Bar Matter No.

553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-
7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy
and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so,
as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used
by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the
bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws
are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one
may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public
good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are
made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance,
not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered
to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken.
This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice
of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers
and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are
subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers
for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely
and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of
the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in
the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are
in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers
in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is
not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560
for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify
an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible
in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and)
by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect
in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But
this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer,
as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be
an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this
phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states
the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services
on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or
a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may
apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what
the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does
there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN
A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice
of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for
the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination
of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding
the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test
to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen
or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail
of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal
if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for,
and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is
not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by
statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from
the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in
the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be
its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines.
28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services
are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill
as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name,
the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered,
we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked
by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic,
Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

- v e r s u s - CORONA,
Complainant,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
Present:
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

CARPIO,

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on
their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services
instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821

Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other
canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting
cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of
Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition
would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice
in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent
or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community
from barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as
well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon
3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client
list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.
[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes,
cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may
not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his
entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of
his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the
Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress
and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in
the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.

So ordered.

Pacita Verzonilla vs Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua

AC 6655 – October 11, 2011

Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint[1] of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the payment of
correct taxes through the use of falsified documents.

Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed[2] was for a consideration of
P250,000 and appears to have been executed and signed by Lopes surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her
children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley
Mipanga. The second deed[3]was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have been executed by and
for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page
numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion.

Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were falsified. She contends that
her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center,
Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification[4]from said
hospital. The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that
Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after
being diagnosed of Substance Induced Psychosis and Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type.

Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of
their existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates[5] (CTCs) in her name and
in the names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them.
Complainant submits the affidavit[6] executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan,
on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the instance of Shirley and were paid without the
complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and
thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes
that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.

Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously
simulated deed of sale[7] dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and
Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only
sixteen years old and still single.

In his comment,[8] respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution. He claims that
the preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the following circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his house and
requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the
parties that the agreed purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property. Upon
finding that the registered owner is Lope Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos and knowing that Lope already
died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the names and personal circumstances of Lopes
surviving children. He asked where Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was
not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he
proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not
secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.

An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After
he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to
Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place
for them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet at the
house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same day.

Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad, complainant,
Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of
the document. Upon being informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined the
document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the
property for P1,000,000. The heirs answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and
its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original
and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.

Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the deed and
transfer of the title in her and her husbands name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid
including the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
which will then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are payable, he
replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be based on the zonal value or selling
price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also
have to be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley
asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is
the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if
there was already an agreement on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.

Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her co-vendors,
however, refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000 paid to them was already used by them to pay and
settle their other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but
Caridad insisted that another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only P250,000 so that they
need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes
based on the selling price stated in the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which
was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional
deed, however, irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home.

Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with the
reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the
parties plea.

In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and notarized
the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only P250,000. He used the same document number,
page number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second
deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.

Respondent denies complainants assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as
stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki
and Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.

As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under confinement at the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical certificate[9]stating that
Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is
one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the
annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that she is mentally or physically
incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the appointment of a guardian for her.

By Resolution[10] dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found
respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to defraud the
government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that
his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being commissioned
as a notary public for two years.

According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his actions. As a
notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it
was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful
nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document
that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he
completed the act by likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.

On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernandos report and
recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a transaction that
effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar
violation in the future will be dealt with severely.[12]

The above resolution is well taken.

By respondents own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the subject
deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public.

Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true consideration for the
transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they appeared before him for the
preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been moved by his
humane and compassionate disposition when he acceded to the parties plea that he prepare and notarize the
second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as
noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial
proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to
respondents contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede the first
deed.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint are
insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have
previously ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless
binding between the parties and their successors in interest.[13] Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she
and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of the subject deeds. In any event, the issues
of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in
the pending suit filed by the complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No.
2836-S).

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the
sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability
for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an
amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the
Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Xxxx

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed
lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing
such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does
not deserve considering its nature and purpose.

In Gonzales v. Ramos,[14] we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is:

By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to
authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his
hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents
to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and
delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.[15]

Moreover, while respondents duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.[16]Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for transactions similar to the
herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any
person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or

immoral; x x x x

In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal purpose. His
purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a member of the
legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent
should have been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any.[17] As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.[18]

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he gavethe
second document the same document number, page number and book number as the first:

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. x x x

xxxx

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him
a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s
of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

Xxxx

Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and book number
as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He
therefore knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his clients intention of concealing the actual
purchase price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.

Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the parties and hence
superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which
requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall
be given a number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned with the validity or efficacy
of the document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the
notarial register.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.[19] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Xxxx

In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories
was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two
years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said penalty was in
accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,[20]Serzo v. Flores,[21]Zaballero v. Montalvan[22] and Tabas v. Mangibin.[23]
The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[24]

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of
his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence,
and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.

With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year suspension imposed
in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply
with the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for
the purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at defiance of the
law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as
proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that
any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Josefina M. Anion vs Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana Jr.
AC 5098 - April 11, 2012

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the
lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from his client;[1] and (2) violating the prohibition on
representing conflicting interests.[2]

In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty.
Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late
common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently
filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of
Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from
her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale.
However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present
disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint
who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty.
Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and
thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil Case No.
B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and
information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale,
respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of
the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.

In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the
written consent of all parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such
written consent was secured by respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x x

xxx

Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the conflict of
interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the
attorneys duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues
for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with
which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as
a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3]

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.[4]

The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the
applicable laws and rules.[5] The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioners recommended
penalty.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a
resolution dated July 30, 2004.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner
and the IBP Board of Governors.

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all dealings and transactions with the client.[6] Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted
below:

Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.[7] The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated.[8] To be held accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in
one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
[9]

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given
case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same
time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that
same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.[10] [emphasis ours]

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of
the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The
records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and
executed in the complainants favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the property subject of the
Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the
complainants interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the
engagement from Zenaida Caete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by
his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded
the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of
Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he
also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a
property in which his legal services had been previously retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above
prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsanas failure to comply with the
requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and
to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that
although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the
property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not
disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete.[11] Moreover, the
records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the
administrative offense of representing conflicting interests.[12]

We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the
complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting
interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he
only answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the
complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a
violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the
complaint:

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover
lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant]
to execute the second sale[.]

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.[13] He also averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida
Caneja-Caete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which
she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex 4) to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably
between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the case in behalf of Mrs.
Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint
against her.[14]
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge
against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[15] These opportunities were all
afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.[17] This is all that we did in this
case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in
terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found
GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

Atty. Florita S. Linco vs Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal

AC 7241 - October 17, 2011

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco
(complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary
action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over
their property.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a
parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C
& D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.

Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a
deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial
acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly
personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on
July 29, 2003.3

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No.
259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance
with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack
of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the
donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.

Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of
Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street,
Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with
him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full
control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the
donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence
along with the witnesses.

However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his
notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of
donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that Atty.
Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation.
Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized
the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.

During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed of
donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not
the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.8

On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him and
signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the
parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet
a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.
Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty.
Linco personally came and appeared before me is false. This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's
Oath to obey the laws and do no falsehood.

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a
period of two (2) years.

On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-
2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying
complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require
complainant to file her comment.12

In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion for
reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent
violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned
for his infractions.

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.

RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already
dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he
knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized
the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize
the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on
guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged
need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act of
notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized.
In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and
appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30,
2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of
notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17
Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon
him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in
damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a
notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation
of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years
and suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same
penalty.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission
of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective
immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take
effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the
respondent.

[ A.C. No. 2427, May 08, 1992 ] 208 SCRA 517

ATTY. ONOFRE P. TEJADA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, RESPONDENT.

In a verified Complaint, dated 19 February 1992, Complainant charged Respondent with gross dishonesty
and malpractice. Respondent was then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, at Bangued.

In its Resolution of 22 July 1982, the Court resolved to docket said Complaint as an administrative case for
disbarment considering that the acts complained of were apparently committed by Respondent when he was still
a practicing lawyer, prior to his appointment to the Bench on 25 October 1975. Pursuant to the same Resolution,
the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Respondent ceased to become a member of the Judiciary when he was not re-appointed after the
reorganization effected by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Complaint charges that on 29 October 1973, Respondent prepared and notarized a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Rollo,
8) which bore the forged signature of the vendor, Vitaliano Quetulio, who died some eighteen (18) years before or on
15 August 1955 as shown in his Certificate of Death (Annex B; Rollo, 10). This fact could not but have been known by
Respondent who was the counsel of the widow of Vitaliano Quetulio, Felipa vda. de Quetulio, plaintiff in Civil Case No.
4743-II, as she testified to her husband's death when Respondent himself called her to
the witness stand in the said civil case (Rollo, 18-19). He is thus charged with being the author of the forgery or, at
the very least, having authorized the same as he had notarized the document himself.

It appears that the said forged Deed of Sale was discovered only when the Decision in said Civil Case No. 4743-
II was reversed by the Court of Appeals and the disputed parcels of land were ordered placed in the possession
of the defendants therein. As it turned out, however, said properties were already in the possession of one Fermin
Edra to whom they had been sold pending appeal by virtue of that same Deed of Sale supposedly signed by
Vitaliano Quetulio on 29 October 1973 and notarized by Respondent.

Complainant further alleges that, subsequently, Respondent signed as a witness (Rollo, 29) in a Deed of
Revocation and Acknowledgement of Ownership (Annex D, Rollo, 25) executed by the vendee, Fermin Edra, and
members of his family on 2 July 1977, which purportedly revoked the forged Deed of Sale. The Deed of Revocation
was alleged to have been likewise forged since Fermin Edra, the vendee, had died a month before or on 30 May
1977 as shown by his Certificate of Death (Annex E, Rollo, 26). The alleged forgery is once more being imputed to
the respondent, who had signed as a witness in the Deed.

To refute the accusations, Respondent, in his Comment and Answer dated 15 March 1982 (Rollo, 30) and letter dated
20 March 1982 (Rollo, 29), denied all the charges filed against him, contending that the alleged forged Deed of Sale,
the basis of the Complaint, "was totally revoked, cancelled and considered destroyed and of no effects" by the Deed of
Revocation and Acknowledgment. The revocation has, therefore, "forever waived and renounced any and all (their)
claims, interest, causes of actions of whatever nature which may arise from said document."

Respondent further claims that he had nothing to do with the questioned signature of Fermin Edra in the Deed
of Revocation and Acknowledgment of Ownership which was notarized, by Notary Public Eligio J. Rios. Thus,
any complaint regarding the forged signature should be directed against said Notary Public, he says.

On 9 November 1982, Complainant filed a Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw Complaint on the ground that "he
came to realize that his perception of facts was a mistake done in good faith," and that he was fully convinced
that he could not substantiate the charges he had made.

In an unverified Manifestation dated 10 January 1982 (should have been 1983), Respondent, in a complete turn-
about, alleged that sometime in 1973, Vitaliano Quetulio who was supposed to have died on 15 August 1955,
personally appeared before him, together with his supposed widow to acknowledge the due execution of the
assailed Deed of Sale. Respondent explained that Vitaliano Quetulio actually emigrated to the United States in
1936 and was unheard of until 1955. Consequently, Vitaliano's daughter presumed her father to have already died
and registered him as already dead on 16 August 1955, and even had a tomb constructed for him at the municipal
cemetery of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Thus, when Vitaliano reappeared sometime in 1973, already under a new identity
to enable him to re-marry and have his own family while in the United States, the entire province of Ilocos Norte
was surprised.

On 16 March 1989, the Court en banc forwarded the records of the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) pursuant to the new Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.

On 29 November 1990, after hearing, and notwithstanding the complainant's Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw
Complaint and the Respondent's Manifestation, the IBP, through its Board of Governors, passed a Resolution
recommending the suspension of the Respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. At said
hearing, Complainant did not appear although notified. Only Respondent showed up and submitted the case for
resolution without further investigation.

On 13 January 1992, Respondent filed a Memorandum reiterating the facts and circumstances he had previously
presented and contending that the aforementioned IBP Resolution "is also a concrete evidence of 'corruption and
abuse of discretion and authority'," similar to what majority of the members of the Board of Governors were
facing in Bar Matter No. 565.[1]

The Court rejects Respondent's submissions.

It has been sufficiently established that Vitaliano Quetulio died on 15 August 1955 as evidenced by the Certificate
of Death (Annex B, Complaint). He was then said to have been 71 years old. Respondent's tale that Vitaliano
had migrated to the United States in 1936 and was unheard from until 1955 by his daughter is a tall one, indeed.
For one, Respondent's Manifestation was unverified and unsubstantiated. For another, if at all true, his widow
would have been a more authoritative source of information.

It is evident then that Vitaliano could not have affixed his signature on the Deed of Sale dated 29 October 1973.
Other falsities are evident from that Deed. It recites that Vitaliano was single whereas in Civil Case No. 4743-II, his
widow, Felipa, on examination by Respondent himself, testified that Vitaliano was her husband who died some
fifteen (15) years before. Further, the Deed recited that title to the property was "absolute" when in truth and in fact
it was under litigation, which fact Respondent himself could not but have known as he was counsel in the civil
case involved.

The records also bear out that Fermin Edra, who is supposed to have executed the Deed of Revocation and
Acknowledgment, died on 30 May 1977. He could not, therefore, have affixed his signature on said Deed on 2 July
1977.

And while there is no direct proof of forgery by Respondent, the IBP has aptly observed:

"While there is not (sic) sufficient evidence to prove that respondent was the one who actually forged the
signatures of Vitaliano Quetulio in the Deed of Sale and of Fermin Edra in the Deed of Revocation and
Acknowledgment of Ownership, the evidence does prove that he notarized the former document fully cognizant
of the falsities therein, thereby making possible the transfer of the property to Fermin Edra. And the execution of
the Deed of Revocation and Acknowledgment of Ownership, rather than rectifying the effect of the said Deed of
Sale, only compounded respondent's misdeeds in view of his awareness that Fermin Edra was already dead
when he (respondent) signed as witness to the same."

Complainant's Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw Complaint hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this
nature can not be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same" (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of
Court).

We recall this Court's Resolution in Vda. de Guerrero v. Hernando (Adm. Case. No. 704, November 24, 1975, 68
SCRA 76), where we had previously found the Respondent guilty "as a notary in making it appear in the jurat of a
tenancy contract that affiant Tranquilino Bernardo exhibited to him a residence certificate when in fact he did not do
so." He was then

"severely censured for the falsehood which he had committed and at the same time x x x barred or disqualified
from acting as a notary public for a period of one year counted from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
He is warned that a more drastic punishment would be imposed on (sic) a repetition of the same anomaly."

The imposition of that severer penalty on respondent is now in order for the commission of a more blatant
anomaly. He has miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar (Bautista v.
Gonzales (Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, citing Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No.
1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638). His actuations amount to gross misconduct and dishonesty, in violation of his
lawyer's oath and the fundamental ethics of the profession (Merritt v. Cacanindin, Adm. Case No. 1422, October
27, 1983,125 SCRA 286).

WHEREFORE, respondent, Harold M. Hernando, is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS. SO ORDERED.

[ Administrative Case No. 377, April 29, 1966 ] 16 SCRA 623

CONCEPCION BOLIVAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ABELARDO SIMBOL Y MANUEL, RESPONDENT.

Disbarment proceedings on moral grounds. This Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. Complainant, the sole witness at said investigation, wound up her testimony on
September 4, 1959. Then followed several postponements of hearing. The last was on August 4, 1960.

There is a vacuum in the record as to what happened thereafter. But on October 28, 1963, the Solicitor General
filed his report stating, inter alia, that complainant made a sworn withdrawal and desistance. In view of the facts
found, however, he recommended that respondent be disciplined, and simultaneously filed the corresponding
complaint[1] asking for his suspension "for a period of at least five (5) years."

On October 31, 1963, the Clerk of this Court sent by registered mail to respondent, thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro, his
counsel of record, a letter, with a copy of the foregoing complaint, requiring answer thereto in 15 days.

On November 27, 1963, Castro wrote this Court:

"In connection with the transmittal letter dated October 31, 1963, addressed to Mr. Abelardo Simbol, c/o the
undersigned, * * * please be informed that since sometime in September or October, 1960, after Miss Concepcion
Bolivar and Atty. Abelardo Simbol had executed a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 01700 of the Juvenile
& Domestic Relations Court, the undersigned ceased to hear from Atty. A. Simbol. Notwithstanding this, upon
receiving your said letter of transmittal, I tried to set in touch with Atty. A. Simbol at 1877-A Tayuman Street, Tondo,
Manila, which is the address appearing in my files. I was, however, informed that Atty. A. Simbol reportedly resides
at 232 Maria Cristina Street, Dumaguete City.
 It is therefore, respectfully requested that copy of the complaint filed by the Hon. Solicitor General against Atty.
Abelardo Simbol in Adm. Case No. 377 be sent directly to said respondent at 232 Maria Cristina Street,
Dumaguete City, * * *."

On December 6, 1963, a copy of the complaint was sent by registered mail direct to Simbol at 232 Maria
Cristina St., Dumaguete City. It was returned to this Court with the notation on the envelope that said respondent
was no longer in that city.

At the hearing set by this Court for February 3, 1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty. Tomas Yumul for
complainant appeared. They submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for
respondent.

The problem that at once projects itself is: Can we proceed further on the face of the facts that: first, there is no
answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General; and, second, at the hearing before this Court neither respondent
nor counsel appeared? The controlling statute, Section 30, Rule 138, Rules of Court, reads:

"SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex
parte."

The pattern of behaviour pursued by respondent requires articulation. Complainant's testimony was completed
on September 4, 1959. Then followed a series of postponements: November 13, 1959; January 15, 1960;
February 24, 1960; April 4, 1960; May 9, 1960; July 1, 1960; August 4, 1960. In the interim, negotiations were had.
Result amicable settlement and complainant's withdrawal and desistance.

That respondent did not take the trouble to answer the Solicitor General's complaint is now unimportant. The
directive for him to answer was first served on his lawyer. Then it was sent to him personally at his address in
Dumaguete City; but the registered mail was unclaimed. Neither will he profit by non-appearance on the date of
hearing before this Court (February 3, 1964). Because, notice of hearing was sent to him at both his Manila and
Dumaguete addresses; and he did not bother to get it from the post-office. Even his two attorneys of record,
who received said notice, did not appear before this Court.

Respondent knew that the disbarment proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession was at
stake. He could ill-afford to just stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by
his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts, to the end that notices could reach him. In all these, he
failed. On the face of the environmental facts, respondent gave this Court ample reason to believe that he
purposely stayed away.

We, accordingly, hold that respondent has had full opportunity to defend himself, and that he has waived his
right to be heard.
In a previous case[2] this Court has had occasion to pass upon a similar question. There, respondent and
counsel, after a series of non-appearances and postponements at their behest, failed to finally appear before the
investigating fiscal in Pangasinan. The fiscal rendered the report on the merits finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending that disbarment charges be filed. The Solicitor General thereafter lodged a formal
complaint before this Court. Notices sent by this Court directing respondent to answer were all returned because
he could not be located at his given address, San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record was also
required to answer; instead, he asked that he be relieved as counsel for respondent. Counsel, however, appeared
in oral argument. This Court there held:

"The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in
this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had been filed or
pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a fair
trial. That he could not be located at his known address without making his whereabouts known implies that he had
chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense."

The next point that logically crops up is the weight to be accorded complainant's withdrawal and desistance,
made long after her testimony in full had been taken down at the Solicitor General's office. Reasons given: first,
they threshed out their differences, and, second, the irreconciliability of religious beliefs allegedly caused the
marriage plans to miscarry. The first is correct. The second is at war with the proven facts. Religious differences
never did mar the relations between the two. As the Solicitor General pointedly remarked, "It is unbelievable for a
Filipino woman to refuse to marry a man she had lived with for 3 or 4 years trusting in the man's promise to marry
on the ground of irreconcilable religious belief", else she "would not have complained if this were so". Indeed,
settlement of the case and the consequent withdrawal obviously were part of an overall plan calculated to purge
respondent from mischief and to insulate him from disciplinary action. To conform to this arrangement is to wink at
wrongdoing.
 This Court had heretofore ruled[3] that, "Any person may bring to this court's attention the misconduct of
any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the
facts proven so warrant". The power to discipline lawyers officers of court may not be cut short by a compound
of compromise and withdrawal of charges.[4]
The preliminaries out of the way, we now go to the core of the case. Here are the facts.[5]

Concepcion Bolivar was 27 years old at the time she took the stand. Her schooling ended in sixth grade. She
testified in Tagalog. She became acquainted with respondent in April, 1952. By December following, respondent
started to court her. Convinced by his promise to marry, she accepted him in February, 1953. By April 7, 1953, the
two lived as husband and wife. Respondent had been "telling his classmates" that she "was his wife". On April 22,
1957, they bore a child baptized Eduardo Bolivar Simbol.

Came November 12, 1957. The two separated. For, complainant learned from respondent's brother-in-law, one
Turing Mendoza, and others, that respondent married another girl, Lydia Lingat. Complainant investigated. At the
Iglesia ni Kristo and in the Local Civil Register of Angeles, Pampanga, her wrst fears were confirmed. Respondent
and Lydia Lingat were really married in Angeles on January 5, 1957.

When the two first met, respondent was a jobless first year law student. He remained jobless during his student days.
Since June, 1953, complainant helped respondent in his studies, gave him money to buy his books and to pay his
matriculation fees and for "other things he needed in his studies". At one point in her testimony complainant stated, "I
had been working nights (ang gabi ay ginagawang araw) and even on Sundays and then afterwards he made me suffer
all kinds of embarrassments and shame". Respondent became a member of the bar, and found work in a law office. Yet,
she continued giving him money. She gave respondent a total of around P8,000.00.

All along, respondent fed complainant with assurances that he would marry her. To ward off celebration of
marriage, respondent offered varied excuses. There was a time when they travelled to Angeles, Pampanga,
ostensibly to get married. The marriage was put off, so respondent gave complainant to understand, because there
was nobody to solemnize. And then, dangling a piece of paper, he told her that the license had already expired. In
early 1954, respondent told complainant "to wait until he finished his studies", anyway, they were "practically
husband and wife". Then he asked her to hold the marriage till after delivery, because "it was shameful to appear in
church" when she was "on the family way". The child was born, Now, marriage became conditioned on his securing
a job for he was ashamed as complainant "was spending for him". Came June of 1957.[6] Respondent informed
complainant that he secured a job as an assistant attorney in the Fernandez Law office and that he would start
earning money. Never running out of explanations, this time it was: "cases take long to finish, but as soon as he
earns thousands of pesos he was going to marry me". Again she agreed. When, on cross-examination, she was
queried why she accepted all the excuses inspite of the birth of the child, she answered: * * * because he told me
that now [that] we have a child I can no longer deceive you because the child is mere than a mere marriage".

These avowals notwithstanding, respondent turned around and married another. Adding insult to injury, he
concealed the fact of his marriage and continued to live with complainant for several more months until the
latter discovered the bitter truth. Even then, respondent had the temerity to deny his marriage and to appease
complainant with the palaver that "the woman was not his wife but the wife of his cousin".

In January of 1958, respondent kept asking complainant to live with him again because he was going to marry her
and "leave his wife"; that he "did not really love the girl he married". He also asked for money. This met with rebuff.
Respondent got angry and threatened her.

And now, to the appropriate action. We part with the premise that this Court has inherent jurisdiction to suspend or
disbar an attorney for sufficient cause.[7] On this point, the Solicitor General aptly observed.[8]

"Undoubtedly, respondent's actuations in making a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter"s discovery of his perfidy, are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the
bar. The fact that complainant has withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not wipe out the grievous
offense he had committed, making complainant and her child with him virtual outcasts of society. This, respondent
should not be allowed to do with impunity."

Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar".[9] He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court.[10]

In the light of the entire record, we vote to suspend respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel from the practice of
law for a period of five (5) years.[11]
 [ Adm. Case No. 1371, Dec 29, 1978 ] 87 SCRA 309
JOSE A. ARFAPO v. ATTY. TEODORO V. NANO +

In this administrative case, respondent Teodoro V. Nano, Sr. is charged with having prepared a deed of sale of a
portion of a 15-hectare land with improvements without the knowledge and participation of the vendors, the
Spouses Jose A. Arfapo and Concepcion Mapalinta, and deliberately altering the consideration of the deed of sale
from P6,000.00 as agreed upon by the parties to P5,500.00, making it appear that the remaining balance of the
consideration, after paying the agreed down payment of P1,500.00, was P4,000.00 instead of P4,500.00, and
with having appropriated for himself the amount of P500.00 allegedly intended by the parties for the payment of
the realty taxes in arrears.

In his answer dated November 25, 1974, respondent vehemently and vigorously denied the charge of malpractice
against him. In defense, he alleged that on December 5, 1972, upon prior agreement, the spouses-vendors Jose A.
Arfapo and Concepcion Mapalinta and spouses-vendees Newton Nano and Hildegarda Ibañez went to his law
office for the purpose of signing the deed of sale of the spouses-vendors' land in favor of spouses-vendees; that
the price of the land was already previously agreed upon by the parties at P5,500.00 with down payment of
P1,500.00 leaving a balance of P4,000.00 payable after vendees-spouses shall have contracted with a loan from
any bank after the title of the land is transferred to vendees; that taxes were never discussed by the contracting
parties including respondent herein that complainant allegedly assured the respondent and vendees-spouses that
he had no arrears in realty taxes over the land subject of the sale, that there were no encumbrances over the land,
and that no other person was claiming any portion of the land or improvements thereof; that it was complainant
who suggested the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale instead of a contract with mortgage to guarantee the
payment of the remaining balance of P4,000.00 as complainant allegedly stated that it was not necessary because
he had complete confidence in the vendees-spouses; that the contracting parties went to respondent's law office
and voluntarily signed the contract of sale and promissory note without raising any objection thereto; that he
discovered that complainant had not been paying the annual realty taxes of the subject land from 1969 to 1973
and as a consequence, the spouses-vendees could not register their deed of sale; that under date of June 16,
1974, said vendees filed Civil Case No. 442 for specific performance and damages against complainant and his
wife to compel the latter to pay all the unpaid realty taxes over the land sold by them and to settle the claims of
third persons claiming payments of the coconuts they planted in a portion of complainant's land and to pay
damages; that under date of August 9, 1974, respondent filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against complainant at the City Fiscal's Office at Davao City for making vendees-spouses believe that the land
they bought from him and his wife was "free of any lien or encumbrances"; that it was because of the filing of the
two cases against complainant by the Nano spouses (Civil Case No. 442) and by herein respondent (of the
criminal case), the threat to expose him for having illegally acquired 275 hectares of land and for enriching himself
through corrupt practices while he was still in the government service, that complainant is acting berserk; that
complainant, in order to dissuade respondent from exposing his ill-gotten wealth and prosecuting the falsification
case against him, allegedly filed the instant disbarment case; and that the libel and slander cases filed by
complainant against herein respondent, and Civil Case No. 8376 filed by said complainant against the Nano
spouses for rescission of contract and damages were all dismissed.

By resolution dated December 16, 1974, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On December 15, 1978, the Solicitor General submitted his report,
recommending dismissal of the charges. According to said report, for convenience of the parties who are all
residents of Davao City, this case was indorsed to the City Fiscal of Davao City to conduct the investigation of the
case, receive the evidence of the parties, testimonial and/or documentary, and submit a report thereon.

Meanwhile, on December 10, 1974, the parties amicably settled Civil Case No. 442, and on December 12, 1974,
a joint affidavit was executed by the Nano spouses and Arfapo spouses, together with respondent herein, stating,
among other things, that the Nano spouses, principal witnesses of respondent in the criminal complaint for
falsification of public document against herein complainant and his wife, are no longer interested as witnesses in
said case and in further prosecuting the same. Moreover, respondent herein likewise manifested his desistance
from prosecuting the same against complainant and his wife for want of witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
The said case was dismissed by the Court on December 16, 1974.

On May 12, 1975, complainant executed an "Affidavit to Dismiss the case" subscribed and sworn to before Alfredo
B. Santos, First Assistant City Fiscal of Davao City, declaring among other things: (1) that he and his wife have
agreed to the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 442 for specific performance and damages filed by spouses
Newton Nano and Hildegarda Ibañez against them; (2) that respondent herein agreed and consented to the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1574 for falsification of public document filed by him against complainant herein;
and (3) that he has lost interest in prosecuting the instant administrative complaint, and requesting that said
complaint be dismissed.

When the administrative case was called for hearing before Fiscal Alfredo B. Santos, complainant reiterated on the
witness stand the contents of his affidavit of desistance, in view of which the Fiscal stated that he has "no
alternative but to recommend the dropping of this administrative case."
There is no question that the burden of proof in disbarment proceedings rests upon the complainant, and for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
evidence.[1] In the case at bar, complainant, instead of proving his affirmative allegations, submitted an affidavit of
desistance, stating that he has settled his differences with the respondent, and asked for the dismissal of this
administrative case. Although the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges will not necessarily
curtail the authority of this Court to proceed further on the matter, such circumstance will undoubtedly render the
investigation of the case difficult. In the case at bar, not only is the respondent entitled to the presumption that as
an officer of the Court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath,[2] but also no evidence has been
submitted to substantiate the charges. It appears also that the deed of sale, which complainant claims to have
been altered, appears on its face to be regular and bears no traces of any alteration whatsoever.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the recommendation of the Solicitor General to
be meritorious, hereby DISMISSES the administrative charges against respondent.

[ Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956 ] 100 PHIL 586
JOSEFINA MORTEL, PETITIONER, VS. ANACLETO F. ASPERAS, RESPONDENT.

On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F. Aspiras, alleging
substantially that:

Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing himself as single, courted her and eventually won her
affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married, and
she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after December 31, 1952, upon being assured
of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a marriage license
was.applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of
respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the
marriage, she and respondent continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at
the indication of respondent, who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and
destroy her.

On April 9, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging that the contents of her
complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her marriage to
respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".

Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal profession[1], this
Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.

On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son Cesar
Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she knew all the time he
was a married man.

On May 13, 1953, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by the
petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.

Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.

However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she had asked
for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement with the respondent; but
that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, from April to November, 1953 at
No. 383 Int. 5 Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she was on the family way. She also charged the
respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live with them, for the purpose of "camouflaging their living
together".

On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the Solicitor
General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.

After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor General filed in
accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his disbarment, on the ground that he
seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a
minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14, 1953; and, what is worse, after the marriage, the
respondent continued having sexual relations with the spouse of his own son.
On May. 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he asked for, and
was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and forwarded by, the Solicitor
General. Yet he failed to produce any.

At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a memorandum which
he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegations were not supported by the
evidence, that the petitioner is in pan delicto and deserves no remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is not
sufficient ground for disbarment.

In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable doubt the
following facts:

In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed mother in Sar
wang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the respondent. Atty. Anacleto
P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented himself as single, although ne was
already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven children.

A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered hers trusting heart.
He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without much ado she approved of
him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was invited to stay and spend the night at
her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into
Josefina's room and after glibly promising marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the
benefit of marriage she gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to
Manila in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to have the marriage
celebrated the following month of April, so as to enable her to continue teaching until the end of the school term.
She stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.

Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the first time, she
met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her bridegroom-to-be. She says
respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He
then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for marriage (Exhibits 7, 8, Respondent) and wrote the name
of Cesar as her husband-to-be.

In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina discovered or
was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to enter into a sham
marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her face
before her relatives and acquaintances who had known her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.

Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josenna and Cesar were married[2] at the Manila City Hall before Judge
Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's aunt) as witnesses. After the ceremony, the two
contracting parties separated, never to Jive together as husband and wife. However, the respondent continued up
to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josenna, as a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy on
January 24, 1954.

Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is confirmed by
his love letters, portions of which say:

"* * * You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world * * * I will bring you along with me before the
altar of matrimony * * *." (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)

"Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first,
middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to you." (Exhibit A,
November 2, 1952.)

And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein respondent is borne
out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953 Exhibits A-19 and A-21.

Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became worse when
he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover up his illicit relations, as
the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning him into an accomplice of his marital
infidelities.

But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each other.
Granted. Then his moral delinquency becomes all the more unpardonable: he cohabited with the wife of his own
son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault in pari delicto, respondent suggests because
this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of unworthy members, to protect the
public and the courts[3]. So much so that even if she should presently ask for dismissal, the matter may not be
dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a
complete defense.[4]

Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney may be
disbarred,[5] still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on grounds other than those enumerated
by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that principle in Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off.
Gaz., 583.

In the United States where from our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession * * * of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law * * * and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment." (5
Am. Jur. 417.)

As stated by Mr. Justice Owen, of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

"One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she shall be of
good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law.
This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to admission to the bar, and the loss of such qualification
requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of this court. The charges preferred against him
challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon
a showing that he lacked the necessary qualifications, so is it its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re
Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R. 1361.)

Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold[6] and on this we
do not decide. But respondent's moral delinquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage, and by corruption of his minor son or destruction of the latter's honor, the under signed all
agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the bar.[7]

Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. So ordered

Adm Case No. 504 November 29, 1961

EUFROSINO L. RAMOS, petitioner,

vs.
EUGENIO P. MICULOB, respondent.

The verified complaint filed by petitioner, Eufrosino L. Ramos, a member of the bar, against respondent Eugenio P.
Miculob, also a member of the bar, alleges that in a sworn statement addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
on July 6, 1961, said respondent stated, among other things, that in December, 1960, he gave Jose Fornier,
Philippine Consul General in Hongkong, the sum of HK$2,500.00 in order to secure the issuance of a visa for his
client, one John Lau, alias Lau Chen Ping, an applicant for a visa to the Philippines; that if true, the act committed
by respondent constitutes malpractice, gross misconduct, bribery, and a violation of his oath of office as a member
of the bar.

It appears, however, that the matter is still pending investigation in the Department of Foreign Affairs by reason of
the charges filed by respondent against Consul General Fornier and Consuls Sabalones and Cataumber.

For the reason stated in the preceding paragraph, it is hereby resolved to dismiss the present case,
without prejudice to filing it again if the decision that will be rendered in due time upon the administrative
charges heretofore mentioned would so justify.

ESTEBAN DEGAMO v. TRANQUILINO O. CALO +

SUMMARY

Respondent was administratively charged but the charges against him are directly involved in two cases pending
with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, namely: Civil Case No. 117 (Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. vs. Villamor Dizon,
et al.) and Criminal Case No. 2347 (People vs. Tranquilino Calo, Jr.). In view of which the investigation of the said
charges is held in abeyance until such time that this Court receives notice of the final determination of the two
cases mentioned.
isbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo1 upon a verified letter-complaint of the petitioner,
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the former with "having committed
false statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.
On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing
an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court accordingly
referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor
General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner
adduced evidence, but not the respondent, because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several
postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which reason the investigating fiscal
considered the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the
record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a
complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross misconduct.

No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or admitted:

On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of
Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the
same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational attainment,
civil service eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads:

Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the details of case and the
final outcome.)" —

to which respondent answered, "None."

Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied for. However,
on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other co-
accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646) for illegal possession of explosive
powder.2

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an information, dated
23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on
the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a member of the Philippine bar.

In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was made in
good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it referred to a final
judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal or police record.1äwphï1.ñët

The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism
hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it asked for records "which did not
reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or
convictions.

Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained of was
committed on 17 January 1959. Without explaining how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense
of prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that —

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance
that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal
proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434).

Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground for
disbarment in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross
misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re
Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In
re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399).

Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information sheet is not
required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the point. The issue is whether
or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence against him of any criminal or police record,
including those that did not reach the court. In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to
secure an appointment in his own favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm.
Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his
oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to a member of
the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher than that of the market
place.
The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses disentitle him
to leniency from his Court.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered stricken
from the roll of attorneys. So ordered.

A.M. No. 669 October 18, 1977

79 SCRA 372
IN RE ATTY. EMMANUEL S. TIPON respondent.

The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice dated May 17, 1965 transmitted certain papers
purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel S. Tipon (admitted to the bar in 1956) might have violated the lawyer's oath
for having imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered as non-mailable matter.

In this Court's resolution of May 31, 1965 action on the complaint of the Postmaster General was deferred until
after Civil Case No. 3898-111 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte entitled "Emmanuel S. Tipon vs.
Belarmino P. Navarro and Enrico Palomar" (Assistant Postmaster General and Postmaster General, respectively)
is decided.

That case was a mandamus action filed by Atty. Tipon in 1964 in Ilocos Norte against the Postmaster General and
his assistant. In a decision dated March 19, 1966 the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue. So that decision is not determinative of the question of whether or not the complaint of the Postmaster
General should be given due course.

What is decisive is the second indorsement dated July 5, 1967 of Hon. Antonio V. Raquiza, Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, who, as Department Head, exercised direct control, direction, and supervision
over the Bureau of Posts.

In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the opinion that Playboy magazine cannot be character
as obscene and that it can be carried and deposited in Philippine mails.

The Secretary said that he scrutinized the background of Atty. Tipon, a 1955 law graduate of the University of the
Philippines who placed third in the bar examinations, a Fullbright Smith-Mundt scholar, and a holder of the Master of
Laws degree from the Yale Law School. The Secretary concluded that "there is absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon
had violated or intended to violate the postal laws, the lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics."

Secretary Raquiza requested that the Postmaster General's t of May 17, 1965 be considered withdrawn.

LUYON VS ATENCIA 77 SCRA 1

[ A. C. No. 728, August 16, 1978 ]
ARMANDO A. ALA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JUAN G. ATENCIA, RESPONDENT.

The Solicitor General in a complaint dated November 14, 1973 charged Atty. Juan G. Atencia (who was admitted to
the bar in 1953) with malpractice, gross misconduct and betrayal of trust.

The charges were based on the 1968 recommendation of the provincial fiscal of Catanduanes who investigated
the complaint for extortion or blackmail lodged against Atencia in 1966 by Armando A. Ala.

The record discloses that Ala, a married man with six children (he was fifty-five years old in 1967) was employed
since 1964 as provincial auditor at Virac, Catanduanes. Working in the auditor's office since 1957 as a clerk or
secretary receiving P180 a month was an unmarried woman (she was thirty-six years old in 1965) named
Miguela R. Luyon, a native of Virac.

On March 12, 1965 Miguela gave birth at the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City to a baby girl who was
named Maria Fe. It was made to appear in the birth certificate that the father of Maria Fe was a man named
Jose R. Avila, a supposed forty-five-year old clerk and native of Virac, whom Miss Luyon allegedly married on
January 24, 1963 (Exh. A).

From the affidavits of Lilia V. Aquino, Ala's alleged goddaughter, and Natividad Balmadrid, Miguela's alleged
companion in the district engineer's office where Miguela was later detailed, it appears that Mrs. Ala came to know
about Miguela's child. Mrs. Ala allegedly spread rumors that Miguela's child was "a communal child", thus implying
that Miguela was a promiscuous woman who had affairs with two or more men. That gossip provoked her to seek a
judicial declaration that Ala had fathered her child (28 tsn July 17, 1974). For that purpose she contracted the
services of Atty. Juan G. Atencia on June 23, 1966 (Exh. B-3).
On June 24, 1966, Atty. Atencia filed in behalf of Maria Fe a complaint for recognition and support in the Court of
First Instance of Catanduanes (Civil Case No. 562). It was alleged therein that the real father of Maria Fe was Ala
and that, as agreed upon between Miguela and Ala, Maria Fe was given the surname Avila because that was a
common patronymic in Virac and it contains the three letters of the surname Ala.

Annexed to the complaint was an affidavit dated June 16, 1966 and supposedly subscribed and sworn to by Ala
before the deputy clerk of court on June 20, 1966. In that affidavit Ala acknowledged that he is Maria Fe's father.

On June 27 Ala was served with summons. He noted from Annex A of the complaint that he had supposedly sworn
to an affidavit of acknowledgment before Lauro L. Fajardo, the deputy clerk of court. As Ala did not remember
having signed that affidavit, he confronted Fajardo with that document. Ala chided Fajardo for not informing him
first about the affidavit since both of them had offices in the same building.

On that same day, June 27, Atencia wrote the following letter to Miguela:

"Dear Miss Luyon:

"This is in connection with Civil Case No. 562, Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, entitled Maria Fe Luyon
Avila, assisted by her mother Miguela R. Luyon, plaintiff vs. Armando A. Ala, defendant.

"You will recall that last Saturday morning at about 11:00 o'clock I chanced upon you and the defendant in a
room of the house of Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Aquino while you were discussing the above-entitled case with the
defendant. I have positive information that you are amenable to have the case dismissed or withdrawn because of
the representations of the defendant. I with to inform you that I have no intention of dismissing or withdrawing the
case if that will prejudice or endanger the future of the plaintiff Maria Fe Luyon Avila and that if you insist on
destroying the future of the child by entering into a compromise prejudicial to her I shall ask the Court that you
should not be made the guardian ad litem of the child and in your place, I shall ask the Court to appoint
somebody else who will protect the interest of the child. Furthermore, if by your acts of compromising the case
with the defendant, damage would be caused to the child, I shall also file a corresponding case against you.

"Please consider this letter as fair and sufficient warning to you in order to guide you in your future acts
in relation to the above-entitled case.

Truly yours,

Sgd. JUAN G. ATENCIA

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Civil Case No. 562" (Exh. B)

On the following day, June 28, Atencia filed a motion in Civil Case No. 562 praying that the petition in the complaint
that Miguela should be appointed guardian ad litem of Maria Fe be considered withdrawn and that he be given
thirty days to nominate another guardian ad litem. The motion contained the following allegations (Exh. B-1):

"II. That the undersigned counsel has strong reasons to believe that Miss Miguela R. Luyon, mother of the
plaintiff, for reasons of her own and for her own personal benefit but to the prejudice of the plaintiff (Maria Fe) is
willing to accede to the wishes of the defendant that this case be withdrawn as may be shown by the
circumstance cited in a letter, the original of which was received by Miss Miguela R. Luyon on June 27, 1966, and
a copy of which is Annex "A" hereof, which is hereby made an integral part of this motion; and

"III. That in view of the fact that in an interview by the undersigned attorney with Miss Miguela R. Luyon on June
27, 1966, he was convinced that Miss Luyon is madly in love with the defendant and therefore, under the
influence of that madness of love would take steps that would be detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff."

At around five o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, Ala, accompanied by his son, Armando, Jr., went to Atencia's
house located at 89 Unang Hakbang Street, Galas, Quezon City. They talked in a private room fronting the sala
near the dining room. According to Ala he asked Atencia how much money the latter wanted for the return of the
affidavit and the dismissal of the case. Atencia allegedly said that he needed money for his children's tuition fees
and that as Ala did not bring any money, Atencia allegedly told him to come back on the following day. Atencia
denied having agreed to return the affidavit to Ala.

Ala said that in the afternoon of July 2, he, accompanied by his son Armando and his brother-in-law, Carlos Tongo,
repaired to Atencia's residence in Quezon City. Ala briefed his son about the case. Tongo gave him a legal-size
envelope. In the presence of Armando and Tongo, Ala placed in the envelope three hundred pesos consisting of
six fifty-peso bills.

Ala and Atencia talked in the private room of Atencia's house which Atencia locked when they were inside. Atencia
allegedly asked Ala if he had brought the money which on the previous afternoon Ala had promised to deliver to
Atencia. Ala said that he would deliver the money if Atencia would surrender the evidence of the case.

Atencia allegedly replied that the affidavit or evidence was in his office in Virac and that he (Atencia) would follow
Ala to Virac after two days and burn the papers in Ala's presence so that other persons would not get hold of them.
Atencia allegedly promised to file a motion for the dismissal of the paternity suit.

On the faith of that promise, Ala allegedly took from the left pocket of his pants the envelope containing the sum of
three hundred pesos and handed it to Atencia. After Atencia counted the money and found that it amounted to
P300 only, he remarked that it was too small and that his children's tuition fees totalled around P950. Atencia did
not give any receipt for the P300.

Atencia denied having asked for and received P300 from Ala. Ala declared that he promised to send Atencia the
balance of P700 after his return to Virac.

On July 4 Ala went home to Virac. On the next day, July 5, he sent by air cargo, as shown in PAL air waybill No.
1285926 "one (1) sealed carton containing cash -seven hundred pesos only (P700.00) in Philippine currency,
counted, packed and sealed in the presence of the shipper", addressed to Atencia at his Quezon City residence
(Exh. C). At the same time Ala wired Atencia as follows: "Amount sent via PAL today. Regards. Ala" (Exh. D). The
amount was delivered on July 6 by Pedro Tabirara, the PAL air cargo messenger, to its Gemina Atencia,
respondent's wife (Exh. C-1-a). Respondent Atencia admitted that fact in his answer.

On July 10 Atencia was in Virac. He allegedly sent word through Mrs. Aquino that he wanted to meet Ala at the
house of Sofio Arcilla, her brother-in-law. Ala went to Arcilla's house and met Atencia in that place. Atencia
admitted to Ala that he received the P700. Ala allegedly then asked Atencia whether he had the papers of the case
and if he had filed the motion for dismissal.

Atencia allegedly replied that he was disinclined to move for the dismissal of the case because he wanted some
more money. He said that with the help of Ala's office the amount of P70,000 earmarked for the Virac seawall could
be released by means of a simulated contract between the government and a private contractor. Ala demurred. He
said that he did not want to be involved in a fraudulent transaction. Atencia denied having asked Ala to cause the
release of any government funds through a simulated contract.

On July 24 while Ala was in the town of Bagamanoc, Catanduanes to inspect the proposed site of a municipal
building, he had a conversation with the mayor, Dioscoro Pascua, Atencia's brother-in-law. Ala told Pascua that
Atencia refused to give him the papers of his case although he had already paid Atencia P1,040. Pascua
promised to help Ala.

On July 25 Ala fetched Mayor Pascua who on arriving at Virac conferred with Atencia. Pascua informed Ala that
Atencia would like to talk with Ala at four o'clock in the afternoon at Balongbong Falls, Bato, Catanduanes. Ala,
accompanied by Rafael Molina and Leonor Gapaz (Ala's son-in-law), met Atencia at the place. Instead of giving
him the papers of the case, Atencia allegedly asked Ala to help him (Atencia) sell his residential lot in Virac for
P15,000. Atencia said that he needed money to forestall the foreclosure of the mortgage on his house. His house
was mortgaged for P25,000 (33 tsn September 20, 1974).

To help Atencia, Ala requested Molina to contact Jose Lim, the manager of Acme Commercial in Virac. On July 26
Atencia dispatched his driver, Pedro Romero, to Ala with the draft of the deed of sale to be signed by Lim. Lim told
Atencia while in Ala's office that the price of P15,000 was too high. Atencia allegedly remarked that Lim could
recover his loss by inflating the price of the materials which he would sell to the government.

On July 28 Atencia filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 562 stating that he was withdrawing his opposition to the
appointment of Miguela as guardian ad litem of Maria Fe. Then, he left for Manila. He entrusted to Mrs. Aquino the
draft of the deed of sale. On July 29, when Atencia was already in Manila, he wired Molina to inform Lim that Lim
had up to August 1 to pay for the land. Molina delivered to Ala the collect telegram of Atencia (Exh. F). Lim decided
not to buy Atencia's lot.

On August 2 Miguela filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 562, the action for recognition and support filed
for her by Atencia. She alleged in her motion:
 "2. That after a thorough examination of my conscience in relation to whatever consequences it may had (have)
in my private and public life, and in particular considering the interest of my issue who is the minor plaintiff, I deem
it wise to withdraw the above-entitled case against the defendant (Ala). An affidavit is hereto attached and marked
as Annex A.

"3. That for purposes of this motion, I hereto attach as Annex B a copy of my letter to my attorney (Atencia)
terminating his services and severing our attorney-client relationship."

Miguela affirmed in her affidavit that she was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against Ala and that she
had terminated Atencia's services.

