Airline Pilots Association of the Phil. v.
CIR HELD: As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
:Definitions)
FACTS: A group of pilots of a particular airline, allegedly anticipation their
forced retirement or resignation on account of strained relations with the
airline arising from unfulfilled economic demands, decided to adopt an
amendment to their organization's constitution and by-laws in order to
enable them to retain their membership standing therein even after the
termination of their employment with the employer concerned.
According to the Court of Industrial Relations in its decision regarding the
certification election of the labor organization, the organization's
constitution is illegal because member of labor organization cannot adopt
an amendment to their fundamental charter so as to include non
employees as member.
ISSUE: W/N the Constitution is illegal for including non employees of the
employer airline as member.
HELD: No. Labor organization was defined by Section 2(e) of R.A. 875
defines as any union or association of employees which exist, in whole or
in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The
absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the
statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the
employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law.
Cebu Seaman's Association vs Ferrer-Calleja
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
:DOLE registration as Basis)
FACTS: A group of deck officers and marine engineers on board vessels
plying Cebu and other ports of the Philippines organized themselves into
an association and registered the same as a non-stock corporation known
as Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI), with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Later, the same group registered its
association with this Bureau as a labor union known as the Seamen's
Association of the Philippines, Incorporated (SAPI).
SAPI has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which will expire on 31 December 1988. In
consonance with the CBA said company has been remitting checked-off
union dues to said union until February, 1987 when a group composed of
members of said union, introducing itself to be its new set of officers,
went to the company and claimed that they are entitled to the remittance
and custody of such union dues. This group, headed by Manuel Gabayoyo
claims that they were elected as such on January 20, 1987 under the
supervision of the SEC.
On 26 May 1987, another group headed by Dominica C. Nacua, claiming
as the duly elected set of officers of the union in an election held on 20
December 1986, filed a complaint, for and in behalf of the union, against
the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI) as represented by Manuel
Gabayoyo for the security of the aforementioned CBA, seeking such relief,
among others, as an order restraining the respondent from acting on
behalf of the union and directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corp. to remit the
checked-off union dues for the months of March and April 1987.
On 10 June 1987, respondent CSAI filed its Answer/Position Paper
alleging that the complainant union and CSAI are one and the same union;
that Dominica C. Nacua and Atty. Prospero Paradilla who represented the
union had been expelled as members/officers as of November 1984 for
lawful causes; and, that its set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo has
the lawful right to the remittance and custody of the corporate funds
(otherwise known as union does) in question pursuant to the resolution
of the SEC dated 22 April 1987.
The controversy in this case is between the two sets of officers in the
union. Both sets of officers claim to be entitled to the release of the union
dues collected by the company with whom it had an existing CBA. The
controversy involves claims of different members/officers to certain
rights granted under the labor code.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the collection and custody of the union dues?
Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of deck officers
organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., (CSAI), a non-stock
corporation and registered it with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The same group registered the organization with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamen's Association of the
Philippines (SAPI). It is the registration of the organization with the BLR
are not with the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with
rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code.
We gathered from the records that CSAI, the corporation was already
inoperational before the controversy in this case arose. In fact, on August
24, 1984 the SEC ordered the CSAI to show cause why its certificate of
registration should not be revoked for continuous inoperation. There is
nothing in the records which would show that CSAI answered said show-
cause order.
Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was
elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private
respondent Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo
Machacon and petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of
discontentment with the leadership of Nacua. This break-away group
revived the moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution
expelling Nacua from association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in
February, 1987, it held its own election of officers supervised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. It also filed a case of estafa against
Nacua sometime in May, 1986.
The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being a
member, has however, not affected her membership with the labor union.
In fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as
the president of the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree
with the contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from
the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not
bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the
labor group by virtue of his having been elected as a president of the
dormant corporation CSAI.
Progressive Development Corp vs Sec of DOLE
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
:DOLE Registration as Basis)
FACTS: Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter
referred to as Kilusan) filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-
and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor
federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees
Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan claimed that
there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending
that the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the
submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and
list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's
motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary
documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution and
by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with their
addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be
submitted as the local union was only recently organized.
In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the
petitioner insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational
meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the
corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution
and by-laws did not bear the signature of the members and was not duly
subscribed. It argued that the private respondent therefore failed to
substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the
rules. Additionally, it prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit
himself from handling the case for the reason that he allegedly had
prejudged the same.
In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the
charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with the
rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he
maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve
the question of representation.
ISSUE: W/N the Kilusan is a legitimate labor organization.
HELD: A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor
organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers,
and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and
attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or
chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify
the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a
legitimate status.
Toyota Motor Phils. Corp v. Tyota Motors Phils Corp Labor Union
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
:Mixed Membership)
FACTS: The Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union
(TMPCLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Department
of Labor, National Capital Region, for all rank-and-file employees of the
Toyota Motor Corporation.
In response, petitioner filed a Position Paper on seeking the denial of the
issuance of an Order directing the holding of a certification election on
two grounds: first, that the respondent union, being "in the process of
registration" had no legal personality to file the same as it was not a
legitimate labor organization as of the date of the filing of the petition;
and second, that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees in violation of law.
ISSUE: W/N there can be a legitimate labor organization with mixed
membership (rank and file and supervisory employees).
HELD: No. An appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees of a
given employer, composed of all or less than the entire body of
employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of law. In Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer Calleja, 18 we defined the
bargaining unit as "the legal collectivity for collective bargaining
purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining interests
in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees
their collective bargaining rights." This in mind, the Labor Code has made
it a clear statutory policy to prevent supervisory employees from joining
labor organizations consisting of rank-and-file employees as the concerns
which involve members of either group are normally disparate and
contradictory. Article 245 provides:
Art. 245 Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. — Managerial Employees
are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both
rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It
cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate
labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification
election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification
election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis
of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ, AND
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,
respondents.
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
: DOLE Registration as Basis)
FACTS:
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa –TUCP (KILUSAN) filed with the DOLE a
petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), alleging that: (1) it is a
legitimate labor federation; (2) its local chapter, Progressive
Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate; (3) there
was no existing collective bargaining agreement; and (4) no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that KILUSAN failed to comply
with Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and
by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and
(c) books of accounts. KILUSAN submitted a rejoinder claiming that it had
submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration and
that since the local union was recently organized, no books of accounts
could be submitted.
Med-Arbiter held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements and the mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. PDC’s MR was
treated as an appeal, as such, the Secretary of Labor took cognizance
thereof and denied PDC’s MR. Thereafter, TRO was issued enjoining the
public respondents from carrying out the resolutions and orders or from
proceeding with the certification election.
ISSUE:
Whether PDC failed to substantially comply with the requirements
prescribed under Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended.
RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED and the resolution and orders of the Med-
Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment are set aside. The TRO is
made permanent.
YES.
A labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the
BLR. Article 234 of the Labor Code prescribes the requirements for
registration. Prescribing those requirements does not limit the right of
assembly or association but rather a condition sine qua non for the
acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or
unions, and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations. Besides, registration, as a valid exercise of
police power, is required to protect both labor and the public against
abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union the purport to represent.
Further, when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter
of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration
are no longer required. A local or chapter need not be independently
registered. A local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization
upon compliance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule II of Book V of the
Implementing Rules, i.e., submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A
charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of
such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance
with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization.
Furthermore, in case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that
the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by the
president is that such submission becomes the BLR’s basis for the
approval of the application for registration. Also, the certification and
attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud.
It may be noted as well that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of
its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its
members, subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and
by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for
certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent;
the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which
must be a legitimate labor organization.
In this case, KILUSAN failed to substantially comply with the
aforementioned statutory requirements. The SC noted that big
federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in
requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and
the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a
furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.
MACTAN WORKERS UNION and TOMAS FERRER, as President
thereof, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DON RAMON ABOITIZ, President, Cebu Shipyard & Engineering
Works, Inc.; EDDIE LIM, as Treasurer; JESUS DIAGO, Superintendent
of the aforesaid corporation; WILFREDO VIRAY, as Resident
Manager of the Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc.; and the CEBU
SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., defendants-appellees;
ASSOCIATION LABOR UNION, intervenor-appellant.
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
: Union Rationale)
Facts:
The defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapulapu City
is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor unions.
Seventy-two of these employees or laborers whose names appear in the
complaint are affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union while the rest are
members of the intervenor Associated Labor Union. On November 28,
1964, the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. and the
Associated Labor Union entered into a 'Collective Bargaining Agreement'
... the pertinent part of which, Article XIII thereof, [reads thus]:
'... The [Company] agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees
and laborers to be taken from ten per cent (10%) of its net profits or net
income.
Said profit-sharing bonus shall be paid by the [Company] to [Associated
Labor Union] to be delivered by the latter to the employees and laborers
concerned and it shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to
furnish and deliver to the [Company] the corresponding receipts duly
signed by the laborers and employees entitled to receive the profit-
sharing bonus within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt
by [it] from the [Company] of the profit-sharing bonus. If a laborer or
employee of the [Company] does not want to accept the profit-sharing
bonus which the said employee or laborer is entitled under this
Agreement, it shall be the duty of the [Associated Labor Union] to return
the money received by [it] as profit-sharing bonus to the [Company]
within a period of sixty (60) days from the receipt by the [Union] from
the [Company] of the said profit-sharing bonus.'"
In March, 1965 the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc.
delivered to the ALU for distribution to the laborers or employees
working with the defendant corporation to the profit-sharing bonus
corresponding to the first installment for the year 1965. Again in June
1965 the defendant corporation delivered to the Associated Labor Union
the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the second installment for
1965. The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their
shares in the second installment of bonus because they did not like to go
to the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance with the
terms of the collective bargaining after 60 days, the uncollected shares of
the plaintiff union members was returned by the ALU to the defendant
corporation. At the same time the defendant corporation was advised by
the ALU not to deliver the said amount to the members of the Mactan
Workers Union unless ordered by the Court, otherwise the ALU will take
such step to protect the interest of its members… Because this warning
given by the intervenor union the defendant corporation did not pay to
the plaintiffs the sum of P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated
Labor Union, but instead, deposited the said amount with the Labor
Administrator.
Issue:
WON the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement extend to the
laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit who do not
belong to the labor organization?
Held:
Yes. It extends also to them.
The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining
representative does not act for its members alone. It represents all the
employees in such a bargaining unit. It is not to be indulged in any
attempt on its part to disregard the rights of non-members.
The right to be the exclusive representative of all the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union
'designated or selected' for such purpose 'by the majority of the
employees' in the unit concerned.
Guirano v. CIR
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
: Union Rationale)
Facts:
Three unfair labor practice cases for unlawful dismissal allegedly based
on legitimate union activity were filed against respondent Central Santos
Lopez Co., Inc. and respondent
United Sugar Workers Union-ILO. In view of a closed-shop provision in
the then existing collective bargaining contract, respondent Central
Santos Lopez Co., Inc. assumed it had to dismiss them. So it was noted in
the decision of the then associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of
respondent Court. Thus: &quote; The respondent company, in its answer,
alleged that the only reason for the dismissal of the complainants herein
is because their said dismissal was asked by the USWU-ILO of which
union respondent company has a valid and existing collective bargaining
contract with a closed-shop provision to the effect that those laborers
who are no longer members of good standing in the union may be
dismissed by the respondent company if their dismissal is sought by the
union; that respondent company has never committed acts of unfair labor
practice against its employees or workers much less against the
complainants herein but that it has a solemn obligation to comply with
the terms and conditions of the contract; and that a closed-shop
agreement is sanctioned under this jurisdiction for such kind of
agreement is expressly allowed under the provisions of Republic Act 875
known as the Industrial Peace Act and the dismissal of complainants is
merely an exercise of a right allowed by said law.&quote; There was no
question, however, as to petitioners having been employed by such
respondent Company long before the collective bargaining contract.
In the decision of respondent Court, there was an acknowledgment of the
prior existence of such employment relationship. Nonetheless, the
conclusion reached, both by the trial judge and then by respondent
Court en banc was that the dismissal was justifiable under the closed-
shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
Issue:
WON the closed-shop provision of the union is compelling and will not
apply to its dismissed members; and whether the dismissal (by the
company) is justifiable.
Held:
The dismissal is unjustifiable and the employees should be reinstated.
The authoritative doctrine that a closed-shop provision in a collective
bargaining agreement is not to be given a retroactive effect so as to
preclude its being applied to employees already in the service. The
closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4, subsec. a(4) of the
Industrial Peace Act above quoted should however, apply to persons to be
hired or to employees who are not yet members of any labor
organization. It is inapplicable to those already in the service who are
members of another union. To hold otherwise, i. e., that the employees in
a company who are members of a minority union may be compelled to
disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union,
would render nugatory the right of all employees to self- organization
and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, a
right guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 875) as
well as by the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6]). It is well settled that such
unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer
in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee
whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any
reasonable ground therefore.
Heirs of Teodulo M. Cruz v. CIR
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
: Union Rationale)
FACTS:
June 21, 1952, the Santiago Labor Union, composed of workers of the
Santiago Rice Mill, a business enterprises engaged in the, buying. and
milling of palay at Santiago, Isabela, and owned and operated by King
Hong Co., Inc., filed before the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) cases for petition for overtime pay, premium pay for night, Sunday
and holiday work, and for reinstatement of workers illegally laid off. CIR
favored the union by a split decision of 3-2 vote. The case reached the
Supreme Court but the SC still favored the union. The SC remanded the
records for enforcement by respondent CIR. In examination of books, said
CIR’s Chief Examiner filed his Partial Report regarding the computation of
the benefits rendered in the case in favor of the Union.
Petitioners claim that in this computation of the Examiner did not,
include the claims of 70 other laborers whose total claims (for back
wages), at the rate of P6,300.00 each and would be P441,000.00.
Therefore, the correct. grand total amount due the laborers would be
864,756.74.
The trial judge took no action on the latest Urgent Motion of the union,
wherein it emphasized that respondent, with Court’s action rejecting its
appeal, no longer had any excuse for refusing to comply with the deposit
Order. Instead, an unscheduled conference was called and held on
October 31, 1963 in the chambers of the trial judge, and attended by
representatives of respondent firm, including their counsels of record and
the President of the union and 8 directors of the union. Four of these nine
union representatives, including the union president himself, had no
claims or awards whatever under the judgment. Said union officials were
not assisted by counsel, as petitioner Mary Concepcion, counsel of record
of the union, was not present, not having been notified of the conference.
In this conference respondent firm made again the same offer to settle
and quitclaim the judgment in favor of the union members for the same
amount of P110,000.00, which offer had already been ‘rejected by the
union at the earlier conference held on June 25, 1963. But this time,
respondent and the directors of the union decided to settle the case
amicably with the payment by the firm of the same amount of
P110,000.00 which was deposited with the Court’s disbursing officer
“immediately upon the signing of the settlement which will be prepared
by the respondent firm through its counsel.”
One of the union director together with 49 of its members questioned the
amicable settlement that took place. They claim that the Board of
Directors did not have any express authority of the members of the
Santiago Labor Union to enter into any compromise for the sum of
P110,000.00, that it was tainted by apparent bad faith on the part of the
President of the Union, that the amount of P110,000.00 is
unconscionable, considering, that the total claims of the members of the
union is more than P400,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the amicable settlement is valid.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners were not accorded due process of law. The union was
deprived of the assistance of its counsel. The lack or due deliberation and
caution in the trial judge’s instant approval of the settlement is seen from
the stipulations therein that the union thereby waived and quitclaimed
any and all claims which it may have against the respondent, as well as
the claim of each and every one of the members of the union against
respondent, when precisely the authority of the union board members to
enter into any such compromise or settlement was under express
challenge by petitioner Magalpo, a board member herself which the trial
judge completely disregarded.
Petitioners were deprived of the formal conference on the and of their
right to be assisted by the union counsel as expressly requested, so that a
fair hearing could be accorded petitioners and an opportunity afforded
them to air their serious charges of bad faith and lack authority against
the Union leadership. Certainly, all these serious questions and charges
made by petitioners could have been threshed out and verified, if the
formal conference had been held with the presence of union counsel.
The transcript of the conference is deficient and does not reflect the
actual discussions and proceedings. This is to be deplored, for in a matter
of such great importance, especially where the union officials were
unassisted by counsel in an unscheduled conference, care should be taken
by the trial judge that the proceedings are faithfully recorded.
We find the forcing through of the settlement arbitrary, unfair and
unconscionable.
Another reason for striking down the settlement is the lack of any express
or specific authority of the president and majority. of the union board of
directors to execute the same and scale down the estimated P423,756.74
judgment liability of respondent firm in favor of the individual union
members to P110,000.00. On the contrary, petitioner board member
Magalpo timely challenged the authority or the union board to execute
any such settlement, expressly informing the trial judge that the union
had specifically appointed an entity in Manila, the “CREAM, Inc.,” as its
attorney in-fact and “exclusive authorized representative for the
evaluation, adjustment and -liquidation or its claim against respondent.
These union members have repudiated the former union president,
Maylem and his board of directors, for having betrayed the union
members, and the new union leadership.
The authority of the union, to execute a settlement of the judgment award
in favor of the individual union members, cannot be presumed but must
be expressly granted.
Just as this Court has stricken down unjust exploitation of laborers by
oppressive employers, so will it strike down their unfair treatment by
their own unworthy leaders. The Constitution enjoins the State to afford
protection to labor. Fair dealing is equally demanded of unions as well as
of employers in their dealings with employees. The union has been
evolved as an organization of collective strength for the protection of
labor against the unjust exactions of capital, but equally important is the
requirement of fair dealing between the union and its members, which is
fiduciary in nature, and arises out of two factors: “one is the degree of
dependence of the individual employee on the union organization; the
other, a corollary of the first, is the comprehensive power vested in the
union with respect to the individual.” The union may, be considered but
the agent of its members for the purpose of securing for them fair and
just wages and good working conditions and is subject to the obligation of
giving the members as its principals all information relevant to union and
labor matters entrusted to it.
The union leadership in the case at bar was recreant in its duty towards
the union members in apparently having failed to disclose to the union
members the full situation of their judgment credit against respondent, to
wit, that they were in the advantageous position of being able to require
enforcement of the respondent court’s P200,000.00-deposit order, and in
presuming that it had authority to waive and quitclaim the estimated
P423,756.74-judgment credit of the union members for the
unconscionable amount of P110,000.00, which had already been
previously rejected by the workers. Respondent firm could not claim that
it dealt in good faith with the union officials, for it hastily executed the
purported settlement notwithstanding the serious charges of bad faith
against the union leadership, and the non-holding of the scheduled
conference where the union leaders, at their express request, could be
duly assisted by union counsel. The interests of the individual worker can
be better protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and
legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for
them the best wages and working terms and conditions in the process of
collective bargaining. As has been aptly pointed out, the will of the
majority must prevail over that of the minority in the process, for “under
the philosophy of collective responsibility, an employer who bargains in
good faith should be entitled to rely upon the promises and agreements of
the union representatives with whom he must deal. under the
compulsion of, law and contract. The ‘collective bargaining process
should be carried on between parties who can mutually respect and rely
upon the authority of each other.” Where, however, collective bargaining
process is not involved, and what is at stake are back wages already
earned by the individual workers by way of overtime, premium and
differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, as in
the present case, the real parties in interest with direct material interest,
as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for collective
action to enforce their just claims, are the individual workers themselves.
Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment
award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed but
must be expressly granted, and the employer, as judgment debtor, must
deal in all good faith with the union as the agent of the individual
workers. The Court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself of the
fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any
compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the individual
workers who are the real judgment creditors.
The settlement in the case at bar was precipitately approved without
verification of the union boards authority to execute the compromise
settlement and that there was no such authority.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Court’s Orders are hereby declared null
and void and set aside.
United Seaman’s Union of the Phil. V. Davao Ship-owners Assn., 20
SCRA 1226
(LABOR ORGANIZATIONS – UNIONS
: Union Rationale)
FACTS: On August 4, 1959, On August 4, 1959, USUP presented a set of
demand to USUP presented a set of demand to DSA, representing the
respondent shipping companies, for union DSA, representing the
respondent shipping companies, for union recognition, union security,
standardization of wages and other benefits. In response, the ship owners
brought to the recognition, union security, standardization of wages and
other benefits. In response, the ship owners brought to the attention of
the USUP the existence of a CBA with the Davao Marine Association
(DMA), where all of the crewmen of attention of the USUP the existence of
a CBA with the Davao Marine Association (DMA), where all of the
crewmen of their launches belonged. They suggested to the USUP that
they first take the necessary steps for certification as their launches
belonged. They suggested to the USUP that they first take the necessary
steps for certification as the collective bargaining agent, as the ship
owners were bound by the CBA until 1959. However, even before
receiving the collective bargaining agent, as the ship owners were bound
by the CBA until 1959. However, even before receiving the ship owner’s
response to its demands, the USUP had filed a Notice of Strike against the
individual ship owners at the ship owner’s response to its demands, the
USUP had filed a Notice of Strike against the individual ship owners at the
Department of Labor Davao Department of Labor Davao Office.
The Chief of the Labor Operations Section of the Davao the Chief of the
Labor Operations Section of the Davao Office requested for a conference
to solve the conflict. On August, Office requested for a conference to solve
the conflict. On August20, 1959, both parties reached a covenant stating
the withdrawal of the Notice of Strike, as well as the observance of the20,
1959, both parties reached a covenant stating the withdrawal of the
Notice of Strike, as well as the observance of the status quo regarding the
jobs incident to the businesses of the DSA and the withdrawal of the civil
case of the DMA status quo regarding the jobs incident to the businesses
of the DSA and the withdrawal of the civil case of the DMA against the
USUP. It was also stipulated in the contract that the USUP will respect the
existing CBA between DSA and against the USUP. It was also stipulated in
the contract that the USUP will respect the existing CBA between DSA and
DMA, but USUP will DMA, but USUP will file a petition for certification
election for file a petition for certification election for determination of
union representation. Determination of union representation. As
stipulated, the USUP filed with the CIR a petition for certification election.
Subsequent to the covenant, the shipping
As stipulated, the USUP filed with the CIR a petition for certification
election. Subsequent to the covenant, the shipping companies separately
served notices of termination upon 64 employees, effecting December 31,
1959, due to different companies separately served notices of
termination upon 64 employees, effecting December 31, 1959, due to
different reasons (from stoppage of operations to the death of one of the
partners of the shipping companies due to business reasons (from
stoppage of operations to the death of one of the partners of the shipping
companies due to business losses). As a result, USUP reported the
terminations to the Department of Labor, which called for a conference.
Losses). As a result, USUP reported the terminations to the Department of
Labor, which called for a conference Nevertheless, on ss, on December 29,
1959, the December 29, 1959, the USUP notified the Philippine
Constabulary, City Mayor, Bureau of Customs USUP notified the
Philippine Constabulary, City Mayor, Bureau of Customs the general
public of a strike on January 1, 1960.the general public of a strike on
January 1, 1960.
On February 11, 1960, the shipping companies filed a petition for writ of
injunction, as a necessity due to irreparable On February 11, 1960, the
shipping companies filed a petition for writ of injunction, as a necessity
due to irreparable damage to properties due to “coercion, violence and
illegal picketing”. On the other hand, on February 24, 1960, the damage to
properties due to “coercion, violence and illegal picketing”. On the other
hand, on February 24, 1960, the USUP filed a ULP case against the ship
owners and DSA, alleging that the ship owners interfered, and continued
to USUP filed a ULP case against the ship owners and DSA, alleging that
the ship owners interfered, and continued to interfere with their right to
self-organization by discrimination against employees. CIR however
sided with the DSA Interfere with their right to self-organization by
discrimination against employees. CIR however sided with the DSA
Dismissing the USUP’s ULP case while declaring the dismissing the
USUP’s ULP case while declaring the strike as illegal. Strike as illegal.
ISSUE: WON CIR gravely abused discretion by declaring the strike illegal?
HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s findings that the
USUP’s Notice of Strike was but a direct offshoot of the “losing effort” to
compel the DSA and the ship owners to recognize USUP as the sole
collective bargaining agent of the employees, to the exclusion of the DMA
as the existing collective bargaining agent of the DSA
First, the Court noted that the USUP filed its Notice of Strike even before
its receipt of the ship owner’s answers to its set of demands, thereby
showing that the USUP was already set on continuing the strike with or
without the answer of the ship owners. This, according to the Court was a
clear showing that USUP was aware of the existence of DMA as a valid
collective bargaining agent, operating as a legal bar to entertaining
USUP’s demands.
Second, the Court stated that USUP completely disturbed the status quo
– the return to normal and original operating practices through
the strike that was done by USUP. By striking, USUP impaired
existing CBA between the ship owners and the DMA which
recognized "the right of the Employer to hire, promote and
transfer and for legal cause suspend, lay-off or discharge
employees subject to the right of the union (referring to the
DMA) to notification and to ask reconsideration of any action
of the Employer in the premises."
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ, AND
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,
respondents.
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Requirements and
Rationale)
FACTS:
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa –TUCP (KILUSAN) filed with the DOLE a
petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), alleging that: (1) it is a
legitimate labor federation; (2) its local chapter, Progressive
Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate; (3) there
was no existing collective bargaining agreement; and (4) no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that KILUSAN failed to comply
with Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and
by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and
(c) books of accounts. KILUSAN submitted a rejoinder claiming that it had
submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration and
that since the local union was recently organized, no books of accounts
could be submitted.
Med-Arbiter held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements and the mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. PDC’s MR was
treated as an appeal, as such, the Secretary of Labor took cognizance
thereof and denied PDC’s MR. Thereafter, TRO was issued enjoining the
public respondents from carrying out the resolutions and orders or from
proceeding with the certification election.
ISSUE:
Whether PDC failed to substantially comply with the requirements
prescribed under Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended.
RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED and the resolution and orders of the Med-
Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment are set aside. The TRO is
made permanent.
YES.
A labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the
BLR. Article 234 of the Labor Code prescribes the requirements for
registration. Prescribing those requirements does not limit the right of
assembly or association but rather a condition sine qua non for the
acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or
unions, and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations. Besides, registration, as a valid exercise of
police power, is required to protect both labor and the public against
abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union the purport to represent.
Further, when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter
of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration
are no longer required. A local or chapter need not be independently
registered. A local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization
upon compliance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule II of Book V of the
Implementing Rules, i.e., submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A
charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of
such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance
with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization.
Furthermore, in case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that
the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by the
president is that such submission becomes the BLR’s basis for the
approval of the application for registration. Also, the certification and
attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud.
It may be noted as well that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of
its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its
members, subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and
by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for
certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent;
the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which
must be a legitimate labor organization.
In this case, KILUSAN failed to substantially comply with the
aforementioned statutory requirements. The SC noted that big
federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in
requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and
the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a
furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.
Phoenix Iron and Steel Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, 244 SCRA 173 [G.R. No.
112141, May 16, 1995]
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Requirements and
Rationale)
Facts
o Private respondent PISCOR Workers Union—Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (PISCOR- ANGLO) asserting
to be a legitimate labor organization filed on 13 October 1992 a petition
for certification election with the Med-Arbiter.
o On 3 December 1992 petitioner Phoenix Iron and Steel
Corporation (PHOENIX) sought clarification of the legal personality of
PISCOR-ANGLO (UNION). On 19 January 1993, finding that the UNION
had not complied with the requisites of law, Med-Arbiter Napoleon V.
Fernando dismissed the petition.
- Issue
o Is the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath fatal to its acquisition of legitimate
status?
- Held
o We agree with petitioner Phoenix Iron and Steel Corporation
and the Solicitor General that our ruling that Progressive Development
Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, 205 SCRA 802 [G.R. No. 96425, Feb. 4, 1992] applies
in this case, to wit:
A local or chapter x x x becomes a legitimate labor organization
only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
• 1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and
• 2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of
officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter,
and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the
local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
o In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan
to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a
legitimate status.
o Compared with what happened in the Progressive case, this
situation before us now is even worse.
o There are no books of account filed before the BLR, the
constitution, by- laws and the list of members who supposedly ratified
the same were not attested to by the union president, and the
constitution and by-laws were not verified under oath.
Issue
o Is the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath fatal to its acquisition of legitimate
status?
Held
o We agree with petitioner Phoenix Iron and Steel Corporation
and the Solicitor General that our ruling that Progressive Development
Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, 205 SCRA 802 [G.R. No. 96425, Feb. 4, 1992] applies
in this case, to wit:
A local or chapter x x x becomes a legitimate labor organization
only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
• 1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and
• 2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of
officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter,
and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the
local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
o In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan
to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a
legitimate status.
o Compared with what happened in the Progressive case, this
situation before us now is even worse.
o There are no books of account filed before the BLR, the
constitution, by- laws and the list of members who supposedly ratified
the same were not attested to by the union president, and the
constitution and by-laws were not verified under oath.
SAN MIGUEL UNION VS. LAGUESMA
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Requirements and
Rationale)
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct
Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt
employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification election among the abovementioned employees of the
different plants as one bargaining unit.
San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on
Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping
together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in
including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential
in nature.
The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter
of origin for determination of the true classification of each of the
employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate
certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory
levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three
plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt
employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence
ineligible from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the
three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall
within the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from
joining a union.
They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who,
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but
may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal
course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict
of interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union
with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the
company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition
of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”
The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees
in Union membership.”
An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the
employee’s need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining
the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employee’s necessary access to confidential labor
relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be
completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the
employees are not sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees
of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.”
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and
other subjects of collective bargaining.
VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA; as Acting Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), and VASSAR
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Action or Denial of
Application and Remedy)
Facts: There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between
private respondents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc.
which expired on May 15, 1977. Prior to such date, 111 of a total number
of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated from the former labor
organization and formed their own union. Thereafter, they filed an
application for registration of their union with the Bureau of Labor
Relations, complying with and the requirements of both the Labor Code
and its implementing regulations. While such application was pending,
petitioner Union filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent for
the rank-and-file employees of the company. The Med-Arbiter, on May 24,
1977, denied their plea on the ground that the union was not duly
registered with the Department of Labor.
ISSUE: Whether or not an application for registration should be denied
just because there is already a registered collective bargaining agent in
the company.
Held: No. As long as an applicant union complies with all of the legal
requirements for registration, it becomes the BLR’s ministerial duty to so
register the union. It suffices then to order that petitioner Union be
registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of the
Bureau of Labor Relations being clear. Then there is this ruling in
Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations that calls
for application that “once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated
beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most
expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the
exclusive bargaining representative.” In the meanwhile, if as contended
by private respondent labor union the interim collective bargaining
agreement which was entered during the pendency of the petition of the
petitioner, has much more favorable terms for the workers of private
respondent Vassar Industries, then it should continue in full force and
effect until the appropriate bargaining representative is chosen and
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement thereafter
concluded. This is one way of assuring that both the social justice, and the
protection to labor provisions would be effectively implemented without
sanctioning an attempt to frustrate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction
in a pending case.
Villar v. Inciong
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of Freedom
of Association)
Facts: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU,
a duly registered labor organization which, at the time of the present
dispute, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private
respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company). The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a
collective bargaining agreement governing their labor relations, which
agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last
sixty (60) days of the CBA, events transpired giving rise to the present
dispute.
Upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company,
including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (hereinafter
referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-
Arbiter's Office, of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petition
was, however, opposed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier,
the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's
opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes
among and between members of the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently, the Med-
Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any
such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR
from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason
FUR withdrew the petition. The same employees who had signed the
petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU.
Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of
the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in
the Company. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved
for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Villar, on
the ground, among others that Villar had no legal personality to sign the
petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or
legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the
local union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by Villar, which
dismissal is still pending appeal before BLR. Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by
the PAFLU national president, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe
Manlapao, for continuously maligning the union spreading false
propaganda that the union officers were merely appointees of the
management; and for causing divisiveness in the union.
PAFLU formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. PAFLU and the Company
concluded a new CBA which also reincorporated the same provisions of
the existing CBA, including the union security clause. PAFLU President
rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU
demanded the Company to terminate the employment of the petitioners
pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting on PAFLU's demand,
the Company informed PAFLU that it will first secure the necessary
clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company to put
petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said
clearances to terminate the petitioners. The Company filed the request
for clearance to terminate the petitioners before DOLE which was
granted. DOLE Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this petition
for review.
Issue: WON the termination of petitioners are proper.
Held: YES. It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to
legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is
a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective
bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security
clause provided for in Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the
same clause in the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer
is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the
employees, herein petitioners, for non- union membership. Petitioners
became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general
membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 15, 1977
pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
The Court rejected petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid
upon the grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the
authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-
employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to
expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local
union was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA,
reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in
applying said security clause.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition
for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their
right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within
the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely
be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners'
insistence untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms
of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have
done with any effective consequence because they constituted the
minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10),
were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang
Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners
constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have
successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96
wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the
union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed
by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over
that of the minority members
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in
a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al.
vs. Artex Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA
561). Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union
members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately be
dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of
Registration)
FACTS: The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY),
formed a local union known as Pambansang Kapatiran ng mga Anak
Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National
WorkersBrotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and By-
Laws on 4 April 1993.
On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election
alleging that there was no existing andeffective CBA between FORMEY
and any union; neither was there any recognized union within the
company. FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition while Kalipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to
dismiss on the ground that there was already a duly registered CBA
covering period Jan. 1, 1992 to Dec. 31, 1996, therefore the contract bar
rule will apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motion to dismiss claiming
that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was fraudulently
registered with the DOLE and that it was defective since what was
certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which as federation only
served as mere agent of the local union and without any legal personality
to sign in behalf of the latter. Med-Arbiter found that there is a valid and
existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI which effectively barred the
filing for petition for certification election. KAPATIRAN appealed
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the
contract bar rule. Secretary of Labor upheld the decision of Med-Arbiter.
KAPATIRAN filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for certification election was properly filed.
2. Whether or not there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI.
HELD:
1. No, the petition for certification election was not properly filed. The
CBA entered into between FORMEY and KAMAPI was made effectively
Jan. 1, 1992 and will expire Dec. 31, 1996. The petition for certification
election was filed on April 22, 1993 which was filed before the so-called
60-day freedom period
2. Yes, the court affirmed that there was a valid CBA between FORMEY
and KAMAPI. Art. 253-A of the labor code provides that “no petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall
be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the
DOLE outside the 60-dayperiod immediately before the date of expiry of
such 5 year term of the CBA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment dated 15 August1993 sustaining the order of the
Med-Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED.
FURUSAWA RUBBER PHILS VS SECRETARY OF LABOR
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of
Registration)
Facts:
FEU-IND filed a petition for certification election among rank and file
employees of Furusawa. The petitioner moved to dismiss the petition as
the respondents was not a legitimate labor organization for having
submitted a photocopy of the certificate which has not been duly
authenticated and not supported by other documentary evidence
contrary to law. The Med-Arbiter found for FEU-IND. Furusawa appealed
to the Secretary of Labor which affirmed the order of theMed Arbiter.
Furusawa’s motion was reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Issue:
Whether or not failure of respondent to submit anoriginal copy of its
certificate of registration disqualifies it to file a certificationelection.
Held:
NO. The fact that FEU-IND was issuedthe certificate of registration is
sufficient proof of itslegitimacy. Failure to submitphotocopy thereof is not
afatal defect and does not affect thelegitimate statis of thelabor
organization. The granting of the certificate showsthat FEU-IND has
complied with the requirements of Art.134 of the LC.The assertion of
Furusawa that FEU-IND was not able tocomply with the 20%
requirement is untenable as it hasalready been found by the Med-Arbiter
that it did.
Villar v. Inciong
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of non-
registration)
Facts: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU,
a duly registered labor organization which, at the time of the present
dispute, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private
respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company). The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a
collective bargaining agreement governing their labor relations, which
agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last
sixty (60) days of the CBA, events transpired giving rise to the present
dispute.
Upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company,
including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (hereinafter
referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-
Arbiter's Office, of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petition
was, however, opposed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier,
the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's
opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes
among and between members of the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently, the Med-
Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any
such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR
from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason
FUR withdrew the petition. The same employees who had signed the
petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU.
Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of
the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in
the Company. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved
for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Villar, on
the ground, among others that Villar had no legal personality to sign the
petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or
legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the
local union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by Villar, which
dismissal is still pending appeal before BLR. Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by
the PAFLU national president, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe
Manlapao, for continuously maligning the union spreading false
propaganda that the union officers were merely appointees of the
management; and for causing divisiveness in the union.
PAFLU formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. PAFLU and the Company
concluded a new CBA which also reincorporated the same provisions of
the existing CBA, including the union security clause. PAFLU President
rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU
demanded the Company to terminate the employment of the petitioners
pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting on PAFLU's demand,
the Company informed PAFLU that it will first secure the necessary
clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company to put
petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said
clearances to terminate the petitioners. The Company filed the request
for clearance to terminate the petitioners before DOLE which was
granted. DOLE Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this petition
for review.
Issue: WON the termination of petitioners are proper.
Held: YES. It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to
legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is
a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective
bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security
clause provided for in Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the
same clause in the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer
is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the
employees, herein petitioners, for non- union membership. Petitioners
became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general
membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 15, 1977
pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
The Court rejected petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid
upon the grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the
authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-
employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to
expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local
union was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA,
reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in
applying said security clause.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition
for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their
right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within
the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely
be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners'
insistence untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms
of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have
done with any effective consequence because they constituted the
minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10),
were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang
Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners
constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have
successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96
wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the
union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed
by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over
that of the minority members
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in
a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al.
vs. Artex Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA
561). Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union
members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately be
dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
Tropical Hut Employee Union v. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc. (181
SCRA 173)
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of non-
registration)

