11th Meeting

G.R. No.
115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28,
1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC
imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April
28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every

candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election,
file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the
statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to
file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection
with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the
Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall
be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the
offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal
delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his
jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification
to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated
on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements.
Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the
regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the
election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who
filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also
advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein
required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to
file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection
with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall
be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the
offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of
the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should
have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically
refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute
implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in
favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the
electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws
and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or
unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166,
Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United
States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements
of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the
solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity
with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutes also
enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence
of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263,
202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky.
423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have
received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is
in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a
candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation,
the statement shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy
did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory
preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses
of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave
benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is
being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent's private residence and medical
clinic.
On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two Administrative cases in the following manner:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces,
Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS
(P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due thereon from the time it was approved in audit up to final
payment, it being legally due the Complainant representing the money value of his leave credits accruing for
services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION,
respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi,
Albay, for a period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authority coupled with
oppression as a public example to deter others similarly inclined from using public office as a tool for personal
vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
beginning after her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative Case No. 02-92. She is
likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electric and
water bills from July to December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16).
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same
time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be
appealed to the following:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President issued an
Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
dated 12 February 1987, quoted below:
Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the
pendency of an appeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall
be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from
is stayed upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the
pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order
appealed from upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).
xxx xxx xxx
After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of
execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of execution of:
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993
suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months, and
b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July
1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision
that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative Order
No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the
President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency
of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts
thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to
identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 467 [1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of
repeal is not favored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management
Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be
such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statutes 631 [1940]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not
irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay
the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of
the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove
from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and
regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the
other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the
construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan
suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the
rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,

