Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS
Author(s): Joachim SCHULTE
Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 43, No. 169 (2), Wittgenstein (1889-1989) avec
un inédit de Wittgenstein (1989), pp. 298-310
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie
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AESTHET1C CORRECTNESS
Joachim SCHULTE
Cyril Barrett, Oxford: Blackwell, 1970. (Roman numerals refer to lectures, arabic
numerals to sections within lectures).
C&V = Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch, Oxford :
Blackwell, 1980.
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 299
There is a second
ambiguity in the words 'express' and 'expression'
which could lead to misunderstandings of Wittgenstein's remarks about
aesthetic questions. In his early notebooks (19.9.16) he writes that art is
a kind of expression and that a good work of art is a perfect kind of
expression. Now here it might be natural to ask what it is that a work of
art expresses and what it is that a good work of art expresses perfectly.
This type of question, however, does not seem adequate. The possible
'content' of an expression is not the aspect which Wittgenstein wants to
emphasize. The meaning of 'expression' he is interested in comes out in
statements like the following, 'The expression on Brando's face is the same
as that on a famous picture of Gödel', 'The expression I can detect in this
phrase is one of melancholy, and to me it seems a melancholy of the same
type as that expressed by certain lines by Lenau' (2). Of course, it is a
natural idea to think that if these lines can express melancholy, then there
must be melancholy in them. But the point is that the way in which that
(2) When talking about 'expression' in this sense we tend to change our normal use
of'identical', 'same',etc., correspondingly : 'Ail have learnt the use of And suddenly
they use it in a peculiar way. They say : "This [indicating an actor playing Lloyd George]
is Lloyd George", although in another sense there is no similarity. An equality which we
could call the "equality of expression". We have learnt the use of "the same". Suddenly we
automatically use "the same" when there is not similarity of length, weight or anything of
the sort' (L&C, IV.6).
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300 J. SCHULTE
which is expressed can be said to be in those Unes is not the way in which
jam can be said to be in a jar. The meaning of 'expression' Wittgenstein
is here interested in is that in which it signifies a certain configuration, a
certain look or physiognomy. In this sense the statement that the ex
pression on my face is one of melancholy can be found to be true even if
I am in high spirits (and even if those who find the expression melancholic
know that I am not in a melancholic mood).
On the other hand, it must be remembered that expressions such as
melancholy or serenity, although sometimes manifested by human beings
who do not actually feel the corresponding émotions and sometimes even
by inanimate objects, can be called expressions of these types only because
there really is human behaviour which can truly be said to display
melancholy, serenity, etc. (3). Here it is plausible to assume that an
expression is more or less closely connected with actual human behav
iour ; and it can also be supposed that the intended shade of meaning of
'expression' varies according to the closeness of the connexion involved.
The expression of pain I may be referring to when talking about a portrait
or a dramatic scene performed on the stage is evidently more closely
connected with actual kinds of human behaviour than what I may be
referring to when speaking of poetry or an abstract painting or a peculiarly
designed garden. But it may none the less be true that ail these expressions
can be seen to conform to one and the same pattern of pain. To
widerstand the rôle of such patterns and their connexions with human
behaviour is of great importance if we try to grasp Wittgenstein's account
of certain aesthetic questions.
Time and again Wittgenstein emphasizes that 'beautiful' and related
words may serve as inteijections but do not play a great rôle in actual
discussions of works of art. This is probably an exaggeration. He admits
that 'people who can't express themselves properly' may frequently use
such words as 'lovely' (L&C, 1.9), and the same presumably applies to
(3) What is important is that the behaviour we are dealing with is 'natural' or even
'instinctive' behaviour. That is why certain explanations in aesthetics can fonction like, or
be parasitic on, utterances (= Äußerungen — 'avowals' — in Wittgenstein's technical sense) :
'Here "explanation" is on the same level as an utterance - where the utterance (when you
say that you have pain, for instance) is the sole criterion. Explanation here is like an
utterance supplied by another person — like teaching him to cry. (This takes the surprising
ness away from the fact that the whole point of an explanation is that it is accepted. There
are corresponding to these explanations utterances which look like this ; just as there are
utterances which look like assertions)'. (L&C, 11.40 n.5).
