Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol 4, No i l')Ht>, pp SS9-573

THE EXPLANATORY AND PREDICTIVE

SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY
ALBERT BANDURA
Stanford University

Convergent evidence from the diverse lines of research reported in the present
special issue of this journal attests to the explanatory and predictive generality of
self-efficacy theory. This commentary addresses itself to conceptual and empirical
issues concerning the nature and function of self-percepts of
efficacy.

Progress understanding human functioning is best achieved by theo

in
ries that have
a broad
range of applicability. To appeal to separate con
ceptual schemes for each aspect of functioning does not produce much
of an advance in the field. The diverse articles comprising the present
special issue of thisjournal attest to the integrative scope of self-efficacy
theory and its value in stimulating research that clarifies the contribu
tion of self-referent thought to human motivation, affect, and action.

CONVERGENT EVIDENCE FROM DIVERGENT TESTS

The explanatory predictive generality of a theory are strengthened

and

by evidence thatdivergent procedures produce convergent results. The

research reported in this issue presents a rich diversity of operations.
Perceived self-efficacy is altered in varied ways by direct mastery ex
periences; by social-comparative information conveyed through vicari
ous modes of influence; and by social persuasion in the form of bogus

feedback, attributional evaluations, and proffered incentives. The do

mains of psychological functioning to which the theory has been ap

plied are also remarkably diverse. The studies encompass, among other

own research as reported in this paper was supported by Public Health Research
My
Grant No MH 5162-24 from the National Institute of Mental Health. Requests for reprints
should be sent to Albert Bandura, Department of Psychology, Building 420, Jordan Hall,
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.

359
360 BANDURA

things, motivational changes, affective reactions of stress and depres

sion, psychosocial dysfunction, development of cognitive skills, achieve
ment
strivings and accomplishments, athletic feats, career choice and
pursuits, and self-regulation of motivation and refractory behavior. The
subject populations are of highly varied characteristics. Moreover, varied
investigatory methodologies are employed, including induced changes
in perceived self-efficacy under laboratory conditions; controlled field
studies in which perceived self-efficacy was differentially altered by

theoretically relevant influences; and multivariate correlational analyses

of naturally occurring covariations.
The research embodies another valuable source of diversity. When
investigators rely entirely on a single measure of a postulated cognitive
mediator, concerns arise as to whether the accumulated knowledge
partly reflects the idiosyncratic contents of that specific set of items. In
the methodology of the research under discussion, measures of per
ceived self-efficacy are tailored to the domains of functioning being
analyzed. The use of diverse indices of the self-efficacy mediator in
creases the
generality of findings.
The evidence from this extensive multiform research is consistent
in corroborating the dual causal linkage: Postulated determinants alter
self-percepts of efficacy: and self-percepts of efficacy, in turn, affect
motivation and action. Mediational analyses lend support to the causal
contribution of self-percepts of efficacy (Bandura, 1986). The general
ized replicability of the causal dependencies amply documents the com

monality of the self-efficacy mechanism in human motivation and ac

tion.

MULTIDETERMINATION OF MOTIVATION AND ACTION

The fact thatperceived self-efficacy operates as a common mechanism

inpsychosocial functioning does not mean that other mechanisms do
not also come into play. One must distinguish between
theorizing and
experimentation aimed at elucidating particular
a mechanism governing
behavior, and studies aimed at maximizing the amount of variance
explained in behavior by combining a variety of factors that contribute
to it.
In social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), human behavior is

governed by multiple determinants operating through varied mecha

nisms. Thus, for example, cognitive self-motivation based on achieve
ment standards is mediated by three different
types of self-reactive
influences operating in concert affective self-evaluation, perceived self-
efficacy, and personal goal setting (Bandura & Cervone, in press). The
SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 361

relative contribution of these self -reactive influences to motivation varies

predictably, depending on the level and direction of the discrepancy

between performance attainments and the comparative standard. Wur-
tele's (this issue) mandate that perceived self-efficacy must exceed all
other predictors of performance accords neither with
self-efficacy theory
nor with what is known about the
dynamic operation of causal deter
minants.