FACTS:
• The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market
Incorporated organized a local union called the Tropical Hut Employees
Union (THEU) and immediately sought affiliation with the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU).
• The NATU accepted the THEU application for affiliation. They
were accordingly registered and it appears, however, that NATU itself as
a labor federation was not registered with the Department of Labor.
• After several negotiations between the union and herein
respondent a CBA was concluded containing the following security
clause:
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the
time of the signing of this Agreement or who become so thereafter shall
be required to maintain their membership therein as a condition of
continued employment.
And check-off Authorization Form, the terms of which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATIONAL Association of
Trade Unions, of which the TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES UNION is an
affiliate as sole collective bargaining agent in all matters relating to salary
rates, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in
the Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc.
• When their existing CBA ended, they entered into a new CBA
incorporating the previous union-shop security clause and the attached
check-off authorization form.
• THEU disaffiliated from the NATU federation and affiliated
with the Confederation of General Workers (CGW).
• Upon the request of NATU, respondent company applied for
clearance with the Secretary of Labor to dismiss the other officers and
members of THEU-CGW. The company also suspended them effective that
day for violation of the union security clause. Consequently, complaints
for unfair labor practices were filed by members of the THEU-CGW.
• NLRC ruled for the respondent company.
• On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE: WON the disaffiliation of the local union from the national
federation was valid
HELD: YES, it is valid.
We held that the validity of the dismissals pursuant to the union security
clause in the collective bargaining agreement hinges on the validity of the
disaffiliation of the local union from the federation.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-
settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free
to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to
disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union THEU in
the registration with the Department of Labor is merely to stress that the
THEU is NATU's affiliate at the time of the registration. It does not mean
that the said local union cannot stand on its own. Neither can it be
interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests independently
of the federation. A local union owes its creation and continued existence
to the will of its members and not to the federation to which it belongs.
When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join a new
federation, it was merely exercising its primary right to labor
organization for the effective enhancement and protection of common
interests. In the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's
constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its
relationship with its parent.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the respondents that the
act of disaffiliation violated the union security clause of the CBA and that
their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid. A perusal of the
collective bargaining agreements shows that the THEU-NATU, and not the
NATU federation, was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters
concerning wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment. Although NATU was designated as the sole bargaining agent
in the check-off authorization form attached to the CBA, this simply
means it was acting only for and in behalf of its affiliate.
The NATU possessed the status of an agent while the local union
remained the basic principal union which entered into contract with the
respondent company. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother
federation, the former did not lose its legal personality as the bargaining
union under the CBA.
Moreover, the union security clause embodied in the agreements cannot
be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not
applicable to the circumstances obtaining in this case. The CBA imposes
dismissal only in case an employee is expelled from the union for joining
another federation or for forming another union or who fails or refuses to
maintain membership therein. The case at bar does not involve the
withdrawal of merely some employees from the union but of the whole
THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no violation of the
union security provision in the CBA, there was no sufficient ground to
terminate the employment of petitioners.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ, AND
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,
respondents.
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of non-
registration)
FACTS:
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa –TUCP (KILUSAN) filed with the DOLE a
petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), alleging that: (1) it is a
legitimate labor federation; (2) its local chapter, Progressive
Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate; (3) there
was no existing collective bargaining agreement; and (4) no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that KILUSAN failed to comply
with Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and
by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and
(c) books of accounts. KILUSAN submitted a rejoinder claiming that it had
submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration and
that since the local union was recently organized, no books of accounts
could be submitted.
Med-Arbiter held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements and the mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. PDC’s MR was
treated as an appeal, as such, the Secretary of Labor took cognizance
thereof and denied PDC’s MR. Thereafter, TRO was issued enjoining the
public respondents from carrying out the resolutions and orders or from
proceeding with the certification election.
ISSUE:
Whether PDC failed to substantially comply with the requirements
prescribed under Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended.
RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED and the resolution and orders of the Med-
Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment are set aside. The TRO is
made permanent.
YES.
A labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the
BLR. Article 234 of the Labor Code prescribes the requirements for
registration. Prescribing those requirements does not limit the right of
assembly or association but rather a condition sine qua non for the
acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or
unions, and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations. Besides, registration, as a valid exercise of
police power, is required to protect both labor and the public against
abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union the purport to represent.
Further, when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter
of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration
are no longer required. A local or chapter need not be independently
registered. A local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization
upon compliance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule II of Book V of the
Implementing Rules, i.e., submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A
charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of
such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance
with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization.
Furthermore, in case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that
the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by the
president is that such submission becomes the BLR’s basis for the
approval of the application for registration. Also, the certification and
attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud.
It may be noted as well that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of
its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its
members, subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and
by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for
certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent;
the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which
must be a legitimate labor organization.
In this case, KILUSAN failed to substantially comply with the
aforementioned statutory requirements. The SC noted that big
federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in
requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and
the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a
furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.
LAKAS NG MANGAGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN VS MARCELO
ENTERPRISE
GR. NO. L-38258
J. GUERERO
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Effect of Non-
registration)
FACTS:
On May 23, 1967, the Lakas had existing CBAs within the bargaining units
in the respective companies comprising Marcelo Companies. The said
CBAs were entered into while they were affiliated with a national
federation, Phil Social Security Labor Union.
Two of the CBAs were about to expire in May and June 1967. The other
one faced conflict as there was a rival union.
On March 14, 1967, the management of Marcelo Steel received a letter
requesting negotiation of a new CBA from PSSLU in behalf of UNWU.
There were also proposals from the unions in Marcelo Tire and Marcelo
Rubber as the existing CBA was about to expire. Same day, the union oin
Marcelo Tire disauthorized PSSLU as their agent. Afterwards, the rival
union submitted ita own proposals.
Another requests were received on May 3, 1967 and May 23, 1967 from
two different unions.
As the management was confused as to which of the union really
represents the workers, the president asked for the proof of
authorization from the unions and they were informed of the conflicting
claims and suggested that they file for certification election and the
decision of the court shall be followed and respected.
PSSLU refused the suggestion of the management and said that they will
file ULP for refusing to bargain with them. All of the unuons subsequently
filed a Notice of Strike.
MUEWA was certified as the bargaining agent as it represents the
majority of the workers in Marcelo Tire and that there were no
oppositions from the other union or interested persons.
Notices of Strike were withdrawn and the management agreed to sit
down in a conference for the bargaining. On the fourth conference, Lakas
declared a strike against Marcelo Companies. Acts of violence and
vandalism attended by picketing, the premises were blocked, windows of
the plants were bad.y damaged.
Cases were filed against the strikers and a Return to Work order was
agreed upon. Marcelo Companies resumed its operations and strikers
went back to work.
Marcelo Companies and Lakas resumed their bargaining negotiations.
On Oct. 13, 1967 the negotiations reached its final stage. Then Lakas
declared another strike without filing a notice of strike resulting to
complete paralyzation of the business.
Notices to return to work were posted and some of the strikers started
working again. The management required the workers to fill up forms so
that they may be given a schedule. However, the workers refused and
insisted that they be admitted without complying to the said requirement.
Lakas then filed a ULP case based on the alleged fact of non readmission
of striking members.
The trial court ruled that the Marcelo Companies were not remiss in their
obligation to bargain and that the strikes conducted were illegal.
However, it was decided that there was ULP in not readmitting all the
strikers.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not Marcelo Companies are guilty of ULP
-legitimate representation
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Marcelo Companies. Lakas was not the bargaining
representative, yet the management did not ignore the demand for
collective bargaining neither it was refused.
Marcelo Companies may rightfully demand for reasonable proof of
majority representation on the part of the supposed or putative
bargaining agent as it is a natural consequence of the employer’s duty to
bargain with the bargaining agent who represents the majority of the
workers. It is, however, necessary that such demand is made in good faith
and not as a pretext of delay or evasion.
Marcelo Companies did not commit ULP. The facts of the case shows that
the strikers were readmitted to work and the form required was intended
for proper scheduling and not to prevent workers from coming back to
work. It is only those who did not report back to work who are not
readmitted.
Alliance of Labor Organization v. Laguesma,
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: Cancellation of
Union Certificate Registration)
FACTS:
The Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization (ADFLO) filed an
application for registration as a national federation alleging, among
others that it has twelve (12) affiliates. After proper evaluation of its
application, it was issued a Certificate of Registration to the federation.
The Confederation of Labor and Allied Social Services (CLASS) filed a
petition for the cancellation of the Registration Certificate issued to
ADFLO.
The first hearing conducted by the BLR after the case was remanded to it
for further proceedings. However, since CLASS was not yet ready with its
evidence, the hearing was postponed. CLASS then filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence. ADFLO filed an Objection to Admission of Exhibits based on the
grounds that the exhibits were not marked nor identified by any witness
during the hearing of the case where ADFLO had been properly notified.
In the meantime, at the hearing of the case, CLASS failed to appear and
only ADFLO’s President Antonio Cedilla appeared. Unaware that an
objection had already been filed by ADFLO’s counsel, Cedilla manifested
that ADFLO will file its answer to CLASS’ offer of evidence within thirty
(30) days. BLR Director without first ruling on the admissibility of the
exhibits of CLASS and without any further hearing then cancelled the
registration of ADFLO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certificate of registration can be cancelled without
hearing.
RULING:
Subject to the requirements of notice and due process, the registration of
any legitimate labor union, chartered local and worker’s association may
be cancelled by the Regional Director, or in the case of federations,
national or industry unions and trade union centers, by the Bureau
Director, by filing of an independent complaint or petition for
cancellation.
The cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of
snuffing out the life of a labor organization. For without such registration,
it loses — as a rule — its rights under the Labor Code. Under the
circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled to be heard before a
judgment could be rendered cancelling its certificate of registration. In
David vs. Aguilizan it was held that a decision rendered without any
hearing is null and void.
Tablante v. Noriel
(LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION: : Cancellation of
Union Certificate Registration)
Petitioner Tablante-Tungol Enterprises, resolute in its determination not
to bargain collectively with private respondent, Association of
Democratic Labor Organization, has once again filed a certiorari
proceeding against respondents Director Carmelo C. Noriel, Bureau of
Labor Relations, and the Chief of its Med-Arbiter Section, Regional Office
No. 3, Eliseo Penaflor.
In this certiorari proceeding, it was alleged that public respondents
should have cancelled the registration and permit of private respondent
labor organization as private respondent labor union had engaged in an
illegal strike. That was the novel issue raised in this petition. Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, in his exhaustive Comment, considered as
the answer, found no merit in such an allegation and sustained the action
of respondent public officials.
Petitioner, nonetheless, would seek to impart a semblance of plausibility
to its claim by the assertion that the Labor Code itself provides, in another
section, that cancellation of registration follows from "any activity
prohibited by law." The argument is false and misleading according to
the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "By this amendatory law, it is
evident that no cause of action exists which will warrant the cancellation
of [Association of Democratic Labor Organization's] permit and
registration. Of course, petitioner tried to evade said issue by relying on
Article 240 (e) and Article 242 (p) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. Let us examine its legal contention on this matter.
Issue: WON the strike is illegal?
Held: No. The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration: * * * (e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the
"cabo" system, or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by law.'
Suppletory to the above provision is Section 6 (c) of Rule II, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, which reads as follows: 'Section 6. Denial of Registration of
local unions. - The Regional Office may deny the application for
registration on any of the following grounds: * * * (c) Engaging in the
"cabo" system or other illegal practices.' It is a fact that [Association of
Democratic Labor Organization] is not a labor contractor or is it engaged
in the 'cabo' system or is it otherwise engaged in any activity of such
nature which is prohibited by law. The above-quoted article should not be
interpreted or construed to include an illegal strike engaged into by any
union. This is so because the phrase 'or otherwise engaging in any activity
prohibited by laws' should be construed to mean such activity engaged
into by a union that partakes of the nature of a labor contractor or 'cabo'
system. The law does not intend to include in the said phrase illegally
declared strike simply because strike per se is legal. Also, if the law
intends to include illegally declared strike, the same could have been
expressly placed therein as had been previously done in Presidential
Decree No. 823."[11] Clearly, an awareness of the relevance of the
maxims noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis ought to have cautioned
counsel for petitioner to shy away from this approach.
The realization must have dawned on petitioner's counsel, Ramos L. Cura,
whose abilities could have been enlisted for a more worthwhile cause,
that the petition filed by him hardly has any prospect for success. The
Comment of Solicitor General Mendoza was filed on July 12, 1978. Then
came, less than a month later, August 3, 1978 to be exact, a joint motion
to dismiss filed by petitioner and private respondent. It alleges: "1. That,
on February 27, 1978, petitioners filed with this Honorable Court a
petition for certiorari and mandamus; 2. That, after the filing of the
aforesaid petition, the parties through their respective
representatives/counsel, met for the purpose of amicable settlement of
the issues raised in the aforesaid petition; 3. That, both parties have
threshed-out their respective disputes and have found ways and means
which would render the above-entitled case moot and academic; 4. That,
both parties are no longer interested in the outcome/result of this case
and pray of this Honorable Court to dismiss it for being moot and
academic."[12] The prayer is for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that it is moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed for being moot and
academic.
UST FACULTY UNION VS. BITONIO
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Union Constitution)
FACTS: Private Respondents are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty
Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year CBA with UST. The
petitioners on the other hand, questioned before the Med-Arbiter, that
the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFU’s
constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to
govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election. Med-Arbiter issued a
TRO enjoining the conduct of elections. However, a general faculty
assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by
members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by “non-
USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST
Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit”. On this occasion,
appellants were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers by acclamation and
clapping of hands.
On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another
CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Said CBA
was ratified by a majority of the UST faculty community.
ISSUE: WON the election of the officers in this case was valid
HELD: NO. The importance of a union’s constitution and bylaws cannot be
overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its
members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members’
rights and obligations. As such, the union’s constitution and bylaws
should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or
public policy.
A union election is held pursuant to the union’s constitution and bylaws,
and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union
election should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the
process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for
purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a
certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the
employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the
affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.
In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise
belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said
election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging
to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union
cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the
constitution and bylaws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections
cannot be decided in a non-union activity.
In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October
4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because the
procedure laid down in the USTFU’s CBL for the election of officers was
not followed. It could not have been a certification election either,
because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for
such election was not followed. The participation of non-union members
in the election aggravated its irregularity.
Heirs of Teodulo M. Cruz v. CIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Nature of Relationship)
FACTS:
June 21, 1952, the Santiago Labor Union, composed of workers of the
Santiago Rice Mill, a business enterprises engaged in the, buying. and
milling of palay at Santiago, Isabela, and owned and operated by King
Hong Co., Inc., filed before the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) cases for petition for overtime pay, premium pay for night, Sunday
and holiday work, and for reinstatement of workers illegally laid off. CIR
favored the union by a split decision of 3-2 vote. The case reached the
Supreme Court but the SC still favored the union. The SC remanded the
records for enforcement by respondent CIR. In examination of books, said
CIR’s Chief Examiner filed his Partial Report regarding the computation of
the benefits rendered in the case in favor of the Union.
Petitioners claim that in this computation of the Examiner did not,
include the claims of 70 other laborers whose total claims (for back
wages), at the rate of P6,300.00 each and would be P441,000.00.
Therefore, the correct. grand total amount due the laborers would be
864,756.74.
The trial judge took no action on the latest Urgent Motion of the union,
wherein it emphasized that respondent, with Court’s action rejecting its
appeal, no longer had any excuse for refusing to comply with the deposit
Order. Instead, an unscheduled conference was called and held on
October 31, 1963 in the chambers of the trial judge, and attended by
representatives of respondent firm, including their counsels of record and
the President of the union and 8 directors of the union. Four of these nine
union representatives, including the union president himself, had no
claims or awards whatever under the judgment. Said union officials were
not assisted by counsel, as petitioner Mary Concepcion, counsel of record
of the union, was not present, not having been notified of the conference.
In this conference respondent firm made again the same offer to settle
and quitclaim the judgment in favor of the union members for the same
amount of P110,000.00, which offer had already been ‘rejected by the
union at the earlier conference held on June 25, 1963. But this time,
respondent and the directors of the union decided to settle the case
amicably with the payment by the firm of the same amount of
P110,000.00 which was deposited with the Court’s disbursing officer
“immediately upon the signing of the settlement which will be prepared
by the respondent firm through its counsel.”
One of the union director together with 49 of its members questioned the
amicable settlement that took place. They claim that the Board of
Directors did not have any express authority of the members of the
Santiago Labor Union to enter into any compromise for the sum of
P110,000.00, that it was tainted by apparent bad faith on the part of the
President of the Union, that the amount of P110,000.00 is
unconscionable, considering, that the total claims of the members of the
union is more than P400,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the amicable settlement is valid.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners were not accorded due process of law. The union was
deprived of the assistance of its counsel. The lack or due deliberation and
caution in the trial judge’s instant approval of the settlement is seen from
the stipulations therein that the union thereby waived and quitclaimed
any and all claims which it may have against the respondent, as well as
the claim of each and every one of the members of the union against
respondent, when precisely the authority of the union board members to
enter into any such compromise or settlement was under express
challenge by petitioner Magalpo, a board member herself which the trial
judge completely disregarded.
Petitioners were deprived of the formal conference on the and of their
right to be assisted by the union counsel as expressly requested, so that a
fair hearing could be accorded petitioners and an opportunity afforded
them to air their serious charges of bad faith and lack authority against
the Union leadership. Certainly, all these serious questions and charges
made by petitioners could have been threshed out and verified, if the
formal conference had been held with the presence of union counsel.
The transcript of the conference is deficient and does not reflect the
actual discussions and proceedings. This is to be deplored, for in a matter
of such great importance, especially where the union officials were
unassisted by counsel in an unscheduled conference, care should be taken
by the trial judge that the proceedings are faithfully recorded.
We find the forcing through of the settlement arbitrary, unfair and
unconscionable.
Another reason for striking down the settlement is the lack of any express
or specific authority of the president and majority. of the union board of
directors to execute the same and scale down the estimated P423,756.74
judgment liability of respondent firm in favor of the individual union
members to P110,000.00. On the contrary, petitioner board member
Magalpo timely challenged the authority or the union board to execute
any such settlement, expressly informing the trial judge that the union
had specifically appointed an entity in Manila, the “CREAM, Inc.,” as its
attorney in-fact and “exclusive authorized representative for the
evaluation, adjustment and -liquidation or its claim against respondent.
These union members have repudiated the former union president,
Maylem and his board of directors, for having betrayed the union
members, and the new union leadership.
The authority of the union, to execute a settlement of the judgment award
in favor of the individual union members, cannot be presumed but must
be expressly granted.
Just as this Court has stricken down unjust exploitation of laborers by
oppressive employers, so will it strike down their unfair treatment by
their own unworthy leaders. The Constitution enjoins the State to afford
protection to labor. Fair dealing is equally demanded of unions as well as
of employers in their dealings with employees. The union has been
evolved as an organization of collective strength for the protection of
labor against the unjust exactions of capital, but equally important is the
requirement of fair dealing between the union and its members, which is
fiduciary in nature, and arises out of two factors: “one is the degree of
dependence of the individual employee on the union organization; the
other, a corollary of the first, is the comprehensive power vested in the
union with respect to the individual.” The union may, be considered but
the agent of its members for the purpose of securing for them fair and
just wages and good working conditions and is subject to the obligation of
giving the members as its principals all information relevant to union and
labor matters entrusted to it.
The union leadership in the case at bar was recreant in its duty towards
the union members in apparently having failed to disclose to the union
members the full situation of their judgment credit against respondent, to
wit, that they were in the advantageous position of being able to require
enforcement of the respondent court’s P200,000.00-deposit order, and in
presuming that it had authority to waive and quitclaim the estimated
P423,756.74-judgment credit of the union members for the
unconscionable amount of P110,000.00, which had already been
previously rejected by the workers. Respondent firm could not claim that
it dealt in good faith with the union officials, for it hastily executed the
purported settlement notwithstanding the serious charges of bad faith
against the union leadership, and the non-holding of the scheduled
conference where the union leaders, at their express request, could be
duly assisted by union counsel. The interests of the individual worker can
be better protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and
legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for
them the best wages and working terms and conditions in the process of
collective bargaining. As has been aptly pointed out, the will of the
majority must prevail over that of the minority in the process, for “under
the philosophy of collective responsibility, an employer who bargains in
good faith should be entitled to rely upon the promises and agreements of
the union representatives with whom he must deal. under the
compulsion of, law and contract. The ‘collective bargaining process
should be carried on between parties who can mutually respect and rely
upon the authority of each other.” Where, however, collective bargaining
process is not involved, and what is at stake are back wages already
earned by the individual workers by way of overtime, premium and
differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, as in
the present case, the real parties in interest with direct material interest,
as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for collective
action to enforce their just claims, are the individual workers themselves.
Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment
award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed but
must be expressly granted, and the employer, as judgment debtor, must
deal in all good faith with the union as the agent of the individual
workers. The Court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself of the
fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any
compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the individual
workers who are the real judgment creditors.
The settlement in the case at bar was precipitately approved without
verification of the union boards authority to execute the compromise
settlement and that there was no such authority.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Court’s Orders are hereby declared null
and void and set aside.
Salunga v. CIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Issue on Admission and Discipline)
FACTS:
1) San Miguel Brewery, Inc (Company) entered with the Union, of
which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a CBA.
Section 3 of the CBA reads: The company agrees to require as a condition
of employment of those workers covered by this agreement who either
are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement,
or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they
shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days
before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof,
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any
employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as
hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or
non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or
worker.
.
2) Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member of the National Brewery
and Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) since 1953.
On August 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union. The
Union accepted the resignation, and transmitted it to the Company, with a
request for the immediate implementation of said Section 3.
3) The Company informed petitioner that his resignation would result
in the termination of his employment, in view of Section 3
4) Petitioner wrote to the Union a letter withdrawing or revoking his
resignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly
union dues.
5) The Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not
be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service,
conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. The Company replied:
Mr. Salunga told us that he did not realize that he would be losing his job
if he were to resign from the Union. We did not at any time ask or urge
him to withdraw his resignation; neither are we now asking or insisting
that you readmit him into your membership. We thought that informing
him of the consequences of his resignation from the Union, was the only
humane thing to do under the circumstances. Nevertheless, if
notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as
having actually resigned from your organization, and you insist that we
dismiss him from the service in accordance with Sec. 3, Article II of our
agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so. The Company
notified petitioner that, in view of said letter and the aforementioned
section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause.”
Petitioner was discharged from the employment of the Company.
6) A prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations commenced the
present proceedings for unfair labor practice against the Union, its
president, respondent John de Castillo, respondent Cipriano Cid, as
PAFLU president, the Company, and its aforementioned Vice-President
Miguel Noel.
7) The trial Judge rendered a decision directing them to readmit and to
continue the membership of Salunga in the membership rolls of the union
after paying all union dues
8) This decision was reversed by the CIR — sitting en banc. Hence, this
appeal by the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be readmitted.
RULING: YES. Having been denied readmission into the Union and having
been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the
part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the
Union.
The appeal is well taken, for, although petitioner had resigned from the
Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon
later — upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in
his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision
above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the
Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor.
The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to
continue his membership. The trial Judge found said refusal of the Union
officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken
or sanctioned by them. As set forth in the decision of the trial Judge:
. . . Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he
believed were illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds. Salunga
was later removed by the union from his position as steward without his
knowledge, and that the union did not honor the of attorney executed in
his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection of
Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him.
The officers of the Union tried to justify themselves by characterizing said
criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true,
not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of
its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the
Constitution and By-laws of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its
members to give their views on "all transactions made by the Union."
Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership
therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of
labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with
which it has a closed-shop agreement. The reason is that
. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements
of trade union to become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a
closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses cause
the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public
interest.
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to
arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-
shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union
in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus
refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members,
who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and
the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a
long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union
officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith
withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those
who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied
readmission.
We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect
that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was
reluctant — if not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner. When the
Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged
implementation of Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company
advised petitioner of the provision thereof, thereby intimating that he had
to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the
Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any
action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of
the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner's discharge,
the Company still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and
that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations,
springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union
without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the Union
reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no
other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him
from the service, although with "regret".
Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the
petitioner. At the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into
the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to
withdraw his resignation. The arbitrary nature of the decision of said
officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. Moreso, the petitioner had
appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had
sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the
PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the
motives of the Union Officers.
Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been
dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part
of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the
Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the
Company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges,
and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the
Union.
Villar v. Inciong
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Right to Discipline)
FACTS:
1) San Miguel Brewery, Inc (Company) entered with the Union, of
which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a CBA.
Section 3 of the CBA reads: The company agrees to require as a condition
of employment of those workers covered by this agreement who either
are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement,
or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they
shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days
before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof,
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any
employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as
hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or
non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or
worker.
.
2) Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member of the National Brewery
and Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) since 1953.
On August 18, 1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union. The
Union accepted the resignation, and transmitted it to the Company, with a
request for the immediate implementation of said Section 3.
3) The Company informed petitioner that his resignation would result
in the termination of his employment, in view of Section 3
4) Petitioner wrote to the Union a letter withdrawing or revoking his
resignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly
union dues.
5) The Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not
be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service,
conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. The Company replied:
Mr. Salunga told us that he did not realize that he would be losing his job
if he were to resign from the Union. We did not at any time ask or urge
him to withdraw his resignation; neither are we now asking or insisting
that you readmit him into your membership. We thought that informing
him of the consequences of his resignation from the Union, was the only
humane thing to do under the circumstances. Nevertheless, if
notwithstanding our foregoing clarification you still consider him as
having actually resigned from your organization, and you insist that we
dismiss him from the service in accordance with Sec. 3, Article II of our
agreement, we will have no alternative but to do so. The Company
notified petitioner that, in view of said letter and the aforementioned
section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause.”
Petitioner was discharged from the employment of the Company.
6) A prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations commenced the
present proceedings for unfair labor practice against the Union, its
president, respondent John de Castillo, respondent Cipriano Cid, as
PAFLU president, the Company, and its aforementioned Vice-President
Miguel Noel.
7) The trial Judge rendered a decision directing them to readmit and to
continue the membership of Salunga in the membership rolls of the union
after paying all union dues
8) This decision was reversed by the CIR — sitting en banc. Hence, this
appeal by the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be readmitted.
RULING: YES. Having been denied readmission into the Union and having
been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the
part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the
Union.
The appeal is well taken, for, although petitioner had resigned from the
Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon
later — upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in
his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision
above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the
Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor.
The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing petitioner to
continue his membership. The trial Judge found said refusal of the Union
officers to be due to his critical attitude towards certain measures taken
or sanctioned by them. As set forth in the decision of the trial Judge:
. . . Prior to August, 1961, he had been criticizing and objecting to what he
believed were illegal or irregular disbursements of union funds. Salunga
was later removed by the union from his position as steward without his
knowledge, and that the union did not honor the of attorney executed in
his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection of
Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him.
The officers of the Union tried to justify themselves by characterizing said
criticisms as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true,
not only because the criticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of
its officers, and, indirectly, the officers themselves, but also because the
Constitution and By-laws of the Union explicitly recognize the right of its
members to give their views on "all transactions made by the Union."
Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership
therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of
labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with
which it has a closed-shop agreement. The reason is that
. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements
of trade union to become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a
closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership clauses cause
the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the public
interest.
Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to
arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-
shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union
in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus
refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members,
who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and
the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a
long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union
officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith
withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those
who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied
readmission.
We cannot agree, however, with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect
that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was
reluctant — if not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner. When the
Union first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged
implementation of Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the Company
advised petitioner of the provision thereof, thereby intimating that he had
to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides, the
Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any
action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of
the Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on petitioner's discharge,
the Company still demurred and explained it was not taking sides and
that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations,
springing from the belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union
without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the Union
reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no
other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him
from the service, although with "regret".
Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the
petitioner. At the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into
the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to
withdraw his resignation. The arbitrary nature of the decision of said
officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. Moreso, the petitioner had
appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and the latter had
sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the
PAFLU had inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the
motives of the Union Officers.
Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been
dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part
of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the
Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the
Company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges,
and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the
Union.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Bugay, 4 SCRA 487 [G.R.
No. L-13093, Feb. 28, 1962]
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Due Process Rule)
- Facts
o Paulino Bugay filed against the Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company before the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for moral damages arising out of an unfair
labor practice allegedly committed by said union which was the subject of
a decision rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations finding said
union guilty as charged.
- Issue
o Was Bugay’s expulsion illegal because of the irregularities
committed in his investigation?
- Held
o Yes
o The finding that defendant union was guilty of the unfair labor
practice preferred against it by plaintiff, the Court of Industrial Relations
made the following comment:
"It is to be noted that both in the investigation held by the
investigation committee of the Kapisanan and in the board meeting of
June 14, 1953, where the committee's report recommending expulsion
was approved, Bugay was not present.
As has been pointed out earlier, the reason for Bugay's failure
to attend the investigation does not appear of record.
On the other hand, during the board meeting, the committee of
three board members assigned to summon Bugay failed to serve notice
upon him because he was then in Lucena, Quezon.
Why all these proceedings were continued by the respondents
inspite of Bugay's absence remains unexplained in the record.
But one thing is certain, whatever might be the merits of the
charge filed by respondent Olazo against him, Bugay did not have
sufficient opportunity to defend himself.
Such proceedings, being violative of the elementary rule of
justice and fair play, can not give validity to any act done pursuant
thereto.
o The fact remains that the CIR and the Supreme Court have
found that his expulsion was illegal because of the irregularities
committed in his investigation.
o In effect, it was found that not only has he not been given an
opportunity to defend himself but his expulsion was not submitted to the
different chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-
laws.
TANCINCO vs. PURA FERER-CALLEJA
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Issues on Election of Officers –
Qualification, Manner of Election, Tenure and Compensation: Voter’s
List)
FACTS:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Resolution and
the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations setting aside the order
which decreed the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated votes for
the determination of the results of the election of officers of Imperial
Textile Mills Inc. Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA).
Private respondents are the prime organizers of ITM-MEA. While said
respondents were preparing to file a petition for direct certification of the
Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM’s bargaining unit,
the union’s Vice-President, Carlos Dalmacio was promoted to the position
of Department Head, thereby disqualifying him for union membership.
Said incident, among others led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao
group, respondents herein. Another group however, led by herein
petitioners staged a strike inside the company premises. After four (4)
days the strike was settled. An agreement was entered into by the
representatives of the management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco
group the relevant terms of which are as follows:
“1. That all monthly-paid employees shall be United under one union, the
ITM Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA), to be affiliated with
ANGLO;
2. That the management of ITM recognizes ANGLO as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the monthly-paid employees;
3. That an election of union officers shall be held on 26 May l986, from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.;
4. That the last day of filing of candidacy shall be on l9 May l986 at 4:00
p.m.;
5. That a final pre-election conference to finalize the list of qualified
voters shall be held on 19 May 1986, at 5:00 p.m.;”
A pre-election conference was held, but the parties failed to agree on the
list of voters. During the May 21, 1986 pre-election conference attended
by MOLE officers, ANGLO through its National Secretary, a certain Mr.
Cornelio A. Sy made a unilateral ruling excluding some 56 employees
consisting of the Manila office employees, members of Iglesia ni Kristo,
non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs. Salazar and the cooperative
employees of Mrs. Salazar. Prior to the holding of the election of union
officers petitioners, 2 through a letter addressed to the Election
Supervisor, MOLE San Fernando Pampanga, protested said ruling but no
action was taken. On May 26, 1986, the election of officers was conducted
under the supervision of MOLE wherein the 56 employees in question
participated but whose votes were segregated without being counted.
Lacanilao’s group won. Lacanilao garnered 119 votes with a margin of
three (3) votes over Tancinco prompting petitioners to make a protest.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal protest with the Ministry of Labor
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga 3 claiming that the
determination of the qualification of the 56 votes is beyond the
competence of ANGLO. Private respondents maintain the contrary on the
premise that definition of union’s membership is solely within their
jurisdiction.
On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties MOLE’s Med
Arbiter 4 issued an order dated July 25, 1986 directing the opening and
counting of the segregated votes. 5 From the said order private
respondents appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) justifying
the disenfranchisement of the 56 votes. Private respondents categorized
the challenged voters into four groups namely, the Manila Employees,
that they are personal employees of Mr. Lee; the Iglesia ni Kristo, that
allowing them to vote will be anomalous since it is their policy not to
participate in any form of union activities; the non-time card employees,
that they are managerial employees; and the employees of the
cooperative as non-ITM employees. 6 On December 10, 1986, BLR
rendered a decision 7 holding the exclusion of the 56 employees as
arbitrary, whimsical, and wanting in legal basis 8 but set aside the
challenged order of July 26, 1986 on the ground that 51 ** of 56
challenged voters were not yet union members at the time of the election
per April 24, 1986 list submitted before the Bureau. 9 The decision
directed among others the proclamation of Lacanilao’s group as the duly
elected officers and for ITM-MEA to absorb in the bargaining unit the
challenged voters unless proven to be managerial employees. 10
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied with the turn of events narrated above petitioners elevated
the case to this Court by way of the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners allege that public respondent director of Labor Relations
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Med-Arbiter to
disregard the 56 segregated votes and proclaim private respondents as
the duly elected officers of ITM-MEA whereas said respondent ruled that
the grounds relied upon by ANGLO for the exclusion of voters are
arbitrary, whimsical and without legal basis.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of segregation (exclusion) of 56 votes of the
petitioner’s union by the respondent is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit. The record of the case shows that
public respondent categorically declared as arbitrary, whimsical and
without legal basis the grounds 11 relied upon by ANGLO in
disenfranchising the 56 voters in question. However, despite said finding
public respondent ruled to set aside the Resolution of July 25, 1986 of the
Med-Arbiter based on its own findings 12 that 51 of the 56
disenfranchised voters were not yet union members at the time of the
election of union officers on May 26, 1986 on the ground that their names
do not appear in the records of the Union submitted to the Labor
Organization Division of the Bureau of Labor on April 24, 1986.
The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the employees
names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a condition
sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of union’s
officers. It finds no support in fact and in law. Per public respondent’s
findings, the April 24, 1986 list consists of 158 union members only 13
wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters’ names do not appear. Adopting
however a rough estimate of a total number of union members who cast
their votes of some 333 14 and excluding therefrom the 56 challenged
votes, if the list is to be the basis as to who the union members are then
public respondent should have also disqualified some 175 of the 333
voters. It is true that under article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended,
only members of the union can participate in the election of union
officers. The question however of eligibility to vote may be determined
through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee’s status
during the applicable payroll period. The payroll of the month next
preceding the labor dispute in case of regular employees 15 and the
payroll period at or near the peak of operations in case of employees in
seasonal industries.
In the case before Us, considering that none of the parties insisted on the
use of the payroll period-list as voting list and considering further that
the 51 remaining employees were correctly ruled to be qualified for
membership, their act of joining the election by casting their votes on
May 26, 1986 after the May 10, 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation
of their intention to join the union. They must therefore be considered
ipso facto members thereof Said employees having exercised their right
to unionism by joining ITM-MEA their decision is paramount. Their
names could not have been included in the list of employee submitted on
April 24, 1986 to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to join the union
was entered into only on May 10, 1986. Indeed the election was
supervised by the Department of Labor where said 56 members were
allowed to vote. Private respondents never challenged their right to vote
then.
The Solicitor General in his manifestation agreed with petitioners that
public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the
issue on the basis of the records of membership of the union as of April
24, 1986 when this issue was not put forward in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby made permanent. The questioned Resolution and the Decision are
hereby set aside for being null and void and the Order of the Mediator
Arbiter is hereby declared immediately executory.
Cost against private respondents.
Manalad v. Trajano
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Issues on Election of Officers –
Qualification, Manner of Election, Tenure and Compensation:
Disqualification of Candidate)
Facts: The petitioners were disqualified from running as candidates in
the election of APCWU officers by the Med-Arbiter, which election had
theretofore been scheduled for November 17, 1981 but was enjoined and
ordered reset. However, on appeal, said order was set aside by the
Director of the Bureau of Labor. Thereafter, the election of officers and
board members of the union was held, with the candidates of the
petitioners, that is, Manalad, Leano and Puerto, winning over those of the
private respondents, who were Babula, Mijares and Navarro, for the
positions of president, treasurer and auditor, respectively. As a
consequence, the latter group filed a petition for review with this Court
assailing the aforesaid order of October 31, 1984 of the Bureau of Labor
Relations which had declared the aforesaid petitioners eligible to run for
said union offices.
The SC in a previous case entitled “Associated Port Checkers and Workers
Union, et al. vs. Ricardo R. Manalad, et al.” however declared vacant all
positions and ordered the winners of the elections to stop acting as
officers, and to turn-over all union funds.
Pursuant thereto, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations issued an
order on July 10, 1985 to the effect that he was taking over the
management of the affairs of said union, ordering private respondents
Babula and all other persons to cease acting as officers of the union, and
requiring them to turn over the union funds to said director.
Subsequently, the Court’s aforesaid resolution of July 3, 1985 was
modified on July 17, 1985 by providing that the special election scheduled
on July 20, 1985 shall be held under the personal supervision of
respondent Director Trajano. Private respondents still won the elections,
despite attempts from petitioners to have them disqualified for their
alleged refusal to comply with the resolution of the SC.
Director Trajano issued a resolution proclaiming private respondents as
the winners in the special election and duly elected officers of APCWU,
with the following observation: “The submission that Mr. Babula failed to
completely turn over management of the union to the undersigned is
within the competence and authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon
considering that the mandate for such a turn-over came from the Court.
Meanwhile, the three-year term of the private respondents under the
disputed July 20, 1985 elections expired on July 20, 1988.
However petitioners insist that they be declared the winners in said
election (in 1985) with their terms of three (3) years to commence from
the time they assume office in execution of a final and executory
resolution of the SC.
Issue: WON respondents are disqualified
Held: It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an election of
officers whose terms had already expired. The SC would have thereby a
judgment on a matter which cannot have any practical legal effect upon a
controversy, even if existing, and which, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.
We agree with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of this
Court should not be left unpunished. However, before the alleged
disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the allegations against him
should be clearly established. The contentions of petitioners, even
disregarding some evidential deficiencies, do not adequately establish the
basis for contempt. On the contrary, respondents have satisfactorily
answered the averments thereon.
At this juncture, it would further be appropriate to remind petitioners
that even if the disqualification of private respondents could be justified,
the candidates of petitioners certainly cannot be declared as the winners
in the disputed election. The mere fact that they obtained the second
highest number of votes does not mean that they will thereby be
considered as the elected officers if the true winners are disqualified.

Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) vs. Trajano
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Issues on Election of Officers –
Qualification, Manner of Election, Tenure and Compensation:
Expulsion Remedy)
FACTS: On June 30, 1981, a written request for accounts examination of
the financial status of KMP Labor Union, the existing labor union at
Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed by private
respondent Silvestre and 13 other employees, who are members of the
union. Acting on said request, Union Account Examiner Vicedo of the
MOLE conducted the investigation and thereafter submitted a report.
Based on the revelations, private respondents filed with the Regional
Office QC, MOLE, a petition for the expulsion of the union officers.They
committed gross violation of the Labor Code, specifically pars. (a), (b), (g),
(h), (j), and (k) of Article 242; and, the constitution and by-laws of the
union, Sections 6 and 7
Union Officers: Denied imputation and argued that the disallowed
expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced the
benefit of members, they are willing to reimburse the same from their
own personal funds,they should not be held accountable for the non-
production of books of accounts of the Union for years 1977, 1978, and
1979 because they were not the officers then and not one of the former
officers of the Union had turned over to them the records, And non-
ratification of the constitution and by-laws of the Union and the non-
segregation of the Union funds occurred before they became officers and
that they have already been correcting the same.
Med-Arbiter Cabibihan ordered the holding of a referendum, to be
conducted under the supervision of BLR. Petitioners appealed the order
to respondent Trajano of BLR the disallowed expenditures of P1,278.00
were made in good faith and not used for the personal benefit of herein
union officers but, instead, contributed to the benefit of the members they
were elected in 1980 only and, therefore, they could not be made
responsible for the omissions of their predecessors who failed to turn
over union records for the questioned period there would be a general
election on Oct. 4, 1982, at which time, both the election and the desired
referendum could be undertaken to determine the membership at
minimum expense they prayed that resolution on the issue be held in
abeyance.Respondents claimed that Med-Arbiter erred in calling a
referendum to decide issue; the appropriate action should be the
expulsion of union officers. Trajano dismissed both appeals and affirmed
in toto the order of Med-Arbiter
ISSUE: Whether or not union officers were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them thus expulsion was proper
HELD: NO
If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of
the New Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98
SCRA 522, should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to
expel them from the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to
decide the issue; the alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein
union officers were not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that
they disbursed the amount of P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on
was disallowed for failure to attach supporting papers thereon did not of
itself constitute falsification and/or misrepresentation. The expenditures
appeared to have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the
purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the
members, are reasonable; and the repudiation of both private
respondents to the highly sensitive position of auditor at the October 4,
1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the
union membership's faith in the herein officers' leadership on one hand
and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.
Rodriguez v. DIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Issues on Election of Officers –
Qualification, Manner of Election, Tenure and Compensation: Invalid
Election)
FACTS:
1. The consolidated cases involve disputes among employees of the
Philippines Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), who are
members of the same union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU).
2. The disputes concern the validity of the general elections for union
officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues adopted and put into
effect by the incumbent officers subsequent to said elections.
3. Assailed by the petitioners in this case are (1) the decision of the
Director of Labor Relations (BLR) annulling the elections of officers of the
labor union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU), and (2) the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration of the decision.
4. The union's by-laws provide for the election of officers every three (3)
years, in the month of July.
5. Pursuant thereto, the union's Legislative Council set the provincial
elections for its officers on July 14 to 18, 1986, and those for Metro Manila
on July 25, 1986.
6. The same Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of
certificates of candidates which had therefore ranged from P75.00 to
P100.00.
7. The filing fee for each candidate for president of the labor
organization was increased to P3,000; that for each candidate for vice-
president, secretary general, treasurer and auditor, to P2,000.00; and that
for assistant secretary, assistant treasurer and assistant auditor, to
P1,000.00 each.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there is any grave abuse of discretion tainting the
adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor Relations that the general
elections for union officers held in 1986 were attended by grave
irregularities, rendering the elections invalid
2. Whether or not the Matter of 30%-Support for Complaints for
Violations of Union Membership Rights was mandatory
3. Whether or not the resolution increasing the union dues must
therefore be struck down, as illegal and void
RULING:
1. No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Director of Labor Relations.
No, because a review of the record fails to disclose any grave abuse of
discretion tainting the adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor
Relations that the general elections for union officers held in 1986 were
attended by grave irregularities, rendering the elections invalid. That
finding must thus be sustained.
2. No, pursuant to Article 242 of the Labor Code.
No, because the respondent Director's ruling, however, that the assent of
30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor
Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any
violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization
(such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here
complained of), cannot be affirmed and will be reversed.
The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states
that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a
labor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all
the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned."
The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the
notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More
decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report
may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially
concerned."
And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is
not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor
Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which
grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor,
over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management
relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30 % support
requirement.
Indeed, the officials are given the power to act "on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well
as (2) "at their own initiative."
3. Yes, the resolution increasing the union dues must therefore be struck
down, as illegal and void, arbitrary and oppressive.
Yes, because the respondent Director found that the resolution of the
union's Legislative Council to this effect does not bear the signature of at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the Council, contrary to the
requirement of the union constitution and by-laws; and that proof is
wanting of proper ratification of the resolution by a majority of the
general union membership at a plebiscite called and conducted for that
purpose, again in violation of the constitution and by-laws. The resolution
increasing the union dues must therefore be struck down, as illegal and
void, arbitrary and oppressive. The collection of union dues at the
increased rates must be discontinued; and the dues thus far improperly
collected must be refunded to the union members or held in trust for
disposition by them in accordance with their charter and rules, in line
with this Court's ruling in a parallel situation, viz:
... All amounts already collected must be credited accordingly in favor of
the respective members either for their future legal dues or other
assessments or even delinquencies, if any. And if this arrangement
regarding the actual refund of what might be excessive dues is not
acceptable to the majority of the members, the matter may be decided in
a general meeting called for the purpose.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in G.R. Nos. 76579-82, the petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion or other serious
error having been shown in the decision of the respondent Director of
Labor Relations, said decision — ordering the holding of new elections
for officers of the Free Telephone Worker Union — being on the contrary
in accord with the facts and the law.
DOCTRINE: It goes without saying that free and honest elections are
indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and workers of their
constitutionally protected right to self-organization. That right "would be
diluted if in the choice of the officials to govern ... (union) affairs, the
election is not fairly and honestly conducted," and the labor officers
concerned and the courts have the duty "to see to it that no abuse is
committed by any official of a labor organization in the conduct of its
affairs.
HALILI VS CIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Legal Counsel)
Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. The disputes
were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the
title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually
registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and
dispose of the property.
Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897
workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases,
still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name
“B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the
principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on
the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another
urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The
sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in
contempt.
Held:
YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties’ litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted
Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property makes the
entire transaction dubious and irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to
sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid
authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter
whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.
Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is
sentenced to imprisonment and directed to show because why he should
not be disbarred.
Pacific Banking Corp. v. Clave
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Source of
Payment of Attorney’s fees)
Facts: This case is about the legality of deducting from the monetary
benefits awarded in a collective bargaining agreement the attorney's fees
of the lawyer who assisted the union president in negotiating the
agreement. It also involves the jurisdiction of the Office of the President
of the Philippines to order such deduction.
Since January, 1979, there had been negotiations between the Pacific
Banking Corporation and the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization (PABECO) for a collective bargaining agreement for 1979 to
1981. Because of a deadlock, the Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction
over the controversy. On July 10, 1979, the Deputy Minister rendered a
decision directing the parties to execute a CBA in accordance with the
terms and conditions set forth in his decision.
The union was represented in the negotiations by its president, Paula S.
Paug, allegedly assisted as consultant by Jose Umali, Jr., the president of
the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) with which it was
formerly affiliated (p. 209, Rollo). Lawyer Juanito M. Saavedra's earliest
recorded parti-cipation in the case was on July 15 and 27, 1979 when he
filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion. No action
was taken on said motions
Even before the formalization of the CBA on June 3, 1980, Saavedra on
March 24, 1980 filed in the case his notice of attorney's lien. On May 20,
1980, the bank's vice-president in a reply to the letter of the union
president stated that he had serious doubts about paying the attorney's
fees
The union officials requested the bank to with-hold around P345,000 out
of the total benefits as ten percent attorney's fees of Saavedra. At first, the
bank interposed no objection to the request in the interest of harmonious
labor-management relations
For nearly a year, the Office of the President in four resolutions wrestled
with the propriety of Saavedra's ten percent attorney's fees. In a
resolution dated May 29, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C.
Clave refused to intervene in the matter. He ruled that the payment of
attorney's fees was a question that should be settled by the union and its
lawyer themselves.
then, he "clarified" that ruling in a second resolution wherein he directed
that the attorney's fees may be deducted from the total benefits and paid
to Saavedra in accordance with the following provisions of the Labor
Code:
"Art. 111. Attorney's fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages
the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered.
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any
judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages,
attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages
recovered."
Article 111 is implemented in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations as follows:
"Sec. 11. Attorney's fees. - Attorney's fees in any judicial or administrative
proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the
amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due
the winning party."
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should have noticed that article
111 refers to a proceeding for the recovery of wages and not to CBA
negotiations. The two are different or distinct proceedings. Not satisfied
with the clarificatory resolution, Clave issued a third resolution wherein
he held that it is the legal obligation of the bank to turn over to the union
treasurer ten percent of the award as Saavedra's fees.
Issue: WON that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds?
Held: We hold that, under the circumstances, the Office of the President
had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on Saavedra's attorney's fees.
The case was appealed with respect to the CBA terms and conditions, not
with respect to attorney's fees. Although the fees were a mere incident,
nevertheless, the jurisdiction to fix the same and to order the payment
thereof was outside the pale of Clave's appellate jurisdiction. He was right
in adopting a hands-off attitude in his first resolution and holding that the
payment of the fees was a question between the lawyer and the union.
Moreover, the case is covered squarely by the mandatory and explicit
prescription of article 222 which is another guarantee intended to protect
the employee against unwarranted practices that would dimi-nish his
compensation without his knowledge and consent. (See National Power
Corporation Supervisors' Union vs. National Power Corporation, L-28805,
August 10, 1981, 106 SCRA 556). Other provisions of the Labor Code
animated by the same intention are the following:
"ART. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. -
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization:
"(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied
upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written
resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership
meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization
shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members
present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and
the recipient of such assessment or fees. The record shall be attested to
lay the president;
"(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary
fees may be checked off from any amount due an employee without an
individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction; and
There is no doubt that lawyer Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his
fees but article 222 ordains that union funds should be used for that
purpose. The amount of P345, 000 does not constitute union funds. It is
money of the employees. The union, not the employees, is obligated to
Saavedra.
CONSOLIDATED WORKERS UNION v. CIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Deposit Funds)
Facts: The herein respondent, Coto Labor Union, composed of workers in
the mines operated by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., in Coto, Masinloc,
Zambales, filed with the Court of Industrial Relations on 3 March 1964 a
complaint for unfair labor practice against the said company and the
herein petitioner, Consolidated Workers Union, a registered labor union
whose members are also workers of the company
alleging inter alia the following:
"1. That complainant is a labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor under Reg. No. 1450-IP ....................................;
"2. ..................................................;
"3. ..................................................;
"4. That on several occasions in July, 1963 and before August 11, 1963
respondent Norberto Corpus (liaison officer of the company), told
Marciano Cruz, then a candidate for president of complainant union, not
to proceed with the complainant union's election on August 11, 1963, join
the res-pondent union and not to run against Juan Calbone of respondent
union and promised special benefits and privileges to Marciano Cruz if
the latter will agree;
"5. That during the second and third week of September, October and
November, 1963 and, again, on the third week of December, 1963
respondent Nor-berto Corpus uttered in front of many workers that the
complainant union is not recognized by the company and that the union
compensation will be turned over to the respondent union,[1] causing by
such ut-terances, the members to be disgusted with complainant union,
making many of them willing and did join the res-pondent union and thus
helping said union;
"6. That on several instances in July, August, September, October and
November, 1963 respondent Pablo Pabilona (department supervisor of
the company) asked Marciano Cruz to stop the latter's union activi-ties
with a promise of giving special benefits and privi-leges as that granted
by respondent company to Juan Calbone of respondent union;
"7. That since the election of Marciano Cruz on August 11, 1963 as union
president respondent company, thru Leon E. Charlot (the company's
general superin-tendent), refused, in spite of demands, to deliver union
compensation to the complainant union in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and instead, since the third week of
December, 1963 turned over said amounts to the respondent union
thereby assisting the same and in order to discourage membership to the
com-plainant union;
"8. That respondent Rodrigo Ebuengan (the company's treasurer), upon
the instruction of Leon E. Charlot and Juan Calbone refused, in spite of
demands, to turn over to the complainant union the union properties and
records in his possession;
"9. That on or after August 16, 1963 Leon E. Charlot threatened Marciano
Cruz with dismissal because the latter asked why the former interfered
with union matters by instructing Rodrigo Ebuengan not to turn over the
union properties to complainant union and on the same occasion
respondent Norberto Corpus told Mar-ciano Cruz to stop his union
activities in order to be steady in his job."
and praying that the respondents therein be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice; that the Consolidated Workers Union be ordered dis-
established, as company-dominated, and ordering delivery of union
properties and records to the complainant union.
The respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of legal capacity
to sue; upon denial thereof, they filed their answers.
Almost a year after the filing of the complaint, complainant Coto Labor
Union filed, on 27 February 1965, an urgent motion for preliminary
injunction to enjoin Benguet Consolidated Inc., and Consolidated Workers
Union from negotiating and concluding, between themselves, a new
collective bargaining agreement; to enjoin the corporation from turning
over to the latter union, and for the latter to receive from the former, the
dues collected from the workers, and from disbursing said dues; and for
the deposit into court of all dues col-lected or which may thereafter be
collected. In the said motion, complainant - movant union alleged its
willingness and ability to post a bond therefor.
On 19 March 1965, Consolidated Workers Union filed, in accordance with
its reservation, a Supplementary Agreement, dated 15 April 1964,
entered into between the company and the said union, purporting to be
"formerly the Coto Labor Union", and the agreement being one to
supplement the collective bargaining agreement then existing between
Coto Labor Union and the company since 8 April 1959 and containing a
check-off provision in favor of Coto Labor Union. This supplementary
agreement provided, among other stipulations, that the employees who
have been paying union compensation through payroll de-ductions on the
date of effectivity of said agreement "shall be considered as having
authorized the COMPANY to pay the said amount to the CONSOLIDATED
WORKERS UNION (formerly Coto Labor Union) as Union Dues". The
Consolidated Workers Union also filed a Consent Election Agreement
executed on 28 Sept-ember 1964 (after the initial charge was filed) by
and between Coto Labor Union, Consolidated Workers Union and
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., providing for the holding of an election, under
the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to determine the sole
collective bargaining agent of the workers, together with the minutes and
tally sheet of the election thus held on 3 October 1964, showing that the
majority of the votes cast by secret ballot favored the petitioner,
Consolidated Workers Union.
Issue: WON deposit of the union dues were valid?
Held: here is no merit to the argument of herein petitioner that the order
deprives it of property without due process of law, for it assumes that the
union dues ordered to be deposited are its property, which is precisely in
issue in the main case. Moreover, as pointed out in the appealed order, if
the Industrial Court, after hearing, should ultimately find that the
Consolidated Workers Union is company dominated or is a company
union and order it disestablished, the result would be that petitioner
would have to return all moneys and dues collected by it from the
workers, since the union would have had no authority to represent the
workers. Because the moneys collected might be improperly spent by the
time the disestablishment order is made, it was logical for the court
below to order that such moneys be deposited in the meantime.
If the petitioner should need any funds to continue its existence and
operations until judgment on the disestablishment issue is rendered, its
remedy would lie in applying to the Industrial Court to release, after due
hearing, so much of the impounded funds as may be strictly necessary for
the purpose, and not to seek the invalidation of the appealed order.
It was error for the labor court not to require the complainant-movant,
Coto Labor Union (herein respondent), to file a bond for the issuance of
preliminary injunction. The posting of a bond under Section 4 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court is a condition sine qua non in order that the writ of
preliminary injunction may issue (Siva, et al. vs. Reyes, et al., 83 Phil. 416;
Villarosa vs. Teodoro, 100 Phil. 24).
"The justice of this requirement of bond as a condition to the issuance of
the 'preliminary injunction is beyond question and the Rules of Court
makes its compliance necessary whether the injunction sought is the
main objective or merely an auxiliary thereto. It has been said that, an
undertaking is the price of injunction and in the case of Tucker v. New
Brunswick Trading Co., 44 Ch. D. 249, 253, it was held that 'if a man gets
the injunction he must pay the price.'" (Commentaries & Jurisprudence on
Injunction, Laureta & Nolledo, pages 58-59)
Rodriguez v. DIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Union dues)
FACTS:
1. The consolidated cases involve disputes among employees of the
Philippines Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), who are
members of the same union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU).
2. The disputes concern the validity of the general elections for union
officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues adopted and put into
effect by the incumbent officers subsequent to said elections.
3. Assailed by the petitioners in this case are (1) the decision of the
Director of Labor Relations (BLR) annulling the elections of officers of the
labor union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU), and (2) the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration of the decision.
4. The union's by-laws provide for the election of officers every three (3)
years, in the month of July.
5. Pursuant thereto, the union's Legislative Council set the provincial
elections for its officers on July 14 to 18, 1986, and those for Metro Manila
on July 25, 1986.
6. The same Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of
certificates of candidates which had therefore ranged from P75.00 to
P100.00.
7. The filing fee for each candidate for president of the labor
organization was increased to P3,000; that for each candidate for vice-
president, secretary general, treasurer and auditor, to P2,000.00; and that
for assistant secretary, assistant treasurer and assistant auditor, to
P1,000.00 each.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there is any grave abuse of discretion tainting the
adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor Relations that the general
elections for union officers held in 1986 were attended by grave
irregularities, rendering the elections invalid
2. Whether or not the Matter of 30%-Support for Complaints for
Violations of Union Membership Rights was mandatory
3. Whether or not the resolution increasing the union dues must
therefore be struck down, as illegal and void
RULING:
1. No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Director of Labor Relations.
No, because a review of the record fails to disclose any grave abuse of
discretion tainting the adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor
Relations that the general elections for union officers held in 1986 were
attended by grave irregularities, rendering the elections invalid. That
finding must thus be sustained.
2.No, pursuant to Article 242 of the Labor Code.
No, because the respondent Director's ruling, however, that the assent of
30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor
Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any
violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization
(such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here
complained of), cannot be affirmed and will be reversed.
The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states
that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a
labor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all
the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned."
The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the
notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More
decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report
may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially
concerned."
And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is
not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor
Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which
grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor,
over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management
relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30 % support
requirement.
Indeed, the officials are given the power to act "on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well
as (2) "at their own initiative."
3. Yes, the resolution increasing the union dues must therefore be struck
down, as illegal and void, arbitrary and oppressive.
Yes, because the respondent Director found that the resolution of the
union's Legislative Council to this effect does not bear the signature of at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the Council, contrary to the
requirement of the union constitution and by-laws; and that proof is
wanting of proper ratification of the resolution by a majority of the
general union membership at a plebiscite called and conducted for that
purpose, again in violation of the constitution and by-laws. The resolution
increasing the union dues must therefore be struck down, as illegal and
void, arbitrary and oppressive. The collection of union dues at the
increased rates must be discontinued; and the dues thus far improperly
collected must be refunded to the union members or held in trust for
disposition by them in accordance with their charter and rules, in line
with this Court's ruling in a parallel situation, viz:
... All amounts already collected must be credited accordingly in favor of
the respective members either for their future legal dues or other
assessments or even delinquencies, if any. And if this arrangement
regarding the actual refund of what might be excessive dues is not
acceptable to the majority of the members, the matter may be decided in
a general meeting called for the purpose.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in G.R. Nos. 76579-82, the petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion or other serious
error having been shown in the decision of the respondent Director of
Labor Relations, said decision — ordering the holding of new elections
for officers of the Free Telephone Worker Union — being on the contrary
in accord with the facts and the law.
DOCTRINE: It goes without saying that free and honest elections are
indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and workers of their
constitutionally protected right to self-organization. That right "would be
diluted if in the choice of the officials to govern ... (union) affairs, the
election is not fairly and honestly conducted," and the labor officers
concerned and the courts have the duty "to see to it that no abuse is
committed by any official of a labor organization in the conduct of its
affairs.
Gabriel, et al v. Secretary of Labor
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Source of
Payment and Special Assessment)
FACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive Board of Solidbank union,
the collective bargaining agent for the Solidbank Corporation. Private
respondents are members of said union. The union’s EB decided to retain
the services of their counsel in connection with negotiations for a new
CBA. A general membership meeting was called where majority of union
members approved a resolution confirming the decision to engage the
services of the union’s counsel, Atty. Lacsina. The resolution provided
that 10% of the total economic benefits that may be secured be given to
the counsel at attorney’s fees. Also it contained an authorization for
Solidbank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees the first lump sum
of payment of benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents issued a
complaint for illegal deduction.
ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorney’s fees.
HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special
assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and
representation expenses. They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at
the general membership meeting called for the purpose.
2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting
3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the
employees concerned.
Such requirements were not complied with as there were no individual
written check-off authorizations; thus, the employer cannot legally
