CHAPTER II THE TORTFEASOR
A. The Tortfeaser
1. Natural Persons
New Civil Code, Arts. 37-40
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to
act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality,
family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law. (n)
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
2. Juridical Persons
New Civil Code, Arts. 44-46
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created
by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to
law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. (38a)
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237
FACTS: The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen (Philippine American
General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita Gueco Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco,
for the recovery of the sum of P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to the Philippine National
Bank on behalf of respondents Tapnio and Gueco, pursuant to an indemnity
agreement. Petitioner Bank was made third-party defendant by Tapnio and Gueco on
the theory that their failure to pay the debt was due to the fault or negligence of
petitioner.
Philamgen executed its Bond, with defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio in favor of the
Philippine National Bank Branch at San Fernando, Pampanga, to guarantee the
payment of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio's account. In turn, to guarantee the payment
of whatever amount the bonding company would pay to the Philippine National Bank,
both defendants executed the indemnity agreement.
Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio was indebted to the bank which she failed to pay despite
demands. The Bank wrote a letter of demand to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid the bank for
the defendant Rita Gueco's obligation. Plaintiff made several demands upon defendant
Rita Gueco Tapnio. Tapnio told the Plaintiff that she did not consider herself to be
indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon
whereby she had leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota. Tapnio filed her
third-party complaint against the Bank. She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to
use said quota for the consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract
of lease of sugar allotment. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was
secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation. Her
sugar cannot be exported without sugar quota allotment. A planter harvest less sugar
than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use. This
is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon . Since the quota
was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had to be approved by said Bank.
The bank required the parties to raise the consideration of P2.80 per picul or a total of
P2,800.00. When the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank at San Fernando
recommended the approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80 per picul, the
board of directors required that the amount be raised to 3.00 per picul. The parties were
notified of the refusal on the part of the board of directors.
The refusal on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the rate of P2.80 per picul
would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to realize the amount of P2,800.00 which was
more than sufficient to pay off her indebtedness to the Bank
Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of Tapnio, it has the right to
fix the rental price per picul of the sugar quota subject of the lease between private
respondents and Jacobo C. Tuazon.
Tuazon informed the Branch Manager of the Bank that the minimum lease rental of
P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and that he even offered to use the loan secured
by him from petitioner to pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the total
consideration of the lease. This arrangement was not only satisfactory to the Branch
Manager but it was also approves by Vice-President J. V. Buenaventura of the PNB.
Under that arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have realized the amount of
P2,800.00, which was more than enough to pay the balance of her indebtedness to the
Bank which was secured by the bond of Philamgen.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for the damage caused. Yes
Decision: The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED ordering
petitioner, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio.
The difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the P3.00
per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total sum of P200.00.
Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured
by chattel mortgage and surety, there was no reasonable basis for the Board of
Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum
of P200.00.
The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. This petitioner failed to do.
The bank knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval
of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question.
In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding
circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner bank is consequently liable for the
damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
3. Corporate Tort
Guillermo v. Uson, 785 SCRA 543
Facts: Respondent Uson was an accounting supervisor in Royal Class Venture Phils.,
Inc. (RCVPI) until Dec. 20, 2000 when he was allegedly dismissed by petitioner
Guillermo, the company’s president/general manager, for having exposed the latter’s
practice of dictating and undervaluing the shares of stocks of the corporation.
Thereafter he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the corporation, RCVPI.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Uson, ordering respondent to
reinstate him to his former position and pay his backwages, 13th month pay as well as
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. RCVPI did not file an appeal
but repeated issuances of Writs of Execution against the same remained unsatisfied.
Uson filed another Motion for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and
Officers of Respondent Liable for the Decision and quoted from the sheriff’s return:
a) that at RCVPI’s address (to which the writs are being served) there is a new
establishment named “ Joel and Sons Corporation” which was a family corporation
owned by the Guillermos, in which Jose Emmanuel Guillermo, the President and
General Manager of RCVPI, is one of the stockholders; b) that Jose received the writ
using the nickname “Joey” concealing his real identity and pretended to be the brother
of Jose; c) that RCVPI has already been dissolved.
Labor Arbiter granted the motion filed by respondent and held herein petitioner Jose
Emmanuel Guillermo, in his personal capacity jointly and severally liable with the
corporation stating that the officers of the corporation are jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the corporation (“piercing the veil of corporate fiction”) to the
employees even if the said officers were not parties to the case.
Guillermo filed a Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the Order of the labor
arbiter. His contentions were a) officers cannot be included as judgement obligor in a
labor case for the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become
final and executory b) in piercing the veil of RCVPI, he was allegedly discriminated
against when he alone was belatedly impleaded despite the existence of other officers
of RCVPI; c)that the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction because the case is one of an
intra-corporate controversy, with the complainant Uson also claiming to be a
stockholder and director of the corporation.
Issues: Whether an officer of a corporation may be included as judgement obligor in a
labor case for the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become
final and executory.
Whether the twin doctrines of “piercing the veil of corporate fiction” and personal
liability of company officers in labor cases apply.
Ruling: The Petition is denied.
In earlier labor cases, the Court held that persons who were not originally impleaded
in the case were, even during execution, held to be solidarity liable with the employer
corporation for the latter's unpaid obligations to complainant-employees. Personal
liability attaches only when, as enumerated by the said Section 31 of the Corporation
Code, there is a wilfull and knowing assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation,
there is gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation, or there
is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation. The conferment of
liability on officers for a corporation's obligations to labor is held to be an exception
to the general doctrine of separate personality of a corporation.
It also bears emphasis that in cases where personal liability attaches, not even all
officers are made accountable. Rather, only the "responsible officer," i.e., the person
directly responsible for and who "acted in bad faith" in committing the illegal dismissal
or any act violative of the Labor Code, is held solidarily liable, in cases wherein the
corporate veil is pierced
The veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors and
officers or even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and held
answerable solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on execution, so
long as it is established that such persons have deliberately used the corporate vehicle
to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice
in doing so.
In the case at hand, respondent Uson’s sworn allegations stating that Guillermo was
the responsible officer in charge of running the company as well as the one who
maliciously and illegally dismissed Uson from employment was uncontroverted.
Furthermore, it was Guillermo himself, as President and General Manager of the
company, who received the summons to the case, and who also subsequently and
without justifiable cause refused to receive all notices and orders of the Labor Arbiter
that followed. He, likewise, was shown to have a role in dissolving the original obligor
company in an obvious "scheme to avoid liability".
Essentially, then, the facts form part of the records and stand as further proof of
Guillermo's bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment obligation.
It is settled in jurisprudence that not all conflicts between a stockholder and the
corporation are intra-corporate; an examination of the complaint must be made on
whether the complainant is involved in his capacity as a stockholder or director, or as
an employee.
In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that he was maliciously and illegally dismissed
as an Accounting Supervisor by Guillermo, the Company President and General
Manager. It raised no intra-corporate relationship issues between him and the
corporation or Guillermo; neither did it raise any issue regarding the regulation of the
corporation.
As correctly found by the appellate court, Uson's complaint and redress sought were
centered alone on his dismissal as an employee, and not upon any other relationship
he had with the company or with Guillermo. Thus, the matter is clearly a labor dispute
cognizable by the labor tribunals.
B. Persons Made Responsible for Others
1. In General
a. Quasi-delicts under Article 2180, how interpreted
Rodriguez-Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA
242
Facts: The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision.Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business
executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no
driver's license.
Trial court ruled On the amount of the award of P1,650,000.00. It was based on two
factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more
years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00
annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the life
expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years. Dr. Vicente Campa testified that based
on Roberto Luna’s condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of
30 years.
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa
and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of
P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, compensatory damages plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00.
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals. The court affirmed in toto
that of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00)
as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna.
The Court of appeal takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as January
18, 1970 and that until now the process of litigation is not yet over. In the interest of
justice, the private respondents are hereby ordered to pay to the petitioners within
thirty (30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals
took into account the fact that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car
racing and manner of life should be one of the factors affecting the value of mortality
table in actions for damages. The court concluded that Luna could not have lived
beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced
to 10 years only.
Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal expenses, the escalating
price of automobile gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social
standing, it should increase that amount to P30,000.00. The Court of Appeals then
determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross income less
P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life
expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of June
19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his
annual personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Their petition contains the following prayer: That after notice and hearing, judgment
be rendered, setting aside or modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent Court of
Appeal only insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, so as to
affirm the trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in the
amount of P1,650,000.00
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they
said that they had no cash money.