ON RECHRISTENING AND CONVERSION

TO REINFORCEMENT THEORY

Kirsch (this issue) would like to rechristen "perceived self-efficacy" as

"expectancy for success in achievement situations" and recast it within

the framework of reinforcement theory. Neither the cumbrous relabel
ing nor the conceptual baptism has much to recommend itself. In the
standard lexicon, the term "success" is defined as "a favorable or sat

isfactory outcome or result." Unless terms are being used idiosyn-

cratically, the label "expectancy for success"
designates an outcome
expectancy. Such a label is a misnomer when
applied to judgments of
operative capabilities. It is ironic that the ponderous appellation "ex
pectancy for success in achievement situations" should be prescribed
in the name of
accuracy and succinctness.
Serious confusions have been introduced into the expectancy litera
ture by misconstruing the specifying criteria of a performance level as
its outcomes. A "performance" is conventionally defined as "an ac

complishment" or "something done," and an "outcome" as "some

thing that follows as a result or consequence of an activity." Thus, if
a
given performance level is defined as a 6-foot jump, then a 6-foot leap
is the realization of the performance, not the outcome that flows from
it. Similarly, in assessments of academic performance, A, B, C, D, and
F are the specifying criteria of performance level, not the outcomes.
Remove the letter indicants of performance level, and one is left with
an indefinite or undescribable performance. The social reactions, per

sonal benefits, costs, and self-satisfactions anticipated for an A-level

performance, or an F-level performance, constitute the outcome expect
ancies. To conceptualize a performance level as the outcome of itself
is to destroy the conventional meanings of performance and outcome.
Kirsch prefers to view perceived self-efficacy from the perspective
of reinforcement theory. As interest in the doctrine of reinforcement
has waned, this type of theorizing has fallen on hard times in recent
years. According to this approach, efficacy expectancies are reinforced,
extinguished, and generalized in the likeness of responses. In contrast,
362 BANDURA

social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), conceptualizes perceived self-

efficacy in terms of self-referent judgments arrived at through cognitive
processing of diverse sources of efficacy information. Because self-per
cepts of efficacy are formed through acts of self -appraisal based on mul
tidimensional information, perceived self-efficacy is more closely allied
to the field of human judgment than to the subject of expectancy, which
refers to an anticipation that something is likely to happen. The deter
minants and processes of self-efficacy judgment are concerned with
how information conveyed enactively, vicariously, persuasively, or

physiologically is selected, weighted, and integrated into self-efficacy

judgments. As regards causal determination, social cognitive theory
seeks to clarify how self -efficacy judgment affects human action, thought,
and affect, rather than treating perceived self-efficacy as a trait-like enti

ty. Self-efficacy judgments influence human functioning through their

impact on choice behavior, on effort expenditure and perserverence,
on
self-hindering or self-aiding thought patterns, and on affective and
neurophysiological reactions to environmental demands.
Kirsch expresses concern that the appearance of self-efficacy theory
has "obscured the considerable body of existing knowledge" regarding

expectancy for success and beliefs about environmental contingencies.

Because a new line of theorizing and experimentation casts no veil, it
can make existing literature neither more nor less visible. Kirsch sum

marizes much of this early research on

expectancy for success. Some
of the studies touch on issues of interest to self-efficacy theory. How
ever, because of the types of tasks and paradigms employed, much of
this research is of limited generality at best, and is misleading at worst.
In the
prototypical expectancy research, people perform a simple
task over aseries of trials with varied feedback, and at periodic intervals
are asked to indicate what score
they they expect to get on the next trial.
are not told what
They specifically they will have to do next. Indeed,
ambiguous tasks are
usually employed so that attainment feedback can
be varied independently of actual performance. Given the vagueness
of prospective tasks and the unrelatedness of actual performance to
feedback, performers' judgments are more likely to reflect extrapolative
guesses from prior feedback than authentic self-appraisals of personal
capabilities. To show that performance expectancies are highly sensitive
to even small variations in feedback rates says more about the limitations
of the task than about self-appraisal of capabilities from enactive ex
perience.
In the prototypical self-efficacy paradigm, people judge their ef

