Crim Pro Case Digests
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
Bail defined:
1. Enrile v. SB, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of
guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1)
upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail
the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over
70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.3
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which
the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
2. Paderanga v. CA, G.R. No. 115407, Aug. 28,
1995
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve
an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.10 As
bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty,
the same cannot be posted before custody over him has
been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful
arrest or voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has put it in a
case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an
accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan,
etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who had been charged
with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without
surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion
asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his
release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for
admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have
either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of
1
their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his
provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even
wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against
him as it is available to "all persons"15 where the offense is
bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or
limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the
custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue
of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule
112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.17 in this light, the
ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et
al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond."
Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital
recuperating from serious physical injuries which she
sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she
expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having
placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On
the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan
authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance
in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he
had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he
was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience
therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail
court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be
deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the
trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In
fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the
arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of
military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or
restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his
counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and
to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,
notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific
whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the
arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just
over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial
court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through
his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal
control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for
bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of
the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge
that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner
never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
Bail as a matter of right; discretion:
1. Cortes v Catral, A.M. RTJ-97-1387, Sept. 10,
1997
Bail is the security required by the court and given by the
accused to ensure that the accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the
charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the
accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him
to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment
prior to conviction.[13]
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of
each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure
the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable
enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail
should not be excessive. [14] Therefore, whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing
is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least
he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing
the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into
account a number of factors such as the applicants
character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or
whether he is a fugitive from justice.[15]
When a person is charged with an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a
matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court states: No person charged with a capital offense, or
2
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
action. Consequently, when the accused is charged with an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth
in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to
determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of
it, against the accused.
A summary hearing means such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to
try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.[16]
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder, without having conducted
any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated
in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them
as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges
cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too
frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on
bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably
expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of
the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.
2. Leviste v CA, G.R. No. 189122, Mar. 17, 2010
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody
of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance
before any court as may be required,[1] is the answer of the
criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be
done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been
proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between
arrest and final adjudication?[2] Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring
the accuseds presence at trial.[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless,
on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court
confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.[5] Even
if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however,
the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes
freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently
prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of
prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling
interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an
individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
crime serious enough to warrant prison time.[7] Other
recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending
appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from
potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.
[8] Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.[9]
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion
in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the
exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption
of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious,
such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and
only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in
fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise
consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate
review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the
accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be
3
more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of
conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which
will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
3. Lavides v CA, G.R. No. 129670, Feb. 1, 2000
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial
court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should
instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the
trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot
waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail
under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to
him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of
his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in
absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not
at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,
[9] (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes,[10] and (c) at the promulgation of sentence,
unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused
may appear by counsel or representative.[11] At such
stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza,
[12] in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the
accused has been arraigned.
Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay
the proceedings by absenting himself from the arraignment.
But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his
absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioners presence at
the arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in the
meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such
court strategy violates petitioners constitutional rights.
Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being
prosecuted, provides:
Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
__ Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child,[14] whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18
years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual
abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate, or group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a
child under the circumstances mentioned in Art. III, 5 of
R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The
offense is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the
Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or lascivious
conduct should be the subject of a separate information.
This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No.