Matters still to be resolved shall be the following; whether the award for unearned net
earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees
shall also be with interest at the legal rate.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision. YES
Decision: Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
Supreme Court sustain the petitioners. Luna was engaged in go-kart racing which
cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low
powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances.
It was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased
by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his
annual gross income.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The
attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under
the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the
court.
The courts are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do
so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of
Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines
or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
 b. Indirect liability for intentional acts
Paleyan v. Bangkili, 40 SCRA 132
Facts: Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who was killed by
defendant Carlos Bangkili. He was then accused of the crime of Homicide with less
serious physical injuries. At the time of the commission of the offense Carlos Bangkili
was a minor. Upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly, but the decision
made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity. The plaintiffs filed the an action for
damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili.
The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint against the defendant Victoria
Bangkili and renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Carlos Bangkili. In dismissing the complaint against Victoria Bangkili the court held
that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili could not be held
civilly liable for the criminal act of her minor son, who was already 19 years of age at
the time he committed the offense; and that Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was
not applicable for it covers only obligations arising from quasi-delicts and not to those
arising from crimes.
Issue: WON the latter, as the mother of Carlos who had him in her custody at the time
he committed the offense, should be adjudged liable with him for the amount which
he was sentenced to pay, considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.
Decision: VICTORIA BANGKILI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HER CO-
DEFENDANT.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180: "The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi- delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Where the allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee was sued directly
under the said provision, in that she "failed and neglected to exercise the proper care
and vigilance over her ward and minor child and as a consequence of such failure and
neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act herein complained of.
The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits that
its application should be relaxed, considering that her son, although living with her,
was already 19 years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This
fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellant from her
responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any
exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." There is no such proof in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed with respect to defendant-
appellee Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby adjudged liable solidarily with her co-
defendant for the amounts awarded in said judgment, with costs.
c. Nature of Solidarity
Lanuzo v. Pinge, 100 SCRA 205
Facts: A Complaint for damages was instituted by Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping,
the owner and operator of a truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. It was alleged
that while Mendoza was driving the truck and because of his reckless negligence, he
rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store
were completely razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount
of P13,000.00. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that a criminal case
for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal
Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff
opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal
case to institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct from the crimina l suit.
The Court rendered a judgment in plaintiff's favor ordering the defendants to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages.
They urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section
3, providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court
nevertheless committed an error in holding them jointly and severally liable.
Issues:
1) WON THE CIVIL ACTION WAS PREMATURELY INSTITUTED IN VIEW OF
RULE 111, SEC.3.
2) WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SY BONG PING JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
NEGLIGENT ACT OF HIS EMPLOYEE
Decision:
1.) The terms of plaintiff's reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action
clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from
the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship
between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store were caused by
the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross negligence
and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard
to the safety of persons and property".
As it is apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-
delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution
of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on
quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently
and regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that a plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or commission of the defendant.
2.) As to the subject of liability of the appellants herein, For his own negligence in
recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador
Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand,
the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article
2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
For failure of the Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the
selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages
caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver), and his liability is primary and
solidary. But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages,
the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee for whatever amount the
employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
Malipol v. Tan, 55 SCRA 202
Facts: In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking on a
road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and was
thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by
the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. He died due to the accident.
The cause of death is "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicula r
accident."
The gasoline tanker was driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto
Labsan which was being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner,
the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of damage having been ignored by
appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Batangas praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the
damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the minor
brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.
Appellants were duly served but they failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion, the trial court declared the appellants in
default and appellees were permitted to present their evidence in the absence of the
appellants.
CFI- Ernesto Labsan is liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs and should Ernesto
Labsan not be able to pay the damages, they shall be paid for by defendant Lily Lim
Tan, who by law, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in
the accident, is subsidiarily liable.
Appellants subsequently filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and for a
new trial which was denied by the trial court.
Issue: WON the liability of Lily Lim Tan in the case, who by law, being the owner
and operator of the gasoline tanker is subsidiary.
Decision: No. Lily Lim Tan’s liability is direct and primary.
We must point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is stated in the decision
appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of
damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and
operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that
is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not correct. The
action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime.
The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the
driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in
the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured
in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection
with her gasoline business. The prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold
appellants jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was
based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. Under Article 218 of the Civil Code,
which treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and
direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can demand from his employee
reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. The employer,
appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable
for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of course, without
prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant
Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to appellees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, dated July 1,
1966, as modified in accordance with the observations we made in the preceding
paragraph, and the order, dated October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion for the
lifting of the order of default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732, are affirmed.
Costs against defendants-appellees.
Anuran v. Buno, 17 SCRA 224
Facts: Petitioners- Representatives of the dead and the injured
Respondents- Driver and owners of motor truck and driver and owners of jeepney
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal,
Batangas. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, with such
violence that three of its passengers died, even as two others (passengers too) suffered
injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and
of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver and the owners of
the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
Court of First Instance- rendered judgment absolving the driver of the jeepney and its
owners but it required the truck driver and the owners thereof to make compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver and the owners
of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
Court of Appeals- it affirmed the exoneration of the jeepney driver and of its owners.
It explained that although the driver of the ill- starred jeepney was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in parking his vehicle improperly with a
portion thereof occupying the asphalted road and because it was overloaded, it
considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause
of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance", the said Court
ordered the owners of the truck to pay, solidarily with its driver, damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court insisting that the driver and
the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.

Issue: WON the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.
Decision: Yes.
Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have become
convinced that error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. It
must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely
is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art.
1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this
instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals'
finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver — and the owners — of the jeepney must
answer for injuries to its passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a suit between
the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney
and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
WHEREFORE, affirming the decision under review, we hereby modify it in the sense
prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants ( Driver and owners of the
jeepney) are required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the
amounts fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals against said three
defendants. So ordered.
* The last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is employed in contributory
negligence jurisdictions. Under this doctrine, a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless
recover if he is able to show that the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident. Where the plaintiff's previous negligence has placed him or her in a position
from which the person is powerless to extricate himself or herselfby the exercise of
any ordinary care, and the defendant detects the danger while time remains to avoid it
but fails to act, the courts have held that the plaintiff can recover.There must be proof
that the defendant discovered the situation, had the time to take action that would have
saved the plaintiff, but failed to do what a reasonable person would have done. In the
absence of any one of these elements, the courts deny recovery on the part of the
plaintiff.
Chan, Je. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., 473 SCRA 177
Facts: Petitioner John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. (Chan), owner of a gasoline station
bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent Iglesia ni Kristo, Inc. (INC),
supposedly needed additional sewage and septic tanks for his gasoline station. To this
end Chan contracted the services of Dioscoro Yoro (Yoro) in which the latter was to
dig the parcel of land. Their Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) provided among
others, that any damage within or outside Chan’s property incurred during the digging
shall be borne by Yoro. Digging commenced, and after some time Chan was informed
that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to INC. The
foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the
damage and prejudice of the respondent.
A complaint was filed by INC with the RTC against Chan and his engineer Oller, who
filed an answer and third-party complaint against Yoro. The RTC ruled that the
diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were
made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure, and that Chan and Yoro are solidarily
liable to INC and absolving Oller from any liability.
Chan and Yoro separately appealed to the CA, which disallowed the latter’s appeal for
failure to pay the docket and other fees. The CA denied Chan’s appeal.
Issue: Whether Aruego is the real party in interest and may be sued as defendant
Decision: Petition DENIED.
The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb this particular conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore, must be ruled in the negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
a) there must be an act or omission;
b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and d) there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation
which caused damage to INC because it was done surreptitiously within its premises
and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation INC’s premises
was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between
Chanand Yoro on the one hand, and INC on the other.
For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint
tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.
The heavy reliance of Chan in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him
clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had
provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within
or outside Chan’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from
liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, Chan cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed INC’s
property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his
security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
 2. In Particular
a. Parents
See R. A. 6809 (An Act Lowering the Age of Majority)
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO
EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age
mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions
favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
New Family Code, Articles 218, 219, 221
Article 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or agreement
which is destructive of the family shall be recognized or given any effect.
Article 219. Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members
of the same family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual
assistance.
Article 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and
wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs
of their legitime.
Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98
Facts: Appellee Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
was charged by appellants Pedro and Patricia Elcano for the killing by Reginald of
their son named Agapito Elcano. The CFI acquitted the Hills on the ground that
Marvin’s act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
The CFI also dismissed the Elcano’s complaint for recovery of damages against the
Hills for the same charge. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married
Decision: Petition DENIED.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also the Court’s
considered opinion that the conclusion of the Hills that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is
the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of
Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in the Court’s considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it
is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177
Facts: A passenger truck and a private automobile collided while attempting to pass
each other on Talon Bridge in Las Piñas. The passenger truck was driven by the
chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. On the other hand,
the private automobile was driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez (118 years old) and owned
by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father
was not in the car, but the mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez
family was accommodated therein. The collision between the bus and the automobile
resulted in the injuries of Narciso Gutierrez, a passenger in another autobus.
It was conceded that the young Bonifacio Gutierrez was incompetent and that he was
driving in an excessive rate. At the time of the collision, he lost his control thus he
contributed his negligence to the accident.
Issue: Whether Mr. Manuel Gutierrez, the father of Bonifacio, is liable for the
negligence of his son??
Decision: Yes.
The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate
motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts,
pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not
the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we can take
cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is
uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it
for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his
children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being
used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family
than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a
child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business,
so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master
and servant.
Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843
Facts: Dante Capuno, a 15 - year old member of the Boy Scout Organization and a
student of Balintawak Elementary School attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal in
the City of San Pablo. Upon the instruction of the city school’s s upervisor, Dante and
with other students boarded a jeep to go to the parade. Dante took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isi doro Caperiña, died as
a consequence.
Dante was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence. Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right to bring a
separate civil action for damages against the accused. Sab ina filed an action for
damages against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante.
Delfin Capuno’s defense primarily states that at the time of the accident, the Dante
was not under the control, supervision 'aand custody of Delfin. On the other hand,
Sabina Exconde contends that Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages with his son
Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the
death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father.
Issue: Whether Delfin Capu no can be held civilly liable with his son Dante, for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.
Decision: Yes.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his dea th or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "dduty of supporting
them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the "rright to correct
and punish them in moderation”. The only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this lia bility is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.
Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as
part of his extra - curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. José Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that
parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the
accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neith er the head of that school,
nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for
by law.
 Fuellas v. Cadano, 3 SCRA 361
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, were both 13 years old. They were classmates
at St. Mary’s High School.
One afternoon, while Pepito was studying in their classroom, Rico took the pencil of
one Ernesto Cabanok and secretly placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto
asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which
angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a
teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home.
Wh en Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico. Angelito
Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico.
However Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance
and pushed hi m to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under
his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito
was helped by oth ers to go home.
That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment.
Rico was convicted for serious physical injuires.
Elpidio Cadano, father of Pepito, filed a civil case for damages against Agapito Fuellas
, father of Rico.
Agapito Fuellas’’ defense is based primarily on the fact that the act of the minor must
be one wherein “ffault or negligence” is present; and that there being no fault or
negligence on the part of his son, but deliberate intent, the artic les of par. 2 of Art.
2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code are not
applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives
the presence of fault or negligence in its.
Issue: Whether Agapito Fuellas is laible for the acts of his minor son, Rico??
Decision: Yes.
The fact that the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior but
the relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of the father ultimately on
his ow n negligence and not on that of his minor son and that if an injury is caused by
the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that there was negligence
on the part of his father.
To hold that Article 2180 does not apply to the instant case b ecause it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi - delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.
Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160
Facts: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Mari a Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in
Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. Their teacher assigned
them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Monfort found a plastic head band. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and
the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain , she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and it was
then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor
for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, and stayed in the hospital for a
total of twenty - three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay
P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fee s, plus the costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not the parent of Monfort is liable for the act commited by the latter,
which caused damage to another child namely, Cuadra
Held: No.
The relevant provisions of the civil Code provides that:
ART. 2176. W hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre - existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi - delict
and is gove rned by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, such as that of the father or the
mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from
that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely
prima facie and may be rebutted. This is the clear and logic al inference that may be
drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "tthat the responsibility
treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family t o prevent damage.”.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any
way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the
care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
could be attributed to her parents.
Complaint dismissed.
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 16
Facts: Respondent spouses Gotiong are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died
was an 18 - year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and
19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event
on the same date.
For more than two (22) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with
Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the
first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompti ng the former
to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of
her best friend, Malou Alfonso.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a S mith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the
death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence,
available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the
other hand, Petitioners, contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti - Narcotics Unit (CCANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and
then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of J ulie Ann filed a case against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court rendered” WHEREFORE, judgment
dismissing plaintiffs’’ complaint for insufficie ncy of the evidence.
On appeal, said judgment was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
spouses Libi.
Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicariou s liability.
Decision: Yes.
Petitioners’’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor
son, is not borne out by the evidence on record.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio
Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s
key is a lways in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never
seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that
fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot
but enter tain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell
could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligen tly left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child
relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was
only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU
agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents
were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the
activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work
such as being drug informers, or even drug users.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’’
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary
liability is premised on the provisions
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delic to caused
by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of
age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was ampl ified by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntari ly assumed by
a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code,
this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of
the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the mi nor offender. For
civil liability arising from quasi - delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall
apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotion g was caused by
a felony or a quasi - delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in
holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bas es of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to
duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
Petition is DENIED.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 518
Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingl y, a civil complaint
for damages was filed with the by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he
had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto. This petition for adoption was granted on after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not them, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental
authority had shi fted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition
for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquish ed by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners'' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents
of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent
spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the
acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, fo r acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
Held: No.
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi - deli ct against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre -
existing contractual rela tion between the parties, is called a quasi – delict.
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child
who lives with them. Art icle 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, a re responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code
upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their
legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption
can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civ il Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred
when parental authority was still lodged in responde nt Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses,
at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious ac t that they could not have foreseen and
which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical
and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently,
no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached
above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of
at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the per iod of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.ee., before the issua nce of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural
parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners.
Petition for Review is GRANTED.
Bartolome v. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78
FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits with the SSS.
However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the
parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great
grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because
she is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on
October 26, 1987, less than three years since the decree of John’s adoption became
final.
ISSUE: Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s dependent
parent and, thus, entitled to the death benefits?
HELD: YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked,
one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still
a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parents.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents
are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances,
are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed
by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules
of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants,
his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in
the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
People v. Darilay, 421 SCRA 45
FACTS: On April 19, 1997 at about 9:000 am in Camarines Sur, Marilyn and Ailyn
Arganda were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish) from a s tore. After
buying the fried fish they walked back home. Momentarily they saw 15 year - old Noel
Darilay, the accused, emerge from a catmon tree. He stuck Ailyn twice with a piece of
wood and boxed her on the left side of her face. She fell unconscious. The appellant
then struck Marilyn twice on the back with a piece of wood. He then carried Ailyn to
a grassy area and left her there. When Ailyn regained her bearings, she looked for
Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be found.
Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened to her and Marilyn.
Their neighbour Allan Candelaria then rushed to the farm where Pascal worked and
informed him of what happened to his daughters. He hurried home and looked for
Marilyn to no avail. Earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the victim’s uncle reported the
incident to the police station. The three police officers rushed to the scene. With the
help of the tanods, they searched for Marilyn in the place where the appellant attacked
the girls. About 15 meters away, they found a yellow and white colored dress, white
panites and slipper bearing the name Marilyn. The dress was torn. While the policemen
were conducting their investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied by PO3
Antonio Pacardo. The appellant finally told them where Marilyn was and volunteered
to accompany them to the place. They proceeded to the place and found Marilyn’s
body in a grassy area near bushes and trees along the Palinao River. She was lying
face down, her legs spread apart and was naked. There was blood on her nose, her
mouth and her vagina. The policemen arrested the appellant and had him detained in
jail.
After the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of rape with
homicide in Criminal case No. 97 - 201 and attempted murder in Criminal Case No.
RTC 97 - 202. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Noel Darilay should be held liable for the
damages sustained by the heirs of the victims.
HELD: Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was
a minor under the parental authority of his parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta
Darilay are primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the
victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda. Consequently, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta
Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in Criminal Case No. RTC’’997 -
201, to pay to the heirs of the victim Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P 50, 000.00 as moral damages; and P 28,000.00 as exemplary -
damages. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence in support of actual damages;
hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto. They are, however, entitled to
temperate
damages in the amount o f P25,000.00. In Criminal Case No. RTC’’997 - 202, the
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
to Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P 25,000.00 as moral damages and P 25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
b. Guardian
See: New Family Code, Arts. 216, 218 and 222
Article 216. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.
Article 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or agreement
which is destructive of the family shall be recognized or given any effect.
Article 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
Rule 93 and 96, Revised Rules of Court
RULE 93 – Appointment of Guardians
Section 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. — Any relative,
friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent
or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition
the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person
or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal
Administration of the United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor
of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should
be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for the appointment of a general guardian
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdiction facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residence of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and
of the person having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render
void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. — When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14
years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice
thereof to be given.
Section 4. Opposition to petition. — Any interested person may, by filing a written
opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor,
competency of the alleged incompetent, or the insuitability of the person for whom
letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of
guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.
Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. — At the hearing of the petition the
alleged in competent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon the courts shall hear the evidence of the
parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a
minor, or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or
both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified.
Section 6. When and how guardian for non-resident appointed. Notice. — When a
person liable to be put under guardianship resides without the Philippines but the estate
therein, any relative or friend of such person, or any one interested in his estate, in
expectancy or otherwise, may petition a court having jurisdiction for the appointment
of a guardian for the estate, and if, after notice given to such person and in such manner
as the court deems proper, by publication or otherwise, and hearing, the court is
satisfied that such non-resident is a minor or incompetent rendering a guardian
necessary or convenient, it may appoint a guardian for such estate.
Section 7. Parents as guardians. — When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father of the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the child's property, with the duties and obligations of
guardians under this rules, and shall file the petition required by section 2 hereof. For
good reasons the court may, however, appoint another suitable person.
Section 8. Service of judgment. — Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be
served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or
incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.
RULE 96 – General Powers and Duties of Guardians
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. — A guardian appointed shall have the
care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the
management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a non-
resident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines,
and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have
jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Section 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. — Every guardian must pay the ward's just
debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not,
then out of his real estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance thereof.
Section 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for ward.
— A guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, and receive
all debts due him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and
give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just dividend of the estate and
effects; and he shall appear for and represent his ward in all actions and special
proceedings, unless another person be appointed for that purpose.
Section 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. — A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without the
waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as may be necessary, to the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and
if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order so to do, and apply to such
of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.
Section 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after hearing.
— The court may authorize the guardian to join in an assent to a partition of real or
personal estate held by the ward jointly or in common with others, but such authority
shall only be granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of the ward as the
court may direct, and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the
proposed action.
Section 6. Proceedings when the person suspected of embezzling or concealing
property of ward. — Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having
actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise,
that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any
money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate,
the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination touching such
money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate
against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
Section 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement of estates. — A
guardian must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within three
(3) months after his appointment, and annually after such appointment an inventory
and account, the rendition of any of which may be compelled upon the application of
an interested person. Such inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian.
All the estate of the ward described in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the
appraisement the court may request the assistance of one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers. And whenever any property of the ward not included in an inventory
already rendered is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward, like
proceedings shall be had for securing an inventory and appraisement thereof within
three (3) months after such discovery, succession, or acquisition.
Section 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. Expenses and
compensation allowed. — Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his
appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian must present his
account to the court for settlement and allowance. In the settlement of the account, the
guardian, other than a parent, shall be allowed the amount of his reasonable expenses
incurred in the execution of his trust and also such compensation for his services as
the court deems just, not exceeding fifteen per centum of the net income of the ward.
c. Owners and Managers of Establishments and Enterprises
Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador, 518 SCRA 568
Facts: Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the accounting department of Limay
Bulk Handling Terminal. As a prerequ isite for regular employment, she underwent a
medical exam at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a medical
technologist conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and issued the
test result indicating that Ranida was “HBs Ag: Reactive.” The result bore the name
and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Bu Castro as
pathologist. When Ranida submitted the result to company physician Dr. Sto.
Domingo, the latter told her that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease.
Based on medical report, the company terminated Ranida’s employment for failing the
physical exam. When she informed her father Ramon, he suffered a heart attack and
was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital. During her father’s confinement, she had
another HBs Ag test at the same hospital. The result indicated that she is non - reactive.
She informed Sto. Domingo but was told that the test by the CDC was more reliable
because it used the Mirco - Elisa Method. She went back to CDC for confirmat ory
testing and the Anti - HBs test conducted on her had a Negative result. She also had
another test at the hospital using the Micro - Elisa Method and the result indicated that
she was non - reactive. She submitted both results to the Executive Officer of the
company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re - employment
would be considered. The CDC conducted another test which indicated a Negative
result. The Med - Tech OIC of CDC issued a certification correcting the initial result
and explaining that the examining med tech Garcia interpreted the delayed reaction as
positive or negative. The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a complaint for
damages against Garcia and an unknown pathologist of CDC. She claimed that
because of the erroneous interpretation of the results of the examination, she lost her
job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless nights, while Ramon was
hospitalized and lost business opportunities. In an amended complaint, she named
Castro as the pathologist. Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the “false positive” result of
the first HBs Ag tests in a letter to the respondents. Castro claimed that as pathologist,
he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that he did not
examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber - stamp signature. RTC
dismissed the complaint because the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and found
Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. The
appellate court exonerated Castro for lack of participation.
ISSUE: Whether Castro has been negligent in issuing the test result and thus liable for
damages
HELD: YES. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of
another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4)
proximate causation. All the elements are present in the case at bar. Owners and
operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people
by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately
supported clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical
laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high
st andards of performance are expected from them. In fine, violation of a statutory duty
is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his
omission or non - performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby. From provisions RA 4688, otherwise known as the The Clinical Laboratory
Law, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised
by a licensed physician authorized by the Sec. of Health, like a pathologist who is
specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must
be under the supervision of the pathologist or licensed physician; and that the results
of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist. These rules are
intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard
clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised.
The public demand s no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical
laboratory examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws
and regulations.
Pacis v. Morales, 613 SCRA 607
FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17 - year old student who died
in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio
City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, wi th Matibag and Herbolario as sales
agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which
killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for
repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he
left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun
from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag aske d Alfred to return the gun. The latter
followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred
in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
“accident” under the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the
instant case.
The tri al court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization
and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s
Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent??
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision
reinstated.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’’ son. Under
Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based
on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may
opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case,
instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Ma
tibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim
for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
*** Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre - existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi - delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP
Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership//Repair,”
a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of fi rearms and ammunition
must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or cancelled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little
or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms
safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that
all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready - access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that
it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a
vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure
that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should
never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he
has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure
that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was
not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective fi rearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with
dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
d. Employers, Meaning of
Art. 2180, New Civil Code
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., 63 SCRA 231
Facts: On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil
- American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc . As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy - nine days, thus depriving the
company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil -
American Forwarders, Inc.
Amon g the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit
was not Pineda’s employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. A s already stated, the
lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver
appealed.
The Civil Code provides:
"AART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
"The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Issue: Whether the terms "employers” and "owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise” used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
Decision: We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation.
It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager” (“director”
in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer.” Hence, under the allegations
of the complaint, no tortious or quasi - delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit
as manager of Phil - American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of hi s employer, Phil - American Forwarders, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.
Genson v. Adarle, 153 SCRA 512
Facts: Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk
and other unserviceable government property located at the compound of the Highway
District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was hired
as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away sc rap iron from the said compound
with a daily wage of P12.00 or about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:000 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non -
working day, while the private respondent was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to
be l oaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the
payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell and
hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle
w as rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City.
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the action below for
damages against Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader operator;
Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District
Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense that he had no
knowledge of or participation in the accident and that, when it happened, he was not
present in the government compound. Apart from the fact that it was a Saturday and a
non - working day, he was in Iloilo. The trial court found that, with the exception of
the petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the Highway's compound when the
accident occurred. However, it still adjud ged the petitioner liable for damages because
the petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their government
equipment within an area under his supervision. Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial
court rendered a decision finding all the defendant s liable for damages under Articles
1172 and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court and further ordered the
defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defen dant Candelario Marcelino
was, however, absolved from liability.
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate court committed a
palpable error when it ruled that the petitioner was present when the accident happened
and that he had given permission to the other defendants to work on a Saturday, a non
- working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were the facts relied upon
by the said court in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages, such a
conclusion, is without basis.