vs.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE

JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in
his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG
ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD
RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS)
CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA
QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA.
VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE
LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the
petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance
with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and
Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur
(IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others
(BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B.
Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose
belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate
the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and
did not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice
sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to
participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions
when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an
executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the
terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has
raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to
be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply
it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President
in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and
distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight
appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the
other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on
statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on
temporary appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates
to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting
the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants
the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how
to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action
or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the JBC to comply
with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election
offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by
the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is
indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the
outgoing President’s powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the
next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the
Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the
appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15,
and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of
the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in
all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to
other appointments to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and
Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated
dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity
in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all
branches of the Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and
physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield
to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the
Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of
the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list
of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice
Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the
principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a
whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no
conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight
in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and
interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy
in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in
conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one
exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish,
because the law itself makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of
Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any
vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has
roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and
study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to
examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive
to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc,
even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to
the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or
the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to
reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to
the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we
should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already
provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its
provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of
the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010
at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the
vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary
appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the
appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief
Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare
decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is
prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial
appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act
not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general
intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of
the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the
interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to
its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to
republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without
proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief
Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight
appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related
matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet
decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the
new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short
list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the
President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The
statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its
implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the
JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were
directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate
opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC as provided
by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power under
Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was
why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a
position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the
exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not
being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the
Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent
and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is
deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within
the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions
of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the
rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system
like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind
each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to
its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law
system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier
decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are
relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The
application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They
seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify
or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission
extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII,
a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the
end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII
"(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII
even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in
the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the
principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on
appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is
self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII,
the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the
silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally
constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9
should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in
them.9Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative
intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be
conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or
words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law
itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the
purposes of any quarter.
Final Word
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the
Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to
her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the
contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the
Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could
have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from
retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an
imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days
from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution
to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128759. August 1, 2002]
RAYMUNDO TOLENTINO and LORENZA ROO, substituted by their HEIRS, represented by EMMANUELA
ROO, as Attorney-in-Fact, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA F. LETICIA, CRESENTE,
ARSENIO, VIOLETA, RAMON, TERESITA, CELIA, YOLANDA, ROLANDO, RESTITUTO and
REDENTOR, all surnamed DE GUZMAN, GLORIA G. PONGCO and AMPARO G.
BADURIA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision [1] dated December 13, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21005, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
162. It likewise seeks to annul the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Spouses Pedro and Josefina de Guzman were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20248 T-105 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They obtained a loan from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and executed a
mortgage as security therefor. They failed to pay the obligation, hence the mortgage was foreclosed.
Before the redemption period expired, the De Guzman spouses obtained another loan for P18,000, this time
from petitioners Raymundo Tolentino and Lorenza Roo, to redeem the property. The parties agreed that repayment
would be for a period of ten years at P150 a month commencing on February 1963. On December 14, 1962, the
loan with RFC was paid and the mortgage was cancelled. Tolentino and Roo, on representation that they needed a
security for the loan, requested the De Guzman spouses to sign a Deed of Promise to Sell. On February 1,
1963,[2] they again asked respondent spouses to sign another document, a Deed of Absolute Sale, on
representation that they wanted the latters children to answer for the loan in the event of their parents untimely
death. Armed with the Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioners secured the cancellation of TCT No. 20248 T-105 and
TCT No. 69164 was issued in their name.
On June 9, 1971, Pedro de Guzman died. His widow Josefina and their children tried to settle the remaining
balance of the loan. Tolentino and Roo, feigning inability to remember the actual arrangements, agreed to reconvey
the property on condition that respondents pay the actual market value obtaining in 1971. Upon verification with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, the de Guzmans found that the title was already in the names of Tolentino and
Roo. Consequently, the de Guzmans filed a complaint for declaration of sale as equitable mortgage and
reconveyance of property with damages, at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
On March 21, 1988, the court decided in favor of the de Guzmans, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
(1) Declaring the said transaction between spouses de Guzman and the defendants as a mere equitable mortgage
and the corresponding documents as deeds of mortgage securing the loan of P18,000.00.
(2) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the unpaid balance of the loan in the amount of P3,750.00 with legal
interest until paid in full.
(3) Ordering the defendants to reconvey by appropriate documents the subject property to the plaintiffs.
(4) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) for and as attorneys fees.
Costs against defendants.[3]
In rendering the foregoing decision, the trial court considered foremost the real parties intent in entering into the
transactions. It observed that the Deed of Promise to Sell, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Contract to Sell were
related transactions which indicated that petitioners did not intend to hold the property as owner, but as security for
the loan extended to respondents. Additionally, the consideration involved in these transactions was P18,000, the
amount of the loan, which showed that petitioners did not profit from the said transactions. Further, the trial court
found that the de Guzmans remained in possession of the property and continued to pay the real estate taxes even
after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. These, according to the trial court, are badges of equitable
mortgage. Invoking Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil Code,[4] the trial court ruled that the presence of these
elements in the instant case was sufficient to raise the presumption that the contract between the parties was an
equitable mortgage.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial courts decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated March 21, 1988) of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 162) in Pasig City in Civil Case No. 40555 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the
