THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000] 2.
2. The testimony of the petitioner, the children, petitioner’s sister, and the social worker
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
FACTS:
Brenda Marcos and Wilson Marcos met in 1980 when they were working in the
Malacañang; Brenda as an escort to Imee Marcos and Wilson as Presidential Guard to
Pres Marcos. They became acquainted through telephone conversations and eventually
became sweethearts. They married twice in 1982 and 1983 where from the union were
born five children.
At the downfall of the Marcos regime, Wilson left the military and engaged in different
business ventures which all failed. With this fact, Brenda, his wife, urged him to look for
gainful employment, the result of which is that they would often quarrel which lead to him
engaging in physical abuse to his wife and children and sexual abuse to his wife. In
1992, the couple was already living separately. When Brenda was discharged from the
military, she became a supplier of AFP until she eventually was able to establish her
own trading company (Ns Ness Trading And Construction Development Corporation).
The turning point of the couple’s relationship happened in 1994 when they had a quarrel
over Wilson being there in their house which Brenda told him never to stay at anymore.
She lambasted Wilson which resulted in Wilson turning violent and hitting Brenda
several times as well as her mother who tried to intervene, after which Brenda fled with
her children to her sister's house. When they went back to look for her missing kid,
Wilson ran after them with a samurai and beat the driver.
RTC found him to be psychologically incapacitated because of his inability to fulfill his
marital obligations and his abusive and violent tendencies.
CA reversed the ruling saying incapacity wasn't established by the totality of the
evidence since psychological incapacity should be proven to exist at the time of the
celebration and marriage and shown to be medically or clinically incurable and must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage under Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
1. WON a psychological examination of respondent is a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity
2. WON the totality of the evidence presented show that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated
RULING:
1. NO. Personal medical or psychological examination is not a requirement to
determine psychological incapacity.
2. NO. Evidences presented do not show the respondent to be psychologically
incapacitated.
RATIO:
1. The guidelines governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down in Republic v CA
and Molina which makes up three basic requirements: gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. These guidelines do not require a physician to examine the person to be
psychologically incapacitated. As long as the assailed behaviors fall within the three
basic requirements, then a person can be deemed psychologically incapacitated.
who interviewed the children, are convincing of the respondent’s inability to provide and
support the family as well as his resort to physical abuse and abandonment, but not of
conclusive psychological incapacity. Moreover, they do not show that these were already
present at the inception of marriage and are incurable.
The respondent’s behavior can be traced to successive events in his life, namely losing
his job, his failed ventures, and not being gainfully employed for a period of more than
six years, which threw him into a spiral of intermittent drinking and failure to give material
and moral support to his family. Hence, the alleged psychological illness was only during
this period and not at the inception of marriage. Importantly, there is no evidence to
show that this condition is incurable especially when he is now employed as a taxi driver.
LAWS/PROVISIONS:
Family Code
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations
shall be satisfied from the separate properties.
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Republic v. CA and Molina the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
Republic vs. Hamano G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004
FACTS:
In October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays
with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime
in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see her and their child.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
partemotion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted
the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days
to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of
60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November
7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding
that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
Trial Court Decision: Marriage is null and void
(PERO ETO ULIT SI O S G )
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court emphasized that this case could not
be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a mixed
marriage, the husband being a Japanese national.
(Pero wait di pa tapos ang Republic of the Pilipins MABUHAY)
According to petitioner (Republic of the PH), mere abandonment by Toshio of
his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a
spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
ISSUE: W/N Toshio is indeed psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
RULING: No. Respondent failed to prove that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. The
Court found that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
Toshio's act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing
that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was
no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
LAWS/PROVISIONS:
FAMILY CODE
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
[G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006]
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
TL;DR: Antonio and Reyes were married but since Reyes displayed disturbingly insane
behavior, Antonio filed for annulment on grounds of psychological incapacity. He won
but the CA said that Reyes’ desire to maintain the relationship was proof of her capacity.
The SC ruled that Reyes has been sufficiently proven to be absolutely insane. Bitch is
crazy.
FACTS: Petitioner Leonilo Antonio and Respondent Marie Ivonne F. Reyes were
married on the 6th of December in 1990. On the 8th of March in 1993, Antonio filed for a
petition to declare the marriage null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. He provides these disturbing circumstances:
1. Reyes concealed the fact that she had a son from a previous man, claiming that the
boy was her adoptive brother. Only after their marriage did she confess.
2. She lied that her brother in law, Edwin David, tried to rape and kill her. Also untrue.
3. She represented herself as a psychiatrist who graduated with a degree in psychology.
False.
4. Claimed to be a singer for Blackgold Recording Company. Further, she claimed that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor. No such occasion
took place.
5. She imagined friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez. She used these names
to write to Antonio to flaunt about her being from Blackgold and how she is their “number
one money maker". Santos and Marquez were only figments of her imagination
6. She altered her pay cheque to make it appear that she earned more than she actually
did. She bought a sala set from the market and claimed that it came from a famous
furniture dealer. She spent lavishly.