Issue: Whether IAC committed a palpable error when it rules that Genson was present
when the accident happened and that he had given permission to the other defendants
to work on a Saturday, a non - working day thereby making Genson liable for damages
Decision: With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the appellate court
based its conclusions on an erroneous finding of fact, we agree with him that the
appellate court's finding that he was present within the premises when the accident
happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when the payloader's
bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability on his part would be based only on
his alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his subordinates. There is
likewise no sufficient basis for the "master - servant” doctrine in tort law to apply.
Buensalido was not working overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the
district engineer can be considered an "employer” for purposes of tort liability who
may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an
application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's
office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the
payloader, was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that
his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement. From
the records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a non - working day in their office premises can be held
liable for everything that happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr.
Arbatin brought his own payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we
are not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue before us is subsidiary
liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is moonlighting on a non -
working day.
There is no showing from the records that Genson received anything which could be
called "inordinate gain.” It is possible that he permitted work on a Saturday to
accommodate an acquaintance but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to clear
his compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non -
working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson to
hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
Martin v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591
Facts: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a privat e car bearing license plate No. NPA -
930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely dam aged. Meralco subsequently
demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon
sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he
was liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's f ees and litigation costs as the
employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was
not his employee.
The Regional Trial Court held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the amount
claimed, with 12%% interest, and P4,000.0 0 attorney's fees, plus costs. The decision
was seasonably elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on February
22, 1988, 2 prompting this petition for review.
Issue: Whether Ernesto Martin is the employer of Nestor Martin thereby liabl e for
damages
Decision: The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondent against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the
driver of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The
action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180
is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned
task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is
done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed
in that article. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff
to show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the
accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer - employee
relationship.
The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and the circumstances
of the accident, a re not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the
employer of Nestor Martin.
In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not have
to employ others to drive for them unless this is needed for business reasons. Man y
cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an unnecessary
expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that
Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question
borrowed the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been
accommodated if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the
use of their employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between Ernes to Martin and Nestor Martin could not
be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had
the burden of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to
establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Failure to do this was fatal to its action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED.
(i) Requisites
(a) Employee chosen by employer or through another
Arts. 1644 and 1713, New Civil Code
ARTICLE 1644. In the lease of work or service, one of the parties binds himself to
execute a piece of work or to render to the other some service for a price certain, but
the relation of principal and agent does not exist between them. (1544a)
Article 1713. By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to
execute a piece of work for the employer, in consideration of a certain price or
compensation. The contractor may either employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish
the material. (1588a)
Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18
Facts: On the afternoon of August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the
son of the plaintiff Balbino Cusion, was on his way to the Santa Mesa School in Manila
in company with his sister Marciana. As they came near to the fire station, some large
pieces of lumber on a truck which had stopped fell from it pinning the boy beneath,
and causing his almost instant death. The truck in questioned was owned by Antonio
Ora. It was driven by Felix Jose, with Telesforo Binoya as the washing and Francisco
Bautista as the helper, the two latter being youths less than18 years of age. Jose
Binoya, and Bautista were employees of Ora. The truck was rented by Ora to Norton
& Harrison Co. On the truck were the letters "N-H," which were the first letters of the
firm name. Ora was in the employ of Norton & Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his
duty as such employee to direct the loading and transportation of the lumber. When
the accident occurred the lumber had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it that
the truck halted, without, however, there arrangement having been made before the
pieces of lumber had fallen and killed the boy. Plaintiff filed an action to recover
damages in the amount of P30,000 for the death of his son allegedly to have been
caused by the negligence of the defendant. Court of First Instance absolved the
defendant from the complaint. Binoya and Bautista, pleaded guilty to the crime of
homicide through reckless negligence, and were sentenced accordingly. Issue:
Whether Ora was a servant of Norton & Harrison Co. or an independent contractor.
Ruling: Ora was a contractor and an employee at the same time of Norton & Harrison
Co. The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the relationship of
paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligece and not on that of his servant. Under the civil law, an employer is only liable
for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties. Here
Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that he was an independent
contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer retained the power of
directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck
were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee
of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of directing the loading and
transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the
use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts
and the law, Ora was not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the
defendant, and for his negligence defendant was responsible.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA
389
FACTS: Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho (private respondent for short) was the
operator of a gasoline station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City, wherein she sells
petitioner Shell's petroleum products. Sometime in April 1983, private respondent
requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks
of the said station in order to determine whether or not the sales losses she was
incurring for the past several months were due to leakages therein. Petitioner acceded
to the said request and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano together with
other workers, came to private respondent's station with a Job Order from petitioner to
perform the hydro-pressure test. Jesse conducted the necessary procedures to carry out
the test.
At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's husband opened the station and started
selling gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers who had bought gasoline
returned to the station complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water
in the gasoline that they bought. On account of this, private respondent was
constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the said customers. However, a certain
Eduardo Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against
private respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he caused the
incident to be published in two local newspapers.
Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed by Villanueva.
Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance. Thereafter, private
respondent demanded from petitioner the payment of damages in the amount of
P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead, offered private respondent additional credit line and
other beneficial terms, which offer was, however, rejected.
Subsequently, or on October 12, 1983, private respondent filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latter's alleged negligence in the
conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part, petitioner denied
liability because, according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the underground storage
tanks was conducted by an independent contractor.
RTC: dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages
CA: reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for the damage caused to private
respondent as a result of the hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held accountable for the damage to private
respondent due to the hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
HELD: It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee relationship must exist
before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. It is likewise
firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee
relationship is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects
of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the
putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of
a power to control the putative employee's conduct, although the latter is the most
important element.
Respondent Court of Appeals concluded that Feliciano was not an independent
contractor but was under the control and supervision of petitioner in the performance
of the hydro-pressure test, hence, it held petitioner liable for the former's acts and
omissions.
We are not in accord with the above finding of respondent Court of Appeals. As aptly
held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and supervision over
Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test.
Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business
name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau
of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum
consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able to finish his
work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes
his own tools and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required
to work on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls from clients such as
petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested. Moreover,
Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business
but not from other oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an independent
contractor.
Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and
omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the
hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in
the conduct of the same.
Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of private
respondent to establish an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
Feliciano. Absent said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and
omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano.
Decision of CA is set aside and RTC decision is reinstated.
(b) Services rendered in which employer has authority to give
De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 518
Facts: Respondent Angeline Steen suffered injuries as a result of the collision between
the passenger jeepney in which she was riding, and petitioner's (De Leon Brokerage
Co., Inc.) cargo truck recklessly driven by its employee, Augusto Luna. Luna had been
prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide with physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. In the criminal action against Luna (and the driver of the passenger
jeepney, who was, however, acquitted), respondent had reserved her right to file a
separate civil action. After a judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent
filed in CFI Manila an action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner. As
proof of Luna's negligence, she presented during the hearing the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case and likewise established her claim for actual, moral
and exemplary damages. Defendants (Luna and petitioner) sought to prove by means
of the former's testimony that he was not engaged in the performance of his duties at
the time of the accident. CFI Manila held petitioner and Luna solidarily liable to
respondent for the sums of P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid
medical fees; P7,000.00 as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issues: 1. Whether respondent was suing for
damages resulting from a quasi-delict or for civil liability arising from crime. 2.
Whether the judgment of conviction is admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-
delict. 3. Whether the employee, Luna, was in the discharge of his duties at the time
of the accident. 4. Whether De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. can be held solidarily liable
with Luna for damages. Ruling: 1. Respondent's complaint is based on a quasi delict.
She alleged that she suffered injuries because of the carelessness and imprudence of
petitioner's chauffeur who was driving the cargo truck belonging to petitioner, which
truck collided with the passenger jeepney wherein she was riding. Since averment had
been made of the employer-employee relationship and of the damages caused by the
employee on occasion of his function, there is a clear statement of a right of action
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The complaint does not, and did not have to
allege that petitioner did not exercise due deligence in choosing and supervising Luna,
because this is a matter of defense. The reservation made in the criminal action does
not preclude a subsequent action based on a quasi-delict. It cannot be inferred
therefrom that respondent had chosen to file the very civil action she had reserved.
The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that she did not want the question
of damages threshed out in the criminal action, but preferred to have this issue decided
in a separate civil action.
2. Considering that the judgment of conviction had been admitted without objection,
its competency can no longer be questioned on appeal. It established the fact of Luna's
negligence, giving rise to the presumption that petitioner had been negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. And petitioner failed to prove that it had
exercised such requisite care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility. 3.