Miguela's letter to Atencia reads as follows (Exh. I) :

"Virac, Catanduanes
August 2, 1966

"Atty. Juan G. Atencia

Virac, Catanduanes

"Dear Atty. Atencia:

I wish to inform you that I am terminating the lawyer-client relationship between us. In this connection, I request
that all pertinent papers regarding Civil Case No. 562 for support and recognition filed against Mr. Armando A. Ala
be returned to the undersigned.

"I am requesting you therefore to state the amount of attorney's fee I will have to pay.

"Very truly yours,

Sgd. Miguela R. Luyon"

On August 8, 1966 the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes issued an order dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 562 (Exh. H-2). On that same date Atencia (who was in Virac) answered Miguela's letter by stating that
she had not given him any pertinent papers except two copies of Ala's affidavit which were attached to the
complaint filed in court. Atencia said that he was "not now disposed to accept any amount of attorney's fees from
Miguela" (Exh. 1-2).

In the evening of August 4, Atencia's driver alllegedly contacted Ala at his boarding house at 62 Calamba Street,
La Loma, Quezon City. Romero told Ala that Atencia wanted to see Ala at Atencia's residence on that same night.
Ala said that due to a prior engagement at the Shellborne Hotel he could not confer with Atencia.

In the following morning, Romero, Atencia's driver, again went to Ala's boarding house in order to fetch him so that
he could confer with Atencia. As Ala had to attend a hearing at the General Auditing Office, he sent his wife and
son to go with Romero in Atencia's car and to find out what Atencia wanted. However, they could not locate
Atencia. On August 6 Atencia sent a note to Ala stating that Ala could see Atencia in his house between eight and
nine o'clock in the morning of Sunday, August 7 (Exh. G). Ala tried to see Atenica on Sunday afternoon. He was
informed that Atencia had left for the province at noontime.

While Ala was still in Manila, his clerk informed him that a person named Pedro T. Pantino (a former colleague of
Atencia in the provincial board) had filed in the Civil Service Commission a complaint charging him and Miguela
with immorality. Pantino said that he later withdrew the charge.

Ala took the offensive against Atencia by filing this disbarment case. In a "petition" dated August 26, 1966 he
charged Atencia with malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar and prayed that Atencia be
"disbarred perpetually".
Miguela R. Luyon, who was Ala's co-respondent in the administrative case, also filed a verified letter complaint
dated August 25, 1966 received in this Court on September 7, 1966 wherein she recounted Atencia's unethical
behavior and chicanery and prayed that "the full penalty of the law" be imposed on him.

Miguela's letter reads (Exh. J):

"The Honorable Supreme Court

Manila

"Your Honors:

"I am an unmarried woman of legal age, residing at Virac, Catanduanes, and hereby respectfully brings to
your honor's attention the unethical act of a member of bar, Atty. Juan G. Atencia, who has his law office in Virac,
Catanduanes.

"Sometime ago, I consulted a certain Atty. Rafael Santelices regarding my child who was fathered by someone
out of wedlock. Atty. Santelices prepared an affidavit which was to be signed by Armando A. Ala wherein he admits
paternity of the child. Later, Atty. Juan G. Atencia sent for me. He asked me about my legal problem. I told him
about my child. I showed him the unsigned statement of Armando A. Ala, prepared by Atty. Santelices. He
instructed me to find a way so that Ala could sign the statement. Later I was able to get the signature of Ala and
Atty. Atencia instructed me to have Lauro Fajardo, a deputy Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes to
ratify it, which said Mr. Fajardo did so. Then I delivered the document to Atty. Atencia. On June 24, 1966, after he
assured me my case was a winning case, he filed a complaint for recognition and support against Armando A. Ala,
Provincial Auditor of Catanduanes. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 562, supported by the affidavit I gave
him.

"After the case was filed, I learned that my attorney, Juan G. Atencia had secret contacts with the defendant in
Civil Case No. 562, I was informed that my attorney received money from the defendant. I did not believe at first
since Atencia seemed to be interested in my case. Later, however, my attorney became quite indifferent to me. So
I believed that he was really given money by Ala, so that my case would be jeopardized.

"On June 28, 1966, my counsel filed a motion to disqualify me as guardian of my child, Maria Fe Luyon Avila. I
was surprised why my lawyer to whom I confided everything regarding my case was trying to disqualify me to be
a guardian of my very own child.

"I had lost my confidence in Atty. Atencia, in fact I lost my confidence to all lawyers. So I filed a motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 562, which motion was granted on August 8, 1966.

"And then to add insult to my already injured interest, Juan G. Atencia induced Pedro Pantino to prepare an
administrative complaint against me and Armando A. Ala. Atencia used as the basis of the administrative case the
evidence which he obtained during the existence of our attorney-client relationship, which evidence he refused to
return to me after I advised him that I was terminating our attorney and client relationship.

"Your Honors, must I suffer because I am a poor woman? Must I be the victim of the chicanery of some lawyers?
I, a citizen of this country, who according to President Marcos is going to be great again needs justice. The highest
magistracy of the Republic of the Philippines was supposed to supervise the conduct of the members of the bar of
this country.

"I am appealing to this magnanimous tribunal to give me justice. With due respect and on bended knees, I beg
an investigation of my case, and if warranted, Atty. Juan G. Atencia, who betrayed the trust and confidence I have
given him due to our attorney-client relationship should be given the full penalty of the law.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 25th day of August, 1966, at Virac, Catanduanes.
 Sgd. Miguela R. Luyon
Complainant"

(Miguela's complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 727. She did not prosecute it because Ala stopped
giving support to her child. 84 tsn July 18, 1974, Exh. 21).

Respondent Atencia in his verified answer to Ala's complaint denied the extortion charge. He said that the sum of
P700 was sent by Miguela to him through Ala to cover Atencia's transportation and other expenses. He denied that
he prepared the immorality charge filed by Pantino.

The case was referred in March, 1967 to the provincial fiscal of Catanduanes. Atencia failed to present his
evidence before the fiscal.

Fiscal Mario L. Bolaños in his 46-page report dated September 18, 1968 found that "there is no doubt that" Atencia
"had asked and actually received from" Ala the total sum of P1,040 (36); that Atencia defrauded Ala because after
receiving that amount he did not fulfill his part of the bargain, which was the dismissal of the paternity suit (40),
and that Atencia's modus operandi of extracting money from Ala without Miguela's consent, while the suit was still
pending, constituted "malpractice pure and simple" because Atencia thereby sold his client down the river and
because a lawyer cannot compromise a client's case "for a valuable consideration which goes into the pocket of
the attorney" (41-42).

In 1973 the Solicitor General's Office, acting on Fiscal Bolaños' 1968 report, filed the complaint for disbarment.
The Solicitor General observed that Atencia's "lack of interest in presenting his defense to the charges and
evidence against him is equivalent to the admission on his part of the weakness and lack of merit of his defense as
set forth in his answer" to Ala's complaint.

Respondent Atencia in his 1974 answer to the Solicitor General's complaint reiterated in substance the allegations
in his prior answer. At his request, he was allowed to present evidence before the Court's legal officer in 1974 and
1975.

Atty. Atencia (who was fifty-three years old in 1974) testified that as a Nacionalista member of the provincial board
of Catanduanes from 1956, he came to know Miguela R. Luyon. She was an employee of the provincial auditor's
office that processed their vouchers. He know that Miguela is the sister-in-law of Mayor Salvador Surtida of Virac.

It was incumbent upon Atencia to overcome the manifestly incriminatory character of his receipt from Ala of P700,
a fact which he admitted because he could not deny it.

Atencia's version is that the amount was sent to him by Ala, at Miguela's behest, to cover his transportation and
expenses for his stay in Virac (Exh. 11). Ala himself had to send it because Miguela allegedly did not know how to
remit it by air cargo.

Atencia at first wanted to return the P700.00 to Miguela, but he did not insist on returning the money to Miguela
because of her assurance that it was her money which she had caused to be sent to him (27-28, 31 tsn,
September 20, 1974). Atencia said that he attempted to return the P700 to Ala but the latter allegedly refused to
accept it.

Atencia also said that on July 11, 1966, when he met Miguela and she asked him how much attorney's fees should
be paid to him since the case would be settled amicably, he assured her not to mind paying him anymore because
he had already received P700 and that would be sufficient (Ibid., 38 tsn).

Atencia's version is that in the afternoon of June 28, 1966, while he was at the Virac airport about to embark in
a Manila-bound plane, Romero, the driver, handed to him a note from Lilia Aquino. The note (Exh. 11) reads as
follows:

"June 28/66

"Dear Cang Juaning:

"Miss Luyon again come (came) to me and told me that she has already made an arrangement with Mr. Ala, that
is good for their child. She requested that if possible you should postpone your trip to Manila so that you can
attend to this problem and finish the case.
 "If you can not postpone your trip, she requested that you should please come back as soon as possible.
She will send you money for your transportation and expenses for your stay in Virac.

"Sincerely,

Lilia"

Atencia said that he instructed Romero to tell Lilia that, as he could not postpone his trip, Miguela should send him
an amount of not less than P500 for his transportation and expenses during his stay in Virac. (18-20 tsn
September 20, 1974). In Lilia Aquino's affidavit the sum of P500 was not specified. She just said that Atencia
wanted Miguela to send him money for his expenses (Annex 5 of 1974 answer).

Atencia was already in Quezon City on June 28, 1966. According to his version, Miguela should remit to him in
a few days the sum of not less than P500 to cover his transportation expenses and the expenses of his sojourn
in Virac for the purpose of settling amicably the paternity suit.

The sum of P700 was received by Atencia's wife on July 6. Atencia said that he was then with his parents at Daet,
Camarines Norte. He went to that place on July 2, 1966. Atencia said that while in Daet he received a wire from his
wife that she had received P700 from Ala.

Atencia was allegedly surprised why it was Ala who had sent the money. He went home to Quezon City. On July 10
he went to Virac. He tried to return the P700 to Ala but he refused to receive it. He tried to return it to Miguela but
she also refused to accept it. He and Miguela finally agreed that the amount would be treated as payment of his
attorney's fees and as reimbursement for his expenses. Miguela paid to him an additional sum of twenty-five pesos
as reimbursement of his expenses in checking the record of birth of Maria Fe in Quezon City and her baptism (38
tsn September 20, 1974).

It is a fact that Atencia received the P700.00 via PAL air cargo. The amount was sent to him by Ala. What is not
clear is why Ala sent the money to Atencia. Ala claims that the amount was extorted from him by Atencia. The note
of Lilia Aquino, Exh. 11, tends to support the version of Atencia that the amount of P700.00 was sent to him by Ala
at the instance of Miguela to cover the transportation and other expenses of Atencia from Quezon City to Virac,
Catanduanes to confer with Miguela about the paternity case.

It is not therefore clear that Atencia extorted any amount from Ala. This being a disbarment case, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the respondent.

However, the actuations of Atencia leave much to be desired. He manifested undue interest in prosecuting the
paternity suit against Ala. Atencia even went to the extent of asking the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes to
appoint somebody also as guardian ad litem of Maria Fe Luyon Avila when he learned that Miguela was about to
ask for the dismissal of the case against Ala.

Moreover, Atencia did not return the original of the affidavit of Ala acknowledging paternity of Maria Fe Luyon Avila.
It appears that what was attached to the complaint in the paternity case was only a carbon copy. The original of
said affidavit was attached to the administrative complaint filed by Pedro Patino against Ala and Miguela in the
Commission of Civil Service. There is reason to believe that Atencia instigated the filing of the said administrative
charge.

For these acts of Atencia he should be disciplined. Under the circumstances of the case he should be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, the respondent, Juan G. Atencia, is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from notice.

SO ORDERED.

RE: AGRIPINO A. BRILLANTES

This is a review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II, suspending Atty. Agripino A.
Brillantes of Bangued, Abra from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.[1]

On July 18, 1972, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case 657, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Abra, by
the spouses Melchor and Valentina Bernardez against the spouses Joaquin and Angustia Balmaceda for recovery
of a parcel of land which said complainants allegedly acquired from Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan under a deed of
sale dated September 18, 1969, registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra on September 30, 1969.
At the pre-trial conference of the above Civil Case 657 on September 13, 1972, the defendants, thru their Counsel, the
herein respondent Brillantes, claimed that they were not the real parties in interest. They exhibited a duplicate copy of a
deed of sale dated April 13, 1969 of the land in dispute executed by Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan in favor of Dr.
Restituto Balmaceda, an alleged son of the defendants, which was notarized by the respondent Brillantes. Due to that
manifestation, Dr. Balmaceda was named as an additional defendant in Civil Case 657.

On January 8, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder:

"1. That there exists a duly notarized document, dated September 18, 1969, marked Exhibit 'A', the due
execution of which is admitted by the defendants;

"x x x

"5. That there exists, too, a document, dated April 13, 1969, not notarized, marked as Exh, '1' the due execution
of which is also admitted by the plaintiffs;

"x x x

"7. That the parties hereby waive presentation of further evi-dence and whatever claims for damages they may
have against each other.

"WHEREFORE, on the bases of the above stipulation of facts, that is, which deed of sale shall prevail: a duly
notarized one, executed later but duly registered, or a document, not notarized, but executed earlier? -- the parties
hereto respectfully submit the case for decision."

Based on that stipulation and the various documentary evidences presented by both parties, the trial court, with
Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella presiding, rendered its decision, dated February 7, 1973, declaring the plaintiffs as the
true and lawful owners of the land in dispute. The decision a quo contained the follow-ing observation:

''Anent Exhibit '1', its genuiness [sic] is doubted by this Court. It is very obvious from the record that there are two
documents marked as Exhibit '1' personally presented and marked by counsel for the defendants, Atty. Agripino
Brillantes. The first document (Deed of Sale in favor of Dr. Restituto Balmaceda) marked as Exhibit '1' is a carbon
original copy duly notarized by Atty. Agripino Brillantes and sealed with his notarial seal and is found on page 22 of
the record. The second docu-ment marked as Exhibit '1' is the original copy of the first document but the
acknowledgment of Atty. Agripino Brillantes is mutilated or cut-off, making it appear as an unnotarized document.
However, the notarial seal of this document is clear and more so of its being mutilated to make it appear as
unnotarized docu-ment.

"On this point, the Court has taken judicial notice of the records of Commissioned Notaries Public of the
Province of Abra and Atty. Agripino Brillantes was never com-missioned as Notary Public and in fact, has no record
particularly for the year 1967 to the present. This explains the discrepancy and by logical deduction, Exhibit '1' is a
spurious and falsified document drawn to suit defendants' defense."

Meanwhile, on December 15, 1972, Atty. Romeo R. Bringas, a nephew of the defendants in Civil Case 657, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Abra two sworn complaints against Atty. Brillantes alleging that the latter
notarized a deed of sale of real property on April 13, 1969 without being commissioned as a notary public in
violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code[2] and knowingly introduced the said deed as evidence in Civil
Case 657 in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.[3] The complaints were heard
in preliminary investigation by Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella who found a prima facie case against the accused. On
March 16, 1973 two separate informations for falsification were filed against Atty. Brillantes.[4]

Prior to the filing of the charges by the fiscal, Atty. Bringas filed an unverified motion in the sala of Judge Gironella
praying that Atty. Brillantes be suspended from the practice of law in view of the "strong prima facie cases" found
against him. Over his objection, the trial judge ordered Atty. Brillantes to file an answer. Thereafter, the matter was
heard on the merits. Incidentally, on September 7, 1973, Judge Gironella ordered his clerk of court to enter the
case as a separate administrative case on the notion that it cannot be merged with the "mother" criminal
complaints.

On September 10, 1973, Judge Gironella rendered a decision ordering the suspension of Atty. Brillantes from the
practice of law for two years "effective upon receipt of this decision." His findings are as follows:

"On September 14, 1972, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 657 before this Court, the Executive Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Abra, the Hon. Juan P. Aquino, in answer to a letter inquiry from the Presiding Judge
of this Court, categorically stated that Atty. Agripino Brillantes, respondent herein, was never commissioned as
Notary Public for the province of Abra since 1967 to the present (Exhi-bit A-1). On the basis of the two documents
and the certification of the Hon. Juan P. Aquino, respondent was charged for Falsification of Public Documents
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 242 and 243 for preliminary investigation. The Court found a strong prima facie
case against the respondent and accordingly, directed the Provincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information x x
x.

"It is further established by the testimony of the Clerk of Court, Atty. Gelacio Bolante, that the signature
appearing above the type-written name Atty. Agripino Bril-lantes, after the acknowledgment, in Exhibit 'A-1' (Deed
of Sale), is the genuine signature of Atty. Agripino Brillantes being familiar with it as the respondent had been
practising for a long time in Abra.

"The defense of respondent Atty. Agripino Brillantes consisted of denial. He denied that the signa-ture
appearing in Exhibit 'B' was his signature. Except for this denial by his testimony, no other evidence was
introduced by him.

"After a painstaking study of the evidence for the complainant and the respondent, the Court finds the evidence
supporting the charge very persuasive and positively point per adventure of doubt that respondent Atty. Agripino
Brillantes acted as a Notary Public and did [in] April, 1969, notarized [sic] Exhibit 'B-3' (Deed of Absolute Sale)
without being commissioned as such and intentionally presented the same as exhibit during the pre-trial hearing on
September 13, 1973 in Civil Case No. 657. Thus, delaying the proceedings by causing the plaintiffs in that case to
amend their complaint (Exhibits B, B-1, B-3, C, C-1, D, D-1, E, E-1, J and M).

"His denial that the signature appearing in Exhibit 'A-1' (notarized Deed of Sale) which he exhibited in Civil Case
No. 657 stands strongly contradicted by his own acts: First, as counsel for the defendants in Civil Case No. 657, he
admitted Exhibit 'B' being notarized (Exhibit B); Second, during the preliminary investigation of Crim. Case No. 243,
he admitted his signature in Exhibit 'B' (Exhibit I); and, Third, having presented the same notarized document
during the pre-trial and marked and iden-tified the same as Exhibit '1' in Civil Case No. 657, fully aware of his
signature in said document. On this score, the respondent stated during the pre-trial: 'x x x It is contend-ed by the
defendants that the land now described in the complaint was previously sold to Dr. Resti-tuto Balmaceda and that
Deed of Sale is a carbon copy all of which we asked that it be marked as Exhibit '1' for the defendant and that the
real parties in interest being the vendee in Exhibit '1' is Dr. Balmaceda. Any adjudication in this case as against the
defendant in which Dr, Balmaceda is not included as party may not affect him but although under the situation we
may submit . . . we are submit-ting for pre-trial in connection with this case for the purpose of giving appreciation of
proof x x x,' (Exhibit 'M-1'). A xerox copy of Exhibit '1' referred to by the respondent is Exhibit B in this case.

"As an old brilliant practi-tioner, it cannot be said that he was not aware of his signature affixed in Exhibit B when
he pre-sented the same in Civil Case No. 657. Worse, he introduced the original copy which was cut-off leaving
the notarial seal visible and readable. All these acts of the respondent strongly militate against him. Comparing the
genuine signature of the respond-ent appearing in his pleadings and other documents attached to the records of
the case to that of his signature in Exhibit 'B-2,' it is safe to conclude that the denied signature is the genuine
signature of the respondent.

"In view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this court that the acts of the res-pondent indubitably
shown by the evidence offered and admitted certainly constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in the office of an
attorney at law and a viola-tion of his oath of office 'to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts'. The Court sympathizes with the respondent considering his being over 60 years old and allegedly a
10th placer of the Bar. But, the law is the law and the honor and dignity of the profession and the administration of
justice shall be upheld. x x x"

Pursuant to Section 29, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, supra, the foregoing decision was elevated to this Court
for review.

On November 6, 1973, this Court denied a peti-tion of respondent Atty. Brillantes to lift the immediate effectivity of
his suspension.

On March 1, 1974, a supplemental complaint was filed by Atty. Bringas in this Court, alleging as follows: (1) on July 31,
1972 the respondent; without being commissioned as a notary public, administered the oath in a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary injunction filed in the Court of Appeals as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828; and
(2) notwithstanding his suspension, the respondent filed on behalf of the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828 a
"Petition for Extension to Comply with Order" which required him to comment on a telegram received by the Court
of Appeals that he (the res-pondent) was not a duly commissioned notary public in 1972 and a "Motion for
Dismissal" of the said case. In this connection, the record of C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828 shows that the respondent
did not directly and categorically answer the query of the Court of Appeals, but merely replied that the petitioner in
C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828 died on December 6, 1972 and the heirs could not be contacted. The motion for
dismissal was filed on December 26, 1973 to apprise the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the deceased (Pedro
Beroña) "have decided not to continue this case."
On September 20, 1974, acting on the mani-festation of Atty. Brillantes that he was a duly commissioned notary for
the 1968-1969 term [to support which he submitted a carbon copy of his alleged commission, oath of office, and a
receipt by the clerk of court (whose name is not revealed thereon) of his notarial books and monthly reports typed
on a small slip of paper, all of which do not bear the seal of the court a quo and showed only an undecipherable
initial over the typewritten name of Judge Macario M. Ofilada, who allegedly issued the respondent's commission,
and a deputy clerk of court, Isidoro B. Valera, who allegedly adminis-tered the oath], this Court required (1) the
respondent to submit the original of his appoint-ment and oath of office; (2) Judge Ofilada to certify to the truth of
the appointment claimed; and (3) deputy clerk of court Valera to certify to his administration of the oath of office to
the respondent.

On October 22, 1974, Judge Ofilada filed a manifestation that "to his best recollection, Mr. Agripino A. Brillantes
was not appointed notary public for the term beginning January 8, 1968 and ending December 31, 1969."
Gelacio B. Bolante, clerk of court below, reported that "according to the records available in his office, Atty.
Agripino A. Brillantes was not appointed Notary Public for the term" 1968-1969. A check of the certified list of
commissioned notaries for the province of Abra, covering the years 1966 to 1973, also showed that the
respondent was not appointed a notary in any of those years. Deputy Clerk of Court Valera did not make any
reply to this Court's summons.

The defenses interposed by the respondent in the court a quo and as well in this Court may be briefly stated as
follows:

1. It is the Supreme Court alone under Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, not the court a quo, which has
jurisdiction over a complaint for suspension of an attorney. Said complaint should also be under oath.

2. Under Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which took effect on January 16, 1973, it is the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines thru an appro-priate grievance committee rather than courts of first instance, that has jurisdiction to
try cases involving suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar,

3. The deed of sale marked Exhibit "1" in Civil Case 657 is a genuine document as admitted by the parties
themselves in their stipulation of facts. Consequently, the acknowledgment thereof before a notary public is no
longer necessary or relevant. Moreover, the finding below that the said deed is "spurious" is a prejudicial question
which has not yet been finally disposed of by the appellate courts.

4. The charges in the instant case are identical with those made in the criminal information filed against the
respondent. The final disposition of said criminal cases should, there-fore, be awaited as they pose prejudicial
questions.

5. The constitutional right of the respond-ent to an impartial trial was violated by the refusal of Judge Gironella
to inhibit himself from presiding over the trial of the administrative complaint.

6. The allegations, contained in the supple-mental complaint of Atty. Bringas are not true.

7. As to the charge contained in the second supplemental complaint of Atty. Bringas, the Rules of Court allows any
person, who need not be a member of the Bar, to appear as a friend of a party before the municipal courts.

We shall discuss seriatim the merits of the foregoing arguments.

1. The theory that it is only this Court which may proceed to take cognizance of a suspen-sion or disbarment
proceeding in accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Rules of Court was already put in issue
before and rejected. In Tajam vs. Cusi,[5] this Court held that the con-tention ignores the fact that Rule 139
pertains to the rules for investigation and hearing of a suit started in or by the Supreme Court. It does not
necessarily cover proceedings initiated in or by courts of first instance which are authorized to do so by Rule 138
of the Rules. Section 28 of Rule 138 states:

"Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. -- The Court of Appeals or
a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises."

Rule 138 likewise prescribes the basic essentials that courts of first instance should follow in
suspension proceedings, namely,

"Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.-- No attorney shall be removed or suspended from
the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte."
The adoption of rules specified in Rule 139 of the Rules of Court is merely optional on courts of first instance
as explicitly stated therein, to wit:

"Sec. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. -- As far as may be applicable, the procedure
above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investi-gation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of
Appeals or in Courts of First Instance.' In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of first instance or
Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of sus-
pension and a full statement of the facts upon which same is based."

