudo Airfield to a.ss1at

the 53d Air Regiment in nlGht interceptlon missions . Matsuzak! and

 MAP NO. 6

Kotu also re c e i ved the same e�uipment but it did not function �rree-

tively in improving night in te rcep t i on p e rfo rman c e .

13 raddr � c anne rs ( a Pl�totJ?e of �� c �i 35 ) were installe d at each

• ai rf'i<.:ld ..:.nd otiler :; tr.J. t.e ci c locations c.mi, by bi n1ng the ground
cOlU
VTSUNOUIYA

. .. A E BASHI
sl!::mncr wi t.h tile Ta.ki 15 radar, a tecl">.niqu<! wa;; <le velop e:d to plot

the course of enemy bombers :Jot nic;t.t without the us e of seurchl1shts .

Other heiGht finde r se ts , usilli; a 68 to 80 megacycle band, were 10-

stalled ;.:.t Shimoda and Matsuzaki to be us e d in coordinution With

ground radar in plotting courses .

Th e Tama. AImy Te cwli cal Research Station had de ve lop e d special

OTSUtO •

tec�i<l.ue3 for t.'le in'te rct.:ptioLl of enemy p lan e s by us in g Type-I! ra-

- --
dar and a p rovi sio:'la1 rac!.a.r guide: unit Wd,l> established in the tirl:lt

ra1t cf 1945 . On 16 July, the p rovi sional Guide un i t was formally

integrated as the 1st Radar Guide Unit and placed under the cO::1l!l8Jld

of the 10th Air Divi s ion . The Ail' Anni e s were, however, /lore con-

c e rned wit h �le p re�c.� tions for t�e final defense of the Homeland

a�nst the anticipated invasion and the radar guide uni t s had lit-

tle opportuni ty to en,3t!.ge in actual operations.

�
KO Z U S H ''' A
There were no deve10p:::e nts in radar op e rations frexn the middle

of July to the end of the war.

Picket Boats
RADAR AND COMMUNICATION
NETWORK IN KANTO AREA To au.y.ent the looitout posts a series of picket boats patrolled
RAOAR TYPE A

--
_;: - "'1
-... RADAR TYPE •

T RADIO STATION

TELEPHONE LINE

o ao 40 eo - 59
I

58
sf
 radioa, but bombers vas very close to the mwdmum range at the 15-mm Weapons and
t ot Japan . These vessels had
the sea east. and southeas
600 m1lea ott that only the l2O-mm guns vere ettective .
Orlg1.nall)" operating about
vere not rada r-equippe d.
w to posi­ en 1 March 1945, when Lt. Gen. Kanetoshi Kondo assumed caD.llllUld
ses, they were later withdra
shore, due to exc essive los
4, in an et­ at the 10th Air Division, his operating plan called tor maj or in­
mainland. <n 21 Novembe r 194
tions Itluch closer to the
the Ea.stem creases in the number of o.ntiail"<:raf't guns stationed .at the u rbase • •
at the early warning net,
tort to increase the radius
Lookout Un1t. '1'vO Although a numbe r ot 2O-IWl\ and 4o-!lI/1l aircraft machine guns vere e­
to torm the 1st SUrl'ace
ArrAY eo.nmand was dire cte d
rox1mately 200 quipped with special mounts tor use in defense of airfields, because
equipped and stationed app
vessels vere to be radar
tie a aro.. but ot the 11m! tations of the ItlOunts they vere useful onl)" in specific
m1lea ott the east coas
t ot Japan . Supply difficul
sent out. Arter locations and vere used principall)" in connection with dumMY' plane.
t vas radar equipped and
eventually one picket boa
r to et­ used as decoys to lead enemy planes into the line or fire or the
tion only a abo rt
t1l&e 1 t rstu:nled 10 orde
remaining in pod
\lll.a aubseQ,uentl)' converted guns (Figure No . 2) .
equipment. '!'he veuel
tect repairs on its radar
efit reaulte4 In spite ot General Kondo ' s good intentions, there vas little
l-Brch 1945 and little ben
sunk during an o.1r raid in
increase in the nUl!lber of weapons onade available to the antiaircraft
trom its ope ration.
ields wits and the only augmentation ws by means ot conversion ot weapons
Antiaircraft Defense at Airf
Eastem � which provided only sllghtly IllO re firepower tor the airtield battal-
under the command ot the
An Air Defense Bri gade,
es . 0rlg1.na1 equip­ 10ns.
a part of the air defens
Cornoand 'oIaS inc luded as
1942, its fire­ Major Command Changes
rcraft BUDs but in April
ment vas 150 15-mm antiai
er at l2O-1IIIIl gun s. On 6 Februar)" 1945, the number ot milltary districts in Japan
plying units vi th a numb
powe r vaS increased by sup
­
24 November 1944, a� (with the exce;t>tion of Hokkaido ) , ws increased from three to five
Afte r the fir st
large-scale B.2 9 raid on
ense Brigade b)" the add! tion ot the East Coast and llortheastern )f111 tary Districts.
o efrected and the Air Det
tation or personnel was als
Following the first This chanGe had 11tUe aftect upon the operations or the lOth Air
iaircraft Group .
vas reorganized as e.n Ant
iaircraft Group Division as it continued to have pr1mo.r)" responsibillty tor th e air
24 November 1944, the Ant
large- scale B-29 raid on
enemy
Anny Comd man that the altitude at the detense of the Kanto Sector, whicb now coincided almost exact!)" with
reported to the EAstern
the Eastern 11,,1 11 tar)" District.

60

«
 FI G U R E 2

The 6th Ai r Anny remained under the control of the General De-

T Y P I C A L A I R FI E L D
L AY O U T
>-f .... -41.--- ��:cLIW'T tense Command, but 1 s sued a new order ot battle on II February,

vith the ors=izat10n of the lOth Air Divis10n being show as in

"RoeAet.E F t. I O H T "ATH 0'
ATTAC K I N G ENEM Y !'LANES

AUTOMATIC W!A�S AND

OIR!CTION OF FIRE
>-f .... Table No. 2.

Tact1c s to Counter the B-29 Bomber

Folloving the 1ncendiary raid on Tokyo on 30 November, t'urther

�
raids, both night and daytime, were experienced and in the inter-

vals between raids, reconnai ssance flichts by single B-29' 8 in-

1---- CONCeALIO
TA)" ST"�
creased in frequency. On each occasion, the Division attempted to

intercept the enemy but by maintaining very high altitudes the B-

29' s easily eluded the Divi sion ' s fighters . The attempted inter-
I---- TAII • •TIt.�

ceptions only resulted in l.'asted fuel, additional maintenance 'WON

and exhaustion of pilot and ground c rew personuel.

The Commanding General of' the lOth Air Division recognized

that a great many problems faced the Division and that a number ot
' J!
',"E
.... l � G them were not capable of solution. The already overstrained indus-
ROU N O

., ,, ', E L D
trial resources of the nation had been badly hit by enemy bombings

and there vas no possibility ot producing the quantity ot high alti-

tude interceptors needed for detense against B-29 attacks . General

Kondo vas displeased by the tact that the latest models ot the Type-

1 Fighter (�el nIl had been denied his Division but were being

supplied to the Special Attack Units . A1J an altemative, it was

100-__ GONCI"LEO
TAll. ST"'�
decided to employ Type-lOO Headquarters Reconnaissance planes, Y.b1ch

62
 had good high-altitude pertomance capab1l1t1es. Since the a.rmament
Table No. 2

th Air D1vision ot the Type-1OO ws onl)" one 7. 7-1!D mch1ne gun, they 'WOuld be eon-
Orgnni zation end Di sposition of lO
6 Febru&l7 1945 verted by installing a 2O-mm carmon.
'rOlQO
lOth Air Divi sion Headquarte rs Authorities were urged to push the production ot the SIlWN1 .1et
• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

Kaah1-
18th Air Reg1cent ( Fighters )
• • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

; Imba tighter" which 'Was still in the experimental stage . Although this
23d Air Regiment (Fignters )
•
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

28th Ai r Re giment (Hq Recon Plane.

) • • • • • • • • • • • 'rogaDe
Nar1maa", Jet fighter would have a very fast rate of c.liL'lb (estimated 10,000
47th Air Regiment (Fighters )
• • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

53d Air Re gUnent (Figh ters ) • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • •
lotLtsu@

70th Air Re giment ( Fi ghte rs)

Kaahi­ meters in four minutes ) , its combat fl1ght t1.r.1e would be only six
)
• • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

Chotu
244th Ai r Re �ent ( Fighters )
• • • • .
• • • • • • • • • • •

d ron (Hq Re c on Planes Chotu minutes . Again, however, the p roduc ti on capab1l1ties o f Japanese
17th Independent Mr Sq ua
Sh1sOd&te
46th Air Secto r COL�d
•
• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

KanalrA nIbe.ra industry was indequate to the task.

164th Ai rfi eld Dattal10n
• • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

' llitta
l65th Airfield Dattal10n • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • •

Nitta During the period from 1 Ja..'lwry to 14 February 1945, frequent

1 66th Airfield Datta1ion • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • •

Nitta
Airfield Enttalion
• • • • • •
169th • • • • • • • • • • •

Tatebayaah1 raids, both night and daytLne, were launched again st Japan by small.
l70thAirf ield Battalion • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • •

ShimodAte
Ai rfie ld Battali on
• • • • • •
175 th • • • • • • • • • • •

Kash1- group s of B-29' s and there were also four larGe da.ylisht raids on
Bat�- - ' ion • • • • • • • • • •
• • • •

3d Airf ield
6th Ai rfield Batt�on
7�� Airfield Bat tali on
43d Ai rfield Battal10n
116th Ai rfi eld Battal10n
• • • • • • • • • • •
Matsudo
• • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
Imba the Kanto Sector. It beca:::e apparent that the enemy' s raiding poten­
• • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
,
Narimasu
• • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
Tokorozaw. tial ws increasing and that SO::lC !!'leans must be found to effective-
• •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

Yachimata
140th Airfield Battali on
• •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

Togane l;y counter the B-29' s .

l4ls t Airfield Battali on
• •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
*

l76th Ai rfield Battalion

• •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

Chof'U The Alert System

2 44th Ai rfie ld nattalion
• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

• • • Chof'U
65th Ai rfield Battalion
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

• • • Oshima During 1944, a systeo of air alerts had been deve loped : under
71st Airfield Battalion
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

N1ij illla
72d Airf ield Battalion
• • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •
Tokyo Alert-B, fuel and ammun1 tion ..as loaded end p1lots stood by in the
1st Air-Ground Radio Unit
•
• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

TokYO
Navigation Aid Unit
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • •
night \18.1 ting l"OOIn; upon announc emen t of Alert-A, pilots stood by
• • • • • • • • • •

( subordinate unit s s tationed

throUGhout the Kanto area)
TokYO their planes, which were in night read.1ness.
Unit
lOth Air Di vi s i on Traininc
• • • • • •
• • • • • • • • •

Tokyo
l g Unit • • • • •

Ai r Inte l i enc e • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

Tokyo Even in the absence ot specific orders fro:n the 10th Air nl.vi-
• • • • • •

13th A1 -� Si gnal Unit

• • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • •

te unit s stationed
( subordina
sion, air \.Ul1ts were to enter Alert-B status autanatical.l;y upon re­
throughout the Knnto area)
i d TokYO
1st Searchli&�t Re �aent
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
ceiving an alert warning froc. the zastern A:r::I:! Corumand.
( Subordino.te units stat one
Alert-A
throUGhout the Knnto area)
ry. Uni t subsequently
* Exact location unYJlovn on 6 Februa
tran sfer red to Shikoku.
65
voul.d be as s u:ued 'When o.n actual air raid 'Warning vas reeeived . With The 53<1 Ai r Re giment , which
had been aSSigned exclusively
to
the announc e:.lent of Ale rt -A <U.J,.
- " 0 -Ni -Go
T- Unit planes would revert to ni ght operation s, :na1ntuined
a separate alert. Betveen 1900 aDd
the co..uand of the 10th Air Division. 0500 hours, one- fOurth of the plan
es were in Alert-A status .
Be-
In connection 'With the alert llystCJ4, a series ot al.ert stations tveen 0100 and 0500 hour s, one
squwl patrolled at 5, 000 me te
rs a-
'Were developed. Areas wId altitudes 'We re aSlligped to each unit in bove Toqo.

such a way as to fonn 3. po.ttcrn o.bove the turget area to be protect- In additi on to eliminating c ontu
Sion, it vas expe cted that
the
ed. new eJ.ert system would serv e
to combine c ombat ope rat ion s
and train-
In spite of the fact that the alert putterns and system were
iog to effe ct economie s in fuel
consumpt ion. Unfortlmately, the re­
well pl.u1.!1e d , ,.. c e rt � ; .rl 8.!�ount of confusion i nva riably
r�. resulted wen
-
sults of the nev aler t plan were
ineffective from a combat
stand-
units were alerted. To re l i eve the w:loiQli ty and confusion caused
point and caus ed exce s sive
fatigue amon� the pilots . It did,
ord�rs
hovever,
oy havins to i s sue e ac h t�ne a so rt i e vas necessary, a change
acco�plish the training misc
ion.
in the alert systeill W:l.S ::w.de, effective 1 January 1945 . A recapitu-
On 9 Ja."luary, o rde r s 'Were illsu
ed to abandon the constant
alert
lation o f the times of enCJJY air raius indi c at e d a patt ern and it
patrol syste.":1 . In its place El system of
air patrols 'Was to be !II&1
n­
, t the periods in which raids were mos t likely to
vas deter-lined tlla
tain ed ooly wen intelli Genc
e infonuation or estimates
indicated
occur could be Genern
-1 ly p redi cted. �ith this guide, a schedule tor
that an ene.":lY raid was prob
able . In an atte.'l!pt to deceive
the en­
a constant ai r p�trol Yas c s tub!ished with one air regL�ent desig­
e:ny and g1ve the ir.1pression that regular patrols Vere still
being
nated as an e..le rt reGiment at eJ.1 time s .
flovo, ai r- ground radio continued to op e rat e during the fo
nne r pa_
Bet....een 1900 and 0100 hours, one f1i eh t maintained an alert
trol hours . Thi s, too, p roved ineff'ecti ve and
vas shortly dropped.
pattern above Toleyo at 5 , 000 r.leters . Bet....een llOO and 1400 hours,
Improve�ent in Attack Techn
ique s
tvo fllt:hts we re o.bove Tokyo at maximum altitude . Du.r1og these
The incr ease d f re quenc
the ene.ony ' s large - sc ale bomb
ing
y of'
raids during January
hour s all other ple.nes of the eJ.ert regiill ent maintained Alert-A sta­
and February resulted in
giving pilots of the
tus and dunn e the remo.in1ng hour s of their shift, Alert-B vas main-
lOth Air D.1 vision much
experi ence and they bee8l
e
ll 1Ilc reas 1.ngly ef­
ta1ned. fective in combat opera
tion s . The tact i c s of the Spec ial Attack
Uni ts ....ere succ es sful In
infllc ting severe loss es
on the enemy and

66

1
67
torced the B-29' s to continue to maintain
high aJ.ti tude s with conae· The 53d Air Reg1ment, still held exclusively tor night fighting, or­

quent loss of bombing accuracy. In sp1te ot tho. successes or the dered all advanced air training un! to vi th pilots ot Class B, or

suicide units, rn£\..."ly commanders were violently opposed to the use or below, to Nitta Airfield to take shelter. Clas s A pilots were al­

such tactics because many of the best trained p110ts were being lost. erted at their hOllle base at Matsuda .

Improvelllent in the operation and reporting ot radar in stalJ.&­ lbe attack began almost immediately atter the varning was re­

tions vas al:;o noted, part1c ula rly the Type-B uni ts . In additlon, ceived and consisted ot seven wves of navy tighters and llght bcub­

coordination vith the Central Army CO!lIlI81lc, and the 11th Air Divi­ ers, vith the last attack beinG carried out between 1415 and 151io

sion 'Was improved a."ld report:l from radar stations in Shionomisaki hours . The attackers c oncentrated on anay and navy air1'ields aJ.ong

and Baldri, in the Central Di strict, were relayed to the lOth Air ��e coast and inflicted conside rable damage on the air1'ields, east

Division vithin five minutes. of Tokyo, at Yokoshiba, Katori and Konoike . c:n e wve attacked an

Fi rst Carrie r Plane Attack airc raft manufacturinG plant at Obta, about 50 J;ule s north ot Tokyo .

On 16 Februa :rJ 19l,5, the first laree - scale ene:ny air raid to 10th Air Division losses, on the ground, 'Were two plane s .

�t. th e lOth Air Divislon De fensive action va s , in eeneral, ineffective d ue to the tact
be launched fro::1 task force carrie rs caU&

cOlnplete1:r by s urf/ ri s e . A civili an lookout post at Shlraham&, OD ��t the D1 vision had been concentrating on train1ns for combat a­

160 kila;:.e ters south ot Tokyo, reported & sains t bombers and pilots were uninstructed in methods ot combat­
the Boso Peninz tU.o. about

..h'o.'8.-""Ii at 0100 hours .

tliGht of sl1lD.ll enemy ai rc ratt flying nor'" tiDG fighters . The lOth Air DiVision ' s lo sses in the air were severe

s,
Since the B-29 ' 6 had oeen ca.unc; in at ext rewe ly high altitude and the total of 37 p lane s shot down greatly reduced canbat etf1cien.

radar ins�al lation s h�d been concen

tratir.g on detectlon and cy. Identif1 ca.tion and !l.Sscs s..'lcnt of ene.. lY �osses 'WaS di fti c ult as
the
and bad tailed to pick
identi ficati on of hieh-altitude ton.Jationll rep ort s trom lookout posts made it clear that personnel had contused

up th e s e 10v-fly1ne planes . f'riend1.y and enemy tighter plane s .

Th e D1 Yi5ion irrunedie.tely ordere d e.ll sin

gle . seat fighten into Since a follow- up ra i d vas antiC ipated o n th e next day, th e 6th

were di spe rsed aJ.ons the Air Army Llade plans to attack the vessels of' the ene;ny task torce
action and all rlanc s held on the ground

tuel and ammunition re·

taxi strip s bord� rin� th� airfields vith and ordered the 47th and 244tb Air Regiments under its direct co:nmand

JIlOved.

68 69

!
i
---"'-
to act as bomber escorts in the proposed ac tion . The loss of tva Division fought vith greatly l-educed strencth, it lo st an addi t1OD&l

air regiments c rippled the already weakcned lOth Air Divi sion and l� planes.
when fighte r wave s appeared the following day, little efteet1Ye Two days later the Division ' s inability to effectively combat

action coul.d be Wkeu. StonilY yeather and snoy during the at'ter­ a large- scale B-29 raid choved hoy badly i t had been handicapped b7
noon ot the second attack caused both s ide s to break ott action at its losces ot veteran pilot o . Som e consolation va ll found in the
an early hour. The banbers to be used in the attack on the task fact tha t a fev pilots vi tIl only 200 hOur5 of flying time had per­

force vere not readied in time, the attack was c ance lled and the
f"ormed yell in the Type-2 single-seat fighter. 2 This plane had Just

enemy task force retiree. southward under cover of the atom.

recently been adopted as a standIlrd combat plane and it bad been 'be-

Among th� staff officers of the lOth Air Div1sion there was a
lieved that only an expert pilot vi th over 1, 000 fl�g hours vas
difference of opinion regarding the reasons i'or the attacks o t the
capable of hancilinG it in combat.
16th and 17th . So:lle thouG'lt that it indicated that defensive et­ Plans to Combat Future Attacks

forts u8�inst the n-29 ' s, although inadequatc, had been sufficiently
Anticipating that the enemy task force, Yhich had struck on the
effective to re�uire the enemy to take concerted action to destroy
16th and 17th, woul.d return af te r refueling and resupply, the 41th
airfields in Japan . others held that the att.o.cks indicated a turn­
and 244th Air Reg1Jr.ents ·...e re aGe-in placed under the 6th Ai r Army to
ins p o ::.nt. and the licginnlng of more intensive cne:uy a.1r operations
prepare for action as bomber e scorts for a possible attack on the
again �t the Home �ld. It was, of course, later deter.ained that both
task forc e . Tile tvo regiments being exempted f rom air defense oper­
:;chools of thouc;.'1 t. were wron£; and that the mids vere directly con­
ations req,uired a cOCl;;lete reorc;a.."lizs.tion of the lOth Ai r Division ' .
nected ...i. th the lil.'1d1ng operations which took place two days later
defense system.
at I'"o Jima .
Wi thin the next fev da;,'s, a naval pi cket boat sighted an �
:1egarcile ss of the reason!: for the mid, one thing vas obvious -
task force vhich included carriers . At the same tL:1e, 1nf'onaatiOl1
if such raid� ...ere to continue, the strencth ot the lOth Air Divi­

don vO\1.1d soon be decimated. In spite of the fact that the period
2 . A nur.:ber of men had been mobili zed fro.n civilian colleges
of combat. on the 17th \18.5 much shorter than on the 16th and that the and, because t.�eir educational s tandard s vere higher than the aver­
age inductee, 'Were g1 ven an abbreviated. traininc course .