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 301
'
'beautiful and simiiar words. He is reported to have said in a lecture of
1938 that
in real life, when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such
as 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play hardly any rôle at all. Are aesthetic adjectives
used in a musical criticism? You say : 'Look at this transition', or 'The
passage here is incohérent'. Or you say, in a poetical criticism : 'His use of
images is précisé'. The words you use are more akin to 'right' and 'correct'
(as these words are used in ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and 'lovely'
(L&C, 1.8).
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302 }. SCHULTE
to reconcile with these ideas. The thesis may also seem to be incompatible
with the widely held view that in the last analysis aesthetic judgements are
a matter of personal taste, éducation, and culture. Whether Wittgenstein
would agree to the claim that in the last analysis there will always be a
personal or subjective element in aesthetic judgements may be an open
question ; but he would no doubt agree that culture and éducation play a
decisive role in this context (7). At any rate, the thesis about the existence
of standards is not incompatible with either of these Claims ; after all,
standards may be relative to cultures and, within a given culture, they may
be accepted or acceptable up to a certain point but not by everyone in ail
cases.
Another question about the général applicability of aesthetic standards
concerns exceptional works of art — what we may call 'great' works or
'masterpieces'. Wittgenstein himself admits that they play a special role ;
in particular, he agréés that at least some of our aesthetic standards do not
apply to them and says,
behaves well' and on the other hand 'He made a great impression on me'.
(L&C, 1.23).
Even if (or especially if) the greatness you are confronted with is of a kind
you cannot fully understand, you will not judge it in terms of correctness
or incorrectness. You may — like Wittgenstein himself in the case of
— marvel at these works but still be unable to make anything
Shakespeare
of them. Here people may stare at the creative artist and his great works
(7) A typical remark occurs in L&C, I.25f. : 'The words we call expressions of aesthetic
judgement play a very complicated rôle, but a very definite rôle, in what we call a culture
of a period. To describe their use or to describe what you raean by a cultured taste, you
have to describe a culture. What we now call a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the
Middle Ages. An entirely différent game is played in différent âges. / What belongs to a
whether
language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe
children whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc. In
give concerts,
aristocratie circles in Vienna people had [such and such] a taste, then it came into
circles and women joined choirs, etc. This is an example of tradition in music'.
bourgeois
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 303
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304 J. SCHULTE
The 'necessity' (8) with which the second idea succeeds the first. (The
overture to 'Figaro'). Nothing could be more idiotie than to say that it is
to hear the one after the other. — Ail the same, the
'agreeable' paradigm
fits into the world of our thoughts and feelings. (1947, C&V, 57).
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 305
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306 J. SCHULTE
'to take lessons in counterpoint right at the end of his life. I think his aim
may have been not so much just learning more counterpoint as determi
ning where he stood in relation to it' ( 1941, C&V, 40). Only if you have
mastered the rules in the second sense and developed a feeling for them
will you for instance be able to décidé cases left open by the rules ; only
if you are able to interpret the rules in this sense will you count as a man
of judgement, a connoisseur.
If you apply rules in the second sense, there will be no exact standards
which you can cite in order to justify what you have done or judged. That
is why the verbal accompaniment of the real connoisseur's scrutinizing
and choosing is often irrelevant : 'That he is an appreciator is not shown
by the interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc.
Similarly in music : "Does this harmonize ? No. The bass is not quite loud
enough. Here I just want something différent...". This is what we call an
appréciation' (L&C, 1.19). But it is not as if there were no reason for
calling him an appreciator. Even if it cannot be demonstrated by citing the
rules that he is a man of judgement, we may still point out that his way
of choosing shows that he has a feeling for the rules. But in order to see
that his way of choosing qualifies him as a real connoisseur, you yourself
must have learned to recognize his behaviour as that of a connoisseur. In
order to learn this, however, you need not become an expert in the field
in question ; you may be able to tell whether a certain person is a
connoisseur by looking at the way he compares things, scrutinizes them,
etc. There is after ail a typical kind of behaviour displayed by a connoisseur
(and that is of course the reason why in some cases it is not at ail difficult
to pretend to know something about a certain subject). But as soon as you
want to go beyond the purely external side of connoisseurship, you will
have to say much more both about the field and the culture in which a
connoisseur counts as an expert appreciator. Wittgenstein thinks that in
order to give a M characterization of appréciation you would have to
supply so much complicated information that it would turn out to be 'not
only difficult to describe what appréciation consists in, but impossible. To
describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environ
ment' (L&C, 1.20).