The fact that the court below took cognizance of Atty. Bringas' motion against Atty. Brillantes even if it was not
verified has no jurisdictional significance. That motion was filed as an off-shoot of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the court a quo on the basis of the sworn complaints file by Atty. Bringas against the respondent for
falsification and introduction of falsified evi-dence in a judicial proceeding. Under the circums-tances, this Court
finds no substantive justifying purpose to be served by adhering to the prescription that a complaint against a
lawyer be under oath. At all events, this Court has already overruled a similar plea, in Tajamvs. Cusi, supra, with
these words:

"It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil
action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceed-ings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the out-come except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion
and thus be the initiator of the proceedings; because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its
own officers. Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion proper
proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own
knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show
that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good
character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote
the purity of the administration of justice."

2. The referral to Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is misplaced and premature. Neither in Rule 139-A which
ordained, by Court rule, the integration of the Philippine Bar nor in the By-laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines which took effect on November 1, 1974 can any provision be found withdrawing from the courts the
authority to investigate and decide complaints against erring members of the Bar.

3. It is irrelevant and immaterial to this proceeding that the parties a quo in Civil Case 657 expressly accepted the
genuineness of the questioned deed of sale marked therein as Exhibit "1." That was purely a matter of personal
judgment and affected solely their private interests. The case at bar is of a different complex and nature. Here, a
lawyer's fealty to his oath and public duties is intimately and inextricably involved, nay affected. The primary
objective of the instant ac-tion is to determine whether the respondent nota-rized a deed of sale of a parcel of
land without be-ing duly appointed as a notary public and introduced the same as evidence in court, thereby
flagrantly violating his duties as an officer of the court.

This Court is convinced, after a thorough -going examination of the evidence on which the judge below anchored
his findings and conclusions, that the same are valid and correct. Indeed, we ordered, of our own accord, a re-
check of the evidence below, and the result thereof showed positively that the respondent's pretenses are feigned.

At the hearing before this Court, Atty. Brillantes claimed that he had in his possession evidence which would prove
that he was commissioned a notary in 1969. What he presented to this Court, however, were carbon copies of an
alleged notarial appointment and an oath of office which did not even bear the signature of the officials concerned,
were not covered by the seal of the issuing court and, although they had what appeared to be initials, did not least
resemble any of the first letters of the names or surnames of the alleged officials who issued the same. In fact, the
appointment of the respondent as a notary was denied here by the very person who supposedly gave him the said
commission. The clerk of court below, who was supposed to have issued the carbon copy of the slip of paper filed
in this Court by the respondent wherein receipt of the latter's notarial books and monthly reports was
acknowledged, also denied that the respondent was appointed notary for Abra during the 1968-1969 term.

The record shows and the respondent asseverates 'that he has been for a long time an active practitioner in the
courts of the province of Abra. It is, there-fore, quite difficult to conceive that Judges Ofilada and Aquino and the
clerk of court below would not know or recall that the respondent was given a notarial commission if such were
really the case. As it is, a check of the records of the court below of the names of persons who were given notarial
commissions from 1966 to 1973 for the province of Abra failed to show that he ever applied for a commission in
any of those years or was given one. For a seasoned practitioner like the respondent, it is quite remarkable and
certainly unmitigating that instead of simply presenting satisfactory evidence of his appointment as a notary which
is required by law to be made in official form, he should choose to avail himself vigorously of technical defenses,
such as that the trial judge below should inhibit himself from trying the administrative complaint and the criminal
cases filed against him; that the com-plaint for his suspension from the practice of law should be tried by a
grievance committee of the Integrated Bar; that the final disposition of the appeal of Civil Case 657 should be
awaited; and that the case at bar "is a bickering of another member of the Bar who pretends to be a Super Citizen
and guardian of Public Weal" which, it is urged, should not be seriously entertained by this Court. When the Court
of Appeals ordered him in a case therein where the respondent is counsel for the petitioner, to inform it whether he
was a duly commissioned notary public, the respondent instead of giving either a "yes" or "no" answer, informed
the Court of Appeals that his client is already dead. All such beating around an otherwise sim-ple, uncomplicated
matter which the respondent could confront squarely if he were honestly and sincerely appointed notary, does not
avail him any good. It, in fact, reveals his desperate position. Hence, the necessity to encapsulate himself in a
shell to forestall. an inquiry into the real merits of the case. Procedural norms, however, have their limits. As this
Court said in Alonzo vs. Villamor[6] "Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes
its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."

4. The contention that the criminal cases now pending against the respondent pose prejudicial questions to the
resolution of the primordial issue in the instant proceeding has no merit. First, the respondent has not cited, and
this Court does not find, any provision of the Constitution, the statutes, or the Rules of Court which can justify the
theory. Second, in a criminal case it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the accused 'is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, which is not so in a suspension or dis-barment proceeding where only
clearly preponderant evidence is required.[7] Third, an accused in a criminal case may escape conviction not
necessarily on the ground that he did not commit the acts charged in the information. Not infrequently, criminal
cases pending in trial courts are dis-missed on account of the failure of witnesses for the prosecution to appear
and testify or on account of a sworn desistance by the complainant. And fourth, in our opinion, it is not sound
judicial policy 'to await the final resolution of a criminal case before we may act on a complaint or information
against a lawyer and impose the judgment appropriate to the facts. Otherwise, this Court as well the courts below
will be effectively rendered helpless from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership
in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.

5. The charge that the respondent's right to an impartial trial was violated cannot be sus-tained. No specific act of
hostility or prejudice toward the respondent by the judge below has been pointed out to this Court. The only reason
cited is that Judge Gironella, who penned the decision suspending the respondent, was the one who tried and
rendered the decision in Civil Case 657 and likewise the same magistrate who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaints filed by Atty. Bringas against the respondent for falsification and introduction
of falsified evidence in a judicial proceeding. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient indicia of lack of
impartiality of the judge below.

The principal and basic charge against the respondent is that he was not a duly commissioned notary public in
1969 for Abra when he notarized the deed of sale marked Exhibit "1" in Civil Case 657. Since the appointments of
notaries public are a matter of public record and require formal documentation, all that the respondent needed to
do was to show to the court below his appointment papers. This he failed to do. An inquiry was made by the judge
a quo from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Juan P. Aquino; whether the respondent was
appointed a notary public in the years 1967 to 1970; the answer, which was dated September 14, 1972, or before
the court below transferred from the Capitol Building to its present site on September 26, 1972, was in the
negative.

At any rate, the entire record of the case below was elevated to this Court and the respondent was accorded
ample opportunity to demonstrate that the findings below are erroneous. We are satisfied from the evidence before
us that the respondent, with malice aforethought, falsely pretended that he was appointed a notary public in 1969
when he notarized the deed of sale marked Exhibit "1" in Civil Case 657.

What made the respondent's pretensions unpar-donable, however, was his act of presenting to this Court spurious
and falsified evidence of his alleged commission. Instead of accepting his misdeeds and asking for leniency, the
respondent chose to sow even more falsehood. The alacrity of the respondent in foisting deception on this Court
is, in the perspective of his long years in the Bar, a manifest sign that as the respondent has gained in age, he has
veered further away from life's virtues. By his persistent disregard of the lawyer's credo "to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court," the respondent has demonstrated beyond cavil that he is not fit and worthy
to con-tinue in the distinguished and exalted calling of the Bar.

In view of all the foregoing, this Court does not consider it necessary to resolve the additional issues raised in
the supplemental complaints of Atty. Bringas.

ACCORDINGLY, Agripino A. Brillantes of Bangued, Abra is hereby disbarred. This decision shall be immediately
executory.
 A.C. No. 3806 December 16, 1992

ARACELI S. DE JESUS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CONSUELO COLLADO, respondent.

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 3 February 1992 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Araceli De Jesus
charged Consuelo Collado, Court Attorney IV in the Office of the Clerk of Court (Third Division), Supreme Court,
with committing "the deceitful act of issuing nine (9) bouncing checks in the total amount of P243,063.75,
manifesting conduct unbecoming of a public servant and member of the Bar."1 In another sworn letter-complaint
dated 10 March 1992 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (docketed as Adm Case No. 3806), the same
complainant further sought the disbarment of the respondent for committing that alleged deceitful act.2

A copy of the first letter complaint was served by the complainant on the Chief Administrative Officer of the
Supreme Court, Atty. Adelaida C. Baumann.3 This circumstance led to the commencement of an administrative
investigation of respondent for possible violation of the Civil Service Law.

In an Indorsement dated 12 February 1992, Atty. Baumann required respondent to submit her comment on the
letter-complaint of 3 February 1992 within five (5) days from notice thereof.4 Respondent failed to submit a
comment despite due notice.

A second Indorsement dated 17 March 1992 was served on respondent on 30 March 1992 and required her to
answer the charge within seventy-two (72) hours, as well as to indicate whether she wished to be heard in a
formal investigation. This Indorsement warned respondent that a failure to answer the charge would be construed
as waiver of her right to be heard.5 No answer or comment was ever received from respondent.6

Meanwhile, acting on the disbarment complaint dated 10 March 1992, the Court resolved on 19 March 1992 to
require respondent Atty. Collado to submit a comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.7 Respondent
complied with this resolution after considerable delay, submitting a two-page comment for the purpose.8 In a
Resolution dated 2 June 1992, the Court, acting upon complainant's "Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Bar Atty. Collado's
Trip to the United States" dated 7 May 1992, ordered the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to issue a
hold-departure order to stop respondent from leaving the country."9

In a Resolution dated 28 July 1992, the Court further directed the Office of Administrative Services to complete its
civil service disciplinary investigation of respondent's case and to submit its report and recommendation to the
Court within thirty (30) days. 10 The required report, prepared by Atty. Ennar Cabanilla of the Complaints and
Investigation Division, was submitted to the Court on 7 September 1992. 11 The report summed up the facts of the
case as follows:

In said letter-complaint [dated 3 February 1992], it was alleged: (1) that in November and December 1991, Collado
obtained from complainant several merchandise; (2) that, as payment for said merchandise, Collado issued postdated
checks; (3) that, after making good two or three checks, the others were dishonored by the drawee bank due to
insufficiency of funds and closed accounts; and (4) that despite repeated demands, Collado failed to comply with her
obligations. In support of her claim, complaint attached therewith xerox copies of the dishonored checks.

xxx xxx xxx

Pending resolution of the instant case, this Office was apprised by complainant, through her submission of an
affidavit of desistance dated 5 August 1992, that she is no longer interested to proceed with all the administrative
and criminal cases she filed against Collado since the latter has already paid her obligation in full through the
replacement of her dishonored checks with cash.

xxx xxx xxx 12

The bouncing checks respondent had issued gave rise to at lease nine criminal informations for estafa or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, against respondent, who posted bail for her provisional liberty. 13 As far as the record is
concerned, these criminal cases are still pending in court.

No separate proceeding for the taking of evidence regarding the disbarment complaint was undertaken. However,
considering that respondent had been given due notice of the fact that two (2) distinct proceedings had been instituted
against her; that she was given a fair opportunity to reply the charges in both proceedings; that she effectively waived
such an opportunity in the civil service disciplinary proceeding and that respondent had in fact replied to the charges in
the disbarment proceeding through the submission of a two-page comment, the Court considers that there is no legal
obstacle to a definitive resolution of the two complaints filed against respondent.
Coming first to the complaint for disbarment, respondent Collado admits that she had purchased merchandise
from complainant De Jesus on credit, with the intention of reselling the same to friends and neighbors.
Respondent also admits having issued postdated checks, allegedly upon complainant's request in order to "fix"
respondent's obligation to complainant. Respondent stated that her buyers did not remit their payments to
respondent, resulting in her inability to "fully cover the figures mentioned in the check(s)." Respondent contends
that her transactions with complainant De Jesus were "purely private in character and [did] not in any manner
concern [her] being employed in the Supreme Court and, likewise, [her] membership in the Bar." 14

We note that respondent Collado had also admitted before the Office of the Prosecutor of the City of Manila,
during preliminary investigation of the charges of estafa or violations of B.P. Blg. 22, that she had issued the
postdated checks which were dishonored upon their presentment.

In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.
We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as either
the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is concerned. 15 Since she had
admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount
thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious
misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar. That misconduct was in effect compounded when, according to the
complainant, respondent was about to evade performance of her obligation by leaving the country and proceeding
to the United States, a course of action frustrated by the hold-departure order issued by this Court and not denied
by respondent.

Time and again this Court has stressed that the conduct of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from
the judges to the most junior of clerks, must at all times be characterized with propriety and decorum and be above
suspicion. 16 The Court has also held that a member of the Bar must observe honesty and fairness even in private
transactions and that failure to do so may be a ground for disciplinary action against the lawyer. 17 In the case at bar,
respondent Collado failed to live up to the demanding standards required from members of the Bar.

Turning to the administrative (civil service) disciplinary case against respondent Collado, we agree with the
investigating attorney that the acts committed by respondent Collado also constitute serious misconduct which
is a ground under Civil Service law and regulations, for separation from the service. 18

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to

(1) in the disciplinary proceedings addressed to respondent Atty. Consuelo Collado as a member of the Bar, to
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. A copy of this Resolution shall be
furnished to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. This Resolution shall also be spread on
the personal record of respondent Atty. Collado in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and

(2) in the Civil Service disciplinary case, to DISMISS respondent Collado from the service for serious
misconduct, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government service, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. All retirement benefits or privileges to which respondent may be entitled,
except leave credits already earned, are hereby DECLARED FORFEITED.

398 SCRA 148

[A.C. No. 4801. February 27, 2003]

MENA U. GERONA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING, respondent.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mena U. Gerona against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling for allegedly falsifying
a document and notarizing it afterwards.

The complaint, which is in the form of an affidavit, concerns a document entitled Consent to Quarry purporting to
be an agreement whereby complainant Mena U. Gerona and her party, composed of Lucila Umali Magboo,
Feliciano U. Umali, Marife Umali, Jovita Umali Galicia, P.J. Galicia, Wendy Sunshine Umali, and Aurelia Umali
Miranda, allegedly agreed to allow Ronald Reagan Hernandez, represented by Engr. Bayani N. Melo, of legal age,
Filipino, of Alangilan, Batangas City, his heirs, successors, and assigns, to enter or occupy a portion of their
property in Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas and engage in a QUARRY business and related activities.[1]

Complainant stated:

1. That I am filing a case for disbarment against ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING of Batangas City whose house
is at the back of the Provincial Jail;
2. That I am constrained to file such disbarment case for the reason that the said ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING
in notarizing the attached document, Annexes A and A-1, he made it appear that I together with my brother and
sisters appeared before him on July 2, 1997 when in truth and in fact we did not and in the said document Atty.
Alfredo Datingaling said, and I quote:

BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR AND IN THE CITY OF BATANGAS PERSONALLY APPEARED THE
FOLLOWING PERSONS, NAMELY:

RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ, represented by: ENGR. BAYANI MELO

LUCILLE U. MAGBOO

MENA U. ENRIQUEZ GERONA

FELICIANO UMALI

JOVITA U. GALICIA

WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI

AURELIA UMALI MIRANDA

KNOWN TO ME AND TO ME KNOWN TO [BE] THE SAME PERSONS WHO EXECUTE[D] THE FOREGOING
INSTRUMENT AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED TO [HAVE] MADE THE SAME AS THEIR FREE AND
VOLUNTARY ACT AND DEED.

THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT RELATES TO A CONSENT TO QUARRY AGREEMENT, CONSIST[ING] OF

TWO (2) PAGES, INCLUDING THE PAGE IN WHICH THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT [IS] WRITTEN AND HAS
BEEN SIGNED BY THE PARTIES TOGETHER WITH THEIR INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON EACH AND
EVERY PAGE THEREOF.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 1997 AT BATANGAS CITY, PHILIPPINES.

3. That aside from the fact that not one of us appeared before Notary Public Alfredo Datingaling at Batangas City
on July 2, 1997 and we have individual daily time records as we are working in Metro Manila, we have signed
each and every document of Annexes A and A-1 before him as stated by him in his acknowledgement and clearly
page 1 which is Annex A has not been signed by any of us and the name WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI refers to
two persons which are my nieces, Wendy is nine (9) years old and Sunshine is twelve (12) years old and both of
them have no legal personality to appear before a Notary Public to sign any legal document and moreover
RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ who appears to have a Residence Certificate No. 8988196 is a son of Elvira
Atienza and is only nine (9) years of age and the first page, Annex A has been written on a different typewriter and
inserted to the document as the front page and allegedly signed on July 3, 1997 at Batangas City ahead of the
notarization of the document which was on July 2, 1997. In short, Atty. Alfredo Datingaling falsified the whole
document and he aggravated such act of falsification when he notarized the same; that moreover, it refers to a
parcel of land which has never been agreed by the parties;

4. That for such acts of falsification, I have filed with the City Fiscals Office of Batangas City a falsification
case against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling and his clients, Elvira Atienza, Bayani Melo and Apolonia Bonado.[2]

Complainant charged that despite knowledge of the falsity of the document, respondent, as notary public for
Batangas City, notarized it on July 3, 1997.

This Court required respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling to comment on the administrative complaint filed against
him. In his counter-affidavit dated March 2, 1998, respondent claimed that the complaint is baseless, out of focus,
an afterthought, childish and in the nature of self-indictment.[3] Respondent denied the allegations against him and
claimed that complainant had signed the documents on July 2, 1997 in Quezon City and had it notarized by
respondent the next day (July 3, 1997) in Batangas City. Respondent stated in his counter-affidavit:

The document was already prepared when it was brought to my law office by Bayani Melo and company who
signed in our office on July 03, 1997. It was my secretary who stamped my name as Notary Public on the bottom
of the Acknowledgement ready for my signature, but through inadvertence she overlooked that date July 02, 1997
thereof as the date of the actual notarization. It bears emphasis that such date (July 02, 1997) was typewritten
beforehand which could easily be reformed if the parties so desire. So why does the complainant want to create
trouble?

Explaining a little further, the negotiation or transaction between the group of Ronald Hernandez represented by
Bayani Melo on the one hand (my client), and the group of Mena Umali Gerona on the other took place at the
residence of Mena Umali Gerona in Quezon City where the document in question was prepared on July 2,
1997, and the parties agreed to meet each other in Batangas City, the following day July 3, 1997 for purposes of
notarization at the office of the Notary Public ATTY. ALFREDO R. DATINGALING.[4]

Attached to the counter-affidavit were the affidavits of Bayani Melo and Matias Magnaye (marked Annexes A and
B, respectively),[5] corroborating respondents allegations. Bayani Melo had signed as the representative of Ronald
Reagan Hernandez, while Matias Magnaye as a witness to the Consent to Quarry.

In reply, complainant submitted an affidavit, dated April 23, 1998, received by this Court the following day.
Respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days, but he did not do so.

In her reply-affidavit, complainant submitted a copy of the resolution of the provincial prosecutor of Batangas in
I.S. No. 97-3353 (for falsification of public document), finding probable cause against respondent and
recommending the filing of an information for falsification of a public document against all the respondents named
in the case, including herein respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling. The prosecutor stated:

After a painstaking study and careful analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, the undersigned has
observed the following striking dissimilarities on the two copies of the document Consent to Quarry
(Authorization) which would clearly distinguish one from the other, to wit:

Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has that blank space for the
technical description of a parcel of land subject of their agreement; it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the
bottom but unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.

On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry reveals that the technical description
refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao, Mabini, Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and
in the approved plan/Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry; it is dated July 3, 1997, it has two
signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan Hernandez and it is also unsigned by Lucila
Umali Magboo.

Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the signatures of Mena U. Gerona,
Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the signatures of witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and
Apolonia before the acknowledgment portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment portion;
blank as to the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series of.

Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures of Mena, Feliciano, and Aurelia as well
as the witnesses before the acknowledgment portion; it is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R.
Datingaling and it is docketed as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.

It has been also established that the said document was brought to Menas residence on July 2, 1997 ready for
signatures and in fact it was signed there by Mena, Feliciano, Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those
witnesses. After the signing of said document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were brought by the
group of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling on July 3, 1997. The issue now
is whether the crime of falsification has been committed by the respondents?

From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent to quarry and the testimony of the
complainant and his brother Feliciano, the undersigned honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had
been committed by the respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is clear that Mena Umali and her
brother and sisters had not presented themselves or appeared before said Notary Public for the acknowledgment
of said document as their free act and voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized document are
different from the lot they intended to be the subject of their agreement. From the unnotarized copy dated July 2,
1997 which bears the proposed insertions/modifications, the land intended to be described as the subject of that
agreement is but a parcel of land while in the notarized copy, it describes two parcels of land. Further, had the
complainant and her brother and sisters appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said document, then
there is no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda would not be required to
sign on the first page of the document. In fact, Bayani Melo signed again the said document on the first page while
Ronald Reagan Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was required to sign said document on the
first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.

....

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an information for Falsification of
Public Document be filed against all the respondents under I.S. No. 97-3353 . . . . [6]

In addition, complainant submitted on December 4, 2000 a list of criminal cases, eight in all, filed against
respondent, including that filed by complainant. Four of the cases had been dismissed, while four others were
pending. Most of the cases were for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, estafa, and estafa through falsification of a public
document.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Thereafter, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, to whom this case was assigned, recommended the suspension of
respondent Alfredo R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a period of one year. In his report, Atty.
Cunanan stated:

We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has not shown qualities that endear him
to the profession or the Bar. While complainants present criminal case against the respondent may be pending,
and he still enjoys the presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is concerned,
the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the evidence presented by the complainant
considered vis--vis the unconvincing explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and
the criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.

We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a
period of one (1) year.[7]

The IBP Board of Governors approved the report with modification:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, . . . the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner . .
.; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility more
particularly Canons 1 and 7, Respondents Commission as Notary Public is hereby SUSPENDED with
disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for two years from receipt of notice.[8]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration declaring himself innocent and insisting he had no participation in
the transaction. In addition, he denied receipt of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, his motion
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the case as it had
already been endorsed to this Court. The IBP Board cited Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court as the basis of
this resolution.

Rule 139-B, 12(b) provides:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

....

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v.
Villanueva[9] that although Rule 139-B, 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is nothing in its
text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors may be filed within 15 days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion before
the Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed
through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[10]

Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was filed after the records of this case had
been forwarded to this Court, we have decided to treat the motion as a petition for review within the
contemplation of Rule 139-B, 12 (b).

After due consideration of respondents motion for reconsideration, we find the motion to be without merit.

First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against respondent, the records show that as
of the date of filing of respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still
pending trial before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.[11] Respondent claims that although he
notarized the document, he had no participation whatsoever in the transaction. He merely notarized the document
on the representation of the persons who appeared before him.[12]

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of a respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[13]
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired.[14] To be sure, conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty
in an administrative proceeding. As we have held in Calub v. Suller,[15] the dismissal of a criminal case is not
determinative of the liability of the accused for disbarment. In the case at bar, however, the criminal prosecution
based on the same acts charged in this case is still pending in the court. To avoid contradictory findings, therefore,
any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case for
falsification of a public document.

Second. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato Cunanan, as to the violation of Act No. 2103
are fully supported by the evidence. Act No. 2103, 1(a) provides:

The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.[16]

Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the document to appear personally before
him and to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by
other persons, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the ones who had executed
the same and the latter should be required to affirm their acts.[17] Respondent failed to do this.

Respondent also failed to controvert complainants evidence that Wendy Sunshine Umali are actually two different
persons named Wendy and Sunshine, both surnamed Umali; that they were minors at the time of the execution of
the aforesaid document; and that their signatures therein had been made by an unidentified person. It is clear even
from the face of the Consent to Quarry that Wendy and Sunshine Umali are two different minors, who were
represented by a person who signed the document in their behalf, thus lending credence to complainants claim
that the document is fictitious. In fact, the residence certificate number of Wendy Sunshine Umali is not stated in
the notarized document. In addition, page one of the agreement appears to have been intercalated and to have
been typed with a different machine.

The acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a private document is converted into a
public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.[18]

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot therefore be overemphasized. No less than the public
faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.