deduct thus the assessment. The union should be made to shoulder the
expenses incurred for the services of a lawyers and accordingly,
reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or account.
No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees
other than those mandated by law.
Vengco vs Trajano
FACTS:
A compromise agreement was entered into by the management of the
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa
sa Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (FOI-TAF) whereby the
company will pay to the union members the sum of P150,000.00 for their
claims arising from the unpaid ECOLA and other benefits which were the
subject of their complaint before the Ministry of Labor. Emmanuel
Timbungo, union president, received the said amount in installments and
distributed the same among the union members.
Petitioners alleged that Timbungco was not authorized to receive the
money and the 10% attorney’s fees was deducted without their written
authorization. So, they demanded to Timbungco an accounting. However,
Timbungco did not give in to their demand and alleged that (1) he is
authorized by virtue of resolutions signed by the majority of the union
members; (2) 10% attorney’s fees was in relation to the claim of the local
union for payment of ECOLA which is totally distinct and separate from
the negotiation of the CBA; and (3) 10% deduction was in accordance
with Section II, Rule No. VIII, Book No. III of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code and therefore, no authorization from the
union members is required. Thus, a complaint was filed against
Timbungco before the Ministry of Labor.
Med-Arbiter issued an Order dismissing the complaint. On appeal to the
BLR, Med-Arbiter’s Order was set aside, and ordered Timbungco to
render full accounting of the P150,000.00 and his expulsion as union
president. Timbungco filed a MR and consequently an order was issued
setting aside the BLR’s Order and ordered an audit examination of the
Books of Account of FOITAF. Petitioners then filed their MR but it was
denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Timbungco is guilty of illegally deducting 10%
attorney’s fees.
2. Whether BLR Director Cresenciano Trajano gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering examination of
union books instead of affirming his previous Order expelling Timbungco
from the union and ordering him to render an accounting of P150,000.00
received by him.
RULING:
The Petition is granted.
1. YES.
It is clear from Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code that attorney’s fees may
not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee
without his written consent except for mandatory activities under the
Code. A mandatory activity is a judicial process of settling dispute laid
down by the law. Here, the amicable settlement entered into by the
management and the union cannot be considered as a mandatory activity.
Although, the union filed a claim for ECOLA and other benefits before the
Ministry of Labor, however, this case never reached its conclusion in view
of the parties’ agreement.
Timbungco maintains that the "Kapasiyahan" or resolutions gave him the
authority to make the deduction. However, contrary to his claim, the
"Kapasiyahan" or resolutions did not confer upon him the power to
deduct the 10% despite the alleged approval of the majority of the union
workers. Thus, considered defective due to: (1) not only because it was
undated but also, the signatories were not apprised since the pages were
not captioned and did not state the very purpose for which it was
prepared; (2) they never authorized, more so, they had no knowledge of
the deduction of 10% attorney’s fees until it was actually effected; and (3)
the resolutions merely indicated their intention to get their claim and to
inform Timbungco of such. Thus, absent such authority, Timbungco
should have turned over the money to the Union Treasurer.
Further, Book III, Rule VIII, Section II of the Implementing Rules which
dispenses with the required written authorization from the employees
concerned does not apply in this case. This provision envisions a situation
where there is a judicial or administrative proceedings for recovery of
wages. Upon termination of the proceedings, the law allows a deduction
for attorney’s fees of 10% from the total amount due to a winning party.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the fringe benefits received by the
union members consist of back payments of their unpaid ECOLA which
are totally distinct from their wages and such payment was effected
through an amicable settlement and not in an administrative proceeding.
Therefore, the submission by Timbungco of an accounting report on the
distribution of P150,000.00 is of no moment since the deduction of 10%
attorney’s fees is illegal and void for failure to comply with the
requirements of the law, thereby, his expulsion as union president is
justified.
2. YES.
Orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The controversy involves the propriety of the 10% deduction from the
fringe benefits of the union workers which they received from the
management in settlement of their claims. Such issue does not touch on
union dues or funds. Besides, the sum of P150,000.00 was not entered
into the records of the Union since the money was not turned over by
Timbungco to the Union Treasurer. Consequently, the said Orders have
no basis.
Galvadores v. Trajano
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: CBA
negotiation)
Facts: Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers
Union, now the Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply
referred to hereinafter as the Union), question the legality of the check-off
for attorney's fees amounting to P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty.
Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from
the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked
collective bargaining agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the
Union.
Respondent Counsel has been the legal counsel of respondent Union since
1964. For his services, he was hired on a case to case contingent fee basis.
When respondent receives a letter from the Union President stating that
his services are needed and that the Union binds itself to compensate him
with the amount of 10% of any improvement, with retroactive effect, of
the PLDT's last offer to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which they
know will result in a compulsory arbitration. PLDT's "last offer" referred
to on the wage increases was: P230 for the first year of the proposed CBA;
P100 for the second year; and P90 for the third year
the Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage increases of P
330/month effective November 9, 1982; P155/month effective November
9, 1983, and P155/month effective November 9, 1984, in addition to the
Christmas bonus of 1/2 month pay per employee effective December,
1983, and other fringe benefits. As will be noted, there were
improvements obtained from PLDT's "last offer."
On October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a
resolution requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal
services extended to the Union by respondent Counsel.
Petitioners initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258, filed a letter-
complaint before the MOLE through their authorized representative,
petitioner Carlos Galvadores assailing the imposition of P130.00 (later
corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of respondents
counsel. Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees of
respondent counsel were not only unreasonable but also violative of
Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that he deductions cannot given
legal effect by a mere Board resolution but needs the ratification by the
general membership of the Union.
the Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067 members of
the Union ratified the October 29, 1983 resolution of the legislative
council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof,
Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees under the September 7,
1983 contract.
Petitioners questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2,
which reads:
Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to
be withdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our
CBA negotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that
was collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU as our counterpart of
the seed money to start the housing program as agreed by the PLDT
management and our union panel and included in the award of the
MOLE?
was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute
regarding the deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits
awarded to PLDT employees.
On February 18, 1985, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dismissed petitioners' complaint.
Issue: WON attorney’s fees can be part of CBA negotiation and can be
deducted to salary of employees.
Held: NO.
Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:
Article 222. Appearance and Fees.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the
collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual
member of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees
may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void.
While Article 242 of the same Code reads:
Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization:
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary
fees may be checked off "from any amount due an employee without
individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The
authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that
deductions from wages of the employees may only be made by the
employer in cases authorized by law, including deductions for insurance
premiums advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as well
as union dues where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the
individual employee himself.
The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees
may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by
the employee specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of
the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are
wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The
question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that
there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.
Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits
awarded to PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining
negotiations although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This
is not the "mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with
individual written authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its
"compulsory" nature. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down
by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed under
compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal
principle should be borne in mind that employees are protected by law
from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without
their knowledge and consent.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION LABOR UNION (NLU) v.
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP.
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Union Officer
Obligation)
FACTS:
• In 1975, the NLRC issued an award regarding the working
terms and conditions in the respondent’s establishment. But due to the
delay caused by disagreements, petitioner staged a strike for the
immediate compliance of the said award.
• It was, however, lifted after the private respondent agreed to
pay the disputed employee s' leaves in three installments.
• Meanwhile, private respondent sought clarification from the
labor arbiter on whether a group of 91 workers who were unable to
complete 300 days of work within a 12-month period was entitled to
proportionate payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, in which it
ruled in favor of herein petitioner.
• On Jun 12, 1976, when the date for the first installment arrived,
petitioner staged a strike.
• On the next day, the Minister of Labor issued an order thru the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, directing the striking workers
to resume work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to the
work stoppage. The order was served on the parties in the afternoon of
the same date.
• Only 11 out of the total work force of about 120 workers in one
shift reported for work and were admitted by the company.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-
work order or its suspension pending compliance by private respondent
with the NLRC award in favor of petitioner.
• Some 110 striking workers did not return to work.
Consequently, private respondent filed with the Department of Labor
reports on the dismissal of those who failed to comply with the return-to-
work order.
• Three days later, the president of petitioner and 7 other
officers requested admission to work but were informed that their
employment had been terminated by the company.
• NLRC ruled for the respondent which was affirmed by the
Minister of Labor.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the strike staged by petitioner on June 12, 1976 until its lifting
was illegal; and
(2) In the affirmative, whether or not the penalties meted out by the
NLRC to the Union officers and the members are warranted by the
circumstances and the law.
HELD: (1) Yes, it is illegal.
PD 823 Sec 1, as amended, provides that all forms of strikes, picketing
and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries. The Letter
of Instruction No. 368 of the President considers cement companies or
firms as vital industries.
Private respondent was engaged in the manufacture of cement which is
no doubt a vital industry in which a strike or lockout is prohibited under
the foregoing aforestated decree. And even assuming that private
respondent was not engaged in a vital industry, the strike that was staged
by petitioner was nonetheless illegal. It was not in connection with any
unresolved economic issue in collective bargaining which is the only
ground for which a lawful strike can be held.
The issue between the petitioner and the private respondent at the time
of the strike concerned merely the implementation of an arbitration
award of the NLRC. The petitioner had a remedy by applying for a writ of
execution to enforce that award. Its resort to a strike was without lawful
basis.
(2) YES. The strikers in question did not only violate the no-strike policy
of the state in regard to vital industries; instead, they repeatedly defied
the orders of the Director of Labor Relations and the Minister of Labor for
them to return to work. Their dismissal was recommended by the labor
arbiter. However, out of compassion, the NLRC and the Minister of Labor
only suspended them.
Petitioner then contends that the separation from work of the officers of
the union is quite severe. The officers had the duty to guide their
members to respect the law. Instead, they urged them to violate the law
and defy the duly constituted authorities. Their responsibility is greater
than that of the members. Their dismissal from the service is a just
penalty for their unlawful acts.
Pursuant to Art. 242 (p) of the labor code, It is within the power of the
NLRC to order the removal of the officers of petitioner,
The officers of petitioner misinformed the members and led them into
staging an illegal strike. If the NLRC is to attain the objective of the Labor
Code to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the
removal of undesirable labor leaders must be effected.
ALDOVINO vs NLRC
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Employee
Individual Rights)
FACTS: Petitioner Anacleto G. Pimentel started work as a lay-out man on
25 April 1985 assigned at AG & P San Roque, Bauan, Batangas, while
petitioner Gaudencio A. Aldovino was hired in June 1989 as an electrician
at the AG & P Batangas Marine and Fabrication Yard (BMFY) in Bauan,
Batangas. Pimentel and Aldovino acquired the status of regular
employees on 1 December 1990 and 1 February 1991, respectively, and
became members in good standing of the employees' union, herein
petitioner United Rank and File Association (URFA), then the recognized
and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file
employees of AG & P. In 1994 Aldovino and Pimentel instituted separate
but similar complaints against AG & P for unfair labor practice, illegal
layoff, illegal dismissal and non-payment of CBA increases and benefits.
They prayed for reinstatement with back wages, interests, CBA wage
increases, benefits and attorney's fees. The two (2) cases were thereafter
consolidated.
On 12 August 1994, finding that the complainants were illegally
dismissed, Labor Arbiter Ernesto S. Dinopol rendered a decision[12] in
the two (2) cases ordering AG & P to reinstate Aldovino and Pimentel as
regular employees and to pay back wages and attorney's fees. He
explained that the financial situation of AG & P was not bleak as was
pictured in its position paper, which was why the extended temporary
layoff status of Aldovino and Pimentel was unjustified and "akin to illegal
dismissal." The Labor Arbiter however rejected the charge of unfair labor
practice and the claims for damages and other monetary benefits for lack
of evidence.
AG & P appealed to the NLRC protesting that the issue of the validity of
the temporary layoff had already been decided in its favor by a voluntary
arbitrator, hence, was res judicata. Aldovino and Pimentel also appealed,
although partially, questioning the Labor Arbiter's computation of their
back wages and the denial of their claim for CBA increases and benefits.
Resolving the appeal on 18 February 1995, the NLRC set aside the 12
August 1994 decision of the Labor Arbiter and agreed with AG & P that
the principle of res judicata was applicable in petitioners' case, citing the
decision of Voluntary Arbitrator Batino which upheld the validity of the
17 September 1991 temporary layoffs. It also alluded to its decision in
Revidad v. AG & P of Manilapromulgated on 14 July 1993which already
established the law of the case. In its resolution of 30 March 1995, the
NLRC denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
The NLRC misapplied Art. 286 of the Labor Code because at the time AG &
P asked petitioners if they were willing to extend their layoff status, there
was yet no resumption of operations in the particular work unit or area
to which they were previously assigned.
Held:
The right of URFA as a legitimate labor union to represent its members is
expressly guaranteed under Art. 242 of the Labor Code.[19] This right,
however, does not deprive its individual members of their concomitant
right to file a case in their own names, nor of their right to withdraw from
any case filed by the union in their behalf. More importantly, the
individual member may seasonably exercise his option to withdraw from
a case filed by his union if he does not want to be bound thereby. In
Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR,[20] this Court
ruled that only those members of the petitioning union who did not
signify their intention to withdraw from the case before its trial and
judgment on the merits are bound by the outcome of the case. Since it has
not been shown that Aldovino and Pimentel withdrew from the case
undergoing voluntary arbitration, it stands to reason that both are bound
by the decision rendered thereon. This obtaining, there is no doubting the
identity of parties between the arbitrated case and that brought by
petitioners before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners are now barred by prior judgment from raising in this case
the same issue of the legality of their layoffs. The test to determine
whether there is identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the
same evidence necessary to sustain the second action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature
of the two actions be different. For NLRC to allow Aldovino and Pimentel
to prove that they were illegally dismissed as a result of the extended
layoff period would be to relitigate the validity and reasonableness of the
retrenchment program of AG & P, a matter already resolved by Voluntary
Arbitrator Batino and likewise settled in Revidad. It is to the interest of
the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.Interest
republicae ut sit finis litium.
Villiar v. Inciong
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Jurisdiction-
Exhaustion of Internal Remedies)
Facts: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU,
a duly registered labor organization which, at the time of the present
dispute, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private
respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company). The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a
collective bargaining agreement governing their labor relations, which
agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last
sixty (60) days of the CBA, events transpired giving rise to the present
dispute.
Upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company,
including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (hereinafter
referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-
Arbiter's Office, of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petition
was, however, opposed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier,
the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's
opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes
among and between members of the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently, the Med-
Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any
such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR
from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason
FUR withdrew the petition. The same employees who had signed the
petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU.
Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of
the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in
the Company. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved
for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Villar, on
the ground, among others that Villar had no legal personality to sign the
petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or
legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the
local union. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by Villar, which
dismissal is still pending appeal before BLR. Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by
the PAFLU national president, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe
Manlapao, for continuously maligning the union spreading false
propaganda that the union officers were merely appointees of the
management; and for causing divisiveness in the union.
PAFLU formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. PAFLU and the Company
concluded a new CBA which also reincorporated the same provisions of
the existing CBA, including the union security clause. PAFLU President
rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU
demanded the Company to terminate the employment of the petitioners
pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting on PAFLU's demand,
the Company informed PAFLU that it will first secure the necessary
clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company to put
petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said
clearances to terminate the petitioners. The Company filed the request
for clearance to terminate the petitioners before DOLE which was
granted. DOLE Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this petition
for review.
Issue: WON the termination of petitioners are proper.
Held: YES. It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to
legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is
a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective
bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security
clause provided for in Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the
same clause in the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is
clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer
is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the
employees, herein petitioners, for non- union membership. Petitioners
became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general
membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 15, 1977
pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
The Court rejected petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid
upon the grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the
authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-
employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to
expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local
union was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA,
reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in
applying said security clause.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition
for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their
right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within
the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely
be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners'
insistence untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms
of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have
done with any effective consequence because they constituted the
minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10),
were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang
Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners
constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have
successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96
wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the
union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed
by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over
that of the minority members
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in
a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al.
vs. Artex Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA
561). Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union
members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately be
dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) vs. Trajano
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Remedies)
FACTS: On June 30, 1981, a written request for accounts examination of
the financial status of KMP Labor Union, the existing labor union at
Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed by private
respondent Silvestre and 13 other employees, who are members of the
union. Acting on said request, Union Account Examiner Vicedo of the
MOLE conducted the investigation and thereafter submitted a report.
Based on the revelations, private respondents filed with the Regional
Office QC, MOLE, a petition for the expulsion of the union officers.They
committed gross violation of the Labor Code, specifically pars. (a), (b), (g),
(h), (j), and (k) of Article 242; and, the constitution and by-laws of the
union, Sections 6 and 7
Union Officers: Denied imputation and argued that the disallowed
expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced the
benefit of members, they are willing to reimburse the same from their
own personal funds,they should not be held accountable for the non-
production of books of accounts of the Union for years 1977, 1978, and
1979 because they were not the officers then and not one of the former
officers of the Union had turned over to them the records, And non-
ratification of the constitution and by-laws of the Union and the non-
segregation of the Union funds occurred before they became officers and
that they have already been correcting the same.
Med-Arbiter Cabibihan ordered the holding of a referendum, to be
conducted under the supervision of BLR. Petitioners appealed the order
to respondent Trajano of BLR the disallowed expenditures of P1,278.00
were made in good faith and not used for the personal benefit of herein
union officers but, instead, contributed to the benefit of the members they
were elected in 1980 only and, therefore, they could not be made
responsible for the omissions of their predecessors who failed to turn
over union records for the questioned period there would be a general
election on Oct. 4, 1982, at which time, both the election and the desired
referendum could be undertaken to determine the membership at
minimum expense they prayed that resolution on the issue be held in
abeyance.Respondents claimed that Med-Arbiter erred in calling a
referendum to decide issue; the appropriate action should be the
expulsion of union officers. Trajano dismissed both appeals and affirmed
in toto the order of Med-Arbiter
ISSUE: Whether or not union officers were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them thus expulsion was proper
HELD: NO
If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of
the New Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98
SCRA 522, should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to
expel them from the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to
decide the issue; the alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein
union officers were not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that
they disbursed the amount of P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on
was disallowed for failure to attach supporting papers thereon did not of
itself constitute falsification and/or misrepresentation. The expenditures
appeared to have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the
purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the
members, are reasonable; and the repudiation of both private
respondents to the highly sensitive position of auditor at the October 4,
1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the
union membership's faith in the herein officers' leadership on one hand
and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.
Rodriguez v. CIR
(UNION-MEMBER RELATIONS: Major Policy Matters: Invalidity)
Topic: Enforcement and Remedies – Intra-union Disputes; Jurisdiction;
Procedure and Sanctions
FACTS:
1. The consolidated cases involve disputes among employees of the
Philippines Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), who are
members of the same union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU).
2. The disputes concern the validity of the general elections for union
officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues adopted and put into
effect by the incumbent officers subsequent to said elections.
3. Assailed by the petitioners in this case are (1) the decision of the
Director of Labor Relations (BLR) annulling the elections of officers of the
labor union, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU), and (2) the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration of the decision.
4. The union's by-laws provide for the election of officers every three (3)
years, in the month of July.
5. Pursuant thereto, the union's Legislative Council set the provincial
elections for its officers on July 14 to 18, 1986, and those for Metro Manila
on July 25, 1986.
6. The same Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of
certificates of candidates which had therefore ranged from P75.00 to
P100.00.
7. The filing fee for each candidate for president of the labor
organization was increased to P3,000; that for each candidate for vice-
president, secretary general, treasurer and auditor, to P2,000.00; and that
for assistant secretary, assistant treasurer and assistant auditor, to
P1,000.00 each.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there is any grave abuse of discretion tainting the
adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor Relations that the general
elections for union officers held in 1986 were attended by grave
irregularities, rendering the elections invalid
2. Whether or not the Matter of 30%-Support for Complaints for
Violations of Union Membership Rights was mandatory
3. Whether or not the resolution increasing the union dues must
therefore be struck down, as illegal and void
RULING:
1. No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Director of Labor Relations.
No, because a review of the record fails to disclose any grave abuse of
discretion tainting the adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor
Relations that the general elections for union officers held in 1986 were
attended by grave irregularities, rendering the elections invalid. That
finding must thus be sustained.
2.No, pursuant to Article 242 of the Labor Code.
No, because the respondent Director's ruling, however, that the assent of
30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor
Code, was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any
violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization
(such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here
complained of), cannot be affirmed and will be reversed.
The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states
that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a
labor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all
the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned."