70
71
 About 2400 hours on 9 ltirch, a small number of unidentified
developed by the Special Intelligence Squadron indicated that B-29' .

based in the Marianas were p reparing tor a tull- acale attack. In-
aircra:t't were spotted south of Katsuura, on the Boso Peninsula a­

bout 80 kilometers southeast of Tokyo . Sinc e this w:l.S the nonnal.

dicationa were that a s iDiultwle oWi attack by B-29' a an4 carrier-
time for ene:ny night reconnaissance, u.nd uince no other pl.anes were
based planes was possible any time a!'ter dawn on 25 FebnllU"Y.
reported, the Gubsequent c.PIJearance of B-29' s, flying at low level,
The defense plan established by the lOth AJ.r Division included
\laS not taken seriously. However, it vas almost immediately an­
the ordering o f all W11 t s to Alert-A, effective 0530 hours, 25 reb­
nOW1ced that bOlilbers were dropping incendiaries in the Tsukish1.ma
ruary. The 11th Ind�pendent Air Squadron, as well as the 28th and
area of eastern Tokyo Wld that other enel:lY bomber for.na.tions were
53d AJ.r Rec1r.lents, were ordered to I:lOVe to Nitta AJ.rl'1eld p razaptly
rapidly approachinG.
after dawn on the 25th and prepllre to intercept B-29' s.
This raid came as a surprise because again the radar installa­
Ro.ids by bombers and fiGhters lllIlteriallzed as expected, but
tions had f"ailed to pick up the enemy f"or..la tions due to their ab­
there was no coord1n!l.ted raid of fiGhters and �be rs on a single
sorption with the detection of" hiGh-altitude plane s . Once aware at
taraet or area. The bombers attacked Tokyo vbile the tighter. con-
the f"act that a hea�1 attack was in progress, all radar stationa
centrated on HIlch1J o Jima and the Izu IslandG . Bad weather pre-

concentrated on tracing the path of the attack. Tne enemy bombers

vented effective defense e fforts although the enemy bomberl, tly1Ds
had approached Tokyo di rectly at altitudes of 2, 000 and 3, 000 meters
above the wea��er, were able to inflict cons1derable damage.
und dropped large numbers of small incendiary bombs vhich turned a
The 6th Air Army continued to p re s s plans for an attack on the
large portion of the city into a se a of flame .
carrier task force, but the bad we ather also interfered with that
The 10th AJ.r Divi sion ordered all av-d.ilable night interceptors
operation and the atto.clt \ru.s cancelled.
Co.bout 90 planes ) into the ai r. Searchlight units and antiaircraft
Ni ght Bombing Attacks
batteries also went into concerted action . The tires of Tokyo lit
The first indication that large- scale ni ght
attack s might be
u� the sky and the D1 vision ' s interceptors were able to attack the
expected was at the tine of a major B-29 raid on the morning ot 4
B-29 ' s from beneath even without the aid of the searchlights . Soan.
March . Intelligence reports indicated that enemy formations bad
however, dense clouds of" GIJoke arose fI'O:Ll the city, obscuring the
rendezvoused over Saipan during t.'1e previous night and it was be-
enemy planes and making it almost impossibl.e to attack them.
lieved tho.t this was a trial for-nation for I!l8.SS night raids in the

near future.
73
72

•
 The toll of enemy bombers, announced as 15, was the heaviest Transfer o f the 6th Air Anny

since interception tactics had been started. The lOth Air D1vision � 19 March 1945, orders were issued placing the 6th Air A:riay

sustained almost no losses in air COQbat although several planes under the cOI11r.lB.Ild of the Cexub i ned Fleet for the defense of the Ryu­

failed to locate their airfields and were lost in attempted forced kyu Islands and its base of operations wns moved to Kyushu. The

landings . The reason for such success was attributed to the low 30th Fighter Group was organized to take over the duties of the 6th

level at which the bombing was perfomed. Although enemy losses Air Anny in defending the Kanto Sector acainst invasion.

were severe, the raid reduced the eastern half of Tokyo to a barren The 1'o=tion of the 30th Fighter Croup was unde rtaken as a

expanse of smoking ruins . There was a large loss of life, thousanda part of a new Ai r Combat Plan which contemplated the Special Attack

were made homeles s and property losses were tremendous - more than Units sho�dering the main responsibility for attacking any eneny

any other, this raid weakened the resolve of the people to continue task forces that might st rike at the Kanto Sector. The 17th Inde­

the war. It was evident that the repetition of such raids would p endent Ai r Squadron, the 1�7th and 244th Ai r R�c;1luents and other

rapidly reduce all. of Tok;ro to ashes and that the center of mill tary U!'llts ....ere re a s si gne d from the 10th Air Division to the 30th Fight­

and govern:nental affairs would be co:npletely paral�ed. er Croup (Chart No. 3 ) .

The administration and do:nni tory buildings of the lOth D1vision Policy Change s - March 1945

were completely destroyed but the operations room was spared and During March there ve re several chance s in the operating pollc,.

there was no interruption of tactical command. for the ai r defen se of Japan. !I.s. j . Gen. Kihachiro Yoshida was re­

To reinforce the air defenses of Tokyo, IGR" ordered ten planes lieved as cO::L'ilo.nd1nS general of the 10th Ai r D1vision and tran8�er­

from the 4th Air Regiment of the 12th Ai r D1vision and ten planes reel to the 13th Air DiviSion, in China . Hi s chief of Stat'�, Col.

from the 5th Air Regiment of the llth Air D1vision transferred to Shui chi Okamoto , ..'as reas dgned to the 55th Ai r D1visioll, in Korea,

the lOth Air Division on 16 March. The planes of the 4th Air Be­ and Lt . Cen. l�anetosh1 Kondo \laS d e signated as commandi ng Bene re.l. of

gi.-nent were stationed at Imba Airfield and those h'CXIl the 5th Air t!1e lOth A i r D1 v l s io� a s ve1l as b e i n g appoint ed air staff officer

Regiment at Chof'u, where both were ordered to prepare for night in­ for the Eastern Army COt"lITland . Lt . Col. Hiroshi Sasao \laS appointed

terception mi ssions . No large-scale night raids occurred in the chi e f of staff for th e Dlvi oion.

Tokyo area during the next week and the 20 planes were released to

their parent un.1ta on 25 March.

74 15
 Chart No . 3

General. Kondo was f'ully cOgnizant of' the graY! ty ot the detense
s:: II
o 'd
o � � situation and knew that plane and personnel replacements vou1d be­
.-- � rJ, g
� � cane progres sively llore d1:ff'icult. Desiring to ma.inta.1n the strength
� =;! ..
� ot the lOth Air Divi sion f'or employment in the tiDal deci sive battle
-g
s:: 0

�� tor Japan, be outlined hi s plans for future operations :

r-- S '!i '"
... � e 15 � s:: Abandon over-emphasis on training tor CCIII.­
.s
§u I-- .r;::l G.t1I� 1D3 ...
1II 1D
� bat against bombers and stress combat against

... :: �
fighter planes . ( This rule came as a re sult ot
" ll ::l H
� , f! ", ,, :.. ?S bis belief' that :fighters trained to combat oth­

<
� � ...a � .8 :5 =1 er tighters 'Would bave no trouble in engaging
.
)
5
boobers if the occasion arose.
'"
:5 i§
,....-
=;! .....
..
� g
:5
... ..... Avoid a deci sive battle with enemy tight­
'd ;:: I::: >
\0
Pb • � o c
U 0 g ers until the :fighter vs . fighter training is

ti d " '"
'" " completed. Concentrate on protecting aircratt
� " c:; ... ...

6 t- Po
M " �
U
J.! i � on the groWld. Inc rease the capabilities and
M!.ke use ot de­

� ��
• II
nUl:lbers of antiaircraft gun s .
II '--- ...
� coy planes to lure enemy aircratt into posi­

�
c
r-i
... :: -g ;:l "
tions 'Where they can be destroyed by ground

�� :a
U fi re .
�(5 N �
.... ....
d!
� :§
r--
U e� r-- �
a
Ignore enemy reconnaissance planes, but
'"
"
C � �
.,..( =;!
make concentrated attacKs on enemy fonllation.
l3'
'""
e§
... "
0 .--
... III
<
" f
... II � composed mainly of bombers perf'orming large­

� �. <':I
-
� scale bombing mi s sions . ( Thi s rule put an end

r�
r.
§'
to the fome r policy of' constant interception
.,..(
.,..( 0
.c ... o
!i �
.. ..
�
e and protection of strategic points in favor ot
.,..( ...

0 2 -ti � 0\ � :5 � �� .., engaging only tarGets of opportunity. )

::s .s GI ,.... ...::t r- �
'" .:t ::s .-1 - .....
� :§
t-- .. ..
0 ; :5 -
" '-t .0
:5 � � �...
III
'- ... Improve supply and maintenance ot plane.
�
u �

to "£!
;:l '" :f
0::>'"d
�§
*
and equipment.
�
M C\J (i5
":1 ::1 '"
.r: 0 :':
... ThroUBh close coo'peration vi tb the Tama
g � �� ,.. A:r:my Technical Research Station, put nev radar

��� • =;! �" into operation end strive for the modernizing
Il.t t-- ... e of' air defenses •
� �
'---- OM

"
o �
.::
"
,, ;:::
1: , ACCOrdingly, orders 'Were i ssued to change operational p�_
0 ... ..
u < ...

CD 'd :9
CI ...
tiona to intenSify training for combatting fighter aircra:tt . At
"' ...

::;! �e
... ...
• U U
f &
ti � � tIl
'---
t- I)
.:t a:;

.
77

76

•
 an operational. canmand and the lOth Air Division \/8.8 placed. in Ita
night, only two to rour planes or the 53d Air Regiment would be
order of' batUe with the rollowing organizatIon :
la\Ulched against SIIIB.ll numbers or enemy raiders - the balance ot
lOth Air D1 vision Headquarters
the Regiment would contillue trailling. In the daytime, two flights
18th Air Regiment ( Fighters )
Regiment (Fighters )
of the al.ert air regiment were assigned illterception duties when
23d Air
SIUall groups or B-29 ' s attacked while the rest continued tra1.rUng. 28th Air Regiment ( Fighters)
5 3d Air Regilaent ( Fighters)
Thereafter, the 10th Air Divi sion headquarters merely passed 70th Air Regiment ( Fighters )
46th Air Sector Coumand
on to the apPI'opriate subordinate units the reports received from 3d Airfield Battalion
6th Ai rfield Batte.lion
t...�e air raid var:ni.ng system. Independent decisions on assu:aptic:m 7th Airfield Battalion
43d Ai rfield Batte.lion
of alert status \rere left to the cOllunanding ofticer of each regi- 116th Airfield Battalion
140th Airfield Battalion
!:lent. Orders were given to concentrate on the shooting down ot en- 141st Airfield Battalion
232d Ai rfield Batte.lion
eJll)' planes wherever they might be found without any consideratic:m 233d Airfield Battalicm
234th Airfield Battalion
beillg given to the guardins or strategic points. The old al.ert 244th Airfield Battalion
65th Ai rfield COllipany
flying pattern was abolished in favor of issuing separate orders 25th Independent Maintenance UDit
26th Independent Maintenance UDlt
on the occasion of each raid. Tnese changes reduced wasted effort
The 47th and 24.4th Air Regiments and the 17th Independent Air
le .
and cade the command ot the Divisi on more flexib Squadron had been pe nnan ently transferred to the 30th Fighter Group,
For.nation of the Air General Amy
vhile the 40th Air Sector Co:mne.nd, together with the 164th, l65 th,
In early 1945, as u . s . air :mids increased ill intensity and
l66th, l69th, 170th, 175th and 176th Airfield Battalions as weU as
the threat of an invasion of the Homeland became greater, it vas
the 71st and 72d Airfield Companies were attached directly- to the
deter.:lined to unity all air derense rorces under a single c ommand.
1st Air Anr.y. All signal. and air-gro\Uld radio units, althousb con­
Accordingly, the orge.nization of the Air General Army, \Ulder the
tinuing to operate with the DiviSion, were removed 1'ran its order ot
c Otllllle.Od of General Ma sai".AZU Kawbe, vas announced as being etfec-
battl.e and aSSiGned to the 1st Air A:rmy.
tive 15 April 1945 . The 1st Air Army, which had been responsible
Simultaneously with the establi shment ot the Air General A:rrq,
for train!.ng and replAcement of air pe rsonnel, vas reorganized as
the Fi rst and Second Gene ral Armies were organized to take over the

78 79

•
ground defense and the anlY c OallIld
lUl s we re rcdes1gDAted as area ar­ p reparation s for the future and fl'Oll1 the TveU'th Area Army regard-

mies . The 10th Ai r Di vi sion, "oIiU.ch bad been under the :Eastern Arusy ing defense againot current air att.o.cks.

C<XlIlI8Jld for operational control, now came under the Tvel.1'th Area �e Ai r General An:ty Take s COCll!l8ld
l

Army. CD 9 July 1945, all air units on the Japanese mainland came un-

The Ketsu-Go Operation der the direct com..1Il.lld of the Air General Army, and the long awaited

The fonnation of three new general armies coincided with the plan ot a unified air defense was put into operation with the 1=ple-

announcement ot a new plan for the final all-out defense ot Japan. 4

mentation of the Sei-Go Operation.

This plan, known as the Ketsu-Go Operation, was an areal detense lbe reorgo.n1zation to ac.hieve a unified cO!llld
ll8.D and a coord!-
concept which sought to weld air and ground forces into a stronger nated defense had, however, come too late . Neither the CO!llbat

defensive force by establishing de1'inite defenBive zones and provid­ strength of the air divisions nor the general si tuati on pe rmitted

ing Qutual support between the several area armies and air armies. ' an effe ct ive air defense . The lOth Air Di vision lISS no longer able

Because suic ide tactics we re to b e employed against invasion to concern itsel.f with interception of raiding plc.Ules, but had to

convoys, the air portion of' the Ketsu-Go Operation was knO'WD as the preserve what lISS left of its fighting strength for the t1nal. de-

Ketsu-To-Go Operation. However, as far as defense against air at­ fense of Japan under the �etsu-To-Go pJ.an. At the end ot July, the

ta.ck vas concerned there vas little chc.Ulge in the operations ot the 10th Air Division had been drastically reduced in strength and bad

lOth Ai r Division. General Kondo ' s outline continued to be the guide le ss than 100 plane s capable ot operating :

and the Di vi sion made every efi'ort to conserve its strength tor the 18th Air Regiment : Type-3 Fighters 15

final defense effort. Although there we re no major changes in the 23d Air Regiment : Type- I, z.k>del III
Fighters 7
immediate duties of the 10th Air Division, the
• • • • • • • • • • • •

chanGes incident to
Type - l Fighters • • • • • •
13
the reorganization caused some contusion since trequently conflict­
53d Air Regiment : Type-2 Two-seat,
ing orders were recd ved from the 1st Air Army re ga rding Ke t su-To-Go Fighters • • • • • • • • • • • • 30
70th Air Regiment : Type-4 Fighters . . . . 15
See Jo.p�nese 1·1onograph No. 23, "Air Defense of the Hooeland",
. .

3.
page 73, for additional information on the Ketsu-Go Ope ration Type-2 Fighters
• .
15
-

Total Serviceable Plane s • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 95

4. � page 68.
00 �
 CHAPl'ER 3
End of the War
AIR DEFENSE OF THE CENTRAL SE(.'TOH
Plans to conserve strength by attacking only large bomber tor_

mations were entirely upset. vith the dropping of the atanic banb on
Tile are a designated by ��e ai r defense force s as the Central
Hiroshima. on 6 August. Since this feat had been accanpl1shed b:y a

Air Defense Sector, gene rally coincided \lith th e boundaries or the

single plA."le, thc lOth Air Division realized that defense aca1nst
Central Di s trict, 'Which extended from the Izu Peninsula. 'We:.t to
that powerful weapon 'WOuld require abandoning the concept. ot attack­
include all but the 'Western tip of Honshu and the southern half of
ing only large bomber formations . Hereafter every single plane
Shikoku . It ��s believed, hO\o1cver, that the ai r derense effort
'Would have to be at.tacked and, vith only 95 serviceable pla.nes re­
'JOule. be confined principally to the defense of the Osaka-Kobe­
maining, this 'W8.S impOs sible .
Nagoya region 'Whe re important o.rd.na.n ce and aircraft w.a.nuf'actur1ng
On 9 August the chief of start of the Air General Army tel.e­
pl3-'1ts 'Were locate d . When the boundaries o f th e Central Di strict
phoned the chief of statf of the lOth Air D1vision to notify him ot
..re re changed, the air defense force continued to consider the gen­
the second atomic strike and hinted of the possible te�tion of
eral area of the old Cen t ral Di strict a s �le Central Ai r Defense
the w.r. He urged that the stronge st efforts be made to continue
Sector.
the fight and emphasized that all enemy attackers should be inter­
Organ1zo.tion of Defensive Air Units
cepted. ()l 13 August, the Tokyo area was again at.tacked b:y carrier­
Prior to April 1942, the air def'enze of t.'l e Central Sector had
based plane s, and although the Divi sion intercepted the planes, the
be en entrusted to the 2 46th Air Regiment . Follo\l1ng the D::Iol1ttle
commander failed to urge hi :. r:lcn to press the a.ttack to the utmost.
Raid of 18 Ap ril, it w.s determined to strengthen the air de�enses
It seemed absurd to incur additional losses vith the 'W8.r obviously
of all districts . The 246th Air Reg:1Jnents 'Was augnented and reor­
lost and its termination due in a matter of days.
ganized in May 1942, a s the 18th Air Brigade ( Chart rio . 4) . 'l'be

Brigade 'oIB.S o rganic to the 1st Air Arr:J;f, but 'WUs under the opera­

tional control of the Cent ral Ar.ay Command for nir defense activi­

ties .

On
 CHART NO. 4
The air defenses of the central Sector underwent few changes

during the next two years c.nd the principal. mission of the 18th Air
O RGAN I ZAT I O N CHART
1 8TH A I R BRI GADE Brigade was the tra10ing or replacement personnel tor the field CCIID­
MAY 1 942
bat units. In J\ule 1944, howeve r, the U . S . began raiding northern

KyuShu :from ba se s in China. The 246th Air Regiment vas thereupon

transferred to Ozuki Airfield in the Western District Where it came

lWl of t.�e 19th Ai r Brigade o.nd a.ssiGted in the de-

under the cOlllld

fense of northern Kyushu. The regiment reverted to the 18th Air

1ST AI R Brigade 10 early July.

ARMY
Formation of the lith Air Dirl slon
(fOR TRAINING)
I
I The increased enemy air activity of June 1944 again IDILde it
I
I
I
neceszary to strengthen the a.ir defences of Japan II.Dd, 10 July, the

18th Ai r Brigade wall stronGly reinforced and reorganized as the lith

Air Divisio�, ��th units located as shown below :

AIR BRIG HQ
Hq. lith Air Divi sion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Taisho

BRIG RECON 16th L"ldependent Air Squadron )

)
• • •

Pl..A NE UNIT 246th Air RebL�ent Ta1sho

)
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2 46th Ai�rield Battalion • • • • • • • •

2 4 6 TH AIR REGT 56th Air RebL�ent , ltam!

)
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

143d Ai rfield �ttalion • • • • • • • • •

A I R BRIG HQ 55th Air ReGiment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ) omaki

I NTEl..L UNIT 42d Airfield Battali on • • • • • • • • • • ) K

163d Airfield Battalion Kiyosu

Fonnation of the 23d Air Brigade

The Osaka and Nagoya areas had gene rally been considered a8 one
de fen se area and the 18th Air Brigade and later the lith Air Division

85

84

•
continued to consider the area as a single defensive entity. This 1, 000 sorties being flovn. Believing that this presaged a possible

vas a convenient arrangement admlnistratively but the Suzuka MoUD­ invasion or signaled the intensification of air attacks against

tain Range, \/bich runs between Nagoya and Osaka, constituted a nat­ Fonno S8, on 22 October, the General Defense CO!lIIId
I8.ll directed the

ural obstacle to efficient air operations . In add! t1on, beeause 11th Air Division to dispatch the 246th Air Regiment to assist in

ot the larse number ot vital targets in both areas, the one a1r di­ the defense of thi s strategiC area.

vision could not provide adequate protection to both Nagoya an4 The strength of the 11th Air Division was still :rurther re­

Osaka. The situation required a nev air \m1t and, on 6 September, duced ....hen, on 11 Nove:llber, the 55th Air Regiment vas ordered to

the 23<1 Ai r Brlg3de was organized vi th headquarters at !C0!!l8lt1 Air­ the Philippines.

tield. Although the nevly tormed Brigade was organic to the llth Formation of the 6th Air Anny

Air Division, because ot inadequate communications tacilit1es, the On 26 De c embe r 1944, the 6th Air Army was establ1shed and the

commander ot the 2311 Air Brigade was given considerable autonomy in 11th Air Division \ill S rellloved f'rom the order of' battle of' the 1st

the conduct ot operat10ns in his area. oUr Army and became organic to the 6th Air Army. The Divi sion still

The 23d Air BriGS-de vas built around the 55th oUr Regiment remained under the operational control of the Central Army COUICland

....hieb was already stationed at Komslti Airfield. Like the 11th oUr a:ld since the 6t.l} Air AnDy was othervise engased, it exercised no

Division, the Brigade vas under the operational control of the Cen- e.ctive command over the 11th Air Division.

tral Army Command. Operations Direction

Transters and Reassicnments The lith Air Division operatioIls room was established at the

Ckl 21 August 1944, 18 planes ot the 56th Ai r Regiment were dis­ Division headquarters at Taisho oUrf'1eld.

patched to Tachia rai Airfield, in north-central. Kyushu, to operate The commander of the 11th Air Division 'WS charged v1th the

under the 12th Air Division. The zone of operations ot the 56th direct responsibility for directinc all defensive air combat. The

extended frorll Tachiarai to Qnw-a Airt1eld and Depot, near Nagasald.. number of personnel vho assi sted him during operational periods

CD 12 October, a day-long raid by carrier-based U.S. planes varied accordine to the situation. Nonnally, personnel sufficient

was conducted against targets on Fannosa, vi th a total of' about to c.e.n the operations room was set up to vork in three shirts of'
eight bours each. In the event of' an attack, all personnel vent em

a 24-hour duty status.