However, the suspension of respondent from his commission as a notary public for two years, as recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors, is too severe a penalty for what he has committed. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr.,[19] this
Court suspended respondents commission as a notary public for one year for notarizing the verification of a motion
to dismiss when the fact was that three of the affiants had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he had been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the suspension of
respondent from his commission as notary public for one year would be proper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of violation of Act No. 2103, 1(a) and is hereby
SUSPENDED from his commission as notary public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely. The charge of falsifying
a public document is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an administrative case for the same act should
the evidence warrant such action.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7747 July 14, 2008

CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAÑA, Respondent.

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint1 for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).2 Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated
Complaint-Affidavit3 which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, charging the respondent
and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).

The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:

Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the
Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation
engaged in spot currency trading.4 Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a
minimum amount of ₱100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that the
said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum
allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company
would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the monthly
guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks
covering the principal investments.5

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketing’s promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier
issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the complainants, thus went to
Wealth Marketing’s office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a
new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and
obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth
Marketing’s Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would
assume the obligations of the former company.6 To put a semblance of validity to such representation,
respondent signed an Agreement7 to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the
investors.8 This prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketing’s officers and directors
which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against the
respondent and his co-accused.9

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law,
to this date.

In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to
submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed
by the complainants.11 The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the
Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent
failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in
default and the case was heard ex parte.

In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketing’s executives (which included respondent
herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting
innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as
Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such
undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketing’s financial status could not support the investors’
demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to
perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously
suspended by this Court for committing similar acts of defraudation.13 Considering the gravity of the acts
committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including the
jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme
Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty.
Antoniutti K. Palaña be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board
of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.14

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Commissioner’s report and recommendation.15

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so
doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in
their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.16

In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role, being Wealth
Marketing’s Chairman of the Board and Ur-Link’s representative. We quote with approval the
Commissioner’s findings, thus:

As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati, it appears that the executive officers of Wealth
Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of
recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was
no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities
and Exchange Commission to perform such task.

In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation, the
authorized capital stock is only ₱9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only
₱605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on
hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources and
financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such as this would
arise.

xxxx

Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their investments, said
respondent even formed and made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the
complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing
Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the purpose of employing fraud.17

To be sure, respondent’s conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still pending in court is of
no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.18 Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case
before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply
the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.19
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law.20 The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court.21

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.22

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative case, for he had been
previously suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaña23 and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v.
Palaña.24 In Samala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources
Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense by making
himself part of the money trading business when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which
FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended
for six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.261avvphi1

The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by
the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.27

Finally, we note that respondent’s case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him.
As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position
paper, nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.28 The Court has
emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.29 Verily, respondent’s failure to
comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial
authorities.30 As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this
Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in
reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.31 By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited
an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.32

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned
for which he was penalized with a three-year suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior
of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a
much graver penalty --- disbarment.33 Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaña is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

84 SCRA 554
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of
the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which
the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made
the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526
and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law
is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of
the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise
of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a
body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It
is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is
a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the
Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from
overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of
the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of
the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her
counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined
the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with
complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing
in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The
complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to
be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the
complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon
Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent
proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting
married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's
promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and
signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved
complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside
and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest
her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I
promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and
then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was
already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2)
sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and
proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were
married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way,
complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to
comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage
which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent
is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed
by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on
June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel.
He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of
introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.
Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his
behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27,
1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that
respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver
Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at
3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City.
When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of
that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in
October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies
from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him
to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise
admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified
by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a
certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records
clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that
she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria
Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he
used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to
discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were
sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established
by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the
complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage
and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now
section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice
of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena,
Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence,
it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for
the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show
where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may
not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when
to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that
the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be
restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re
Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs.
Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is
now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

IN RE: RUSIANA 56 SCRA 242

On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on
January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited such a frame of mind and
observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the legal profession," ordered his disbarment.

Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission, supported by resolutions from
members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of professional and
civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to respondent's good conduct and moral character since his
disbarment, and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal profession.

The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously disbarred, is to
determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the effort
he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-
admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.

The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified petition for
reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral character
(clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu, Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials
on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the
Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu
Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a
resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:

"x x x [A] cling on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar, and considering
(a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the said respondent may be
considered as having undergone adequate punishment; (c) that he has observed exemplary conduct since then,
according to credible certifications attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago,
and may be reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view
of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render
adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is
hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his
filing with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attesting to his
having regularly attended and passed their subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant
Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court."

Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Court's above-quoted resolution, as
evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting
to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students, and
the separate letters, both dated February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of
the University of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar
Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.

WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972, respondent Carlos C. Rusiana is
hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this Court the requisite
fees.

IN RE: SATURNINO PARCASIO

69 SCRA 339

The Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision dated August 31, 1966 convicted Atty. Saturnino Parcasio of
Malita, Davao del Sur, together with Mariano Regis, of robbery with intimidation and imposed on him an
indeterminate sentence of one year, seven months and seventeen days of prision correctional to six years and one
day of prision mayor and to pay an indemnity of P200 to Venancio Sepulveda (Criminal Case No. 8466).

The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in CA-G.R. No. 07232-Cr. dated November 27, 1968. This Court in its
resolutions of August 4 and September 29, 1969 denied the petition for the review of the Appellate Court's decision
(L-30781, Parcasio vs. People). Parcasio commenced the service of his sentence on November 11, 1970.

The robbery imputed to Parcasio and Regis was that in collaboration with Ong Pin they extorted on June 10,
1963 from Sepulveda (a naturalized Filipino citizen) two hundred pesos so that it would not be necessary for
Sepulveda to appear in Manila for investigation (Parcasio was Congressman Rasid Lucman's secretary and
Regis posed as the Congressman's agent).

This Court in its resolution of November 5, 1969 referred Parcasio's case to the Solicitor General for disbarment
proceedings.

Acting on this Court's directive, the then Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio filed on May 5, 1971 against Parcasio
(who was admitted to the bar in 1959) a complaint, praying that the respondent be disbarred by reason of
having committed a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Parcasio in his answer to the complaint said that he disagreed with the factual and legal findings in the judgment
of conviction rendered against him. He alleged that he filed a motion in the trial court to reopen his case on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, consisting of (a) the affidavit of Patrolman Fidel de Guzman, stating that
Sepulveda admitted to him that Parcasio never extorted money from the complainant (Sepulveda); (b) a summons
dated June 21, 1963 from Congressman Lucman, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and
Naturalization for Mindanao and Sulu, requiring Sepulveda to appear before the subcommittee to shed light on his
acquisition of Philippine citizenship and of real properties, and (c) the directive dated June 3, 1963 addressed by
Congressman Lucman to Julito Ongpin, his special investigator, and Regis, his confidential assistant, to conduct
an investigation of the alleged fraudulent income tax return of Vicente Maruya, the mayor of Malita, Davao del Sur.

Parcasio revealed that the Provincial Fiscal did not interpose any objection to his motion but the trial court denied
it on the ground of loss of jurisdiction.

Parcasio annexed to his answer a certification from Judge Vicente Cusi, Jr. (who rendered the judgment of
conviction against him) stating that Parcasio appeared to be a bright and promising young lawyer who, if given a
chance, would be a credit to the law profession. Also annexed to the answer was a letter dated May 31, 1971
addressed to the President of the Philippines by Martin V. Delgra, Jr. (the fiscal who filed the information for
robbery against Parcasio and directed his prosecution and who was then President of the Davao del Sur
Lawyers' League), stating that "an error had been committed" in the conviction of Parcasio and recommending an
absolute pardon for him.

The case was set for hearing on September 6, 1971. The parties did not appear. The case was deemed submitted
for decision on that date.

On June 12, 1975 the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and
Parole, granted to Parcasio "an absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political
rights". (He served his sentence from November 11, 1970 to September 15, 1971).

On October 9, 1975 Atty. Parcasio (now forty-three years old) filed a "manifestation" praying for the dismissal of
this case on the basis of the absolute pardon. Annexed to his manifestation were carbon copies of the certifications
as to his good moral character signed in November, 1970 by Judges Alfredo I. Gonzales, Cayetano F. Tuason and
Elviro Peralta and by three Fiscals. The original certifications were attached to his petition for executive clemency.

Asked to comment on Atty. Parcasio's manifestation, the Solicitor General offered no objection to the dismissal of
the instant case. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its President, Atty. Liliano B. Neri, also
recommended the dismissal of the case. The respondent in his motion of November 19, 1975 submitted the
certification of Judge Cusi, reiterating his 1970 certification, that Atty. Parcasio "should be given the chance to
remain in the practice of law".

The question is whether in view of the plenary pardon granted to Atty. Parcasio during the pendency of this
disbarment proceeding, its dismissal is warranted. That is not an unprecedented and novel issue.

In the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 a disbarment proceeding was filed against Marcelino Lontok because he
was convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude. During the pendency of the disbarment proceeding,
Lontok was pardoned by the Governor General. At the instance of the Attorney-General, the disbarment case
against Lontok was dismissed by reason of the pardon.
This Court in the Lontok case applied the rule that "a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense." "If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity." (Ex-Parte Garland, 4 Wall.
380. As to nondisbarment cases where the rule was applied, see Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39; Pelobello
vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441; Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507; Flora vs. Oximana, L-19745, January 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 212; Lacuna vs. Abes, L-28613, August 27, 1968, 24 SCRA 780).

The ruling in the Lontok case applies to this case. Hence, respondent's motion for dismissal may be granted. (Cf.
In re Gutierrez, 115 Phil. 647, where the rule was not applied because the pardon was conditional).

Wherefore, the instant case is dismissed. So ordered.

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

5 SCRA 663

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal
case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon
Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty
of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101),
but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted
a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil.
293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5
Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond
the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent
therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court
decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for
a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the
case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ.
App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer
be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met
with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any
felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of
this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received.
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon
and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the
United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon
the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position
(respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez,
supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed
with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension
or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

MARITES E. FREEMAN
Vs
ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES

AC 6246
November 15, 2011
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman, seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without
rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased
husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance
proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.

In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant alleged that her
husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her son, Frank
Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the
visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she had
to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all
expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment
for the receipt of P47,500.00 for service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a
Cash/Check Voucher,[2] issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in the
amount of P50,000.00 and the date 12-5-98 were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she acceded
into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary
Receipt[3] bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she
went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional amount of
P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary Receipt[4] bearing said date, issued by respondents law firm. After
several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa applications, respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang
pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa Embassy. (It is difficult to railroad the process of securing visa,
because you are blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that
to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or grease money to bribe some staff of
the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued
on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue resident visas instead of tourist visas.
Respondent told her that to expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again give P20,000.00 and a
bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as grease money to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After several weeks,
respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and that another amount of P18,000.00 was
needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary Receipt,[5]
dated April 19, 1999, to be used for booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per
Temporary
Receipt[6] dated May 13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were
issued by respondents law firm.

Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came out. Instead, she received a
picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later learned that
respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it. Respondent explained that she needed to go to
London to follow-up the insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed
the proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a letter[7] dated March 9,
1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the arrangements for
the funeral and that her late husband was covered by three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society
(Account Number 0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No.
PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512).[8] Respondent offered to help and assured
her that representations with the insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would be
receiving the insurance proceeds soon.

According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special Power of Attorney (SPA),
[9] dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to follow-up the insurance claims.
However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not notarized, but another SPA,[10] dated April 6,
1999, was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came
across a similar copy of the SPA,[11] dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this
time, additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and consent,
respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her correspondence with the insurance companies
in London.

Complainant discovered that in an undated letter,[12] addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish Equitable PLC
(Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her husband left no will and that she had no verified
information as to the total value of her husband's estate and the existence of any property in London that would be
subjected to Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for probate
in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added therein that As to the matter of
the installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent
directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St.
Barangay Central District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account name: Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her
temporary account until further notice.

Subsequently, in a letter[13] dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group
(PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the complainant],
per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999], replied that she had appended the documents required
(i.e., marriage certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter,[14] dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance
company; that pursuant to an SPA[15] executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should
be forwarded to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether complainant is entitled to death benefits
under the policy and, if so, the amount due and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the absence of a
Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left no will), she enclosed an alternative document [referring to the
Extrajudicial Settlement[16] dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the surviving
spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence Freeman). In the same letter, respondent reiterated
that complainant requests that any amount of monies due or benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account
No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola,
which serves as her temporary account until further notice.

Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her passport
and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not heeding her
demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss
about the visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On
the supposed rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel
and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who assured her that he
would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made her sign an application for visa and demanded the
amount of P3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm,
who advised her to ask respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer[17] dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998, complainant,
accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another woman
whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the inheritance of her deceased husband, a
British national.[18] She told complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their
son, and other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before she accepted
the case, she explained to complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance fee of
P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said
complainant agreed to these rates and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA,[19] dated April 6,
1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been executed in her favor, she made preliminary
communications with the insurance companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received
communications from said insurance companies, she stated that complainant offered, which she accepted, to
shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for
London in May 1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims.

As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked her why she had not
left for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She explained to
complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle the visa arrangements for a fee, to
which the latter agreed. She stated that when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in
December 1999, to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous visa
applications had been denied four times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was able
to secure a visa through the help of the travel consultant, who charged her a professional fee of P50,000.00. She
added that she had no participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the said
travel consultant.

With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the existence of the same, and
declared that the SPA,[20] dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis
for communications with the insurance companies in London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through
wily representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary, and never returned
the same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then
had no immediate need of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case
folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so as to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's
lingering ailment and consequent death.[21] Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the case folder
and, thus, the law firm was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that
through complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her law office was prevented from effectively pursuing
her claims. Between January to February 2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the
expenses incurred[22] by the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a
malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations.

On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments
on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter[23] dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's
Court, respondent began to show interest and volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee
was agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal fees and expenses to be
incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to
be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that
upon return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance companies in
London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason
why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International Law Conference, not solely for her insurance
claims, which explained why the receipt for the
P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she
merely made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an
SPA [referring to the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of 10,546.7
[should be 10,960.63],[24] or approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of
respondent, but the same was never turned over to her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that
she never executed any SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the only
SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court proceedings.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint[25] for malicious mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal
Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for allegedly barging into the law
office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the
line connections for the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment in an
estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution,[26] dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The case
was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and for failure of respondent to appear during the
preliminary investigation of the case.[27]

Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the
Resolution[28] dated October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be
withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.[29] Consequently, in the Order[30] dated November 27, 2002,
the trial court granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case.

In the Report and Recommendation[31] dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the
trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance
proceeds intended for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the
approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that
through deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of
complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to
complainant the amounts she received from the London insurance companies.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-166,[32] adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred.

The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently
substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance
proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be disbarred.

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and
to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[33]

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney.[34]

Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's
administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages
as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising
from the respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts.

In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa
applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the
scope of authority of respondent to represent the complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA,[35] dated November 6, 1998,
which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent
her and her son, in order to protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the
possibility of any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both in the Philippines and
United Kingdom. The [second] SPA,[36] dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the
forged signature of complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear and
represent the complainant, in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury
warrants, checks arising from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for
the successful pursuit of the claims. The [third] SPA,[37] also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999,
allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses,
was a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to the
pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of the records of the case, were not certified true copies and no
proof was adduced to verify their genuineness and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of
respondent in her behalf with regard to the insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as
lawyer, that she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a
lawyer-client relationship.[38]

Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to represent the complainant in
pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property of a client when due or upon demand.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.[39] In the present
case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm,
Z.P. Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount of P167,000.00[40] from the
complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's case. Respondent admitted having received money from
the complainant, but claimed that the total amount of P120,000.00[41] she received was in accordance with their
agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant
of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy in the actual amount that
respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as
there was absence of a formal contract of legal services.

Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the purpose of assisting her in
claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry Clearance,[42] dated
December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary purpose in traveling to London was to attend the
International Law Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gall to take
advantage of the benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into
believing that she needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the insurance policies. Worse,
respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of
giving grease money or lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00,[43] to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was
an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite
the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal bank account, as
shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for the years 2000-2001),[44] respondent
never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an
accounting, on the proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis--vis the
correspondence by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following
amounts to the respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter[45] dated November 23, 2000, from one
Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to
complainant, stating, among others, that An amount of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27th
September 2000), and per letter,[46] dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims
(CLD), of the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the Lincoln
Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among others, that I can confirm that a death claim was made on the policy
on 13 October 1999 when an amount of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's legal
representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City, Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of
10,489.57 and 471.06 were remitted to respondent through other means of international transactions, such as the
International Moneymover, which explains why no direct remittance from the insurance companies in London could
be traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per monthly transaction report, covering January to
December for the years 2000-2001.
A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and
the law applicable to each case.[47] Section 5, in relation to Sections 1[48] and 2,[49] Rule 133, Rules of Court
states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the
present case, the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and independent
action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely
substantial evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already
dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown
trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of
acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
or that no crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal
of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and,
a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.

In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature.
Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the
lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not, under
any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.
It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are
guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.[51] Indeed, lawyering
is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[52]

In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for breach of trust and
confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. In Manzano v. Soriano,[53] therein respondent, found
guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client) and malpractice, represented
therein complainant in a collection suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their
agreement and, to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at the
same time, the notary public. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[54] therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice, deceit,
and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's insurance claim, falsified the check and
made it payable to himself, encashed the same, and appropriated the proceeds.

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a
job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom
from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.[55]
Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web
of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance
proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly
transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should
be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the
practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies
remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company
Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant
to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.

SO ORDERED.

LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA
vs
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE
AC 6258
August 24, 2010

For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant) against Atty. Sergio
E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation of real property despite the non-
appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainants father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero,
both of whom were already dead at the time of execution of the said document.

In his Answer,[1] the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero,
considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed, however, that he had no
knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he
notarized the Deed of Donation.[2] He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons
who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.[3]

After the submission of the respondents Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the matter to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline) for investigation, evaluation
and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline made the following findings:

The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath as a lawyer and his
duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation purportedly executed by Benvenuto H.
Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors and Cecilio R. Lustestica and Juliana Lustestica as the donees
on 5 August 1994.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:

x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed. x x x.

As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondents Acknowledgment is the best evidence that NO RESIDENCE
CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the donees. Had the parties presented their residence
certificates to Respondent, it was his duty and responsibility under the Notarial Law to enter, as part of his
certification, the number, place of issue and date of each residence certificate presented by the parties to the Deed
of Donation. Respondent, however, failed to make the required entries. Respondents claim that the persons who
allegedly appeared before him and represented themselves to be the parties to the Deed of Donation showed their
residence certificates and that he instructed his secretary to indicate the details of the residence certificates of the
parties is self-serving and not supported by the evidence on record.

xxxx

The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not only by [the] strength of
Complainants documentary evidence but more importantly, by Respondents own judicial admission. x x x. In view of
Respondents judicial admission that the alleged donors, BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA
P. RIVERO, died on 7 September 1987 and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond reasonable doubt that said
donors could not have personally appeared before him on 5 August 1994 to [acknowledge] to him that they freely and
voluntary executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-judicial notice of the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court finding accused CECILIO LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
as principals of the crime of falsification of public document.[4]

In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the respondent grossly
negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and recommended that the respondents notarial
commission be suspended for a period of one (1) year. The IBP Commissioner also recommended that a penalty
ranging from reprimand to suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning that a similar conduct in
the future will warrant an imposition of a more severe penalty.[5]
By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner. The pertinent portion of this Resolution
reads:

[C]onsidering Respondents gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary Public, Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Respondents notarial commission
is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years with a notification that this
suspension of one year must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of
Suspension of one year in CBD Case No. 04-1371.[6]

From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into consideration of the present
case.

First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, respondent,
which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was docketed as A.C. No. 6963[7] before the
Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court revoked the respondents notarial commission and
disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his failure to properly
perform his duties as notary public when he notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. In addition,
the Court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2005-116
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to reconsider the IBP Resolution, claiming
that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed was too harsh. The motion was denied in Resolution No.
XVII-2006-81, dated January 28, 2006,[8] for lack of jurisdiction of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, since the
administrative matter had then been endorsed to the Court.

Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute Resolution dated March 22, 2006, the Court
noted the findings and recommendations in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 and required the complainant to file her
Comment to the respondents motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2006, the complainant filed her Comment
praying for the denial of the motion.

On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondents motion for
reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainants Comment to the respondents
motion before the Court.

Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after considering that no
motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP resolutions, had been filed by the
respondent.[9]

On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar Confidant, requested that
he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow him to be commissioned as a notary public. In
his letter, the respondent alleged that he has already served the penalties imposed against him in A.C. No. 6963
and the present case. He claimed that after the receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he did not practice
his profession and had not been appointed or commissioned as a notary public.

The Office of the Bar Confidant

Acting on the respondents letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and Recommendation, which
states:

1. The EFFECTIVITY of the respondents suspension and disqualification should have been COMMENCED on
the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and not from the date of receipt of the Resolution of the IBP
recommending the respondents suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public, it being recommendatory in nature;

2. The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963 be denied;

3. The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and IBP that he has fully
served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963;

4. The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of the IBP in its Resolution No.
XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No. 6258, for final disposition of the case and for proper
determination whether the order of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after
the respondent has satisfactorily shown that he has fully served the suspension and disqualification.[10]

The Courts Ruling

The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-taken. We cannot
overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos,[11] we stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity.[12] A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face.[13] It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.[14]

The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his duties as a
notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic
function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their residence certificates or any
other document to prove their identities. Given the respondents admission in his pleading that the donors were
already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the
identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.

Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public but also
as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)[15] states:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.

In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. At the same time, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.

In this regard, a reading of the respondents Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows how these provisions
were violated by the respondent:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994, personally appeared:

BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________

CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________

CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________

JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.[16]

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his Acknowledgment that the
persons who appeared before him were known to him to be the same persons who executed the Deed of
Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them and did not ascertain their identities as he attested.[17]

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the requirements under Section
1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged
and presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
certificate) and to enter the residence certificates number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification.[18]
The unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers should have been clearly
established that the respondent did not perform this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the above
infractions committed is in order.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period of one (1) year, from
the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years.
Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabes second infraction, we find the IBPs recommendation to be very light;
it is not commensurate with his demonstrated predisposition to undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer
lightly.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[19] we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties imposed upon a
notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered the lawyers prior misconduct where he
was suspended for a period of six (6) months and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely.[20]

In Flores v. Chua,[21] we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false representations that the
vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. We took into account that he was previously
found administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (for bribing a
judge) and sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future would
be dealt with more severely.[22]

In Traya v. Villamor,[23] we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his notarial practice for
failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person appearing before him is the same person
who executed the document presented for notarization. Taking into account that it was his second offense, he was
perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.[24]

In Social Security Commission v. Coral,[25] we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission of the respondent
lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints that were allegedly executed and
verified by people who have long been dead. We also directed him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred.[26]

Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case, we find that Atty.
Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a
notary public. We emphasize that this is respondents second offense and while he does not appear to have any
participation in the falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross negligence for failing to
ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him as the donors. This is highlighted by his
admission[27] in his Answer that he did not personally know the parties and was not acquainted with them. The
blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did not even require these parties to produce documents that
would prove that they are the same persons they claim to be. As we emphasized in Maligsa:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[28]

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondents request to be given clearance to resume the practice
of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the administrative sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now
moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial
commission.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the Office of the Bar Confidant.

(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with MODIFICATION on
the administrative penalty imposed.

(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the performance of his duties as
notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest attestation, in the course of administering the oath taken before
him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.

(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio
E. Bernabe.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabes record, as a member of the bar, and copies
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts.