The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the
notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More
decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report
may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially
concerned."
And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is
not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor
Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which
grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor,
over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management
relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30 % support
requirement.
Sugbuanon v Laguesma
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Affiliation:
Purpose of; Nature of Relations)
FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a
duly-registered banking institution with principal office in Cebu City and
a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI Association of
Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union
(APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade
Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).1âwphi1.nêt
On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted
Certificate of Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP,
hereafter referred to as the union.

Indeed, the officials are given the power to act "on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well
as (2) "at their own initiative."
3. Yes, the resolution increasing the union dues must therefore be struck
down, as illegal and void, arbitrary and oppressive.
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of
the supervisory employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1)
APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-registered with the Labor
Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more supervisory employees; (3) a
majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was no
existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and
SRBI; and (5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the
past 12 months prior to the petition.

Yes, because the respondent Director found that the resolution of the
union's Legislative Council to this effect does not bear the signature of at On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition.
least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the Council, contrary to the The pre-certification election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-
requirement of the union constitution and by-laws; and that proof is TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.
wanting of proper ratification of the resolution by a majority of the
general union membership at a plebiscite called and conducted for that
purpose, again in violation of the constitution and by-laws. The resolution
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s
increasing the union dues must therefore be struck down, as illegal and
petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on two
void, arbitrary and oppressive. The collection of union dues at the
grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact
increased rates must be discontinued; and the dues thus far improperly
managerial or confidential employees.
collected must be refunded to the union members or held in trust for
disposition by them in accordance with their charter and rules, in line
with this Court's ruling in a parallel situation, viz:
ISSUES:
... All amounts already collected must be credited accordingly in favor of
the respective members either for their future legal dues or other
assessments or even delinquencies, if any. And if this arrangement
regarding the actual refund of what might be excessive dues is not (1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial
acceptable to the majority of the members, the matter may be decided in employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees, hence
a general meeting called for the purpose. prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union
activities.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in G.R. Nos. 76579-82, the petition for