S6
 A large 1nfonuatioll board showed the positions of enemy plane s of having the headquarters o.f the A.tr Division estaolished v1th the

aDd a weather chart indicated fl.y1ng conditions and visibility in

Army hea.dquarters in Osaka Castle . Tbe purpose o.f the desired wove

From the operations room commWlication \inS to improve liai son betwcen the two heatiquart.ers . In addition,
all parts of the country.
and direct since the entire intelligence netvork of the Central Anny Command
vith subordinate units vas maintained by Lleans of radio
enabled the op­ ",-as concentrated ill the Osaka. Castle headquart.ers, it vas felt that
telephone lines, W:lile air-gruund radio- telephones
air. the joint headquarters wuuld improvc the llth Ai r Division ' s intel­
erotio ns room to keep ill tou<:h 'With plane s in the
Responsibility for radio commwli cutions between the headquar­ ligence system.

ters and subordinate units \/as assigned to the 18th Air Signal Unit, The Division commande r pointed out that Taisho vas only 16 kil­

'With the signal section leader of headquarters being in charge of ometers from Osaka end that four telephone and two radio circuits

all cOlllmunications facilities 'Within the operations room . Tbe reg­ constituted !ll1Ip le means of communication. The Divi sion cOlllJlde
l8.D r

ularly established telephone line s of the CommWlications Ministry further stnted that the loss of direct supervision ot his unit ' s

were ordinarily useu for communication between the division head- tl�ining and combat operations would inevitably result in a 108s of

operating efficiency. Actually, it vas the belie! of the Division

q,uarters and its subol'dinat.e Wlits .
Offi cers f rom the Air Si gnal Units , the Air-G round Radio Unit that air combat directions from the Centre! Ar.JlY CO;:I.il8.lld vould be

all assigned dutie s ��ecessary in most cases .

alld the Meteo rological Cooperation Sectio n were
ds of cOlllbat op­ The controversy dragged on for SOI!le time until the C in C ot
in the operet.ions room. In addition, during perio
Supply and Medical
erati ons, liai son office rs from the Ordnan ce, Defense finally directed that the move be made . The DiviSion, in

prepared to take
Departments were instl"Ucteli to stand by and be spite of difficulties encount.e:..ed in obtaining additional equipment,

he s . began the installation of an operations room in Osaka castle .

prompt action in matters affecting thei r bl�c In

Loca.tion of 11th Air Divi sion Headquarters April 1945, just before the mOVe vas actually &lade, the newly es­

Although the Taisho headquarters of the llth Air Division vas tnbl1shed Air General Anny cancelled it and the Divi sion headquar­

located very near Osaka, the Central Army c�and vas most desirous ters remained in Taisho until the end of the var.

8S
 T roining
�ergency Reinforcements
Ai r Program

l of lith Ai r Divi sion

personnel, In the latter part of 1944, when the lith Ai r Division sutfer-
To improve the c Otllbat potentia
ed a num.ber of losses by transt'er and reassignraent, an effort vas
wn o inst ituted to increase p rofi ciency in high
a t roinins prog ram

o control and Ta-Dan bombing tech- made <rth throu@l the use ot provis1ona1 lm1ta
to bolster its streDo
altitude flyins, ai r-ground radi

construction and per!o:n.anee ot (To-Ni-Go Butai ) . These unit s , gene rolly knovn as To mu t s , were
niques . All. a.vailable data on the
s for study. Tech­ t'ormed t'rom instructors from the Yura and Kakogava Ai r �in1ng U­
and di stributed to ai r unit
the B-29 vaS gath ered

a B-29 which hn.d been shot nit s . A To Unit vas also f'omed from Akeno Flyine; School personnel
h vere found in
nical photographs vl1ic
particularly helpful but vas late r reorgan1:r.ed a s a. pe nnanent operationa1 lm1t.
hu on 20 Septembe r ....ere
dovn in northe rn Kyus

War game s vere conducted

to p rovide p ra ctical experi­ The To Units, vhich cwue under the command of the lith Ai r Di-
in thi s vo � .

hing and attacking B-29 ' s

. Training 10 vision in the event of an air raid, were assic;ned positions 10 the
ence in locatinG, app roac

vas held in conjunction vi th searchlight. alert defense pattern. Although the provi:.10na1 tmits did not op­
combatting night attacks
erate as effi ciently as the reGularly aS Signed organic unit.s, the
units .

vere graded and a ssi gned to one of Divi sion \/as requi red to make the fullest use of them as its regu­
All. ai r c revmen and pilots
rative abilit.y. Group A lar strenet.h had. been so drastiCally reduced. The use of instruc­
three groups in acco rdan ce vith thei r compa
Group B those wo tors as pilots in the provi sional units naturally re sulted in a
capable of' night flyi ng,
vas composed of pilo ts

dayt ime operation s . Group C vere belov re­ reduction of the ef't'iciency of the schools and imposed a severe
vere proficient only in

As the troining pro�ram

increased the abilities strain on the instructor group.
quired standard s .
er
pilots and creVlllen, they vere e.dw.nced into the next high Service muta
of the
With !:lany of the flying units of the llth Ai r Dlvision being
group .
enemy air activity ws great. deployed in other areas, every effort \/as made to strengthen the
f 1945, wen
�er the firs t part o
Ju

l iJllpo ssible
vi rtualy
to ma1nta.1n a real train­ service unl ts so that airfield and plane maintenance might be 1m-
ly intensified, i t vas
vere required proved.
ing program. Instructors and advanced student pilots

the pi lot replacement

stream dv1ndled to
to fly combat mi s sion s and

e. mere trickle.

91
 M A P NO. 7
Airfield Conditions

At the t1.cle of the organization ot the llth Air Division, Te.i­ I- a

()
a::
sho and lte.mi Airfields were equipped tor day and night use and bad I- 4n • 0
f/) Q •
c
supporting antiaircl"aft artillery. Most of Karnaki Airfield 'WaS op- 0 ...J III
..
laJ o ..
...J � .
:II
erotional, eJ.though some portions were \Uldergoinc repair and the •
�
< a::: i
a:: < 0
aiet1eld vas eJ.so being enlarged. Kiyosu Airfield vas not opel1l.- .... N
Z
�
tional and no flying units were stationed there . It was, howver, U
•

protected by o.ntiaircroft artillery and vas \Uldersains extensive

z -=>

repo,irs to penni t it to GUpport a flyinc unit.

In the latter part of 1944, attention was concentrated on the

enlarging ot airfields near strategic points. The enlarging ot

Komaki Airfield vas neariIlb completion and vor'", \13.5 started on the

construction of an operations roow for the 23d Air Brigade . The

Kiyosu Airfield taxi area vas almost completed and construction ot

i
strips and area installations vas p roceedin& satisfactorily. M1k1,
:1
=�
Sano and "iura. Airfields were in process of beine; constructed by the e" <D
e
'"
Arrr.:y Aeronautical Department . Akeno, "iokaichi, Gifu, Kakogawa and o

Kitaise Airfields were already in use by To Units and co;a:nunications

acd other facilities had been almost completed (Map No . 7) .

In February 1945, the 47th Air Sector Co;;u!illld

l vas placed di-

rectly under tlle 11th Air Divisioll which orU<!l"ed it to Kamaki and

directed it to rush completion of Kiyosu Airfield. The nirfield

battalions at Hwnamatsu, lll:l.goya and Ise were placed \lllder t.'1e 47th

92

93
Ai r Sector Command. At about this sllUle ti.r:1e, special attention \laS the Osaka-Kobe area. Reserve radio equip;uent had also been pre-

di re c ted to the c on s t ruc ti on or auxiliary defense installations, pared tor use when planes fro.u the Nagoya region were operating 10

such as revetlUents for the p rot e c ti on of reserve planes and the t.�e Osaka-Kobe area . 'IVo ai r- g round radio p lane s vere assigned to

bombproofing of regimental Ilnd battalion command p o s ts. In add!- the Central Ar.ny COUli.1s.nd for use in the directing ot local cOI1lbat

tion, refuellin.:; methods ....ere improved anu the nu;nb e r ot refuelling in Osaka and Kobe .

c a rs and pumps ....ere in c re a s e d at almost all airfield s . provision In April 1945, additional one-kilowatt air-ground radios vere

w.s also rr.e.de fo r cons'.;; ru ction of refuellinG rorJP S e:t each field. set up in the Divi sion I S ope:rs.tions roe:n. These were designed to

Speci al Intelligence Squadrons relay urgent infor.uation and ins t ruc tions by simultaneously broad-

Infonr.a tion on t..:'1 e movement s

of en emy p1.o.ne s ;ro.s gathe re d, pri- casting to all plnnes in the ai r. All e.lr-ground radios vere UDder

rJari ly , by ti'le Int e ll i ge nc e Sec

tion of the Central. An:;! Coc:oand and the control of the 13th Air-Ground Radio Unit, an element of which

in stallations and look-

in!onnation emanated p rincipally 1'l"O..!l radar vas stationed \11 th each Air Regiment.

out posts . Air Raid Warnin§ System

ved throuch the Army �,

To supplement the i nfo r.ua.ti on recei Tne air raid varnins s::rstem for the Central District vas oper-

a Special Intelli genc e Squadron w.s e stablished in the headquarters ated by the Central AnlY CQ:];llBJld and consi sted of both civ1Uan aDd

Tne Squadron sp e c ia ll z ed in monitoring mil1tary lookout posts and radar installations .

cf the llth Air Divi sion .

g in Saipan and Timan to obtain ad­ Lookout Posts

radio trall sm issio ns ori gi natin

i nfor�ti on on B-29 activity in that area. The Squadron also Beceuse of the position of the Central District 10 respect to
v��ce

bet'Jeen enemy plAnes and was tre

­ the app roach routes nOlT.lB.lly utili zed by the U . S . planes, the looIt­
interc epted radio cO::u;luniclltions

quentl.y s uc c e ss ful in p redi

c tine nir raids . out posts of the District vere only of nominal value to the llth

Air Division. The information Yhich the lookout posts genenLted

Ai r-Ground Radio Communications
l w.s maintained by
be t'Je e n unit s of the cOl!l.":I8.ld and which the llth Ai r Division passed on to the !astern Army Cca­
Co;ru�un icati ons

both \I1re · end redio telephone . To control planes i n the ai r, air- mand and the 10th Ai r Division vas, hovever, o t great value to the

had been installed for the use o t

units in \laming system of the Kanto Sector. Iccations of both military and
grou.�d radio -telephon es

94 95
 MAP NO. 8

civilian lookout posts are shown in Table No. 3. Location of civil-

ian area h eadqua rte r s are shown on Map No . 13 (page 167) .

Lookout posts vhich verc expected to be of great assistance in

determining the course of ra idi ng bombers u.nd predicting thei r pro-

:::l
bable targets, found that the approach tacti c s utilized by the B- I
tf)
29' s made it ve ry difficult to make accurate estiJ�tes . At first, Z
0
the B-29 ' s �ntalned more or le ss set routes ��d ve re succesQtul- I at
f �
ly attacked by interceptors . Later, hovever, they chanc;ed their .... --1..... \l
�

technique and began usine diversionary tactics vh1ch misled plot-

<- ,
/
�
� �
ters and interceptors.
� �
..

�i
at ,

InstallatIons �
�
Radar

Both Type A and B moor s tati ons vere insta.1.led vlthin the � -.P

i!
Central Di strict u.nd althoush the Type B i ns tallati on :: had, under
"II
....
.... r
lC

ideal conditions, a maximum range of 300 ki lomete rs, the approach

paths utili zed by the B-29 ' s generally precluded early pick� . As

e re :; ul t , the rildar detection of planes, like the visual pick� or

the lookout post�, �:: of er eat e r value to the K��to Sector than

to the Central Sector (Map No . a) .

Right up to the end of the var, radar stations in the Cent re.l

Di strict failed to locat e small planes. No information concerning

the enemy' s freQ.uent raids emanating from Ivo Jima and Cklnava or

fro::! carrier tllsk f'orces vas ever IlVlli lable to the 11th Air Dirt-

sion prior to the time of the act� appearance of the planes over

the Central Sector.

96

97
 Table No . 3 Table No. 3 (Cont ' d)

c rlILIfu'l! AND AR."1i LOOKOtfl' POSTS EHIME PREF&."l'URB

Ul;'"DER CENTRAL AIMY COMl·1ANI)
Civ1lian Posts

Area Hq. UwaJ1ma

Area Hq. - Mats�
-
AlCHl pr,sFS:£URE Do1 K\.IIIa
GUDClJu
Akeb&ru
M1.bama
M1sh1llla
Hakata Higash1 aotonouad.
Ci vtlian Posts
HoJo 1w.matau
Mizuhama
Toyobalth1
1&\1111
Area Hq. - Nagoya Area Hq. - Otazaki Area Hq. - Ikazalt1 Nagazava
Imabar1 Kall8ltam1
Fuld Anjo AkabaDe OChiai
KamiDada Kawatahama
Handa. Asuke Eb1 SaiJo
Kam1 sak ura. M1.kame
Ichinomiya Issh1kl Fukue Shimizu
Komatsu
M1sh1ma.
Inuyama Karlya Futagava '!'achibana
Ko zak i
Nagaballa
I\lBkura Koromo Garnagor1 Tanano
Kik uma Nakastai
Kan1 e Nishio Goyu Uga'" Ozu
Kornak1 O'r.nezaki lrako
Tomatsu
Mi yosh1 Sakurai Shinsh1ro
MorouUd Takaoka Tcltatoyo
Na I'Ul!li Yoshida Togo
Nawa Toyotsu Civi 11 an Posts
Ono
Area Hq. - Fukui Area Hq. - Suruga
Seto
Ech1 z en
Area Hq. - 'l'akef'u
So:f'ue Ka1z u HakUS8.D
Goka Kato
Tokonarue H1gash1ura
Kanazu Obams.
U"t s � Hirom1
Katsu,yama Dwano
Yabat.a
KwUJu1 Santo
Yatomi
Menaya Shiotsu
Mill tar.! Posts* Mikun1
Tabe
Oda
Tate1chWsalt1
Okazaki-Baw Tawal'& OJima Toba
Asuk.e
Toyokawa Sh1h1
lrako ShimoyazIIB. TS u'!'lekam1zo.k1
Ut sumi Sh1.moarlama
Okazaki Tak e toyo Urlyu
Sh1zu
Uno

* Al.tho� both military and civilian lookout posts

are frequent­
arate posta 0ft-
ly ShOVIl in the same tOVIl or cityI th ey we re sep
en some distance apart.

9S 99
 Tab�e no. 3 (Cont ' d)
Tab�e No. 3 ( Cont ' d)
HYOGO PREFEX:'l'URE
GIFU PREm::TURE
CIv111an Posts
Civ1lian Posts

Area. Hq. - Taka)'SJIB

Area Hq. - HimeJI Area Hq. - Kobe Area Bq. - Sumoto
Area Hq. - Gifu Area Hq. - Tajima
Funa tsu Aboshi Akash1 AIDa
Hachiman Akechi
Furuke:wa Ako Arima Fukura
Ibuki Iw.mUlU
Qero HoJo Kaihare. Iwya
J(ashIwbarn Kamiaso
�yaroa Bag1vara Kekogawa Mikage Kanya
Kuse Murots u
Kucuno M1kI Sh:1.zuk1
Kuwhara Ka.wube
Qsa.ka . Of'u Nakamura Tosh1.ma
Ogaki Nagash1ma
Shikema Ni shinada Tsush1
Seki Nakatsu Sal-.ash ita
Washimi Takasago Ni shlwld. Yura
SekIga.hara Tokl
tIne 000
Takata Tsukechi
Yamazaki Sanda
Takatomi
Sasuyawa

Hili ta!Z Posts Suma

Uozak1
Sek i Takatolll1 Uozum1
H1romi
Sekigahara TaJima
M1.j unama
Taka ta
Area Hq . - Toyooka Area Hq. - wadayama
H1daka BanaeI
Kasu:n1 Dtuno
HIROSHIMA PREFrl'URE
Kinosa.k1m1nato NIsh1ta.n1
K1!m1helJll\ Seklnom1ya
CI vilian Post.
Muraoka Yoke.
Area Hq. - H1rosh1.oa
:.I1li ta!1: Posts
M1tsu Takehara
Aka
Taman Ama Murotsu Sumoto
Fukuyama Miyosh1
Tomo Miki NI sh1l18kl Yura
Itozo.ki Nigata
Onom1chl Uch1noum1
Kabe
Yano ISHIKAWA PREFE:;TURE
Kure Sa.1Jo
M1.bu Tadanoumi
CIv1lian Posts

Area Hq. - Nanao Area Hq. - Kanazawa Area Bq. - KClllt

la su
Ane.m1zu Kanaiwa Ataka
Hagu1 Mikawa De.1ahoJl
I1d& Mitarashi Mibato
Takahama Tsubata Nash1date
Togo Tsurugi N1ahio
Uzetsu OSug1da1
wajima ShIoya
Yamanaka

100 101
 Tab1e No. 3 (Cont' d) Tab1e NO. 3 (Cont' d)

KOCH! pREFF,X;TURB Millta!1: Posts

Clvillan Post.a lJash1moto* GoJo*

Kem11ch1 Sonobe
Area Hq. - Kochi
MIE PREFl!L"l'URB
Mi sak1 Sb�
Akaoka Sh1m1zu
l-fit.au C1 villo.n Posts
Ak1 Sh1mokavagu.chi
Mit.auk1
Amat.subO SUk\lllO Area Hq. - Kinomoto
Ashlzuriz,ak1 Murotoz.ak1 Area Hq. - Tsu Area Hq. - Toba
Miyanotani Susak1 Adava Agele1 Gokaaho
Chl ch1sat.O Tal-.aoka Arasaka Aho
Hiragawa Nakamura Goza
NUda Tano lkura Awa Hamash1ma
Hirata Tate1Bhi Kamik1tayama
Och1 Kameyama Icbino se
Osugi
Irino Tom1� Shimok1tayama
KamihanyamA
Ku'WB.M. Isobe
Saga yot.su Kui Kagam1ura
Kanoura Area Hq. - Cashi
Kure
Shimada !-1a.tsusaka Kak1no
Akaba Shiroko Ka:aata
KYaro PREFwruRE Hikimota Toyotsu Kama
Nagashima Tsuchiyama Koga
Ci vi 11 an Posts Kat.suragi Ueno Mataya
Kuk1 Ywnochi Minue:yama
lyarna Area Hq. - Kj'oto Area Hq. - Sh1molch1 Yokkalchi Nagaoka
Area Hq . - Fukuch GoJo Area Hq. - Uj1yamada
!)al go Na.k1r1
Ayabe IIanZODO Fut.am1
Hiraoka Cka
Monobe Hash1llloto Oyodo
Hirara 0sug1dan1
Mutobe Kavalte.m1
Hosono Ugata
Sh iinOyakuno Kudoyama
Iozumi lkura
lwakura Ko;ya Yo shi zu
Area Hq. - Miyano Mitaue Mlllta;:z Posts
Kuchild
Oyoclo
Amino
Kurama
As eku
Kuze Takam1 Agek1 Komono Tau
Hioki Uda - Kameyama Kuwana
Muko Ueno
Hongo Yoshino Kanbe Ms.t suzaka
Saga Yokka1 ch1
Honjo Suzuka
Shuzan
Kurita Area Hq. - Sonobe
Kyugasak1
Takashima
Uj1 Qokaao NARA PREFrl'URE
GomagO
Maizuru
Ya8i
Maru sez eld Ck1e Civilian Posts
Yat.suse
Ta1za �ch1
Yodo
Takal'J,eJ!la Area Hq. Nara
Yue;e Tsurugaoka -

Yag1
Gose Nabarl Takada
Baibara Sakurai Tah.a.remoto
lkomn SanboDmat.su Tanabaich1

102 103
 Tuble No. 3 (Coot ' d) Table No . 3 (Cant.' d)
}.fllItag Poats OSAKA PREFE:TURB
Haibara CIvilian Posta
CKAYAMA. PREFEL"l'URB Area IIq. - Osaka

