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Microeconomics, Volume I
A Primer on
Microeconomics, Volume I
Fundamentals of Exchange
Second Edition
Thomas M. Beveridge
A Primer on Microeconomics, Volume I: Fundamentals of Exchange
Copyright © Business Expert Press, LLC, 2018.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Keywords
comparative advantage, consumer surplus, demand and supply, economic
efficiency, elasticity, equilibrium, imperfect competition, marginal ben-
efit, market failures, , monopoly, opportunity cost, perfect competition,
producer surplus, profit maximization
Contents
Preface...................................................................................................ix
Acknowledgments....................................................................................xi
Chapter 1 Scarcity and Choice...........................................................1
Chapter 2 Demand and Supply........................................................37
Chapter 3 More on Markets.............................................................67
Chapter 4 Elasticity........................................................................105
This Primer has been written with the hope that long after you have
turned the final page, you will retain a deeper understanding of the eco-
nomic issues that confront us and the tools to analyze the exciting and
challenging concerns that we all must address in our contemporary world.
My best wishes to you in your study of economics. You will find it
a rewarding and worthwhile experience, and I trust that this Primer will
stimulate you in your endeavors.
Acknowledgments
Through the years, many students have asked me questions, and by doing
so, have given me deeper insights into the difficulties that arise when
economics is first approached. I am grateful to all of them. Much of the
material included in this book springs from such “after-class” discussions.
The efforts of reviewers Phil Romero and Jeff Edwards have added
greatly to the quality of the final product. A former student, Jonas Feit,
now thriving in Washington, DC, critiqued early drafts of the first edition.
Scott Isenberg and Charlene Kronstedt of Business Expert Press provided
stalwart support. Rene Caroline Balan of S4Carlisle Publishing Services
deserves great credit for keeping things moving smoothly by encourag-
ing and cajoling effectively. Denver Harris was reliable in converting a
misshapen, poorly written first-edition manuscript into an orderly text.
Needless to say, any remaining lapsi calami are my responsibility.
This Primer is dedicated, with love, to the memory of my parents, to
my wife, Pamela, (a software instructor with Microsoft Certification), to
our son, Andrew (whose surprises are no longer shocks but delights), and
to the dogs and cats, and especially for Jake, for whom all lunches are free.
Thomas M. Beveridge
Hillsborough, North Carolina
CHAPTER 1
Scarcity
Resources
Caution: Terms used in economics may not mean the same as they
do in regular speech. “Rent” is a good example. Apartment-dwellers pay
“rent” to their “landlord,” but most of that payment is not for the use of a
natural resource (the space the apartment occupies); it’s for the structure
itself, and for the wiring and plumbing and other man-made (capital)
features being used. “Investment” (the addition to the stock of capital) is
another term with a very specific meaning in economics.
A Personal Example
Opportunity Cost
Choice is at the heart of economics. Any time we make a choice, there
is a cost involved. Economists use the term “opportunity cost.” Oppor-
tunity cost is the value of the next most preferred alternative given up
when you make a choice. This idea of opportunity cost is both simple and
profound—there’s no such thing as a free lunch, as the saying goes. In the
restaurant, if you order shrimp lo mein, then, unless you are very hungry,
you must give up the opportunity to have other items on the menu. If the
shrimp had not been available, the value you place on the item you would
have chosen instead is the opportunity cost of the shrimp, as this item is
the next-best alternative that you gave up in order to enjoy the shrimp.
Suppose that, currently, you are only producing chairs. Abe, Bill, and
Calvin are producing a total of six chairs. Who would you choose first to
switch over to table production? And who would be your next choice?
Does it matter?
It does matter! You should choose Abe first to produce tables, then
Bill, and finally, Calvin because, relative to the others, Abe can produce
tables at the lowest (opportunity) cost. With Abe, the table he produces
“costs” one chair that will no longer be produced, but if Calvin is selected
to produce the table, then we must give up the three chairs he could other-
wise have produced. Looked at differently, we should keep Calvin produc-
ing chairs as long as possible because he is so skilled at chair production.
Note that as we expand the production of tables, the opportunity cost of
tables increases. The first table (Abe’s) costs one chair; Bill’s costs two chairs;
and Calvin’s costs three chairs. The production alternatives are listed as follows.
Production
alternatives Tables Chairs
A 0 6
B 1 5
C 2 3
D 3 0
production of tables and chairs, then Abe should be switched first. Why?
Because the opportunity cost, in terms of chairs lost, is least with Abe.