certiorari is DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion or other serious
error having been shown in the decision of the respondent Director of
Labor Relations, said decision — ordering the holding of new elections
for officers of the Free Telephone Worker Union — being on the contrary
in accord with the facts and the law.
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a
certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification election
by a registered union, despite the petitioner’s appeal pending before the
DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the union’s registration.

RULING:

DOCTRINE: It goes without saying that free and honest elections are
indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and workers of their (1) Petitioner’s explanation does not state who among the employees has
constitutionally protected right to self-organization. That right "would be access to information specifically relating to its labor to relations policies.
diluted if in the choice of the officials to govern ... (union) affairs, the Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the bank’s
election is not fairly and honestly conducted," and the labor officers Board of Directors may not be so classified.
concerned and the courts have the duty "to see to it that no abuse is
committed by any official of a labor organization in the conduct of its
affairs.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor
relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential
employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial
employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-
employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the
normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies
relating to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the
employee does not have access to confidential labor relations
information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees
from forming, assisting, or joining a union.
(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article
242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the
requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a
legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.16 Nothing
is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification
election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the
union’s registration. On this score, petitioner’s appeal was correctly
dismissed.
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. VS. TORRES,
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Effect on
Legal Personality)
FACTS:
Private respondent SLMCEA-AFW brought to the attention of petitioner
via a letter dated July 4, 1990 that the 1987-1990 was about to expire,
and manifested in the process that private respondent wanted to renew
the CBA. This development triggered round-table talks on which
occasions petitioner proposed, among other items, a maximum across-
the-board monthly salary increase of P375.00 per employee, to which
proposal private respondent demanded a P1,500.00 hike or 50% increase
based on the latest salary rate of each employee, whichever is higher.
A deadlock on issues, especially that bearing on across-the-board
monthly and meal allowances followed and to pre-empt the impending
strike as voted upon by a majority of private respondent's membership,
petitioner lodged the petition below. The Secretary of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction and the parties submitted their respective
pleadings.
On January 28, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor issued the
Order now under challenge. Said Order contained a disposition on both
the economic and non-economic issues raised in the petition. One of the
rulings in the order is the granting of the retroactive effect to the
enforceability of the CBA.
Petitioner argues that the Order of January 28, 1991 is violative of Article
253-A of the Labor Code, particularly its provisions on retroactivity. Said
Article pertinently provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any agreement on such other provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of
the term of such other provisions as fixed in the collective bargaining
agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If
any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall
agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the
renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may
exercise their rights under this Code.
Petitioner argues that in granting retroactive effect to the enforceability
of the CBA, public respondent committed an act contrary to the above
provision of law, pointing out that the old CBA expired on July 30, 1990
and the questioned order was issued on January 28, 1991. Petitioner
theorizes that following Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides that
there are 30 days in one month, the questioned Order of January 28, 1991
was issued beyond the six-month period, graphically shown thus:
July 30, 1990 Expiration
July 31 = 1 day
August 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
September 1-30, 1990 = 30 days
October 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
November 1-30, 1990 = 30 days
December 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
January 1-28, 1991 = 28 days
—————————
TOTAL = 182 days
(6 months and 2 days)
Private respondent agrees with the Labor Secretary's view that Article
253-A of the Labor Code does not apply to arbitral awards such as those
involved in the instant case. According to private respondent, Article 253-
A of the Labor Code is clear and plain on its face as referring only to
collective bargaining agreements entered into by management and the
certified exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees therein
within six (6) months from the expiry of the old CBA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CBA should be given retroactive effect.
HELD: The effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to
the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of
petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be
property applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent
in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration —
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions awarded,
we would stress that the provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article
253-A of the Labor Code, speak of agreements by and between the
parties, and not arbitral awards . . .
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting
retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, such as herein
involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Supervisor -
Rank and File Union Affiliation: Rule on Affiliation)
FACTS: The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY),
formed a local union known as Pambansang Kapatiran ng mga Anak
Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National
WorkersBrotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and By-
Laws on 4 April 1993.
On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election
alleging that there was no existing andeffective CBA between FORMEY
and any union; neither was there any recognized union within the
company. FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition while Kalipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to
dismiss on the ground that there was already a duly registered CBA
covering period Jan. 1,1992 to Dec. 31, 1996, therefore the contract bar
rule will apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motion to dismiss claiming
that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was fraudulently
registered with the DOLE and that it was defective since what was
certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which as federation only
served as mere agent of the local union and without any legal personality
to sign in behalf of the latter. Med-Arbiter found that there is a valid and
existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI which effectively barred the
filing for petition for certification election. KAPATIRAN appealed
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the
contract bar rule. Secretary of Labor upheld the decision of Med-Arbiter.
KAPATIRAN filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for certification election was properly filed.
2. Whether or not there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI.
HELD:
1. No, the petition for certification election was not properly filed. The
CBA entered into between FORMEYand KAMAPI was made effectively Jan.
1, 1992 and will expire Dec. 31, 1996. The petition forcertification
election was filed on April 22, 1993 which was filed before the so-called
60-day freedomperiod
2. Yes, the court affirmed that there was a valid CBA between FORMEY
and KAMAPI. Art. 253-A of the
labor code provides that “no petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by
the DOLE outside the 60-dayperiod immediately before the date of expiry
of such 5 year term of the CBA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment dated 15 August1993 sustaining the order of the
Med-Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED.
Malayang Samahan v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 [G.R. No. 113907, Feb.
28, 2000]
- Facts
o At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in an unfair labor practice case instituted, by a local union
against its employer company and the officers of its national federation.
o The official declaration of strike was at around 3:30 p.m. of 14
March 1989. The strike was attended with violence, force and
intimidation on both sides resulting to physical injuries to several
employees, both striking and non-striking, and damage to company
properties. The employees who participated in the strike and allegedly
figured in the violent incident were placed under preventive suspension
by the company. The company also sent return to-work notices to the
home addresses of the striking employees thrice successively, on March
27, April 8 and April 31, 1989, respectively. However, only 261
employees were eventually accepted back to work. Those who did not
respond to the return-to-work notice were sent termination letters dated
17 May 1989.
- Issue
o Can company officials be held personally liable?
- Held
o No, company officials cannot be held personally liable for
damages on account of the employees’ dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who
merely acted as its agents
o However, the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of
respondent company’s failure to accord petitioners with due process, that
is, notice and hearing prior to their termination.
o Also, said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied
upon by respondent Federation was not valid.
o Nonetheless, the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor
practice.
o It has come to the attention of this Court that the 30-day prior
notice requirement for the dismissal of employees has been repeatedly
violated and the sanction imposed for such violation enunciated in
Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC32 has become an ineffective deterrent.
o Thus, the Court recently promulgated a decision to reinforce
and make more effective the requirement of notice and hearing, a
procedure that must be observed before termination of employment can
be legally effected.
o In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann Department Store (G.R.
No. 117040, January 27, 2000), the Court ruled that an employee who is
dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized cause but without prior
notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he
was terminated until the decision in his case becomes final, when the
dismissal was for cause; and in case the dismissal was without just or
valid cause, the backwages shall be computed from the time of his
dismissal until his actual reinstatement.
o In the case at bar, where the requirement of notice and hearing
was not complied with, the aforecited doctrine laid down in the Serrano
case applies.
o WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE
ATLAS LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICES INC., VS LAGUESMA
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Supervisor -
Rank and File Union Affiliation: Rule on Affiliation)
FACTS:
On July 16, 1990, the supervisory, administrative personnel, production,
accounting and confidential employees of Atlas Lithographic Services Inc
(ALSI) affiliated with Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipinom a national
labor organization. The local union adopted the name ALSI-SAPPACEA-
KAMPIL, which shall hereafter refer to as the “supervisors” union.
Kampil-Katipunan filed on behalf of the “supervisors” union a petition for
certification election so that it could be the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the supervisory employees. ALSI opposed the petition claiming
that under Art. 245 of the Labor Code, Kampil-Katipunana cannot
represent the supervisory employees for collective bargaining purposes
because it also represents the rank-and-file employees’ union.
On September 18, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order allowing the
certification election. ALSI appealed but such appeal was denied. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON, under Art. 245 of the Labor Code, a local union of
supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate with a national
federation of labor organization of rank-and-file employees where such
federation represents its affiliates in the collective bargaining negotiation
with the same employer of the supervisors and in the implementation of
the CBAs.
HELD: NO, supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union.
What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of
rank-and-file employees or their joining in a federation of rank-and-file
employees that includes the very local union which they are not allowed
to directly join.
RATIO:
ALSI’s arguments:
1. KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN already represents its rank-and-file
employees and, therefore, to allow the supervisors of those employees to
affiliate with the private respondent is tantamount to allowing the
circumvention of the principle of the separation of unions under Article
245 of the Labor Code.
2. It further argues that the intent of the law is to prevent a single
labor organization from representing different classes of employees with
conflicting interests.
KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN’s arguments:
1. Despite affiliation with a national federation, the local union
does not lose its personality which is separate, and distinct from the
national federation. [Adamson & Adamson vs. CIR (1984)]
2. It maintains that Rep. Act No. 6715 contemplates the principle
laid down by this Court in the Adamson case interpreting Section 3 of
Rep. Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act) on the right of a supervisor's
union to affiliate. The private respondent asserts that the legislature must
have noted the Adamson ruling then prevailing when it conceived the
reinstatement in the present Labor Code of a similar provision on the
right of supervisors to organize.
DISCUSSION:
The basis of the Adamson case is R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act)
where employees were classified into three groups, namely: 1)
managerial employees; 2) supervisors; and 3) rank-and-file employees.
Supervisors who were considered employees in relation to their
employer could join a union but not a union of rank-and-file employees.
With the enactment in 1974 of the Labor Code (Pres Decree No. 442),
employees were classified into managerial and rank-and-file employees.
Neither the category of supervisors nor their right to organize under the
old statute were recognized. So that, in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez (144 SCRA 628 [1986]), the Court interpreted the superseding
labor law to have removed from supervisors the right to unionize among
themselves. The Court ruled:
In the light of the factual background of this case, We are constrained to
hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the
law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing
bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file employees of the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the private
respondents are considered managerial employees. Also, it is distinctly
stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no longer recognized
nor allowed to exist and operate as such. (pp. 633, 634)
In Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing Pres.
Decree No. 442, the supervisory unions existing since the effectivity of the
New Code in January 1, 1975 ceased to operate as such and the members
who did not qualify as managerial employees under this definition in
Article 212 (k) therein became eligible to form, to join or assist a rank-
and-file union.
A revision of the Labor Code undertaken by the bicameral Congress
brought about the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6715 in March 1989 in
which employees were reclassified into three groups, namely: (1) the
managerial employees; (2) supervisors; and (3) the rank and file
employees. Under the present law, the category of supervisory employees
is once again recognized. Hence, Art. 212 (m) states:
(m) . . . Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise
of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires
the use of independent judgment. . . .
The rationale for the amendment is the government's recognition of the
right of supervisors to organize with the qualification that they shall not
join or assist in the organization of rank-and-file employees. The reason
behind the Industrial Peace Act provision on the same subject matter has
been adopted in the present statute. The interests of supervisors on the
one hand, and the rank-and-file employees on the other, are separate and
distinct. The functions of supervisors, being recommendatory in nature,
are more identified with the interests of the employer. The performance
of those functions may, thus, run counter to the interests of the rank-and-
file.
This intent of the law is made clear in the deliberations of the legislators
on then Senate Bill 530 now enacted as Rep. Act No. 6715.
The definition of managerial employees was limited to those having
authority to hire and fire while those who only recommend effectively the
hiring or firing or transfers of personnel would be considered as closer to
rank-and-file employees. The exclusion, therefore, of middle level
executives from the category of managers brought about a third
classification, the supervisory employees. These supervisory employees
are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to join the
rank-and-file union because of conflict of interest (Journal of the Senate,
First Regular Session, 1987, 1988, Volume 3,
p. 2245).
In terms of classification, however, while they are more closely identified
with the rank-and-file they are still not allowed to join the union of rank-
and-file employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while
they are not managers, when they recommend action implementing
management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates,
they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to
the interests of the rank-and-file.
The Court agrees with ALSI’s contention that a conflict of interest may
arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. Members
of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures
against their co-member rank-and-file employees. And also, in the event
of a strike, the national federation might influence the supervisors’ union
to conduct a sympathy strike on the sole basis of affiliation.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that, as in Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act, supervisors shall not be given an occasion to bargain
together with the rank-and-file against the interests of the employer
regarding terms and conditions of work.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. The prohibition
extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a
national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-
and-file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in
the case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees
whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
There is no question about this intendment of the law. There is, however,
in the present case, no violation of such a guarantee to the employee.
Supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union. What the
law prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file
employees (Art. 245, Labor Code) or their joining a national federation of
rank-and-file employees that includes the very local union which they are
not allowed to directly join.
NOTE: Before this case was resolved, ALSI caved in to the pressure and
was no longer interested to pursue this case. SC just said the employer is
free to grant whatever concession it wishes to give to its employees
unilaterally or through negotiations. However, the resolutions issued by
DOLE were still struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The private respondent is
disqualified from affiliating with a national federation of labor
organizations which includes the petitioner's rank-and-file employees.
Adamson v. CIR
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Supervisor -
Rank and File Union Affiliation: Rule on Affiliation)
Facts:
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) holding that the Adamson and
Adamson Inc. Supervisory Union (FFW) can legally represent supervisors
of the petitioner corporation... notwithstanding the affiliation of the rank
and file union of the same company with the same labor federation, the
Federation of Free Workers.
Issues:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
ELIGIBILITY OF THE RESPONDENT UNION TO REPRESENT THE
PETITIONER'S SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES NOTWITHATANDING THE
AFFILIATION OF THE SAID UNION WITH THE SAME NATIONAL
FEDERATION... whether or not a supervisor's union may affiliate with a
federation with which unions of rank-and-file employees of the same
employer are also affiliated.
Ruling:
The supervisory employees of an employer cannot... join any labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may validly form a
separate organization of their own
The Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and the Adamson and
Adamson, Inc., Salesmen Association (FFW), have their own respective
constitutions and by-laws
There could be no employer influence on rank-and-file organizational
activities nor there could be any rank and file influence on the
supervisory functions of the supervisors because of the representation
sought to be proscribed.
Volkschel Labor Union v. BLR,
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Local Union
Disaffiliation: Nature of Right)
FACTS:
Volkschel Labor Union (VLU) was once affiliated with Associated Labor
Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL), jointly entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (one of the subjects dealt with payment of union
dues) with respondent companies. However, VLU decided to disaffiliate,
and a resolution was adopted and signed by VLU’s members revoking
their check-off authorization. Thereafter, ALUMETAL wrote respondent
companies advising them to continue deducting union dues and remitting
them to said federation.
Respondent companies, then sought the legal opinion of the BLR. Med-
Arbiter issued a Resolution finding the disaffiliation legal and gave its
opinion that VLU’s members should continue paying their dues to
ALUMETAL in the concept of agency fees. However, on appeal to the
BLR’s Director, said resolution was reversed. VLU appealed to the
Secretary of Labor, however treating the same as MR, referred the same
back to BLR. BLR denied the appeal.
Secretary of Labor issued an execution of the BLR’s Director’s Order
stating that the same had become final and executory and ordering the
respondent companies to turn over the dues to ALUMETAL in accordance
with the check-off provision in the CBA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether VLU’s disaffiliation from ALUMETAL valid.
2. Whether respondent companies have the right to effect the
union dues collections despite revocation by the employees of the check-
off authorization.
3. Whether ALUMETAL is entitled to union dues payment
notwithstanding their disaffiliation.
RULING:
The Resolutions of the BLR are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
1. YES.
A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve
the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when
circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association. A disaffiliation does not disturb the
enforceability and administration of a collective agreement; it does not
occasion a change of administrators of the contract nor even an
amendment of the provisions thereof." But nowhere in the record does it
appear that the contract entered into by the petitioner and ALUMETAL
prohibits the withdrawal of the former from the latter.
2. NO.
The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his
affiliation or membership. The employees' check-off authorization, even if
declared irrevocable, is good only as long as they remain members of the
union concerned. A contract between an employer and the parent
organization as bargaining agent for the employees is terminated by the
disaffiliation of the local of which the employees are members.
Respondent companies therefore were wrong in continuing the check-off
in favor of respondent federation since they were duly notified of the
disaffiliation and of petitioner's members having already rescinded their
check-off authorization.
3. NO.