Civilian Posts .Amam1 It.am1 11IJoyama

Fujl1dera Kaizuka Selta1
Area Hq . - CkOoyama Area Bq. - Takamatau Hira.oka Katsurag! Sanoch1ha.7&
Asllimori KannonJ1 Hirakat.a Misbima Suit.a
Chlyaye.chi Kokubu Ibarald ¥.1ya.rua. Ta¥.at.suk1
Fuklya Kotohira Imazu Nagano lao
Fuse Ma.rugame
Hibi l-ture SHIGA PtOO'a"l'URE
Hikino Saka1de
Ih:l.l"a Sanbonmatau Cl vi 11 an Post.s
KnnagaW8. Shido
Kasaoka Tadot.su Area Hq. - Otsu
Tak\1118.
Area Hq. - Hikone
K onosh lma
Kotoura ToyohallB Hachiman Kusat.su Awami
KUl'ashlkl Tsuda Hayami Kumoi Chikubu
Kuro:z.e..lti Hayano Minaguchi Echigava
Mlzuta Area Hq. - Tsu;yam& Hi re. Nakaau laono
Nariha Dn1 Dcatachi Qn1zo Nagahama
Nim1 Higasa IcbIbe Sakamoto Nanao
Ochiai Hinase Kataga Seta 0ta.k1
SaidalJI Hlre.fuku Kldo lasu Samegai
Sendo Inbe
Yokalch1
S.'1imotsui Kamo
Shimokura Kat sumat.a
Milltag Poata
TakahashI OsakI
Takaya Sayo Hikone Minaguch1 Yasu
TaJna.sh1Jna Susai
Told'ola Takakura
Ud..J Wake
lkan luge
Uno
Ush l.mado
Yakahe
Yorish1ma

104 lOS
 Table No. 3 (Coot. ' d) Table No. 3 (Cont ' d)

6ll IZUacA PIWlL'TORB TOYo'\MA PREFPI:TURE

Civ1l.1an POSt.1S C1viUan Posts

Area Hq. -Kakegava Area Hq. - Bamamatau Area Hq. - Takaoka Area Hq. - Toyaua
Ikesh1nden Are.1 Fukuno Goh)'8kkolcu
Kana),. Kokezuka Fush1k1 Higash1wase
K&.w.aald Ma1salt& Fum1 Name r1kawa
K1 tamata Sb1ruulca JobaDa
"Url.
16hu...
TaDar1
Misakubo Uozu
Hi tsuke Area Hq. - Shbuoka t.Jn8.zuld
Morl Ash1na Yatsuo
Qnae ;.:.aki FuJ1eda
Sagara �abe WAKAY�IA PREl<�
Tahara Sh1m1zu
YBlIl8.gI1 Yabu C1vilian Posts
Yokosuka Yui
Area IIq. - Kush1moto Area lIq. - Tanabe Area Hq. Wakayama
-

T(.1(USHIMA PREFE::'l'URB Arlta Aikava Higata

Esllllli Chikano Iwabe
C1 rtl1an Post.s Hik1 Funatsuk1 Ivaa
Hongu Gobe K.o.da
Are� Hq. - Tokush1m& I rokawa Iehonose Kokava
Katsuura I.nami Minosh1lua
Aide KandA Seto Y.avazoe Iwkura Miyo
Anabuk1 KavashimD. Sh1shiku:1 Koza Kaminoj o Shirosak1
Aratano Komo.tsush1ma Taeh1bUna. Iw.za.!d. Kavakami Tannova
Fukllhama Miyaha,ma Tanoura Nach1 Kirlsugawa ToyaJo
Hashikuro Mugi Tomooku Shi.mosato Minabe Waksnoura
H1I.;asa. Muya Tsubak1 Shingu Ryu&in
IkedA Sad.am1tsu Urano6ho Susamu Samukawa
Iwkuro. Sakan1shi Tanami Totsugava
Ukui Yavata
TOITORI PREFH:TURE Wabuka

Ci rtl1an Posts Mili ta.ry Posts

Area Hq. - Tottorl Area Hq. - Yonago Kokava Wakanoura

Aj l ro Hinanisak1 Se.da
Aoya. Hoshoj1 Sa1SO
Chizu Ijirl Sakai
Hamasaka Iya StlimohoJo
Iva1 Goka Shina!
Kamo Ki suk1 ShinJ1
Shikano Kurosaka Yabase
Tomarl Mihonosek.1 Yas�
Wakasa Mizo8UChi Yura
NoIla!d Yurayoshi 107

106
 Since the approach routes and the d.1versionaI7 tactics ot the
ene,"'QY bO'.nbers mnde it extreraely dit'f'icult to follow the course ot
an attack or to predict the intended target by means ot radar or
lookout lJosts, the lith Air Division foWld it Iilore advantageous to
re1y on patrol planes for spottina and tracing raiding planes.
Search Mi ssions
The Type-100 Headquarters Reconnai ssance p1anes ot the 16th
and 82d Independent Ai r Sq\l.!ldrons beca.use of their superior speed
highe r altitude capabill tie s, ....ere nonnal.ly used in search m.1 ealona.
Such �i3sions ....ere conducted 1n accordance with the general estimate
ot the s ituation or 1n ref'erence to inf'onnatlon developed br the
Special Intell1gence Squadrons . Reconns.i ssa.nce Dd aeions we re sen­
era1ly rlown by Croups of' three pla.ne s . It enemy plane s were spot­
ted, they .... ould be approached from the rear, thoir movements observed
and reports relayed to headquarters. or the three reconnaissance
planes, one would nonr.a.l.ly be assigned to folio" the raiding planes
and the o ther :. would be assigned ney mi ssions .
Alert System
As B-29 l�ids we re intensified in e a rly 1945, the alert system,
which h'ld pre'liously been established on a fairly simp1e patteI'D,
was re-ex.e.nd.ned and a core efficient system ot graduated al.erts
adopted. The lith Air Division prepared a series ot directives
wich described the action to be taken by each unit as the al.erts
108
were anno\Ulced. Four types of alerts vere listed : A, B, C and D.
Starting with Al.ert D, men and machines were pl.aced in
graduated
states of readiness \Ulti1 reaching Al.ert A, which calle d for pi10ts
to be in their planes with the cngines twning over (Chart No. 5 ) .
Al.so inc1uded in the alert plan were movements o f' various
u­
nits, both prearranged and er:tergenc y. In general, these movement s
sent Wlits into an alert flying pattern or assi@led air regiments
and to teruporo.ry bases were they would be in more strategi
c positiona.
Time Differential Study
In the development of the alert system. and the making ot pre­
parations for defense against B-29' s, a study vas made of the char­
acteri stics and capabilities of the American heavy bombers and an
appraisal was made of Japanese air defense strengths and weaknesses.
One of the prinCipal weaknesses was the time involved in relaying
air raid warnings . Thi s weakness received l:luch serious consider­
ation since it vas obvious t.�at in order to successfully meet and
attack the enemy bombers, the Air Division had to be given e.mp1e
warning of their approach. The maxilUum range of the Type-B Radar
vas about 300 kl10tneters and, because of the size and shape ot
Japan, radar stations in the Central Di strict could seldom be lo­
••
cated more than 150 kilometers fl"OCl a vi tal target area. This
meant that it was of'ten possible for a B-29 to approach wi th1D 450
kl1o:neters of its tarGet before being detected. With the speed of'
109
 Chart No. �

the :8-29 being in excess of 500 ltilaneters per hour, the bomber could
•
...
.... .
I .... �I e
... . be over its target 50 to 55 minutes after tirst being detected. Ever'7
§
!� t "l.
•

... ... •

a . � a� ...
...
.... effort vas made to speed up the process ot relaying mes sage s from the
.... ... �
fl
§ .
'... 8 o�
...
e
radar installations through Division headquarters to the air regi­
8
•
... a
• •
£ 8
"
II III
a� .., ...
.... ....
.... u
� o
�� ... §....
ment s . In spite o f the fact that th e time lost in getting the order
�� gM s ... as
� 0...
�� ;§!
� J! " ...
as '"'
.... 0
� t: to the f'i{;hter units "Was cut to approxtrnately 20 minutes, it stUl
't oO
�� � � ... ...
g e �...
•

'e f a�
0 »

�� � -g
�e
required an addi tioD8.l. 50 minute s or more for an entire regiment ot
��
t,;) al � t! �! .... u
as II
Type-2 and Type-3 Fighters to reach an altitude ot 10, 000 meters

( Chart No. 6 ) . Thi s time lag :aeant that whole i'omations of :8-29 1 •
... . .
III III •
... 8 a
� would often be met by the one or two !1ghters which wre the tirst

�a
as "

�e ,
....

III

a�
� .,
;• III
to get off the ground. The entire ret;1l!lent 'Would have difficulty in

B �
...
a- lii becoming ai rborne in su1'1'icient time to attack the enemy banber tor-

"
.... u
... <
e I)
� "
I)
"
0

� •. i
" mations even on their retUl'U run.
8- co
'e .
co
�
III
'"'
� a
'"' In some cases, depending on the route of approach and. the tar-
a- � �!
I ",
8- 8.
vas
�! �! � � get, a little more time available, but the time differential be-

tween the first reports of enemy planes and the time required to

mount an effec tive defense remained c ritical. Decisions on the dis-

�
� I
.
]III jIII i�
III ...
. :. . pod tion of forces bad to be made very quickly in order not to lose
,S uf
t!
• •
III ... •
I) S
� a
:9 �
II
m oO

$ 13 S�
J �i I:lit •
the opportunity for interception, but in1tial information vas of'teD

i
8 � ] '2g , '2! l�
e . � t! misleading and too meager to permit the making of decisions . onus,
... e
il s' .go � 8
f§ e
co

�f �
• in turn, caused still greater delay as infonnation trom. the radar

3�! � $ 1 � $
III
to. P..
III., ..."' ....� III •
...
�i �i
... ... insta.llat ions w.s carefully studied prior to commi tting the units •

� "O ....
P.. � � i
�� ! � 13t Po g:;

III

1D ....
1 r::
.... 0 CI t) sq <
t! ;: ;: ;: 1:
I) �
e) '"
as
� t) �
... � � � � lll.

110

*
 Chart No. 6

Time Di fferential Study

Study ot B-29 Raids

The 11th Air Division al.so made a caref'ul study o� the hea"7

Time Requ:1red to B-29 l1!.ids which began in November 1944, and sUlll!:la rized re sults �or
Speed Climb to llt.1tude
ot 10,000 JIl
the benefit of operational planning.

Type �-29 Target Selection

The B-29 ' s, operating from Saipan bases, had concentl1!.ted their
Single Section Flight
�um Cruis1ng f'1rst attacks on the Nakaj ima Aircraft Factory, in the Tokyo area.
Plane
�nen the destruction of that plant had been e cc ocrplish ed during ten

days of steady bombioGs of Tokyo and vi C ini ty, the enemy sv1tched

Type-2 its attack to the Nagoya area for several days . Follo'J1ng these
634 km 40 IlIin 50 min 50 min
Fighter
attacks, the enemy began bombing th e Kawasaki Ai rcraft Factory at

Akashi, near Kobe .

It was clear that the prlmary target of the eneJllY 1oI8.S the air-

c raft industry, with the total destruction of Japan ' s aircl1!.fi manu-

Type-3 40 min 50 min 1 hr

5� km 400 km facturing potential as the ultilllate aim. Ctlee a fa.c tory had been
Fighte r
selected as a target, the D-29' s wuld bomb it until canplete de-

st ructi on 1oI8.S achieved. Then, a new ta rget wuld be selected anQ.

accorded the SBJlIe treat:nent . In view of thi s definitely e stabl1shed

T)'pe-2
llQ zn1n
pattern of ene::ty target selection, the study 1ndicated that. it would
tv1n-seat 5 45 k:n 50 miD l hr
Fighter be pos sible to anticipate future targets v1th a reasonable degree o�

acc urac y .

B-29 Flight FOrmations and Approach Routes

Tne Division ' s study took note of the fact that the standard
Headquarters
Reconoaia- 630 km 450 kill 40 min
sauce

113
B-29 fo rma tion consi sted ot a unit. ot tour planes in a diamond pat­ In an effort to obta.1n 1nfonoat10n well in advanc e of raids,

tern. Four such Wl1 ts usuo.lly be ing grouped to fona 0. larger dia. the Division maintained cl.ose liai son vith the :Eastern Army Camnend

mond . The tour &roUPs, nying at intervalE; of five to ten ldlometera, to secure !nfonnation emanating froL1 the Bonin Islands, Iwo J1ma
l
consti tuteu one echel.on lIh1ch vas tre<!,ucntl.y folleved by s everal otb. end the Izu IslAnds . The Division also reinforced the Special In­

e r similarly tomed. echelons. telligence Squadron in an effort to imp rove the operatina efficlenc1

�le bomber formations tended to app roach Japan tram the south of that Wl1t. To aid radar installations in effec ting speedie r Iden­

or soutllvest and, after arriving ove r the mainlAnd, turn to the eaat. t.i fi cation of enemy planes and detennining their direction ot ap­

to the assu.-.xption that this maneUYer proach, plotting device3 vere set up vi thin the radar installations
The study of the tactic s led

the !H'evailing v.l.nter viDda . at Quaezaki, Shirahama, Yavatahnllla and Osalta.

vas used 1n order to take advantage of

gpe rations Against B- 29 ' s

Plotting ot B-29 Courses

As they gained experience, the efficiency or the radar units At. first , as the B-29 ' s maintained their successive echelon

shoved marked improvement. Hovever, unless the intial radar report fOrr.lat1ons, with each echelon closely folloving the route ot the
'
vas s upported by intellleence received f1"O'� other sources, It '1018.11
fi r st , they vere successfully attacke d. This type of tOIWlt1on

se ldom sufficiently complete to indicate the di rec tion ot the e� served to overcome a di sadvantage vhich plagued interceptors tl.y1ng

attack . oCca.siono.1ly it vas possible to make a rough approximatioD at hi gh altitude s : Any me..nueve r a tt. empte d at an altitude of 10, 000

of' the ene.:!y ' s approach path by colla ting information received traa meters invariably resulted in a great loes of altitude and by the

t.ime altitude had been regained, the opportunity tor attack would
the radar stations at O:naezald, Nakir1, Shio no M1saki and Ash1zuri

M1 saki , but due to the loca ti on II and dista."lces between the lltattona, bave been lost. Hovever, vith e chelon s flying in regular progres­

Sion, recovery of alt! tude could be achieved in sufficient time to

simultaneous identifIcation wos seldom eftected. AlthoUGh it ba4

penni t an attack to be mnde on follOwing echelons.

been expected that the informatIon developed by the Spec1al Intel­

ligence Squadron lIOuld be of material assistance to the plottera 1ft

1 . Direct contact vith radar installations in the Bonin Is­
lands and lwo Jima vas maintained by GDC a genc ie s in Tokyo and
the operatIons rooril, �levant Into:ma.tlon wall not otten obtained 01
transmitted to the :EAstern Ar"lY Comnand. Radar in stallations on
the Izu Islands vere directly under the :Eastern Army Ccx.'1Ira8Jld .
the Squadron.

I
llS
114

Ids
 The fighter un1t.s 01' the llth Air OJ.vision also achieved good approach, dispatch 01' the :t1rst \mit would be ordered. Fighter

result.. aa long as the B-29' s cont.1nued their habit 01' approac:h1.D« units then took off in s uc cessive waves and if subsequent intorma-

central. Japan over the K1i Pen1naulA o.nd then turning east. to at.- tiOll required changes, the orders could be revised as the sit.uation

tack Na.go� or '.rcJlQO. demanded. Tlli s method of dispatching interceptors and effecting

Changea in B-22 Tact.ic s di sposition a.chieved unexpectedly effective results as long as the

Apparent.ly becom1.ng ....re that rigid adherence to the -­ ene..':lY continued its syste:n of attacking with successive echelons

types ot fomations o.nd the S8Jlle approach paths waa reault1n& in alone the same approach route . W'Llen fo:nn.a tions were changed and.

losse., the enemy beean adopting deceptive and diversiOD&r.J tac ­ echelons followed varied paths, the 11th Air Division' s tactics

tic s . Tne B-29 echelons chose different routes and otten separat.­ lost their effectiveness.

ed to attack several. targets . In addition, they made change. in Another innovation successfully practiced by the enemy ,.s the

their approach routes and often caused interceptor plaDe. to tly latmchinc of a nu:nber ot s:r.all raids sllllultaneo\Wly with a tull.­

into the wind . This was a definite disadvante.ce to the amaller scale attack. Tne s:nall tllGhts of planes frequently were uncietect-

and lighter fighter a.1rcratt. ed by the radar stations and first in1'ormation "'8.S genere.l.ly 1'8-

'!'be change from \Wing successive echelons ot bOClbera to at.- cei ved froon the lookout posts . With such a short warning, the plAnes

tack a single target also had the affect ot making the task 01' the ot the Air Divi sion ....ere unable to even atte:apt to take on and

operations room much 1Il0re difficult. It had been recognized that reach t.�e requi red 10, 000 meter altitude .

the information available 1mII1ediat.ely after the first identifica­ So successtul were the enemy' s diversionary tactic a, that they

tion 01' enemy plaDes was too meager to J\Wtify the di spatch 01' the otten were able to penetrnte into key target areas and begin bomb1ng

entire Division. � the other hand, the alerting ot the Division betore the plotters and interceptors were able to detenn1ne the pro­

could not be delayed unt.U collation and caref'ul st.\lI3,y 01' all in­ bable target. As a matter of fact, the Division' s di sposition ot
tell1gence could be accomplished. The Division hed compran1sed 'b7 forces seldom coincided with the true battle situation and vben it
having all tighter \mit.s assume Alert C - ready tor action - as
did, it was generally due entirely to chance or coincidence. Tbe
soon as radar stations contacted the tirst enemy plAne . \ihen sut­
inabill ty ot the air defense units to even attempt to cope vith the
ticient 1nfol'\Jl&tion was developed to estimate the direction 01' nev B-29 tactics had a demoralizing affect OD the entire Division.

1l.6 1l.7
 Attacks to avoid falling into a trap . With radar seld0i4 able to detect
Carrier-Baaed Plane

Starting about the middle of February 1945, in the III1dst ot tighter planes, particularly when acting as escorts to bombers,

very intense :8-29 nUds, a. number of attacks vere laWlched by enemy there vas danger in mounting a defense wen it vas not clear wheth­

task. torces. The Kanto Sec tor had already been subjected to such er or not the attackins i'onnations vere accaupanied by fighters.

attacks and, t.sking advantage of the experiences of the lOth Air Di­ It vas necessary to study the Situation very carefully when it 1I&S

vision, the 11th set up plans for dealing \11th the carrier-based at- believed that »-29' s might be accompanied by righters .