At alternative C, two tables are being produced. Who should be
moved from producing chairs and asked to produce the second table?
Bill, because relative to Calvin, the opportunity cost of the table, in terms
of chairs given up, is less—only two chairs lost, instead of three.
At alternative D, we finally switch over Calvin to table production.
We have saved him until last because this is a relatively expensive deci-
sion, in the sense that the three chairs that Calvin could have produced
are being sacrificed to increase table production by one.
The “big idea” revealed in this example is that as we begin table pro-
duction, we should choose the least-cost resource (Abe), and as table
production expands, we are forced to switch over resources that involve
progressively higher opportunity costs.
We can plot these alternatives. Graphically, as shown in Figure 1.2,
the PPF bends outwards. The “bowed-outward” slope of the PPF depicts
the increasing opportunity cost we have discussed.
A
6
5 B
Chairs
4
3 C
2
1
D
0 1 2 3
Tables
Figure 1.2 Production possibility frontier
Marginal Cost
Let’s press this example a little further. Economists, as we shall see later,
are deeply concerned with “marginal” analysis. “Marginal” is just a fancy
term economists use, meaning “extra” or “additional.” Marginal cost is
the additional cost incurred when an extra unit of a good is produced.
(Similarly, marginal benefit is the additional benefit that is received
when an extra unit of a good is consumed.) Superficially, we may think of
“the additional cost incurred when an extra unit of a good is produced”
in terms of dollars and cents, but more profoundly, it is the opportunity
cost. Alone on his island, Robinson Crusoe has no money, but because he
makes choices, he still incurs costs.
In our example, choosing to produce more chairs results in increasing
costs. The extra opportunity cost of the first table was one chair, but the
second table cost two chairs, and the third table’s cost was higher still—at
three chairs. Typically, because of the law of increasing cost, we’d predict
that the marginal cost would increase as more tables are produced. If he
chooses to pick berries today, then the cost is not financial, it is the value
of the next most preferred alternative he gives up.
Constant Costs
An outward-bending PPF depicts increasing cost. However, if the PPF is
a straight downward-sloping line, then the opportunity cost is constant.
A straight line shows that the rate of trade-off, one good for the other, is
12 A PRIMER ON MICROECONOMICS, VOLUME I
M currently unattainable
Guns
K a maximum combination
L Underproduction
0
Butter
Figure 1.3 The components of a production possibility
frontier
90
PPF1 PPF2
0 30
Corn
Figure 1.4 A general increase in the production
possibility frontier
causing the PPF to pivot from PPF1 to PPF2, as shown in Figure 1.5.
Observe that in this case, the slope of the PPF has changed. Because the
slope of the frontier depicts opportunity cost, the opportunity cost of
corn (and thus, soybeans) must have changed.
90
Soybeans
PPF1 PPF2
0 30 45
Corn
Figure 1.5 A good-specific increase in the
production possibility frontier
B
Meat
C
E
D
0 Vegetables
Figure 1.6 Productive efficiency and
allocative efficiency
16 A PRIMER ON MICROECONOMICS, VOLUME I
and can be thought of as examining how we might move the production mix
to a point of greater allocative efficiency along the line. Macroeconomics,
which considers the consequences of unemployment or lackluster growth,
may be thought of as exploring how we might either move toward the
frontier, or indeed, shift the frontier itself.
Ja ck 12 Jill
8
Bread
Bread
0 4 0 3
Wine Wine
The law of comparative (cost) advantage states that Jack and Jill
are each able to benefit from specialization and trade if their opportunity
costs (and the slopes of the frontiers) differ.
We must determine who should produce which good by compar-
ing opportunity costs. For Jack, the opportunity cost of producing eight
loaves is the four bottles of wine he is no longer able to produce—one loaf
costs him half a bottle of wine. Using the reciprocal trick, one bottle of
wine must “cost” him two loaves. For Jill, the opportunity cost of produc-
ing 12 loaves is the 3 bottles of wine she can no longer produce—1 loaf
costs her a fourth of a bottle of wine. Using the reciprocal trick, one bottle
of wine “costs” her four loaves.
One bottle of wine costs Jack two loaves, whereas for Jill, one bottle of
wine costs a four loaves. One loaf costs Jack half a bottle of wine, whereas
for Jill, one loaf costs a fourth of a bottle of wine.