ALUMETAL is not entitled to union dues payments from petitioner's
members. A local union which has validly withdrawn from its affiliation
with the parent association and which continues to represent the
employees of an employer is entitled to the check-off dues under a
collective bargaining contract.
Thus, ALUMETAL was ordered to return to VLU all the union dues
enforced and collected through the execution of BLR’s Director’s Order.
Alex FERRER VS NLRC
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Rules on
Legality of Act of Disaffiliation)
Facts:
Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental
Foundry Corporation (OFC). They had been in the employ of OFC for
about ten (10) years at the time of their dismissal in 1989 as piece
workers. The Samahang Manggagawa ng Occidental Foundry
Corporation-Federation of Free Workers (SAMAHAN) and the OFC
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The agreement
provides that a union member who fails to retain a membership of good
standing may be dismissed by the employer upon written request by the
union. Pursuant to this provision, herein petitioners were dismissed from
employment on the ground of failure to retain membership in good
standing. It was later on found out that the dismissal was due to an intra-
union squabble arising out of the attempt by the petitioners to oust the
elected union officials. Upon knowledge of their dismissal, petitioners
volunteered to be admitted as members of the Federation of Democratic
Labor Unions (FEDLU) who represented them before the DOLE in the
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company, SAMAHAN and FFW.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners failed to maintain membership in good
standing by committing acts of disloyalty against SAMAHAN
Held:
No. Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned
of the termination of their employment. Their alleged application with
federations other than the FFW can hardly be considered as disloyalty to
the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that
petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their membership in the
SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW, the federation
to which it belonged. Neither may it be inferred that petitioners sought
disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union
distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local
union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in
the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is
legal. Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association.
Hence, while petitioners' act of holding a special election to oust Capitle,
et al. may be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the
SAMAHAN members, and, perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which
could have been dealt with by the union as a disciplinary matter, it
certainly cannot be considered as constituting disloyalty to the union.
Faced with a SAMAHAN leadership which they had tried to remove as
officials, it was but a natural act of self-preservation that petitioners fled
to the arms of the FEDLU after the union and the OFC had tried to
terminate their employment. Petitioners should not be made accountable
for such an act.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21,
1989, Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. And as implemented by Section 3, Rule 8 of the 1990 New
Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, it would
seem that the Mercury Drug Rule (Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 56 SCRA 694 [1974]) which limited the award of
back wages of illegally dismissed workers to three (3) years "without
deduction or qualification" to obviate the need for further proceedings in
the course of execution, is no longer applicable.
As to the propriety of the dismissal, the court said that while it is true that
the CBA between OFC and the SAMAHAN provided for the dismissal of
employees who have not maintained their membership in the union, the
manner in which the dismissal was enforced left much to be desired in
terms of respect for the right of petitioners to procedural due process.
SAMAHAN did not conduct any investigation and hearing where
petitioners could have defended themselves. Moreover, the company
summarily dismissed petitioners upon request of the union officers
without conducting their own investigation.
LIBERTY COTTON MILLS WORKERS UNION, RAFAEL NEPOMUCENO,
MARIANO CASTILLO, NELLY ACEVEDO, RIZALINO CASTILLO and
RAFAEL COMBALICER, petitioners,
vs.
LIBERTY COTTON MILLS, INC., PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE
LABOR UNION (PAFLU) and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Rules on
Legality of Act of Disaffiliation)
Facts: Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union, hereinafter referred to as the
Union, adopted its Constitution and By-laws on January 1, 1959.1 Among
other things, the said Constitution provided:
ARTICLE I — NAME AND DOMICILE.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE X — UNION AFFILIATION
Section 1. The Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-Paflu shall be affiliated
with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, otherwise known as
PAFLU, and shall remain an affiliate as long as ten or more of its members
evidence their desire to continue the said local union's affiliation, in
accordance with the Paflu Constitution, Article XI-Paragraph 11:15
thereof;
ARTICLE XIII — CHARGES, TRIALS, AND IMPEACHMENT OF OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS: APPEALS.
Section 1. Any member or officer of the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers
Union-Paflu may be charged, tried or impeached if an officer, in
accordance with this and the PAFLU CONSTITUTION.
On October 1, 1959, a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into
by and between the Company and the Union represented by PAFLU.
Collective Bargaining Agreement was amended on February 28, 1964,
thus:
Article III. UNION SECURITY
Additional Clause
The Company agrees to encourage casual workers and non-union
members to join the Union which is the sole and exclusive agent for all
the employees covered by this Agreement.
Article XI. DURATION
The Duration of this Agreement shall be for two (2) years, that is from
November 2, 1963 up to November, 1965.
The Agreements aforementioned bore the signatures of representatives
of both the Company and the PAFLU, and the incumbent President of the
local union.
While the Collective Bargaining Agreement was in full force, Marciano
Castillo and Rafael Nepomuceno, President and Vice-President,
respectively, of the local union, wrote PAFLU, its mother federation,
complaining about the legal counsel assigned by the PAFLU to assist them
in a ULP case (Case No. 4001) they filed against the Company. In said
letter, the local union expressed its dissatisfaction and loss of confidence
in the PAFLU lawyers, claiming that PAFLU never lifted a finger regarding
this particular complaint.
On May 17, 1964, thirty two (32) out of the 36 members of the local union
disaffiliated themselves from respondent PAFLU pursuant to their local
union's Constitution and By-Laws, specifically Article X thereof, supra (p.
12 Record). A copy of the signed resolution of disaffiliation was furnished
the Company as well as the Bureau of Labor Relations. The following day,
the local union wrote the Company and required the turn-over of the
checked-off dues directly to its Treasurer.
PAFLU then wrote a letter to the company stating that they received the
letter signed by 32 persons and informing them of their desire to
disaffiliate the local union from the mother federation — PAFLU. And also
stated, that the members and officers who made the letter have no right
to do the same under our existing contract and under the PAFLUs
Constitution and By-Laws. PAFLU wrote the Company again, this time
quoting en toto Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement on
"Union Security" and requesting the termination of the employment of
Rafael Nepomuceno, Marciano Castillo, Nelly Acevedo, Enrique Managan,
Rizalino Castillo and Rafael Combalicer, all petitioners herein. PAFLU at
the same time expelled the aforementioned workers from their' union
membership in the mother federation for allegedly "instigating union
disaffiliation."
The Company terminated the employment of the members expelled by
the PAFLU
Issue: whether or not the dismissal of the complaining employees,
petitioners herein, was justified or not.
Held: NO. The resolution of this question hinges on a precise and careful
analysis of the Collective Bargaining Agreements. (Exhs. "H' and "I") In
these contracts it appears that PAFLU has been recognized as the sole
bargaining agent for all the employees of the Company other than its
supervisors and security guards. Moreover it likewise appears that
"PAFLU, represented in this Act by its National Treasurer, and duly
authorized representative, ... (was) acting for and in behalf of its affiliate,
the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union and the employees of the
Company, etc.' In other words, the PAFLU, acting for and in behalf of its
affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest of all its
members including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances
warrant. This is clearly provided in its Constitution and By-Laws,
specifically Article X on Union Affiliation.
For while it is correct to say that a union security clause did exist, this
clause was limited by the provision in the Unions' Constitution and By-
Laws, which states:
That the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-PAFLU shall be affiliated
with the PAFLU, and shall remain an affiliate as long as ten (10) or more
of its members evidence their desire to continue the said local unions
affiliation.
Record shows that only four (4) out of its members remained for 32 out
of the 36 members of the Union signed the resolution of disaffiliation on
May 17, 1964, triggered by the alleged negligence of PAFLU in attending
to the needs of its local union, particularly its failure to assign a
conscientious lawyer to the local to attend to the ULP case they filed
against the Company. The disaffiliation was, therefore, valid under the
local's Constitution and By-Laws which, taken together with the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, is controlling.
The disaffiliation, coming as it did from the greater majority of its
members, is more than enough to the collective desire of the members of
the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union to sever their relations from the
mother federation. The right of disaffiliation is inherent in the compact
and such act should not have been branded as an act of disloyalty,
especially considering the cause which impelled the union to take such a
step.
Lastly, we will take up the process by which the workers were dismissed.
We find that it was hastily and summarily done.
Philippine Skylanders vs NLRC
(UNION AFFILIATION: LOCAL AND PARENT RELATIONS: Rules on
Legality of Act of Disaffiliation)
Facts:
In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association
(PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its
rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-
WATU) immediately protested the result of the election before the
Secretary of Labor.
Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation.
PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers
(NCW), changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association
– National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity
within the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to
continue occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-
formed PSEA-NCW.
On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with PSI which was immediately registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA’s shift of allegiance, PAFLU
Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a
copy of PSI’s audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI through its
personnel manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as reason
PSEA’s disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.
Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate.
Held:
At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-
union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.
We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother
federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations,
local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national
federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their
members. Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free
to serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed by the
constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to
renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which
brought such affiliation into existence.
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the
local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor
were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the
pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and
the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.
2) directing respondent Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. and J.P.
Coats to stop remitting to ANGLO federation dues and instead to remit
the whole amount of union dues to the treasurer of petitioner union; and

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective

bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself
from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it 3) enjoining ANGLO-KMU from interfering in the affairs of
from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective petitioner union.
bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.

SO ORDERED.1
Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union
as against those of a national federation, those of the former must be
preferred. Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother federation to
ANGLO filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for
protect its locals are not altogether to be shunned. It will however be to
lack of merit. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
err greatly against the Constitution if the desires of the federation would
be favored over those of its members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the
law. For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be
disregard and neglect of the lowly workingmen. The petition calls upon us to resolve two issues, to wit:

Alliance of Nationalist Union vs Samana Bay 1) whether the disaffiliation was valid; and
(Period)

2) whether petitioner can validly oust individual private

respondents from their positions.

Petitioner Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization

(ANGLO for brevity) is a duly registered labor organization while We rule for the respondents.
respondent union Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila
Bay Spinning Mills and J.P. Coats (SAMANA BAY for brevity) is its affiliate.
In representation of SAMANA BAY, ANGLO entered and concluded a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Manila Bay Spinning Mills For clarity, we shall first consider the issue respecting the validity of the
and J.P. Coats Manila Bay, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the disaffiliation.
corporations) on November 1, 1991. On December 4, 1993, the Executive
Committee of SAMANA BAY decided to disaffiliate from ANGLO in view of
the latter's dereliction of its duty to promote and advance the welfare of
SAMANA BAY and the alleged cases of corruption involving the federation Petitioner ANGLO wants to impress on us that the disaffiliation was
officers. Said disaffiliation was unanimously confirmed by the members invalid for two reasons, namely: that the procedural requirements for a
of SAMANA BAY. valid disaffiliation were not followed; and that it was made in violation of
P.D 1391.

On April 4, 1994, a petition to stop remittance of federation dues to

ANGLO was filed by SAMANA BAY with the Bureau of Labor Relations on
the ground that the corporations, despite having been furnished copies of
the union resolution relating to said disaffiliation, refused to honor the
same. ANGLO counter-acted by unseating all officers and board members
of SAMANA BAY and appointing, in their stead, a new set of officers who
were duly recognized by the corporations.
Anent the first ground, we reiterate the rule that all employees enjoy the
right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. This is a
fundamental right of labor and derives its existence from the
Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we
have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of
labor rights. 2

In its position paper, ANGLO contended that the disaffiliation was void
considering that a collective bargaining agreement is still existing and the
freedom period has not yet set in. The Med-Arbiter resolved that the
disaffiliation was void but upheld the illegality of the ouster of the officers
of SAMANA BAY. Both parties filed their respective appeals with the
Department of Labor and Employment. In a resolution dated September
23, 1994, herein public respondent modified the order and ruled in favor
of respondent union, disposing as follows:
This Court is not ready to bend this principle to yield to a mere
procedural defect, to wit: failure to observe certain procedural
requirements for a valid disaffiliation. Non-compliance with the
procedure on disaffiliation, being premised on purely technical grounds
cannot rise above the fundamental right of self-organization. 3

We quote, with approval, the findings of herein public respondent, that:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondent ANGLO is hereby denied for lack
of merit while the appeal of petitioners is hereby granted. Accordingly,
the order of the Med-Arbiter is modified by:
1) declaring the disaffiliation of petitioner union from respondent
ANGLO as valid;
. . . the resolution of the general membership ratifying the disaffiliation
action initiated by the Board, substantially satisfies the procedural
requirements for disaffiliation. No doubt was raised on the support of the
majority of the union members on the decision to
disaffiliate. 4
This, to our mind, is clearly supported by the evidence. ANGLO's alleged
acts inimical to the interests of respondent union have not been
sufficiently rebutted. It is clear under the facts that respondent union's
members have unanimously decided to disaffiliate from the mother
federation and ANGLO has nothing to offer in dispute other than the law
prohibiting the disaffiliation outside the freedom period.

In the same wise, We find no ground for ruling against the validity of the
disaffiliation in the light of recent jurisprudential rules.

Although P.D. 1391 provides:

Item No. 6. No petition for certification election, for intervention and

disaffiliation shall be entertained or given due course except within the
60-day freedom period immediately preceeding the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement,

said law is definitely not without exceptions. Settled is the rule that a local
union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union when
circumstances warrant. 5 Generally, a labor union may disaffiliate from
the mother union to form a local or independent union only during the
60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA.
However, even before the onset of the freedom period, disaffiliation may
be carried out when there is a shift of allegiance on the part of the
majority of the members of the union. 6

Coming now to the second issue, ANGLO contends that individual private
respondents were validly ousted as they have ceased to be officers of the
incumbent union (ANGLO-KMU) at the time of disaffiliation. In order to
fill the vacuum, it was deemed proper to appoint the individual
replacements so as not to put in disarray the organizational structure and
to prevent chaos and confusion among the general membership and
within the company.

The contention is bereft of merit. A local labor union is a separate and

distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members. A
local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is
affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its
creation to the will of its members. 7 The mere act of affiliation does not
divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the
mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It
only gives rise to a contract of agency 8 where the former acts in
representation of the latter.

By SAMANA BAY's disaffiliation from ANGLO, the vinculum that

previously bound the two entities was completely severed. ANGLO was
divested of any and all power to act in representation of SAMANA BAY.
Thus, any act performed by ANGLO affecting the interests and affairs of
SAMANA BAY, including the ouster of herein individual private
respondent, is rendered without force and effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.