Preparations for Future Attacks

tacks.
be attacked and that no To the problems created by intensified :8-29 raids and carrier­
It. vas decided that only bomber s vould

To avoid possible based fighter and light bomber attacks vas added another serioua
action should be taken age.ins t fiGhter plane s .
e rsed and hid its threat . Toward the end of February 1945, Ivo Jima fell to the U.S.
damage to planes on the �roWld, the Division disp
forces, giving them an air base only 1, 250 kilome te rs tram Japan.
plane s . Dnphas is \/Us placed on the use of antia.1rcratt artillery

There vere several reasons tor A drive against Ckinaw. vas clearly indicated and it the American.
to canbat. the ene.1IY fighter plane s .
threat : '1'be bal­ should be successful in taking that island they vould have another
adopting passive defense measure s against the nev
favor ot the enelll1' air 'base only 1, 000 kilometers trom Japan . The c onstruction ot
ance of fighter strength vas heavily t1pped in
in losses 'bases on these two islands would inevitably result in an even great­
and an eneagement in a test of strength could only result
of the Division bad er intensification of the B-29 raids . Worse, the big bombers vould
heavi er thnn the Division could atford; pilots
cOlllbat, bav1ns undoubtedly be accompanied by large numbers of fighters, aea1nst
received allIlost no training in fiGhter vs. fighter
success­ which the air defenses of Japan were all but helpless. The 11th
c oncent.rated on attacking bombers and, sinc e the problem ot
solved, it ap­ Air Division speeded p reparations to meet this nev threat.
tully copinG \11th the »-29 menace bad not yet. been
to the nev During the attacks by carri er-ba sed planes, which were conduct­
peared to be virtually i:npos sible to find a solution
. ed at l4uch lowe r levels than the bomber attacks, it bad been tound
p roblem of combat.ting fiGhters sinlult.aneoualy
considered to be a that antiaircra1't veapons were relatively ineffective belov 3, 000
Since efforts against enemy tighters vere
caution had to be exercised' mete rs . To correct this shortcoming, six automatic cannon UD1ta
vaste ot plane s and pe rsonnel, extreme

1l.9

-
rrom the Central. Army Caamand were attached to the Air Division and part of the old Central Di strict and the southwe stern portion or the

distributed to air1'iel.d.s . In addition, rocket-type grenade la\mch- Eastern District. In general, the line of demarcation between the
2
era were i s sued to Taisho Airfield. E;tst Coast mlltary Di strict and the Central M1.litary District was

Measures were also taken to install searchlights and other 10- the Suzuka M01.Ultain Range which ran approximately north and south

c:ator aids in order to orient pilots during night flights. midwa.y between Nagoya and Osaka. The t'tlO mill tary districts were

guides bad beccme a neces sity because of the enemy' s incend1&r7 still conside red as one administrative district by the 11th Air Di-

raids against most of the large citie s. Due to beat and smoke sen- vi sion and continued to be r.DO'WIl as the Central Sector.

enlted by the buge :fire s, it was orten difficult for flyers to ori­ With the fonnation ot the nev area a:nni e s, the 11th Air Dirt-

ent the:nselve s and it 'Wa S particularly difficult tor them to laDd. sion came under the operational control of the Fifteenth Area A.:rrlf1,

Also as a result of the enemy ' s wide spread use of incendiary bombs while the Thirteenth Area Army exercised control over the 23d Air

and shells, further emphaSis 'WaS placed on concealing and dispera1n& Brigade . The Bri{;ade, which 'WaS a�nted by the addition ot the

combustible materials as vell as plane s . 5th Air Reg:l.r.lent, remained under the adz:l1ni strative J uri sdiction or

Changes in Zones o t ReSpon sibility the 11th Air D:l.vision.

en 6 Feb ruary 1945, when the three districts of Japan were sub­ The Air General Amy
divided into five military districts, the l3:reo.test chanGes were en 9 April 1945, the order of battle for the Air General Artq

vi thin the Central District. The nev area assigned to the Central was announced by IGHQ, vith an activation date or 15 April . Coin­

lo!1l1 tary Di strict wa.s extended to enccmpass al.l of the western end Cident vi th the e st3.bli sh:llent of the Air General Army, the Firat

or Honshu and the entire i sland of Shikoku. The 11th Air Division' s and Second General Armies were also organized and the .Ketsu-Go Op_

subordinate unit, the 23d Air Brigade, 'W8.S made responsible ror the enltion, the plan tor the final detense 01' Japan, was published.

new East Coast Mill tary Di strict lIhich 'WIlS formed from the eastern It vas intended that the Air General Army should telte over re-

sponsibility tor all air ope rations as well as preparations tor the
2. Research fails to reveal �ctl.y what type of weapon 1.
meant by " rocket-type grer.a.de la1.Ulchers . " It is probable, bowever, derense 01' Japan against the expected invasion. However, the COIIl-
that the weapon refe rred to 'WaS the Japanese 70-mm Barnlge Mortar
firing a shell that, a1'te r reaching a predetermined altitude, expel­ mand charlees were so complicated that it was determined to bring
led several parachute-supported time-fuzed high explosive charges.

121.
 l gradual.J.)' in order
the various air un!ts under the nev air ca:m:ll8.ld Steps were immedia.tely taken to plan supply requirements, ea­

not to disrupt current detense operations. tablish cClllll1'UIlications and train for air and ground activiti.s

lbder the nev command system, the Eleventh, Twel.tth and Thir­ called for by the Ketsu-Go Operation. The Air Gene ral J.:rmy named

teenth Area Anrdes came under the First General A:rmy, vh1ch meant July as the deadline for the cOlllpletion of all preparations.

that the 23<1 Air Brisade, vh1le still orc;an1c to the 11th Ail" Divi­ '!be Air Ge neral Army took command ot the 1st Air Aroy, relieved

sion was under the operational. control of the First General Antr:I. it ot its training and replacement mission and e stabllshed it as an

The Fit'teenth and Sixteenth Area Ar.des vere included in the order operatiOnal. comman d. The 11th Air Division, together with the 234

of battle of the Second General Army under wich the 11th Air DiYi­ Air Br1gade wera then transferred trom the order ot battle ot the

don nov found itself. This rather complicated comma.nd system made 6th Air Army to the 1st Air Army. Actoo.lly, this change vas onl.7

the ad."I1inistrative task of the 11th Air Division extre:nely difficult a paper transaction and made little, if any, difference in the op­

and to this already complicated arrangement vas added another diffi­ erations of the Division. Since the 6th Air A:rmy had been engaged

culty. The 11th Air Division was expected to conduct air detens. in other fields, it had never exercised any coo::and over the 11th

operations asainst the intensified B-29 and carrier-plane raids and Air Divi sion and, with operational control of the air detense. ot

at the same time stockpile all the necessary materiel that \/Ould be the Central and East Coast Mill tary Districts beinB vested in the

necessary for the implementation of the Ketsu-Go Operation. Sine. respective area andes, it 'Was not anticipated that the Division

it was not possible to peri'onll both tasks, and since the air detens. becocUng organic to the 1st Air Amy would e.tfect its operations .

ot the area bad not been particularly eftective, it was dete:na1Ded Air Defense Operations - May and June 1945

to curtail detense operatIons and concentrate on preparations tor In early May, the Air Gene ral Army reassigned the 16th Inde­

the Ketsu-Go Opero.tion. Ito attacks \/Ould be made against s1ngl.e en­ pendent Air Squadron from Tai sho Airfield to the Tokyo area. To

emy planes and sorties would only be tlCNn against tIghter fomation. accomplish the search ud ssions \lh.i.ch had previOUSly 'been fiovn b7

wen the Division could operate with nW1erical superior1ty or other the 16thl the 14 planes of the 82d Independent Air Squadron were

definite advantage . There \/Ould not, of course, be any curta1lment assigned additional reconnaissance missions.

ot attacks on large :8-29 formations vh1ch were unescorted by fight-

ers.

122
 During �y and JWle, incendiary at-tacite on the Central Sector the 1s t Air Army vas re sponsible coincided with t.bat ot the First

were particuJ.ar1.7 strong and although interceptor planes toUD4 the · General Army, taking in the Northeastern, !hstern and !hst Coast

beat and smoke ·of the fire s made night t1y1ng cxtrelllely bazUdoua, J.H.lltary Dist.rict.s. The 6th Air Army' s zone coincided with that

o
pil ts learned to use the light ot the tires to attack E-29' . frail of the Second General Army and covered the Central end Western Mil.­

belovo Fighters, �clud1ng Type-1OO Headquarters Reconnaissance itary Districts. The llth Ai r Division w.s given tour air regiments

planes equipped with 2O-1IIIIl cannon, had some degree ot BUCce .. . In end the 302d Navy Air Group, elements ot vhich bad been located at

addit 1on, the To Units launched the stron�st possible sui c ide at­ 1tam1 under the Division, "Was transferred to the newly established

tacks in an ettort to curb the enemy. About the middle ot JUDe, Navy Air Comuand at Yamato Airfield, near Hara. 3
wi th most ot the c1 ties in the Central Sector badly damaged, the The Air General Army, in an e ffort to provide the cax1mum de­

cedj,\I11 size ci t1es became targets tor massive bo:nbing raids . tense aga1nst bomb1ng raids vith the mini..cl\J.:l number of planes, de­

By the end of June the battle tor Ckinava had been los t and veloped the Sei-Go Operation. This nev concept of air detense cen­

the ener� vas in a posi tiOD to turther increase i t8 air operationa. tered around a static air defense torce vithin each air detenae

� the first part or July it vas est1.�ted. that. the enemy bad, or sector. A mobile group vas also assigne!l to each sector with the

'WOuld shortly bave , at least &Jo planes on Ckinava, 300 on 1'010 J1ma
J:1i ssion ot rende rinc primary support to its home sector and second­
It.
ary support to adJacent sectors.
and 1, 000 in the ll.arianas . At th1s time, the llth Air D1v1a1oa

bad barely 200 servicee.ble planes and the Air General A.'rmy could In the developi!1ent of the Sei-Go Operation the llth Air Divi­

800
sion, vith the 5th, 55th, 56th and 246th Air Regiments, vas desig­
muster about combat- ready tighter and bo:nber p lane s and lICIIle

nated as the stat1c torce for the Central Air Defense Sector. The
2, 000 suicide planes.
20th Fighter Group, organized on 22 July, vi th the l.llth and l.l2th
Final Air Detense Measures

en 10 July t.'le Air General Army asslr.1ed. operat10nal. t

con rol ot
3. See Japanese !·�nograph No. 23, Ai r Defense ot the HOIIIe ­
land, pages 28 - 31 and pace 91, for further details ot the Japa­
al.l air pover and. developed zones of responsib111ty tor the l.at aDd
nese Navy ' s contribution to the air defense of Japan .

68 12,
6th Air Ar.:l1es, the latter having been released. by the CanbiDed
4. Ibid, page s - tor a deSCription of the Sei-Go Op­
eration.
Fleet at the conclusion ot the Ckinaw, CaI:lpaign. The area tor which

125

1
 MAP NO. 9

Air Regiments vas assigned as & part ot the mobUe torce. i'he bal.-

anee ot the mobile force consisted at the lOOth Air Brigade" CQIIl-
Ie
posed of the 101st and 1030. Air Regiments. For the purposes of the ..
•
:!
o
D
...
... ...
� �
...... ....
II: .. c
Sei-Go Ope ration, the 5th Air Regiment �vUned wder the 234 Air ... c
C :2
- C
.. :2
Brigade vhich, in twn, wos te;nporarily attached to the 20th Fight-
U
er Group �or operational control . While both the 5th Air Reg1ment,

at K1yosu, and the 23d Air Brigade, at Komaki, recained organic to

the 11th Air Divi sion, because of c()l!lJl1UIl1 cations difticul.ties, it

was thought expedient to have operational control vested in the

z <OJ
20th Fighter Group which had also established headquarters at Xo-

!lIB.ki Airlield.
o
...

Despite the Sei-Go Operation plan for the efficient use ot air �
..
..
OIl
de�ense strength the enemy continued to hurl greater and greater

nUI:lber of aircraft into raids on the Japanese mainland and the

s'trenc;'tl'l of the air defense units continued to decline . By 1 Au-

gust, sorties againot raiding ene!l1y planes had been virtually dis­

continued as the Air General Army sought to conserve its strength

for the Ketsu-To-Go Operations . In p reparation for the t1n&l all-

out defense of the Homeland, nev di spo s iti ons or air units vera

planned to /P. ve the Centr&l Se cto r e. better defense against enerq

invasion operations ( Map No. 9) .5

5 . �\e.p No . 9 vi11 be fowd to have mino r variances trom un1t

listings in Appendices III and IV at Japanese MOnograph Ro. 23.
Subject lists shov actual lmi t locations, vhile I-!ap No . 9 shows the
plann e d disposition �or the implelllentation at the Xetau-To-Go Oper-
ations .

1
126
111 1
1 27
 CHAPl'ER 4
'When the loIIl r ended, on 15 August 1945, the lith Air Diviaion
AIR DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN SH:TOR
b8.d been reduced to a strength at 182 plane s , at lIhich 52 were un-

dergoing repairs .
The Western Air Defense Sector of' Japan included all at Kyu­

shu, the western part of Honshu, southwe stern Shikoku and other

principal island groups adjacent to the I:'ain i slands . Origjoall.,.

cOinciding vith the area of the Western Di strict, when the mil.1'ta.r)­

districts of' Japan were changed in 1945, the air de fens e torce

still retained its original sector and was not l.1m1 ted to the re­

duced zone of' the Western !<1ilitary Di strict. The reason f'or the

retention of the sector concept w.s due parUy to the nature of' air

defense - it being im.possible to restrict planes in the air to the

precise boundaries which coni'ine the operetions of ground units -

and partly to the f'act that northe rn Kyushu, western Honshu and

southwe stern Shikoku were interdependent e.!ld considered as consti­

tuting one air defense zone . The importance attached to the Bungo

Channel by the Navy also strone;ly affected the e stabllshoent of' the

def'ense zone.

Organizetion of the 19th Ai r Brigade

The 19th Air Brigade was organi zed in June 1944 and was organic

to the 1st Air Ar::J.y although it 'Was under the Western A.r::Jy COIIII:IIUld.

tor air defense operetion s . Th e p ri..

"'lB. ry mis sion o f' th e newly tolU­

ed Brigade was the defen se of the stretegic industrial areas at

1
northern Kyushu. To accomplish this mission the 19th Air Brigade dives . Fev o f the 59th ReGilnent ' s pilots and only tour 01' the

was organized and located as shown below: plane s we re ca.pab1e of night combat operation s . :Because o f' engine
19th Air B ri gade Headquarters Ozuld Airfield trouble and other maintenance difricultiefl, only about seven or
( Cl:ldr : Fur\Jya)
• • • • • • • • • •

Maj . Cen.
eiGht of' the Regiment ' s planes vere operational.
Heac.quarters Re connai ssance Unit • • • Ozuk1 Airfield
Ope rational Planning
4th Air Regiment ) . . . . . . . . . • • Oz\lki Airfield
4th Ai rfield rattalion) The prima.:ry mi s sion of the 19th Air Brigade , the defense 01'

Re giment »
59th Air the industrial in s talla ti on:: in north ern KJ'U:.hu and particular�
248th
• • . • . • • • • Ashiya Airfield
Airfield Battalion
the hiehlY impo rtan t Ya'Wtl.tc I ron Work s , called for the dep10�nt
Evaluation of Personnel and »\uipme!!t
o£ all air strength over the
strat egic area . Fro!n thi s position,
The 19th Air Drieade Headquarters Reconnaissance Un1t lIaS e­
interceptor planes wotJ.d move
Ol'.J.y lim! ted distances to attack en-
quipped vith te:l Type-lOO Headquarters Recon:a.Ussance plaDes (Model
emy plan e s before they couJ.d ente r the vi tal target area . The con-
II) . Six of the ten plAnes vere operationc.l and two vere equipped
cept of dep10yinc air stren
gth to cover a limit ed area wns develop-
for night operations .
ed because of t...'le l1n>ited numbe
r of plane s avai1e.ble and because
The 4th Air RegiJaent posses:led the best trained pilots and bad
searcbll g.'lt coordination wo.s
neces sa.ry for night operations . '!'bere
the highest e sp ri t de corp s . Comprising the main strength at tbe
vere not suft1c1e�t sea.rchliGhts availa
ble for use outSide the stra-
Brigade , the Reg1::lent bad about 35 Type-2 Two-seat Fighters, �
tecic area..
wich 25 vere op e rat i onal . E1.ght 01' the 4th Regiment' a planes were
The assi ��ent of this restricted defen se area was a matter
imp roved model night fighte rs . Most ot the planes were equipped
of' great conc ern to the Brigade
as it was felt that it lim1ted o!)-
vith 2O -lllIIl cannon and 12 . 7-rom machine guns . Tva 01' the planes bad
portuniti es to i nte rc ept the enemy in other area s . The Westem
31-mm automatic cannon .
ANY Command was que rie d. regartn
ti E; the ac tion s of' air defense unit.
The 5 9th Ai r Ret;1ment wa s equipped vi th 2 5 Type-3 Fighters,
in the event enemy raids on nearby ta rge ts offered opportun1ties
but had. been usinc them tor only a short time and the pilots lIere
tor interception. The AnrJ.y COIld
lIIlD.n took no definite position but
not c omp e t.e ly fami liar ....-1 th them . Conside rable unexplained engine
appeared to :favor defenrling only the strategic industrial area 01'
trou'ole had. been eX"',t>erienced : Just after toke-otf' vapor locks tre-
however,
northern Kyushu. IAter orders revealed, that the ArrIr¥
quently developed and enu·nes
,...f vere inclined to stall e.tter steep

130
Coomand 1ncluded Nagasak1 as a strategic area and, when enemy a't­ a certain number of hits on friendl.y plAnes vouJ.d be a nomaJ. ope%'­

tacks actual.l.y started, the Brigade w.s frequentl7 called on to atiODA1 risk and that the fire power ot the ant1aircrai"t unite

de fend other c 1ties and airf1elda 10 the Westem District. should not be curtalled. In spite ot this recommendation, the an­

Af't.er a s s es sme nt aDd cons1deration or 1ts mi ssions aDd strength, t1aircraf't groups decided that 10 a..ll cases where triendly planes

the 19th Air Brigade detenuined that to be prepared for 1mmed1ate llI1gbt be exposed to Sro\md tire, all firing 'WOuld be hal.ted 10 ac­

ope rations , e.1l. 1ts air s trength 'Would bAve to be assigned to the cordance 'With the judgment ot local antia1rcraf't unit cnmma.nde rs .

des1gnated s tra te gi c area. Tllree operations vere established &Del Agreements on coordinated jo1ot combat aDd tra.1n1ng operations "be­

given code nar.le s : Ope rat10n ICarasu, ca.ll1ng for one ai r reg1.ment tveen searchl1ght wits and air reg1lllents vere also developed.

to cove r the entire areaj Operation Megane, 'Wlllch d1vided the stra­ Alert System

tegic area 1oto t'Wo zones, 'With the 4th Air Regiment providing CClll­ Four types ot operat10nal alerts vere established by the 19tb

bat patrols in the eastern half aDd the 59th Air Reg1:nent covering Ai r Brigade : 1) Yo1oe, during 'Wh1ch training would continue while

the vestern halfj and Operation Nika1, cal..l1ng for the 4th Air Re­ nonnal combat readines s \ill S ma1ota1oed; 2) Asaok1, during W1ch

giJ:lent to patrol at about 4, 000 meters vh1le the 59th patrolled at fuel aDd 8.IIlIuni
Iltion 'Were to be loaded on planes while the pilot.

so;nevhe.t belo'W that altitude . In all operat10ns, the defense ot me.de ready 10 the wa1tlog room; 3 ) Yofukashi, during which pUote

alt1tudes beloY 1, 000 mete rs was left to the aDtia1rcratt units, stood by their planes aDd preparations vere !!lade tor 1Jnmed1ate

aided by the barrage balloons moored around Kuklooumi Bay, Just starting ot engines and 4) Tetsuya, during vh1ch the pilots vould

north of yawata. be 10 their planes and the engines of one-third ot the aircraft

'With Ant1aircratt Unit. would be started. Announcement ot the alerts \I'Ould be telephoned
Cooperat1on

In jo1nt pl.a.nn1ns vith the ant1a1rcratt units, the 19th A1r to each regimental headquarters trom the operations room or Brigade

Brigade agreed to report the nu:nber, altitudes and take-ott time. headquarters.

or 1ts plane s . The Brigade also recOllle

lll nded that ant1a1rcraft, The Brigade commander and a..ll headquarters personnel, except

'Weapon s continue to fire at enemy planes during COlllbat operatioaa . medical and supply sect10ns, vere required to live at the headquar­

This suggestion was l:l3.de as a re sult of the Brigade ' s reel.1ng that ters. Uoder the Asaold. Alert all statf otficers and one-b&lt ot

132 133

1
 MAP NO. 10

the ()pel'Btiona personnel were to be present in the operations roaa.

Under the TetsU)'a Alert, the cOIIm8l1der and all operations personnel

were ordered to the operations room .

In order to speed transmission of air raid 1ntormation gathered.

by the Western � COGllJl6Od. and. to serve u liaison tor the Br1p4e,

seve ral staff' officers from operations and an element of' the Br1e1I4e

SiGMl Section were attached to the headquarter.s of the Arrrs::! COIIII!I8l1d .

Air ieJ.d War¢nS Net

Info:nna.tion a va i lable to the Western A:rr::ry COII\IlIBJld emanat.ed from

radar installations, regular m1lits.r,y and Civilian lookout posta and

a n\%llOer of special lookout posts wich were c omb ination radar ate-

tions and visual observation posta .

Radar In stallation.

Radar instaJ.l&t1ons 1"urn1 shing 1nto:nna.t1on to the Weatem ArtIq

COl!t!8.lld we re not confined to the physic:s.l l1m1 ta of the Westem 01.-

trlct. 'i'ype-:a scanner radar installations were located. at MosuJ,po

( Boshippo) on the i s land of CheJu-Do and at Tsuzu and H14akatsu 00

Tsush1ma Island. There were, in addition, a number of' 1nstal.laUona

in Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and nearby ielArld.s, including TamanQ\1rl.

in the Gate Islands . Type-A vertical bea..-u radar was installe4 at

the spec ial lOokout posts Yi thin the Western Di s tric t aa well as on

adjacent is lands and in Korea. (Map No. 10)

-==a -_ _ � ..
-()--_ TY _ _

135
 M A P NO. 1 1

Lookout posts
l.ookout posts manned 1»7
Wi tW.n the Weste m Distric't were 50
H O N S H U
unication with the neare st anQ
milltary personnel in direct cown
out POI't.
headquarte rs . A total. ot approximatel.y l50 civ1l.ian l.ook

headquarters, one ot which _I

were organ ized under seven area
10-

No. II and Tabl.e no . 4) . or the 50

cated in each prefecture (Map
manned by signal.
mil1 tarJ lookout post s, ten were special. posts

corp s
tion with
pe rsonnel WO combined the dutie s ot radar detec

Some 30 ot the posts , primarily mi

litary, vere
visual obse rvation .
i ds Illld island groups s urrounding
located on the many small slan

Kyushu.