Jack can produce wine cheaper (he has a comparative advantage in
wine) while Jill can produce bread cheaper (she has a comparative advan-
tage in bread). As long as the slopes of the PPFs differ, then it must be true
that one producer has the comparative advantage in one good and the
other producer has the comparative advantage in the other good. Again,
Scarcity and Choice 19
Caution: “But,” you say, “This result is obvious. Jack is better at wine
production because he can produce more wine than Jill, and Jill is better
at bread production because she can produce more loaves than Jack!” This
is false logic. You have fallen into the trap of absolute advantage. In abso-
lute terms, while it is true that Jack is superior to Jill in wine production
and Jill trumps Jack in bread production, this fact has no bearing on how
the two parties should specialize.
The fallacy is easy to show. Suppose that Jack can produce more wine
and more bread than Jill. Does this mean that Jack should produce every-
thing and that Jill should produce nothing? Clearly not. In the real world,
there are large countries with many resources and small countries with
few, but the small countries can still gain from trade and still can contrib-
ute to general prosperity despite an absolute disadvantage in all goods.
We can summarize the results thus far.
Opportunity Comparative
cost of: Jack Jill advantage
One loaf of bread 1/2 bottle 1/4 bottle Jill
One bottle of wine 2 loaves 4 loaves Jack
one bottle of wine is traded for three loaves. Jack, producing wine at a
cost of two loaves, will gain because the price he is charging exceeds his
cost of production. Similarly, but less obviously, Jill, producing bread at
a cost of a quarter of a bottle of wine per loaf, will also gain because the
price of a loaf (one-third of a bottle of wine) is also higher than her cost.
Both benefit.
There is no requirement that both must benefit equally—that depends
on relative negotiating abilities, for example. As long as the price lies
between the limits where one party or the other does not gain (one wine
sells for two loaves and one wine sells for four loaves), trade will be mutu-
ally beneficial. If the price of a bottle of wine moves outside the limits to
the terms of trade—trading for one loaf or five loaves, for example—then
trade between the two parties will collapse. For example, if the price that
wine commands is five loaves, then Jack will produce wine, but so will
Jill! Jill’s opportunity cost for a bottle of wine is four loaves. If she can
exchange her wine and receive five loaves, then that is what she should do.
THINK IT THROUGH: Can you verify that Jill would make a loss
if she continued to produce loaves if the terms of trade are one wine
for five loaves?
If the “price” of one wine is five loaves, then the “price” of one loaf is
one-fifth of a bottle of wine. It costs Jill a quarter of a bottle of wine to
produce the loaf. If she did, then the cost of production would exceed the
benefit she would receive.
Caution: We have concluded that the Law of Comparative Advantage
persuades us that trade can be beneficial and that parties should specialize
in producing the good in which they have the comparative (cost) advan-
tage. Before moving on, it’s worth noting that the analysis depends on
the assumption that each person (or economy) is fully employed that
is, on the production possibility frontier. If that is not the case, then the
basis for trade (being on one’s PPF, and from there, being able to com-
pare opportunity costs) evaporates. Our opportunity cost calculations are
valid only along the frontier itself. A nation struggling through a recession
might still find it to be in its own best interests to restrict imports and
boost domestic employment.
Scarcity and Choice 21
been removed that his satisfaction level has been restored to its original
(10 cigarettes and 20 pieces of candy) level. Let’s say he stops us when
we have taken away 10 pieces of candy. We have established that the two
“bundles” of goods—10 cigarettes and 20 pieces of candy (bundle A) and
12 cigarettes and 10 pieces of candy (bundle B)—are equivalent for Juan.
An economist would say he is “indifferent” between the two bundles. The
results are given in Table 1.1.
that.) By trading, Juan achieves a better outcome and improves his overall
level of satisfaction.
Similarly, Pedro approaches Carlos and offers to give him 3 pieces of
candy for 2 cigarettes, leaving Carlos with 8 cigarettes and 23 pieces of
candy (bundle C). Like Juan, Carlos should accept the trade because bun-
dle C is superior to bundle B (more candy), and bundle B is equivalent to
him to bundle A; therefore, bundle C is superior to bundle A. See Table 1.2.
The next time the Red Cross parcels arrive at the camp, another
entrepreneur—Pancho—appears on the scene. Pancho has observed the
economic profit—four pieces of candy—that Pedro has been earning on
his trades and wishes to get in on the action. He approaches Juan, and
in order to encourage Juan to trade with him, offers him a better deal
than Pedro’s—2 cigarettes in exchange for only 8 pieces of candy, leav-
ing Juan with 12 cigarettes for 12 pieces of candy. This bundle of goods
(bundle D) is superior to bundle C (Pedro’s offer) and Juan will benefit
by accepting it.