ficacy in advance over a wide range of task demands within a mean

ingful domain of functioning. This assessment procedure is designed
to identify the pattern, strength, and upper limits of perceived self-
SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 363

efficacy. Stringent performance tests are later conducted with varied

tasks measuring generalized use of capabilities, rather than
having peo
ple repeatedly do essentially the same thing in the same situation under
conditions shrouded in ambiguity except for the performance feedback.
In the self-efficacy
paradigm, people have to appraise the limits of their
operative capabilities, whereas in the usual expectancy paradigm they
typically set their expectancy slightly above what they have been told.
Expectancy research that renders people heavily dependent on feed
back as the indicant of
capability will find that performance expectan
cies closely mimic performance feedback. Feedback is not
"reinforcing"
anything; it simply tells subjects where to set their next estimate. Ex
pectancy research using veridical feedback poses similar problems of
generalizability. When people are asked to do the same thing repeated
ly under unvarying circumstances, performance feedback will account
for most of the variance in expectancy for a subsequent try.
In everyday life, people must deal with changeable circumstances

embodying uncertain and unpredictable elements. Appraisal of self-

efficacy from performance feedback is complicated by the reality that
many factors can affect how well one's capabilities are put to use. There
fore, there is no simple equivalence of past performance to perceived
self-efficacy. Appraisal of self -efficacy is an inferential process in which
the relative contribution of ability and nonability factors to performance
must be weighted. The extent to which people will alter their
perceived
self-efficacy on the basis of performance feedback will depend on such
factors as the difficulty of the task, the amount of effort they expend,
the amount of external aid they receive, the situational circumstances
under which they perform, and their mood and physical state at the
time. Moreover, performances are not compressed into a massed block
of discrete trials in a barren setting stripped of contextual and personal
factors except for instant performance feedback. Under usual circum
stances, performances are separated in time, with some performances
surpassing, others matching, and still others falling below one's typical
attainments. Such temporal variability allows leeway for cognitive biases
to distort how one's attainments are processed and coded for memory

representation.
To complicate the self-appraisal process further, the weight given
to new experiences depends on the nature and strength of pre-existing

self-efficacy into which they must be integrated. Self -percepts of efficacy

are not simply reflective imprints of past action or performance feed

back. This is shown in fine-grained analyses of performance attainments

and changes in perceived self-efficacy at each step in the change process
(Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982). Self -percepts of efficacy often ex
ceed, only occasionally match, and sometimes remain below past per-
364 BANDURA

formance attainments, depending on how performances are cognitively

appraised. When people are fully assured of their capabilities, they
remain unshaken in their perceived self-efficacy and persevere doggedly,
even
though they fail repeatedly (Brown & Inouye, 1978). Analyzing
the multiple sources of efficacy information and how it is cognitively

processed in forming self-efficacy judgments holds greater promise of

furthering understanding the nature and function of self-referent thought
than does reinforcing expectancies.
The level-of-aspiration research of yesteryear, which Kirsch also
reviews, provides another illustration of how trivial tasks have yielded
some
misleading generalizations. Most of these studies used simple
tasks, such as tossing darts or rings, that call for little in the way of
effort, mobilization of resources, and perseverance. In such situations,
people generally set their expectancies and goals slightly above their
immediately preceding performance level.
When accomplishments require arduous effort over an extended
period, as they usually do in everyday life, people do not judge that
they can surpass each past accomplishment in an ever-rising series of
triumphs. Lofty accomplishments achieved through sustained extra
ordinary effort are not easily repeated or excelled. Feedback of having
surpassed a demanding standard through laborious effort does not
automatically strengthen perceived self-efficacy and raise aspiration
(Bandura & Cervone, in press). It is true that some performers respond
to their notable attainment by affirming a strong sense of self-efficacy
and setting themselves even more challenging goals to accomplish.
However, a sizable number are left with self-doubts that they can
muster the same level of laborious effort again, and they set their sights