In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at the time of
notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor General, Department of Justice
for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem appropriate to bring against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA AND MAXIMO A. GLINDO

VS
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

AC 9081
October 12, 2011

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo
(Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross
misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought
Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23
July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-
asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC,
Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay
ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kayat
bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at
Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza
Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina
na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa
kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung
saan siya ay naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga
pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking
(Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-
sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca,
Quezon.
(Sgd) (Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA

Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca,
Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

Notary Public

PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;

Book No. XI;

Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving
their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all
their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that
the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a
complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared
the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but
she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office
and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature
and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations
and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her
staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and
authority.

Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a
girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in
her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosas desistance did
not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her
function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies
in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later
claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing
much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as
a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaas motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization
of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing
similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which
permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from
each other;5 ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from each
other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married
couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have
against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with
the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary
public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal
effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty.
Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a
copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO
VS
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 6593

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the
respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The
complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino
Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel
Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. xxxx
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to
me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child
of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters
told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at
Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and
Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. xxxx

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to
the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana
P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he
alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when
he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married him in
1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.
He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial
support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools;
all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido
alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May
11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his
children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that
Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning
due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of
the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.
Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty.
Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea
was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and
beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for
concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido
filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of
merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them.
The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido
was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing
that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.[10] The
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan)
submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with
modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar,
Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion
under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that
the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is
already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding
his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of
the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the
penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-
year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed
against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and
to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or
in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in
the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the
complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the
practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is
not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may
be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over
the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice
of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the
disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these
proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence;
her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by
her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute
the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal
financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.[21]
We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.[22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used
legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions
of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development
of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife
was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the
respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a
second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second
marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a
pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled;
it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage,
he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law
was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to
Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place
and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he
took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he
was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent
attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with
two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a
period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by
Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This
was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the
bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a
lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first
marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same
Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example
in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his
own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression
that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and
desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33]
Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively
liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall
not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall
not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree
of morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a
good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held
by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of good moral character has four general
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that
Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty.
Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a
romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she
married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to
our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person
possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters
family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that
he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her
liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with
Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if
viewed outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was
invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later
on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the
honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this
marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this
Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together
with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of
his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us
to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but
note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one
roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing
her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral
values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions
were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as
the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him
during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but
be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be
the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did
not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior
demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of
the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the
Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack
of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido
and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show
the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness
and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with
Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his
oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other
circumstances are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious
flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession
and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized
by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the
illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.
Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig
(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence
when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting,
constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue
his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on
the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution,
as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003,
resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failing to file his comment on the complaint against him.6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his
comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received
no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion
was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the
Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho
St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion
when the same was sent to his law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected
that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has
an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed
that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new
residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of
the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment
on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint
was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt for such failure.10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint.
He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the
same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint,
and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by
respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court
should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a
copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed
at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation
"RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence
with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address.
However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server.
Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili
Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for
failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the
Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the
Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise
resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent
II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No.
922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given
address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as
per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August
4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the
case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera
be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the
court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to
be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite
the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of
Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the
Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox
copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states
that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at
the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a
second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently
took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was
still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as
the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also
clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the
certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of
two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the
complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued
numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will
take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to
comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming
that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a
complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he
wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint.
The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach
respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations -
both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial
process which this Court cannot countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of
the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is,
thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in
the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 ]

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO,
RESPONDENTS.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty.
Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960's when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in
1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court
Dr. Perez.[2]

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the
latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[3] Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.[4]

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no
longer any impediment to their marriage.[5]

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.[6]

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that
was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When
she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once
he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to
legally adopt their son.[7]

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the
said petition.[8]

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter[9] in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig's scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter[10] written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain
the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his
marriage to Gomez.[11]

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.[12]

In a Resolution[13] dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.[14]

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,[15] admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property.
She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may
have and comfort it may provide them.[16]

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of
the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution
of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.[17]

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the
Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.[18]

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if
he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.[19]

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October
2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.[20]

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and
that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out
that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.[21]

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig's romantic overtures; she told
him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.[22]

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.[23]

On June 2, 2003, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order[24] setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on
October 17, 2003[25] and October 20, 2003,[26] respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper[27] on October 24,
2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,[28] which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez
still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt
or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. Respondent's bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism
have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and
expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he
failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he
has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a
serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community.[29]

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the
alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,[30] which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration[31] of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez's uncorroborated allegations. He
pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez' testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status
of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez
and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution[32] dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig's motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,[33] the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to
the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust
and confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."[34] (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."[35] Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community's sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[36]

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig's own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed
again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage
was then already falling apart due to Gomez' serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez
in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved
heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig's sense of social propriety and moral values. It is
a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that
Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr.
Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig's claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with
the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court's finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig's desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'"[37] In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who
has borne him a child.[38]

Atty. Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his
legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig's claim that Dr. Perez's allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and
not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration.
Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render
disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to
prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.[39]

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of
the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo
a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations
of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found
GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

EUGENIA MENDOZA
VS
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
AC 5338
February 23, 2009

PER CURIAM:

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not
be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[1]

Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks
without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her.

Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed
from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest,
secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she
was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's
Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.[2] Claiming that the
amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned
complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of
P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was
able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the
Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999,[3] thereby paying respondent the total
sum of P35,690.00.[4]

Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check
Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20,
2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received
on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and
that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than P6,000.00,
such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling
up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.[5]
In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his
private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.
Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was
complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999
transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason account closed; the
October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case
against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim
that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks
referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that
complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to
maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a
higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.[6]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines[7] (IBP), and the parties were required to file
their position papers.[8]

In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the
hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5, 2001, again filled up three of her blank checks,
Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another criminal complaint, since
the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig
City was dismissed on August 14, 2000.[9]

Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed P100,000.00 in exchange for two
postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks on
complainant's assurance that they were good as cash.[10]

Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
year.[11] The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October
19, 2002.[12] Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of
Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was
already endorsed to the Supreme Court.[13]

On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the conduct of
formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted.[14]

After hearings were conducted,[15] Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report dated
December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended respondent's suspension for three years.[16]

Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who between complainant and respondent
was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his own contradicting allegations, showed that
complainant's version should be given more credence.[17]

Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to respondent was only P24,000.00, since
the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998 was P20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by
April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest.
Moreover, the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all
typewritten[18]

Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was respondent's modus operandi
to demand a certain amount as settlement for the dropping of estafa complaints against his borrowers. As
Commissioner Funa explains:

[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's Office in Pasig
City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On October 2, 2000,
Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was surprised
to receive a demand letter demanding payment once again for another P100,000.00 corresponding to another
three checks, Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and 0047265.

Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated October 17, 2001, this
time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office recommended the filing of the criminal case for one
of the checks.

xxxx
Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to him for loans
(rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and not for a loan contracted on October 13, 1998. x x x He
claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or
on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for which
Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for
P20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15,
2001 for P50,000.00].

xxxx

Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan on November 16, 1999 in his
Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even discuss it in
his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution of the QC
Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16, 1999 transaction was a mere concoction that did not actually occur.
It was a mere afterthought. Respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his possession (checks
dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another estafa/BP 22 case against
Complainant (October 17, 2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office
had been dismissed (August 14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this disbarment case (October 2,
2000).

More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending this second loan of
November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion for
Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact that he alleges that the loan was contracted on
November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and
June 15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or 1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999.
This is strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally.
With no collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent transaction. It was merely concocted by
Respondent.

More importantly, and this is where Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his illegal machinations,
Complainant allegedly received P100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant gave
Respondent, in return, checks also amounting to P100,000.00. The checks were supposedly dated May 16, 2001,
May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 x x x.

Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if he gave away P100,000.00 on November 16, 1999 and
then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending
business would want to earn interest. The same also with a person re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his
haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum,
for 1 years, Respondent should have collected from Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he filled
up totaled only P100,000.00. The same is true in re-discounting a check. If Complainant gave Respondent
P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving Complainant an amount less than P100,000.00. This
exposes his story as a fabrication.

The same observations can be made of the first loan of P100,000.00 secured by Check Nos. 0047261
and 0047262.

More strangely, during the course of the entire investigation, Respondent never touched on what transpired on the
dates of November 15 and 16, 1999. Consider that Complainant's position is that no such transaction took place on
November 15 and 16. And yet, Respondent never made any effort to establish that Complainant borrowed
P100,000.00 on November 15 and then another P100,000.00 again on November 16. Respondent merely focused
on establishing that Complainant's checks bounced --- a fact already admitted several times by the Complainant ---
and the reasons for which were already explained by Complainant. This only shows the lack of candor
of Respondent.[19]

xxxx

We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail sorter earning less than P6,000.00 per month. Who would lend
P200,000.00 to an employee earning such a salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a written
document or a collateral? It defies realities of finance, economy and business. It even defies common sense.[20]

Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v.
Deciembre[21] and Acosta v. Deciembre.[22] In Olbes, complainants therein, who were also postal employees,
averred that respondent without authority filled up a total of four checks to represent a total of P200,000.00. In
Acosta, the complainant therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a
total of P100,000.00. Acosta, however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground that it did not
involve any lawyer-client relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.[23]
On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving Commissoner Funa's
Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219

Adm. Case No. 5338

Eugenia Mendoza vs.

Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of
committing the same set of facts alleged in AC 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law to be served successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite
Suspension.[24]

Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of Governors, nor a petition for review
before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution
merely recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action.

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in
order.

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[25] A
high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar.[26] They must
conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.[27]

The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by
respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on
the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.[28] Indeed, there is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[29]

In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the
legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.

xxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment dated
January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December
20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also
questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly issued to
secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any interest. The same
is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of P100,000.00, which were supposed to
secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these circumstances and the
sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against complainant, and
complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more believable is complainant's claim
that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal
cases in order to harass complainant.

The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001[30] had its dates, amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the
blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan,
were all filled up in her handwriting.[31]

It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts.
In Olbes,[32] complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1,
1999, for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan,
respondent filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity
and used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty
of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as
reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.[33]

In Acosta,[34] complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from respondent
with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already
paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply
therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her blank
checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was
dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction
did not involve any lawyer-client relationship.[35] As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is
erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client relationship.

As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from
his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents
for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance
from the legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired,[36] the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme
power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[37] This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[38]

As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege
to practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
of the Philippines.

TANU REDDI
VS
ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SERBIO, JR.
AC 7027
January 30, 2009
Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and a practicing endodontist in New York, seeks the
disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly deceiving her into giving him a total of US$
3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things, purchasing several real estate properties for resale.

From the records of the case, the following facts are gathered:

Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable activities in India, complainant nurtured
philanthropic desires of her own consisting primarily in opening a hospital with modern facilities in an
underdeveloped part of Asia.[1]
Together with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino citizen,[2] who was her assistant of over 10 years,
complainant visited the Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the level of poverty in the country and the
lack of medical services for the poor,[3] she decided to put up a hospital.[4]

Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging in the real estate business in the Philippines in order
to speed up the generation of funds.[5] Heeding the suggestion, complainant returned to the Philippines in 2003
to explore opportunities in the real estate business.[6]

Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help her acquire real properties for development and/or
resale. Since she could not acquire ownership of lands in the Philippines, respondent advised her to use
corporate vehicles to effect the purchases. Three corporations were thus formed Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic
Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc.[7]

By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying several parcels of land located at Tagaytay City, Las
Pias City, Makati City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. She related the details surrounding the intended acquisition of
property as follows:

Re the Tagaytay City Property

Respondent represented to complainant that his client Teresita Monzon (Teresita) owned an untitled 27-hectare
property located at Tagaytay City. Through the Tagaytay Twins, Inc., complainant and Teresita executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21, 2003 (Tagaytay MOA)[8] prepared by respondent under which she
agreed to finance the titling of the property in the total amount of P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property
would be offered for sale, the proceeds of which would be divided equally between her and Teresita. Complainant
thereupon made staggered payments of US$1,000, P2,000,000, and US$36,360 to Teresita.[9]

Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of the 27-hectare property had been purchased by Aldio
Properties, Inc. in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which sale Teresita challenged in an action for annulment
before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. In said action, respondent was Teresitas counsel of record.[10]

Re the Las Pias City Property

Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a house and lot located at Las Pias City, which were
encumbered by a mortgage, and which respondent represented as owned and being sold by one Francisca
Parales (Francisca)[11] to finance an urgently needed heart surgery of her daughter.[12]

On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to operate a Jollibee food outlet, with the agreement
that out of the profits that its operation would generate, she would get 50% while respondent and Immaculada
would share the remaining 50%.[13] Complainant thus sent respondent sums of money for the acquisition of both
the Las Pias property and a franchise to operate a Jollibee outlet.[14]

Re the Makati City Property

Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C. Mangco (Mangco), alleged legal officer of the intestate
estate of one Faustino Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to be the owner of a real property located at
the consular area adjacent to Forbes Park in Makati City.[15] Complainant having been interested in acquiring the
property, respondent prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (Makati MOA) which she, together with Mangco,
forged on March 20, 2004.[16]

Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did, release P10,000,000 representing the cost of
development and titling of the property, and payment of back taxes; and an additional P2,000,000 for the execution
of the Makati MOA.

Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither owned by the intestate estate of Ramos nor for sale.

Re the Quezon City Property

Respondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the land on which SM North Mall in Quezon City stands,
he representing that it belongs to his client, purportedly a retired US Navy employee who resides in Mindanao.[17]
Complainant assented and transmitted large sums of money to respondent for the purpose of, among other
things, filing a petition for injunction against SM North Mall, paying back taxes, and titling of the land.[18]

Re the Pasay City Property

Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the purchase of a vacant lot located along Roxas Boulevard
in Pasay City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda) and Alma Mallari (Alma), but which was mortgaged to
one Atty. Go to secure a loan of P5,000,000.[19] She also defrayed expenses, on the strength of
respondents representations, to secure title to the lot, settle the mortgage obligation, relocate squatters on the
lot, and bribe a judge to close the transaction.[20

Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such vacant lot along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City;
instead, she found out that the vacant lot referred to was titled in the names of Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBC) and Banco De Oro Universal Bank (BDO).[21]

In light of the foregoing developments, complainants counsel, by letter dated December 19, 2005,[22] demanded
from respondent the return of the amount of US$3,000,000, claimed to be part of the total sum of money she
had sent to him for all the transactions that did not come about. No amount has been returned to complainant.

Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 2006[23] of the present complaint for disbarment against respondent.

By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828 from complainant[24] which amount he
claims was used not only for the purchase of the Las Pias property and discharge of the mortgage thereon, but
also for the setting up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the downpayment on the Makati
property and related expenses.[25]

Respondent likewise admits having represented to complainant that the Las Pias City property belonged to one
Francisca,[26] certificate of title to which and the corresponding deed of sale signed by Francisca, by his claim,
are in his possession; but the title has not been transferred to Tanu, Inc., as agreed, in view of complainants failure
to provide the money needed therefor, he adding that he is also exercising his retaining lien over the Las Pias
documents.[27]

Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent claims having paid P500,000 to Mangco representing
initial payment[28] thereof.

Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits that the Tagaytay MOA exists, and avers that it is
complainant who wants to get out of a perfected sale in order to recover her partial payment amounting to
approximately P4,000,000.[29]

With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states that he is willing to surrender all the documents
pertaining thereto, but would do so only if complainant is first ordered to pay him his professional fees.[30]

As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies complainants claims thereon as mere preposterous allegations.

Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision by Resolution of January 22, 2007.[31]

At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on September 13, 2007 before
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing (the Commissioner),[32] respondent failed to appear despite notice. He
instead sent a representative who sought a resetting as, allegedly, respondent was in Ilocos attending to an
important family matter.[33] The Commissioner, finding respondents absence inexcusable, given that he had ample
time to file a motion for resetting but he did not, considered respondent to have waived his right to participate in the
proceedings.[34] Complainant thereupon presented evidence ex-parte and submitted her position paper.[35]

In her Report and Recommendation[36] submitted to the IBP Board of Governors on December 14, 2007, the
Commissioner found respondent to have committed fraudulent acts which constitute violations of the lawyers
oath and numerous provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), viz:

1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and for legal processes.

Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. With unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, he misappropriated millions of pesos which was [sic] given to him on his
misrepresentation that such were needed for the acquisition of the aforementioned properties.

Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e., falsification as part of his fraudulent scheme) when he
tampered with the Articles of Incorporation of Tanu, Inc.. A perusal of the Articles of Incorporation given by
respondent to complainant shows that the incorporators are Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee, Prasuna Reddy, Ahalya
Devi, and Robert Juntilla. When complainant obtained a copy of the same in September 2005, she discovered
that other names were inserted. The names of respondent, Clarito D. Cardozo, Brian Pellazar, and Michael
Angelo Lopez were intercalated. (Exhibit W)

2. He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he offered properties for sale to complainant on the
misrepresentation that complainant was dealing with the true owners thereof. This is very clear from the documents
he asked complainant to sign; namely, the Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit D) for the Tagaytay property, Deed
of Conditional Sale (Exhibit U) for the Pasay City property, and Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit M) for the
Makati City property. The certificates of title, tax declaration and other documents obtained by complainant from the
various government agencies reveal that all these properties aforementioned were either fictitious, not susceptible
to sale, simulated, or inexistent.

3. Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR which state:

CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

He failed to account for the sums of money he received from complainant and failed to return the same
upon demand. (Copy of demand letter dated 19 December 2005, Exhibit T)

4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which provides:

A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our judges since, he claims, that it is a common practice in
the Philippines.[37] (Underscoring supplied)

The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred; that his name be ordered stricken from
the roll of attorneys; and that he be ordered to return the total amount of US$3,000,000 to complainant.

By Resolution of January 17, 2008,[38] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commissioner, with the modification that respondent was ordered to return only the
admitted amount he received from complainant (US$544,828), without prejudice to complainants recovery of
the other amounts claimed in the appropriate forum.

The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its findings/conclusion that respondent committed estafa
and falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine whether he committed these offenses.

The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the intended
transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is sufficiently established.

It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received from complainant at least US$544,828. He claims,
however, that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the discharge of the
mortgage thereon, the setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the downpayment on the Makati
property and related representation expenses therefor. The Court finds that the claim does not lie.

All that respondent presented to account for the money is a handwritten acknowledgment of a supposed partial
payment of P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one Mangco.[39] By any standard, this
document is a mere piece of paper, Mangco not having been presented, if he exists at all, to confirm that he indeed
issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon demand, for the money held by him in trust an
element of misappropriation[40] complainants claim that respondent employed deceit on her is established.

Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of regard for the seriousness of the charges against
him. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him.[41] He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him.[42] This, respondent miserably failed to do.

Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any documents to substantiate the so-called property
acquisitions that he is exercising his retaining lien over them as, allegedly, his professional fees have not been paid
is incredible.

If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to practice law is on the line, respondent could
have readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a semblance of credibility to his
claim. His retaining lien claim remains just that. Worse, it only amounts to an admission that he acted as counsel
for complainant; yet, he completely failed to show that in his dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before
his.

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court finds the same to be in order.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

To reiterate, by his own admission, respondent received a total of US$544,828 from complainant, which he could
not properly account for. The orchestrated manner in which he carried out his fraudulent scheme, in connivance
with other persons, and by taking advantage of complainants naivete in the workings of the real estate business
in the Philippines, depict a man whose character falls way, way short of the exacting standards required of him as
a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Thus, respondent is no longer fit to remain as such.

The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar.[43] If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them.[44] The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far
as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[45]

The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to return only the amount of US$544,828. While
complainant submitted documents showing her bank remittances involving different sums of money, some of these
remittances were not made in the name of respondent.[46] And as complainant herself declares, the amount of
US$3,000,000 is a mere estimate of her total claim.[47] Thus, only the return of the admitted amount of
US$544,828 is in order. As reflected above, complainant is not precluded from litigating her claim for any balance
due her in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant the amount of US$544,828. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

KELD STEMMERIK
VS
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS
AC 8010
JUNE 16, 2009

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines, he
was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.

In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed his interest in
acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he could legally
acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in
Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his representative or
attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the preparation of the necessary
documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received a P400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to Denmark, entrusting
the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented by respondent, and
a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the property.[1] Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized
a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.[2]
Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was
complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.[3] Complainant then gave respondent the full
amount of the purchase price (P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt.[4]

After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch with respondent to
inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However, respondent suddenly became
scarce and refused to answer complainants calls and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez
Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he
supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover,
verification at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was
situated within the former US Military Reservation.[5] The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.[6]

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,[7] exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes
of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned
his law office in Olongapo City.[8] Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his
abandoned office address in Olongapo City.

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the IBP.[9] He deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of
respondent from the legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the
Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million.[10]

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known address.
Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that respondent
abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to
contest the charges against him.[11]

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the matter of land
ownership by a foreigner.[12] He even went through the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious contracts,
deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he
pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with it.[13]

The CBD found respondent to be nothing more than an embezzler who misused his professional status as
an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainants money.[14] Respondent
was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD
recommended the disbarment of respondent.[15]

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with the modification
that respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2 million to respondent.[16]

We agree with the IBP.

Sufficiency Of Notice Of

The Disbarment Proceedings

We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment proceedings
against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled mandatory
conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he
committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Courts
jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his
whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and processes on respondents office was sufficient
notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to
him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile.[17] The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted
in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.[18]

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or their
respective chapters[19] of any change in office or residential address and other contact details.[20] In case such
change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the
IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against
him.
Respondents Administrative Infractions

And His Liability Therefor

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and uphold the integrity
of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and
not as an instrument of oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.[21] That oath is
neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at
all times.[22]

Lawyers are servants of the law[23] and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should
also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the
first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[24] to mean that
under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands. The
provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy.[25]

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for
the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void
and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter
sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public
documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.[26]

Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly
acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent
deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him
by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were
both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant
for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after unethical act, wantonly
violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his
selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal
system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the Butchers call,
Kill all lawyers![27] A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2 million with
interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until full payment. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate criminal
charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its action in this case to this
Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia),
both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty.
Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia),
a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case
filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia
since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared
that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying
his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and
Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty.
Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since
the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of
the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of
his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard
A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case
and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-
filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and
Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence
in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty.
Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that
was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the
submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants
maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information.
They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that
after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary
pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants
filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied
that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the
Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was
reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite
receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint
based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective position
papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and
respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed
against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary.
He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were
found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon.
The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent
is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice
constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law
Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,]
he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing
law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in
his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a
partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the
name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is
hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration
dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to
Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and
Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court,
counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing
one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give
legal effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim
of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law
partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he
gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had
an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty.
Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the
Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find
proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality
of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL

VS
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO
A.C. No. 5736
June 18, 2010
The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors[1] of the Rural Bank of Calape,
Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave
coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically
taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation.
The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.[2] RBCI alleged that respondent
violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios
Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and
intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also
forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff
to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the
authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors
of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged
that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth
transition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask
Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm.
Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no
transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the
locks of the banks vault.

Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already
dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the
administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent
added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants
and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his
report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law
and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future
will warrant a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just
forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the
take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is
independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid,
Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and
submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory
conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that
respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent
from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe
penalty.[4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied
respondents motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law
and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the
legal system.[7]
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For
this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and
principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain
from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.[9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become
guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as
representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients
interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they
are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be
made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration
of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any
means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02
and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND

SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO
VS
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA
A.C. No. 5859
November 23, 2010

For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding
respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending
his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in
1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado.
Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the
proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the
latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys
fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.[4]

On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of
infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension
from the practice of law.[5]

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against the Mercado
family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the
corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to
collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman
and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for
one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family
problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the
complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.[6] They maintain that the primary
purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted
out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross
misconduct under Section 27,[7]Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits against the
complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants were not
harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely exhausting the
remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of
the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees.

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the case that he and
George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions
committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the contrary, he
asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of
extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find ourselves in
agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than
to punish the attorney.[11]In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended
for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his
acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for
one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of
his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution,
the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present
counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been dismissed.
The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos.
97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the
aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does so
in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and
fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former
client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not
fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the timing of the
filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants family,
the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions[15]all indicate that
the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to
be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary
complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for a lawyer to file
frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no person should be
penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt
satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it
their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the
court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he owes
loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[19]provides:

CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation
is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the
respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of
the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the
cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client
relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by
the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

TERESITA D. SANTECO
VS
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE
A.C. No. 5834
February 22, 2011

The case originated from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna
B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for
reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In an En Banc Decision[2] dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for,
among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders
directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the
amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), which she never filed.

Respondent moved to reconsider[3] the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution[4] dated February
24, 2004.

Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo
Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report[5] dated November 12,
2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter that respondent had appeared and
actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as Atty. Liezl Tanglao. When her opposing
counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted
and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that
her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew
her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her
court confirming the report.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution[6] dated April 9, 2008, required respondent
to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June
10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution based on available records on file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice.
Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution[7] on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect
contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions
will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance.[8]

A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at 26-B Korea Ave., Ph.
4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City by registered mail. The same was delivered by Postman Hermoso
Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per certification[9] dated February 3, 2011
by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central Post Office.

Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution
based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash Collection and
Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The said certification reads:

This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made by one ATTY.
LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in
the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.[10]

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form
of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.[11]

Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she
obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued
her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another
person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law
practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court.
Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.

We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination
or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment.[12] Sebastian v. Bajar[13] teaches

Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect
to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not
to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.[14]

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as
an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine
Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an
officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys.

MARIA ANGALAN
VS
ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE
A.C. No. 7181
February 6, 2009

This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena, Dionicio, Magdalena, Francisca, Inis, Rosalino, and Josefina Angalan
(complainants) against Atty. Leonido C. Delante (respondent) for gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Complainants are the heirs of Angalan Samal (Angalan) and Sanaan Samal (Sanaan). Complainants allege that
they are illiterate and belong to the Samal Tribe. Angalan, Sanaan, and complainants owned a 9.102-hectare
parcel of land in Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The property was
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11499.[1]

On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Navarro R. Eustaquio and Arabella P.
Eustaquio (Spouses Eustaquio). To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of the
9.102-hectare property and surrendered OCT No. P-11499 to the Spouses Eustaquio. The Spouses Eustaquio
prepared a document[2] and asked Angalan and complainants to sign it. Angalan and complainants affixed their
thumb marks on the document.

When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover OCT No. P-11499 from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses
Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which
complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro
R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the 8.102-property to his name OCT No. P-11499 was
canceled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9926[3] in the name of Navarro was issued.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. In a receipt[4] dated
18 November 1970, respondent acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from Francisca Angalan and her husband,
Macario Capul (Capul), representing the full payment of his professional fees: Received from Mr. MACARIO
CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00)
representing full payment of professional services in regard to recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499
in the name of Angalan (Samal).

Respondent filed a complaint[5] dated 13 April 1976 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Judicial Region XVI, Tagum, Davao stating that:

2. x x x Angalan Samal and his children x x x are the original patentees of a certain parcel of land, situated in
Ombay, Samal, Davao, covered under Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499, of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao, having acquired the same under HP-No. 65310, pursuant to the provisions of the Homestead Laws of the
Public Land Law (C.A. 141);

3. x x x [O]n April 15, 1971, the herein original patentees x x x sold and conveyed said parcel
of land covered by the aforesaid title to the herein defendants for the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) x x x;
4. x x x [U]nder the provisions of the Public Land Law, particularly Section 119 thereof and
even on the face of the title of said property now under the name of the defendants x x x the herein plaintiffs
have the right to repurchase said property within a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance;

xxxx

7. [A]s a matter of right under the law, the herein plaintiffs are entitled to the produce of the property at least
beginning April 8, 1976;

xxxx
9. [B]y reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter
have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel x x x[6]

Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement[7]
dated 3 September 1977, the parties stated that:

1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as repurchase
price which the defendant[s accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum of

P15,000.00 and for this purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from the Clerk of Court
which amount had been deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of
Reconveyance shall be immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to plaintiff[s];

3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue to possess, and if
necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of
P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and
turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said balance.[8]

In a Decision[9] dated 30 September 1977, the CFI approved the amicable settlement.

Complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent advanced the P30,000 and,
in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid. In a
letter[10] dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte,
respondent stated that:

This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr.
Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of
the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the
property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.

When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from respondent,
respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property to his name TCT No.
T-9926 was canceled and TCT No. T-57932[11] in the name of respondent was issued.

Complainants filed a complaint[12] dated 30 April 2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI, Branch 34, Davao City
praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be
declared void, (2) TCT No. T-57932 be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to pay damages. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 57-2004. In his answer[13] dated 29 December 2004, respondent stated that:

[In] 1971, ANGALAN (SAMAL) [now deceased) [sic] together with his son-in-law, MACARIO CAPUL, the latter
being the town mate of herein defendant Delante in Danao, Cebu and who is married to the daughter of the
late ANGALAN (SAMAL), came to herein defendants office and sought for an advice to borrow money;

x x x [T]he late ANGALAN (SAMAL) together with his children in company with MACARIO CAPUL, were directed
by herein defendant to inform him why it was necessary for them to borrow money and for whatever [sic]
purpose; after their story, herein defendant disagreed as to their justification in borrowing money which was for no
other purpose except to have money on their own;

xxxx

It is preposterous for plaintiff[s] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional services of herein defendant to
file an annulment case since plaintiffs never came back apparently ashamed when they were driven out, but worse
they had [sic] never paid the herein defendant a single centavo for purposes of filing an annulment case against co-
defendant NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO;

x x x [T]he transfer of said property consisting of 8.102 hectares under the name of herein defendants was not
tainted with any deceit but effected legally by virtue of a valid deed of sale executed by defendants [sic]
spouses EUSTAQUIO in favor of herein defendants.

xxxx

[T]he absolute deed of sale, [sic] dated 15 April 1971, executed by herein plaintiffs in favor of defendants
EUSTAQUIO, speaks for itself. It is a sale of real property and NOT a mortgage.

xxxx
Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of the plaintiffs, the legal services of defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked defendant from where they could borrow money, and
after knowing that they just simply would [sic] like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to
repay [sic] back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to
look for another person to help them;

Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL, who is a friend and a town mate, and
who is the husband of FRANCISCA ANGALAN CAPUL, that the plaintiffs had negotiated a sale with a certain
NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO x x x;

In September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein defendant DELANTE, who, and his family [sic] are now
permanent residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement home, [sic] and he
approached herein defendant, in which he was referred to defendant EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon visiting the property
of defendant EUSTAQUIO, he was so impressed of the location of the property and decided to buy the same,
hence left the money to herein defendant DELANTE and to buy [sic] said property under defendants name, with the
understanding to turn over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall have returned to the country;

x x x [S]ince herein defendant is not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for his client from
New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided not to come back anymore
to the Philippines, and directed herein defendant to register the Deed of Sale over the property to [sic] his name
and directed herein defendant to refund his client.[14]

Complainants filed a complaint[15] dated 28 December 2005 with the Court charging respondent with gross
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution[16] dated 3 July 2006, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint and, in a Resolution[17] dated 4 December 2006, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Notice dated 14 March 2007, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) directed
complainants and respondent to appear before the IBP for a mandatory conference. The parties failed to appear
at the mandatory conference. In an Order dated 16 May 2007, Commissioner Hababag directed the parties to
submit their position papers.

In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed with the RTC, respondent and complainants prayed that Civil Case No. 57-
2004 be dismissed. Complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment dated 4
April 2007 and an affidavit of desistance dated April 2007.

In his position paper dated 2 July 2007, respondent stated that (1) Angalan and Capul went to his office in 1971 to
seek advice about borrowing money; (2) his client from New York bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio;
and (3) complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.

In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag found that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

The issue to resolve is whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional
Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and against their will?

Weighing evidence presented by both parties, respondent should be punished for his unprofessional and
distasteful acts.

xxx
His vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts was too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance. It is unbelievable that
a buyer would entrust his money intended for payment of a property but allowed that said property be registered
under the name of another, specifically his lawyer, simply runs counter to ordinary human nature. (Emphasis
supplied)

Commissioner Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report
with modification. The Board increased respondents suspension from six months to one year.

Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,[18] the Board forwarded the case to the Court for
final action.

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP.

Complainants and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to complainants, they engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property from the Spouses Eustaquio. In violation of the
trust and confidence they reposed in him, respondent transferred the title over the property to his name.
According to respondent, complainants did not engage his services. His client from New York was the one who
bought the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.

After a careful review of the records, the Court gives credence to complainants version of the facts.

Respondents credibility is highly questionable. In his answer dated 29 December 2004 and filed with the CFI and
in his position paper dated 2 July 2007 and filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that Angalan and Capul went to
his office in 1971 to seek advice about borrowing money. According to respondent, complainants did not engage
his services. In his answer, respondent stated that:

It is preposterous for [complainants] to claim that they had [sic] engaged the professional services of herein
defendant to file an annulment case since [complainants] never came back apparently ashamed when they
were driven out x x x;

xxxx

Contrary to the malicious and untruthful claim of [complainants], the legal services of defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE was never solicited by them. Plaintiffs only asked defendant from where they could borrow money, and
after knowing that they just simply would like to borrow money without any concrete investments in mind to repay
back [sic] any loan, defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE drove them out of his office and told them to look for
another person to help them;

Defendant Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE later learned from MACARIO CAPUL x x x that the plaintiffs had negotiated a
sale with a certain NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.[19] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court is not impressed. Angalan and complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice about
borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property. This is obvious. First,
after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent filed a complaint with the CFI praying that
the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent
stated that, by reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs,
the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel. Third, respondent
issued a receipt to complainants stating that he RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL
CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of
professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan
(Samal). Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay,
Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants:

This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr.
Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of
the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the
property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.[20]

These clearly show that complainants engaged the services of respondent.

In his answer, respondent alleged that complainants did not pay him his professional fees (which, according to him,
they did not engage). He stated that, [complainants] had never paid the herein defendant a single centavo for
purposes of filing an annulment case against x x x NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.

The Court is not impressed. Complainants fully paid respondent his professional fees. This is obvious. In a receipt
dated 18 November 1970, respondent stated that he RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA
RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of
professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan
(Samal). This clearly shows that complainants paid respondent his professional fees.

In his answer and position paper, respondent alleged that his client from New York bought the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio:

[I]n September 1977, a former Filipino client of herein respondent, who, and his family [sic] are now permanent
residents of New York, was looking for a real property to build his retirement home, and he approached herein
respondent, in which [sic] he was referred to Navarro Eustaquio; and upon visiting the property of Navarro
Eustaquio, he was impressed of [sic] the location of the property and decided to buy the same, hence left the
money to herein respondent and to buy [sic] said property under respondents name, with the understanding to
turn over said property to him, as soon as he and his family shall have returned to the country;
x x x [S]ince herein respondent was not interested over the said property as his own, he waited for his client from
New York to come home and to get his property but after 11 years, his client decided not to come back anymore to
the Philippines, and directed herein respondent to register the Deed of Sale over the property under his name and
directed herein respondent to refund his client.[21]

The Court is not impressed. Complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio. This is obvious.
First, complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement stating that complainants
would repurchase the property from the Spouses Eustaquio:

1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs have offered to the defendant[s] the sum of P30,000.00 as repurchase price which the
defendant[s accept];

2. x x x [U]pon the signing hereof, the plaintiffs shall pay the defendant[s] the sum of P15,000.00 and for this
purpose hereby authorize the defendants to collect the same from the Clerk of Court which amount had been
deposited with this Honorable Court; Likewise, upon signing hereof the Deed of Reconveyance shall be
immediately executed and delivered by the defendants to plaintiff[s];

3. x x x [W]hile the balance of P15,000.00 has not been paid, the defendant[s] shall continue to possess, and if
necessary to gather the produce of the property, however, upon receipt of the defendant[s] of the balance of
P15,000.00, said defendants together with [their] agent and/or worker, Alfredo Rabadon shall clear the area and
turnover the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt [of] said balance.[22] (Emphasis supplied)

Second, in his letter to the barrio captain, respondent stated that complainants repurchased the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio:

This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr.
Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978. In my capacity as counsel of the Heirs of Angalan Samal and owner of
the money in redeeming the property, I have authorized Mr. Macario Capol to take over the possession of the
property together with the harvesting of the matured coconuts.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

These clearly show that complainants repurchased the property from the Spouses Eustaquio.

Respondents story about the client from New York is unbelievable. Respondent did not give any detail or proof to
substantiate his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old passport of the alleged
client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court
agrees with the observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondents vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts
[is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance.

In his position paper, respondent alleged that complainants executed a motion to withdraw the complaint for
disbarment and an affidavit of desistance. This is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states
that, No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers
shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should have held
in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand.[24] Instead of holding in trust the
property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the
property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants charges as malicious and untruthful.

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should
have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are
illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of
complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.

Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of
Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct.[25] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct.
In Hernandez v. Go,[26] the Court disbarred a lawyer for transferring the titles over the properties of his client to his
name without the knowledge of his client. In Hernandez, the Court held that:

Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears
reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his
own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus
preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.[27]

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is
unfit to be a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

DOLORES C. BELLEZA
VS
ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA
A.C. No. 7815
July 23, 2009

This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against respondent Atty. Alan S.
Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with the handling of a criminal case involving
complainants son.

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua.
Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John
Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165.[1] Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On
November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004.
Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure
the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant
went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored
her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the
services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for disbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental
chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua
which read:

I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after having been
sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:

1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a lawyer
to help her son in the case that the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;

2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs.
DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;

3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan
Macasa:

Date Amount

November 11, 2004 P15,000.00

A week after 10,000.00

November 18, 2004 5,000.00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorneys Fees were immediately forwarded by me to
Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the foregoing statements.

x x x x x x x x x[4]

In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the complaint to the
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6]

In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from
receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,[8]
simply brushed aside the complaint for being baseless, groundless and malicious without, however, offering any
explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions[9] for second and third extensions of time praying to be given
until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were ordered to submit their
respective position papers.[10]

In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,[11] the CBD ruled that respondent failed to rebut the
charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several chances to do so.

The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by
him.

The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and unworthy of the privileges
conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD recommended a suspension of six months with a stern
warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent
be ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the complainants son and
the P30,000 attorneys fees.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received
as attorneys fees.[12]

We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify the IBPs
recommendation as to the liability of respondent.

Respondent Disrespected

Legal Processes

Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against him. Yet, he showed
indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct
against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His propensity to flout the orders of
the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he
took when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted
legal authorities. He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the
CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only irresponsible but also constituted
utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers.[13] His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known that the orders of the CBD (as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not mere requests but directives
which should have been complied with promptly and completely.[15]

Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client

Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking imposed upon him
the following duties:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

xxxxxxxxx

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and
effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to
be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing
shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[16]

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with competence and
diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that
by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree
of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the
use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps
necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.[18]

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may
cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from
the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is
both unprofessional and unethical.[19]

If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly filing the
necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a
lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case.

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.[20] However, this right can only be
meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:

... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights;
it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding
of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.[21]

∞○∞
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial
itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other
words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.[22]

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity
to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply
perfunctory representation.[24]

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and
purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude
towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also
deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for
posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional
right to bail.

Respondent Failed to Return

His Clients Money

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from the client.[25]

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money
was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.[26]
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[27]

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.[28] His
failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[29] It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.[30] Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.

Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the
provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended purpose yet also never returned it to
the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters repeated
demands.

Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule,
the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of
an attorney-client relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.[31] Thus, a lawyer who
does not render legal services is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly enriched
at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.

Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal Profession

For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to obey
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility disrespects
the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of
the legal profession.

Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[32] Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[33]
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for the bond of the
complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client.
[34] He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he
would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His transgression
showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but also of
professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and
14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02,
16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law
effective immediately.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts of P30,000 and
P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days
from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC

VS
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III
A.C. No. 8380
November 20, 2009

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up
portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of
a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.

In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents he
needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of his
attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for facilitation and processing. He in turn promised to give the
money back in case he was unable to get the work done.

On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the property,
meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the
documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his
clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it
had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him.

On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in the
titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he
changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and served
him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him.

In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses of action
relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for a survey plan which the DENR-NCR
approved for a facilitation cost of P500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA endorsement for a facilitation cost of
another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the Land Registration Authority for a facilitation cost of
still another P500,000.00.

Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a favorable
endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later
met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the latter
would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna
through their common friend on Lacunas instruction.
Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an identical
application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld this fact from him.
Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty recommending approval of
the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July
23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it.

Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but they
were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only P45,000.00 as his
fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna.

The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint.
Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and adduce evidence in
his defense.

On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation[1] in the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize Mijares
to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable to account
for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having bribed a
government official.

Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule
15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent
documents to the University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to
the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing
with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.

On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite
suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all pertinent documents
to the University within six months from receipt of the Courts decision.[2]

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the
P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a
property that it claimed.

The Courts Ruling

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.[3]

Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must promptly
account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or
property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended
purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the
lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him.[4] A lawyers
conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.[5]

Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record that the
Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in
facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his
purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless
refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same does not
rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the Universitys
conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete
turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out, the MMDA had
previously given such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that
endorsement.
But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it had no
cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept
silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money.
Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave him. More, his not
showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his
defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act favorably
on his clients application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore,
inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his
practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up.

The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include in its decision an
order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly
gave him that money to spend for facilitation and processing. It is not nave. There is no legitimate expense called
facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will not permit the conversion of a
disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed
to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the titling matter that
it referred to him.

A.C. No. 8253 March 15, 2011

(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067)

ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent.

We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for
his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action
to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant
was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death.

Antecedents

In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in
the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to
see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles.1 They ultimately
engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the
Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying.

Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay ₱7,000.00 as filing fee, which
they gave to him.2 He explained the importance of depositing ₱65,000.00 in court to counter the ₱60,000.00
deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had only
₱60,000.00, he required them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3 To raise the ₱65,000.00 for
the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued
a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo.4

On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the ₱65,000.00. When
Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to
him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that
representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort.5

After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed
them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus
interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere
assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands.

The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for
annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered
₱15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum.6
When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning the
₱65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the
₱65,000.00, plus interest, and the ₱15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum.7 Yet, they did not receive any
reply from Atty. Ricafort.

In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the ₱65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the
amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance
fee, attorney’s fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but
excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill
and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social
standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents of the
complaint, which did not mention anything about any consignation;8 and that Arnulfo, being a retired school
principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted
against him.

Findings of the IBP Commissioner

Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation dated October 7, 2004,9 in which
he concluded that:

It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return
the amount of ₱65,000 and ₱15,000 which he got from his client.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty.
Ricafort, observing:

Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating
witness, we find their statements to be credible.

Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of ₱65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant
as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorney’s fees and
other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic notes
wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in court. The respondent admitted in his
testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would
prove that the amount of ₱65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case.

Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because the late
Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued.

The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen in the
litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that ₱65,000.00 did you not put anything there
that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered this
₱65,000.00 as your attorney’s fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why they were not showing
the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the receipt of ₱30,000.00 how much more
with that ₱65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that ₱65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why……

During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not
answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was presented by the
complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their helper
who did not forward the letter to him. He also adopted the position that the complainant was demanding the
₱65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent
Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he received the ₱65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that
Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement.

The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog, Erlinda
Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his answer the
respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was
surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the decision of the Supreme Court
for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect from him.

The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to redeem
his property is ₱240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem the
property he answered in the negative.
The alleged payment of ₱65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was stated
on complainant’s affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty
Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the Real
Estate Mortgage. The amount of ₱65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the principal obligation of the
complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for
annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to
produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the
complainant in court that the bank needed ₱240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing
on the actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit ₱65,000.00 by his lawyer. The
Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainant’s
narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles.10

Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being
dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of ₱65,000.00 to them.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI-2004-473,11 resolving to return
the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim
that the ₱65,000.00 had been in payment of attorney’s fees and other expenses.

On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and Recommendation,12 in which he
declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of
₱65,000.00 had been part of his attorney’s fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by
not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the
demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also
promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise
despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation.

Action of IBP Board of Governors

Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,13 therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the
order for him to return the amounts of ₱65,000.00 and ₱15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic] vulnerability
and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED and
Ordered to Return the amount of ₱65,000 and ₱15,000 to complainant.

Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration,14 maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because he had
affirmed having received the ₱65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the
receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves
upon the client to demand for a receipt;"15 that considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the
receipt he had issued for the ₱30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for
attorney’s fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the
testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfo’s affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfo’s
demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did
not at all know.

Acting on Atty. Ricafort’s motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from
disbarment to indefinite suspension,16 thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the
Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of
Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law and Ordered to return the amount of ₱65,000 and ₱15,000 to complainant.

Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration,17 assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for
violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in
writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based.

Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution.
Ruling

We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence.
However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension,
considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously
administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a
similar offense.

A.
Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort

Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the ₱65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the
transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of
their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal"
arrangement.

Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs’ version more credible.

We hold that Commissioner Reyes’ appreciation of the facts was correct and in accord with human experience.

Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited
in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to
consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being
ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricafort’s representations about the
requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty.
Ricafort’s standing in the legal community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not
far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be
deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their property.

Secondly, Atty. Ricafort’s denial of receipt of Arnulfo’s demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted
receiving the letter through a househelp.18 His denial came only subsequently and for the first time through his
motion for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006,19 in which he completely turned about to declare that the
Gemma Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him.20 Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded
his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his
earlier admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty.
Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established circumstances.

Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the ₱65,000.00 and ₱15,000.00 issued to
the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it
behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt."21 But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical and
practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and
to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys
entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping
receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened
with the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for them.22

And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the ₱65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted
that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation.
However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence, specifically
in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs’ (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of
₱69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and interest) in court, thus:

16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the amount
of ₱69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued interests, if there are any; 23

Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion that
could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only ₱60,000.00 for the
consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The excerpt of her pertinent testimony
follows:
Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to
the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of ₱65,000.00 in the form of check, how
did you come to know this fact?

Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng ₱65,000.00 tapos may ₱60,000.00 kami sabi niya
dagdagan niyo ng konti.

Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo?

Witness: Nandoon po ako.

Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given?

Witness: Yes.

Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong ₱65,000.00 na tseke?

Witness: Opo.

Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit?

Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court.

Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court?

Witness: Opo.

Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman?

Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi naming
salamat.24

B.
Atty. Ricafort’s acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney

The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.25 In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his
possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.27 Thus,
having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to
deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand.281avvphi1

Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to
keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit:

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

Atty. Ricafort’s act of obtaining ₱65,000.00 and ₱15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the
amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a
responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him
to deposit the amount of ₱65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it
upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of ₱15,000.00 upon
demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an
accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended.29 He was
thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in
violation of the clients’ trust reposed in him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for
the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients.31

Atty. Ricafort’s plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of
Canon 16,32 particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17,33 all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired
public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.34
Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricafort’s acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges include:

xxx

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct; xxx

That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability. In Nuñez v.
Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him to have violated Rules 1.0136 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.0337 and
Rule 12.0438 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell the realty in her behalf). His
failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the
proceeds against him and his wife. The

Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar
acts, stating:

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondent’s grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.

There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused
the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds
of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the
recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite
his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of
what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been
validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks
were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by
the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent’s claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed
all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still
other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity
dates.

By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon,

337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the
standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

Respondent’s act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered
by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite
demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes,
which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.39

Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for violation of Canon 16 ranges from
suspension for six months,40 to suspension for one year,41 to suspension for two years,42 depending on the
amount involved and the severity of the lawyer’s misconduct, we rule that disbarment is the commensurate
punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust funds for his clients.
WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to
strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of ₱65,000.00 and ₱15,000.00, plus interest of six
percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice.

This decision is effective immediately.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference.

[ A.C. No. 8051, April 07, 2009 ]

EDERLINDA K MANZANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, RESPONDENT.

