Edmund Burke Political Obligation PDF

EDMUND BURKE ON POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
Author(s): HOWARD B. WHITE

Source: Social Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (MARCH 1950), pp. 106-127
Published by: The New School
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EDMUND BURKE ON POLITICAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE
BY HOWARD B. WHITE
W hen Edmund Burke tried to influence British policy with

regard to the American colonies, he refused to justify his own
suggestions by distinctions of right, asserting that of such distinc-
tions he hated the very sound. He referred instead to the happi-
ness of the American people before changes in the old colonial
policy had been introduced. "These are the arguments of states
and kingdoms," he added. "Leave the rest to the schools; there
only can they be discussed with safety." In this particular case,
it was traditional policy, Burke thought, that had made for
human happiness and a more recent policy that had led to oppres-
sion. But the distinction between the arguments of states and
kingdoms and the arguments of schools runs throughout his
speeches and letters. If we consider the two kinds of argument
together, quite apart from the immediate colonial problems dis-
cussed in the speech on American taxation, we may be able to
perceive Burke's special position regarding the relation between
political theory and practice. While Burke said on one occasion
that he never attacked "theory as such" but only "weak, errone-
ous, fallacious, unfinished, or imperfect theory," it is nevertheless
true that he made frequent implicit and explicit distinctions
between theory and practice. He stressed their different roles,
and therefore their different methods and requirements. It is
probably true that he did not attack "theory" as such, but he did
more than anyone else, I believe, to define the statesman's realm
of discretion, the area which theory, by definition, cannot enter.1
i Quotations are from Speech on American Taxation, in Edmund Burke, Works
(Boston 1866) vol. 2, p. 73, and Speech on a Motion for a Committee to Inquire into
EDMUND BURKE 107
Burke believed firmly in political

claimed a consistency in his long career
in principles, would have been hard to
it a part of his special contribution to p
to point out the very difficulty of app
danger of applying them too narrowly
suggestion that the realm of discretio
thinker may, in fact, serve to caution u
own principles too narrowly - for examp
nation of the French Revolution to more recent events, as some
writers have attempted to do. Burke would be the first to main-
tain that parallels are never exact.2
The existence of the realm of discretion is a problem of political
theory, but action in that realm is a problem of practice. To the
philosopher it is a contingent area and has long been recognized
as such. The very distinction between science and prudence
suggests the need for different qualities in knowledge and action.
Aristotle touched on the problem in numerous statements. "We
must be content then," he wrote, in speaking of such things
[ethics and politics] and from such data to draw also conclusions
merely general." As Aristotle saw it, the statesman must have
knowledge of details, and the deliberation of the statesman, con-
fined to and focused on that small corner of political life wherein
he must act, differs from the deliberation of the philosopher, who
the State of Representation of the Commons in Parliament, ibid., vol. 7, p. 97.

All subsequent citations of Burke's writings refer to this edition of the collected
works, unless otherwise indicated.
By "theory" in this discussion I mean the process of separating the pervasive in
politics from the unique and of devising rules for the pervasive. No judgment is
here implied as to whether the pervasive should include that which ought to
pervade or merely that which does. In much contemporary political science, which
uses the term "theory" somewhat more narrowly, this process is usually considered
a search for principles.
For several suggestions regarding the relation between theory and practice and
its importance to Burke, I am indebted to Dr. Leo Strauss, of the University of
Chicago, and to discussions of this problem with him.
2 See Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with respect to France, vol. 4, pp.
468-69.
io8 SOCIAL RESEARCH
considers the nature of the soul,

to particular objects.3
A recognition of the distinctive
has led to various criticisms of t
regard sufficiently the realm of
fully the systematic nature of Bu
it may be well to note the comm
were both knowers and doers. To what extent is their criticism
a discussion of the general limits of theory, and therefore of the

lines which mark the frontier between theory and practice, and
to what extent is it a criticism of particular theories for their
failure to perceive those lines?
Alexis de Tocqueville criticized the political philosophers of
eighteenth-century France for their remoteness from political life.
What was needed, he said, was not necessarily active participation
but at least some mingling of political writers and political men.
The complete absence of liberty, however, made the political
world invisible to the philosophes, and the result was a depend-
ence on "simple elementary rules drawn up in reason and natural
law" as a substitute for the much more complicated functions
"which ruled the society of their time." "Separated from politi-
cal practice by an almost infinite void," said de Tocqueville, "no
experience came to temper the ardor of their natures. Nothing
taught them the obstacles which actual facts imposed upon even
the most desirable reforms; they had no idea of the perils which
always accompany the most necessary revolutions." 4
The problem here is not whether de Tocqueville's arguments
are just. I am not convinced that they are.5 They imply certain
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 b 12 if., 1102 a 5-25; see also 1180 b 13 ff.,
1141 b 8-28. Compare Plato, Statesman, as a whole.
* De Tocqueville, L'Ancien régime et la révolution, Book III, Ch. 1, passim; quota-
tion from p. 207.
s The suggestion that discussion concentrated on "the origins of society, the
essential nature of government, the primordial rights of man" because of specific
political factors in eighteenth-century France requires explanation, for other writers
had the same preoccupations. John Locke did not live in eighteenth-century
France, but was as much concerned with these matters as Rousseau.
EDMUND BURKE 109
useful general observations: that the