Inte lligence from Units in China

l8 April l.942, llttle
FollovinS the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo on

activity insofar as 1t
information had been obtained on ene�y air

on the Japanese Homel.and. ID early

might perta in to furthe r raids

received that many 10ng-ranse bomb-

1944 , hoveve r, in fo r�ti on vas
being nown into China
ers, inc luding the newly developed B-29 , were

as, therefore, expected that i t woul.

d be on.J.y a
from Indi a. . It ..
.
..

short time be fo re the enCUIY woul

d be launching a'ttackl frca
air-

of' the China Expeditionary Army

were alert.­
!1e1d s in China . Units

ing lnf'onnation on en� boII1be

r tl1;bta
ed to the importance of pass

man . 15th Army and the 5th Air ArIq CIVILIAN

to the 'o1e st.em Army Comd
The
LOOKOUT POST
t be
incre ased their radar cove:roge of
the parts of China wic!l migh AREA
HEADQUARTERS
WESTERN ARMY
COMMAND

1 37
 Table Do. ..
Table No. 4 (Cont 'd)

li'taro(»\A PRErn:.'TU.RE
ARMY AND CIVILIAN LOClCOO'.r PamJ
UNDER WES'l'ERN ARMY COKWiD
C1vil1an Posts

Area Hq. - Fukuoka

NAGASAKI PREFi1:TtJRE
Onuta Kuroki ZendoJ i
Yanagava Sh1rosh1ma. Halt1
C1vi11an Poata
Fuku.sh1.ma Kurume Higo;yama
Akizuld. ImaJuku Genkai-sh1ma
Sasagur1
Area. Hq. - Nagasak1
Yamae Fukuma
Fukuyosb1 Kash1 1 Sone
Mogi Naga!
Ma.ebaru Sh1l.lQ. Kanda
Kasuaa Onura
KOf'uJ l Shiga-shima Yukuhash!
Ohama Seto
Sb1lllabara Sak1to
ArTIlY Post.s
Chij1_ Sonogi
Kechi (TSU8b1ma) Ha1ld
Ckinoshima Ke.m1m1nat.o Saigaw
Saee'bo Muts ure shima Akama Haeh1ya
Annl
Oshima Iizuka Soeda
Poata
OITA PREF�
Unzen Ik1tsuki
NO!IIo Ioj1Jna.
Area Hq. - Oi ta
Sakiyama (Ooto Islanda ) Izuhara. (Tsush1ma)
Mie
CI vi 11an Posts
Special Army Poat. Sotaro Tsurusa.k1 Tate1ch1
Shimonituzu Yuf'u1n Kak1saka
Tamanoura. ( Ooto Islands ) Ridak.atsu (Tsush1ma) Taketa Beppu Usa
M1 1 ra.ku ( Ooto Islands ) Tsusu (Tsush1ma) Mie Morl Nakatsu
Saek1 Hide. ZenkoJ1
SAGA PREFmrURE Tsukum1 111.11 Taketazu
Usuki Kitsuk1 Kunisak1
CIvilian Posta
Amy
- Sa.ga
Posts
Area Hq.
Hibur1ebillla Nagasald Saganoselt1
UreshiDo Kashima
Tara Mbukue Uch1J 1ma H1meJima
Arlta Imarl Kanazak1
Nar..a.baru Ki)'8llla Karatsu
SpecIal Army Posts
Ogawash1ma
Tsuruud saki
Army Posts

Taku Ouch!
Usbizu
Yobuko
 Table No. 4 (Cont' d) Table No . 4 (Cont 'd)

Kl.MAMOl'O PREFn:TURK KAOOSHIMA. P�

C1vi11an Posta Civilian Posts

Area Hq. - K\lIllBJIlOto Area Hq. - Kagosh.1.ma

Yeda.ke Mil'8.j1 Ueld Nap:tam1se.kl Sembi Takarabe

H1toyoshi 0gun1 CleJa& Anho Akune Sue;yoshi
Wa1tu Uto Nishinoomote Noda Iw.gaw
M1�
Tarald
Yunomae otsu E1 Hagash1ma. M!t.ts�
Gokasho Yanaga Yataush11"O Ibuauld. Ckuchl Mob1k1
Tomochi Arao H1nasu Makurazald. Miyanojo Sh1bush1
Nagasu Sasb1k1 K11re Kurtno KanOl'8.
MiDamata
Mi1'une
Takamerl Takase Chlran Mak1zono Kushira
Ta.niyam Kaj1k1 IzUlll1
Amy Post. IJu:1 n Shigetol!l1 SakuraJ1ma
Kush1kino Kokubu
yama p .Arano
Nagasu TakAs. Ar.JJY Posts

Kuchinoerabush1ma Anno Ka1monodake

IchinOGl1nato Hetsuka Nomam1sak1
ct vi11an Post.. Na.katanega Uchinoura Sato

Area Hq. - M1�zald Spec1al Amy Posts

Fukushima Kirlsh1ma 'l'sUDO Teuchl Kandnaka Sa t&-miaa.k1

Aburatsu Kobo.�shi JoUJa1tau Bono-misakl
Udo Aye. Nobeoka
I1no Takach1ho
Kitakata
MiY8konojo
Shiw.chi Bonjo
Sadow.ra SOUba
Aoidake
Takaharu Takanabe

Amy Posts

To1m1sakl

Spec tal Army Posta

Hososhial.
Aoshima

141
utilized as approach routes and nlso established a nWlber 01' l.ook-
out posts. Because of this excellent cooperation the Western A:raJy
CoIllrnand �s seldom surprised by nUda 1'rom U.S. bases in China.
Al.though the intelllgencc orig1nal.ly received was not compl.ete as
to types 01' planes and altitudes, it eventuall.:y improved and de­
l.
tailed inf'or.nation 'Wll.S received.
Training Program
ga1n1ng of' designated altitudes. In trial.s conducted from the Te­
tauya AJ.ert condition, the time required for the tirst tighter to
take ott nonnal.l.:y ranged tI'ODl t'olO to 1'1ve minutes and to reach an
altitude of' 1, 000 meters required 30 to 40 udnutes.
Tra.in1n8 w.s also extended to incl.ude the maintenance un1ta
of the airfiel.d battalions, with emphasis being l.aid on speeding
up fueling and servicing of pl.anes forced to land during combat

Special attention was given to conduct1nc a training pro� operations . It '\i8.S recognized that 'oIOrtdng under simulated combat
that 'oIOuld be pre.cticnl and realistic . Flexibility in making eom­ conditions 'oIOuld assist maintenance crews to achieve greater etti-
bat preparations was stressed by switching frequently from one t)'Pe ciency in read:yins planes to return to interception duties without
01' alert to another in practice drills . Systematic take-ott train- delay.

ing was er.1phasized throughout the entire training program. The Night Operations Tra1n.ing

attention of pilots was constantl.y directed to the importance ot Train1ng in night combat particularl.y stressed cooperation 01'
fl:y1ng tactics and accuracy in firing. It was recognized that the pilots and searchlight units, although trequent test 1'li�ta were
enemy planes had a speed advantage and this affected the tactical. also cade to train pilots in l.ocating strateE;ic areas under condi-
principles to be used - attacks 'oIOuld have to be made 1'rom in t'roDt tions of' complete blackout. As a guide for night pil.ots, red and
of' the ene:ny, preferably f'rom a higher altitude . Because ot their green lights were installed on the SUllllDit of lott. SarakUl'8, south ot
superior speed and maneuverability, Type-l.OO Headquarters Reconnais· Yawata.

sance planes 'Were senere.l.l.y used as targets in pursuit train1ng. Because of the proximity of Ashiya. Airtield to the strategiC

Time trials 'Were held in an effort to reduce the time bet\leeD defense area, night take-ofts and landinGs were conducted with a

the issuing of' orders and the actual. take-orr of plAnes and the :n1Jl1mum number ot beacons and warning lights in order not to tur-

nish a guide to enC1llY aircraft. M:dntenance units 'Were also train-

l.. See Japanese lI.onogra.ph No. 16, Air Operations in the Cb1na
A..
-ea, pages l.80 182, for the 5th Air Ann:y' s part in rel.a:y1ng in­
- ed to 'oIOrK with mini!num l.1ght1ne.
f'oraation •.
Navigation Aid Tra.1ning wuld be over the tarGet between 2300 and 2330 hours . Later a re­

In the basic t raining given pilot.s, special emphas1e .s placed vised est1l:late predicted the attack would be at 21too hours.

on in st rument fiying. The t.re.1.n1ng o� pilots tor the T)'pe-1OO Bead­ Intelligence Reports

quarters RecoDllB.i s sanc e plAnes and tliO-seat fi8htera stressed 1nBtruc_ Reports from the radar stations Ilnd 8pecl.aJ. lo okout posta pro­

tion and practice in radJ.o navil)ll.tion with the Chi T)'pe-l dJ.rection vided a steady flow of ini'onn.o.tion . At 2238 hours 0. radar installa-

riDden. tion in Korea reported interference but did not make positive Iden­

Maintenance of Morale
ti fication - due, pl�bably, to the fact that th e first fo rmations

the
The physical well-being or pilots unde rgoing t.raining was krlown
had entered radar !leld at extremely low alti tude s . Be twe en 2331
Special rations provided and a
0021
to be 01' crucial L�portance . were
a!1d hours, six reports were filed by the radar ins tal.l.ation at
liberal " time orr" polley ws establlshed. Provision 'WaS also made
Mosulpo on Cheju- Do . Special lookout posts also reported plAnes
for the entertnlnment and rel.e.xation ot pilots during tra1.n1n& peri.
heading east between 0015 and 0030 .
ods and tollowinc combat operatIons.
An inte rp retation of intelli �ence received indJ.c�ted that the
First Raid by China-Based U . S . Planes
enemy force had rendezvoused be tveen the islands of Tsushica and
Intelligence gathered by the China Expeditionary Army and re­
Cheju-Do. Although an almost full moon (23 . 9 days) was scheduled

the weather was hazy and infor�'I3.tlon on the alt1-

layed to the Western An.lY Co:.rmand indJ.cated that the enemy would
to rise at 0125,
soon start the e:{pected air attacks on the Japanese liJainl.and. At
tude of the enemy planes vas lacking. AlthoU{;h the attack was now
1530 hours on 15 June 1944, an alert wrnin8 'oI3.S i s s ue d tor the
expected at app roximately 0100 hours, in order to be prepared tor
Westenl District. Durine the afternoon and e vening, aevent.l re­
��y enemJ plnnes uhi ch midlt not have been detected by radar instal­

ports or enemy movements, received froa the China Expeditionary Az­

lations, an air raid warning was i ssued at 0024 hours . At 0027
my and the 5th Air Army, we re transmitted to the 19th Air Brigade.
hours, one sqUll.dron of the 4th Air Re�llent w.s ordered to take oU
JudginG from the course or the enemy plAne s i t was estimated that
and p�trol at an a.lti tude or 2 , 000 I:Ieters over the strategic de!enae
they vould attack the strategic industrial area or northern Kyushu.
area. Since the altitude of the ene;:IY planes had not yet been de-
From their average speed i t w s est1ma.ted that the first echel.oo
te nniRed, another squadron was dJ.rected to patrol between 2, 000 and

145
4, 000 meters . Deplo),!lIent of the entire 4th Regilllent vas cOII1ple ted The es tiuluted alti tude ot 2, 000 t.o 4, 00:0 me te rs had proved to

at 0100 hours . be correct and the planes ot the 4th Regime nt had been in a tavor-

The Attack able position for the !:1ttack . Tile effectivene s s ot the Brigade ' s

The first. enemy plane to cOille over the strategic area conducted training progl"Wll was demon s t rated by the calm and o rderly canne r in

a pre-attack reconno.issance at o.n alti tude of 2, 000 meters. Dur1na which the ope ration \l3.S conduc ted . The se factors combined to g1.ve

the reconnaissance period, the enelllY tonnatioo8 circled over Cbeju- the pilots greater confidence .

Do as well as the i slands of Tsush1ma and Dci . The actual attack The 59th Ai r Regiment vas not used in th i s first engagehlent

began at 0112 hours when several plane8 appeared over Yavata trom because its ba.se at Ashiya \las directly on the course ot the enelilY

the west and northweat . Approximately 30 enemy planes participated pla.'les and directly in front of t.'le stretegic defense area.

in the attack, with all fonnations followinG a.lmost identical. course

•• ! the e ngine s of the planes been started. in the blackout, the airfield

After attacking, the enemy withdrew tow.rd CbeJu-Do ..mere tomattona I would have been an easily ident i fied target . Although theoretical-

were re sume d and the planes tlew westvarcl. 1y, it vould have been possible to trans fer at least a part ot the

Losse s , 3uppOSedly confirmed, indicated that one B-24 and three 59th to Ozu.1d Ai rfi eld, prior to the attack, it ...·as feared that such

o the r unidentified plane s had been shot down and one B-11 and three a maneuve r Ill bht ",ell confuse operations - t!le 59th neve r having

3-24' s had been damaged . Unconfinned losses were claimed as one B- ;;orked vi th 4th Ai r Re gimen t in night tn!.ining. In ad.d.1tion, the

11, one B-24 and one unidentified plane also shot down . The wreck­ 59th Air Regiment st111 lacked confidence in i ts Type-3 Fighters.

age of two enemy aircraft ws :found ( one west ot WakalDatsu and the Assessment ot Results

other rive kilo.leters north of Orio ) the othe r two were reported In thi s first o.ction, it appeared tha.t the 19th Air Brigade

sh ot dO\l!l over the ocea.n. The only dD.::lllge suffered by planes ot had achieved an out standing success, having ,possibly dowed seven

the 4th Air Re{;iLlent ;re.s dam.a.ge to the left engine ot one t.wo-seat. planes and dwr.a.ged four, without suffering any los se8 . This tavor-

ti ghter ..mich was hit by enemy shells . able outcome also served to raise corale vithin th e Brigade and

The ac t i on lasted 2 hours and 39 minutes o.nd at 0500 hours the convinced the military autho rit i es that the planning and prepara-

ai r raid alann vas lifted, at 0535 all planes of the 19th Air Bri- tion tor air det'ense ilad been correctly handled. Mature consider-

gade were ordered to land. at10n and a mo re aearch1ng reviev, hovever, revealed that the ac-

lA?

1
-----
I
1:.100 bed. not. been quite as successtul. as it. bad. �irst. appeared. In power of the Type-2 Fighter was also too weak . Lack of radar-equip­

the final. analysis •. only two of the losses were poa1tively confirmed ped fighters meant that enemy planes had to be v1suaJ..l,y detected and

and reports 1'rotII. the China Expeditionar,y Army bore out the fact. that. those which did not C(MC wi thin rallge of the searchl..1 ghts were able

claimed losses were too high. With approximately 30 enemy planes to evade interceptors with eas e . I t wa s also concluded tha t the

involved in the attack. definitely establisbed losses of only two insufficient number of ai rfi elds had limited activities and bad. re­

planes constituted a loss ratio of less than ten per cent. It was stricted the numbe r of intercepting plane s thc.t c ould be used.

agreed that to take a real toll of enemy strength and materially Certain othe r defects. of which the command had long been cog­

lower bi s morale. more than half of the attackers would have to be ni zant, �erc also c learly apparent during this first air action.

shot dow . Actually. all that had been accomplished had been to Radar waruing de vi ces had been unable to deter.nne the altitudes or

somewhat hamper the enemy' s air activities . The enelllY had succeed­ app roachins p lane s . In addition. althoUGh the air raid wrn.1ns net

ed in performing a bombing mission and the 19th Air Brigade bad c.a.d worked satisfacto rily in this instance, it was apparent that a

fai led to protect the ta re;et or inflict cripplinc losses . more c cmplete network would have to be developed to furnish infor­

Defects in Defense mation on attAcks ....hich might be launched from southern bases . PlAne.

Chief among the les sons taught by this first air battle .. s '.'ith better altitude pcrforn�nce characte ristic s were also essential.

that the nu::lb er of planes capable of n1�t action was ent.irely in­ to the air defense operations .

adequate . The ene!ay bad used about three times a s Ll&llY plane. a. Reinforcement of the 19th Air Brigade

t..'le Brigade was able to mount. There were. in addition. a number T!:le !::a·uility of t.'le 19th Air Bri gade to mount sufficient num­

of other weaknesses brought out. The ene!lty planes could achieve bers of inte rc eptors "Was noted by the GDC which assigned the 16th

speeds of about 510 kiloUleters per hour as compared with a speed ot Air Bri gade and the 246th Air Reg1laent to the Western District aa

541 kilO!!Ieters for the Type-2 Two-seat Fighters of the 4th Air Re­ re inforcements .

gin:ent . This difference in capabilities made it difficult for pi­ The 16th Air BriB&del composed or the 51st and 52d Air Reg1-

lots to make conte.ct with the ene.:ty planes and shortened or entire­ ments , established hea.dquarte rs at Asllya. Airfield. The 51st Air

ly eliI:d.nated the possible firing time ,...hen contact was wade . Fire Re,;1ment, eC!.u1pped with Type- 4 Fighters. was aSSigned to the baae at

149

-
 MAP N O. 1 2

Ashiya . The 52d Air RcgLaent., also equipped with Type-4 �'1gbtera,

ws as signed to Dafu Airfiel.d. The mission given to the newly as-

signed Brleade was to int.ercept enemy plane s a.Plll"OO.ching the stra-

tegic area fro.a the ".rest.

The 246th Air Regilllent, equipped with T:fpe-2 Sinele- seat. F1ght-

ers, was assigned t.o Ozuki Ai rfield and charged with the direct

defense of the strategic area in cooperot1 on with the 4th and 59th

Air RegimenttJ . Subsequently, an element of the 246th was ordered

to Cmura Airfield to aid in the defense of the Nagasaki area ( Map

No. 12 ) .

Revi sion of Operational Plan

Wi th the 3.1J8Illenta tion of the strength of the 19th Air Brigade,

1 ts mi s sion 'o/8.S broadened to include interception of enemy planes

at short distances outside of the strategic area. A request was

s ubmitted to the Western Arm:! COIllId

Ilall for an inc rease in the number

of searchlights in the area west of the cnga Rive r as far as Ts1.l)'&-

zaki . The request being Granted, and the installations accompllsh-

ed, plans were 1lIlInediately pushed .for Joint. training wi th t�e nev-

ly e stabllshed searchliGht units to i!.'1prove night perfo:nnance ot

pilots operating in that. area.

Previous plannin g had called .for the 5th Air }Jury, in China,

to attack the enemy fonaations en route to Japan as vell as those

ret.urn1.ng after having made at.tacks . To assist in thi s phase, an ..

W E STERN DISTRICT
AIRFI ELDS

o 110

150 KIL.o:::t;r;R.

151

-
agreement was concluded concerning the exchange ot more precise in­ area wh1l.e one eneJay element headed northeast and struck at indus­

tormation between the air :force s in Japan and those in Ch1Da. The trial targets in northern Kyushu. other enemy planes were reported

5th Air Arm::! was to warn the 19th Air Brigade 01' approaching enemy as flying d1 rectly from the d1 rection of Tsush1ma, with the apparent

planes and the latter was to fwnish info rmati on to the 5th Air Ar­ intention of hitting northern Kyushu. Inasmuch as the planes d1d

my on routes, t1mes, types and nunbers 01' planes in returning tor­ not enter the area, it vas not knO\lIl if this maneuver was a ruse or

ma tions . Inf'on:IB.tion 'WO.s to be as complete as possible and Head­ whether they were d1 verted. Toe air raid warnIng was llfted at

quarters Re connai ssance planes 01' the Brigade were to pursue vith­ O�l and the alert at 0430 hours . Although the 19th Air Brigade had

dxawing enemy aircraft in order to :furni sh :f'ull.e st In!'onnation on deployed approximately twice the strengtb used on the 16 June, it
2
courses and altitudes. d1d not Succeed in engaging the enem:y.

Second Raid by Ch1na-lla.sed U . S . Planes Or.;;anization of the 12th Air Divisi on

Twenty-two days after the attack of 16 June, U . S . planes ap1D The build up in strength of the 19th Air Brigade required an

attacked the Western Di strict. fI'Oll1 ba ses in China. en thi s occasion, increase in COfolr.".and ele':1ents and in order to provide an organiza­

the 19th Air Brigade gathered advance in1'o rmation on the attacken tion adequate to the task, the Brigade vas inactivated and the 12th

in a similAr mann e r as on t.he first occasion . AIl alert warning vaa Air Division fonued. Orgm1zation was coapleted on 11 July 1944,

i ssued by the Western Army Courna.nd at 0011 hours on 8 July and an wi th the D1 viSion aSSigned to the GOC but remaining under the West.­

air raid warning at 0019. Planes 01' the 4th and 246th Air Regi­ ern Ar::.ty COr.l..-:l&Ild for operational control. The order ot bat.tle tor

ments , with the exception 01' the unit at Qnura Ai rfield, ere deplo;r­
.... the 12th Ai r Di vi si on showed the rolloving un! ts :

ed in a double layer over the strategic area. West or the a re a, in Hq. 12th Air Division:
( Cmdr : MaJ . Gen. F\J.nJya)
the d1rection of the enemy ' s approach, the 16th Air Brigade and the
4th Air RegL.tent - Type-2, Two-seat Fighters
5 9th Air Regiment 'Were similarly deployed. With a cloud density or
41th Air Re(!i:'1ent - Type-4 Fighters
10 and a ceiling of 400 meters in the neighborhood 01' Nagasek1 and
59th Air Ret,"i...I ent - Type-3 Fighters
Sasebo, the enel!ly launched a radar guided bocbing attack on that
7J.st Ai r ReGi.aent - Type-4 Fighters

2. rug., pages 182-4 tor 5th Air Arm::! operations.