Pancho then approaches Carlos and offers to give him 4 pieces of
candy in return for 2 cigarettes, leaving Carlos with 8 cigarettes and
24 pieces of candy (bundle D). Bundle D is superior to bundle C (Pedro’s
offer) and Carlos will gain by accepting it. Pancho’s payment from trading
is the 4 pieces of candy he receives. (Initially, there were 40 pieces—Juan
has 12, Carlos has 24, and Pancho has 4.) If Pancho values his next-best
alternative to negotiating in the hot sun, sitting under a shade tree, at two
pieces of candy, then his economic profit is two pieces of candy.
When Pedro was the only trader, the payment he received was six
pieces of candy. With Pancho in competition, the payment was cut to
four pieces of candy, as each trader tried to attract customers to him. If an
Scarcity and Choice 25
additional trader (Pablo) were now to enter the market and compete for
customers with both Pedro and Pancho, then we can see that the traders’
reward would be driven even lower.
How low will the payment go? Not to zero—for no one would be
willing to accept the risk and inconvenience of trading for no payment
at all. The answer is determined by opportunity cost. A trader will par-
ticipate if the reward he receives is “worth it,” that is, if it covers his op-
portunity cost. If the opportunity cost of trading is the value placed on
socializing with friends under a shade tree and if that value is two pieces
of candy, then the lowest payment that will encourage traders to par-
ticipate in the market is two pieces of candy. This payment, equal to and
determined by opportunity cost, is a reasonable payment for their time
and trouble, and economists call it a normal profit. In economics, unlike
in accounting, normal profit (a reasonable rate of return for the entrepre-
neur) is treated the same as wages and salaries, rent, and interest. Just as
those other payments represent costs of doing business, so does normal
profit. Any payment received above the amount that covers opportunity
cost is considered economic profit.
Lesson 1: If participants have the same endowments but different pref-
erences, then trade can be mutually beneficial. This is true
whether Juan and Carlos prefer to trade with each other or to
use intermediaries.
26 A PRIMER ON MICROECONOMICS, VOLUME I
Lesson 2: It is self-interest and the desire to earn a profit that prompts
Pedro and the other entrepreneurs to provide goods, or, as in
this case, services. Entrepreneurs, seeing profit opportunities,
will enter the market.
Lesson 3: C
ompetition among traders can be expected to drive down
profit margins until only a normal profit is earned. At that
point, there is no incentive for additional entrepreneurs to
enter the market and the market will stabilize. It is opportunity
cost that determines the level of normal profit.
Lesson 4: (following from Lesson 3). Competition is beneficial for cus-
tomers such as Juan and Carlos. Because competition drives
down the profit received by entrepreneurs, as competition
increases and profit margins decline, Juan and Carlos retain
more of their candy, and therefore, gain more.
Lesson 5: There is an incentive for entrepreneurs to collude to reduce
competition. Although competition benefits customers,
it hurts entrepreneurs because it reduces their profits—
ultimately to the point at which only a normal profit is being
earned. Entrepreneurs have an incentive to collude to fix
prices or to impose barriers to the entry of more entrepreneurs
in order to reduce competition and keep profits high.
Lesson 6: (following from Lesson 5). Such collusive or restrictive action
hurts consumers and reduces market efficiency.
In our example with Juan and Carlos, we assumed that each refugee
would trade, perhaps using middlemen, perhaps not, but that each would
trade if such a trade were in his own self-interest. In such circumstances,
it would be rational to do so and irrational to hold on to inferior bundles
of goods and not to trade. But is this how we actually behave in the real
world? The new field of behavioral economics, which extends the tradi-
tional view of rationality by incorporating insights from psychology and
real-world behavior, suggests strongly that it is not!
Scarcity and Choice 27
raised, the public was more willing to attend, and then, reclaim their
fifty-cent “refund.”
We ought to react equally to losses and gains but, for most of us,
because we exhibit loss aversion, the happiness we feel at receiving a one-
time $100 bonus is less than the displeasure we feel at experiencing a one-
time $100 deduction in this month’s paycheck. The tendency to respond
more vigorously to losses than to gains is known as loss aversion.