7. She was extremely jealous. She called his officemates and monitored his behavior.
Antonio claimed to have tried to repair the relationship after he separated from Reyes
but found that she was unable to change her behavior.
Dr. Dante Herrera and Dr. Arnulfo Lopez testified that Reyes’ persistent and constant
lying and extreme jealousy were pathological and abnormal. Both experts concluded that
she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.
Reyes denied all these and attempted to prove that she was not lying with the following
explanations:
1. She only concealed the child because she was afraid of losing Antonio.
2. David’s act of touching her back and ogling her caused her to think she would be
raped and killed.
3. She’s a BS Banking and Finance graduate who teaches psychology.
4. She’s a voice talent of Aris de las Alas of Channel 9. She had done commercials for
McCann Erickson. She was not under contract with Blackgold but reported to their office
after office hours.
5. She denied that she wrote the letters and that Bea Marquez and Babes Santos were
real people.
6. She admitted to calling Antonio’s female officemate but simply asked if she was
asking for chocolates from her husband.
7. She denied spending lavishly. She only spends 7,000 a month.
On the 30th of March in 1995, Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage. Both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
and Roman Rota of the Vatican affirmed the decree. The RTC ruled that the marriage
was null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity to perform her marital
obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision because the evidence was not
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the evidence adduced to support Reyes’ psychological
incapacity is sufficient.
RULING AND RATIO: YES. Antonio was able to satisfy the requirements and guidelines
based in the Molina case.
Firstly, He has presented witnesses who had corroborated his testimony regarding
Reyes’ behavior. Furthermore, Blackgold Records and Philippine Village Hotel issued
certificates contrary to respondent’s claims. He has also presented 2 experts of
psychology who testified that Reyes’ behavior is tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Secondly, the root cause of Reyes’ psychological incapacity has been medically
identified, proven by experts, and clearly explained. Particularly, the initial complaint
alleged that Reyes had unusual behaviors such as constantly lying, making up stories,
imagining persons, fabricating situations, writing letters with fictitious names, lying about
her occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background. The court ruled
that all these mentioned are indications of Reyes’ psychological incapacity.
Thirdly, Reyes’s psychological incapacity was proven to have existed prior and at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She displayed the aforementioned behavior
before she married Antonio.
Fourthly, the gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Fifthly, Reyes is unable to comply with Article 68 of the Family Code as it is difficult to
see how a pathological liar would be able to commit to the relationship based on love,
trust and respect.
Sixthly, the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Although the
church’s decision does not have bearing, it should be given great respect.
Seventhly, the fact that Reyes was unable to change her behavior even after Antonio
sought to fix their relationship bears the last requirement in Molina that the condition is
incurable. The court ruled that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave and to cure it would
be nearly impossible.
LAWS: FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations
shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) Art. 71. The management of the
household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. with antisocial personality disorder which makes her unable to assume the essential
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009 others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
Facts: Petitioner Edward met Respondent Rowena in a gathering organized by the qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Filipino-Chinese association in their college in January 1996. Sharing similar angst By these very findings, it is clear that the ability to both grasp and assume the real
towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment that are now considered a necessary
of closeness towards each other. Three months after, Rowena asked Edward that they prerequisite to a valid matrimonial consent is lacking from both parties. The fulfillment of
elope. At first Edward was reluctant, but soon succumbed. Thus, they left Manila and the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
ticket. Their cohabitation only lasted for a month due to financial concerns, forcing them relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
to go home. Edward stayed at his parents’ house while Rowena stayed at his uncle’s obligations.
place. As Edward’s family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at Laws/Provisions:
her uncle’s place. Art. 36. Family Code. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. The two celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner— obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns only after its solemnization.
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. Eventually, the parents of Edward found out Art. 68. Family Code. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
the marriage, and thus, disinherited him. After a month, Edward escaped from the house mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk
to Rowena and asked that they stay at his parent’s place. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. They then parted ways.
On January 18 2000, petitioner filed a petition for annulment before the RTC of
Quezon City on the basis of psychological incapacity. The clinical psychologist who
examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, citing that Edward
is afflicted with dependent personality disorder and Rowena with narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder. Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as
each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. (See full case for complete
findings)
The RTC declared their marriage null and void. Thereafter, the OSG intervenes, and
upon review by the CA, the decision was reversed. The CA ruled that petitioner
failed to prove the psychological incapacity of the respondent since the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent and only relied on the
information provided by petitioner; and that the psychological incapacity was not shown
to be attended by gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability. Hence, petitioner
filed this review on certiorari.

Issue: Won the marriage between the parties is null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Held: Yes. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the marriage is declared null and void.

Ratio:
The SC held the clinical psychologist’s findings to be adequate.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, as clearly shown
in this case, followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive
self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. Respondent is also afflicted
 G.R. No. 166579 February 18, 2010
JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner, vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.