The law profession is not a trade or a business venture.[1] The practice of law and membership in the bar for that
matter is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions[2] and is limited to citizens who show and continue to
show the qualifications and character traits required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[3] In accordance,
therefore, with its constitutional mandate to regulate the legal profession and its authority to discipline its erring
members, it behooves the Court to keep an ever watchful eye on, among others, unscrupulous lawyers with a
penchant for hoodwinking, at every turn, their trusting clients; and, in general, on those whose misconduct tends to
blemish the purity of the legal profession. And if need be, the Court shall remove from the ranks those unable to
adhere to the rigid standards of morality and integrity required by the ethics of the legal profession. So it must be in
this disciplinary proceeding.

The records of the case disclose the following:

In a verified complaint for disbarment dated March 23, 2006, with enclosures, filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), complainant Ederlinda K. Manzano charged respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano with
dishonesty (misappropriation) and misrepresentation and/or usurping the authority of a notary public. The case was
docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 06-1702.

According to complainant, she engaged respondent's services to commence and pursue collection cases from
individuals dealing with her construction supply/hardware business. As part of the agreement, respondent was
allowed the free use of an office space in the Manzano Complex building in Nabua, Camarines Sur. After a time,
complainant noticed that not a single successful collection was ever made, albeit respondent kept on asking for
money to cover incidental expenses. Later on, complainant discovered that respondent had succeeded in
convincing one of her debtors, Abelino G. Barela, to sell to him, for PhP 65,000, a piece of land and the house
standing on it. The condition of the sale was that, out of the proceeds, respondent should deliver PhP 50,000
personally to complainant to Hilly cover Barela's indebtedness. As complainant would later claim, the PhP 50,000
was never turned over to her.

In the light of this unsettling development, complainant severed her client-attorney relationship with respondent
and evicted him from his office-space at the Manzano Complex. She, together with Barela, later charged
"respondent with estafa.

Complainant also allegedly discovered further that respondent had for a time been acting as a notary public for
and in the province of Camarines Sur without the necessary notarial commission.

In his answer,[4] respondent merely entered a general denial of the inculpatory allegations in the complaint,
focusing his sights more on the dismissal of the estafa case that complainant and Barela had earlier filed against
him. He alleged that the filing of the instant administrative case was complainant's way of getting back at him for
his having charged her and her husband and son with grave coercion.

In the mandatory conference/hearing scheduled on July 6, 2006 and later reset to August 10, 2006, respondent,
despite due notice, failed to appear, although he would later submit, albeit belatedly, a conference brief. And
despite being accorded, with a warning, several extensions within which to file a position paper, no such paper
came from respondent, prompting the IBP CBD to declare him as having waived his right to participate in the
proceedings.

In his Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
found respondent guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to his client) and malpractice,
and recommended his disbarment.
On May 22, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-237, approving Commissioner
Magpayo's report and recommendation with modification insofar as the recommended penalty was concerned,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, continued violation of the Rule on Notarial Practice, and for failure to comply with his duties as a
member of the Bar in good standing by his failure to pay his membership dues since year 2003 up to the present,
Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law.

The findings of the CBD, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, on the guilt of respondent, first, for
misappropriating his client's money he held in trust and his attempt to hide his fraudulent act, are well supported
by the evidence on record and, therefore, commend themselves for concurrence. As aptly observed by the CBD,
respondent perverted his position, as complainant's lawyer, and his legal expertise by convincing debtor Barela to
sell and transfer to him the tetter's house for PhP 65,000 with the understanding that respondent would remit the
PhP 50,000 to complainant to offset Barela's debt. Instead of remitting the PhP 50,000 to complainant,
respondent, however, misappropriated this amount for his benefit without so much as informing complainant. In
net effect, respondent duped both complainant and Barela. And in a vain bid to cover up his grave misdeed,
respondent, via a deed of sale dated August 27, 1996 (Exhibit "F"), made it appear that he acquired the aforesaid
property from Barela's mother, Eusebia, for PhP 10,000. On its face, however, the deed had respondent as
house/lot buyer and, at the same time, as the notarizing officer, although he was without an appointment as notary
public at that time.

As a result of his dishonest but crude maneuvers, respondent was charged by both complainant and Barela
with estafa, which, contrary to what he wanted to impress on the CBD in his answer, eventually led to the filing
of an amended information (Exhibit "B") for that crime with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37 in Iriga City.[6]

Respondent's acts immediately adverted to are reflective of his gross and wanton disregard of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, more specifically its Canon 16, which provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
money and property collected or received for or from the client."

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that, as an officer of the court, theirs is the duty to obey, respect,
and uphold the law and legal processes by not engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[7]
An immoral or deceitful conduct necessarily involves moral turpitude.[8] Needless to stress, the commission of
any of these unlawful acts, which amounts too to a violation of the attorney's oath, is a ground for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers.[9]

Definitely not lost on the Court with respect to this case is the IBP's documented report about the respondent
having been once the subject of an administrative complaint in CBD Case No. 05-1514 lodged by Andrea Balce
Celaje, in which the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for misapplying the money of his
client.[10]

The Court agrees too with the other inculpatory finding of malpractice on the part of respondent consisting of
exercising the powers of a notary public without having the appropriate commission. The evidence on record shows
that the respondent held himself up and acted as notary public for the province of Camarines Sur for Calendar
Years 1996, 2005, 2006, and 2007, as evidenced by several documents he notarized for the period, although he
was without the proper commission during those times.[11] Among these documents listed in the Commission's
report and borne out by the records are: (1) Exhibit "H," Affidavit of Loss of Madelina Ayuman; (2) Exhibit "H-1,"
Affidavit of Heirship for Insurance Benefit; (3) Exhibit "I," Joint Affidavit of Grace Pastoral and Daisy Lomame; (4)
Exhibit "I-1," Affidavit of Supplemental Information of Diwane Julianes-Sarmiento; and (5) Exhibit "I-2," Affidavit of
Guardianship of Consuelo Alina.

The act of notarizing without the necessary commission is not merely a simple enterprise to be trivialized. So much
so that one who stamps a notarial seal and signs a document as a notary public without being so authorized may
be haled to court not only for malpractice but also for falsification. Zoreta v. Simpliciano elucidated on the
importance of notarization and the Court's inclination to whack with a heavy disciplinary stick those who would
dare circumvent the Notarial Law:

xxx [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public,
the courts and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the commission therefore as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents." xxx

xxx [Performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more
specifically the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for
all intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes.[12] x x x

In a four-year stretch, perhaps even longer, respondent, without commission, presented himself falsely as a notary
public. But the worst uncovered cut of all occurred in 1996, when respondent authenticated a purported conveying
deed, one he doubtless prepared, in which he himself was the transferee of the lot. Respondent, by his conduct,
created an impression of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, not only in his dealings with a client but also with the public,
[13] obviously oblivious to the fact that among an attorney's duties is to aid in the administration of justice.[14] We,
thus, see respondent as an attorney who, both in appearance and action, was deceitful.

A lawyer, by taking the lawyer's oath, becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the
orderly administration of justice. As such, he is expected to have a mega-dose of social conscience with the end in
view of making a meaningful difference and with a little less of self-interest.

Indeed, the moral standards of the legal profession expect lawyers to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. Respondent has not paid heed to this
lofty ideal. His guilt for the acts complained of which constitute dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or serious
malpractice, not to mention his delinquency in the payment of his annual IBP dues since the year 2003, is
indisputable. But the Court has not detected the slightest indication of remorse on his part. In what we in fact
perceive to be a display of hubris, respondent hardly felt it necessary to defend himself in the disbarment
proceedings before the IBP. The Court shall, therefore, impose the fitting sanction called for under the premises.

As between the penalty recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and that of the Investigating
Commissioner, we find that of the latter to be more appropriate. We take this course of action, fully aware that only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as officer of the court
and as a member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[15] Judging from his past actions,
respondent has become a liability to the legal profession. His act of notarizing a sham deed of sale where he is
named as a vendor is reprehensible. He cannot be trusted any longer with the sacred duty and responsibility to
protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice. His continued practice of law will likely
subvert justice, bring further dishonor to the bar, and lessen the respect and the trust reposed by the public in the
integrity of the legal society.[16]

WHEREFORE, the premises of this case considered, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is DISBARRED from
the practice of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR
VS
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ
A.C. No. 8243
July 24, 2009

This case stems from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-
Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]
Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling,
and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC).
MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).[3]

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and
investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors
after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee
of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of the Couples for
Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active members. From then on,
complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests
in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped
him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A
Retainer Agreement[4] dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign
the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,[5] a
telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not
within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent[8] asking for the
return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant
confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her clients
defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that
there was nothing to worry about.[9]

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by
Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can
closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),[10] and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also convinced complainant
that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the
DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by
Multitel.[12]

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever
necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent
herself.[13] Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amounts were all
part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the companys
properties.[15]

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent sent through
electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the
Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on be
implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold
departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from
respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter
discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to clear complainants name.[16] In two
separate e-mail messages,[17] respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was
handed by complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,[18] and
another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent was able to
convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the
latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainants house and inside a
warehouse.[20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems, complainant was
advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-
mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer. The charges
are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your
company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic)
and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds
you received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo
must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we can inform
them [that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister
Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this cases
(sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of
the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to
work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can
help with all his connections. Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity
(sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it
covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic)
for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier
according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I
hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to work with.

As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients and government
officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to
happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand
to work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are
ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you and make you the hero in this
scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side.
Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy[22]

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of his departure
from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been
cleared by the NBI and the BID.[23]

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them that she has
already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in
appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help, she would not have earned
such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on,
changed her mind and told complainant that she would instead invest the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a
business venture. Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money
instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she
failed to fulfill her promise.[24]
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help settle the ten (10)
warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated how she was able to
defend complainant in the said cases.[25]

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would either refuse to
return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went
on for several months.[26] In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of
Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly
answered that she was very busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote
respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the
latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004.[28] When complainant
found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting.
[29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31]
explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who
had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents
clearing complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint[33]
against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking
the disbarment of respondent

In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no
formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant
by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to
the same religious organization.[35]
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the
settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement
between both parties were fully documented and accounted for.[36] Respondent believes that her act in helping
complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule
2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[37]

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for estafa was also
filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds.
The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of
evidence.[38] Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by
complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text
messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and should be excluded
as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and Recommendation[40]
finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence
of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be
candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a
full accounting of all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended her disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors issued a Recommendation[42]
denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste[43] and, more importantly, upon necessity. In
the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including
its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by
the loss thereof.[44] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described
the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[46]

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at
that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations,
[47] precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of
the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.[48]

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the
engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant.[49] This argument all the more
reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected
from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between
the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to
desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be
permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict
of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[52]

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and,
later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she
had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from
any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants
against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent
herself admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and
that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.[53] Clearly,
respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
[54] but also toyed with decency and good taste.

Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of respondents unethical
behavior.[55] This remark indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As
a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be
initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board
of Officers of an IBP Chapter[56] even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of
deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath, has been rendered
moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed under
the Department of Justices Witness Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her
membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative
case against her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the degree of
her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by
respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is
because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him
or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if
this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in the Bar
voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to
further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting
interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

NATIVIDAD UY
VS
ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN
A.C. No. 8252
July 21, 2009
For resolution is a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by complainant Natividad Uy against respondent Atty. Braulio
RG Tansinsin.

Complainant was the defendant in an ejectment case filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 49,
Caloocan City, entitled Josefina Orlanda herein represented by her Attorney-in-fact Ma. Divina Gracia Orlanda vs.
Natividad Uy and all other persons claiming rights under her.[2] To defend her rights, complainant engaged the
services of respondent who timely filed an Answer[3] to the complaint for ejectment. Required to file a Position
Paper, respondent, however, failed to file one for and on behalf of the complainant. Eventually, a decision was
rendered by the MeTC against the complainant. Complainant, through respondent, elevated the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)[4] by filing a Notice of Appeal.[5] In an Order[6] dated May 25, 2004, the RTC
dismissed the appeal solely because of the failure of respondent to file a memorandum on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for having been filed out of time.[7]

Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel, complainant initiated the disbarment
case against respondent, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Complainant averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to respondent, but the latter failed miserably in
his duty as a lawyer and advocate.[8] She also claimed that respondents failure to file the required position paper
and memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross negligence, which caused grave injury to
complainant.[9] Lastly, complainant alleged that not only did respondent fail to file the required pleadings, he also
was remiss in informing her of the status of the case.

For his part, respondent admitted that complainant obtained his legal services, but no legal fee was ever paid to
him. Respondent explained that he could not submit an intelligible position paper, because the contract between
complainant and her lessor had long expired. He added that he failed to file the position paper and
memorandum on appeal, because complainant told him that she would work out the transfer of ownership to her
of the land subject matter of the ejectment case. In effect, respondent said that he did not submit the required
pleadings, because he knew that the law favored the plaintiff as against the defendant (complainant herein) in
the ejectment case.[10]

In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag made the following findings:

Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best effort and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients
cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, or to the public.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the active practice of law for six (6) months with stern warning that repetition of similar acts/omissions will be
dealt [with] severely.[11]

In its Resolution No. XVII-2006-586 dated December 15, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the report and recommendation of Atty. Hababag, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents gross negligence and incompetence in handling cases,
Atty. Braulio RG Tansinsin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.[12]

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] but the same was denied in Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-706[14] dated December 11, 2008. The Board further modified its earlier resolution by increasing
respondents penalty of suspension from three (3) months to six (6) months.

We sustain the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except on the imposition of the six-
month suspension.

Verily, respondents failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client about the developments in her case
fall below the standard exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause.[15]
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance, and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.[16] A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious,
diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself,
would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he represents that he
will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the
business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor;
and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently.[17]

It must be recalled that the MeTC (in the ejectment case) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court order. In addition, respondent
failed to file the memorandum on appeal this time with the RTC where complainants appeal was then pending. Civil
Case No. C-20717 was, therefore, dismissed on that ground alone.

The importance of filing a memorandum on appeal cannot be gainsaid. Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court states:

SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

x x x x.

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum
which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to
the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants Memorandum, the appellee may file
his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]

By express mandate of the said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such
submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform this
duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.[18]

Respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Resposibility[19] which states:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Aside from failing to file the required pleadings, respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his client, as
he omitted to apprise complainant of the status of her ejectment case.

It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the
client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping
in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in
particular and in the legal profession in general.[20] Respondents act demonstrates utter disregard of Rule 18.04,
Canon 18, Code of Professional Resposibility, which states:

Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the clients request for information.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant,
respondent indeed violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty
imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand or a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of
three months or six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[21]

Considering the circumstances surrounding the instant case, a three-month suspension from the practice of law
is the proper penalty.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, respondent ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be
dealt with more severely.

CESAR TALENTO and MODESTA HERRERA TALENTO,

VS
ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA
A.C. No. 7433
December 23, 2009

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and Cesar Talento
charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of duty.

This case was initiated by petitioners with the filing of a Complaint[1] before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on August 29, 2005. In the said Complaint, petitioners alleged the following:

a. Sometime in October 17, 2000, a civil complaint was filed by Leticia Herrera. The same complaint was raffled to
Regional Trial Court Branch 31, Agoo, La Union presided by Hon. Clifton U. Ganay;

b. This case was entitled: LETICIA HERERRA, Plaintiff vs. MODESTA H. TALENTO and CESAR TALENTO as
Defendants for Quieting of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. A-2043;

c. [Petitioners] secured the services of Atty. Agustin Paneda to help and defend [them] in the aforementioned case.
[Petitioners] paid the attorneys fees he required from [them] in order that [they] could avail of his services as
counsel;

d. Atty. Paneda filed [petitioners] answer to the complaint on November 14, 2000 and the case was set for pre-trial.
The Honorable Court in an order required both parties counsels to submit their respective pre-trial briefs and
appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing on December 18, 2000;

e. Despite the order and notice to [their] counsel, he did not file or submit a pre-trial brief for [petitioners]
behalf. Much more to [their] surprise and predicament, although [petitioners] attended the pre-trial hearing, he
did not appear;

f. As a result of his non-appearance, the counsel for the other party spoke of things beyond our knowledge which
the Honorable Court granted being expressly stated and provided in the Rules of Court. [Petitioners] were
declared in default because of the failure of [their] counsel to file and submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief. The
Honorable Court allowed the case to be heard ex parte much to our damage and prejudice;

g. The Honorable Court issued a decision against [petitioners] simply for failure of [their] counsel Atty. Paneda to
submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief and for his failure to attend the pre-trial of the case. It was simply because of
technicality and not based on the merits of the allegations of both parties that [petitioners] lost the case;

h. Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2000, but the same was dismissed by the
Honorable Court;

i. Atty. Paneda told [petitioners] that he will appeal the case to the Court of Appeals and [they] agreed because
[they were] confident of [petitioners] claim over the parcel of land subject of this case. He filed a notice of appeal on
February 8, 2001. [Petitioners] paid the required fees and he even required [petitioners] to shell out more money
for the preparation of the Appeal brief;

j. [Petitioners] waited for so long for the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and [petitioners] found out later
that [petitioners] appeal was dismissed due to lack of an appeal brief only when [petitioners] went to Atty. Paneda.
[2]

In the Order[3] dated August 30, 2005 issued by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), respondent
was required to submit his Answer to the Complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. Respondent
filed his Answer[4] on October 24, 2005.

In his Answer, respondent states that he honestly believed that he had not violated his oath as a lawyer nor did he
commit negligence in handling the case of the petitioners. He likewise avers that there were other considerations
and incidents which had intervened in the case that produced adverse reactions. He cites as reason for the non-
filing of the Pre-trial Brief the fact that, before the date set for pre-trial hearing, respondent was informed by
petitioners that they had already entered into an Amicable Settlement with the plaintiff. Respondent advised
petitioners to submit the said agreement to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in lieu of the Pre-trial Brief. Respondent
did not appear during the pre-trial conference scheduled in the morning of December 19, 2000 because he chose
instead to attend the pre-trial conference of the replevin case involving his personal vehicle in Dagupan City which
was also set on that same morning.[5] With regard to his failure to file the required Appellants Brief before the
Court of Appeals (CA), he points to his secretarys oversight in promptly informing him of the latters receipt of the
Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief.[6] Respondent insists that he was not negligent in his practice but there
were circumstances beyond his control and were unavoidable. He contends that petitioners should not altogether
blame him but they should also accept that the debacle was due to their inaction.[7]

Petitioners refute the foregoing assertions of the respondent.[8] They vehemently deny respondents claim that
they allegedly informed him of the Amicable Settlement prior to the date of pre-trial hearing. In fact, they intended
to show the document to him for the very first time at the pre-trial conference in which he did not appear. They
likewise belie respondents claim that he gave instructions to petitioners on what to do during the pre-trial
conference in his absence. They further deny respondents claim that he had informed them beforehand of his
inability to attend due to a conflict of schedule. Granting that there was indeed a conflict of schedule, petitioners
maintain that respondent is required by Rule 18, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court[9] to file the Pre-trial Brief at least
three (3) days before the date of pre-trial conference. Finally, petitioners insist that, contrary to respondents
assertion in his Answer, respondent did not exert his best efforts for his clients because, after negligently
abandoning them at the RTC, respondent likewise failed to fulfill his duty of safeguarding their interests in the CA
when respondent failed to perform a basic legal requirement of filing an Appeal Brief in order for the said court to
take cognizance of their Appeal.

The parties were then required by the Commission to appear at a mandatory conference held on November 30,
2005. Petitioner Cesar Talento appeared together with his counsel, Atty. Matthew L. Dati. Co-petitioner Modesta
Herrera Talento executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Cesar Talento and Atty. Dati. Respondent
appeared on his behalf.

After the termination of the hearing, the parties were directed to file their respective verified position papers within
ten (10) days from receipt of the Order[10] and were informed that with or without said position papers, the case
shall be deemed submitted for report and recommendation. Only petitioners submitted a Position Paper[11] which
was received by the Commission on January 4, 2009.

On April 28, 2006, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and of inexcusable negligence with the
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. The salient
portion of the Report reads:

Respondents failure to file complainants Pre-trial Brief, his failure to appear during the Pre-trial Conference
because he has to attend to another case, his failure to file complainants Appeal Brief and his failure to inform
complainants of the dismissal of the case at the Court of Appeals are in gross violation of his duties as a
lawyer and show inexcusable negligence on his part.

His contention that he told complainants to present the Amicable Settlement agreed upon by the parties for the
courts appreciation does not excuse him of his obligation to his clients, much more his allegation that he advised
complainants of the futility of the case. It should be noted that the Amicable Settlement was forged by the parties
after the case was already filed in court, therefore the same has no legal effect.

The lawyer owes a duty to his client to be competent to perform the legal services which the lawyer undertakes
on his behalf. The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should
provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a
like situation (citation omitted).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that respondent ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA be
SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
as a member of the Bar.[12]

On November 18, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-495 adopting the
aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondents inexcusable negligence, Atty. Agustin F. Paneda is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.[13]

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct
in handling petitioners case both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its dismissal without
affording petitioners the opportunity to present their evidence.

After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, this Court agrees with the IBP in its findings
and conclusion that respondents documented acts fall extremely short of the standard of professional duty that
all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to.

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxxx

Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

There is no doubt that respondent was woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and competence in
protecting the interests of his clients. The records of this case clearly detailed dire instances of professional
neglect which undoubtedly showed respondents failure to live up to his duties and responsibilities as a member of
the legal profession. Petitioners lost Civil Case No. A-2043 in the RTC mainly because they were barred from
presenting their evidence in court. This was a result of their being declared in default in the said case as a
consequence of respondents failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. Respondent defended his non-
appearance by stating that he had informed petitioners beforehand of a conflict of schedule and that he had
instructed them on what to do in his absence, but petitioners vehemently denied this claim.

Even if we are to give credence to respondents justification, this does not excuse him from the fact that he was
unable to file a Pre-trial Brief at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled pre-trial conference, as required by the
Rules. Respondent alleges that he already prepared the Pre-trial Brief but did not push through with filing it
because he was allegedly furnished by petitioner Modesta Herrera Talento with an Amicable Settlement that was
forged between the parties before the Barangay Lupon of San Pedro, Agoo, La Union. He claims that he instructed
his clients to present said document during the pre-trial conference as he had another hearing to attend.[14]
However, respondents excuse is untenable as any lawyer worth his salt would readily know that once a case has
been filed in court, any amicable settlement between the parties must be approved by the court in order for it to be
legally binding in accordance with Section 416[15] of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to the last
paragraph of Section 408[16] of the same Code. Thus, he cannot assume that the case will be deemed closed by
virtue of the supposed amicable settlement so as to excuse him from filing the Pre-trial Brief and from appearing at
the pre-trial set by the court.

With regard to his subsequent error of failing to file the required Appeal Brief which led to the dismissal of his
clients appeal before the CA, respondent did not give any plausible explanation other than merely placing the
blame on the incompetence of his secretary in not promptly informing him about her receipt of the Notice of
Submission of Appellants Brief.[17] This mistake by respondent is exacerbated by the fact that he did not care to
inform his clients of the dismissal of their appeal in 2002 and it was only in 2005 that his clients learned about
this unfortunate turn of events.

It is beyond dispute that respondent is duty-bound by his oath as a lawyer to diligently prosecute the case of his
clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law. Regrettably, the facts of this case illustrate respondents
dismal performance of that responsibility, which in its totality could amount to a reprehensible abandonment of his
clients cause.
A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution
until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and he should do no less,
otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath.[18]

As held in the case of Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose:[19]

The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a
case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to
serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds
of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is
also required to prepare adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.

In Balatbat v. Arias,[20] the Court also held that:

It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the prosecution or defense
of a clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his
client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict
compliance with ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Accordingly, for seriously prejudicing his clients interests due to inexcusable neglect of his professional duties as a
lawyer, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent for one (1) year from the
practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors acceded to this recommendation.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Agustin F. Paneda GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and 18 as well as
Rules 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon finality of this Decision.