7160, which provides:
[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period;
4. San Miguel v Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evi de nce of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, all persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
Records show that complainant was charged with violation
of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 which is
punishable by prision correccional. Following the provisions
of the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
Records show that the prosecutor's Motion to Cancel
Recommended Bail was very precise in its prayer, i.e., that
the allowance for bail granted to the accused to secure
his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest
dated May 10, 2001 be canceled as there is reasonable
4
ground to believe and all indications point to the probability If the penalty imposed by the trial
that accused is seriously considering flight from the court is imprisonment exceeding six
prosecution of the case. (6) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
As we opined in Andres v. Beltran,[12] it is a misconception upon a showing by the prosecution,
that when an accused is charged with the crime of murder, with notice to the accused, of the
he is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of murder is following or other similar
non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with circumstances:
an offense that carries with it the penalty
of reclusion perpetua x x x is discretionary on the part of the (a) That he is a recidivist,
trial court. In other words, accused is still entitled to bail but quasi-recidivist, or habitual
no longer "as a matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary delinquent, or has
and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence of committed the crime
guilt is not strong in order to grant bail. The prosecution is aggravated by the
accorded ample opportunity to present evidence because by circumstance of
the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the reiteration;
basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong.[13] (b) That he has
previously escaped from
As we held in Sy Guan v. Amparo,[14] where bail is a matter
legal confinement, evaded
of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted
sentence, or violated the
from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such
conditions of his bail
circumstance. The existence of a h i g h d e g r e e o f
without valid
probability that the defendant will abscond confers
justification;
upon the court no greater discretion than to increase
the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to
(c) That he committed the
assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted,
offense while under
such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision
probation, parole, or
that excessive bail shall not be required.[
conditional pardon;

(d) That the

5. Chua v CA, G.R. No. 140842, April 12, 2007
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[3] provides:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial
court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court,
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of
the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
circumstances of his
case indicate the
probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue
risk that he may
commit another crime
during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu
proprio or ON MOTION OF ANY PARTY,
review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.[4] (Underscoring
supplied)
It is clear from the last paragraph of the above provision
that private respondents appropriate remedy against the
trial courts May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail is
by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the
said order in the same regular appeal proceedings in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 he himself initiated. Such motion
is an incident in his appeal.[5] The filing of
a separate petition via a special civil action or special

5
proceeding questioning such adverse order before the requiring him to be present at the
appellate court is proscribed.[6] Such independent special promulgation of the decision. x x x.
civil action obviously contravenes the rule against multiplicity
In case the accused fails to appear at
of suits and constitutes forum shopping. Hence, the Court of
the scheduled date of promulgation of
Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondents petition
judgment despite notice, THE
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340. The basic rule is that
PROMULGATION SHALL BE MADE BY
such petition may only be availed of when there
RECORDING THE JUDGMENT IN THE
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
CRIMINAL DOCKET and serving him a
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7]
copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals granting respondents application for a
If the judgment is for conviction and
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
the failure of the accused to appear
of the trial courts Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft
was without justifiable cause, he
of any factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive
shall lose the remedies available in
writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear
these Rules against the judgment and
existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against
the court shall order his arrest. Within
which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
right.[8]
judgment, however, the accused may
The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be
surrender and file a motion for leave of
freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial courts
court to avail of these remedies. He shall
judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment
state the reasons for his absence at the
exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision
scheduled promulgation, and if he proves
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
that his absence was for a justifiable
maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e)
remedies within fifteen (15) days from
of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear
notice.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on . His
It bears stressing that the rule authorizing the promulgation
inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the
of judgment in absentia is intended to obviate the situation
condition of his bail that he shall appear before the court
in the past where the judicial process could be subverted by
whenever required by the latter or the Rules,[9] but
the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of
also showed the probability that he might flee or
judgment.[11] As mentioned earlier, the trial court should
commit another crime while released on bail.
have promulgated the judgment in absentia on . The
resetting the promulgation on is tantamount to condoning
At this point, we stress that when respondent did not appear
respondents act of making a mockery of our judicial process,
during the promulgation of judgment on despite notice, and
thereby defeating the avowed purpose of the Rule.
without offering any justification therefor, the trial
Since respondent has not shown any right to be protected,
court should have immediately promulgated its
the second requisite for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Decision. The promulgation of judgment in
injunction is obviously absent. As such, the Court of Appeals
absentia is mandatory pursuant to Section 6, Rule 120 of
clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
the same Rules, the relevant portions of which read:
assailed Resolution of granting the writ of preliminary
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The injunction. We held that the grant of the writ of preliminary
judgment is promulgated by reading it in injunction despite the absence of a clear legal right on the
the presence of the accused and any part of the applicant constitutes grave abuse of discretion
judge of the court in which it was amounting to lack of jurisdiction
rendered. However, if the conviction is for
a light offense, the judgment may be 6. Moslares v CA, G.R. No. 129744, June 26,
pronounced in the presence of his counsel 1998
or representative. When the judge is
absent or outside the province or city, the
While it is true that the right to present evidence
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk
may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that
of court.