152 153
 83d Indepe ndent - Type-1OO Headquarters return the 26th Air Bril3l:l.dc and the 246th Air Rebiment to thelr
Air Squadron
re-
ReconnaiSSWlce Pl.e.nes
spectl ve co,1\UUlds .
51st Ai r Sector COIIlId
IIBD
On 25 Se.l,'tember 1944, Mlj . Gen. Furu,ya was named ccxn:nanda.nt o t
4th Airfield Battallon
tee Hi tachl Army Air Sc hoo l and C.Ola:IJW'lU o f the Divi sion was assumed
64th Ai rfield Battalion
by Maj . Gen. M1yoshi .
65th Airfield Battalio.�
New De fense Measures
193d Ai rfield rattalion
Tl:e 12th Air :)ivi sion repe:l.ted.ly reque sted additional niGht­
194th Airfield Battali on

fi(jlters but the re duced :lirc raft !:'.3J'1 ufa.cturing potential ot the
235th Airfield Battalion

nation p reve nt e d ful.f12l:"cnt of the request . As a sUbstitute meas­

236th Ai rfield Battalion

\L.
'"e , a special tro.ininc proGram vo.s de velop e d to train and prepare
248th Airfield Batt:l.l.1on

headqua.rten pilots for night flyL-lg i n the regular righters . Pilots assicned
The 12th Air Division retained the Ozuki Ai rfield

Air Brigade
to ni c;..'1t fly:ins ni s s ions enti rely reversed t.1-J. eir day and niGht llte,
and the 16th and the 2 46th Air Reg1;nent remained attach­
sleepinG in 6rkened roo.�.s durinG the clay and wearing dark gls.sses
ed to the Division. The 47t.'1 Air ReciIl!ent \:as stationed at Ozuki
O� tee :ev oc c a si on s they �ere re�uired to venture out into day-
and the 71st at Bofu Ai rfield. Alt.'1ou.Yl both reg1lllents 'Were newly

fonned and \mderstreDGth, they we re oein� built up rapidly in 'both

li. :;..'1t. Tile "Mi" d •,..,...",
,,, ,W�
�
__" also use d t 0 silaI'l)en vi sual acuity and

pilot reaction. 3
pe rsonnel and equip:uent. The 51st Air Sector command wa s transter­
Thc increa5ed intensity of ene:ny air attacks revealed a criti­
red fro.ll Ozuki to the lta.zuke Airfield c.t Fukuoka in order to exer-

c l s� closer supervision over the airrield battalions on KYush� ce-l shor...a :e of pe rzonnel and equipment vhich the D1 vi s ion sout;ht

to re.;edy by reC].ue stin;:; teo;.p orary t:ransfer of reinforcing units.

Raids fI'Olol U . S . bo.ses in China. continued, following the same
Since this va s not possible, about tvo-thlrds of the Type-lOO Bead­
general. pattern of the first raids with l.arge-scale attacks begiD­

ning on 20 August. On a few occasions, dayt1.ll1e :nUds were tollowd quarvers Reconnai ss:l..'1ce plane s of the 83d Independent Ai r Squadron

by night attacks . Althouc;h enemy ro.ids were increasing in intensi­

3• J.L,e
" .d... .. u...
.... .. ..1 ""1..lC
. s "� 1uulated the centIUl nervous system and
decreased ra ti.:;uc . It vas si."Ji l3.r to the cOLllIle rcial st1Iilulant mar­
ty, 1mlned1ately a1'ter the action of 20 Aue;ust, lt was necessary to
keted in post- ....-:lr Japan 1.!..'1der the t:rs.de �lIe or "Phillpon. "

154
155
were diverted trom reconnaissance mi ssions to interceptor missiona, Raids :rroo. Marianas Bases

us1ng the Ta-Dan Bombing Technique. Sa1pan tell in July 1944, and tour months later, on 24 Novem­

To increase the speed and climbing abil1ty ot available planes, be r, U . S . planes launched the1r first reid on Japan t'l'Oll1 Marianas

pn1nt and all equip:nent, except armament and radio, vas removed . base s . Th e first raid was directed at Tokyo but i t 1oI8.S obvious tb&t

This stripping technique increased the average speed ot planes by Kyushu would also be a tuture target.

15 to 20 kilometers per hour. Organizational Changes

Summa ry of Attacks fl"Or.l China Baae . To meet �e new threat, a nUllber of organizational changes took

Raids by U . S . plane s based in China, which began on 16 JUDe place in the over-all air defense torces as well a s in the 12th Air

1944, continued until 6 January 1945 , when the enemy completed IIIOY­ Division. On 26 Dece:!l.ber 1944, ,the order of battle ot the 6th Air

ing its base of opcrn.t1ons to the Marianas. Attacks during the seven­ Army was announced and the 12th Air Division vas transt'erred tro.

month period were not as frequent as had been expected, bein8 apaeed the basic orQUlizatio:l of the GOC c.nd placed unde r the ne.... Air Army.

at interval.s ot one week to one month . The principal. targets ot the Operational control of the Division still re:Jained with the Western

ene.1IY bombers vere the Yawata Iron Wo rk s, in northern Kyushu, and Anny Cor.':'1and. The 12th Air Division aucmented it s starf' t.o provide

the Nagasaki dockyards . impro",ed l ia i s on ...1. til other headquarters and to 1uprove CO!l1lll8.nd au-

Mter the auo�entation ot the 19th Air Brigade and with the new pervision.

units assigned at the time of the tonnation ot the 12th Air Diviaion, Improvements in Q�erational Faci11ties

the strength ot the enemy 1018.6 not overwhelmincJ.y superior. Arter 20 DurinG ea rly 1945, t.he over-o.ll preparatory efforts ot the 12th
August 1944, dayt1::.e ra.1ds were nonnal1y conducted with about 100 Air Division ....ere devo�ed to il�lproving its operational f'acil1ties ao
planes, while approx��te1y 20 planes were generally employed in the
as to make it independent of' the Army Comme.nd and other outside agen­

night ra.1da . During the period trom 16 June 1944 to 6 January 19 45, cie s in the accompli shment of its defen se mi ssion. Steps were taken
there were tour occasions on which the detending torc .. shot dawn or
to improve the intellieence cOl;;:&lunications network, including the
damaged as many ns 20 of the raiders . Such 10llsell were not, hO\leTer,
installation of broedcast1:lS equ1p�ent to supple.�nt the vulnerable
considered to be sutt'1ciently destructive to materially attect the wire telephone servicel operated by the Co=uni cati ons Ministry.
enemy ' s operation Dince the average per raid 10s8 infl1cted vas les.

than ten per cent.

156 157
SpecIal ult.ra-high f'requency radio telephones were installed tor use the Bungo Chann el, vh1ch ceparates Kyushu from Shikoku. The per_

bet.ween Di vi sion and AJ."fJJY COIJIIJlaDd headquarte rs . A Speeial Intell1- to�ce of the radar instal.l.at1on at Ash1zurizak1, in southee.atern

gence Squadron ws orGUlized to intercept. enemy radio ccx:un.unicationa. Shikoku, was outstanding and enemy pos! tions vithin Its re.nge could

In spIte of the fact. t.bat it. \laS a dupl1ca t.Ion of' the ettorta be accurately detennined . Since the enemy frequent.ly Circled and

of other si�l unit.s, the Air Division Sic;nal Unit assI(;Oed a radio rendezvoused over the southern part of the Bungo Channel, there ....

c�lmunications sect.ion to each airfield to operat.e cocmun1cationa an excellent. chance of detecting the attackers, particularly a1nee

exclusively for the Division. To expedite tactical canrnand, the 01- flyUlg weather in that area was generally tavorable .

vision Headquarte rs Sienal Unit acted as a clearing station in col- The plan ca.lled for the deployment of interceptors along the

lectin£; inforlllO.tion fro::l radio intelligence detaclu:lent.s ot both the entire lenGth of t.�e enemy' s Bunge Channe l approach course to t01'\il

Air Divi sion and the Western Anro,y Con::nnd . The infor.JS.t1on gathered a cauntlet which the a.pproaching bomber fonnat1ons \/Ould. haft to

by the Si gna l Unit 'Was :nore spec ific than had hereto!'ore been avail- run. On 14 May 1945, the 56th Air Regiment, a component ot the llth

able and included types of attacking aircraft, size of formations Ai r Divi sion, w.s orde red to the Saeki Naval Ai rfield i n nortbe&s't­

and altitude s . ern Kyushu, to carry out the plann ed interceptions . thfortunately,

Yonago Airfield, in the northern part of western Honshu, &Del enemy pressure on the Central Sector increased at that time and the

Kaiundai Ai rfield, in southern Korea, were prepared for use !l.S re- 5 6th wes required to return to its parent orb&l1zation after about

one week of operations in the Bunge Chann

serve airfields by sto ckpiling fuel and ��un1tion and assigning a e l area . The 12th .Hr

;)ivision le.ckcd th.c strenGth to send a

signal teWll to each. replacel!lent unit and the op­

eration vas d1�continued.

Orde rs were i s sued to each reGiment to r-ove its operations , roaa

unde rground and to widely di sperse all fuel, a.::r:l\!ll i tion end aircratt Mill tar.! Di strict Reorg:ut1zEltlon

at each airfield. On 6 February 1945, the three mil1 tary districts ot Japan were

Bungo Channel Defense increased to 1'ive and vo.rious changes of boundaries were eftected.

Plans were c!B.de to establish an advance base in order to inter- In adc.;ttion, the ar..1Y cOfC.!ll!I.D ds were redesignated as area armies and

cept approaching Marianaz-based B-29 ' s along their no� route over the 12th Ai r Division came under the operational control ot the Six­

te enth Area Army. Although the new alic;nment of military di stricts

158
159
 the Westero Military Distric t Change in Enemy Tactics
removed the vestern tip of Honshu i':rClIil
Di strict, the air defense or In Mlrch 1945, the enCl.1,Y changed i ts tactics and instead at re­
and placed. it in the Centra l Millta ry

t..'1e vcstero point of Honshu and southvc stenl

Shikoku remained vith1n stricting itselt to bacbins industrial areas, began lov-level incen­

ued to be the re::l'0n:libill- diary attacks on the larsest cities. Selecti.ng areas \/here Japanese
the ��estern Air Defenc e Sector and contin
air def'enses vere .-eak, and choosing times wen interception vas dit'­
ty of the J.2th Air D1 visio n.

Chang� in Operational Pollcy ficult, the ene'�1Y attacked boldly, maltinG many daylif3ht raids troaa

' c defense area had above the clouds or durinS inclement veather.
Although the boundaries of tile 12th D1 vision In the lAtter part ot'

not changed, there ,no 0. significant chnnge in operational polley . March, wile continuing strikes a(.'a.inst the urban areas, the eneIQ'

E.!pMs is w.s shifted :<I"OIJ defend1n� the strate

Gic industrial area at initiated concentrated attncks on airfields throUGhout the Japanese

possible enerJY planes mainland and partic ularly

northero Kyushu to the shooting down of all in Kyushu.

be attacked. Whatever Although the industrial

whenever and vherev er they miGht logically areas \/ere no longer the sole targets

L1ethod that vould bring dovn enemy planes vould

be w:: ed. I f a pi­ they were not cow.pletely neglected and, as air raids increased in

e the enemy in aerial combat f'requency and intensity, targets of' all types \/ere heavily bc::IClbed.
lot poss e sse d ::u.Ci'1cient skill to engag
such tacti cs; if' be could not It ..as clear that the U . S . intended not only to destroy the Japa­
and shoot h1::1 dovn, he ....a.s to continue
he vas e�::pccted to carry out nese air facilities and industrial potential but also to break the
succeed in outfi ghtin g his ndversaries

suicide tacti cs to dovn th e ene:lY by crash

diving me thods . The key spirit ot the people .

" , ft
De stro y enemy pla.nes . Attacks on airfields had the affect of cbecking the 6th
to pilot s ' instructions and orders VolS, Air

Logistic Suppo rt of Suicide U11 ts Army' s mission of cooperating 1i1 th the navy in the defense ot au ­

n of the forthcoming caw. This phase of' enemy operations also added to the already
As preparations proGre ssed in a."lticipatio
ion w.s given an added respon­ beavy task ot the l.2tb Air Division as it be cao.e necessary s1:nul.­
<kina..a operati ons, the J.2th Air Divis
Units . The burden taneously
sibility : The billetins end supplying of TO-Go to defend the stratecic areas and pro�ct airfields in

of providing logis tiC support, inclu

dinG tile preparation and cain­ Kyusbu and vestern Honshu. To provide closer liais on vith the 6th

ion ' s operations and

tenance of airf'ields co=lplicated the Divis Ai r Arr:ry, the Dividon IIIOved its headquarters frcw Ozuk1 Airfield

rdened staN' .
plAc ed a heavy d.xain on 1 ts already overbu to Itazuke Airfield, near Fukuoka .

160 161.
 Commnd
n Changes Due to the increased t'requency of e
ngagement s with the enemy
and the
In April 1945, the GOC was replAced by the Firat and Sec<:m4 tremendous loss es of skilled pilo
ts, it b E!C8lJle
necessary to use pl-
General Am1es and the Air General Arrq was established. Althousb lots who were bare....,
' trained and COll1pletaly
�
inexperienced. Th
e T0-
the 12th Ai r Division wa s slated to come under the eOIIIIIIIUld ot the Go tklits were strengthened thro
ugh additional. recrui
ting programs
newly fomed Air Army, it ws decided to GlBke the necesBa17 cOlllm8oZl4 but even the hero ic effor
ts of these S uic Ide un1
ts were not enoueb
c he.DGes gradually, and the Division remained under the operational. to tum the tide of battle .

control o� the Sixteenth Area. Anny which, in tum, was now under the Underthe extreme pres sure of cons
tant and intense air
raida
Second General Artrty. the intelligence system, which had
been shoWing mark
ed improvement,
ed to rnak
On 18 May, tlaj . Gen. Mi yo shi was reassigned as commande r ot tbe becaoe confused and frequently faIl
. e accura te prediction.
20th Fighter Group IUld Maj . Gen . H1deji Habu replAced him as coavnend- o! probable enei:lY targets, partIcuJ.a.
" 'When spee
r'....,
d 'Was imperative.
er o� the 12th Ai r Division. The 12th Air Divi sion deterrn1ned to
exerc i se s t roD
ger control over
Air Defense Situation - June and July 1945 all air act ivi ty. Prior to thi s time, D:bri
s ion bas as sembled, a­
To counteract the overwhel.ming strength lIhich the enenl1' bad nalyzed and diSS eminated
all intelligence 1n:t'o
rmation to Its sub.
manifested in �rch and Ap ril , a plan for Joint action with the ordinate units . In addi t ion, it bad directe d
preparations for and
Navy ' s 5 th Air Fleet was developed. Unde r the planned Joint respoo­ assu:nption o� the alert status end has subsequently made
target as-
to
sibility, the Ai r Fleet would take the re spon sibi lity tor the air signments . The reGLaents vere permi tted
�,'
re � ft ... te
.... their own take-
defense of naval instal.l.a.tions and dockyards, particularly �ose 1a of!s and assi ;;n defense flight patte rns .
Under the new method or
Sasebo end Nagasak i . Army and Navy leade rs met at Ozuki Airt1e14 centralized control, Divis ion headqua rters not only continued to
on 27 M9.y, to conduct war gtlJIles to perfe ct the details ot the Jo1nt pertorm all. of Its previous functions but
added the di rec tIon ot
take -ort times and assi co:nent of flight
ope re t1ons plan . Proving feasible, the plan was adopted and placed patte rns.
In orde r to speed
the launching of tighter units,
in ope rati�n after 5 June 1945. the DiVi Sion 'WOuld
O rde r the take-
ott's ot the reg1.l:lents on the basi s
Fro.n this time until the end ot the \oI8.r, the difticulties ot of 1n1 t1ft�' repo
rts. As addition-
al. iDtormatlon became ava.1J.a.
the 12th Air Di vision and its personnel became increasInsl7 severe. ble the operatlons
room 'WOuld then di-
rect the tighters to prec Ise
defen se areas with
de f1n1te attack

163
instructions. F1ns.l. Days ot the War

Land-llnsed Fighter Attacks '!be atocn1c banb -"..as dropped

on H1ro sh1ma on 6 August
1945, b7
Hith the full of adnaw. in June 1945 , land-based fighters from a single pl.ane, and it was Lruaediately rea.l1zed that the passive
air
the be.se s newly e stablished by the enemy 'be� escorting the a1otack­ defense poll cy could no long
er continue . Regardless ot the ult1ma.
te
in!; B-29' s and other lighter bombers . This gree.Uy increased en� consequen ces , it was c lear tbat
not even a sinele B-29 coul
d be ig­
ai r power a.nd their 1'1Ghter planes outmIL'l'bere<i those of the 12th Air nored. Picked airc raft were
there af'te r a ss i cned patro
l miss iona
Divi sion. It became impo ssible to even make an effort to interc ept over the old stra tegi c area
of northe:nl Ky\u;hu when
ever there vas
and check the ever-increo.sing botnbing raids . The p rlocipe.l of poa1- a report ot an approaching enemy
bombe r.
tive action was cho.nced to a poli c y of st rength conservation in pre- This w.s the situation wen
the w.r ended on 15 August
1945 .
paration for the final de fe ns e of the Homeland against amphibioua

invasion attempts . Interception fli£;hts wuld be made otlly when the

odds ....ere clearly in favor of the defenders and the 12th Air Divi­

sion conduc te d interce�tions only against lerBe- seale bomber torma­

tions ",.-hich verc not accompanied by a large nu;;ibe r ot escort fight-

ers . Every effort \la S made to safe(,'Ua rd planes and supplie s Oft the

&round by use o f camou!'lage and. di spersion.

Releas e of the 6th Air Anny by t..�e COI'!lbined Fleet

In July, the 6th Air A:rr:iy vas releaaed troc. attachment to tM

COIIIbined Fleet and C3me under the direct cClC:ll&Zld ot the Air GeDenJ.

Army . The 12th Air Division was relee.sed fl'Olll the ope�t1OEal COIl-

1orol of the Sixteenth Area Ar&7 and ...... brought. under the o�c

&Ad operatioM1. control of the 6th Air A:raJ:;f. Frca this t1.IIe ,.tU

the end of' the war, the Ai r General. Army controlled all &1r detm..

actIvity.