But if connoisseurs or people who wish to describe the connoisseurs'
behaviour have no independent standards to cite in order to justify their
judgements or descriptions, we may well wonder how their judgements or
descriptions can be justified or criticized. In order to see how criticism,
controversy, and justification are possible in this context, it will be helpful
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 307
Take the question : 'How should poetry be read ? What is the correct way
of reading it'? [...] There are cases of poetry which should almost be
scanned - where the metre is as clear as crystal - others where the metre
(9) This and similar parallels are discussed in my book Erlebnis und Ausdruck,
München : Philosophia, 1987, especially chapters 4 and 5.
( 10) Cf. L&C, 1.10 : 'If I say of a piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that is like
giving it a face (I don't express approval or diapproval). I could instead use gestures or
dancing. In fact, if we want to be exact, we do use a gesture or a facial expression'.
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308 J. SCHULTE
(11) One example given by Wittgenstein is the following (L&C, IV.6, excerpt from a
lecture on description) : 'You can sometimes find the similarity between the style of a
musician and the style of a poet who lived at the same time, or a painter. Take Brahms
and Keller. I often found that certain themes of Brahms were extremely Kellerian'.
(12) Cf. the following passage : Ί give someone an explanation and tell him "It's as
though ..." ; then he says "Yes, now I understand it" or "Yes, now I see how it's to be
though I had, as it were, given him conclusive for thinking that this passage should
reasons
be compared with that and the other one. I don't, e.g., explain to him that according to
things the composer has said this passage is supposed to represent such and such' (1948,
C&V, 69).
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AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS 309
of the correctness of his own interprétation, or they may both change their
minds. Of course, the gestures or parallels themselves are not standards
of correctness ; they are means of finding out where to look for evidence
which may then be used to prove an aesthetic judgement correct.
However, the correctness intended here is not the correctness of a
statement's corresponding with the facts, nor is it the correctness of an
action that has been performed in accordance with the raies. Whether a
statement of the type 'It's like the introduction of a new character in a
story' will count as correct is a matter of whether it will be accepted. There
simply are no independent standards here. A lot will also depend on the
way in which it is accepted, if it is accepted ; if a positive reaction is
spontaneous, it will mean more than reluctant approval.
Aesthetic correctness is a simple matter only in those cases where we
are dealing with straightforward raies like the raies of harmony. Here the
composer as well as the critic can invoke the same raies and unambi
guously determine whether they have been followed or not. But then there
are a number of cases where it is for example a question of the correctness
of an interprétation, a judgement, a performance, etc., where only in more
or less indirect ways — by means of quoting parallels or making certain
gestures — we can corne to see what to look for in order to find out
whether the interprétation, the judgement, or the performance is 'right' or
not. And in these cases the reactions of my audience will matter a lot, and
also the way in which they express their approval or disapproval.
There is still another way of determining correctness or incorrectness
in aesthetics, and that is by means of tiying out how we shall react to slight
graduai variations of a given feature. Wittgenstein's example is taken from
architecture : 'You design a door and look at it and say : "Higher, higher,
higher ... oh, all right". (Gesture)' (L&C, II.9). In a similar fashion one
might change the loudness of the bass when trying to play a piece of music
'correctly', and the same method can be used in order to find out what
the 'right' way of reading a certain poem is : at first I stress the metre, then
I stress it a little less, and so on until it sounds just right. In such cases
we often ask another person whether he has the impression that it sounds
(or looks) right to him. Here we are performing a kind of experiment (u).
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310 J. SCHULTE
But then the reason why we pay attention to his reaction — 'a reaction
analogous to my taking my hand away from a hot plate' (L&C, II. 15) (14)
— is not that we wish to
predict his or other people's future behaviour but
we do so in order to learn whether that to which he responds seems
correct.
(14) Cf. above, the quotation from L&C, 11.40 n.5, in footnote 3.
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