on
simply trying to match the standard they previously surpassed.
Having driven themselves to success, some performers judge them
selves inefficacious to repeat the demanding feat and lower their aspira
tions. Clearly, much work remains to be done in this area in order to

gain generalizable knowledge about the impact of human attainments

on
perceived self-efficacy and aspiration.

EXPECTED FEAR AND AVOIDANT ACTION AS

COEFFECTS OF PERCEIVED SELF-INEFFICACY

Social cognitive theory posits an interactive, though asymmetric, rela

tion between perceived self-efficacy and fear arousal, with coping ef
ficacy exercising the greater sway (Bandura, 1982, 1986). Perceived self-
inefficacy leads people to approach intimidating situations anxiously,
and experience of disruptive levels of arousal may further lower their
SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 365-

sense thatthey will be able to perform well. However, people are much
more likely to act on self-percepts of efficacy inferred from mastery
experiences and social comparison of capabilities than to rely heavily
on the indefinite
stirrings of their viscera. This is because mastery ex
periences and comparative appraisals are more reliable diagnostic in
dicants of capability than affective arousal, which bears no uniform rela
tionship to performance accomplishments. Moreover, whether or not
perceived self-efficacy is affected by emotional arousal depends on how
such information is cognitively processed. Many factors, including ap

praisal of the source of arousal, the level of activation, the circumstances

under which arousal is elicited, and personal experiences on how arous
al affects one's performance, influence the efficacy meaning given to
arousal. Thus, for example, accomplished actors interpret their anticipa
tory stage fright as a normative situational reaction rather than as an
indicant of inefficacy, and are not at all dissuaded by their agitated
viscera from going on stage and performing what they assuredly know

they can do once they commence.

Kirsch reconstrues measures of perceived self-efficacy in phobic
domains of functioning as indicants of fear. His analysis rests on ques
tionable premises and on an outmoded conception of "skill." Before
addressing the latter issues, let us examine the proposition that fear
causes avoidance.
Kirsch argues that people behave avoidantly because of expected
fear. The notion that anticipatory fear controls avoidance behavior has
been investigated extensively with diverse lines of research (Bandura,
1986; Bolles, 1975; Herrnstein, 1969; Schwartz, 1978). In some studies,
feedback of autonomic arousal, which presumably constitutes the aver
sive motivator, is removed surgically or blocked pharmacologically. In
other studies, the occurrence of avoidance behavior is measured after
fear arousal to threats has been thoroughly eliminated. In still other
studies, changesin fear arousal are related to changes in avoidance
behavior. The evidence is highly consistent in showing that avoidance
behavior is not controlled by anticipatory fear. Kirsch never addresses
the issue of how the paler expectation of fear can control behavior when
the anticipatory actual experience of fear does not.
To attribute avoidance behavior to expected fear simply begs the
itself needs ex
question, because the source of fearful expectations
not sourceless. Kirsch does not in
plaining. Fearful expectations are

dicate where from. Within the conceptual framework of social

they come

cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), it is mainly perceived inefficacy in

with aversive events that gives rise to both fearful
coping potential
who judge themselves as
expectations and avoidance behavior. People
efficacious in managing potential threats neither fear nor shun them.
366 BANDURA