FACTS
1. November 1996 – Jordan (then 27 y/o) and Jeanice (then 19 y/o) met.
January 1997 - they became a couple
10 May 1997- they were formally engaged
3 July 1997 - They had their civil wedding
21 September 1997 - their church wedding
February 12 1998 - one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on this day
23 February 1999 - After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home
15 September 1999 - Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Jordan
2. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage. According to Jeanice, this was manifested by his uncontrollable
tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to
become violent and abusive whenever his whims were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan:
- had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and
spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family
business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask
Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts
- heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice
noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than
help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply
of milk and diapers for their son.
- became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her
with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected
her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added
that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their
conjugal home.
3. Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with
"Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency
and instability."
4. Jordan denied Jeanice’s allegations. Jordan also pointed out that he was not
subjected to any interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan said he wants
Jeanice back and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
5. RTC ruling: Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage, particularly Articles 68 and 70 of the Family Code. The trial court
also declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family
background, antedates the marriage and that without any sign of reformation, found the
same to be grave and incurable.
6. CA ruling: dismissed Jordan’s appeal because he needs to file a motion for
reconsideration or new trial first before an appeal from the decision is allowed (Section
20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
7. Jordan filed motion for reconsideration, but dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
RULING: No. The petition is granted. CA ruling is set aside and RTC ruling reversed.
RATIO
1. Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code (see laws/provisions).
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must
be confined "to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged psychological incapacity was not
shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice’s allegations
showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
2. The Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological
incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of
stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Gates only diagnosed
Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan.
LAWS/PROVISIONS
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Sec. 20. Appeal.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has
filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
Family Code
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations
shall be satisfied from the separate properties.
Alain M. Dino, petitioner, vs Ma. Caridad L. Dino
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to
respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article
40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14
January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision
holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the
case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of
the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
Facts:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 in Salug, Zamboanga del
Norte. They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2)
children. On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665,
alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. In compliance with the Order dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the
public prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between
Rodolfo and Natividad and found that there was none. Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad
when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and he was forced
to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18
years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as
"kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army,
Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter,
Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez),
and bore him a child. After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived
since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City. From the time Natividad abandoned
them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of their two children and he exerted earnest
efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable. For her part, Natividad failed to
file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of summons. Nonetheless,
she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr.
Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims. Rodolfo also underwent
the same examination.
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is
unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by
established norms of conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she
lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired
a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both
parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only
manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union
was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition to the complaint, contending
that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.
RTC Ruling:
The RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding
that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry
constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties’ marriage
but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that
Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her
personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more
comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof. The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that
there was no showing that Natividad’s personality traits constituted psychological
incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of
the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court
CA Ruling:
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividad’s emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to
psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render
[Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations." The Republic
moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution, hence, the
instant petition.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity
Held:
YES. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her
duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage.
Ratio:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability. Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v.
CA,41 held that therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not
be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to
discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there
exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
incapacity. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how
Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable
within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to
disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr.
Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show
that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness
of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital
obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained
therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any factual or
scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-
serving.
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the
existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence After
poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient
enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is
another.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.
G.R. No. 166357 | January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:
-In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, it dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon finding that the petition has no merit.
-In the case petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
-Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and
neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
-But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
Petitioner’s allegation against her wife (respondent)
1. playing of mahjong
-Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a
wife. The children affirmed that their mother would play mahjong and that they were with
their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner also implied
that two of his sons repeated the second grade because respondent would play mahjong
but petitioner was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. It is
true, as admitted by respondent, that she plays mahjong but its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
2. Constant visits to the beauty parlor and going out with friends
-Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the
beauty parlor and going out with friends. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove
her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends.
3. Obsessive need for attention from other men.
-The petitioner even presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these
nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only
testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. And if it is proven that there is
infidelity on the part of respondent, it will not be sufficient ground to declare the marriage
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In the earlier case, the following Court decisions are:
RTC: the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
CA: reversed the decision of trial court for lack of legal and factual basis
SC: The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the
trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
Present case:
Issue: W/N the earlier decision of the SC should be reversed and that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent shall be declared null and void ab initio under Art. 36 of the
Family Code
Ruling: YES. The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due
to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ratio:
Application of Art. 36 of the Family Code:
The guidelines in the Republic vs CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity
to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly
and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its
application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent
and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts
Trial court’s finding shall be given due weight:
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a
party’s psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings
and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of the trial court
are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate
court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.
finding shall be appreciated together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would
advance more the cause of justice.
The opinions of the experts:
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to
dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the
Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because
they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore
be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions:
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that upon closer look at the testimonies of
the children, it was shown that respondent was too addicted to mahjong that she would
even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last
from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her children
with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong
sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to
the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton
disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
Marriage as inviolable social institution:
It would be great injustice to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and
compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. To protect the inviolability
of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a
marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered
by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

However, the Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos that there is no requirement for
one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Hence, the opinions of the Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy shall not be dismissed on the ground
that their opinions were rendered based on the petitioner’s version. As a matter of fact,
the court said the opinion of Fr. Healy could be not justly disregard. His opinions and