The endowment effect seems to be related to loss aversion. We place
more value on things we own (and that we might lose) than on equivalent
items that we don’t own (that we might gain). In one experiment, partici-
pants were asked to give a value for an item that they were shown (a coffee
mug). Following this, they were given the mug and then asked what price
they would a ccept if they were to sell or trade the mug. Having estab-
lished ownership of the mug, participants tended to value it significantly
more highly than before they owned it. Clearly, we dislike loss more than
we like gain.
We also dislike excessive choice. Certainly, we regard choice as benefi-
cial, and may express discontent when presented with a severely limited
choice set. However, some research has shown that at the other extreme,
when confronted by a great many options, decision-makers can become
confused and overloaded, sometimes to the point that “no choice” is
seen as the preferred action. In one study, shoppers were offered a free
sample from a range of available soft drinks that they might then go on
and purchase if they wished. In one condition, the choice was from a
Scarcity and Choice 29
range of 6 soft drinks; in the other, 24 varieties were available. Two results
emerged. First, subjects tended to prefer the smaller range of items—they
disliked too much choice. Second, when the shoppers had taken their
sample, those who had been exposed the larger range of alternatives were
significantly more likely to leave without buying any of them than those
subjects who were offered the smaller choice set. After some point, more
numerous alternatives became demotivating.
This behavior may be due, in part, to the cognitive burden required to
assess each option, and then, to weigh it against the others. In the cereal
aisle of the grocery store, for instance, with differing prices, ingredients,
and package sizes, it may not seem worthwhile to incur such a burden,
and be preferable simply to buy what was bought last time or what is on
sale today. Further, the larger the choice set, the greater the number of
alternatives that must be evaluated but rejected, and therefore, the greater
may be the feeling of regret at opportunities not pursued. If we suffer
regret that we may have made a suboptimal choice, then we may prefer to
avoid having to make the choice at all!
In our trading example with Juan and Carlos, if we assume that each
middleman is a maximizer, then, as a result of competition, each interme-
diary would see his profits driven down to the level of a “normal” profit
that would barely cover the opportunity cost of trading. Consequently,
Juan and Carlos would benefit from competition between “maximizing”
middlemen. But what if the middlemen had been content with less profit?
In that case, the drive to undercut the competing traders would have been
absent, collusion would have been more plausible, and paradoxically, eco-
nomic profits would have been preserved!
With respect to choice, whereas a maximizer will devote time and
energy to assessing all the options available to her (as suggested by
Kahneman’s System 2 thinking), a satisficer will find an option that
achieves her acceptable level of value, and then, move on. For the business
owner, profit, rather than holding center stage, instead may be only one
of a number of variables that the entrepreneur is trying to reach. Having
reached a sufficient level of profit, the accomplishment of other goals,
such as a less-stressed life, may become more prominent.
Perhaps because of their relentless quest for optimality, maximizers
are an unhappy lot, research indicates, with significantly lower levels of
satisfaction, self-esteem, and happiness than their more optimistic sat-
isficing counterparts, and with measurably higher levels of remorse and
self-doubt. In the light of this evidence, we may conclude that it is irra-
tional to be rational.
nonzero amount, should offer her only a small fraction of the $20 so that
his gain is increased.
In practice, however, it does not turn out the way that rational
self-interest would dictate. The first player typically offers the second player
a substantial fraction of the $20—perhaps between 40 to 50 percent.
In addition, if the second player feels that the amount offers is too low
(usually something less than 20 percent), then the offer will be rejected.
Although the percentages may vary from trial to trial, the conclusion is
robust—neither the Henrys nor the Minnies of our world are driven solely
by rational self-interest.
Even if we admit that Henry may feel it necessary to make an offer
big enough to mollify Minnie, that still doesn’t explain Minnie’s behavior.
If offered $3, why should she refuse? Is it some desire to exact revenge on
parsimonious Henry, even if it means losing the $3, or perhaps to teach
him a lesson that will guide him to better choices in future transactions?
The related Dictator Game (devised by Kahneman and his associates)
provides some answers. In this game, Henry (the “dictator”) gets to keep
his fraction of the money, even if Minnie rejects his offer. Any amount he
offers her, therefore, cannot be because of a fear of rejection and monetary
loss. Even in this case, however, researchers have found that offers remain
significantly higher than zero, indicating some other-regarding altruistic
motive. In the real world, we share our bounty.
One final aspect of this topic is worth touching on—fairness. Some
years ago, Coca-Cola introduced a vending machine that adjusted the prices
of sodas as the temperature changed—higher temperature, higher price.