In contrast, if people judge themselves as inefficacious in exercising

control over potential threats, they view then anxiously, conjure up

possible calamities, and unwilling to have any commerce with them

are

(Bandura, 1983). In short, behind expected fears and calamities, and

the unwillingness to try coping tasks, lie judgments of personal inef

ficacy to exercise control over risky situations. Fearful expectations and

avoidance behavior are thus largely coeffects of perceived coping inef
ficacy.
Consider now Kirsch's correlational argument for reconstruing self-

efficacy measures in transactions involving threats. Kirsch reasons that

because perceived self-inefficacy in coping with phobic objects and an
ticipated fear correlate positively with each other and with avoidance
behavior, they must be measuring the same thing namely, fear. Nei
ther the conclusion of equivalence nor the conferral of priority on fear

necessarily follows from such correlations. For example, in a school

population, age and weight are highly correlated with each other and
both may correlate with a third factor, but one would hardly conclude
from such evidence that indices of age and weight measure the same
construct.
Williams and his colleagues (Williams, Dooseman, & Kleifield, 1984;
Williams, Turner, & Peer, 1985) have analyzed by partial correlation
several data sets from experiments in which perceived self-efficacy,
expected fear, and phobic behavior were measured. Perceived self-
efficacy retains its predictiveness of phobic behavior when expected fear
is partialed out, whereas the relationship between expected fear and

phobic behavior essentially disappears when perceived self-efficacy is

partialed out. Contrary to what Kirsch claims, perceived self-efficacy
and expected fear are not measuring the same thing. The variance con
tribution of perceived self-efficacy may be reduced in pretreatment
assessments if the analyses are confined only to the severest cases,
which markedly curtails the range of self-efficacy scores. Williams and
Watson (1985) similarly demonstrate the predictive superiority of per
ceived self-efficacy over perceived dangerous consequences and level
of fear arousal associated with performance of threatening activities.
When perceived dangers and performance fear are controlled, per
ceived self-efficacy accounts for a substantial amount of variance in

phobic behavior, whereas perceived dangers and performance fear have

no
predictive value when perceived self-efficacy is partialed out.
It is interesting to speculate on why the belief that anticipatory fear

triggers avoidance behavior remains firmly entrenched in psychological

thinking, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. A possible answer
may lie in the force of confirmatory biases in judgments of causality
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Confirming instances in which fear and avoid-
SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 367

ance occur jointly likely to remain whereas

are
highly salient, noncon-

firming instances in which fear and approach behavior occur jointly,

or avoidance occurs without fear, command less attention. It is not that
the nonconfirming instances are any less prevalent. Quite the contrary
is true: People commonly perform activities at low strengths of self-
judged efficacy, despite high fear arousal. Thus, for example, actors
strut on
stage and students take intimidating examinations, although
they may be plagued by aversive anticipatory arousal. Similarly, people
regularly take self-protective action without having to wait for expec
tations of fear to impel them to action.
They disconnect electrical ap
pliances before repairing them without having to conjure up fears.
These different types of
disconfirming occurrences tend to be ignored
in judging the relation between fear and avoidance.
Kirsch's conclusions regarding the implications of social induce
ments on self-judged
efficacy rest on a mistaken premise. He seems
to assume that if one can
strengthen people's beliefs in their efficacy
by the prospect of escalated benefits, such evidence challenges the status
of self -efficacy measures in phobic domains of functioning, as if self-
efficacy judgments are authentic only if unalterable by social influences.
In point of fact, judgment of self-efficacy is not an immutable entity

reflecting a fixed faculty of the organism. People alter judgments of their

efficacy on the basis of direct mastery experiences; social comparisons
through vicarious influences; inferences from bodily states; and varied
forms of social persuasion, including bogus feedback of attainment,
arbitrary attributional interpretations, and monetary lures (Bandura,
1986).
Kirsch cites his study in which hypothetical escalated benefits per
suaded students who said they feared snakes that they could handle
a snake or toss a wad of paper into a distant wastepaper basket. As the
inducements were raised to $1 million, saving another's life, or sparing
one's own life, eventually all the students persuaded themselves that
could handle a snake, and many of them similarly
they persuaded
themselves that they could marshal sufficient dexterity to hit a waste-
paper basket at some (46%) or at 50 feet (24%). Kirsch concluded
distance
from these responses to the pretended activity that self -efficacy judg
ments regarding shifty snakes reflect expected fear rather than skill.
The results of this exercise have little bearing on the
hypothetical
nature of perceived self-efficacy. Self-efficacy scales do not measure
skill; they measure what people believe they can do under varied cir
cumstances whatever skills they possess or the particular skills required