164 165
Aeronautical. Department, Army : Aircraf't, Japanese (Cont'd)
2, 8 , 10 , 26, lIO Industr,y: 8, 65, 69,
83
Air Academy, Arr:J:t : 65 -7, 72, 155
108-10, 116, Losses : 69, 74
133- 4, 143- lota1ntenance : 17, 63, 91
4, 152 Night Fl ghters : 43, 69
Air Army Numbers : 2, 11, 37, 81,
1st : 8, 9, 31, 33-4, 78-80, 131
83-4, 123-5, 129 Perfonoance : 11-2, U,
2d: 38 63, 65Lll
5th : 136, 142m, 144, 150, 130, 1!f6
152 Supply : 8, 77, 123, 161.
6th : 28-9, 31, 39, 63, 69, Types : 11-2, 33-5, 37, '
71-2, 75-6, 81, 123-5, 65, 81, 112, 130,
151, 161, 164 1 49-50, 153
Air Bases Airc raft, u . s .
Japanese : See Ai rfields, Jap- B-11' s : 146
anese B-24' s : 146
U . s ., in China : 13� 142, 144, B-29' s : 13-7, 19, 22, 21
154, 156 35, 31, 39-41, l
on Iw Jima : 119, 124 60, 63, 65, 68-!
in Ml.rianas : 28, 124, 3, 18, 90, 94, �
156-8 108-9, lll, 113-
on Ckinawa : 119, 124, 111-9, 122, 124j
164 158, 164-5
on Sa1pan : 13, 19, 26, Carrier-based : 1, 3, 9,
lIO, 48, 72, 82, 119,
94, 113 Formations : 113-7
on T1nian : 13, 26, 48, Land-based : 2, 164
94 Losses : 69, 74, 146-8, J
Air Br1gade Air Counterattacks, Japanese
16th : 45, 149, 152, 154 -5 50, 69-70, 72, 82
17th : 9, 11, 34 Air De:t'ense
18th : 9, 11, 83-5 Concept : 1, 9
19th : 9, 11, 85, 129-33, 144, Hissions : 7, 14
146-50, 152-3, 156 Orsanizat1on : 6-8
23<1 : 85-6, 92, 120-3, 126 Pollcy : 1, 2, 75
lOOtb : 126 Air Defense Sectors
Aircraft Identification : 21, 42, Central : 83, 85, 96, 12l
49, 69, Kanto : 33, 36, 38-lIO, 45
115 61, 65, 75, 95-6,
Aircraft, Japanese Western : 129, 160
Fighters : 11-3, 15-6, 33, 38, Air D1vision
46, 63, 11, 81, 116, lOth : 10, 11, 13, 15, 31,
118, 124 31- 49, 59, 61, 63-
68-10, 72-82, 95,
 '\

Air Division (Coot ' d) Airf'1eld Conditions : 92 Airfields, Japaneee (Coot ' d) Air Regiments (Cont ' d)
11th : 10, 11, 13, 68, 74, Airfield Construction : 11, 62, Tateba,aeh1 : 36, 64 59th : 130-2, 147, 152-3
92
85-92, 94-6, lOS, 117, Togane : 36, 64 70th : 35, 38, 64, 79, 81
119-20, 122-6, 128, TokOl'OZA\I8. : 35-6, 47, 74 7lst : 153-4
Airfields, Japanese
Akeno : 92-3, 127
159 Utsunaniya : 36 101st : 126
10, 11, 15, 3�t 74, Ash1ya. : 143, 147, 149-50 Yacll1mata : 36, 64 103d : 126
llltb : 125
12th :
86, 153, 155-04 Botu: 150-1, 154 Yamato : 93, 125
13th : 75 Chotu : 35-6, 47-8, 64, 74 Yokaich1 : 92-3, 127 112th : 125
55th : 75 Ganno su: 35, 151 Yokoshiba : 69 21i-4th : 33-5, 37-8, 64, 69, 71,
Airfield ]3e.tta.l1ons G1f'u : 92 -3, 127 Yonaso : 4, 158 75-6, 79
Gene ral : 17, 47, 61, 64, 79, Hamamateu : 38, 92- 3, 121 Yura : 92-3, 127 246th : 83-5, 87, 125, 149-50,
110, 143 Hokoda : 45 Air Fighter Groupe 152, 154-5
47, 64, 79 20th : 125-6 Air Squadrons, Independent
3d : !mba : 35-6, 64, 74
4th : 130, 154 ltami : 92-3, 125, 127 30th : 75-6, 79 16th : 85, 108, 123
6th : 47, 64, 79 ltazulte : 151, 15 4, 161. Air Fleets : See Navy, Japanese 17th : 35, 37-9, 43, 64, 72,
64, 79 Kaiunda (Korea) : l58
Air General A:my: 21-2, 31-2, 75, 79
7th :
42d: 85 Kakocawa : 92-3 78-9, 81-2, 89, 121, 123-6, 82d : 108, 123
43d : 64, 79 KanaL1arubara : 64 162, 164 83d : 154-5
64th : 154 Kashiwa : 35-6, 47, 64 Ai r-Ground Padio Un1 ts : 19, 64, Air Test1ng Stations
65th : 154 Katori : 69 67, 79, 84, 88, 94- 5 Fussa : 36, 45
70th : 47 Kita1se : 92-3, 127 Air Patrols : 66-7, 108, 123, 132 Tru:n : 57, 59, 77
Kiyosu: 92-3, 126-7 Airplanes : See Airc� Air-to-Air Bombing :
1lst : 64
12d : 64 Kotu: 57 Air Raid Warning System : 20, 24, See Ta-!an Bomb1ng TechD1.que
116th : 64, 79 Komaki : 86, 92-3, 126-7 48-9, 78, 95 , 97, 134, 1 49, Air Training Amy:
l1!oth : 64, 79 Konoike : 69 153 See Tra1n1ng Arat:;t, Air
141st : 64, 79 Kumagaya : 36 Air Raid Warning Un1 ts : 10, 49 Air Training Divisions :
143d: 85 Matsudo : 35-6, 47, 5 7, 64, 69 Air Raids, by U.S. : 1, 2, 6, 8, See Training Divisions, Air
163d : . 85 Me.tsuyam& : 127 15, 19, 33, 37-9, 43, 46, 60, Akeno Ai rfield : 92-3, 127
164th : 64, 79 Matsuzak1 : 57, 59 63, 65-6, 69-70, 72-4, 78, 83, Akeno Air School :
165th : 64, 79 Milti : 92-3, 127 87-8, 94, 109-11, 113, 117, See Tre.1n1ng Schools
166th : 64, 79 Nar1masu: 35, 47, 64 124, 126, 132, 136, 1 45-8, Antiaircraf't : · 2, 6, 7, 10, ll,
169th : 64, 79 Nara : 93 152, 151�, 156, 161 22, 60-1, 77, 92,
l7Oth : 64, 79 Naruo : 93 Air Reg:fJ:1ents 110, 119, 132-3
175tb : 64, 79 N1tta : 64, 69, 72 4th : 130, 146-7, 153 Number ot Weapons : 2, 11
176tb : 64, 79 Qnura : 86, 150-1 5th : 125-6 Area Armies : See Amy, Area
193d : 154 Oshima : 36 18th : 35, 37, 39, 64, 79, 81 Army AeronautIcal Department :
232d : 79 Ozuki : 85, 147, 151, lS 4, 224 : 45 See Aeronautical Department,
233d : 79 161-2 234: 35, 37, 64, 79, 81 Army
234th : 79 Sagam1 : 36, 40, 45 28th : 38, 64, 12, 79 Army, Ai r : See Air Arrlr:!
235th : 154 Sano : 92-3, 127 47th : 35, 37, 64, 69, 7J., Army, Air General:
236tb : 15 4 SI:Wuoda : 59 75-6, 79, 153-4 See Air General Arm7
246th : 85 Shimadate : 36, 45, 64 51at : 45, 149 Axmy, Area
248th : 130, 154 Tachiari : 86, 151 52d : 45, 149-50 11th : 30, 122
Airfield Co:upaD1es Ta1sho : 87-9, 92-3, 120, 53d: 35, 37, 43, 57, 64, 67, 12th : 30, 80-1, 122
65th : 47, 79 123, 127 69, 72, 78-9, 81 13th : 30, 121-2
71st : 47, 79 Takamatsu: 127 55th : 85-7, 125 15th : 30, 121-2
72d : 47, 79 Tama : 36 5 6th : 85-6, 125, 159 16th : 30, 122, 159, 162, 164

170 1'11
 Centre.! District : See Diatrict
144, Central Mil1ta17 nLstrict:
See Milltal7 District
Formosa : 6 Centml. Se<ltor: See Air Detenae
Korea : 6 Sector
Kwantung : 35 CheJu-Do : 134, 14S-6
Northe rn : 6 China, infon::.at1on !rail Wl1t. in :
15th : 136 1, 25, 15, 8S, 136, 142, 152
32d : 6 China. Expeditionary A:raq:
J.rmy COIIII!ISlld Sc e Army
central : 5, 6, 81 10, 83-4, Cbof'u Airfield : 3S-6, 47-8, 64,
86-9, 94-5, 91, 120 74
!):!.stern : 5, 9, 10, 13, 33-4, C1vil1an Lookout Posta :
39, 57, 60, 65, 15, See Lookout Posts, C1Y1..l1aD
80, 95, li5 Combined P'l.eet : See BaY7, Jape-
Northe rn: 6 nese
Western : 5, 6, 9, 10, 129, C in C ot Defense :
134-1, 142, 144, See Defense Comr.:and, General
150, 152-3, 158, Ccmpanies : See Airfield Camp8D1ea
167 Call1nl.m.1cat1ona, interception ot :
A.rmy General 19, 4.3, 94, 158 ( See al.ao
First : 30-2, 19, 121-2, l.25, Special Intell1Bence Uc1ts )
162 Communica tiona, systeI:us : 20-1,
Second: 30-2, 19, 121-2, 162 49, 58, 60, 88, 126, lS 1
Ash1ya Airtield : 143, 141, 149- Cmsh-dive Tactics : lS-6
50 Defense C<xJ;-.-.and, Genere.!: 3, 5,
Atonic :Bomb :82, 165 6, 8-ll, 29, 31, 34, 39, 63,
Aviation Fuel : 14, 26, 40, 46, 76, 89, 153, lS1, 162
61, 158 Di strict
B-17, n-24, B-29 : See A1rcratt Centre.! : 3-5, 13, 23, 29, 38,
U. S . 63, 83, 93, 95-6,
Bad-weather tlying : 19 , 26-8, 72 109, 120-1
_
Tmining tor : 42, 4lj Easte rn : 3-5, 13, 23, 29, 33,
l3attallons : See Airfield Bat- 121
tallons Northern : 3, 4
Bof'u Airtield: 150-1, lS4 Western : 3-S, 29, 85, 1291 .
Bonin Islands : 3" 24-S, liS 132, 134, 136, 144,
Bo80 Peninsula : 68 73 14S;-Sl
Brigades : See Air Brigade s Divisions : See Air Divisions
Bungo Channel : 129, 158-9 Doolittle Raid : 8, 33, 83 f 136
carrier-Based Planes : Early "-laming l!etvork : 24, 60
See Aircrat't, U . S . East Coast !.t111 ta17 District:
Centre.! Air Defense Sector : Gee :·tLll tary District
See Air Defense Sector Eastern Army Cc'v'vneDli :
Centre.! Army Caumand : Sce Arr:r:I �
See Arm:.! CQIIId
IIIBll Eastern �tl.l1tIl.ry District-:
See m.lltary District
172
FiGhter Groups :
See Air Fighter Groups
Fonnosa : 3, 6, 86-7
FOn:lOS8 Anrr;r : See krmy, FoI'Ulosa
Fuel : See Aviation ;ruel
Fukuoka : 4, 30, 137, 151, 154,
161
Furuya, MaJ . Gen. : 155
Fussa. Air Testing Station : 36, 45
Ganno su Airfield : 35, 151
General Defense Cowrnnnd :
See Defense CO;lII!ID.Ild, General
Glf'u Air1'1eld : 92-3, 127
Goto Ialands : 134
Ro.bu, Hideji Maj . Gen . : 162
H1l.chijoj1ma. : 25, 12
Ha.klri I6dar Station : 68
EamnJaatsu Airfield : 38, 92-3,
121
HiGh altitude flying : 15, 26, 40-
1, 63, 63,
13
Training �or : 46
Hi roshima : 4, 30, 82, 9 7, 165
Hitachi Advanced Ftr. Tog. School :
See Training Schools
Hi tach! Air tl'l1 t : 40, 44
Hokkaido : 3, 6, 61
Hokoda Adv. Lt . Boluber ToG.
School : See Tmining Schools
Hokoda Airfield : 45
Honshu:
. 3, 29, 83, 120, 129,
l3 h- 5 , 137, 158, 160 - 1
Identification, of aircra1't :
See Aircra1't Identification
Imba Airtleld : 35-6, 64, 74
Imperial General lIeadquarters
( IGHQ) : 5, 9, 28, 31, 74, 121
Impe rial Pahce : 33
Independent Air Squadrons :
See Air Squadrons, Independent
Inspectorate General o� Arm:y
Aviatlon : 8, 10, 26, 28, 40
Instructors, p11ot : 1, 13-4, 45 ,
91
173
Intelligence : 20, 89, U�S,
152
( See also Special Intell1gence
Squadrons)
Interception Z<U.ssions : 14, 33
41, 57, 59, 63, 72, 74, 71, '
82, 131, 156-7, 160, 163- 4
Interception Tactics : 27-8, 13
InvaSion, plans to canbat : 9,
28, 39, 5 9, 80, 121, 126
Itallll. Airfield : 92-3, 125, 127
Itazuke Airfield : 151, 154, 161
Iw J1ma. : 38, 69, 96, li5, 119
124
(See also Air Bases, U.S. )
Izu IslAnds : 12, 115
Izu Peninsula : 83
Japan Sea : 4, 24, 30
Japanese Ai rcmft : See Aircrat't,
Japanese
Je t Fic;htcrs, Shusui : 6S
Kaiunda Airfield: 158
Kakoeawa Airfield : 92-3
Kakoec.wa Tmining thit :
See Tmining Uc1t.
Karo1Jr.aze : 15
Ka.na.:uarubara Airfield : 64
Kanda District (Tokyo) : 42
!{anto Air Defense Sector:
See Air De 1'ense Sector
Xanto Plain Area : 29, 33, 58, 76
Karaf'uto : 3, 6
KIlshiwa Airfield : 35-6, 41, 64
Katori Ai rfield : 69
Ka tsuura : 13
Kaw.be, Hasukaze General. : 78
Ketsu-Go Opemtion : 30-1, eo,
121-3
Ketsu-To-Go OpemtiOl1 : 80-1, l.26
IC1 Type Planes :
See Aircraft, Japanese
IC1i Peninsula : ll6
IC1 talse Airfield : 92-3, 127
IC1yosu Airtield: 92-3, 126-7
Kobe : 82, 95, 127
JCotu Airfield: 57
Kokura : 13
Komald Airfield : 66, 92-3, 126-
7 Na.eoya :
Kondo, Kanetosh1 Lt. Gen. : 61,
63, 15, TI, 80
Konoike Airfield: 69
Korea : 3, 6, 25, 75, 134-5, 145,
158
Korea A:nny : See Anrry, Korea
Ktmagaya Airfield: 36 Navy, Japanese : 2, 6, 7, 9, 2�,
KurU Islands : 3, 6, 25
Kwnt\mg A:rrny. : See ArrAy, Kwntung
JCyushu : 3, 13, 35, 48, 15, 8? t
90, 129-- 31, 134-7, 144,
153-4, 157-8, 160-1, 164
land-Based Planes : See Aircraft,
u.s.
Look out Posts
Civilla.n : 20-1, 49, 51-6, 96,
98-107, 136-41 167
Equipment : 20-1, 50
mll tary: 20-1, 49-56, 95-6,
98-107, 134, 136,
135-42, 145
Training of perso!Ulel : 21, 49
Rl.nchuria : 1, 35, 38
Maria.nas : 28-9, 72, 124, 156-8
( See also Air Bases, U . S . )
Maritime province s : 1
Matsuda Airfield : 35-6, 47, 57,
64, 69
Matsuyama Airfield : 127
l/.atauzaki Airfield : 57, 59
Milti Airfield : 92-3, 127
Milltary District
CentraJ. : 29 , 30, 120-1, 123,
125, 160
last Coast : 29, 30, 61, 120-
1, 123, 125
Eastern : 30, 61, 125
Northeastern : 29, 30, 61,
125
Weste rn : 30, 125, l29, 160
Mill tary Lookout Posta :
See Lookout Posts, !-t111tary
174
Miyoshl, Maj . Gen. : 155, 162 Pilot tra1n1ng : See Training, Sh1modate Airfield: 36, �5, 6J.
Nagasak1 : 86, 1)2, 137, 150-2, Pilots Sh.1ona:dsald Radar statioa:
156, 162 Pilots See �r Stations
30, 83, 85-6, 93, 97, Inexperienced : 15-6, 71, 130, S1beria : 1
116, 121, 127 163 South Pacific : I, 34
Narimaau Airfield : 35, �7, 64 Losses : 14, 71 163 Spec1al. Attack Un1ts : 14-6, 31,
Hara Airfield : Si3 Replacement : 14, 90, 163 39, 63, 61, 15-6, 80, 124, 160
Haruo Ai rf'leld : Si3 Plane s : See Aircraft Special Intelligence Squadrons :
Navigat10nal Aid Ul:l1ts : 19, 27, Provisional Uni 108, Secondary : 1St, 41-8, 72, 94, loa, 114-5,
42, 46-8, 64 13-4, 44- 5, 61, 91-2 158
Radar : 22-4, 49, 51, 60, 68, 73, Squadronn : See Air Squadrons
38, 69, 71, l25, TI, 94-7, 109, ll4, 134- Suicide tactics : See Spee 1Al
12Si, 161-2, 164 6, 145, 152 Attack th1t.8
Combined Fleet : 3J., 15, 12�, Radar Guide Uni105 : 59 Suz uka !-lolmtain Range : 86, 121
164 �dar Stat10ns Tachi-type Padar: 57, 5 9
5th Air Fleet : 162 Ashizuri !·tl.saki : ll4, 159 Tachiari Airfield : 86, 151
Na.vy, U . S . , Task Forces : 14, 28, Bonin Islands : ll5 Tachikava : 33, 36
46, 68-T�, 118 Hak1ri : 68, ll4 Ta- tan Bombing Technique : 16,
Night !lying : 19, 26-7, 37, 5 7, Iwo Jirna : 115 18, 26, 28, 38m, 43-4, 90,
SO, 13J., 143, 155, Izu I slands : 115 156
159 ODaezak1 : 114 Taisho Airfield : 81-9, 92-3,
Tra1n1ng tor : 4�t 1t8, 90 Sh.1onom1sak1 : 68, Si7, 114 120, 123, 127
Niish1ma : 47, 58, b4 Regiments : See Air F.eg1J:aents TD.kauatsu Airfield : 127
Nitta Ai rfield : 64, 69, 72 Reinforcement : Tal�i-type Radar : 57, 59
Northeastern Military District : See Provisional Units, Secondary Tam. Airfield : 36
Replacement tra1n1ng : Ta.:::a Amy Technical Research
See mlitary District,
Northeastern See Tra1ning, Pilots Station : 5 1, 59, TI
Northern Army : See ArrAy, Horthem Ryukyu Islands : 3, 25, 15 Task ::'orcc:s : See Navy, U.S.
Northern Arrn:y COIIIiId IaD : Sagami 1st Adv Air 'l'ng Ul:l1t : Tatebayashi Ai rfield : 36, �
See Aruly COIII,III8Jld Northem See TraininG tbltE< Testing Stations
Northern Di strict : Sagami Airfield : 36, 110, 45 Fussa ArrAy Ai r : 36, 45
See A1r Bases, U.S. Tama. A:r::J.y Air: 57, 59, n
See Dist.rict, Northem Sa1pan :
Ckinava. : 3J., 96, 161 Sano Airfield : 92-3, 127 Timan : See Air Base s, U.s.
(See also Air Ba ses, U.S.) Sasebo : 151-2, 162 Tosane Airfield : 36, 64
c:muro Airfield : 86, lSO-l Sato, Shoich1 lw'Aj . Gen. : 34 To-Go Ul:l1 ts : Sec Spec 1al Attack
Osaka : 30, 83, 85-6, 88-9, 93, Schools : See Training Schools Units
95, 97, 115, 121, 127 Sea. ot Japan : 4, 24, 30 Tojo, Hidek1 : 2
0sh1ma Ai rfield: 36 Secondary Provision/l.l Un1ts : See Tokorozaw. Airfield : 35-6, 47,
Oshima Island: 47, 58, 64 Provisional Un1ts , Second.&r7 74
Ozuki Airfield : 85t 147, lS1, Sel-Go Operation : 81, 125-6 Tokubetsu Koge1t! Ta1 :
154, 161-2 Bendai : 4, 30 See Special Attack Unit.8
Philippines Serviee Ulits, General : 17, 41, Tokyo : 4, 25-6, 30, 33, 36, lt2,
Transfers to : 26, 37, 87 91, 110, 158 ; 6-8, 63-4, 66-7, 72-4,
Suicide tact1cs in : lS, 39 Shikoku : 3, 6, 29, 83, 120, l29, 02, 116, 123, 157
Supplies tor : 110 134-5, 159-60 To-N1-Go Units :
Picket Boats : 24-5, 49, 59, 60, Sb1!!VV}a Airfield : 59 See Provisional UD1ts, Second­
71 ary
175
'l'ra1n1ng Arm:y, Air:28-9
Txa1n1ng Divisions : 91
Training, Pilots : 7, 8, 13-4, _19,
26-8, ljQ, 42-3,
46, 67, 7lf'n,
71-8, llO, 142-
4, 141, 155
Defense tactics : II
'l'ra1n1ng ProGram : �, 9O
Training Schools
Hi tach1 Adv Ftr : 44, 155
Hokoda Adv Lt Bomber : 45
K\.II:!ag!l.ya Ai r : ljQ
UtsWlomiya : II()
'!'raining Ul1ts : ljQ, 44-5, 64, 91
Tsushir..a : 134, 145-6, 152
Types of planes :
See Ai rc raft, Japanese
u . s . Air Bases :
See Air Bases, U.S .
U . S . Planes : See Aircraft, U . S .
U . S . S .R . : 1, 2
UtsunOI:liya Airt'1e1d : 36
UtsWlan1� Air School. :
See T2'a1n1ng Schools
SEP 111959
Volcano Islands : 6
War 1.u.n1stry: 3, 5 �
Western Air Detense Sector: f'."f1f.jv 1958
Japan ... Mono9fOph No. 1 19
See Air Defense Sector, Weatam
Western District :
See Diatrict, Westem
We s tern Milltary District:
See Milltary District, Westem
Western Sector: See Air Defense
Sector, Vestem
Ya.ch1.mata Airt'ie1d : See Airfielda
YWlI£I.to Ai rfield : See Airt1eld.a
Yawata : 13, 131-2, 143, 146, 151,
156
Yokaichi Airt'1e1d : See Airfi�ld8
Yokohama : 33, 36, 58
Yokoshiba Airfield : See Airf'1elda I
YOIUl(?;O Airfield : See Airf'1e1ds O UT L I N E OF OP E R AT I ONS
Yoshida, Kehach1ro MaJ . Gen. : 75
Yunl. Airfield : See Airf1elda P R I O R TO T E RM I N AT I ON O F WA R
Yunl. Air Training Ul1t :
See Tra1.n1.ng Ul1 ts
AND
A CT I V I T I E S CON N E CT E D W I TH THE C E S S AT I ON
OF HOST I L I T I E S
PREPARED BY
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION
HEADQUARTER� ARMY FORCES FAR EAST
DISTRIBUTED BY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1
176