petitioner had waived said right in this case. The
xxx postponement sought by petitioner and counsel appear to
be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive as borne
The proper clerk of court shall give notice
by the record of the case. The intention and the willingness
to the accused personally or through his
of petitioner to present evidence can be gleaned from the
bondsman or warden and counsel,

6
fact that he had already presented one witness and has
other witnesses ready for presentation, although this was
delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of the
petitioner and his counsel, petitioner's confinement at a
hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and
substitution of counsel.
The rights of an accused during trial are given
paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal
procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this
right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right
has been recognized and established in order to make sure
that justice is done to the accused.
Further, the constitution right of the accused to be
heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under
our system of government has the power to deprive him of
that right (People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515 [1982]).
It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of
the Court of Appeals had it ordered the trial court to reopen
the case for the reception of petitioner's evidence. Granting
that petitioner had sought a number of postponements,
the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he
should have been given his day in court. The grant of a
reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial
discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy
disposition of the case, but at the expense of a fundamental
right.
Hence, it was error for the trial court to have
proceeded with the promulgation of decision on the premise
that petitioner had waived his right to appear in court to
present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in
affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it
sustained a decision of the lower court rendered in violation
of the right of petitioner to due process. As enunciated in
the case of Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization
vs. Laguesma (254 SCRA 565 [1996]), the most basic tenet
of due process is the right to heard.
As regards the third assigned error, the Court of
Appeals held that the defense sought to be established by
petitioner would not, even if considered by the court,
exonerate him from his criminal liability under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. This disclaration seems to be no less
than, and is tantamount to, prejudging the nature of the
testimony of petitioner and his witnesses.
On the matter of bail, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion to post bail on the bail on the ground
that the decision of the lower court had become final
and executory, inasmuch as the petitioner's appeal has also
been denied.
The following provision of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, are
pertinent:
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right. - All persons in custody shall:
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua of life imprisonment, be admitted
to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary - Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to
continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond
during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail prebe cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated
the conditions of his bail without valid jurisdiction;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole or under conditional pardon
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the
adverse party.
Petitioner was not convicted of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment where
bail is not matter of right on the part of petitioner nor of
discretion on the part of the Court. Neither has he been
convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment of six to
twenty years where bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion and may be denied if any of the circumstances
aforementioned are present. Rather, petitioner was
convicted erroneously - it is to be hastily added - of offenses
punishable only by imprisonment of one year each. In this
light, petitioner's admission to bail becomes imperative and
7
indispensable, moreso because of petitioner's deteriorating
health.
The right to bail is a constitutional guaranty which
every person under legal custody may invoke, except those
qualified under the law. Petitioner does not fall under these
exceptions and must, therefore, be duly accorded such
right. Verily, it was patent error for the respondent Court of
Appeals to deny petitioner of said right.
7. Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599, Feb. 23,
2000
For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail
bond represents his only ticket to liberty, albeit provisional.
But the right to bail is not always a demandable right. In
certain instances, it is a matter of discretion. This discretion,
however, is not full and unfettered because the law and the
rules set the parameters for its proper exercise. Discretion
is, of course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave
nature would warrant intervention of this Court by way of
the special civil action for certiorari.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not under the
facts thereof petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of
right or on the discretion of the trial court. Assuming it is a
matter of discretion, whether or not the trial court in
denying bail committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the
accused except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
[7]
Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.- All persons
in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as prescribed
by law or this Rule.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.- Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period
to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but
not more than twenty (20) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense
while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused
or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
motion and with notice to the adverse party.
xxx
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.- No person
charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two
warnings from the Court of Appeals, petitioners had
remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled
to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise,
deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's
release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free.[8] Petitioners' Compliance and Motion, dated
February 08, 1999, came short of an unconditional
submission to respondent court's lawful order and to its
jurisdiction.