by the task. How well people perform on

a task
partly depends on their
beliefs about how well they will be able to orchestrate the subskills and
cognitive resources they possess, and about how much effort they will
368 BANDURA

be able to mount and sustain in a

given endeavor. Thus, they perform
poorly if persuaded by bogus feedback that they are physically inef
ficacious, but they perform at a high level if persuaded that they are
physically efficacious (Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979). The illusorily
instated self-efficacy even overrides pre-existing sex differences in phys
ical stamina. Students persevere doggedly when arbitrarily high ref
erence
points positively bias their self-efficacy judgments as problem
solvers, but they abort their efforts quickly when arbitrarily low reference
points bias their self-efficacy judgments negatively (Cervone & Peake,
1986). Even training in a skill that can impair functioning produces
beneficial results when presented through bogus feedback in ways that
enhance perceived self-efficacy (Holroyd et al, 1984). As these and many
other experiments reveal, the same capability can spawn performances
that are subpar, ordinary, or extraordinary, depending on the influen
tial contribution of self-judged efficacy. Judgments of operative self-

efficacy are concerned not with the skills one has, but with beliefs about
what one can do with the subskills one possesses in dealing with con
tinuously changing realities, most of which contain ambiguous, unpre
dictable, and stressful elements. If Kirsch wishes to conceptualize a self-
efficacy judgment as an unalterable reflection of a fixed skill, then that
should be regarded as his conception to defend, rather than burdening
self-efficacy theory with such a notion.
Although perceived self-efficacy is concerned with perceived opera
tive capability, not inherent skill, one might examine in passing Kirsch's
rationale for the choice of tasks in the preceding study. Kirsch (1982)
is of the view that coping with a shifty reptile involves no skill, whereas

tossing a wad of paper into a wastepaper basket does. He rests his

argument on an elementalistic conception of "skill": Since the con
stituent motor responses of locomotion, grasping, and the like exist
within the behavioral repertoires of snake phobics, presumably no skill
is involved in coping with reptiles. This is analogous to arguing that,
because people possess a large stock of words in their verbal repertoire,
neither verbal discourse nor written composition involves skill. Human
skill is a generative capability requiring variable utilization of multiple
subskills, not a fixed entity.
Neither theorizing nor experimentation on how perceived self-

efficacy contributes to human endeavors and accomplishments is well

served by false dichotomies that coping with threats involves no skill,
but tossing a wad of paper does. Isn't it time to retire the conception
of "skill" as a fixed faculty and the trite arguments that flow from it?

Herpetologists come to deal routinely with deadly reptiles not by ex

tinguishing their "expected fear" or infusing them with "willingness,"
but by building their sense of coping self-efficacy through modeling and

mastering sets of strategies for exercising control over reptiles, whatever

SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 369

situation might arise. When severe snake phobics verbalize aloud their
thoughts while to cope with
attempting a snake at the
beginning of
treatment, judgments of their coping capabilities determine what they
are
willing to risk (Bandura, 1983). They shun activities when they
believe their inept coping efforts will
provoke adverse reactions. They
promptly abort interactions they have initiated when they do not know-
how to deal with unpredictable situations that ensue. They are reluctant
to attempt tasks
they might be able to handle, because they believe the
encounter will escalate to a level that will exceed their
coping capabili
ties. The most profound level of self-inefficacv involves
perceived vul
nerability to total loss of personal control, which believe will leave
they
them defenseless. An efficacy-oriented treatment that restores a
strong
sense of
self-efficacy by conveying effective coping strategies rapidly
eliminates phobic thinking, expected fear, and
phobic avoidance. Pho
bics would be ill served by the view
propounded by Kirsch that their
problems stem from a lack of "willingness" and that no coping tech
niques need be offered them because their "behavioral repertoire"
already contains the necessary "motor responses."
Kirsch makes much of the fact that the students were more
per
suadable regarding coping with a than
tossing a wad of paper
reptile
into a small remote target. There is little of conceptual import here. All
this shows is that it is difficult to persuade people that thev can execute
a
performance with little margin of error on a task set at or near a
physically unattainable limit. As regards self-efficacy for pretended
snake handling, the findings unsurprisingly show that escalated bene
fits raise self-efficacy judgments among subjects selected by a self-
can