may be oversimplified; that recomm
while political practice is necessarily
"philosophize on the origins of society
at a certain moment, with a tradition to bind it. But, while
general principles regarding the area of discretion may be inferred
from de Tocqueville's words, in substance his remarks are warn-
ings of the dangers to which political philosophy may, but need
not, expose itself. He himself did not suggest that limitations
imposed by a removal from political life were limitations on
political philosophy as such, but only that they limited the work
of certain political philosophers.
Francesco Guicciardini, like de Tocqueville a writer of con-
siderable political experience, criticized Machiavelli (without
naming him) in much the same way that de Tocqueville criticized
the philosophes. In this case, however, oversimplification is seen
as the result of too great a dependence on history: "It is fallacious
to judge by examples," wrote Guicciardini, "because if they are
not similar in all cases and for all purposes, they do not serve.
A variant, however small in any case, may cause an enormous
variation in the effect. And to discern these variants, when they
are small, requires a good and penetrating eye." And again,
"The affairs of the world cannot be judged by discourse, but must
be judged and resolved day by day." 6
Do Guicciardini's comments suggest a broader interest in the
rules of theory? It certainly seems that he placed limits on the
use of rules which theory, at least most modern theory, seeks to
construct not incidentally but as part of its principles. Guicciar-
dini suggests that theory is general, while practice is particular,
and particularized by the all-important factor of circumstance.
Yet even he was looking for rules, and he wrote of his own
Ricordi that "they are rules . . . but rules which will be written
«Guicciardini, Ricordi politici e civili, Nos. 117, 114; see also Nos. 6, 10, 155,
257» 336> 343» 393-
no SOCIAL RESEARCH
badly unless written in the bo

rules may also be used discreetly
Whereas in de Tocqueville, an
task of historical criticism, whi
is secondary or incidental, may
discussion of the problem of the
Edmund Burke the task of histo
present, is clearly secondary. Fo
ing and defining the realm of
only the fullness of Burke's con
the distinction between a primar
his discussion more fundamental than theirs. Burke felt that
knowledge and action must suffer alike if the realm of discretion

is invaded by "friendly forces" or even penetrated by neglect.
That which tends to make the two activities distinct may also
make them useful to one another. From his attack on the court
cabal in 1770 to his assault on the Directory of 1796-97, Burke
was absorbed by the problem of theory and practice. He was no
enemy of political thinking. The warning is an important one,
especially when we are speaking of the implicit limits of theory
itself. But by specifying the distinction between theory and
practice, Burke did more than recognize the realm of discretion.
He went far toward defining it. With his assistance we can make
a catalogue of theoretical limitations.
n
The intentions of political theory are comprehensive. Its stress,

as here understood, is a stress on principles. It cannot be too
narrowly applied to a particular situation. The prudent states-
man knows the general principles of politics, although he may
not understand them as well as the political philosopher. He is
not, however, guided too much by "general maxims." The
statesman must see the specific case. Burke himself was, he said,
"far from slighting" these general maxims when properly applied
7 Ibid., No. 257.
EDMUND BURKE 111
to the circumstances. The d

politicalsituation is not made
ciples but by meeting, with t
particular requirements of the
The distinction between th
be supplemented by another
"no very exalted opinion of
nor of any politics in which
from the execution." Plans,
council, demanded certain c
should generally be in the sea
plans might show "some degr
some want of knowledge of
ready for the plans. Readin
general, plans should not be p
circumstances."9 Burke consid
distance from authority pr
American Revolution and tha
of conflict restricted him dur
demand for an association, in
tion, helps to explain his dist
He liked the British Constitu
grew together. His critic, T
Britain had a Constitution at
tution "antecedent" to a go
stitution, in a sense that prec
»The passages quoted are from Ame
Sir Hercules Langrishe on the Subjec
p. 244. See also the statement, "I dar
of your affairs than at present I can c
Assembly, vol. 4, p. 43). Re discretion
a Regicide Peace, III, vol. 5, p. 430.
» Passages are quoted from Speech on
vol. 2, pp. 104-05, and Letter to a Mem
see also ibid., p. 43.
10 Paine, The Rights of Man, Part 2
York 1945), vol. 1, pp. 375, 382. See
Constitutionalism: Ancient and Mode
112 SOCIAL RESEARCH
something of a "paper government

plans and execution, while they may
likely to be originally divorced. S
necessity. It is always a risk. And t
bility; even when it is needed, th
of execution. The British Constitution, while recommended to
the French National Assembly, could not be, Burke thought, "a
model for . . . any people servilely to copy." And one who had
a knowledge of plans might not himself understand political
forces. No true judgment could be formed, he said, "from the
perusal of a piece of paper." n
It is true that Burke thought that there were fixed principles
of government. In so far as plans include fixed and general
principles, they too are fixed, but execution is fluid. The recon-
ciliation of knowledge and action may be a reconciliation of the
fixed and the fluid, as the stream has a bed which moves but
slowly with time, or the runner a track which he may wisely
follow. Burke was not a relativist. There are points, he asserted,
in which Nature does not change, "but they are few and obvious,
and belong rather to morals than to politics." In political prac-
tice on the contrary, there are "infinite modifications and com-
binations." 12 The best legislator, he thought, would fix only the
principle, and then leave it to its own operation. Theory is fixed,
practice is fluid; theory is original, practice avoids originality,
and, wherever possible, is instead corrective. Even consistency,
a philosophic virtue, is a doubtful political virtue. "Firmness is
a virtue only when it accompanies the most perfect wisdom,"
Burke said. "In truth, inconstancy is a sort of natural corrective
of folly and ignorance." 13 A contrast of which Burke was rather
fond is that between politics and morality on the one hand and
11 Quoted passages are from Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,

vol. 4, p. 47, and Letter to a Peer of Ireland, vol. 4, p. 219.
12 Policy of the Allies, vol. 4, pp. 468-69; see also Reflections on the Revolution
in France, vol. 3, p. 345.
is Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 440; see also
French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 456-57.
EDMUND BURKE 113
mathematics and metaphysics on the

difference, Burke acknowledges his ind
do not exhaust the significance of the c
distinction between fixity and fluidity, b
in morality, where Burke grants gener
broad and deep/* It is not so with th
matics." 14 Perhaps the most charmin
found in Letter to a Noble Lord, whe
no doubt of his Grace's readiness in all
arithmetic; but I shrewdly suspect that
theory of moral proportions, and has n
three in the arithmetic of policy and st
That rule of three is not, however, an
practice creates difficulties. And the
circumstance may differ greatly from th
Political events are complex, while theo
at least, Burke suggested. "In books,
men . . . " he complains. "They are w
14 The reference to Aristotle is in Conciliation, v
few places where the indebtedness, which must ha
acknowledged. For a discussion of that indebte
Kennedy, Principles of Burke's Political Philoso
Natural Law, Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Faculty of the
1949, and E. J. Payne, Burke's Select Works (Oxfor
The passage quoted is from Appeal from the
p. 81. See also French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 473-7
Unitarians, vol. 7, p. 41; Present Discontents, vol.
chean Ethics, I, Ch. 3. Contrast the remarks of
Papers, No. 31, Modern Library ed., pp. 188-89
Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes
pp. 136-38 and references therein. See also the r
sophic babbling" and "practical truth" in Lettre à
1948) p. 8, and Preface to the First Discourse. It
inconsistency between Burke's assertion that the
deep and his assertion that there are a few fixe
can be made." Exact definitions of the few fixed p
and application may be complex.
is Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, p. 178.
16 Machiavelli, Discourses, III, Ch. 9, and The Prin
114 SOCIAL RESEARCH
tion." 17 It is the deviation from the rule t

Further, the difficulties are difficulties of t
always considerable. Political practice, whe
the extremes of theory. Now Burke may
realized that theory may seek a mean while
an extreme. This implies no judgment o
advantages of either procedure. Rules d
from practice are subject to the same reservat
rules - the lines are broad and deep. In a
distinction between mean and extreme m
merely of that theory which does recomm
is a strong attack on the political philosop
particular and on the modern political phi
Thus the assertion that "abstract perfe
fault" and the statement that "mankind d
tically any speculative principle, either
freedom, as far as it will go, in argumen
contain implicit attacks on modern politica
that reaches back considerably further t
special opponent. Government enforced nei
exclusively. It tended to a middle. That mi
good. The deficiency of the natural rights
perfection. The doctrine of revolution,
doctrine of extreme medicine, and its pract
cation of extreme medicine from principl
require a less drastic cure.18 But there
17 Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 442; see also Fragm
the Laws against Popery in Ireland, vol. 6, p. 326.
18 Quoted passages are from Letter to the Sheriffs o
America (1777), vol. 2, p. 229 (almost the same phr
Revolution, vol. 3, p. 310) and from Conciliation, vo
tation to a middle is discussed in the Appeal, vol. 4
extreme medicine is discussed in French Revolution, v
be made of the question as to whether an emphasis o
same objections as those made by Burke to emphasi
while germane to the question of theory and practi
Burke than the other.
EDMUND BURKE 115
distinction between the theoretical ext
mean beyond the criticism of a particular
may provide, willingly or not, new conte
If the arguments of the schools, exciting
of day-to-day politics, stress sharp and irr
the presence of theory itself may becom
It may keep decisions from becoming p
may prevent decisions altogether. Even
posed extremes may result in a politics bu
nected truths/' which, Burke says, are to
is to theory. In politics, extremism, how
to be ruthless and irresponsible. If we ar
of mean and extreme in practice and theo
ment something more than a polemic agai
I think that Burke's position amounts no
of compromise but to a recommendation
sound practice, which may differ from, a
any theoretical extreme. If it is true that
or of political truth does have such dange
that any solution must lie not in the aban
in natural moderation.19
The natural rights thinkers were assailed by Burke not merely

for their extremism but for their abstrae tness. Their "abstract
perfection," he said, "is their practical defect/* Burke himself
was not concerned with the "abstract value of the voice of the
people." "Pure metaphysical abstraction" does not belong to

politics and "no rational man ever did govern himself by abstrac-
tions." Political practice does not traffic in the abstract.20
"You have theories enough of the rights of man," he wrote to
M. Dupont. "It is with man in the concrete you are to be con-
cerned." As with the polemic against extremes, there is more
18 Petition of the Unitarians, vol. 7, p. 42. See also Present Discontents, vol. ir
p. 476, and Letter to Rockingham, September 8, 1770, the latter in Letters, ed. by
Harold Laski, World's Classics ed.> p. 85.
20 French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 310; Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 436; Appeal,
vol. 4, pp. 80-81; Petition of the Unitarians, vol. 7, p. 41.
ii6 SOCIAL RESEARCH
here than a slur on the "right

believe, altogether consistent
important than measures, a view
the advocates of natural constitu
over, rises in importance when
This importance can be recognize
of statesmanship is a matter of
concrete than practice.21
The consistent doctrine of stat
found perhaps its strongest expr
for invention. He himself claim
to a Noble Lord and his claim can be shown to have been well-
founded. "Example/* he said, in Thoughts on the Causes of the

Present Discontents, "is the only argument of effect in civil life."
To consult "invention" rather than "experience," he said, in
speaking of American affairs, is "diametrically opposite to every
rule of reason and every principle of good sense established among
mankind." He condemned the French Revolution as a "revolu-
tion of innovation," and he urged his correspondent in Irish
affairs to "innovate as little as possible upon speculation,"22 when
there is no material inconvenience. In the Letter to a Noble
Lord, Burke distinguished between change and reform. He
regarded change as coming from new and different principles of
government, as inventive, dangerous, and resulting from a con-
fusion between theory and practice. Reform, on the contrary,
was healing and mediatorial. It did not therefore pass farther
out of experience than necessary.23
A question suggests itself. Is that experience to which Burke
21 Letter to M. Dupont, October 1789, World's Classics ed., p. 274. Compare
Present Discontents, vol. 1, pp. 436, 531; Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, p. 221;
Letter to Richard Shackeltún, August 15, 1770, World's Classics ed., p. 81; Letter
to Dupont, p. 275; French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 283. Contrast Francis Bacon, "Of
the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," in Essays (London 1939) p. 119.
22 Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, pp. 185-88; Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 499;
American Taxation, vol. 2, pp. 7-8; Letter to Chevalier de Rivarol, June 1, 1791,
World's Classics ed., p. 301; Letter to a Peer of Ireland, vol. 4, p. 237.
23 Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, p. 186.
EDMUND BURKE 117
refers personal experience? The experie

most political practice need not be pers
ence of the old rules and practices whi
the Chevalier de Rivarol. Ancient institutions, as in India, were
the product of cumulative experience. Burke's preference for
the British Constitution was based not only on a preference for
"great statesmen" over "warm and inexperienced enthusiasts'1
but also on a belief in the cumulative wisdom of the ages.24 It is
also true, however, that personal experience is recommended.
Burke considered it the best though not the only schooling for
the prudent statesman. He recommended "rather a large con-
verse with men and much intercourse in life than deep study
of books." The controversy over the importance of experience in
learning politics is an old and an important one. It falls a little
outside this discussion because it deals not so much with the
relation between theory and practice as with the question of the
best school for the statesman. But it is closely related in Burke's
thinking to his conception of invention and experience.25
Experience is a source of political education, and that source is
most reliable when it is personal. "The science of constructing
a commonwealth is an experimental science," he wrote. It is
"not to be taught a priori" The experience required for that
science is a long experience. Invention, on the other hand, is
not a virtue of practical politics and is of theoretical value only
when it is unpretentious. In other words, Burke doubted
whether discoveries in morality, or great political principles, could
be made. Without denying the importance of reason, he clearly
24 Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics ed., p. 300; French Revolution, vol. 3,

p. 252. Compare Impeachment of Warren Hastings, vol. 9, p. 382; Conciliation,
vol. 2, pp. 115-16.
25 The passage quoted is from Warren Hastings, vol. 9, p. 358. Compare French
Revolution, vol. 3, p. 284. A few of the discussions may be mentioned: Plato,
Republic, Books V-VII, passim, and Statesman, 259, 284; Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, 1102 a 5-25, 1141 b 17-21, 1180 b 35-1181 b 13, Book VII, passim, and
Politics, 1324 a 24-b 25; Cicero, De legibus, I 23, and De re publica, I 2; Bacon,
Advancement of Learning, Book I, World's Classics ed., pp. 11-18.
ii8 SOCIAL RESEARCH
wanted politics to distinguish its

tions were different.26
Nor is the problem of invention and experience confined to the

political value of cumulative and personal experience. The
inexperienced man is a danger to political life, not only because
the most fruitful source of political understanding is not yet open
to him, but also because novelty, which meets with a warm
response in men generally and appeals to their love of adventure,
is a grave temptation to the inexperienced. While all men have
this love of adventure, the impact of novel ideas is more likely
to be cushioned in the case of experienced statesmen.27
The spirit that admires concreteness, that finds experience a
strong asset to statesmanship, and that fears innovation in politics
might logically distinguish the plainness of the statesman from
the refinement of much political thinking. Since political think-
ing is designed to answer questions in a more refined manner
than common sense, some refinement may be presumed to be
virtuous in theory. Attention to overnice distinctions, however,
might bring about the collapse of government. Refined policy,
according to Burke, causes man to lose sight of the good objects
of government, and causes confusion. And refinement may even
be a "refinement in injustice," which Burke found in the "phi-
losophy of this enlightened age." 28
"Plain good intention," on the other hand, was a reasonably
reliable political criterion for Burke. In his work there is a
democratic element; indeed, in one respect he was more demo-
cratic than Rousseau. He had a horror of manipulated opinion,
but a profound regard for plain principles and practices in politi-
cal life. He thought the common people had a special function
in understanding those plain things. He was one political
26 French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 311, 345; American Taxation, vol. 2, p. 73;
Representation in Parliament, vol. 7, p. 97.
27 Appeal, vol. 4, p. 76.
28 French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 417. Compare Present Discontents, vol. 1, pp.
476, 489; Conciliation, vol. 2, p. 106; American Taxation, vol. 2, p. 68; Appeal,
vol. 4, p. 79. Contrast Letter to a Peer of Ireland, vol. 4, p. 226.
EDMUND BURKE 119
philosopher who implicitly repudiated
lative genius. The reasoning required fo
a "coarse texture," "rustic," "manly,"
these are words he liked. Burke, who
of the separation of powers, consider
political virtue, but the special virtue
Commons.29
Other distinctions may be added, although perhaps not all of

them are susceptible of general application. Theory may be
presumptuous, as Burke complained, while political practice may
be humble, but that is certainly not uniformly true. The union
of substantial violence and formal justice, which Burke attacked
roundly in the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, provides a clue
to another possible distinction, but it appears to be a distinction
that cannot apply to theory as such. The same can be said of the
distinction between the natural and the artificial.30 What seems
to go deeper is the suggestion that the aims of theory and practice
may differ. It is up to the philosopher and the statesman each to
follow his own way. It is, said Burke, the "business of the specu-
lative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is
the business of the politician ... to find out proper means."
That Burke nevertheless saw the two as closely related is clear
from the Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, in which
he holds Rousseau largely responsible for both the ends and the
means of the French Revolution. Moreover, the question of the
possibility of ends is implicit in all serious political thought
which is not Utopian in its intent. Although "theoretic and prac-
tical perfection may differ," as Burke asserted, practicality is
implied in serious discussions of perfection. In the sense, how-
ever, that no discussion of the perfect in politics can include a
comprehension of all the circumstances in which some improve-
29 Warren Hastings, vol. 11, p. 170. Compare Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol
(1777), vol. 2, p. 229; Conciliation, vol. 2, pp. 120, 154.
so Letter to Dupont, World's Classics ed., p. 278; Warren Hastings, vol. 9, p. 342;
Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics ed., p. 299.
12O SOCIAL RESEARCH
ment may be possible, while pol

circumstances, Burke's distincti
improvement appears to be a legit
These distinctions between gene
execution, fixity and fluidity, inv
on, were evidently posed by Burke
and practice in general. Some, a
general, whereas in others the gen
find. It is, however, the fact that
primary and the "axe-to-grind"
significance of Burke's contributio
saying, however, that these distin
political wisdom, independent of c
ship, which is never independent o
that such a statement depends on
teaching to eliminate the realm
political science may claim that it
will enable man to narrow the realm of discretion, to make the
frontier between theory and practice a receding line, like the
American frontier between civilization and wilderness. In
politics that is more than we know. Whether changed metho

will succeed in making for frontiers in the future is conjectu
and is likely to remain so until someone devises a chart of th
political unknown. Another problem, however, is raised by t
claim that certain types of political theory may narrow the re
of discretion. If we ask how far political philosophy as suc
theoretical - that is, antithetical to practice - and how far
nature as theoretical or practical might affect the pervasive ch
acter of the contrasts pointed out here, we pose a crucial quest
si Passages quoted are from Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 530, and Lette
Dupont, World's Classics ed., p. 277. The problem of ends and means may possi
be clarified by citing the comparison between moral virtue and prudence in Th
Aquinas: "A moral virtue is ordered to the . . . end of that virtue, whereas
prudence, which is in the reason, is ordered to things directed to that end" (Summa
Theologica I- II Q. 20, Art. 3, Reply Obj. 2; compare, however, ibid., Q. 66, Art. 3,
Reply Obj. 3).
EDMUND BURKE 121
I do not think that that can be answ

the fact that classical political philo
life directly"32 might possibly hav
could not abolish, the differences b
The distinction between general a
would seem to be valid in any cas
of formulating principles which
tingent area should serve as warnin
in
"Circumstances," Burke wrote, "give in reality to every politica

• principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect." Th
man who disregards circumstances is mad, he said, "metaphysi-
cally mad." He held that the "circumstances and habits of every
country" should "decide the form of government." 33 What are
the circumstances that give reality to political principles, an
independent of which, according to Burke, the best governmen
could not be adopted? Some statement of these may help u
further to identify the realm of discretion.
There is a relation to time, obviously a threefold relation. The
vantage point at which the statesman stands is not determined b
him alone. The heights he commands are sometimes no more than
knolls. The past has brought him where he is. Even if he knows
what can be seen from the highest peaks, he may have to legislat
for the "cities of the plain." Seldom is he dealing with govern-
ment at its inception and even then there is likely to be a past.
"Laws, like houses," Burke wrote, "lean on one another." The
repeal of a law, even a very undesirable law, poses problems which
could not have arisen at the time of its original adoption. Not
32 Leo Strauss, "On Classical Political Philosophy," in Social Research, vol. 12
(February 1945) p. 106.
33 French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 240; Petition of the Unitarians, vol. 7, p. 41;
Appeal, vol. 4, p. 109. Burke, while holding that the form of government must
vary with the circumstance, as the classical writers also held, never, so far as I
know, questioned the traditional principle of political philosophy that there could
be a best form.
122 SOCIAL RESEARCH
only does it lean on the other laws,

prima facie evidence in its favor.
Hastings trial, "we should pass ju
framed their laws and institutions
yesterday." The origin of these la
hand. History was useful, as Burke
experience and prudence, but the u
purpose of establishing constitution
ought to be a "sacred veil" over go
cussion of the state of nature inter
statesman began with the fact th
fruitless to wish it otherwise.84
Political continuity brought stability, and that stability gave the

statesman an opportunity to work. That same continuity brought
prejudice, but prejudice was not altogether bad. "Many of our
men of speculation," Burke said, "instead of exploding general
prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom
which prevails in them. . . . Prejudice renders a man's virtue his
habit, and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just preju-
dice, his duty becomes a part of his nature." 35
The dangers of this notion need not be stressed. The precau-
tions which the modern reader should adopt in interpreting Burke
are legion. We are dealing with his principles, not any special
politics. Moreover, the word "prejudice" may have to be
employed in a broader sense than some of us are accustomed to.
The contemporary political scientist is less likely to speak of preju-
dice, but he may use more indirect terms like "stereotypes" and
"symbols," and sometimes he will tell you that he wants to do
the manipulating before someone else does. The authors of the
34 Laws against Popery, vol. 6, p. 319; Warren Hastings, vol. 9, p. 382. Compare
French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 439-40; Warren Hastings, vol. 9, p. 401; Petition of
the Unitarians, vol. 7, p. 49; Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of
Parliaments, vol. 7, p. 71.
so French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 346-47. Compare Letter to William bmith,
vol. 6, p. 368; Letter to John Trevor, January 1791, World's Classics ed., p. 293;
Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics ed., p. 299.
EDMUND BURKE 123
Federalist Papers, more modestly, rec

udice be used in support of principle,
sarily be the one to use it.36 And B
writers, thought that prejudice could
The political circumstance is created
that binds the statesman, but the circumstance itself is of the
present. It is almost certainly unique in some way. There is a
pressure of moving events, an utgency of particularized action in
a fleeting historical panorama. The movement calls for a habit
of decisiveness. History may pass you by. The prudent statesman
understands the "tide in the affairs of men." He takes it "at the
flood."
A political act is part of a political whole. Acts must be judged

not in themselves but in their capacity to become parts of a
changing tradition, and "not in their immediate results but in
their ultimate." "The real effects of moral causes," wrote Burke,
"are not always immediate, but that which in the first instance is
prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation. And its
excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the
beginning." Political ideas also have a relation to the future, but
it is the relation to a particular, probable, and foreseeable future
that characterizes the statesman's work. Actions tend to become
habitual. Actions create precedents. Actions are not for a
. day. Dangers to the government must be defined by the cir-
cumstance. The British Constitution itself depended on a pre-
carious balance. What part to defend, what part to restrain?
That, in turn, depends on the danger. "The question," said
Burke, "is not which is more eligible, but which is more immi-
nent."37 Once the elements of government that make for its
continuity and stability are destroyed, they cannot readily be
restored. The course of the statesman is prejudicial to the future,
and, whether it will or no, government binds its successors. This
s« Hamilton or Madison, Federalist Papers, No. 49, Modern Library ed., p. 329.
37 French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 311; Present Discontents, vol. 1, p. 458. Compare
Substance of the Speech in the Debate on the Army Estimates, vol. 3, pp. 217-118.
i«4 SOCIAL RESEARCH
is Burke's reply to Paine - not so much in

a good part of his choleric response to the
of the French Revolution.38
There are other elements in political circumstance beside time.

There are emotional elements. The statesman ages quickly in an
atmosphere of perpetual concern. His charge is his care. Burke
himself might prefer the "cold neutrality of abstract justice," but
to the statesman that preference may at times be unreal. In one
of his more intemperate expressions, Burke said, "Nothing can
be more hard than the heart of a thorough-bred metaphysician." 3g
The danger of speculation was the danger of want of sympathy,
the danger of "hating vices too much and loving men too little." 40
This danger may lead to hypocrisy, but hypocrisy can be a
vice of either theory or practice. Concern, on the other hand,
is the atmosphere of the statesman. It is part of his risk. Should
concern deteriorate into despair, the risk is great indeed. "Specu-
lative despair is unpardonable when it is action that is required." 41
In political philosophy there is an element of safety. There is no
such safety in politics. The arguments of the schools, Burke
thought, may be protected, but only in the schools. The emo-
itons which the conscientious political man brings to his office
differ from the reflections of quiet work, and serious political
thinking is quiet work, the kind of work Arnold called "too great
for haste, too high for rivalry." 42
Circumstance is unavoidably complex. The personal factors,
the need for human attachments if politics is to be a going con-*
cern, the limits which the disposition of a people may impose, the
doubtful value of thorough consistency - all these were discussed
by Burke in his long political career. Political thinking may
a« Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, pp. 224-25. Compare Letter to William Smith,
vol. 6, p. 368; French Revolution, vol. 3, pp. 440-41.
3» Contrast Letter to a Noble Lord, vol. 5, p. 216, with Appeal, vol. 4, p. 63.
*o French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 458.
« Letter to the Duke of Richmond, September 26, 1775, World's Classics ed.,
p. 206. Compare Letters on a Regicide Peace, I, vol. 5, p. 240.
42 American Taxation, vol. 2, p. 73;- Representation in Parliament, vol. 7, p. 97.
EDMUND BURKE 125
recognize, as it usually does, that gover
always good. All the substantial corrupt
not be foreseen. We cannot tell when
detryannized by sheer human inefficie
may turn to arbitrariness. Political pow
buy more and sell more, or a stronger
and sell. Public opinion may decay with
writing. Political theory may tell us
act, or how it does act, but it can give
tions of democratic conduct. It cannot
single mistake. The infinite variety of
to its very nature.
The knowledge of the circumstance pre
knowledge of the principles. Politics ma
sible," as Bismarck called it, if the possi
The knowledge of the desirable may be
that the principles of politics were the p
that their texture was coarse. Yet sinc
that knowledge can become perverted,
Burke, these principles are not really so
The limitations of theory do not indic
the study of theory may help the pursui
not preclude such aid. Francis Bacon
relation between the two. Burke criticiz
said that "among advocates and lawyers
business and not grounded in books," ex
to be confined. The "empiric" politician
shock of unexpected circumstance. Burk
sloth, whereas Bacon pointed out that on
his mind accustomed to "perpetual moti
complained of too many plans, while Bac
ing taught the latitude of rules and p
his opponents of presumptuousness, but
*3 Compare Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics e

Member of the National Assembly, vol. 4, pp. 1-55
126 SOCIAL RESEARCH
was the politicians who "presum

learning." And in the Apology of
own ignorance of which he was aw
who in his presumptuousness was
wroth at the suggestion of it.44
Bacon need not be defended agai
Bacon. While there are difference
here is with the realm of discretion rather than the school of
statesmanship. This discussion is in no sense an attack upon the

life or the function of the political thinker or an attempt to con-
struct an inverted utopia of political practice. While it is certain
that Burke would have much less sympathy than Bacon with the
attempts of contemporary political science to narrow the realm
of discretion and hence to narrow also the possibilities for impru-
dence and caprice, the present study makes no pretensions to
deciding such a controversy. It can only repeat that in politics
there is at present a frontier between theory and practice; the
number of future frontiers is conjectural.45
As long as there is need for the discretion of the statesman,
there will be room for the virtue of the political life which is
called prudence or practical wisdom. Prudence is not caution,
as it may be in popular parlance, but a "reasoned and true state
of capacity to act with regard to human goods," according to
Aristotle.46 Prudence is intended to avoid the extremes of smart-
44 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Books I- II, World's Classics ed., pp. 11-18;
Plato, Aòoloey. 21 D 1-10.
45 Contrast Burke's statement, "We know that we have made no discoveries and
we think that no discoveries are to be made, in morality - nor in the great principles
of government, nor in the ideas of liberty" (French Revolution, vol. 3, p. 345) with
Bacon, De interpretation naturae prooemium, passim. Later agreement with
Bacon is, of course, widespread. Compare Federalist Papers, No. 9 (Hamilton),
Modern Library ed., p. 48; for contemporary statements, see C. £. Merriam,
Political Power, p. 33, and his article, "Physics and Politics," in American Political
Science Review, vol. 40 (June 1946) p. 446, with reference to the infancy of political
science.
46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 b 20-21. Among other general discussions,

see Plato, Republic, 428A-429A; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, passim;
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I- II Q. 57.
EDMUND BURKE 127
ness and timidity. "Prudence," wrote
first in rank of the virtues political a
director, regulator, the standard of them
A few warnings may be useful. Politica
compromise. Of course, there may be c
is when and where. There are higher
prudence." There is even a "false, r
prudence, that combination of knowled
appraisal of the circumstance, is rare, an
these rules, Burke said, were "rarely exa
Grave indeed is the responsibility of
stance Burke says: Good will is not e
enough, forthrightness is not enough,
In politics, it is necessary that what is r
the statute books and embodied in hum
of the statesman find their fulfillment in t
ship, in the triumph of justice and the
imprudent politician might better seek
licized privacy.49
The relation of the entire discussion
I think, clear. Its relation to political
Burke's rules of particularity, experience
prudence, may be good rules. They narr
tical thinker. But they do not simplify
it. They suggest that anyone who pon
may have an obligation to respect the r
can happen there may impose limits on
especially on the mode of expression of
course an opposite danger- the danger th
this realm may encourage a diversion o
principles to trivalities. But that is beyo
47 Appeal, vol. 4, p. 81. Compare Warren Hasti
Dupont, World's Classics ed., p. 277.
48 See American Taxation, vol. 2, pp. 62-64. Quo
Revolution, vol. 3, p. 243, and Letters on a Regicide
49 Present Discontents, vol. 1, pp. 526-27.

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EDMUND BURKE ON POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

Author(s): HOWARD B. WHITE

W hen Edmund Burke tried to influence British policy with

Burke believed firmly in political

the State of Representation of the Commons in Parliament, ibid., vol. 7, p. 97.

considers the nature of the soul,

a discussion of the general limits of theory, and therefore of the

useful general observations: that the

badly unless written in the bo

knowledge and action must suffer alike if the realm of discretion

The intentions of political theory are comprehensive. Its stress,

to the circumstances. The d

something of a "paper government

11 Quoted passages are from Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,

mathematics and metaphysics on the

tion." 17 It is the deviation from the rule t

The natural rights thinkers were assailed by Burke not merely

people." "Pure metaphysical abstraction" does not belong to

here than a slur on the "right

founded. "Example/* he said, in Thoughts on the Causes of the

refers personal experience? The experie

24 Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics ed., p. 300; French Revolution, vol. 3,

wanted politics to distinguish its

Nor is the problem of invention and experience confined to the

Other distinctions may be added, although perhaps not all of

ment may be possible, while pol

politics that is more than we know. Whether changed metho

I do not think that that can be answ

"Circumstances," Burke wrote, "give in reality to every politica

only does it lean on the other laws,

Political continuity brought stability, and that stability gave the

Federalist Papers, more modestly, rec

A political act is part of a political whole. Acts must be judged

is Burke's reply to Paine - not so much in

There are other elements in political circumstance beside time.

*3 Compare Letter to Rivarol, World's Classics e

was the politicians who "presum

statesmanship. This discussion is in no sense an attack upon the

46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 b 20-21. Among other general discussions,

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