defendants/appellants.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition, where petitioners aver that the
Court of Appeals erred in:
I ...APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 1602 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
II ...NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY OR CAUSE OF ACTION.[6]
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that Article 1602 of the Civil Code relied upon by the trial court, as
well as by the Court of Appeals, in holding that the sale in question is an equitable mortgage, applies only when
there is no express agreement or stipulation between the parties. According to petitioners, this is the reason for the
use of the word presumed or inferred in the said article. In the instant case, petitioners allege that the parties
expressly agreed on the two conditions that private respondents would remain in possession of the property and
that they would also pay the real estate taxes thereon. Article 1602 is clearly inapplicable, according to petitioners.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioners argue that private respondents adopted the wrong remedy in
asserting their rights over the subject property. Petitioners insist that instead of an action for reformation of
instrument, as provided in Article 1605 of the Civil Code,[7] respondents erroneously instituted an action for
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and specific performance. Private respondents counter that this is the first
time that petitioners are raising this issue. New issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Besides,
petitioners active participation in the proceedings before the trial court estopped them from questioning the action
instituted by private respondents. Further, Article 1605 of the Civil Code does not preclude an aggrieved party from
pursuing other remedies to effectively protect his interest and recover his property, according to private
respondents.
We find no merit in petitioners contentions.
Nothing in Article 1602 of the Civil Code indicates that the provision applies only in the absence of an express
agreement between the parties.
Further, we applied Article 1602 in several cases despite the presence of an xpress or written contract between
the parties. In Lapat vs. Rosario,[8] petitioner asked for a consolidation of ownership over two parcels of land by
virtue of two Deeds of Sale of Realty with Right to Repurchase allegedly executed by private respondents in
petitioners favor. Petitioner therein alleged that as respondents failed to repurchase the property on the agreed
period, she then became its owner and was therefore entitled to consolidate ownership over it. However, private
respondents denied selling the two parcels of land to petitioner. They alleged that petitioner sold to them an Isuzu
Elf truck which needed some repairs. As they didnt have the money for repairs at that time, petitioner loaned to them
P60,000 with 4 percent interest. To secure its payment, petitioner required respondents to sign the two Deeds of
Sale with Right to Repurchase. In that case, we ruled that the two deeds of sale constituted an equitable
mortgage. We applied paragraph 6, Article 1602 of the Civil Code, to wit: In any other case where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation. The contract of sale with right to repurchase was in reality intended to secure
the payment of the P60,000 loan.
In Misena vs. Rongavilla,[9] petitioner sold to respondent an undivided one-half portion of lot 315 of the Naic
Estate Subdivision in Cavite, evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Later on, respondent obtained a loan from and
mortgaged the same property to petitioner. Despite respondents failure to settle the loan, petitioner did not foreclose
the mortgage. In 1988, upon petitioners misrepresentation that the document was intended to foreclose the
mortgage and that respondent had one year to redeem the property, petitioner asked respondent to sign a Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying the property to petitioner. As respondent refused to vacate the property despite repeated
demands, petitioner brought the case to court. We ruled in favor of respondent and held that, applying Article 1602
of the Civil Code, the transaction was an equitable mortgage. The real intention of respondent in signing the
document was to provide security for the loan and not to transfer ownership over the property.
Anent the second assigned error, we note that petitioners never raised the propriety of the remedy adopted by
private respondents before the lower courts. Well entrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.[10] Moreover, there is nothing in
Article 1605 of the Civil Code that prohibits the institution of an action different from the one provided therein. Said
article uses the word may. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word may denotes discretion, and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.[11] Thus, it is not obligatory for the aggrieved party, under Article
1605 of the Civil Code, to file an action for reformation of instruments. He can avail of another action that he thinks
is most appropriate and effective under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, there being no error committed by the Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 13, 1996, and its resolution dated March 31, 1997, in CA-G.R. CV No. 21005,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to
annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
dated August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500,
10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head
Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging
petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was
taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as
Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt
practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges
embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1,
1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for
fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal
Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that
former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO
L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but
the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5,
1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon,
recommending that the following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation
controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand
and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of
P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of
January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in the
release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan
on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn
statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public
officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the Tanodbayan
on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South
East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the
Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and operating
expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of Public Information as it was
organized to undertake research, projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the
funds advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP,
to the damage and prejudice of the government.
on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his
assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer.
on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn
statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every public
officer.
on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on the
follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and
10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for Violation
of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501 (for Violation
of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in
particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have already prescribed
and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538,
contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since
the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were
committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually
filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten
(10) year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to
acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is
separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the
former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement
of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government
employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws
are separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said informations
defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary investigations is merely
directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's "Consolidated
Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117,
Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case
No. 10500 being one which could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to
amend said information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged
from January 31, 1974 toSeptember 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an
amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to September
30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of
his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing
until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with
the trial and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with
said resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6,
1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the supervening events,
including the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, insofar far as the Public respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether
or not he maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new
Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing
whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny
the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such
as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a
manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-evaluation with the
Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the
informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan.
However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material
bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had
deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of prima facie evidence to
sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy
disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the
corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses,
which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan
dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was
"nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage
of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any
showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent
accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed
by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented
and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings
before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have
been due to certain factors which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to
explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a
painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this
respect, We are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended,
regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of
the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the
proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language in
Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may
be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the
performance of its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its
discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case,
such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any other
constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for and against
the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein
attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which
precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and
the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich
like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only
after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused
from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due
process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of
the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The
complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential
Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC
until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected
in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's
resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command,
for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25,
1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However,
it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed
with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only
after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by
the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
Security Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an
office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the
prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest
of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the
prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the
facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed
by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause,
but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay
by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a
former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were
for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny"
as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges
relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial
legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to
resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for
even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the
absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be
dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S.
Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983
BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF
RIZAL, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from
promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled People of the Philippines versus Bernardino
Marcelino, and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction
of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from
submission thereof.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII. Trial was
conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his case on August 4, 1975. On the same date,
however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial
court granted the motion as follows:
Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their respective memoranda,
simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for decision of the Court.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for
promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. 1
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the Grace Park Post
Office 2to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and 011981, addressed to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango
Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness, and Atty, Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg.,
Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the accused, respectively, were posted in said office on December 4, 1975. These
notices were received by the respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. 3
Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig and to the Provincial Warden of Pasig, Rizal, who both
received them on December 2,1975, 4
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first
time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission
thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to
take, the respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 A. M.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation of decision. Granting
the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before Us the present petition. On January 16, 1976,
this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent judge from promulgating the decision in Criminal Case
No, C-5910.
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in
the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days from September 4, 1975
the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the
decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month
period prescribed by the Constitution.
In Comia v. Nicolas, 5 Ago v. Court of Appeals 6 and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance 7 this Court ruled that the
rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no
doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the
promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge
had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as
the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent
to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As pointed
out in People v. Court of Appeals 8, the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide
with the date of its delivery by the judge of the clerk of court.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or
matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the
Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate
courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered by this Court. Thus, in
approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr. Cooley characterizes as "very dangerous ground
when they [referring to the courts] venture to apply rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the
provisions of a constitution." 9
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision
or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." 10 "The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law." 11
In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty [30] days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions
which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually
those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act. " Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
On this view, authorities are one in saying that:
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict have
been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly
have indicated it." [American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742;
Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39, State v. Davis, 194
Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92 S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher, 115 Mo. App.
82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v. Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo.
App. 454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration. In Mikell v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that "the legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to
fundamental as it is to statutory laws."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the
general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is
subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New
Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there can be no
doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of
procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, 14 declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not
mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at various times, upon
proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-
month period within which to decide cases submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision
would result in less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the
courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts
are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a
decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our
fundamental law.
As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 15 the constitutional
provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where the contrary construction) would lead to
absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be followed. "
One last point, Notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to decide a
case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts,
that cases pending before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact a certificate to this certificate is
required before judges are allowed Lo draw their salaries.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated January 16, 1976 issued by this
Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to
decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of the record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the case is
raffled to him.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997]
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioners motion for
reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995, which also
dismissed the petition for disqualification[1] filed by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent Humberto
Basco.
The essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. The Court held:
WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF
MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.
x x x x x x x x x[2]
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the
January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he
succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not
remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his
opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
One such case was a petition for quo warranto[3] filed before the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo, another
candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of
the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the
Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior and Local Government.[4] All these challenges were,
however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 8,
1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for
six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner
Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the
declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manilas Second District.
On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy
of the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17,
1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied
for the seats.[5] Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he
considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He reiterated
Bascos disqualification and prayed anew that candidate Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner. As
expected, Basco countered said motion by filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with Reservation to
Submit Answer and/or Motion to Dismiss Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with Temporary Restraining
Order).
On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation he made
earlier, summarizing his contentions and praying as follows:
Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the following reasons:
1. The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of the Local Government Code
because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by prior judgment,
law of the case and stare decisis;
2. Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed
prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs
vested rights.It is also a class legislation and unconstitutional on the account.
3. Respondent had already been proclaimed. And the petition being a preproclamation contest under the Marquez v.
Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement.
4. Respondents three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by the people of previous
misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec G.R. 105128; Rice v. State 161 SCRA 401; Montgomery v. Newell 40 SW 2d
4181; People v. Bashaw 130 P. 2nd 237, etc.).
5. As petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed; it was premature as an election
protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest as such protest.:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant motion to dismiss the prayer for
restraining order denied (sic). If this Honorable Office is not minded to dismiss, it is respectfully prayed that instant
motion be considered as respondents answer. All other reliefs and remedies just and proper in the premises are
likewise hereby prayed for.
After the parties respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELECs First Division resolved to dismiss the
petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court
on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him and
that on account of Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected councilor of the Second District
of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC en banc in its
assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.[7] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been
removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992.[8]
Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:
1. Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992;
2. Whether or not private respondents election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City Councilor of Manila
wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him;
3. Whether or not private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, is void ab initio; and
4. Whether or not Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates for City Councilor of
Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646.
While we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the COMELEC in the assailed
resolution, nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in dismissing the petition for
disqualification. The instant petition must, therefore, fail.
We shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim.
I. Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992?
Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner anchors Bascos alleged disqualification to
run as City Councilor states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x x x x x x.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b)
must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Bascos dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It
is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office
of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as
long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place
during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.[9] To him, this interpretation is made more
evident by the manner in which the provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in
enumerating the grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision must have also referred
to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code.[10]
We do not, however, subscribe to petitioners view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of
Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.Thus,
in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC,[11] reiterated in the more recent cases of Reyes vs. COMELEC[12] and Salalima vs.
Guingona, Jr.,[13] we ruled, thus:
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) which provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local positions:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.

