Right to Bail

Teehankee vs. Rovira

Any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. But in order that
a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a
formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the bill of rights.

People vs. San Diego

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution is denied of such
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process. The court’s discretion to grant
bail should be considered in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.

Cortez vs. Catral

Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.

The right to bail can only be availed by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

Lavides vs. Court of Appeals

To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be
put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and
his right to bail.

US vs. Puruganan

The constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. However, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under custody of law, bail may be applied for and granted

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as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by
the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein.

Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals

An arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest, e.g., house arrest or, in case of the military
offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area. When
Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trial
court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined in a
hospital and could not obtain medical clearance to leave said hospital, Paderanga was by then
considered in the constructive custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail.

xxx

Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court
should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application. The lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of
the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence
on both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court
conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no
showing that, since then and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of
the conditions of his bail.

Go vs. Bangolan

A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but
likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace if the community from
dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice,
hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of discretion. The judge should have set the
petition for bail hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for fixing
the amount of bail, even if the Provincial Prosecutor would not interpose an objection to the
grant of bail.

People vs. Gako

When a bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion

of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it,
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guild of the accused when he did not even bother to hear
the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of the case simply
does not suffice.

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Marallag vs. Cloribel-Purungganan

The prosecution’s failure to submit evidence on the accused’s application for bail did not
justify the Judge’s act of granting bail to the accused without a hearing, because the established
rule is that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt of the
accused. A judge is in fact required to include in his or her granting or refusing bail a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, such order would be uncontrolled and
may be deemed capricious or whimsical.

Enrile vs. Salazar

The trial court should not be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, it should not be denied an opportunity to correct its error.
It makes no difference that then Judge issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Hence, the Court
reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must
be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence Enrile and the Panlilios are entitled to bail,
before final conviction, as a matter of right.

People vs. Donato

When the parties stipulated that “Petitioner Salas will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody over his person,” they simply meant that Salas will remain
in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished
from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall
of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, “to submit themselves to the court
having jurisdiction over their persons.”

xxx

Consequently, having agreed to remain in legal custody, Salas had unequivocally waived
his right to bail. The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is
a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

People vs. Fortes

If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted

by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would
not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong – which would have been sufficient
to deny bail even before conviction – it would have likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

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Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals

It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.

Xxx

Under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail
bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary.

Xxx

Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the accused may
be admitted to bail upon the court’s discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied
or bail previously granted shall be cancelled if the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5 is present.

“Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (5a)”

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Obosa vs. Court of Appeals

While the bail bond was granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval
of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the appeal had already been
perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction.

Xxx

While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of
the court, that discretion – particularly with respect to extending the bail – should be exercised
not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding
the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must attend
the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now
specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses
nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6
years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may
commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable likelihood that the
accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an
accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime.

Villasenor vs. Abano

The inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not make
the amount excessive. For, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or
none to turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would fall into the
category of excessive bail; and, he “would be entitled to be discharged on his own
recognizance.” So it is, that experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which
may be summarized as follows:

1. Ability of the accused to give bail;

2. Nature of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Health of the accused;
6. Character and strength of the evidence;
7. Probability of the accused appearing at trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds;
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

De la Camara vs. Enage

Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee
were found in the fundamental law.

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Almeda vs. Villaluz

The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a
cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole
purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there
should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the
government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction
only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature
of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.
And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily
belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and
insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.

Yap vs. Court of Appeals

Under the circumstances, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the
bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure
order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court
cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

Cabanero vs. Canon

The judge also imposed excessive bail. Under Department Circular 4, the 1996 Bail Bond
Guide for the National Prosecution Service for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the
property stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00, the bail recommended is
P24,000.00. Herein, the monetary value of the falcata trees cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail
of P30,000 is not proportionate to the amount stolen. When the law transgressed is elementary,
the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Antonio K. Cañon
was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00, to be taken from his retirement benefits in
view of his demise.

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who
is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon Manotoc to

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make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel.