Mina v.
Pascual, 25 Phil 540 On November 5, 1936, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff
FACTS: Francisco is the owner of land and he allowed his
brother, Andres, to erect a warehouse in that lot. Both
Francisco and Andres died and their children became their
respective heirs: Mina for Francisco and Pascual for
Andres. Pascual sold his share of the warehouse and lot.
Mina opposed because the lot is hers because her
predecessor (Francisco) never parted with its ownership
when he let Andres construct a warehouse, hence, it was a
contract of commodatum.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the contract between
Francisco and Andres?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that it was not a
commodatum. It is an essential feature of commodatum
that the use of the thing belonging to another shall be for
a certain period. The parties never fixed a definite period
during which Andres could use the lot and afterwards
return it.
NOTA BENE: It would seem that the Supreme Court failed
to consider the possibility of a contract of precardium
between Francisco and Andres. Precardium is a kind of
commodatum wherein the bailor may demand the object
at will if the contract does not stipulate a period or use to
which the thing is devoted.
MARGARITA QUINTOS and ANGEL A. ANSALDO, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. BECK, defendant-appellee.
FACTS: The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff. The
latter gratuitously granted to the former the use of the
furniture subject to the condition that the defendant
would return them to the plaintiff upon the latter's
demand. The plaintiff sold the property. There after the
plaintiff required the defendant to return all the furniture
transferred to him for the new owners in the house where
they were found.
reiterating that she may call for the furniture in the ground
floor of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the
defendant wrote another letter to the plaintiff informing
her that he could not give up the three gas heaters and the
four electric lamps because he would use them until the
15th of the same month when the lease in due to expire.
The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the fact
that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of
them. On November 15th, before vacating the house, the
defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture
belonging to the plaintiff and they are now on deposit in
the custody of the sheriff.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant complied with his
obligation to return the furniture upon the plaintiff’s
demand.
HELD: NO.
The contract entered into between the parties is one of
commadatum, because under it the plaintiff gratuitously
granted the use of the furniture to the defendant,
reserving for herself the ownership thereof; by this
contract the defendant bound himself to return the
furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause
7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles 1740, paragraph 1, and
1741 of the Civil Code).
The obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to
return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means
that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the
latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply
with this obligation when he merely placed them at the
disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three
gas heaters and the four eletric lamps.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return
all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter's demand,
the Court could not legally compel her to bear the
expenses occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the
defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled
to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff
under a duty to accept the offer to return the furniture,
because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas
heaters and the four electric lamps.
Republic v Court of Appeals
FACTS: The heirs of Domingo Baloy, represented by
Ricardo Baloy, filed an application for land registration
with a possessory title acquired under the provisions of
the Spanish Mortgage Law. The Court of First Instance of
Zambales, denied the application thus it was interposed
on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
thru its Fifth Division reversed the decision and approved
the application for registration. The petitioners filed their
Motion for reconsideration and was denied.
A communication/letter which contains an official
statement, recognizes the fact that Domingo Baloy and/or
his heirs have been in continuous possession of the said
land since 1894, as attested by an “Informacion
Possessoria” Title, which was granted by the Spanish
Government. And was interrupted only by the occupation
of the land by the US Navy in 1945.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is a need for a court order
for a private land to be deemed to have become public
land.
Whether or not the private respondents’ rights by virtue
of their possessory information title was lost by
prescription.
HELD: The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
Under Sec 3 Act 827. Private land could be deemed to have
become public land by virtue of a judicial declaration after
due process and hearing. Without a judgement or order
declaring the land to be public, its private character and
the possessory information title over it must be respected.
During the interim of 57 years from November 26, 1902 to
December 17, 1959 the possessory rights of Baloy or his
heirs were merely suspended and not lost by prescription.
The occupancy of the US Navy was not in the concept of
owner. It partakes of the character of a commodatum.
One’s ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by
reason of another’s possession if such possession be
under claim of ownership, not where the possession is
only intended to be transient, in which case the owner is
not divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in
the meantime.
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (now FIRST
INTERNATIONAL BANK), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS AND FRANKLIN VIVES, respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in 1979, private respondent Franklin
Vives was asked by his neighbor and friend Angeles
Sanchez to help her friend and townmate, Col. Arturo
Doronilla, in incorporating his business, the Sterela
Marketing and Services (“Sterela” for brevity).
Specifically, Sanchez asked private respondent to deposit
in a bank a certain amount of money in the bank account
of Sterela for purposes of its incorporation. She assured
private respondent that he could withdraw his money
from said account within a month’s time. With this, Mrs.
Vivies, Sanchez and a certain Estrella Dumagpi, secretary
of Doronilla, went to the bank to open an account with
Mrs. Vives and Sanchez as signatories. A passbook was
then issued to Mrs. Vives. Subsequently, private
respondent learned that part of the money was
withdrawn without presentment of the passbook as it was
his wife got hold of such. Mrs. Vives could not also
withdraw said remaining amount because it had to answer
for some postdated checks issued by Doronilla who
opened a current account for Sterela and authorized the
bank to debit savings.
Private respondent referred the matter to a lawyer, who
made a written demand upon Doronilla for the return of
his client’s money. Doronilla issued another check for
P212,000.00 in private respondent’s favor but the check
was again dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Private respondent instituted an action for recovery of
sum of money in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig,
Metro Manila against Doronilla, Sanchez, Dumagpi and
petitioner. The RTC ruled in favor of the private
respondent which was also affirmed in toto by the CA.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE
DORONILLA AND RESPONDENT VIVES WAS ONE OF
SIMPLE LOAN.
HELD: NO.
A circumspect examination of the records reveals that the
transaction between them was a commodatum. Article
1933 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two kinds
of loans in this wise:
By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to
another, either something not consumable so that the
latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in
which case the contract is called a commodatum; or
money or other consumable thing, upon the condition
that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall
be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan
or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay
interest.
In commodatum, the bailor retains the ownership of the
thing loaned, while in simple loan, ownership passes to the
borrower.
The foregoing provision seems to imply that if the subject
of the contract is a consumable thing, such as money, the
contract would be a mutuum. However, there are some
instances where a commodatum may have for its object a
consumable thing. Article 1936 of the Civil Code provides:
Consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if
the purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the
object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of
exhibition, or when the intention of the parties is to lend
consumable goods and to have the very same goods
returned at the end of the period agreed upon, the loan is
a commodatum and not a mutuum.
The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall be
accorded primordial consideration in determining the
actual character of a contract. In case of doubt, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties shall
be considered in such determination.
Delos Santos v. Jarra
FACTS: The Plaintiff Felix delos Santos filed this suit
against Agustina Jarra. Jarra was the administratix of the
estate of Jimenea. Plaintiff alleged that he owned 10 1st
class carabaos which he lent to his father-in-law Jimenea
to be used in the animal-power mill without
compensation. This was done on the condition of their
return after the work at the latter’s mill is terminated.
When delos Santos demanded the return of the animals
Jimenea refused, hence this suit.
ISSUE: W/N the contracts is one of a commodatum
HELD: YES. The carabaos were given on commodatum as
these were delivered to be used by defendant. Upon
failure of defendant to return the cattle upon demand, he
is under the obligation to indemnify the plaintiff by paying
him their value. Since the 6 carabaos were not the
property of the deceased or of any of his descendants, it is
the duty of the administratrix of the estate to either return
them or indemnify the owner thereof of their value.
Catholic Vicar Vs. CA
FACTS: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province
(Vicar), petitioner, filed with the court an application for
the registration of title over lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 situated in
Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites of
the Catholic Church, building, convents, high school
building, school gymnasium, dormitories, social hall and
stonewalls.
Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano
claimed that they have ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2
separate civil cases)
The land registration court confirmed the registrable title
of Vicar to lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private
respondents (heirs), the decision of the lower court was
reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.
VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.
During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1)
witness, who testified on the alleged ownership of the
land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest,
Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the
return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for
the use of the land at P10,000 per month. On the other
hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the
land in question is not covered by any title in the name of
Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs. Vicar dispensed
with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs
admitted that the witness if called to the witness stand,
would testify that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for
75 years continuously and peacefully and has constructed
permanent structures thereon.
ISSUE: WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3
merely as bailee borrower in commodatum, a gratuitous
loan for use.
HELD: YES.
Private respondents were able to prove that their
predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar
after the church and the convent were destroyed. They
never asked for the return of the house, but when they
allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum
and the petitioner the bailee.
The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of
commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse
possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in
trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The
adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it
declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into
title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of
the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not
meet the requirement of 30 years possession for
acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it
satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary
acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just
title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the
trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by
purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from
Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was
absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same
and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the
application for registration.
Pajuyo v. CA
FACTS: Pajuyo entrusted a house to Guevara for the
latter's use provided he should return the same upon
demand and with the condition that Guevara should be
responsible of the maintenance of the property. Upon
demand Guevara refused to return the property to Pajuyo.
The petitioner then filed an ejectment case against
Guevara with the MTC who ruled in favor of the petitioner.
On appeal with the CA, the appellate court reversed the
judgment of the lower court on the ground that both
parties are illegal settlers on the property thus have no
legal right so that the Court should leave the present
situation with respect to possession of the property as it
is, and ruling further that the contractual relationship of
Pajuyo and Guevara was that of a commodatum.
ISSUE: Is the contractual relationship of Pajuyo and
Guevara that of a commodatum?
HELD: No. The Court of Appeals’ theory that the
Kasunduan is one of commodatum is devoid of merit. In a
contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to
another something not consumable so that the latter may
use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential
feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another
feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing
belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the
bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until
after expiration of the period stipulated, or after
accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is
constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the
thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the
use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can
demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the
contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil
Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum. The Kasunduan
reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to
Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the
Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it
obligated him to maintain the property in good condition.
The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a
contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the
Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum.
Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on
tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant
relationship where the withdrawal of permission would
result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s
withholding of the property would then be unlawful.