Luna testified that on the day of the accident he had been instructed to go to Pampanga,
from there to proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after unloading his cargo in Pampanga,
he at once returned to Manila. However, his reason for immediately returning to
Manila is not clear. He could have returned for purposes of repair. It does not appear
that he was on an errand of his own. In the absence of determinative proof that the
deviation was so complete as would constitute a cessation or suspension of his service,
petitioner should be held liable. 4. Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible for
the quasi-delict, their liablity is solidary, although the latter can recover from the
former whatever sums it pays to respondent. SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303
Facts: Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning
of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. She was travelling along
Aurora Blvd. heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street,
she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk,
about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to
the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact, plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and
then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. She was brought
to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic
amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital
for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for
the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00)
were paid by defendants from the car insurance. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for
moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings. Defendant Richard Li denied that
he was negligent. He was on his way home. Considering that it was raining, visibility
was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving
along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards
the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of
A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at
80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which
he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early
warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left
rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally"
on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she
was not a licensed driver. The lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial,
Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff but absolved the Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two
separate petitions. Both petitions were consolidated. Issue: Whether Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is liable as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li. Ruling: The
Supreme Court concluded that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued
Mitsubishi Lancer. It sustained the finding of the CA that Valenzuela was not guilty
of contributory negligence. Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence. Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities.
The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was
not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable
precautions. The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias,
in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before
the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him
to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform
work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine
hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his
company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-
related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of
travel. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full
and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
(c) Illicit act of employee is by reason of the functions entrusted
to him
Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220 45
(check earlier reviewer)
ALR4th 289 (Liability of Hospital or Clinic for sexual
relationships with patients by staff physicians, and other
healers)
(d) Presumption of negligence and its effects
Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263
FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground were
blown down and fell on the electric wire on the transmission line of Alcala Electric
Plant. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on
the electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants. On the
following morning, the barrio captain passed along the area and saw the broken electric
wire. Thus, he warned the people not to go near the live wire. He also notified one of
the laborer in the said Plant about the broken line and asked to fix it. However, the
laborer said he could not do it but he was going to find the lineman to fix the said
broken wire. Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the
place, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes,
whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken
line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and subsequently
died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was
fixed by the lineman of the electric plant.
ISSUE: Whether there was negligence on the part of Umali as the owner and manager
of Alcala Electric Plant and thus liable under the concept of quasi-delict as a proximate
cause for the death due to electrocution of the child.
HELD: A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence
on the part of defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death
of the victim by electrocution. (1) That the employees did not take precautionary
measures to eliminate the big and tall bananas as it could be a source of danger to the
electric line; (2) That known to the employees of the plant that possible damage may
brought by the storm, did not cut off the floe of electricity along the lines; and (3)
Employee Baldomero was negligent because even if he was already made aware of
the live cut wire, he did not have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody
from approaching the live wire; instead he left the premises and obviously forgetting
that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of
the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of
by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury
caused by his employees’ negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which states: The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer
because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the
employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil
Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the
employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the
diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection
of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
Secosa v. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco, 433 SCRA 273
FACTS: On June 27, 1996, at around 4:00 p.m., Erwin Suarez Francisco, an 18 yr old,
3rd yr. PT student of the Manila Central University, was riding a motorcycle along
Radial 10 Avenue, near the Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of Manila. At the same
time, Raymundo Odani Secosa, was driving an Isuzu cargo truck owned by Dassad
Warehousing and Port services Inc. on the same road. Behind Francisco was a sand
and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa.
The three vehicles were traversing the southbound lane at a fairly high speed. When
Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle causing
Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which
resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his life, Secosa left his truck and fled
the scene of the collision. Thereafter, the parents of Francisco filed an action for
damages against Secosa and Dassad Warehousing impleading Sy, its president. The
lower court ruled against Secosa, which affirmed by the CA in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees
HELD: When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in
the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict
committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised
such degree of care.
How does an employer prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee? xxx In the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Jurisprudentially, therefore, the employer must not merely present testimonial
evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial
evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the
biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his witnesses.
Applying the foregoing doctrines to the present case, we hold that petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively prove that it had exercised
the requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees.
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, 523 SCRA 184
Facts: Sebastian M. Baking (Baking) went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical
check-up. He underwent an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis,
Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr.
Sy then gave Baking two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Baking then proceeded to Mercury Drug
Corporation (Alabang Branch, hereinafter, Mercury) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to Baking was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
After taking the said medicine for three consecutive days, Baking figured in a
vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta.
Baking fell asleep while driving and could not remember anything about the collision
nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical
and mental state at the time of the collision, Baking returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon
being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent
was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Baking filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against Mercury
where the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Baking ordering Mercury to pay the
former damages as fllows: (1) P250,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; (3) plus ½% of the cost of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment; MR was
also denied, hence, this petition.
Issues: 1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was
the proximate cause of respondent’s accident; and 2. Whether the award of moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified.
Ruling: Petition is denied. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. To sustain a claim based on the above
provision, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees
will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of
the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling to Baking
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could
be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine
she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s
negligence in driving his car.
We disagree.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and
precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been
careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a
sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states: ART.
2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of
the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him,
after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing
on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner's failure
to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by
the latter.
Mercury Drug Corporation v. De Leon, 569 SCRA 432
FACTS: Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding judge of Branch 258,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paraaque. He noticed that his left eye was reddish. He
also had difficulty reading. Dr. Charles Milla, a friend for dinner at the Foohyui
Restaurant, prescribed to him the drugs “Cortisporin Opthalmic” and “Ceftin.” The
good judge went to a branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed
medicines. He showed his prescription to a pharmacist assistant. He subsequently got
the medicine handed over by the assistant.
When he applied the drop on his left eye, he felt “searing pain.” He rinsed it with water
but the pain did not subside. He then discovered that he was given the wrong medicine
or “Cortisporin Otic Solution.”
The judge returned to the same Mercury Drug branch. The assistant did not apologize
and instead replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. Her supervisor
was the one who apologized and merely informed the judge that they did not have on
stock the medicine that he needed.
The judge wrote Mercury Drug, through its president about the incident but did not
get a response. Two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their
supervisor was busy with other matters. With no apology or explanation forthcoming,
he filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Mercury Drug argued that the proximate cause was the judge’s own negligence. And
that he should have first read and checked to see if he had the right eye solution. Also,
Mercury Drug explained that there is no available medicine known as “Cortisporin
Opthalmic” in the Philippine market. What was written on the piece of paper De Leon
presented was “Cortisporin Solution” and the pharmacist assistant gave him the only
available “Cortisporin Solution” in the market. Which leads one to ask, since his eye
was troubling him, how could you expect him to read the label?
Moreover, Mercury argued that the judge failed to present a proper prescription as it
lacked the required information concerning the attending doctor’s name and license
number. He was entertained only because he was a regular customer of their branch.
RTC ruled in favor of Respondent De Leon.
CA dismissed the appeal of Petitioner Mercury.
ISSUE: WON Mercury and Ganzon had exercised the degree of diligence expected of
them
HELD: Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence
expected of them. Mercury Drug and Ganzon cannot exculpate themselves from any
liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the
highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.
The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care
of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other
words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and
vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them,
and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and
care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature of the business, cannot be heard to
say that his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for
those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross negligence.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption may be
rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of the family.90 Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its
employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the
purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There
exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent
death or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar
learning.
The award of damages is proper and shall only be reduced considering the peculiar
facts of the case. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant’s wrongful
act or omission.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest.
This cannot be more real for Mercury Drug, the country’s biggest drugstore chain.
This Court cannot tolerate any form of negligence which can jeopardize the health and
safety of its loyal patrons. Moreover, this Court will not countenance the cavalier
manner it treated De Leon. Not only does a pharmacy owe a customer the duty of
reasonable care, but it is also duty-bound to accord one with respect.
(e) Vicarious liability of employers
Heirs of Redentor Completo v. Albayda, Jr., 624 SCRA 97
Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Facts: Sgt. Amando C. Albayda, Jr. was riding a bicycle on his way to the office. He
stopped and moved to the side of the street when he saw the taxi driven by Redentor
Completo was moving fast towards him. In spite of Sgt. Albayda, Jr.’s precautions,
the taxi still bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Sgt.
Albayda, Jr. was admitted to the hospital for six (6) months. Thereafter, Sgt. Albayda,
Jr. sued Completo and his employer, Elpidio Abiad, for damages. No receipts were
presented during trial. Afterwards, the trial court awarded actual and moral damages
to Sgt. Albayda, Jr.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is correct.