The rule is:
xxxxxxxxx
x x x Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. x x x (Jones vs.
Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. vs. Whyel 28 (2d) 30; Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55 SCRA 533 [1974],
cited in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 [1974]. See also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]; Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8,
1992).
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
(Underscoring supplied).
That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and
that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in
legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought by
petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or
matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[14]
II. Did private respondents election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections
wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office?
Petitioner maintains the negative. He quotes the earlier ruling of the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC[15] to the
effect that a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the
ballot. Thus:
x x x (T)he qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as
in this case, thatthe candidate was qualified. x x x
At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioners argument. However, the issue
of whether or not Bascos triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the
argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous
elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification
at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed
from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more
reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length.
Anent Bascos alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the
national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or
controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioners contention is baseless. Neither does petitioners argument
that the term any position is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any
consideration.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective
position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court couched the prohibition in this
wise:
x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL

GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term reinstatement. Under the former Civil Service
Decree,[16] the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term
reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus:
ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.
SEC. 24. Personnel Actions. -
xxxxxxxxx
(d) Reinstatement. - Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career service and
who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the
same level for which he is qualified.
x x x x x x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on November 10,
1975,[17] provides a clearer definition. It reads:
RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS.
SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINMENT of a person who was previously separated from the service through
no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently
appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running
for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to
an appointive position.
III. Is private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification
case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio?
To support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our ruling in the cases of Duremdes v.
COMELEC,[18] Benito v. COMELEC[19] and Aguam v. COMELEC.[20]
We are not convinced. The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of context. For the
sake of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.
Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.-
xxxxxxxxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after
the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
x x x x x x x x x.
The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its face
considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested
qualifications of a candidate.
Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Underscoring supplied).
This provision, however, does not support petitioners contention that the COMELEC, or more properly
speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word may indicates that
the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer
discretion.[21] What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of
whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own
determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has
been exercised whimsically and capriciously.[22] The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized
constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,[23] has more than enough expertise in its field
that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.[24] The COMELEC has not found any
ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion
from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[25] states that:
SEC. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is proclamation shall be suspended
notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent with
and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to
carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.[26] Thus, in Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Factoran, Jr.,[27] the Court ruled that:
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. The scope of the
exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in
1914, thus: Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By
such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said power of administrative
officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law
as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of
Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations,
see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil.
Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
xxxxxxxxx
x x x The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim,
108 Phil. 1091).
Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
seeks to implement, employed the word may, it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to
have used instead the word shall in its rules.
Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning
City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the
canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers
concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. This has been the rule as early as in the
case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Laguna[28] where we clarified the nature of the functions of the
Board of Canvassers, viz.:
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the
voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or in quo warranto
proceedings. (9 R.C.L., p. 1110)
To the same effect is the following quotation:
x x x Where there is no question as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the returns are before them, the
powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and
declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on
the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. (20 C.J., 200-201)
[Underscoring supplied]
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable
to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do
not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.
In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election
returns.
In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of Canvassers
violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to
succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty position
died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere
second-placer, the mayor.
Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on
advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal
basis for proclamation.
With no precedent clearly in point, petitioners arguments must, therefore, be rejected.
IV. May Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate?
Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to
our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth
place. Thus, petitioners emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC,[29] where we laid down a possible exception to
the rule that a second placer may be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case.The exception
is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes
is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioners allegation that Basco was well-known to
have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural,
unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification.[30]
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by grave abuse of
discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondents continuance in office as City Councilor
for the Second District of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum
of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company against Albino
Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and
his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the
sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for
the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21,
1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance
of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was
not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That
Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res.
No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo
Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs.
Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No.
12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have
been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the
original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of
an obligation," as follows:4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may
reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only
prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all
cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this
date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was
merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor
General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits
of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this
comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same
on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment
made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613,
s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be
given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that
Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive
application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No.
20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official
Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation
of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn
farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals,
128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive
effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see
also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez
v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed
the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was
ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . .
.'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People
v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities
is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205
SCRA 515, 527-528:8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on
February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18,
1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that
enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations
of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating
new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case
of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact
negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as
regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the
Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S.
371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act
No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and
which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit:11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that
matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be
the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being
supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative
or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be
to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official
(Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has
been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in
Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of
Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21
SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 —
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted
in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700,
ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights
of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no
longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions
during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders
issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not
just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision
in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic.
Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question
arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts
of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice
that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar
doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant
inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at
bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing
the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on
the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official
pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though
not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the
correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the
very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos
vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as
in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court
on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in
favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set
aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

11th Meeting

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

11th Meeting

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

G.R. No.

115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,

(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92

(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

The petition is devoid of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191032

JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191057

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE

G.R. No. 191149

JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191420

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:

WHEREFORE, the Court:

Motions for Reconsideration

Tolentino and Inting

6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.

Philippine Bar Association

IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.

3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.

The contention has no basis.

Section 13. xxx

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:

The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

Costs against defendants.[3]

G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

Re: Criminal Case No. 10499

Re: Criminal Case No. 10500

Re: Criminal Case No. 10501

Re: Criminal Case No. 10502

Re: Criminal Case No. 10503

Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:

2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.

3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.

BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,

Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:

On this view, authorities are one in saying that:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.

x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL

ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.

SEC. 24. Personnel Actions. -

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).