report criterion known to be deficient for identifying the types of severe

phobics used in self-efficacy research. Among people who report thev

dread snakes and seek help for the problem, almost 40% perform boldly
when administered an actual behavioral test (Bandura, Blanchard, &
Ritter, 1969; Bandura, Jeffery, & Wright, 1974). Thus, selecting subjects
on the basis ofreported fear yields about a 35% false-positive rate. In
Kirsch's student sample, chosen according to self-reported fear, slightly
over 40% did not require strong inducement to raise their self-efficacy.

However, the self-efficacv judgments of the remaining students were

unusually resistant to change; they yielded only to extraordinary in
ducements, considering that the students were involved only in a pre
tended situation. Kirsch cites the study by Valins and Ray (1967), which
was similarly flawed by self-report selection, as showing that monetary

inducements weaken avoidance behavior. When phobics are chosen

by a behavioral test, they display a refractory distrust of their coping

efficacy that even real money fails to dislodge in situations requiring
transactions with real snakes (Rimm & Mahoney, 1969).
It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that self-efficacy theory
370 BANDURA

regards social persuasion as one means of raising people's beliefs con

cerning their operative capabilities. To show that the prospect of large
benefits can
persuade themselves that they might be
lead students to
able to mount extraordinary coping effort, which they need not even
an

perform, corroborates predictions from self-efficacy theory that judg

ments of self-efficacy are influenceable by social persuasion. Consider
a familiar
example. In their life pursuits, countless young athletes per
suade themselves, goaded by the prospect of fame and fortune, into

believing they possess the capabilities to make it into the professional

ranks. For the vast majority, the self-belief is ill founded, but it sustains
long hours of grueling practice under miserable conditions for years
on end.
Except for attainments that clearly exceed human capacity,
there are numerous difficult things people can persuade themselves

they could conceivably do for prized benefits.

Kirsch seriously distorts the conception of self-efficacy when he
claims that it refers solely to perceived capability independent of task
demands. Self-efficacy theory has never tendered the preposterous no
tion that perceived self-efficacy is an autistic entity that is identifiable

independently of the nature and complexity of performance tasks. This

misrepresentation is especially ironic, because self-efficacy theory has
explicitly argued against omnibus trait conceptions of self-efficacy dis
joined from the nature and complexity of the activity in question. In
point of fact, the standard assessment methodology measures self-per
cepts of efficacy in relation to task demands ordered in difficulty or
complexity. Level of perceived self-efficacy is defined in terms of whether
a
person's self-judged efficacy is limited to simple tasks, whether it
extends to moderately difficult ones, or whether it includes even the
most taxing performances within a particular domain of functioning.