The trial court correctly denied petitioners' motion that they
be allowed provisional liberty after their conviction, under
8
their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they
were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94,
provides that:
xxx
The Court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period
to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.[9]
The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only
be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122)
and not during the entire period of appeal. This is
consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that
the bail "shall be effective upon approval and remain in
force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case
was originally filed in or appealed to it."[10] This
amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94
is a departure from the old rules which then provided that
bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the
case until its full determination, and thus even during the
period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the
accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail
bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman
is necessary. From the record, it appears that the
bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in
the trial court on January 06, 1987 for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the
same upon its expiration.[11] Obtaining the consent of the
bondsman was, thus, foreclosed.
Pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused
may be admitted to bail upon the court's discretion after
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However,
such bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be
cancelled if the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section
5 is present.[12]
From the records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to
bail. Firstly, petitioners violated the conditions of their bail.
Bail is defined as a security for the release of a person
conditioned upon his appearance before any court.[13] The
accused shall also appear before the proper court whenever
so required by the court or these Rules.[14] Petitioners' non-
appearance during the promulgation of the trial court's
decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason,
and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities
as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constitute violations of
the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that
petitioners failed to renew their expired bail bond,[15] as
shown by a Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO
Insurance Corporation, praying for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew
the same upon its expiration.[16]
The petitioners complain that they were not informed of the
date of promulgation of the decision of conviction in the trial
court and that their counsel of record abandoned them.
Even if we are to concede that these allegations are true,
petitioners still failed to surrender to the authorities despite
two orders to that effect by the Court of Appeals. Moreover,
petitioners had no cause to expect that their application for
bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely
because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a
notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending appeal
because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such
notice. It has been held that trial courts would be well
advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a
lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to
the appellate court's sound discretion.[17]
8. Obosa v CA, G.R. No. 114350, Jan. 16, 1997
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T.
Obosa, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder (a
capital offense)[1] for the ambush slaying of former
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer
and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, but who was convicted
only of two (2) counts of homicide by the trial court, may be
granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital
offense. The Regional Trial Court of Makati answered in the
affirmative but the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
the presence of any of which could preclude the grant of
bail are as follows:
"(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on
probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime."
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing
amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner for
two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted
to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail application to
the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the
circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e
9
above, which are present in petitioner's situation, would
have justified and warranted the denial of bail, except that a
retroactive application of the said circular in the instant case
is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of
petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by
Adm. Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause either.
In Quemuel vs. CA, et al.,[34] this Court held that the
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review
and this includes the penalty, which may be
increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted
for review, even factual questions may once more be
weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the
possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever
present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong,
as it had done so in this case, such determination subsists
even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since
such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether
to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on
whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted
of the charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after
conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion
of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to
extending the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but
with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in
view of upholding the majesty of the law and the
administration of justice. [35]
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is
best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No.
12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically
provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in
non-capital offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has
been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of six (6)
years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused
is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement
or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the
accused may commit another crime while his appeal is
pending) that point to a considerable likelihood that the
accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must
be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be
cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old
rules on bail (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm. Circular
12-94). Senator Vicente J. Francisco's[36] eloquent
explanation on why bail should be denied as a matter of
wise discretion after judgment of conviction reflects that
thinking, which remains valid up to now:
"The importance attached to conviction is due to the
underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it
is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After
a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error
in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment
is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than
before conviction. x x x"
In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of
right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital
offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital
crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding
applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal
may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged
and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still
subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave
the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than
the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate
court's sound discretion.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise
the degree of discretion and caution required under and
mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being
too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of
judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the
bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of
petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well
as his prior convictions.
Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be
commended for its vigilance, discretion and
steadfastness. In ruling against bail, it even scoured the
records and found that treachery attended the killing
thereby justifying its action. The trial court's literal
interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully debunked by
the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the rationale of
the applicable rules. Truly, law must be understood not by
"the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." Law
should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry but
always in context of pulsating social realities and specific
environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does
not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness
of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice." [39]
10