Ruling: NO. The award of actual damages is not proper because Sgt. Albayda, Jr.
failed to present documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount that he
incurred during his hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he suffered. In the
absence of stipulation, actual damages are awarded only for such pecuniary loss
suffered that was duly proved. But while the amount of actual damages was not duly
established with certainty, Sgt. Albayda, Jr. incurred a considerable amount for his
medical expenses, as well as loss of capacity to earn wages. Temperate damages, more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature
of the case, be proved with certainty. However, the award of moral damages is proper,
since moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.
(ii) Employer need not be engaged in business to be held liable
Ortaliz v. Echarri, 101 Phil. 947
Facts: Jose A. Ortaliz (Jose) is the lawful father of the child, Winston Ortaliz. On or
about December 18, 1953, at the corner of Washington and Justicia Streets, Bacolod
City, Philippines, the Studebaker Sedan Car with Plate No. 35-1138 of the Corado
Echarri (Echarri), which was, at that time of accident was driven and controlled by
Segundino Estanda, a driver under the employ of the Echarri. The said vehicle struck
Winston Ortaliz causing upon him physical injuries as a result he was taken to the
Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital.
A criminal case was filed against Segundino Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical
Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence, where the latter pleaded guilty to the crime
charge where he was sentence to suffer the penalty of five (5) days of Arresto Menor
and to pay the costs in a Decision rendered in said case. Jose is now claiming in a
separate civil case damages he had suffered in the form of expenses paid for the
hospitalization, medicines, physicians' fees and incidental expense of his son, Winston
Ortaliz, in the amount of P446.58; and further asks for moral damages of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000), Philippine Currency.
On the other hand, Echarri filed a motion to dismiss wherein, after admitting the
ownership of the Studebaker Sedan car with plate No. 35-1138, he alleged that the
complaint does not allege that defendant was nor is engaged in any business or industry
in conjunction with which he has at any time used the said car, much less on the
occasion of the alleged accident, nor the defendant had at any time put out the said car
for hire; and that the obligation or liability of Echarri, if any, for the damages alleged
in the complaint, being an obligation arising from a criminal offense, is governed by
Article 1161 of the Civil Code, which, in turn, makes the penal laws applicable thereto;
and under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential, in order for an
employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies committed by his employee, that the
former be engaged in some kind of industry, and that the employer had committed the
crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such industry. Therefore,
defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his driver as
alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
Trial court (Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental) granted said motion to
dismiss, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not CFI erred in dismissing the case for failure to state the cause of
action.
Ruling: Petition granted. Remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.
Jose contends that under paragraph 2 of Article 2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph
1 and 5 of Article 2180, a sufficient cause of action has been clearly alleged in the
disputed complaint and therefore the same should not have been dismissed. Article
2180 in part provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omission but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and those of Article 2176 to the
effect that "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done", there seems to be good reason
to support plaintiff's contention that the complaint in question states sufficient cause
of action. Defendant-appellee, however, claims that there is no allegation in the
complaint that "the defendant was engaged in some kind of industry and that the
employee had committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with
such industry," hence the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the crime
committed by his driver and therefore the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. But paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for
it clearly provides that “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.”
Echarri also contends that when the judgment in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the
Municipal Court of Bacolod was rendered against the driver Segundino Estanda, Jose
did not reserve the civil action and thus he lost his right thereto and consequently the
present action against the defendant-appellee would not lie. This contention, however,
is untenable, for Article 33 of the Civil Code clearly provides:
ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
(iii) Defense of diligence in selection and supervision of employees
Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Pnil. 398
Facts: Metropolitan Water District (MWD) owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited
and for which a nominal fee. The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape
known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." The care and supervision of
the pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a recreational section composed of
Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had
taken the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila.
For the safety of its patrons, MWD has provided the pools with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in
charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. MWD has also on display
in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools,
one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant.
Although MWD does not maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool
compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer
injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student
and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to MWC’s swimming pools.
After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small
pools where the water was shallow. After a while, Dominador Ong told his brothers
that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in
the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of
coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys
who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that
somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed
lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into
the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom. The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately
applied manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to
render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being
called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying
with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy
with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr.
Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the
artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr.
Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he
found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated by the
Police Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben Ong and
Andres Hagad, Jr. gave written statements. On the following day, July 6, 1952, an
autopsy was performed by Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal
Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who found in the body of the deceased the
following: an abrasion on the right elbow lateral aspect; contusion on the right
forehead; hematoma on the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion in the brain
with petechial subcortical hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face and on the
nails; the lung was soggy with fine froth in the bronchioles; dark fluid blood in the
heart; congestion in the visceral organs, and brownish fluid in the stomach. The death
was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
Issue: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence
of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
Ruling: Petition is denied. There is no question that appellants had striven to prove
that MWD failed to take the necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by
not placing at the swimming pools efficient and competent employees who may render
help at a moment's notice, and they ascribed such negligence to MWD because the
lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was drowning was not available or was
attending to something else with the result that his help came late. Thus, Ongs tried to
prove through the testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when Eusebio
Ong and Hagad, Jr. detected that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big
swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help, lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not
immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon the third call that he threw
away the magazine he was reading and allowed three or four minutes to elapse before
retrieving the body from the water. This negligence of Abaño, they contend, is
attributable to MWD.
But the claim of these two witnesses not only was vehemently denied by lifeguard
Abaño, but is belied by the written statements given by them in the investigation
conducted by the Police Department of Quezon City approximately three hours after
the happening of the accident. Thus, these two boys admitted in the investigation that
they narrated in their statements everything they knew of the accident, but, as found
by the trial, nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting
with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic
magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond
to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was
that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the
pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother. For this
reason, the trial court made this conclusion: “The testimony of Ruben Ong and Andres
Hagad, Jr. as to the alleged failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to
their call may therefore be disregarded because they are belied by their written
statements. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD has taken all
necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident
which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of
MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a
first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards
who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief
and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the
safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available
always in case of emergency. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong
was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of MWD did everything
possible to bring him back to life.
Sensing that their former theory as regards the liability of MWD may not be of much
help, appellants now switch to the theory that even if it be assumed that the deceased
is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still MWD may be held liable under
the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to
save the victim, it failed to do so. We do not see how this doctrine may apply
considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers
that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time
on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900-902)
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself in the wrong side of the road. But
as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It
will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances, the law is that a person who has the
last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. (Picart vs.
Smith, 37 Phil., 809)
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of MWD as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of MWD had been put
into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to MWD.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means
at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the
injury. O'Mally vs. Eagan, 77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo. 233, 350, 2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R.
Digest, Vol. 8, pp. 955-956)
Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289
Cola Bottling and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a
consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and
a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision
driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-
truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ramos, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Not satisfied with the
judgment, PEPSI appealed to the CA saying that he had observed due diligence in
selecting its employees. PEPSI has explained their process in selecting their drivers
thru the testimony of Anasco. they looked into his background, submitted clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house
to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of theoretical and practical exam.
CA found the employer PEPSI not liable. hence the petition of Ramos. ISSUE: WON
PEPSI has observed due diligence in selecting its employees? WON it is liable to
Ramos? DECISION: No. Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-
COLA exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by
this Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In order that the defendant
may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications,
his experience and record of service. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit
that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely
clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and
supervision of the driver-employee. Neither could SC apply the respondent superior
principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is
his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible for
failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. We do not
— and have never — followed the respondent superior rule. So, the American rulings
cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, 212 SCRA 637
FACTS: Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of
the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service driver.
On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa
returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he
could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same
place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so
Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an
elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal
case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable
for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article
2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage
hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that
the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as
it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s
appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
DECISION: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs
cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X,
Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance
with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned.
This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code.
The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is
merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a
distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in
a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by
one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against
both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule
on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is
beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation
service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden
of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either
in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has
failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of
a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, 476 SCRA 236
Facts: In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the
boy’s comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of
nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy
started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help.
When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process
of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical
injuries.
In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or
negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence
of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its
students. The trial court decided in favor of Tagorio. P200,253.12 as actual and
compensatory damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages,
P100,000 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. CA affirmed its decision.
Issue: WON CLC is negligent?
Decision: Yes. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred. In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to
provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two
instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the
problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the
fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, 525 SCRA 427
Facts: Personal circumstance of the victim before the accident: 17 years old, nearly 6
ft. tall and weighed 175 pounds; in 4th year high school, and a member of the school
varsity basketball team; class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual; had
shown very good leadership qualities and was looking forward to his college life,
having just passed the entrance examinations of the UP, DLSU, and the UA&P. UST
even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented
him from attending the basketball try-outs; an exceptional student who excelled both
in his academics & extracurricular undertakings.