Because perceived self -efficacy is measured for different levels of task

demands spanning a wide range, the assessment procedure reveals
variations in perceived self-efficacy for the same set of task difficulties.
Locke, Motowidlo, and Bobko (this issue) show how self-efficacy meas
ures
bring order to conflicting findings across studies arising from ex-
pectancy-of-success measures that confound expectancy with task dif
ficulty. In this same connection, self-efficacy theory regards fear and
stress as products of a relational condition the fit between perceived

coping capability and perceived task demands that carry negative con
sequences if unfulfilled.
Kirsch further misrepresents self-efficacy theory when he alleges
that the theory postulates low
perceived self-efficacy as the cause of
fear, irrespective of the domain of activity. He points out that perceived
inefficacy regarding innocuous laboratory tasks does not make subjects
fearful. I cannot imagine why self-inefficacy on such tasks would pro-
SCOPE OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY 371

voke fits of fear. The fact is that self-efficacy theory explicitly posits
perceived self-inefficacy to exercise
control over potentially aversive events
as the source of fear and
anxiety. This important domain qualifier is
not something that can be
easily overlooked, since it is italicized both
in an early publication
addressing this very issue (Bandura, 1978), and
in a later publication (Bandura,
1982) explaining that perceived self-
inefficacy to control aversive outcomes is central to anxiety, whereas
perceived self-inefficacy to control valued outcomes is likely to give rise
to
despondency.

PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY VERSUS

EFFORT-PERFORMANCE EXPECTANCY

Some expectancy-value theories include an

expectancy that effort will
beget requisite performances (Vroom, 1964). It should be noted, how
ever, that perceived self-efficacy encompasses much more than effort
determinants of performance. Effort is but one of many factors that
govern the magnitude and quality of performance. People judge their
capacity for challenging activities more in terms of their perceptions of
the knowledge, skills, and strategies they have at their command than
solely in terms of how much they will exert themselves. Performances
that call for ingenuity, resourcefulness, and adaptability depend more
on adroit use of skills and
specialized knowledge than on effort. People
who cope poorly with stress expect that marred performances in intim
idating situations will be determined by their self-debilitating thought
patterns rather than by how much effort they mount. Indeed, the harder
they try, the more they may impair their execution of the activity.
Expectancy theorists have probably singled out effort as the sole
cause of
performance accomplishments because the theory has usually
been concerned with how hard people work at routine activities. Hence,
the aspect of self-efficacy that is most germane to how much is ac

complished is people's perceived perseverant capabilities that is, their

assurance that they can exert themselves sufficiently to attain desig

nated levels of productivity.

MULTIDOMAIN SELF-EFFICACY VERSUS

OMNIBUS GLOBAL SELF-EFFICACY

different activity domains, dif

Self-perceptions of efficacy vary across

ferent levels of demands within activity domains, and different environ

mental circumstances of performance. Therefore, the role of perceived
372 BANDURA

self-efficacy in
psychosocial functioning is best elucidated by self -efficacy
measures tailored to
particular domains of functioning, rather than as
global disposition assessed by an omnibus test. Such omnibus tests
include a fixed set of items, many of which may have little relevance
to the domain of functioning being analyzed. It is unrealistic to expect
suchall-purpose tests to predict with appreciable accuracy how people
will
perform different activities under diverse circumstances. Indeed,
domain self-efficacy scales predict better than global tests (Bandura,
1986; in press).
Domain scales do not mean that
self-efficacy items must be cast in
minute particulars. Rather, the items are constructed at an intermediate
level of generality representing a generic level of competence at each

aspect of a domain. Thus, for example, individuals are asked to judge

their perceived efficacy to cope with congested city traffic rather than
with traffic on a specific street in a specific city. Nor do domain-linked
scales mean that there is no generality to perceived capability. Multi-
domain measures reveal the patterning and degree of generality of

people's sense of personal efficacy. Some may judge themselves as

highly efficacious across a wide range of domains and levels of task
demands within each domain; others may judge themselves as inef
ficacious in most domains of functioning; and many may judge them
selves as relatively efficacious in domains in which they have cultivated
their competencies, moderately efficacious in domains with which they
are somewhat less conversant, and inefficacious in
activity domains
foreign to them. One can derive the
degree of generality from multi-
domain scales, but one cannot extract the patterning of perceived self-

efficacy from conglomerate omnibus tests. The research reported in this

special issue documents the promise of the microlevel approach for
achieving broad understanding of how self-percepts of efficacy affect
human functioning.

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