This seemed like good economics. On a hot day at the beach, the enjoy-
ment derived from a cold soda is greater than would be derived on a chilly
overcast day, and accordingly, consumers ought to be willing to pay more.
The marketing strategy was a disaster! When they saw the higher
prices, consumers felt as if they were being exploited, and refused to buy.
The Coke machines were soon withdrawn.
To Be or Not to Be—Rational?
“What does all this mean?” you might ask. If economics is based on
an assumption—rational self-interest—that has proven itself not to be
Scarcity and Choice 33
Big Ideas
Big Idea #1: “Choice involves cost, or, there’s no such thing as a free lunch.”
Choices matter and trade-offs exist because of scarcity. When we choose an
option, we give up all the other competing options—there is an opportunity
cost and that is the value placed on the next most preferred alternative given
up. In a world of limited resources, our actions have consequences, and no
lunches are free.
Big Idea #2: “Trade is beneficial in that it increases value for the traders.”
More precisely, free trade voluntarily entered into can be mutually
beneficial. Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was a reaction against the
restrictive mercantilist and monopolistic trade policies of the time and
his argument was that exchange benefits both partners. A generation
later, David Ricardo provided the theoretical confirmation with his Law
of Comparative Advantage. Is trade always beneficial? No, certainly not
for every individual. In the past, textile workers in North Carolina and
car workers in Michigan have suffered from trade liberalization as jobs
have moved overseas. In times of high unemployment, for instance,
the temptation to “save jobs” through protectionist policies may be
compelling, but in general, freer trade generates gains that restricted trade
denies.
Big Idea #3: “Individuals and firms respond to incentives and markets
efficiently coordinate production, distribution, and consumption.” Self-
interest and incentives drive the participants in competitive markets to
produce the mix of goods and services that is most preferred by society. A
government’s function is to act as a referee, facilitating transactions and
standing by to levy sanctions when the market’s rules are broken.
Elasticity Fairness, 32
applications Federal Trade Commission, 224
elasticity and tax revenues, 126 Ferrari sports, 38
gas price volatility, responsible Fine Fruit-Filled Pies, 158–159
for, 127 “First come, first served” rationing
incidence of taxes, 124–126 method, 91
minimum wage legislation, Fish market, 122
elasticity and effectiveness of, Ford, Henry, 189, 193
127–128 “Framing,” concept of, 27
cross-price elasticity of demand, Freda, 142–152
116–118 Free rider problem, 279
income elasticity of demand,
115–116 Game theory, 251–256
measure of responsiveness, 106 Gas price volatility, responsible
price elasticity of demand, 106–107 for, 127
absolute value, 107–109 Gasoline, 90–92
determinants of, 113–114 Gates, Bill, 243
midpoint formula, 111–113 Gentlemen’s agreements, 247
total revenue test, 109–111 Giffen goods, 76
price elasticity of supply, 118–120 Gift-giving and inefficiency, 98
determinants of, 120–124 Global warming, 262
Elasticity value (“coefficient”), 107 Government failure, 102–103
Electricity generation and deregulation, Great auk, 277–278
232–233 Great Recession, 48
Employment, tax revenues and, 126
Emus, 200–201 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 256
Endowment effect, 21–26, 28 Honey subsidy, 273
Enforcement costs, 87 Hopkins, Jerry, 28
Enterprise, 3 Human capital, 3
Entrepreneurial ability, 3 Human resources (“labor”), 3
Envelope curve, 179–180 Hurricane, 275
Equilibrium, 46 Hydrogen fuel cells, 189
adjustment to, 45–46 Immediate (market) period, 122
great about, 47 Incentives, 34
market price, 91 Income
price, 90 after-tax, 48–49
Ethanol, 188 effect. See Substitution effect and
Eve’s marginal cost curve for apples, income effect
81–82 elasticity of demand, 106, 115–116
Excludability, 199, 274 expectations about, 49
Explicit collusion, 246–247 Increase in demand, 47, 59, 60
External economies and diseconomies of Increase in supply, 62
scale, 188 Increasing cost, law of, 8
Externalities, 88, 192, 198, Inelastic demand, 108–113
260–261 Inferior goods, 49, 75–76, 115
negative, 261–264 Initial equilibrium diagram, 58
internalizing negative, 267–272 Internal economies and diseconomies of
positive, 264–267 scale, 187–188
internalizing positive, 273 Internalizing negative externalities,
267–272
Facebook, 226 Internalizing positive externalities, 273
Fair return output level, 228–229 Interstate Commerce Commission, 230
134 INDEX
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