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck (14, 058 kg.) driven by petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario. While
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen
Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan (1, 450 kg). These two
vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within
the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway,
north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The
car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right,
when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of
the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around
and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and
zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR).
His driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended
for reckless driving. As a result of the accident, the car, valued at P300,000.00, was a
total wreck and Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head,
face, and lung leaving him paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires
continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondent’s arguments: Del Rosario is at fault for committing gross negligence and
reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug is also at fault for
failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
Petitioner’s arguments: it was Stephen Huang’s recklessness that is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. According to Del Rosario, he was driving on the left
innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire. The truck then swerved
to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the
other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island and landed
on the same portion of C-5. Further, Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all its
employees.
Ruling of the Trial Court: the petitioners are jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
CA: Affirmed. The evidence does not support petitioners’ claim that at the time of the
accident, the truck was at the left inner lane and that it was respondent Stephen
Huang’s car, at its right, which bumped the right front side of the truck. Firstly,
petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by the
car, despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the car. Del
Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which
was on its left side. He said that "the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or
under him or over him or behind him." If the truck were really at the left lane and the
car were at its right, and the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not
have landed on the opposite side, but would have been thrown to the right side of the
C-5 Highway (this conclusion is arrived at by giving credit to the testimony of Dr.
Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics).
Issue: WON Mercury Drug Corp. is liable for failing to exercise the due diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
Decision: Clearly, there is no question that petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence is the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen Huang as
he failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.
As to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario, Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate.
It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the
employee.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the
employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge
its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employee, petitioner Del Rosario for the ff reasons:
1. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic (petitioner’s testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure), the Recruitment and Training Manager of Mercury Drug, applicants are
required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological examination.
However, she admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination
when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the
position of Truck Man.
2. She also admitted that he used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck
during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, he attended only three driving seminars – on June 30, 2001, Feb. 5,
2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident
which occurred in 1996 was held 12 years ago in 1984.
3. At the time of the accident, he has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours,
without any alternate. It appears that Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up
driver for long trips.
4. Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, he
was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified
that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against him.
(iv) Nature and kinds of employer's liability
a) Primary or Direct
Africa v. Caltex (Phils.) Inc., 16 SCRA 448
Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and
Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle
of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. (owner of the station) and Mateo
Boquiren (agent in charge of operation). Negligence on the part of both of them was
attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issues: WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
WON Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants.
Decision: Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable. Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect
that “where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant,
that the incident happened because of want of care. The aforesaid principle enunciated
in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in this case. The
gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is
fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver
of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the
underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of
negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass
through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10
taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke
cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and cannot
prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire. These facts, descriptive of the
location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station
in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to
appellants. This issue depends on whether Boquiren was an independent contractor, or
an agent of Caltex. Under the license agreement the operator would pay Caltex the
purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all equipment therein.
The operator could sell only Caltex products. Maintenance of the station and its
equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. The operator
could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator.
These provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of
the Caltex, not an independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be held liable for
damages caused to appellants.
Lamis v. Ong, 466 SCRA 510
Facts: Vicente Lamis, a security guard of Sandigan Protective and Investigation
Agency (Sandigan), was hired to guard the Manila Chinese Cemetery. He was
instructed by Sandigan to not allow anyone to enter the cemetery from 6:00pm to
6:00am since the visiting hours were at 6:00am to 6:00pm.
Around 3:00am, a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by David Ong arrived at the south gate of
the cemetery. Lamis informed Ong that he cannot enter the cemetery being beyond the
visiting hours. Ong accelerated the speed of his car trying to enter the cementery. This
irked Lamis prompting him to close the gate and take his shotgun. Lamis fired a
warning shot which did not stop Ong. Ong alighted from his car to check on the gate.
As he was returning to his car, Lamis shot him hitting his right arm, left hip and right
waist. Ong managed to drive to Chinese General Hospital where he was treated. The
hospital guard reported the incident.
Sandigan conducted its own investigation but did not turn over to the police the firearm
used by Lamis. Sandigan also paid Lamis’ mother the amount spent for medical
expenses. Ong filed in the RTC a complaint for frustrated murder and a complaint for
damages against Sandigan and Lamis. The RTC, ruling on the civil case ordered both
Lamis and Sangdigan to pay joint and solidarily to Ong; 500,0000 as moral damages,
300,000 as exemplary damages and 50,000 for attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA correctly held Sandigan liable despite the fact that Sandigan
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards
2. Whether the CA correctly awarded damages
Ruling: Petition is DENIED.
Petitioners maintain that there is no legal basis for the trial court’s award of
damages.As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis’ act ofshooting the
respondent was “deliberate and intentional,”hence, both petitioners are jointly and
solidarily liable torespondent for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “Whoever by an act or omission causes
damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. xx x.” The obligation imposed by this Article is “demandable not only for one’s
own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is
responsible.” Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is
likewise liable for damages caused by the latter.
As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid the medical expenses (or actual
damages) incurred by respondent. We find, however, that the trial court erred in
awarding to respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, exemplary
damages of P300,000.00 and attorney’s fee in the amount of P50,000.00. These
amounts are quite excessive. We have held that although the trial court is given the
discretion to determine the amount of such damages, the appellate court may modify
or change the amount awarded when it is inordinate, as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is meant to compensate the claimant
for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused by the defendant’s wrongful acts.10 Although incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the
wrongdoer,12 neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is
no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial
courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should
not be palpably and scandalously excessive.14 We hold that an award to respondent
of P30,000.00, instead of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
Cerezo v. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167
Facts: Country Bus Lines passenger bus owned by Cerezo collided with a tricycle
driven by Tuazon. Tuazon filed an action for damages against Cerezo and her husband,
Atty. Cerezo, and the bus driver Danilo Foronda. He claimed that at the time of the
accident, he was at his proper lane and that the driver of the was negligent and without
regard with traffic rules which caused severe damage to the tricycle and serious
physical injuries to Tuazon making him unable to walk and his thumb and middle
finger on the left hand was cut.
Tuazon also filed a motion to litigate as a pauper which was granted by the trial court.
Summons were issued against the spouses at their Makati address but were returned
unserved. The alias summons were finally served at the office of Atty. Cerezo at
Tarlac. The spouses participated in the proceedings in the trial court and filed a motion
for the issuance of new summons for the spouses to comply with the proper service
under the Rules of Court which was subsequently denied stating that the allowance by
the court for Tuazon to litigate as a pauper cured the defect. The Cerezo spouses filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied and the trial court issued an order directing
the spouses to file their answer. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer and upon
motion was declared in default.
After considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court
ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability
because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold Atty.
Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the
family. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by
Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the
grounds of fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. Tuazon did not testify but
presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in
the case. The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
The trial court stated that having received the decision, the Cerezo spouses should have
filed a notice of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. And
that the spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a good and
substantial defense.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari which questioned whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
claimed was an indispensable party and that Tuazon did not reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action. The CA denied the petition holding that the Cerezo
spouses’ failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence, considering that
they continued to participate in the proceedings without filing an answer. Then the
spouses filed before the SC a petition for review on certiorari but was denied for failure
to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of Appeals and to
the adverse parties. The SC also ruled that even if the petition complied with this
requirement, the Court would still have denied the petition as the spouses failed to
show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The decision of the SC
became final and executory.
The spouses filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment praying for the
annulment of the decision of the trial but the CA denied the petition holding that the
spouses availed the remedy of petition for relief making the remedy of annulment of
judgment no longer available. The CA also denied the spouses’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s findings are null and void for failure to serve
summons to Danilo Foronda which is an indispensable party and such findings cannot
become a basis of the lower court to adjudge petitioner-employer liable for damages
Ruling: Petition lacks merit.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. The trial court
found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in
part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs.
Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it
is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution
of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor
is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire
obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is
available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as
Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while
the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words “primary
and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,” refer to the remedy provided by law for
enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation.
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee
causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and
separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting
and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely
subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the
sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but
it is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against
the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action
for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.
The Cerezo spouses’ contention that summons be served anew on them is untenable
in light of their participation in the trial court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo
spouses’ contention would make a fetish of a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity
in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial court’s jurisdiction over
the persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed
a petition for relief from judgment.